UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page Date 17/05/2006 Time 3:56:56 PM

S-0879-0001 -01 -00001

Expanded Number S-0879-0001 -01 -00001

Title |tems-in-Peace-keeping operations - general - United Nations peace-keeping force

Date Created 15/11/1963

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0879-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: General

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit ;, i/* •^ ~x -^- i«- 7*" MEASUKES £X)R THE JCMPHOWSMUiHT OF THE ^/^ (^AXVUs

military operations in th© Congo entering a new and final phase,; the tin; a is propitious for the adoption. o£ a rnoinber of measure ; throuj;h which the United Nations couM benefit from its past experior: :o in the field of peacekeeping and improve its egpability for dealing rep:uily and effectively viith any emergencies which nd^-ht arise in the future. Among those mee,sures are tjie , following s A. Conduct a thorough analysis of all aspects of the Congo oper Aion. Bo Continue the Office of the Military Adviser to the Secretary General viitb the following functions: 1, JJevaLop Standing Qperatijig Procedures for future r.ilitar ••• actions, to include: a. personnel and Administration,

bn Information, c» Operations, including command and control,

d« Logistics (supply, maijatenance, transportatiot)., engineerzlng, medical)* CarefUl coordination o.-' thes ? activities with operational requirements should be stressed. Particular attention should be given to t ,e employment of airlift and

2, Maintain information files (ports, airfields, roads? rai - roads, etc,,). Thero is a wealth of unclassified material readily sv& lable for these studies, much of it within various UN staffs aad organs, e,,;8 fiepartae-at of Sconoitdc and Social Affairs, 3. Prepare military contingency plans for various kiu's of peacekeeping operations, to provide the Secretary General with ..Iten courses of action, facilitate sound decisions and permit rapid ^espon :e V5iat is envisioned here is a group of plans to govern various types o ' peacekeeping ojjcsrations, vjithout pin-pointing the location of areas o • nations involved. This can be done using time-space factors ana the several scales of magnitudes possible. For example, ona plan would involve small operations consisting primarily of observers, A .econfl plan vjould cover a someTflAiat larger operation, such as Yemen, wherein obser'/ers sud troop units are involved. A third plan would bo conoer ed with large-scale operations such as UNEF and the Congo, Other uselul plans -2- plane could 'be prepared for operations in tropical, temperate and cc li climates j, in jungles, deserts, island areas, etc. This is i'~\e kind of '/solitary planning that saves time,, money, supplies, snd mci's ll-> :;3a U» Prepare troop lists of balanced forces for vario is contingencies., indicating the Member States most likely to b© able and vailing to provide the forces and jaajor items of equipinaDi. Particular attention should bo given to speciaii2ed unitsa uush aa Engine STS.J Comuni cations, Supply, etc, Specific planu and ]. .'©para tioas ah on Id be mado for the rapid movement, employment arsi ojpport of peacekeeping units which are being earmarked for Ufti use "by a few of the Member States* 5« Preposition ei^plias and equipment as' appropriate, Vfiiat is erndsioned here is:

(1) Modest stockage of comrnon-use iteras,, eeg, Iielmet liners painted blue, UN decsls, blue beret,-:., c-to,, id (2) Retention and stockage of carefully selected items noxtf becoming surplua in tho Congo. (Very study is required to determine economic fe of retaining surplus items versus salvage and poao: i^lo later repurclieae,) 6, Prepare contingency policy directives for supply and movements activities of the Field Operations Service for peacekeepir.; operations and logisties priorities to ensure adequate support of, i ;i cooiTliaation with operations. 1, Prepare, and keep current, lists of officers who could serve in key cosurtarKi aisd staff capacities in United nations peace- keeping operations Provide for orientation for these officers in peacekeeping iXinctions of the United Nations,

C8 In order to accomplish the foregoing tasks, as well as pro Ldo daily military advice and assistance and supervise military aspects of current peacekeeping activities, it is recommended that the ir.ilit.ar;- Mviserfe present staff of four officers be augmented by a minimum ti r-e© additional officers and that appropslats provision for this staff b. jnsde in the fouclget either separately or in connection vdth existing peaceke^>ing operations* The present staff of four officers is provided for in the OWUC budget. Their tours of duty will end wh©n that operation terminates on June 30, l?6ii.e The throe additional officers should be recruited now and their salaries charged to the -3-

OliUO budget,, so that an adequate and furic tioning staff will s o in existence when OUVG is terminated. These additional officers shou. .1

1 Colonel - Chief of Staff ^- 1 Lt. Colonel or Major - Logistics Office :""~ 1 Lt. Colonel - plans Officer >-- This small addition w>uld help to alleviate the rroab seiloiis deficiencies bys 1, Providing depth and back-up to the staff of tue Hilitrry Adviser,

2S .Isnpro'ving the logistics managanent and planning organ - zation, and 3» Aiding an operational planning capability.

An a&Htlonal increanent of t^ro officers should "be cMed to the • staff j v/tien this proves possible;, In cnrfbar to enable it fully to ct oat the tasks conteatzplated isa 'bhi© peper. These officers should "be: / r ' 1. Lt, Colonel ~« -Jnteaiigenc/f> /• i? /" ^i< ff/irrte Officer ' S. Colonel/Lt. Colonel -» Logistic Officer *•" PERSONAL AMD CONFIDENTIAL March 6,

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT AND FINANCING OF FUTURE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

We are prepared to explore with the Soviet Union ways of meeting its concern with respect to the conduct and financing of future United Nations peacekeeping operations so that it need not feel that payment of its arrears will prejudice its future position. To this end we have developed certain suggestions which we are willing to explore on the understanding that any agreement on the future must involve the settlement in some manner of Soviet arrears for past peacekeeping operations. (a) How can the position of the Security Council be strengthened in relation to the General Assembly so far as peacekeeping operations are concerned? It is our thought that it might be established for the future that all proposals to initiate major peacekeeping operations would be considered and acted on first in the Security Council -- they would be passed on to the General Assembly only if the Security Council demonstrated that it was unable to take action.

(b) How can the countries having the greatest responsibilities and making the greatest contributions -- particularly the permanent members of the Security Council — be given a greater voice in the financing of peacekeeping operations? We suggest the following approach: 1. A Peacekeeping Finance Committee would be established by the General Assembly which would include the permanent members of the Security Council and be weighted generally in favor of the larger contributors. The Peacekeeping Finance Committee would be constituted under a firm General Assembly rule of procedure. 2. The General Assembly would arrange to act only on the recommendations of a two-thirds majority of the Peacekeeping Finance Committee when apportioning expenses of future major peacekeeping operations.

3« If a major peacekeeping operation has been authorized by the Security Council or General Assembly, the Secretary General would be authorized to commit only up to two million dollars (which is the limit of his present authority without the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) in order to finance the first stage of the operation. Expenses above this initial amount would be authorized only in accordance with the arrangements mentioned in paragraph (2) above. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 - k. In apportioning expenses for future major peacekeeping operations, the Peacekeeping Finance Committee would consider a number of alternative approaches including such financing plans (for example a special scale of assessments) as might be formulated in the Working Group of 21 this Spring. Such a special scale would be available as one of the alternative methods to be recommended by the Peacekeeping Finance Committee for the apportionment of the expenses of large peacekeeping operations. (c) What should the attitude of the General Assembly be in the future; with respect to a permanent member of the Security Council, in regard to the financing of a particular peacekeeping operation undertaken by the Assembly over the strong political objections of that permanent member? This question involves the practical political reality that the majority of the United Nations membership clearly will insist that it can commence and arrange for the financing of a peace- keeping operation if the Security Council is unable to act. The question also involves the collective financial responsibility of the entire membership for actions approved by a principal United Nations organ such as the General Assembly. Here there is a need for some accommodation between the opposing views which have been stated on many occasions in the past. We have developed some tentative views on the possibility of such an accommodation and will be glad to discuss them with the Soviet Union if the latter is interested in the total approach to this problem which we have outlined. One possibility would be an arrangement under which the Peacekeeping Finance Committee and the General Assembly might take into account the position of a permanent member of the Security Council which had fundamental political objections to a particular peacekeeping operation undertaken by the Assembly, and might decide not to assess that permanent member beyond the point that the cost becomes really substantial. CW/pbg

you for ycsar IsinS letter of 50 March 19-54 with, t good esou^t to seaS ae a eof y of snsar speech esitit * ^^ great latersst. also' notsd the ssssr essstructtTe sEggestiojss you li fes* tlie isppoveffleat af oar paaee^eepiag; operat

.-

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON March 30, 1964

Dear Mr. Secretary General: It was good to see you at the luncheon on Friday.

You may be interested in seeing my latest attempt to describe in a systematic way the lessons we have learned from the UN peacekeeping operations so far.

Warmest regards. Sincerely,

Harlan Cleveland

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, New York. MARCH 20, 1964 «*8UVMUUW»M U^U^UMU* UlUaiMU-.m^ua ^Q ^ ^g

FOR RELEASE AT 6;30 P.M., E.S.T., SATURDAY, MARCH 21, 196^, NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN AMY WAY.

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE HARLAW CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, AT THE MIDWEST MODEL UNITED NATIONS, IN THE CHASE-PARK PLAZA HOTEL, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, SATURDAY, MARCH 21, AT 8;00 P.M., C.S.T. THE THIRTEENTH ALARM

I. Just a week ago the United Nations answered the peacekeeping firebell for the thirteenth time.

This time the alarm came from a troubled island in the Mediter- ranean Sea: one island with two warring ethnic communities. As a result, two of our friends and NATO allies found themselves locked in an ever-tightening spiral of tension - closer to serious armed conflict than most Americans would believe. Even before the fighting began last Christmastime, the issues Were touchy in the extreme. Cyprus got its independence as part of a complex treaty structure which left British, Greek and Turkish troops on the island, and a constitution that required both Turk and Greek Cypriots to agree on acts of the independent government. Now the first task became to break the vicious and lengthening chain in which incident begat incident and violence spawned violence. The second was to work out an agreed solution that would go to the root of the trouble. Talks among North Atlantic allies produced no workable answer. A regional peace force linked to the UN was agreed in principle, but not in practice. Meanwhile, arms flowed-:in and local fighting infected first one village and then another. The Communists, everywhere the scavengers of independence, began to work to turn the situation to their advantage. And a few thousand harassed, heroic British soldiers tried to keep the island from exploding again in communal strife.

And so the Cyprus issue came to the United Nations -- for peacekeeping and peacemaking is the UN's major business. Once again the - 2 - PR 128

again the United Nations Security Council had to listen to acrid debate, and then agree to call up volunteers for an international bucket brigade• For in Cyprus, as in twelve other cases, Shakespeare's wisdom well applies:

"A little fire is quickly trodden out Which, being suffered, rivers cannot quench4" Beginning with Greece in 1947, the UN's record of on-the-spot peacekeeping operations runs through Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, Korea, Trieste, Suez, Lebanon, Laos, the Congo, West New Guinea, Yemen, and now Cyprus. Some of these once-ominous problems still persist, but none of them seriously endangers world peace or threatens to involve the great powers in catastrophic contest. The United Nations has succeeded in moving them away from the battlefields and barricades, into the chambers and corridors where peace is made by lengthy and tedious talk. Solutions may not follow quickly or easily, but the guns are checked outside the conference halls. And that is what counts when the issue is peace or war. Now that the world has lived through a baker's dozen of these traumatic near-wars, we have a right to ask what progress we are making in keeping the peace. And the real test of progress, of course, is ;not whether emergencies stop occurring — because in this highly flammable world there are quite a few oily rags lying around and too many careless people with matches. The real test is whether we are better able to cope with crises when they do occur than we were, say, a decade ago. Is the world profiting from its ticklish experience, or are the peacemaker's still playing each crisis by ear - on the same primitive instruments? What does the record show? II. The record so far tells us at least five things worth telling: First, threats to the peace can, and do, break out almost any- where. Over the past seventeen years, peacekeeping operations have been undertaken by the UN four times in the Middle East, twice in Southern Europe, twice in Southeast Asia, and once in the Far East, the Western Pacific, Africa, and now in the Mediterranean. And while action was in every case left to the Organization of American States, the Security Council has had on its docket thirteen crises in the Western Hemisphere. As of tonight the Security Council still has fifty-seven large and small disputes listed on its agenda — some of which have been settled long since and some of which are dangerous enough still to require a watching brief by the Council.

Second, - 3 - PR 128

Second, the record tells us that each of these disputes — being different — has required different kinds of peacekeeping machinery. In Korea — uniquely large and uniquely destructive of young lives — the United Mations defended a nation against outside communist aggression. In the Congo a major military police force was attacked and had to defend itself. In the Middle East and in Kashmir, the need was for armed peacekeepers to patrol armistice lines. In other cases, observation teams,, fact-finders, and mediators have filled the bill.

What's more, the weaponry, the political sponsorship, the racial composition, and the financing arrangements have all been different — each tailored to the necessities of the case. In retrospect, this diversity of solutions makes the original idea of a standing UN army look rather naive and simplistic. But there was no experience to go on when the founders of the UN were trying to figure out, on paper, how to organize for peace in an unpredictable postwar world. III. Third, our experience in the UN demonstrates that an international police force, once on the ground, has a mission unlike most national military missions — because it's much less national and often less military. Members of UN peacekeeping forces are soldiers from the military establishments of the nations contributing units. They are commanded by professional military officers. They wear uniforms and carry guns. They sleep in tents or barracks and eat military rations. But once they put on the blue beret or — if need be — the blue helmet, they find they are supposed to be soldiers without enemies, fighters without rancor, members of an armed force without a military objective — their mission not to start shooting but to stop it, not to win a battle but to see to it there is no battle to be won or lost. The implications that flow from this strange state of affairs for soldiers-turned-peacemakers are large and fascinating — and were seen most clearly in the Congo experience. Having spent some time talking about these things with UN officers during the tougW days of the Congo operation, I should like to dwell for a moment on what was learned there. In a remote section of the Congo, I visited with a Brigadier General from Malaysia, commanding a Malayan UN brigade. In a real war, he said, he would be merely commanding a brigade, but with the UN force he had to command each platoon. His point was that the smallest incident in the life of a minor patrol can easily become a major - 4 - PR 128

major political issue. In the jungles of Malaya, the Communists that had been shooting at these same soldiers were clearly the enemy — no doubt about it. "But here", said the Brigadier, "if somebody shoots at our soldiers," he said, "it is a political question whether they should even shoot back." The point was clear enough in the case of Indian troops manning a check-point who were attacked by a howling mob of several thousand women organized by secessionists under liaise Tshombe. The women kicked, spat, slapped, ripped shirts and tore insignia from the stoic Ghurkas who had been ordered not to fight even in self-defense. As the mob beg n to tire of this one-sided fight, the Indians fired exactly nine rounds of ammunition over the heads of the crowd and advanced to disperse the mob, using only their batons. The Indian officer in charge told me that an army unit brought in to put down such an outbreak under what he called a "normal situation" could readily have caused dozens or scores of civilian deaths.

One commander in the Congo told me that when opposing troops run from a police force, the "no-enemy" principle may require the UN force to let them get away. But curiously enough, he did not think this is necessarily a military disadvantage: "If a man has to run away from you," he said, "he will deliberately exaggerate the size and effectiveness of your force, in order to look better in the eyes of his own people." If the rank-and-file of a peacekeeping force has to make a difficult adjustment, so do the officers. The commander of a peace force often must go out ahead of his troops. This used to be a standard operating practice back in the Middle Ages, when a commander would ride out to parley with the opposing commander, to see whether things could be settled without anybody getting hurt. In more modern warfare, the commanding officer doesn't spend much time in no-man's land. But in this sense, UN peacekeeping has brought the sensible Middle Ages up to date — for the object, once again, is to pacify. The Brigadier commanding the Indian Brigade in the Congo made a regular and successful practice of going out ahead of his troops and persuading hostile local forces to return stolen helicopters, retire gracefully from the field without battle, and even to give up cities. It is remarkable, this officer reported, how well this sort of thing works in situations where the other side is not quite sure of itself or its orders. "If you do something that looks deliberately stupid, it is sometimes so surprising to others that you get away with it." A final PR 128

A final distinction between an international peace force and a conventional military one is that a peacekeeping force in an under- developed area is often drawn deeply into the civil life of the community. UN units in the Congo found themselves providing leader- ship, supplies, transportation and other services to local governments and sometimes to private firms, in an effort to help the economy get moving again. The UN force even had to develop a scale of charges by which businesses could be billed for hauling goods to market in UN military vehicles. Soldiers without enemies operating on behalf of the world 'commu- nity, are a new kind of people doing a new kind of work. Their doctrine, their mandate, their training manuals, are still first drafts — and not yet ready for final printing.

Let me return to the record of UN peacekeeping so far and what it tells us about this unprecedented, pragmatic, and fateful business:

IV. Fourth, the record shows clearly that the United Nations peace- keeping machinery is not an alternative to regional organizations or to direct diplomacy. All three are essential — to be employed separately or in some combination depending upon the task at hand. Issues directly involving basic national interests of the major powers will be settled between them or not at all. Regional dis- putes are handled preferably within the framework of regional organiza- tions — like the Organization 'of American States and the Organization for African Unity — when they are up to the job. In others, the United Nations must play the leading role — and in all disputes, the United Nations by the terms of its Charter is the last resort, the peacemaker in reserve. The best example of combined use of national, regional and world facilities was the fateful crisis over Soviet installation of missile sites in Cuba. Our response to that effort to change the world's power balance brought into action — at one and the same time — national power, the OAS, and the United Nations. Each played a mutually supporting role in a textbook case of crisis diplomacy. The Cyprus case is another fascinating study in irony and paradox: here the United Nations, by keeping the peace on the island, can prevent the southern flank of NATO from bursting into flames. Fifth, and finally, the record shows that the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations has operated in the national interests of the United States, as well as in the interest of every other nation that cares about the peace of the world. And that should include every responsible"government in the world, regard- less of its political, social, or economic structure. For there - 6 - PR 128

For there is a nuclear seed lurking somewhere in almost any open conflict anywhere today. Even where major power interests do not appear to be directly and immediately involved, there is the danger that organized fighting at any level, and with any kind of arms, could eventually engage the interests or prestige of major powers and drag us into a nuclear war that nobody wanted. As long as nuclear arms exist, the threat exists that an armed skirmish can wind up in a mushroom cloud. So what serves peace anywhere serves our interests every- where. This is one all-important area where we share common interests with the Soviet Union. And there is some reason to hope that the Soviet leaders agree.

Maybe that is why Chairman Khrushchev, in his New Year's Day message, put the case for settlement of all territorial disputes by peaceful means, including recourse to the United Nations. We are still dubious whether concrete policies will follow this general declaration; but it is the task of our diplomacy to find out — and to keep on seeking agreement on how to back the doctrine with effective machinery for peaceful settlement. V. Thus, the record of the peacekeeping experience of the United Nations to date shows . that threats to the paace can and do arise almost anywhere; . that every peacekeeping operation is likely to require a different kind of peace force than has ever been needed before; . that the conduct of peacekeeping forces must be drawn more from the police books than from the military manuals;

. that when crisis comes, national, regional and world action are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing; and . that the UN's capacity to keep the peace has a lot to do with our national interests and, indeed, our personal chances of survival in the age of the ultimate weapons. But - 7 - ' PR 128

But does that mean the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations is all that it should be — that it is up to such an awe- some assignment? It does not, and it is not. We can take some comfort in the fact that the UN's peacekeeping performance to date has been heartening in most instances, and brilliant in some. We can all be grateful that the Secretary-General is able to assemble a force of a few thousand men for Cyprus; though if the British had not been holding the fort and had not then contributed half of the manpower, it would have been enormously difficult to, mount the peacekeeping mission in Cyprus at all.

We can be grateful, too, that the Canadians and the Nordic countries and Holland have agreed to earmark forces for future emergency duty with the United Nations. But there is something eerie about the spectacle of the United Nations having to plead and scrounge and cajole to help tack together a minimal peacekeeping force in the nick of time. There is something nightmarish about the notion that in a world which spends some $120 billion a year in.the name of defense and keeps some 20 million men under arms, peace could hang on the overnight availability of a few thousand men and a few million dollars. In short, the performance of the world community is not yet nearly good enough. There will need to be many more earmarked units from every continent, from a variety of nations, large and small — contingents always on the alert for prompt assignment in an emergency- so that once a peacekeeping mission has been authorized, the right mix of forces can be put together, if need be, in a matter of days, not weeks. We are entitled to hope that UN members will search their souls, re-examine their attitudes, and reassess their own national interests to make sure that the United Nations never wants for men or money to act in the interests of peace. We are entitled to hope that acquiescence will give way to enthusiasm — that reluctance will give way to responsibility — that service with the United Nations will be seen not as a burden but as an honor worthy of some of each nation's best men with the best training and talent and experience. ' And I PR 128

And I speak not only of soldiers called to serve as peace- keepers but of statesmen called to serve as peace-makers. I see no reason why the United Nations should not have available a distinguished international panel of peace-makers — and should not be able to reach into any public or private institution and command the finest talents in the world to serve as fact-finders or observers or mediators or arbitrators to disputes which tear at the fragile fabric of world peace. The very difficulty the Secretary General has been having this week in locating a mediator for Cyprus on whom all concerned can agree, illustrates the need for more of this kind of talent already at the service of the world community. Meanwhile, the prickly problem of financing peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and Congo has produced a situation in which the United Nations is deeply in debt, a large number of nations are in arrears on their peacekeeping assessments, the Soviet Union and others are headed toward collision with the dictum laid down in Article 19 of the Charter which says that any member owing more than two years of assessments "shall have no vote in the General Assembly," and a shattering constitutional crisis could be in the making. Apart from the difficulties of cleaning up the past, there is the very likely prospect that the United Nations will be called upon again and again to restore the peace, to keep the peace, and to build at last a dynamic system of world order which will permit peaceful change in a world which will endure the status quo only until something blows up.

Will the members of the United Nations have the wit and the will to provide the United Nations' with enough resources to do the jobs it is likely to be asked to do? The returns are not in, and nobody can say for sure. But I think the UN's members will endow the UN with the capacity to act for peace — simply because it's there, and it's badly needed. Nations, like people, seldom do things that require decisions, especially expensive decisions, until the need for action is obvious and compelling. And most learning is by doing. The margin between success and failure ito getting a peacekeeping mission on the island of Cyprus was all too narrow for comfort. But I suspect that this has been noticed by others as well. I suspect that the s.ervice of the United Nations in response to thirteen fire alarms and scores of other warning signals is being re-assessed in more than one capital around this globe. And, bit-by-bit, I suspect the world community is being drawn by events into an unspoken consensus: Now, in these perilous years of our days, we cannot afford to be without effective, reliable and operational machinery for peace. "-'•*>£ vi"i(L>•^ *-asr, F:'I, "

SSM1 10 June 1964

In the ecsurse of infoiwal discussions on matters for sons Id ©ration at future meetings of the Working Group of Twentyons the following points were raised as ijorthy of study?

10 Any formal paper should begin with a short factual review of the methods of authorisation and financing of all past United Nations peacekeeping operations,,

20 a0 Before initiating a peacekeeping operation the Security Qouneil should examine its financial implications,,

b0 The Council itself mayP of course , provide for financing?

in its resolution Initiating an operation (for examplep by

voluntary" contributions p by agreement ai^ong the parties

concemeo) „

C0 If the Council's resolution specifics that the costs of an operation involving heavy expenditures are to be born©

by the United Nations p or if It Tntxs'b be assumodl that iSiese costs are: to be borne by the United Nations beeausa the

Gouaell Tiiakea no other provision p tho Gsnersl Assembly should meet at the earliest possible opportunity to

10 aporopriate the necessary r-toney? and

ii0 apportion these costs amont? the members on the basis of eolleetivs respsnsibilityi,

nsiri^ a previously adopted special f orr<«33.a0 Until the Assembly does so the Seoretary-Gsneral raay, of

©ourse9 expend up to $10 million (with the eonc-Jirrsnee of the &CABQ) under the provisions of the annual resolution

on unforeseen and extraordinary expanses,, (This procedure is squally applicable for paaeekaepin^ operations coating

less than flO million in any one year.)

30 If the General Assembly finds it necessary to Initiate a peacekeeping oparatioiij the Security Council having bssn unable to act through lack of unanimity of the Pornjassent Merjbers9 the /ksserably should first examine the financial implications „ DRAFT -a» 10 Jtme 1964

4-0 a0 To assist the Assembly in this respsst (and also when the Assembly arranges f inane int? for peacekeeping operations initiated by the Security Council which I^voi^s costs to be borne by th© United Nations), and to afforti a further opportunity for the Permanent Msrabers of the Seeurity Council to influence a proposal by the General Assembly to initiate a peaeeteeping operation^ a spseial eowmittee on the financing of peacekeeping operations could bs established,, The •membership

of this special financing eotRfl"ittees while based on adequat©

isofsraphical rapresentationp would reflect the interest of the principal contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations, both within the United Illations as a vjhole asd ijitbin the

srespective geographical regions. (The wembership would bep in effect, essentially similar to that of the Working Group of Twsntyoae as currently eoir?pO3®?i „ )

b0 The Fifth Coramittee would act on reeornmsndationa wade by a tv?c=. thirds majority of the special financing committee on

the financing ofp ineludling: assessments fors peaeelcesping operations. If either the 'Fifth Go?sFiittes or the General Assembly did not accept the reeosnnsaflation of the spaeial financing committee that recsorniiondation would be r by the special financing eosnmittee. Co The spaeial financing cofmrtittee would be ^ided b^1 i. th© principles established in resolution 1874

iie a speeial formula for •fee finalising of operations involving heavy expenditures, as maj oe recommerided by thg' Vforkin? Group of Twsntyone ara3 approved by the Gensral Ass^friblyi a^ iii. in addition, although it would he guided "by the principle of oolleetive s^esponaihility as laM do«n in resolution 1®?4 (S-ET) „ the cowmittse would "bs smpoi^srad to recomiRsnd adjtsstments to the assessments of member states for a peacekeeping operation as DRAFT .3=, 10' J

fos 'appropriate in "the circsvrastancss (for

e;;er.iplep to take into go own* tfoa sr-tiaatien o*° £.117 Member States wViich a^« vit ^iws oP,

wliioh ar^ dtherwisa Involved ir.P the events ei? actions leading to a peacekeeping -operB'Slonj, or •

of a Fersanont I^nfer whieb has xretoed the oparattbn proposed when under eonsl/f ©ration in the Security

Goancll and has atyonsfLy opposed it vhea tsa

corislderation 1.n the Ghsaeral

GO The ©:Ke.ct tsrms of reference for s«ch a committee s

with 'its 3ompositlons require further examination,

1 50. The details of a specie! formula for the financing; o'* p;>ac@ keeping operations involving heavy espendifetres' rp-q^lre Qxaminstion0 fee, The p'rdposa!-. for a ps^ce frm^ --=. Its nature,, its pxir-pose-j-,,. sources of intsorftB;, ancl n-sthods of control ~ reauiv-e:, UNITED NATION Distr. GENERAL SECURITY S/5811 10 July COUNCIL ENGLISH ORIGINAL RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 10 JULY 196k FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I request you to arrange to have the attached "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR regarding certain measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security" issued an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) N. FEDORENKO

6^-1523)4. S/5811 English Page 2

Memorandum of the Government of the USSR regarding certain meas-ures to strengthen the effectivenss of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security

1. Recently the course of international relations has "begun to show distinct signs of changes for the "better. The conclusion of the Treaty "banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, followed by the achievement of an understanding not to orbit objects carrying nuclear weapons and to reduce in the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, have contributed to a certain easing of international tension and to the germination of seeds of mutual trust in relations between States. The principles of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems have been given increasing recognition as the sole reasonable basis for international relations in our time. There has been some improvement, too, in the situation within the United Nations, as revealed in the course of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly and in the deliberations of the Security Council on a number of important political issues. Nevertheless, the general state of international relations is still not satisfactory from the standpoint of securing a durable peace. The threat of war has not been eliminated. Some countries are still endeavouring by force to maintain their dominion over peoples waging the just struggle for freedom and independence. In various parts of the world friction in the relations between States and even conflicts fraught with dangers to world peace have arisen because of the actions of certain circles that have no interest in preserving peace. These same circles continue to impede progress at the disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Government is deeply confinced that it is the duty of all countries to do everything in their power to help in further easing international tension, in strengthening mutual trust in relations between States and in normalizing the international situation. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, a major contribution in this respect would be the achievement of an understanding among States Members of the United Nations on the strengthening of the Organization's effectiveness in safeguarding international peace and security. The United Nations Charter offers the necessary possibilities in this regard, but up to now these possibilities have not always been fully exploited. S/5811 English Page 3

2. The United Rations Charter contains the essential principles for peaceful and good-neighbourly relations among States. Therefore, to enhance the * effectiveness of the United Nations in keeping the peace means first of all putting an end to violations of the Charter, permanently ridding the Organization of all remnants of the "cold war" period, creating within the. United Nations a situation favourable to the co-operation of all States as equals. At the same time, wider use should be made of the peaceful means of settling international disputes provided for in the Charter. The enormous changes which have occurred in the world over the past decade, the expansion and consolidation of peace-loving forces, give every reason to believe that if countries, and primarily the great Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council, demonstrate goodwill and a genuine desire to preserve the peace, much can be done to enhance the ability of the United Nations to thwart attempts to disturb the peace and to prevent conflicts by means of the peaceful procedures provided for in Chapter VI of the Charter, such procedures as negotiation, good offices, conciliation, etc. The Soviet Government does not deny, however, that in some cases there may arise a situation in which the maintenance of peace in a given area may be difficult to secure by peaceful means of settlement alone. In such cases, where there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the Soviet Government considers it rightful for the Security Council to adopt enforcement measures of a non-military character, in accordance with Article lj-1 of the Charter, including the interruption of economic relations, the severance of diplomatic relations and other related measures. As is well known, the Soviet Government has repeatedly supported in the Security Council the demands of African States for the application of such measures to the Republic of South Africa, which is pursuing the inhuman policy of apartheid fraught with dangers to peace in Africa, and also to Portugal, whose Government is waging, a colonial war against the people of Angola and other Territories. 3. While the Soviet Government holds that the peaceful, non-military means prescribed in the Charter should first be used to settle disputes and conflicts between countries, it does not exclude the possibility that situations may arise where the only way to prevent or stop aggressive acts, and protect the sovereignty S/5811 English Page 4

and territorial integrity of a victimized State, is for the United Nations to employ force in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter. In these exceptional cases it may prove necessary to send United Nations armed forces to the area concerned. Decisions of this kind should be taken, however, only as a last resort and after all the relevant facts have "been carefully weighed, for it must "be kept in mind that the use of any foreign troops including those of the United Nations to settle conflicts, indeed their very presence in foreign territory, may, as experience has shown, lead to the very opposite result, i.e. to interference in the domestic affairs of States, to grave international complications, to a heightening of tensions. The indispensable condition for the application of so extreme a measure as the use of United Nations armed force must at all times and in all circumstances "be scrupulous compliance with all the provisions of the Charter dealing with the use of force for the maintenance or restoration of international peace. Under the Charter, the only "body authorized to take action in the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security is the Security Council. It is likewise within the purview of the Security Council to adopt decisions in all matters relating to the establishment of United Nations armed forces, the definition of their duties, their composition and strength, the direction of their operations, the structure of their command and the duration of their stay in the area of operation, and also matters of financing. No other United Nations "body, including the General Assembly, has 'the right under the Charter to decide these matters. These provisions of the Charter are profoundly sensible. They form the only basis on which it is possible to ensure that the United Nations armed forces may not be used in the narrow unilateral interest of any individual States or groups of States to the detriment of the interests of other States, which would lead not to a strengthening of peace but rather to a further aggravation of the situation. This basis is the agreement of the permanent members of the Security Council on all fundamental matters relating to the establishment,, utilization and financing of United Nations armed forces in each particular case. S/5811 English Page 5

In the present circumstances, when an active part in international affairs is . being played by numerous States belonging not only to different geographical areas but also to different military and political groupings, a further necessary condition to ensure that the application of force by the United Nations corresponds solely to the interests of peace and not to the unilateral aims of any particular States or groups of States is the adoption of arrangements for the composition of the United Nations armed forces whereby these forces would include, together with contingents from Western and neutral countries, contingents from the socialist countries. This means, too, that representatives of the socialist countries would participate in the command of United Nations armed forces established by decision of the Security Council in a given situation. The Soviet Government takes the view, however, that it is inadvisable for United Nations armed forces to have contingents from nations which are permanent members of the Security Council. As regards assistance to the Security Council in all matters relating to the use of United Nations armed force, including the preparation of plans for its application, under Articles h6 and ^7 of the Charter this task belongs to the United Nations Military Staff Committee. The Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the United Nations, should contribute by all the means at his disposal to the execution of the relevant decisions of the Security Council. The Soviet Government considers that the question of the reimbursement of expenditure required for the execution of emergency measures adopted by the Security Council to deter or repel aggression through the use of United Nations armed forces should be decided in conformity with the generally recognized principle of international law that aggressor States bear political and material responsibility for the aggression they commit and for the material damage caused by that aggression. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government does not rule out the possibility that situations may arise where, in order to execute the above-mentioned emergency measures of the Security Council, it will be necessary for States Members of the United Nations to take part in defraying the expenditure involved in the maintenance and use of United Nations armed forces established in order to maintain S/5811 English Page 6 international peace and security. In such future cases when the Security Council adopts decisions to establish and finance United Nations armed forces in strict compliance with the provisions of the Charter, the Soviet Union will be prepared to.take part with other States Members of the United Nations in defraying the expenditure involved in the maintenance of those armed forces. • U. With a view to securing conditions in which contingents could, when necessary, be promptly made available to the Security Council for inclusion in United Nations armed forces, the Soviet Government thinks it advisable that agreements, prescribed in Article 1+3 of the Charter and defining the procedures and terms for the provision of such contingents by States, should be concluded between the Security Council and States Members of the United Nations which so desire. In keeping with Article ^5 of the Charter, those agreements might make it an obligation of States which have entered into such arrangements with the Security Council to hold immediately available, within their armed forces, certain military contingents and supporting facilities which would be at the disposal of the Security Council. A draft of the main provisions of such agreements might be prepared by the Military Staff Committee, for subsequent consideration by the Security Council. Upon approval of the main provisions by the Security Council, the conclusion of appropriate agreements between the Security Council and interested States might commence. The Soviet Government is convinced that the achievement of an understanding among States Members of the United Nations, and first and foremost among the permanent members of the Security Council, to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of peace and security on the basis of the propositions set forth in this Memorandum will help to enhance the authority and prestige of the United Nations as an instrument for international co-operation, among equal partners, in the cause of peace and the good of nations. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

July

PERSONAL and CONFIDE33TIAL

Dear Mr. Secret ary-General: I am enclosing, as you requested on Saturday, a copy of the memorandum which formed the basis of my remarks to you on the memorandum of the U.S.S.R. With best wishes for a successful trip. Sincerely yours,

_-;. \^\^/u-tsn0&r~> Adlai E. Stevenson

Enclosure As stated

The Secretary-General United Rations New York PERSONAL AMD COHFIDEHTIAL

July 10, 1964.

Preliminary Comments on "Memorandum of the U.S.S.R. Government on certain measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security".

1. Memorandum is to be welcomed in that it indicates increased Soviet interest in UN's peacekeeping capabilities, and willingness of Soviet Union to share in expense of peacekeeping operations, even though the terms of such willingness are not as yet acceptable. 2. Memorandum should also be welcomed as an additional set of proposals which can be considered by the Working Group together with the proposals here- tofore made by (a) U.S. and UK, (b) certain Western European countries members of the Working Group, and (c) less developed countries members of the Working Group, and together with such proposals as may be made by others. 3. The Soviet proposals are not an initiative, but are a reply, albeit unresponsive, to the US - UK initiative of March 6, 196k. It is to be regretted that the proposals in that initiative are not even mentioned in the Soviet memorandum. U. The memorandum is a reiteration of the long-held Soviet position that only the Security Council can initiate and conduct peacekeeping operations, and provide (by assessment or otherwise) for the expenses thereof. It specifically denies the right of the General Assembly to decide any such matters. This position has been rejected by the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion and the acceptance of it (75-17-110 by the General Assembly, and it is believed unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of the UN members. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

5. The memorandum goes further in insisting that the Security Council have sole authority, not only to establish a peacekeeping operation, but as to the "definition of their mandate, composition and their strength, direction of their operations, structure of their command, period of peresence of these military forces in the area of operation, and problems of financing the consequent expenditures.™ This not only excludes the General Assembly, but also sharply restricts the past and present authority of the Secretary General to manage most of such matters, subject only to the broad mandates of the Security Council or the General Assembly* Instead of being the executive officer of the United Nations responsible for the conduct of such operations, the Secretary General vould be reduced to the status of administrative agent of the Security Council. 6. The memorandum also goes further. It states that it is inadvisable to include armed forces from any of the permanent members of the Security Council. Such a position runs counter to the responsibility of the major powers for peacekeeping, and would have ruled out Korea and the present Cyprus operation. There is no basis in the Charter for the exclusion of the permanent members from peacekeeping operations, and flexibility Is In any event desirable. It may be unnecessary for permanent members to earmark in advance contingents for UN service, but logistic support and even troops from permanent members might be required and certainly should not be ruled out. T* The memorandum proposes to institutionalize a troika in peacekeeping operations by requiring the participation, in command posts and in contingents, EERSOML AMD C03SFIDEMTIAL

-3- of "Socialist" countries. Socialist countries should not of course "be excluded, •but should not be required to "be included — in most UN peacekeeping operations, the UN must use contingents acceptable to the Government of the country where they are to "be stationed. It is important to maintain maximum flexibility in the national composition of international peacekeepingforces* 8. The memorandum's insistence on Military Staff Committee's participation in peacekeeping operations, although literally in accordance with Article k6f etc. would also introduce an element of complication and is inconsistent with the flexibility of present practice of the Secretary General's handling the details of peacekeeping operations pursuant to a broad mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. 9* The memorandum apparently suggests the setting up of a permanent international peacekeeping force through the negotiation of Article l»-3 treaties between the Security Council and individual UN members. An attempt to negotiate on this basis reached an impasse with the U.S.S.R. in 19^7. Also, the requirement of compulsory furnishing of armed forces on call presents constitutional difficulties for many members. 10. It is unclear whether the Soviets propose to substitute a standing UN force for the present evolving system of stand-by earmarked national units. The latter arrangement appears more flexible and preferable. 11. The memorandum appears directed at peace enforcement measures under Chapter 7, and it is not clear whether the proposals apply to Chapter 6 situations. This must be explored. However, Fedorenko did say that the PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

General Assembly has no power to recommend, even though agreed to by States concerned, cease-fire supervision such as Kaslmir operation, and that only the Security Council could do this. 12. The general tone of the memorandum is more favorable to the principle of UN peacekeeping than has been true of recent Soviet pronouncements. 13. Reference to the payment of peacekeeping expenses by "aggressors™ is impractical; the UN has never been able to agree on a definition of "aggression" and there is always a dispute as to who the aggressor is. 1^. The memorandum, contains no mention whatsoever of the present indebtedness of the United Nations incurred for peacekeeping operations, or of the arrearages which must be paid up if such indebtedness is to be met. Fedorenko said the Soviet position in this regard is unchanged. 15. The U.S. and the UK had hoped to have quiet talks with the Soviet Delegation, based on US - UK proposals of March 6, 196k, looking toward adjust- ments as to future peacekeeping operations which would not only facilitate and avoid disputes as to such operations, but would also make it easier for the Soviets to take care of their arrears. It is unfortunate that the Soviets chose to wait for four months before doing anything, and then instead of resuming quiet talks, should broadcast to the world a reiteration of its well- known position. 16. However, the U.S, and the UK intend to engage in further quiet negotiations with the Soviet Delegation to clarify the ambiguous points and to explore the possibility of compromise solutions as to future peacekeeping. PERSONAL AMD COKFIDEHTIAL

-5-

17• It is believed that the Soviet insistence on exclusive authority of the Security Council in peacekeeping is unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of members, and it is hoped that this sentiment can be brought to the attention of the Soviet Delegation. # * # *•*# * #

18. The Working Group of 21 does not intend to hold any formal meetings until after the Secretary General's return from Paris and Moscow. However, in the meantime informal discussions will go forward as to the various proposals that have been made, formally or informally, including this one. 19. It is to be noted that the suggestions made in the "Barton1" paper, a copy of which has been given to the Secretary General, is along the general lines of the ideas of the U.S. and the UK, but that there are certain elements in it which are not satisfactory and that certain other elements need to be developed more precisely. 20. There is some danger, that must be guarded against, that the Soviet memorandum may be designed to lead to lengthy negotiations as to Article ^3 agreements, etc., designed to divert attention from more practical solutions and the financial problem and the Article 19 situation.

Note by the Chairman of the Working Group of Twenty-one

Most countries agree that there is no objection t« the Security Council, wherever possible under article 43, disposing of the financial costs of a peace-keeping operation by "special agreement or agreements" within the meaning of that article.

Controversy arises when there is expenditure, not covered by such agreements, which has to be assessed on the general membership of the Organisation.

A number of countries maintain that this assessment should be carried out by the Security Council, others that it is the proper function of the General Assembly.

It is submitted that a compromise solution can be reached by arranging for the assessment to be carried out by a standing committee whose composition and terms of reference, including the principles by which it should be guided in its task, are approved by both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

This'is, at this stage, only a purely personal submission.

July 13, 1964. ' UNITED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL GENERAL A/5721 13 July ASSEMBLY ENGLISH ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER BATED 10 JULY 196^ FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I request you to arrange to have the attached "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR regarding certain measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security" issued as an official document of the General Assembly.*

(Signed) N. FEEORENKO

* Transmitted to the Security Council under the symbol S/5811.

64-15387 A/5721 English Page 2

MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR REGARDING CERTAIN MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE SAFEGUARDING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

1. Recently the course of international relations has "begun to show distinct signs of changes for the better. The conclusion of the Treaty "banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere., in outer space and under water, followed "by the achievement of an understanding not to orbit objects carrying nuclear weapons and to reduce in the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom the production of fissionable materials for •'military purposes, have contributed to a certain easing of international tension and to the germination of seeds of mutual trust in relations between States. The principles of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems have been given increasing recognition as the sole reasonable basis for international relations in our time. There has been some improvement, too, in the situation within the United Nations, as revealed in the course of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly and in the deliberations of the Security Council on a number of important political issues. Nevertheless, the general state of international relations is still not satisfactory from the standpoint of securing a durable peace. The threat of war has not been eliminated. Some countries are still endeavouring by force to maintain their dominion over peoples waging the just struggle for freedom and independence. In various parts of the world friction in the relations between States and even conflicts fraught with dangers to world peace have arisen because of the actions of certain circles that have no interest in preserving peace. These same circles continue to impede progress at the disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that it is the duty of all countries to do everything in their power to help in further easing of international tension, in strengthening mutual trust in relations between States and in normalizing the international situation. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, a major contribution in this respect would be the achievement of an understanding among States Members of the United Nations on the strengthening of the Organization's effectiveness in safeguarding international peace and security. The United Nations Charter offers the necessary possibilities in this regard, but up to now these possibilities have not always been fully exploited. A/5721 English Page 3

2. The United Nations Charter contains the essential principles for peaceful and good-neighbourly relations among States. Therefore, to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in keeping the peace means first of all putting an end to violations of the Charter, permanently ridding the Organization of all remnants of the "cold war" period, creating within the United Nations a situation favourable to the co-operation of all States as equals. At the same time, wider use should be made of the peaceful means of settling international disputes provided for in the Charter. The enormous changes which have occurred in the world over the past decade, the expansion and consolidation of peace-loving forces, give every reason to believe ^hat if countries, and primarily the great Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council, demonstrate goodwill and a genuine desire to .reserve the peace, much can be done to enhance the ability of the United Nations to thwart attempts to disturb the peace and to prevent conflicts by means of the peaceful procedures provided for in Chapter VI of the Charter, such procedures as negotiation, good offices, conciliation, etc. The Soviet Government does not deny, however, that in some cases there may arise a situation in which the maintenance of peace in a given area may be difficult to secure by peaceful means of settlement alone. In such cases, where there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the Soviet Government considers it rightful for the Security Council to adopt enforcement measures of a non-military character, in accordance with Article ^1 of the Charter, including the interruption of economic relations, the severance of diplomatic relations and other related measures. As is well known, the Soviet Government has repeatedly supported in the Security Council the demands of African States for the application of such measures to the Republic of South Africa, which is pursuing the inhuman policy of apartheid fraught with dangers to peace in Africa, and also to Portugal, whose Government is waging a colonial war against the people of Angola and other Territories. 3« While the Soviet Government holds that the peaceful, non-military means prescribed in the Charter should first be used to settle disputes and conflicts between countries, it does not exclude the possibility that situations may arise where the only way to prevent or stop aggressive acts, and protect the sovereignty A/5721 English Page ij-

and territorial integrity of a victimized State, is for the United Nations to employ force in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter. In these exceptional cases it may prove necessary to send United Nations armed forces to the area concerned. Decisions of this kind should be taken, however, only as a last resort and after all the relevant facts have been carefully weighed, for it must be kept in mind that the use of any foreign troops including those of the United Nations to settle conflicts, indeed their very presence in foreign territory, may, as experience has shown, lead to the very opposite result, i.e. to interference in the domestic affairs of States, to grave international complications, to a heightening of tensions. The indispensable condition for the application of so extreme a measure as the use of United Nations armed force must at all times and in all circumstances be scrupulous compliance with all the provisions of the Charter dealing with the use of force for the maintenance or restoration of international peace. Under the Charter, the only body authorized to take action in the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security is the Security Council. It is likewise within the purview of the Security Council to adopt decisions in all matters relating to the establishment of United Nations armed forces, the definition of their duties, their composition and strength, the direction of their operations, the structure of their command and the duration of their stay in the area of operation, and also matters of financing. No other United Nations body, including the General Assembly, has the right under the Charter to decide these matters. These provisions of the Charter are profoundly sensible. They form the only basis on which it is possible to ensure that the United Nations armed forces may not be used in the narrow unilateral interest of any individual States or groups of States to the detriment of the interests of other States, which would lead not to a strengthening of peace but rather to a further aggravation of the situation. This basis is the agreement of the permanent members of the Security Council on all fundamental matters relating to the establishment, utilization and financing of United Nations armed forces in each particular case. A/5721 English Page 5

In the present circumstances, when an active part in international affairs is being played by numerous States belonging not only to different geographical areas but also to different military and political groupings, a further necessary condition to ensure that the application of force by the United Nations corresponds solely to the interests of peace and not to the unilateral aims of any particular States or groups of States is the adoption of arrangements for the composition of the United Nations armed forces whereby these forces would include, together with contingents from Western and neutral countries, contingents from the socialist countries. This means, too, that representatives of the socialist countries would participate in the command of United Nations armed forces established by decision of the Security Council in a given situation. The Soviet Government takes the view, however, that it is inadvisable for United Nations armed forces to have contingents from nations which are permanent members of the Security Council. As regards assistance to the Security Council in all matters relating to the use of United Nations armed force, including the preparation ,of plans for its application, under Articles h6 and k-J of the Charter, this task belongs to the United Nations Military Staff Committee. The Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the United Nations, should contribute by all the means at his disposal to the execution of the relevant decisions of the Security Council. The Soviet Government considers that the question of the reimbursement of expenditure required for the execution of emergency measures adopted by the Security Council to deter or repel aggression through the use of United Nations armed forces should be decided in conformity with the generally recognized principle of international law that aggressor States bear political and material responsibility for the aggression they commit and for the material damage caused by that aggression. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government does not rule out the possibility that situations may arise where, in order to execute the above-mentioned emergency measures of the Security Council, it will be necessary for States Members of the United Nations to take part in defraying the expenditure involved in the maintenance and use of United Nations armed forces established in order to maintain international peace and security. In such future cases when the Security Council A/5721 English Page 6 adopts decisions to establish and finance United Nations armed forces in strict compliance with the provisions of the Charter, the Soviet Union will "be prepared to take part with other States Members of the United Nations in defraying the expenditure involved in the maintenance of those armed forces. k. With a view to securing conditions in which contingents could, when necessary, be promptly made available to the Security Council for inclusion in United Nations armed forces, the Soviet Government thinks it advisable that agreements, prescribed in Article ^3 of the Charter and defining the procedures and terms for the provision of such contingents by States, should be concluded between the Security Council and States Members of the United Nations which so desire. In keeping with Article ^5 of the Charter, those agreements might make it an obligation of States which have entered into such arrangements with the Security Council to hold immediately available, within their armed forces, certain military contingents and supporting facilities which would be at the disposal of the Security Council. A draft of the main provisions of such agreements might be prepared by the Military Staff Committee, for subsequent consideration by the Security Council. Upon approval of the main provisions by the Security Council, the conclusion of appropriate agreements between the Security Council and interested States might .commence. The Soviet Government is convinced that the achievement of an understanding among States Members of the United Nations, and first and foremost among the permanent members of the Security Council, to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of peace and security on the basis of the propositions set forth in this Memorandum will help to enhance the authority and prestige of the United Nations as an instrument for international co-operation, among equal partners, in the cause of peace and the good of nations. the text of a ITote •*< ^fv.s ' ' • to the Soviet : iff "llf fe^i^ilW^Siil"idi^>!¥e£ice ~ke e p i ng ..-t * c,, cj Jr;'f «^irj;f^;sJi5i%JH;:viiji:ife?;,*:;^Cj.^: .' '.-5 V..S -••.' ... M^-^^^^M^^^f^i'^: ^ -".-•.. rwia''tetff^'l^'Wi:';w^;''Ministry of Foreign Affairs : ^«l|Slf^S54S^il»;ilSftS5pK>S5rJT4'V-:Vv"«ri"^^^"?iS&^7V.':S-"r^'Jt •'• '»:-.'-'".--:.';.'.•,•^ • • . iWi px^^^i^^*^^^*.**^^**'^-^^ BepiAlics on the 24th ; ;Sii>i:rfelp:'f *£,[!'3S1-:!

SpSgS InEoscoW. •r-rS^I'^v^f, , . would arrars^e for the

Couooil and 111

of my highest ccnsi Jeratio:iffi|| TOTTED KINGDOM REPLY TO THE SOVIET MEMORANDUM

ON PEACE-KEEPING

Her Majesty's Government have carefully studied the Soviet Memorandum of July 13 on the strengthening of the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means is a fundamental principle of British foreign policy. The United Kingdom as a founder member of the United Nations therefore welcome the Soviet reaffirmation of support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, notably Article 1 paragraphs 1, 2 and k. 2. Her Majesty's Government agree that it is important to build further on the foundation of the Agreements mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Soviet Memorandum. Her Majesty's Government fully share the Soviet Government's view in paragraph 2 of their Memorandum that the means for peaceful settlement of " :.'. international disputes embodied in the United Nations Charter should be used more extensively. Her Majesty's Government have already had occasion to suggest to the Soviet Government, in connexion with Premier Khrushchev's message of December 31 on the settlement of territorial disputes and frontier problems, that greater use should be made of negotiations, mediation and conciliation or other peaceful means in the settlement of international disputes, with particular reference to the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague and the machinery of the United Nations generally. 3. This machinery has been gradually and in the view of Her Majesty's Government reasonably adapted to meet the great change in the international scene, which have, as the Soviet Memorandum recognises, occurred over the last two decades. Newly independent nations have come onto the scene and new problems have arisen in new situations which could not have been foreseen in 19^5. It has therefore been natural that over this period the United Nations has had to develop the necessary flexibility to enable it to deal with such dangers to peace as have arisen in various parts of the world. The United Nations has fortunately found means not only for dealing with breaches of the peace between states, but also cases in which the prospect for the maintenance of international peace have been undermined by the situation existing in certain areas. In these cases, the United Nations has been able to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by the provision of forces bearing arms, which have entered the territory of the states concerned with the consent of their governments. Her Majesty's Government hope the Soviet Government have no' intention of excluding the possibility of these valuable activities which are clearly in accordance with the United Nations Charter, k. Her Majesty's Government recognise the primary responsibi- lity of the Security Council for the maintenance of inter- national peace and security. They welcome and continue to work for developments in the international situation which will reduce the divergencies of views among permanent members of the

T /Security Security Council. But so long as these divergencies exist the International Community cannot allow them altogether to preclude the pursuit of joint action for the maintenance of international peace and security. Her Majesty's Government trust that the Soviet Memorandum is not intended to support the doctrine that any permanent member of the Security Council has the right under the Charter wholly to prevent the United Nations fulfilling its peace-keeping role. 5. Her Majesty's Government note that the Soviet Memorandum suggests that negotiations for the conclusion of special agreements under Article 43 of the Charter should be renewed so that forces may Toe placed at the disposal of the Security Council as originally contemplated. While it may "be recalled that the lack of progress in this respect was in no way due to any obstruction on the part of the United Kingdom Her Majesty's Government would "be interested to learn at an appropriate time the views of the Soviet Government about how and when to resume discussions of this matter. Her Majesty's Government for their part are always ready to consider the possibilities of establishing under the appropriate chapters of the Charter efficient means for the maintenance of peace, including the placing of forces at the disposal of the Security Council for the purposes foreseen in Chapter VII of the Charter. 6. However the basic question to be considered is the proper role of the Security Council and of the General Assembly respectively in relation to peace-keeping operations and their financing. In this connexion, in addition to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice entitled "Certain Expenses of the United Nations" dated July 20, 1962, the deliberations of the General Assembly at its 4th Special Session in 1963 are of special importance. In particular General Assembly Resolutions 1874 and 1877 (S-IV) must be taken into account. The general principles set out in Resolution 1874 to serve as guide lines for the sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations, and the proceedings of the "Working Group of 21", (established under Resolutions 1854 B(XVII) and i860 (S-IV) will have an important bearing on the work of the General Assembly at its 19th Session. It is noted here, in relation to Resolution 1877, that the Soviet Memorandum makes no mention of how the problem of arrears for past operations is to be solved. 7. In approaching the problems here involved, Her Majesty's Government have three considerations in mind. First, the responsibility-of all member states under the Charter to contribute to theexpenses of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Second, the need to take account of any excessive burden which the costs of an extensive operation might impose on the economies of the developing countries. Thirdly, recognition of the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries, since they may in fact have to bear a heavy financial responsibility for large peace-keeping operations. /8. The general GONJIDMTIAIi CONlIDENTIAIr 8. The general ideas of Her Majesty's Government based on these principles have already "been put to the Soviet Government at the beginning of March 196^« The salient features are as follows;- (a) All peace-keeping proposals should "be dealt with first by the Security Council and should be referred to the General Assembly only if the Security Council were to demonstrate that it was unable to act. (b) A Peace-keeping Finance Committee, including all permanent members of the Security Council would be established by the General Assembly. (c) The Committee would consider a number of alternative schemes for the financing of peace-keeping operations, including possibly any special scale of payments that might be formulated-by the United Nations Working Group of 21. The General Assembly would arrange to act only on a recommendation from the Committee passed by a two-thirds majority of its membership. 9. These proposals were put to the U. S.S.R. by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States Governments in a genuine attempt to find some compromise between the known views of the Soviet Union on the one hand and of the vast majority of United Nations membership on the other. The proposals cover the whole field of possible United Nations action involving the use of peace- keeping forces in the light of United Nations experience to date. Her Majesty's Government suggest that the object of all member nations should be to work towards agreement on the principles governing future peace-keeping operations, in particular the equitable sharing of the costs, -taking account of developments since 19^-5} including the relevant specific decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. 10. Her Majesty's Government are deeply concerned to maintain the principle of collective financial responsibility to put United Nations finances on a proper basis, and to make effective arrangements acceptable to all countries for United Nations peace-keeping operations in the future. Any moves by the Soviet Union or other member states of the United Nations in support of these aims will have the firm and sympathetic support of Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government would welcome further discussion of these matters. UN/TED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL GENERAL .A/5726* ASSEMBLY 5 August 196V ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 AUGUST 1964 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit the text of a note by Her Majesty's Government in reply to the Soviet memorandum on United Nations peace-keeping operations—' which was delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 2k July by Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Moscow. I should be grateful if you would arrange for the note to be circulated both as a Security Council and General Assembly document.

(Signed) R.W. JACKLING Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations

* Also issued under the symbol 8/5853• I/ A/5721.

6^-16586 -2-

UNITED KINGDOM REPLY TO THE SOVIET MEMORANDUM OH PEACE-KEEPING

Her Majesty's Government have carefully studied the Soviet memorandum of 10 July on the strengthening of the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means is a fundamental principle of British foreign policy. The United Kingdom as a founder member of the United Nations therefore welcome the Soviet reaffirmation of support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, notably Article 1, paragraphs 1, 2 and ^. 2. Her Majesty's Government agree that it is important to "build further on the foundation of the agreements mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Soviet memorandum. Her Majesty's Government fully share the Soviet Government's view in paragraph 2 of their memorandum that the means for peaceful settlement of international disputes embodied in the United Nations Charter should be.used more extensively. Her Majesty's Government have already had occasion to suggest to the Soviet Government, in connexion with Premier Khrushchev's message of 31 December on the settlement of territorial disputes and frontier problems, that greater use should be made of negotiations, mediation and conciliation or other peaceful means in the settlement of international disputes, with particular reference to the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague and the machinery of the United Nations generally. 3.. This machinery has been gradually and in the view of Her Majesty's Government reasonably adapted to meet the great change in the international scene, which have, as the Soviet memorandum recognizes, occurred over the last two decades. Newly independent nations have come onto the scene and new problems have arisen in new situations which could not have been foreseen in 19^-5 • It has therefore been natural that over this period the United Nations has had to develop the necessary flexibility to enable it to deal with such dangers to peace as have arisen in various parts of the world. The United Nations has fortunately found means not only for dealing with breaches of the peace between States, but also cases in which the prospect for the maintenance of international peace have been undermined by the situation existing in certain areas. In these cases, the United Nations has been able to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by the provision of forces bearing arms, which have entered the territory of the -3-

States concerned with the consent of their Governments. Her Majesty's Government hope the Soviet Government have no intention of excluding the possibility of these valuable activities which are clearly in accordance with the United Nations Charter. k. Her Majesty's Government recognize the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. They welcome and continue to work for developments in the international situation which will reduce the divergencies of views among permanent members of the Security Council. But so long as these divergencies exist the International Community cannot allow them altogether to preclude the pursuit of joint action for the maintenance of international peace and security. Her Majesty's Government trust that the Soviet memorandum is not intended to support the doctrine that any permanent member of the Security Council has the right under the Charter wholly to prevent the United Nations fulfilling its peace-keeping role. 5. Her Majesty's Government note that the Soviet memorandum suggests that negotiations for the conclusion of special agreements under Article Vj of the Charter should be renewed so that forces may be placed at the disposal of the Security Council as originally contemplated. While it may be recalled that the lack of progress in this respect was in no way due to any obstruction on the part of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty's Government would be interested to learn at an appropriate time the views of the Soviet Government about how and when to resume discussions of this matter. Her Majesty's Government for their part are always ready to consider the possibilities of establishing under the appropriate chapters of the Charter efficient means for the maintenance of peace, including the placing of forces at the disposal of the Security Council for the purposes foreseen in Chapter VII of the Charter. 6. However, the basic question to be considered is the proper role of the Security Council and of the General Assembly respectively in relation to peace-keeping operations and their financing. In this connexion, in addition to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice entitled "Certain Expenses of the United Nations" dated 20 July 19^2, the deliberations of the General Assembly at its fourth special session in 19^3 are of special importance. In particular General Assembly resolutions 187^ (S-IV) and 1877 (S-IV) must be taken into account. The general principles set out in resolution 187^- to serve as guide-lines for the -It-

sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations,, and the proceedings of the "Working Group of 21" (established under resolutions 185^4- B (XVII) and 1880 (S-IV)), will have an important bearing on the work of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. It is noted here., in relation to resolution 1877 (S-IV), that the Soviet memorandum makes no mention of how the problem of arrears for past operations is to be solved. 7- In approaching the problems here involved. Her Majesty's Government have three considerations in mind. First, the responsibility of all Member States under the Charter to contribute to the expenses of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Second, the need to take account of any excessive burden which the costs of an extensive operation might impose on the economies of the developing countries. Thirdly, recognition of the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries^ since they may in fact have to bear a heavy financial responsibility for large peace-keeping operations. 8. The general ideas of Her Majesty's Government based on these principles have already been put to the Soviet Government at the beginning of March 196^. The salient features are as follows: (a) All peace-keeping proposals should be dealt with first by the Security Council and should be referred to the General Assembly only if the Security Council were to demonstrate that it was unable to act. (b) A Peace-Keeping Finance Committee, including all permanent members of the Security Council, would be established by the General Assembly. (c) The Committee would consider a number of alternative schemes for the financing of peace-keeping operations, including possibly any special scale of payments that might be formulated by the United Nations Working Group of Twenty-one. The General Assembly would arrange to act only on a recommendation from the Committee passed by a two-thirds majority of its membership. 9- These proposals were put to the USSR by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States Governments in a genuine attempt to find some compromise between the known views of the Soviet Union on the one hand and of the vast majority of United Nations membership on the other. The proposals cover the whole field of possible United Nations action involving the use of peace-keeping forces in the light of United Nations experience to date. Her Majesty's Government -5- suggest that the object of all Member nations should be to work towards agreement on the principles governing future peace-keeping operations, in particular the equitable sharing of the costs, taking account of developments since 19^4-5, including the relevant specific decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. 10. Her Majesty's Government are deeply concerned to maintain the principle of collective financial responsibility to put United Nations finances on a proper basis,, and to make effective arrangements acceptable to all countries for United • Nations peace-keeping operations in the future. Any moves by the Soviet Union or other Member States of the United Nations in support of these aims will have the firm and sympathetic support of Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's. Government would welcome further discussion of these matters. UNITED NATIONS Distr. S EC U RI T Y GENERAL S/5853* COUNCIL 5 August 1964 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER' DATED 5 AUGUST 196^ FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTJD7E OF THE UNITED KINGDOM "OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit the text of a note by Her Majesty's Government in reply to the Soviet memorandum on United Nations peace-keeping operations—' which was delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 2k' July by Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Moscow. I should be grateful if you would arrange for the note to be circulated both as a Security Council and General Assembly document.

(Signed) R.W. JACKLING Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the . United Nations

* Also issued under the symbol A/5726. I/ S/5811. -2-

UNITED KINGDOM REPLY TO THE SOVIET MEMORANDUM ON PEACE-KEEPING

Her Majesty's Government have carefully studied, the Soviet memorandum of 10 July on the strengthening of the effectiveness of the United Nations in the .maintenance of international peace and security. The settlement of international disputes ."by peaceful means is a fundamental principle of British foreign policy. The United Kingdom as a founder member of the United Nations therefore welcome the Soviet reaffirmation of support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, notably Article 1, paragraphs 1, 2 and k. 2. Her Majesty's Government agree that it is important to "build further on the. foundation of the agreements mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Soviet memorandum. Her Majesty's Government fully-share the Soviet Government's view in paragraph 2 of their memorandum that the means for peaceful settlement of international disputes embodied in the United Nations Charter should "be used more extensively. Her Majesty's Government have already had occasion to suggest to the Soviet Government, in connexion with Premier Khrushchev's message of 31 December on the settlement of territorial disputes and frontier problems, that greater use should be made of negotiations, mediation and conciliation or other peaceful means in the settlement of international disputes, with particular reference to the International Court of . Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague and the machinery of the United Nations generally. 3- This machinery has been gradually and in the view of Her Majesty's Government reasonably adapted to meet the great change in the international scene, which have, as the Soviet memorandum recognizes, occurred over the last two decades. Newly independent nations have come onto the scene and new problems have arisen in new situations which could not have been foreseen in 19^-5 • It has therefore been natural that over this period the United Nations has had to develop the necessary flexibility to enable it to deal with such dangers to peace as have arisen in various parts of the world. The United Nations has fortunately found means not only for dealing with breaches of the peace between States, but also cases in which the prospect for the maintenance of international peace have been undermined by the situation existing in certain areas. In these cases, the United Nations has been able to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by the provision of forces bearing arms, which have entered the territory of the -3-

States concerned with the consent of their Governments. Her Majesty's Government hope the Soviet Government have no intention of excluding the possibility of these valuable activities -which are clearly in accordance -with the United Nations Charter. k. Her Majesty's Government recognize the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. They welcome and continue to work for developments in the international situation which will reduce the divergencies of views among permanent members of the Security Council. But so long as these divergencies exist the International Community cannot allow them altogether to preclude the pursuit of joint action for the maintenance of international peace and security. Her Majesty's Government trust that the Soviet memorandum is not intended to support the doctrine that any permanent member of the Security Council has the right under the Charter wholly to prevent the United Nations fulfilling its peace-keeping role. 5- Her Majesty's Government note that the Soviet memorandum suggests that negotiations for the conclusion of special agreements under Article ^3 of the Charter should be renewed so that forces may be placed at the disposal of the Security Council as originally contemplated. While it may be recalled that the lack of progress in this respect was in no way due to any obstruction on the part of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty's Government would be interested to learn at an appropriate time the vievs of the Soviet Government about how and when to resume discussions of this matter. Her Majesty's Government for bheir part are always ready to consider the possibilities of establishing under the appropriate chapters of the Charter efficient means for the maintenance of peace, including the placing of forces at the disposal of the Security Council for the purposes foreseen in Chapter .VII of the Charter. 6. However, the basic question to be considered is the proper role of the Security Council and of the General Assembly respectively in relation to peace-keeping operations and their financing. In this connexion, in addition to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice entitled "Certain Expenses of the United Nations" dated 20 July 1962, the deliberations of the General Assembly at its fourth special session in 19&3 are of special importance. In particular . General Assembly resolutions 187^ (S^-IV) and 1877 (S-IV) must be taken into account. The general principles set out in resolution 187^ to serve as guide-lines for the sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations, and the proceedings of the "Working Group of 21" (established under resolutions 185^ B (XVII) and i860 (S-IV)), -will have an important tearing on the work of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. It is noted here, in relation to resolution 1877 (S-IV), that the Soviet memorandum, makes no mention of how the problem of arrears for past operations is to be solved. ' •• ' -; 7- In approaching the problems here involved, Her Majesty's Government have three considerations in mind. First, the responsibility of all Member States under the Charter to contribute to the expenses of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Second, the need to take account of any excessive burden which the costs of an extensive operation might impose on the economies of the developing countries . Thirdly, recognition of the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries, since they may in fact have to bear a heavy financial responsibility for large peace-keeping operations. 8. The general ideas of Her Majesty's Government based on these principles have already been put to the Soviet Government at the beginning of March 196^. The salient features are as follows: (a) All peace-keeping proposals should be dealt with first by the Security Council and should be referred to the General Assembly only if the Security Council were to demonstrate that it was unable to act. (b) A Peace-Keeping Finance Committee, including all permanent members of the Security Council, would be established by the General Assembly. (c) The Committee would consider a number of alternative schemes for the financing of peace-keeping operations, including possibly any special scale of payments that might be formulated by the United Nations Working Group of Twenty-one. The General Assembly would arrange to act only on a recommendation from the Committee passed by a two-thirds majority of its membership. 9- These proposals were put to the USSR by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States Governments in a genuine attempt to find some compromise between the known views of the Soviet Union on the one hand and of the vast majority of United Nations membership on the other. The proposals cover the . whole field of possible United Nations action involving the use of peace-keeping forces in the light of United Nations experience to date. Her Majesty's Government -5- suggest that the object of all Member nations should be to work towards agreement on the principles governing future peace-keeping operations, in particular the equitable sharing of the costs, taking account of developments since 19^5; including .the relevant specific decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. 10. Her Majesty's Government are deeply concerned to maintain the principle of collective financial responsibility to put United Nations finances on a proper basis, and to make effective arrangements acceptable to all countries' for United - Nations peace-keeping operations in the future. Any moves by the Soviet Union or .other Member States of the United Nations in support of these aims will have the. .. firm and sympathetic support of Her .Majesty1s Government. Her Majesty's. Government would welcome further discussion of these matters. . . / .f if

UNITED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL GENERAL - A/5726* ASSEMBLY 5 August 1964 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 AUGUST 1964 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO , THE'UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit the text of a note, by Her Majesty's Government in reply to the Soviet memorandum on United Nations peace-keeping operations— which was delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 24 July by Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Moscow. I should be grateful if you would arrange for the note to be circulated both as a Security Council and General Assembly document.

(Signed) R.¥. JACKLING • Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations :

* Also issued under the symbol S/5853• • \ I/ A/5721. 6^-16586 -2-

UNITED KINGDOM REPLY TO THE SOVIET MEMORANDUM ON PEACE -KEEPING

Her Majesty's Government have carefully studied the Soviet memorandum of 10 July on the strengthening of the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means is a fundamental principle of British foreign policy. The United Kingdom, as a founder member of the United Nations therefore welcome the Soviet reaffirmation of support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, notably Article 1, paragraphs 1, 2 and U. 2. Her Majesty's Government agree that it is important to "build further on the, foundation of the agreements mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Soviet memorandum. Her Majesty's Government fully-share the Soviet Government's view in paragraph 2 of their memorandum that the means for peaceful settlement of international disputes embodied in the United Nations Charter should be.used more extensively. Her Majesty's Government have already had occasion to suggest to the Soviet Government,, in connexion with Premier Khrushchev1s message of 51 December on the settlement of territorial disputes and frontier problems, that greater use should be made of negotiations, mediation and conciliation or other peaceful means in the settlement of international disputes, with particular reference to the International Court of . Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague and the machinery of the United Nations generally. 3.. This machinery has been gradually and in the view of Her Majesty's Government reasonably adapted to meet the great change in the international scene, which have, as the Soviet memorandum recognizes, occurred over the last two decades. Newly independent nations have come onto the scene and new problems have arisen in new situations which could not have been foreseen in 19^5• It has therefore been natural that over this period the United Nations has had to develop the necessary flexibility to enable it to deal with such dangers to peace as have arisen in various parts of the world. The United Nations has fortunately found means not only for dealing with breaches of the peace between States, but also cases in which the prospect for the maintenance of international peace have been undermined by the situation existing in certain areas. In these cases, the United Nations has been able to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by the provision of forces bearing arms, which have entered the territory of the -3-

States concerned -with the consent of their Governments. Her Majesty's Government hope the Soviet Government have no intention of excluding the possibility of these valuable activities which are clearly in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 4. Her Majesty's Government recognize the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. They welcome and continue to work for developments in the international situation which will reduce the divergencies of views among permanent members of the Security Council. But so long as these, divergencies exist the International Community cannot allow them altogether to preclude the pursuit of joint action for the maintenance of international peace and .security. Her Majesty's Government trust that the Soviet memorandum is not intended to support the doctrine that any permanent member of the Security Council has the right under the Charter wholly to prevent the United Nations fulfilling its peace-keeping role. 5- Her Majesty's Government note that the Soviet memorandum suggests that negotiations for the conclusion of special agreements under Article 43 of the Charter should be renewed so that forces may be placed at the disposal of the Security Council as originally contemplated. While it may be recalled that the lack of progress in this respect was in no way due to any obstruction on the part of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty's Government would be interested to learn at an appropriate time the views of the Soviet Government about how and when to resume discussions of this matter. Her Majesty's Government for their part are always ready to consider the possibilities of establishing under the appropriate chapters of the Charter efficient means for the maintenance of peace, including the placing of forces at the disposal of the Security Council for the purposes foreseen in Chapter .VII of the Charter. 6. However, the basic question to be considered is the proper role of the Security Council and of the General Assembly respectively in relation to peace-keeping operations and their financing. In this connexion, in addition to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice entitled "Certain Expenses of the United Nations" dated 20 July 19&2, the deliberations of the General Assembly at its fourth special session in 19^3 are of special importance. In particular General Assembly resolutions 187^ (S^-IV) and 1877 (S-IV) must be taken into account. The general principles set out in resolution 187^ to serve as guide-lines for the -If-

sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations, and the proceedings of the "Working Group of 21" (established under resolutions 185^ B (XVII) and i860 (S-IV)), -will have an important bearing on the work of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. It is noted here, in relation to resolution 1877 (S-IV), that the Soviet memorandum makes no mention of how the problem of arrears for past operations is to be solved. 7- In approaching the problems here involved, Her Majesty's Government have three

considerations in mind. First} the responsibility of all Member States under the Charter to contribute to the expenses of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Second, the need to take account of any excessive burden which the costs of an extensive operation might impose on the economies of the developing countries. Thirdly, recognition of the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries, since they may in fact have to bear a heavy financial responsibility for large peace-keeping operations. 8. The general ideas of Her Majesty's Government based on these principles have already been put to the Soviet Government at the beginning of March 196^. The salient features are as follows: (a) All peace-keeping proposals should be dealt with first by the Security Council and should be referred to the General Assembly only if the Security Council were to demonstrate that it was unable to act. (b) A Peace-Keeping Finance Committee, including all permanent members of the Security Council, would be established by the General Assembly. (c) The Committee would consider a number of alternative schemes for the financing of peace-keeping operations, including possibly any special scale of payments that might be formulated by the United Nations Working Group of Twenty-one. The General Assembly would arrange to act only on a recommendation from the Committee passed by a two-thirds majority of its membership. 9. These proposals were put to the USSR by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States Governments in a genuine attempt to find some compromise between the known views of the Soviet Union on the one hand and of the vast majority of United Nations membership on the other. The proposals cover the whole field of possible United Nations action involving the use of peace-keeping forces in the light of United Nations experience to date. Her Majesty's Government -5- suggest that the object of all Member nations should be to work towards agreement on the principles governing future peace-keeping operations, in particular the equitable sharing of the costs, taking account of developments since 19^5; including .the relevant specific decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. 10. Her Majesty's Government are deeply concerned to maintain the principle pf collective financial responsibility to put United Nations finances on a proper basis, and to make effective arrangements acceptable to all countries for United-. Nations peace-keeping operations in the future. Any moves by the Soviet Union .or other Member States of the United Nations in support of these aims will have the .. firm and sympathetic support of Her.Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's. Government would welcome further discussion of these matters...... Baltiim-e - 30 J©su©22T 1965

Sff £EAC&3ttKSS&: STASHES H3ACS&SS22KG

2 C. '¥. CBSESB CHEg1 ^S CAMIS5? ^ SB

is vesfy &j&s sss& ed? savlBg eiaeeeegiBg geaasatioas fssm the of wBar Is the s^jsssy pas^ose of tfe© Ifeited nations , in& tke Eii^sesssfSi session of t Is t&@ resalt of s eoratsweara^ o^eff tlie soSe of United Hatioas IE tJae peaec&eep&ag fi@2£,

Oae say esk9 Uotf is it possible to eteeiEgt&ea. t'ae ISsited sese who feel tfeat tfeis fiass fejr Esaas of isstituSiossl efoss-gs, 2fee?® a?a scse ^"no ciple of c&e vote f&s ose eouateF? &&?ge ou,1S33a.@a sefi timt gcs^ sjrstos of 'cJ®igtitsd vot-iisg is ©3*© tJiose i€s© ^sliei^ that ££3 couat^ ekouM IIUTQ a vote* Cosaadl. ISiegQ ®s© ysr6 oth^s vSuo fee! i&srfj the « ifee Seca^-i^1 CJousaaii is the the -easterns theories e'fto^s ifeat SGSJS l^stil^ticfj^l cliaagos «1I3, useful asS ass iafieetl l&feeljr to Iss smfis; ^ut ths^r So net

i&e BO js-o-alsii^i for the ItisS ©f peaG^iespiffig spes^tioiss ISiat the

pacific

to resS.^iml ©gs-ieies 02? -s-

S&© staticaing f os?e@s t?ill &ave to be Jsy. as esttsasioa of t&fi latss'ps'-etatloa a? Ssticle 33 as essp^sssioa "othes? peaceful sssssa. Chapts? VXI ©etioii b^ the Ssea^itj Ssu32cil la action Ms to ^e tsfeea wt© saistaia or restore ra peace. asafl sec^rit.y e- Slest ©f 13ie sre-eeat ^MteS Hatioas psm ojsE^tioss TJil3. not qp^li^r cades' Shsftsr ¥H ©itJiej?. It is olsvicms that Uie pc&itieal evol^tloa of ijeaeeke^ place ia © ^asuer aot ea-slsstgsS ia th® ^aclB^it of -tfes Chssftes? to psf©¥S,d© foK» o;g©gatioss is ii!^?a®tiG!al? other ^s&js @si*3 sseaas fea^e te fee t tc m$s& it possible for the laslted latioas to to plsjf a isssfiii s1©!© la tbls fieM. fee ef tSia smjos1 ticgss fo^ -s^glag tSie psase. At a ssfiest es-b ssilita^ pass's spesfl. scssettsiias M3se $120 "siHioa a S^e ttstal Sissaaeial iM©^t©SEess ©f tu© is lees tSsaa |5®0 sUMoa t^ick is csss

2. Evesiy eK^orfe slioislfi be isjafie to svoM & soafs^s'fea'&ioa la &@g&i& to tihe iBtesrp'etatioa of Article 19. 3. She f&iaaeisl si-tnjatiaa of the it sfeoiald be see-tesd to solvssaey ^r eubstsatisl f the in all its lias lases so leek of ccptmts?ies £!o? the p^c^:«aj>iag role of lave earp3?eseea t3a@i? Himssg&ess to forces fop use by i^e (Baited Satioas la to S3?07!<2e 3bos?.stic SGSPori £o? ssoirias -feeo^gs ©nd KSitsiKlQi, la the s»eee&t> PslBa Kirsiater of t&e Gove^sssat of is favcsiw of Ms eff cs-t Sa this ba-tfS reea]JltQiai&icn it skoulS sab sole o? the IMteS HEM.OES la pssee^s • i&e role of a fS^e &rigafle. la regss-fi to •5-

soft especially auelessr dleasaassEieiat the t&£3$sd nations fcss a -vital role to plays it ca&tot fee sogazfled as Q an&ibep ©tasg> for ES^OJ? fieeieioas readied. la Mlat€SGl or 't^lattaeal ca? othes? Esgotatiocsj coafluetea • oytsids of it, UMs is p33r&tew2ss>3y the case since aueleas? £Htll«ot£b does ao-fc respect aatioml f3?QatieESf ©ad &a atomic ^s?^? %111 ^rore flieastsrous not ^ust for i&e * Imt fog- t&s ^ole W3s«M« Ea this r@^vd tlte say veiH afiopb, tdt& sH^it as3fii£icatlo&> a slogas gcdag back to tbe ss»ly S©^s of t&e AEsesleaa r0rol»zfeioa: UN ITEP NATIONS _ _ _ ^ ^X^ L-^**x. ^. GENERA>~. i- i i r n A Li ^ LIMITED

ASSEMBLY ORIGHTAL: ENGLISH

nineteenth session.

COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE -KEEPING OPERATIONS IH ALL THEIR ASPECTS Dre.ft resolution j^abaiitted by the President of the General Assembly

The general Assembly. Concerned with the situation at its nineteenth session,

Deeply anxiousi to resolve urgently the problems which have arisen at the nineteenth session, so as to enable the Organization to continue to fulfil its objectives, Considering it necessary to ensure as soon as possible the normalization of

its work; •*-• Invites the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, as a matter of urgency, jointly to make arrangements for and to undertake appropriate consultations on the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the. Organization; ^* 'Establishes a Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, under the chairmanship of the President of the General Assembly and with the collaboration of the Secretary-General, to be composed of the following Member States:

3. Instructs the Special Committee, taking into account the consultations envisaged in paragraph 1 above, to undertake as soon as possible a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization; Ij-, Requests the Special Committee to submit a report to the General Assembly as soon as possible and not later than 15 June 1965.

65-02809 UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y.

BRITAIN PLEDGES SUPPORT FOR U.N. PEACB-KLF'ING.

Official Text of Statement Mr. Michael Stewart, M.P. No. 12.

The following is the text of a statement, raa'de "by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart, M.P., in the House of Commons, today, February 23. "Now that the General Assembly has adjourned I wish to assure the House that we and the vast majority of nations are determined to do our utmost to see that the United Nations shall emerge from tv>ls crisis stronger tfo-an "before. To this end the Secretary-General and the President of the General Asssmbly have been invited as a matter of urgency to undertake appropriate consultations, and a decision has been taken to establish a Beace-Keeping Committee, For this outcome much credit is due to my noble friend, Lord Caradon. The Committee is required to undertake as soon as possible a comprhensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the organisation. It is to submit a report to the General Assembly not later than the 15 June. The Assembly has adjourned until 1 September unless it proves necessary to reconvene it earlier in the light of the Committee's report. A single vote necessary to reach this situation, and postponing the Article 19 issue, was taken without prejudice to conflicting views.

This country intends to play a leading part in the Peace-Keeping Committee, and we intend to bring to it new ideas worked out in consultation with experts on United Nations affairs. Further, as an earnest of our intention we shall make the following offc-r of support to United Nations jpeace-JEeeping. If so requested, and subject to our national commitments, we will help to provide logistic backing for a United Nations force of up to six infantry battalions. This could include, for example, shert-range aircraft, engineering and signal troops, and ambulance, ordance and motor transport units.

If it were desirable, suitable units of these categories would be ear-marked for use as available, Her Majestjr's Government also hope to take a share in providing long-range Aircraft for the transport of peace-keeping forces. The financing of this offer would depend on the arrangements prevailing at the time, i J Great Powers are and should be closely concerned with United Nations problems. But they are not alone. The United Nations must develop as a result of discussions and Agreement among all its members great and small. Small nations i /have have played a great'c part in the United Nations itself, and it is to their interest and that of the United Nations that they should continue to do so. With this in mind, the 18th Session of the General Assembly passed resolutions expanding the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. This involves Charter amendments which Her Majesty's Government intend to ratify. It Is ono thing to keep the peace, another to settle the problems which threaten peace. A number of experts are considering the process of settling disputes by conciliation, mediation, arbitration and other methods. After examining their recommendations we shall expect to make positive suggestions. The Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and many other'organs of the United Nations can continue their work despite the Assembly's adjournment.. ^Disarmament negotiations can continue, the United Nations Trade and Development Board can go to work, so can the Human Rights Commission in which Her Majesty's Government have a keen and continuing interest. We shall continue to work in all these fields. We have announced our increased contribution to Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. Great difficulties remain. But we are determined that solutions must be found. The United Nations must be enabled to fulfil its task of keeping the peace and improving the conditions of human life. BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES News Division

February 23, 1965

BRITAIN'S PLEDGE OF SUPPORT jWJJ_.j^._^PEAC_Eig:EPING COMMITTEE

Britain means to play a leading part in the Peacekeeping Committee of the United Nations, and intends to "bring to it new ideas worked out in consultation with experts on United Nations affairs. British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, .affirmed this in the House 'of Commons today (Tuesday) in a statement in which he declared that Britain and "the vast majority of nations" were determined to do their utmost to see that the U.N. would emerge from its current crisis stronger than ever before. After paying tribute to the part played by Lord Caradon, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in the negotiations which led to the setting up of the U.N. Peacekeeping Committee, Mr. Stewart made the following offer of support: "If so requested, and subject to our national commitments, we will help to provide logistic backing for a United Nations force of up to six infantry battalions. This could include, for example, short-range aircraft, engineering and signal troops, and ambulance, ordnance and motor transport units. If it were desirable, suitable units of these categories would be ear-marked for use as available. H.M. Government also hope to take a share in providing long- range aircraft for the transport of peacekeeping forces. The financing of this offer would depend on the arrangements prevailing at the time. Great powers are and should be closely concerned with United Nations' problems. But they are not alone: the United Nations must develop as a result of discussions and agreement among all its members, great and small. /Small ..,

845 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y., 10022, Telephone: PLaza 2-8400

This material is filed with the Department of Justice, where the required registration statement of B.I.S. under 56 Stat. 248-258 as an agency of the British Government is available for inspection. Registration does not imply approval of this material by the United States Government. — 2 —

Small nations have played a great part in the United Nations itself: and it is to their interest and that of the United Nations that they should continue to do so. With this in mind the 18th. Session of the General Assembly passed resolutions expanding the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. This involves Charter amendments which H.M. Government intend to ratify. It is one thing to keep the peace; another to settle the problems which threaten peace. A number of experts are considering the process of settling disputes by conciliation, mediation, arbitration and other methods. After examining their recommendations we shall expect to make positive suggestions. The Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and many other organs of the United Nations can continue their work despite the Assembly's adjournment. Disarmament negotiations can continue; the United Nations Trade and Development Board can go to work: so can the Human Rights Commission in which H.M. Government have a keen and continuing interest. We shall continue to work in all these fields. We have announced our increased contribution to Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. Great difficulties remain. But we are determined that solutions must be found; the United Nations must be enabled to fulfil its task of keeping the peace and improving conditions of humanity. UNITED NATIONS Press Services Office of Public Information United Nations, N.Y. (FOR UEB OF INFORMATION MEDIA — NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release GA/3005 27 February 1965

MEMBERSHIP OF SFHCIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

After appropriate consultations by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, the following Members have accepted to serve on the Special Comnittee on Peace-Keeping Operations established under paragraph 2 of General AsseiTfbly resolution 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Iraq., Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Spain, •Sweden, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

•x- #** *

t „ *>{f '' r J TTMES. Sunday, 3 April 1966 U.N. Peace Urged in Johns Hbpkffis

Special to The Kew,Tork Time? WASHINGTON,^ April 2 — reached\on maintaining such a | Establishment of a permanent force permanently. United Nations peace observa- Until nowj each case of ob- servation or peace-keeping has tion corps that could promptly seen, handled., by Jmprovising a 'be ordered into trouble spots is group when the need arose. recommended in a study pre- Soviet Proposal Recalled pared for 'the Arms Control and In July, 1964, the. Soviet Disarmament Agency. ^ , Union .circulated a memoran- , As ^a star Vthe peace observa- dum to other governments sug- :ion corps would be Built1 around gesting establishment of a per- a cadre of 50 specially 'trained manent United Nations peace offiders assigned to the United force under jurisdiction' of the STations Secretariat. They would Security Councirthat would ex- 3e supplemented on missions by clude the 'Big Five powers — officers ana^men provided by Britain, China, France, the So- individual nations. viet Union and the United States. The recomrnendation is con- United::States .observers crit- tained in a lengthy study of icized the plan as an effort to past peace-observation/ efforts endorse the long-standing So- prepared^ bit ^ the Washington viet view that only the Security! Center of1 Foreign Policy Re- Council could dii^ect^eace-keep- search. of ttte_ Johns Hopkins ing, effort. The United States School of Advanced Internation- has favored a role for the Gen- al Studies under a ?150,oqO re- eral Assembly if the Council is search grant from the Djisarma- paralyzed by a veto. No prac- ment Agency. tical action,was4ak.gn,,tp set up J * H | The ' ;was made public the force suggf ' -page book, titled viet Union. Peace Observa- ilished by the Johns is. The r^ort is described as the first" comprehensive , historical study of /the successes iand fail- ures in 70 peace-observation and peace-keeping" attempts during the last 45 years, by the League of Nations, the Organization of American States and the United Nations. k , 'Th& study (was made under the direction of Daviji W. fWain- house, former1 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and United States Minister to Austria Associated with him were Bernhard G, Bechhoef er, former adviser to United States disarm- ament Delegations; John C. Dreier,' former i United States Ambassador in the Organiza- tion of American States; Harry R. Turkel* former United States Ambassador rn the Inter-Amer- ican Economic and Social Coun- cil, and' Benjamin Gerig, former •iifectbr of the iState Depart- ment's Office of Area Affairs. Observation Ui SpeciaHo The N^^^^-^ . » UNITED NATIONS, N. T., April J2 — A United Nations Peace'obseirvation' Commission, established in 1951, has observed alleged breaches of the peace mber states. 'for example, ussion to the Greece at the 'Greek Govern- roup reported on incidents along the border with Albania' and Bulgaria. It was disbanded in August, '^954,! at the request of Greece. / A special United Nations Mil- itary Observer Group observes conditionsN on-^the troubled, In- dian-Pakistani/fr6htier., i"1 These) ] groups! differ,, from peace-keeping forces like those sent to the Congo and tne Gaza Strip in having no large i body of personnel to,, keep hostile forces apart. Their" duty is only to investigate} and report on incidents. / v Articles 43, 44 and 45 of the Charter provide ^for troop con- tingents toj ,be held- ready by member states forJuse, in main- taining or restoring peace on behalf of _(th.e United '..Nations when necessary.' Howevier, np agreement has, ''ever, been cc: Dr. Baaclie Mr. Rola-Beaaett Mr, Lemieusc

11

you 'for your latta? 27 September We tlia& ft wisM t*e SBpeas f^Lta a ^00 to

tie sagg^et tlmt at tbe ^taest tiiae jroa siio»M tefce csi tlss mittef "Bitti t3» ©tsv^ijsjeat 0t&sr ifca ta tstoi 't&at tiss 06©3?staf^«8eneml iauc9i apB^etotss the of tli© SweKQMisfc of JfeJLta to m&® analiible to the Ifetisaas a eoastis^est foaf saight Isess w€le«sd by the ao ties ereatim of & or of ttos tfeited tfati^ss S» adlitasy result essapsaaitleaa of tte to fee le , of aeeessity^ ijgr th® csf the sJfcuatim gives rlee to the asod for a

Us?* S*B* tfce '.la •*» •**

of sad ija^sta^a tfeese £lre®B§taziei!3S» It sight also be m a suitable oesSa©ioiit t® ssa^@ eleas* to tfeie d^weraseHt of Stilts tfcat tte mi^3s2?JdJ3g of troops for IMit@d teeplj^ opdmtioaas Implies s® fto^iacMl a^spanalMlity on the part of the tlal-fesa Slatieas, «»3£©s ^aa wr&il tfee B a UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME c/o OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, Tel C. 25231 AUBERGE D'ARAGON,

Our Ref. .. VALLETTA, MALTA. Your Ref.

27th September, 1966. CONFIDENTIAL

I don't know except in very general terms what the situation is nou) about the supply of suitable troops for peace-keeping operations, as distinguished from the question of paying for them. ^However, the possibilities here may perhaps be worth keeping in mind. In particular, the British defence cuts may result in a situation where some well-trained English-speaking troops are available which the Government might be quite glad to have employed and paid for outside Malta.

For'instance - this is an illustration to give the picture more body, not a forecast - there could be a disbandment of artillery units at present forming'part of the British Army, Maltese soldiers with mostly Maltese officers; and ground (uniformed) personnel now embodied in the British Air Force. All of these are trained troops, with small arms training included. In the event of change's of 'this sort 'it seems probable that enough Maltese officers could be the permanent/. found from the Maltese units in the British army and from/offleer* cadre of the Maltese Land Force, a wholly Maltese controlled and financed territorial force, with a permanent nucleus. The resulting units would of course have to be reformed as a wholly Maltese force*, but this would not appear to present any insurmountable difficulties.

I would myself speculate in terms of a contingent of 400/500 men, though a rather larger one might well be possible depending on circumstances.

Politically, I imagine that Maltese troops mould have quite a wide range of acceptability. The country is of course in deficit financially and an arrangement would only be feasible at all on condition that the financing came from outside Malta.

I am of course not mentioning this notion to anybody and mill amait any comments you may care to send*

G.E. Yates

Mr. C.V. Narasimhan, United Nations.

XERO COPY CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Saturday, 19 November 1966

an By Mario Rossi jQ gested that the demands of principle should study to bring about a compilation and Special correspondent of be set aside for the time being and "stren- analysis of the experience gained and the The Christian Science Monitor uous efforts should be made to achieve cer- tain limited results." practice acquired over the many years United Nations, N.Y. when the UN has acted in a peacekeeping He proposed a number of practical steps. capacity. "First," he said, "it would be useful to Another attempt is being made to fill a Third, Sweden suggested a study on hoyv large gap .in United Nations machinery— obtain a survey of the preparations that provision of armed forces, assistance, and lack of a workable policy for meeting threats have been undertaken by certain member facilities could be made available to the to the world peace. countries for participation in peacekeeping Security Council, on its call, within the UN members long have sought such a operations." framework of peacekeeping operations. policy. They well remember, of course, that The Swedish Ambassador referred in par- a divergence of views among great powers ticular to arrangements for earmarking Financing studied on this issue paralyzed the organization two certain military and civilian units or serv- years ago and actually threatened its very ices to be kept ready for use in the peace- Finally, Sweden suggested that since ex- existence. keeping operations duly authorized by a perience has shown that no country can be In the light of this background, a practi- competent organ of the UN. compelled to pay for peacekeeping operaJ cal proposal was put forward by Sweden, tions, "The General Assembly would be well-! which in the 21-year history of the UN has No obligation intended advised to limit itself, at this session, to rec- done more than its share in contributing ommend a special scale of apportionment or "So far," he stated, "the United Nations to arrange for one to be worked out." to peacekeeping operations. has not been able even to take official cog- Two great Swedes — Secretary-General nizance of those arrangements. It might be This scale would serve as a prearranged Dag Hammarskjold and Palestine mediator useful to invite member countries to furnish model which could eventually be changed Folke Bernadotte—were killed "in the serv- such information to the Secretary-General to suit specific circumstances. ice of the UN. and to authorize him to receive it in the Ambassador Astrom warned that unless name of the United Nations." limited steps were agreed upon, the United Limited plan proposed In so doing, the countries concerned Nations might not be prepared to deal with In a statement Thursday before the Gen- •would not place an obligation on either future emergencies, with all that that im- Political Committee themselves or the United Nations. plies, for the preservation of peace,in..the Astrom sug- Second, Sweden is proposing a technical world. UNITED NATIONS Distr. CSECURITY

C\ I I M C I I 5 April 1967

LETTER DATED k APRIL 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE. SECURITY COUNCIL

I should be grateful if you' would take the necessary steps to have the attached memorandum of the USSR Government concerning "United Nations 'Operations for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security" circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) N. FEDORENKO

67-0731^ S/T814-1 English Page 2

MEMORANDUM

OF THE USSR GOVERNMENT CONCERNING "UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY"

The question of operations for the maintenance of international peace and security with the use of armed forces has recently "been the subject of active debate in the United Nations. As is well known, one of the principal purposes of the United Nations, as laid down in its Charter, is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, i.e. to maintain international peace and security. Accordingly, interest in the question how the United Nations fulfils its functions in that field is entirely understandable. However, certain Powers ostensibly concerned to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in safeguarding international peace and security are in fact launching an offensive against the provisions of the United Nations Charter which regulate measures taken on behalf of the Organization to safeguard or restore international peace, in particular measures connected with the employment of armed force. What we refer to is the undisguised effort to accelerate the elaboration of proposals aimed at revising the basic provisions of the United Nations Charter, under which the Security Council alone is authorized to decide on all questions pertaining to measures for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations Charter has never suited those whose purposes and political principles differ from the purposes and principles of the Charter. One cannot fail to see that the object of the propaganda campaign developed by the United States and some of its allies is to exert influence upon those States, particularly smaller nations, for which the United Nations, as established on the basis of its Charter, is an important guarantee of their security and independence. The current discussion in the United Nations of the problems of safeguarding international peace and security shows that some States threatened by the encroachment of the imperialist Powers on their independence and sovereignty fear that the United Nations will not be in a position to safeguard their security effectively unless the General Assembly is given the power to adopt decisions on peace-keeping operations, binding on all Members of the United Nations, designed to protect the victims of imperialist aggression, including the dispatch of S/781+1 English Page Z

United Nations armed forces to the affected areas. In that connexion, it has "been suggested on a number of occasions that the Western Powers would be unable to prevent the adoption of such decisions by the General Assembly- because they possess no right of veto in that body, whereas they do possess the right of veto in the Security Council and could therefore use it to block the adoption of such decisions, Accordingly, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to outline its position on the question of United Nations measures involving the employment of armed forces - a question of vital importance to the Organization. At the very outset we must warn against certain dangerous misconceptions, such as the idea that the security of small nations can be safeguarded, with United Nations assistance, on any basis other than that of strict observance of the provisions of the United Nations Charter which regulate the employment of force on behalf of the Organization. In point of fact, only the unfailing observance of the Charter can provide a real guarantee that armed forces are not used for objectives which have nothing in common with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter or with the intentions of States which would like to use such forces for the protection of their security. Conversely, the contravention of those provisions gives the imperialist Powers a completely free hand, by turning the United Nations forces into an instrument for securing their narrow interests to the detriment of the small nations. In other words, there is and can be no way of using armed forces on behalf of the United Nations in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter other than that of strictly observing the Charter. If we picture the situation which would arise if the General Assembly were authorized to take binding decisions on the maintenance of peace and security, it is clear that such a state of affairs would be precisely in the interests of the Powers which have long been seeking to achieve that objective. ' It will be recalled in that connexion that in 1950, under pressure from the United States, the United Nations adopted the notorious "Uniting' for Peace" resolution, under the terms of which measures for the maintenance of peace with the use of armed forces could be taken by the General Assembly also. And when it is considered that at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly certain Powers 3/78*1.1 English Page 4

again attempted to sanction the conduct of United Rations peace-keeping operations by the General Assembly and this time also to turn over to the Assembly the financing of such operations, then surely the small countries should be put on their guard by the stubborn efforts of the Powers concerned to shatter the Charter, which regulates the use of force on behalf of the United Nations-. This fact shows that the Powers which are seeking to breach the Charter by the application of pressure have still not given up their attempts to impose on the General Assembly decisions convenient to them and aimed against the independence and sovereighty of the smaller States. If they were to succeed, the United Nations, so far as the use of armed forces is concerned., would become an instrument in their hands by using which they could re-establish the colonial and neo-colonial order in regions in which colonialism has been defeated. Is not it a fact that voices are being heard in the United States arguing that the United Nations flag should be used to cover up United States aggression in Viet-Nam? To give the General Assembly such functions would be dangerous to many independent States in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and to the world at large. That is precisely where the proposals on peace-keeping operations made by Ireland and Canada at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly are leading us. They are a continuation of the attempts already made to revise and breach the most important provisions of the United Nations Charter which regulate the use of force on behalf of the Organization. It is of course gratifying to note that the majority of the States Members of the United Nations have demonstrated their high sense of responsibility for the future of the Organization and have not taken the lead of those who have sought to push the United Nations on to a course of violating the Charter of the Organization. At the same time the Soviet Government would like to point out that the use of the machinery for the maintenance of international peace and security, as prescribed in the United Nations Charter, is of particular importance in protecting the interests of newly independent States. The principle that the permanent members of the Security Council must be unanimous in taking decisions on questions relating to the maintenance of international peace is important not only for the Soviet Union which is capable of defending itself against any external danger, and not so much for the Soviet Union as for the newly independent States which are not yet firmly established. The Soviet Union cannot agree to the Charter being undermined - and it cannot agree that English Page 5

questions relating to the use of force on the behalf of the United Nations should be referred for decision by a mechanical majority of votes in the General Assembly - mainly because the imperialist forces can use this procedure in their awn interests. The right of veto in the hands of the Soviet Union is an important guarantee of the independence and sovereignty of smaller States. The Arab and other independent States know from their own experience how, in the Security Council, the Soviet Union opposes attacks by the imperialist States on newly independent States. If the rule of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council did not exist, the imperialists could without any difficulty use the United.Nations for crushing the national liberation movements of peoples. This is exactly what happened in the Organization of American States when the United States of America succeeded in obtaining authorization from a majority of States members of that organization for United States aggression against the Dominican Republic. It is also a fact that the existence of the principle of unanimity in the Security Counci^ prevented United Nations support being given to Portuguese colonizers who had been thrown out of Goa. Similarly, the existence of this principle prevented the Security Council from taking a decision directed against Indonesia. When speaking of the possibilities of using force on the behalf of the Organization, we cannot fail to take into account the nature and character of the United Nations itself, as they are reflected in its Charter. The United Nations was founded in 19^5 as an organization for co-operation between States with a view to maintaining international peace and security, preventing and removing threats to peace, suppressing acts of aggression, promoting the peaceful settlement of international disputes, developing friendly relations between States and achieving international co-operation on economic, social and humanitarian matters. Realizing that, the question of the use of force on behalf of the United Nations is one of the main questions relating to the Organization's activities, and that the responsibility which the United Nations assumes in this respect is particularly great, the authors of the Charter strictly regulated the Organization^ actions in this field. As is known, in accordance with the Charter, decisions of all kinds relating to the dispatch of United Nations troops can be taken only by the Security Council witil S/781H English Page 6 the agreement of all its permanent members. This constitutes a reliable guarantee that armed forces employed on behalf of the United Nations will not be used in the narrow interests of any State or group of States. If, let us say, there was no rule in the Security Council requiring unanimity among its permanent members, and if the application of peace-keeping measures was decided by a majority of votes, then an attempt by some permanent members of the Security Council to use armed forces against the interests of other permanent members could in practice mean only one thing - namely, war. Of course, no international inter-governmental organization can or should initiate a new war, and thereby dig its own grave. The founders of the United Nations clearly realized this as long ago as 19^4-^5 when they drafted the United Nations Charter and when, having made enormous efforts to discover a mutually acceptable solution, they found a way out by giving the permanent members of the Security Council the right of "veto". This is the only correct and only possible solution in the conditions which actually exist in the world. The experience of the United Nations itself shows very clearly that violations of the Charter in matters connected with the use of armed force on behalf of the Organization - including matters relating to the financing of such a force - cannot fail to lead, and do in fact lead, to situations in which operations of this kind are used for purposes that have nothing in common with the objectives and principles of the Charter, and actually damage the Organization itself. There is yet another important aspect of this question. If decisions on the question of using armed forces on behalf of the United Nations are taken by the General Assembly, this implies that the military operations concerned would be conducted, not under the direction of the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee - as prescribed in the Charter - but under the direction of the United Nations Secretariat. It is not difficult to imagine what consequences this might have, and indeed the consequences which it has had, when, such attempts have been made. And quite regardless of the person who holds the office of Secretary-General. Even the most authoritative and impartial figure cannot settle problems which should be settled by States themselves and by their Governments, guided by the Charter. Everyone will remember, for instance, how disastrous it was for the Congo that, as a result of efforts made by the Western Powers, the direction of United Nations operations in that country was removed from the Security Council and handed over to S/78M English Page 7

the United Nations Secretariat. As may be seen from the book by Mr. O'Brien., former United Nations representative in Katanga, all matters relating to the Congo were thereafter dealt with in the United Nations by the so-called "Congo Club", which consisted of United States citizens grouped around Hammarskjold on the Secretariat staff. In those circumstances, as O'Brien points out, it was the United Nations Secretariat itself that took the shameful decision which transformed the United Nations forces in the Congo into actual accomplices in the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, at whose request the troops had in fact been sent to the Congo. As a result of similar violations of the United Nations Charter in the course of operations in the Congo, foreign monopolies proved to be the only force which gained anything from the Congo tragedy. The experience of the Congo serves as a solemn warning that it is not by violating the Charter, which governs the use of force on behalf of the Organization, that one can seek protection from aggressors and violators of the United Nations Charter. With all these circumstances in mind the Soviet Government is firmly convinced that the provisions of the United Nations Charter governing the use of force on behalf of the Organization are a reliable guarantee of the interests of the newly independent States and of all peace-loving countries, and that any attempt to revise them might have very dangerous consequences. For that reason, on the question of United Nations armed forces too, the Soviet Union has been and still is advocating measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the Organization in the .safeguarding of international peace and security, based on the strict observance of the United Nations Charter and the utilization of the possibilities inherent in the Charter. This position was outlined in the memorandum of the Government of the USSR dated 10 July 196^ regarding certain measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security. No one who is genuinely prepared to help in strengthening the United Nations machinery for the maintenance of international peace, as provided for in the Organization^ Charter, can deny that the implementation of these proposals would be of great positive value. As is known, the Soviet Government^ proposals envisage, first, that the newly independent States should be invited to participate to the greatest possible extent in the Security Council's work on the preparation and English Page 8 conduct of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Implementation of these proposals would make it possible for a large number of these States to participate in the work of the Security Council's Military Staff Committee, in the general strategic direction of a United Nations force created for a given purpose} and in the operational command of this force. These States would also play an important role in the regional bodies which the Military Staff Committee might set up for different regions of the world. In the Soviet Government's proposals, there is also a reference to the need for an appreciable increase in the Security Council's readiness to take rapid and effective action. This could be achieved, in particular, by concluding the agreements provided for in Article ij-5 of the Charter, which define the procedures under which contingents are placed at the disposal of the Council by States, and also by having States undertake, in accordance with Article lf-5 of the Charter, to hold certain contingents immediately available for placing at the Councilrs disposal. The possibility of implementing these important provisions of the United Nations Charter without delay is evident from the well-known statements made at the end of 196U by the Governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which both declared that they were ready to place contingents of their armed forces at the Security Councills disposal and to conclude the relevant agreements with the Council. As is known, the Soviet Unionrs proposals point to other possibilities inherent in the United Nations Charter for strengthening the Organization's machinery for the maintenance and restoration of international peace. In particular, the proposals envisage a wide range of possible methods of financing for the Security Council to choose from, when it has to take a decision on the financial aspects of this or that operation. The Council may, for instance, decide to charge the costs of a given operation to the aggressor, to apportion them among States Members of the United nations, or to cover the costs by voluntary contributions or payments made by the parties directly concerned, etc. Thus, in regard to efforts to promote the implementation of the provisions of the United Hations Charter - and, in particular, the provisions relating to such an important field of the Organization's activities as the maintenance of international peace and security - the Soviet Union is second to none. S/78M English Page 9

In stating its willingness to co-operate with States Members of the United Nations in this respect, the Soviet Government in turn expects that its proposals in this connexion will be given due consideration by States Members of the Organization. At the same time, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to stress once again that the Soviet Union will oppose any attempts to revise the provisions of the Charter relating to the use of armed force on behalf of the United Nations, or to the terms on which such operations are financed. The Soviet Union will not be able to remain a detached observer of breaches of the United Nations Charter, which would enable certain Western Powers to impose upon the General Assembly decisions likely to impair the basic interests of Member States of the United Nations. If Member States of the United Nations were to embark on that course, a situation would arise in which the Soviet Union would be obliged to reconsider its attitude to United Nations activities. In expressing these considerations regarding one of the most important aspects of United Nations activities, on which the very fate of the United Nations largely depends, the Soviet Government hopes that the Governments of Member States of the United Nations will give careful attention to these considerations and will take positions in keeping with the United Nations Charter, with the interests of maintaining and strengthening the United Nations and with the interests of peace.

Moscow 16 March 1967. UNITED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL SECURITY COUNCIL il 1967 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 196? FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to draw the attention of the Security Council to the offer made "by the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in accordance with Article ^3 of the Charter of the United Nations and contained in the Czechoslovak statement of 26 November 196^ (S/6070) which in particular reads as follows:

"The Permanent Mission .of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations has been authorized to declare in this connexion that under conditions explained in the present statement,, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in accordance with Article Vj of the United Nations Charter, is ready to make available' to the Security Council a contingent of the Czechoslovak armed forces, Under condition that the principles referred to in the Czechoslovak statement will be put to life, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in compliance with provisions of Article ^3 of the Charter, is ready to conclude an appropriate agreement with the Security Council. If necessary and under conditions specified in the present statement, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is willing to participate in the financial coverage of military operations conducted by the Security Council.

The Government of the.Czechoslovak Socialist Republic expects that all questions related to the strengthening of the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security will be considered with the objective to work out within this framework also generally recognized rules for United Nations military operations meeting the provisions of the United Nations Charter."

The agreement which the Czechoslovak Government is ready to conclude with the Security Council should proceed from the following principles: (l) Armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council by Members of the United Nations shall be employed for the sole purpose of maintaining and restoring international peace and security in cases of existence of any threat to the peace, of any breach of the peace, or any act of aggression, should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article Ul would be

67-08112 S/7852 English Page 2

inadequate or have proved to be inadequate or should the threat to international peace and security be such as to necessitate the employment of these armed forces. (2) These armed forces shall be limited in such a way as to be adequate for carrying out effective actions to maintain or restore international peace and security. The employment of these armed forces shall be decided upon by the Security Council with the participation of and in agreement with the Member State, the military contingent of which will be involved. (j) A military contingent, made available to the Security Council in accordance with an agreement would be employed in whole or in part solely on the basis of a valid decision of the Security Council and only for a period necessary for the fulfilment of the tasks envisaged in Article k-2 of the Charter. After having carried out the tasks envisaged in Article k2 of the Charter the military contingent shall be withdrawn to the territory of the State which had made it available. (ij-) Size and composition of the military contingent shall be determined in an agreement concluded by the Security Council with the respective Member of the United Nations. The Security Council shall take due care to the effect that the States Members of the United Nations belonging to different social and economic systems contribute to the total number of armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council on the basis of this agreement. (5) The military contingent shall be made available from among especially selected and trained units of national armed forces prepared for the fulfilment of those tasks. (6) The Security Council shall secure assistance and facilities, including rights of passage to the armed forces made available to the Security Council on the basis of the agreement on its call. (7) The military contingent shall be located in the territory of the State which undertook to make it available to the Security Council. In the implementation of measures envisaged in Article kS. of the Charter, such a contingent shall be located in the **?rea determined by the Security Council in agreement with the Government of the country which undertook to place it at the disposal of the Council. S/7852 English Page 3

(8) The degree of readiness of the 'Germed forces which., under an appropriate agreement, States shall keep ready for use "by the Security Council on its call, shall be specified in that agreement. (9) The individual contingents of armed forces shall remain also during their employment under national command and jurisdiction. The contingents will retain their national character and will always he subject to rules and regulations in force in their respective national armed forces. In the event that the Security Council employs such contingents, the Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for their strategic direction. (10) After the approval of an operation upon the recommendation of the Military Staff Committee the Security Council shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of armed forces; officers of countries whose military contingents have been designed to participate in the United Nations operation in question shall be given posts of responsibility in the staff of these forces. (11) Logistic support and health care as well as the complementing of the employed contingent with personnel shall be determined in the agreement. (12) The question of costs connected with the employment of armed forces shall be settled by the Security Council in agreement with the State which made the military contingent available. Expecting that, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly, its Chapter VII entitled "Actions with Respect to the Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression", the Security Council will proceed to the consideration of the Czechoslovak offer,, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic expresses its readiness to take part in the consideration of the question both in the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee. I should be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council. Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Dr. Milan KLUSAK Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations BEur/bc cj Mr. Bola-Bennatt ec: Mr, Bunche Mr. Turner l-lr. Vaughan !>ir» Urqafaart Col.'Kcfoo Mr.

IT

Str, m the higjs©«r to a^fesKsrla^ge receipt of ^our letter $o. SSI of SO Janissary 1969, ecsesraing the Isttosrlassda coatingart for service with

I note anS: appreeiat^ tw-s desire of 13is S^tferi4ai4-s Goverrsaeijt to ls th-a tw@ ob^a-etltrs-s of prior cossuitatl«® and. the Oeverjasefit &R^ t&e XSiited Bttiosas OE the ^.se of the cc-n&iBgants aM or th& il«slralfili% of th® Ifeitsd Jjatisss to be In ^ ;-osltieft to IPSS-|;«J^ prcsptly whan & psse«-4e»piBg op©i'ati<3i is require Irs s$- iftev, fciGwevsr, tfee propess4 sssthod of dealing wit-li this profele-E a prier agra-'asemt bet^ssss the See^wtsidrat aaa the- Oav'ssrrsaent of tCft.a 5iw p2^s-3ssts both fcwsal aad pstictleal aiffieultiee. IE tfe-a

3it'{-satieas I as Sscsret-s^y^sRsj^sl laek awthorlSifitlcs to enter o an sgressezit o» bdbslf of tha Uhiiefi fetlo&s ^itfe a B«sfber OovcrVi until ons ©f tbs prieeipal oirgass l^s fesmzlstaa a aanagi,t« for a s^aei

Pmt the praetieal point of v&aw, I dcufet *rhe"fy?.er iwa agreggse-a s.svanc-3 of a sspeetfle ojsratlcas la -UiS1 ;sar.s«r atsg^sstsd aoiiM tx? of very value. As you Esscy, «gaeh ef tfea 35&ac%?"fee^x3i»S operations t«i&t so far has €iffer®4 wids^y Isfca its j>radecs?ssc«r© in sa ^md our eKparleaea &s@ tlesjs-eastratsd tlsat a nssafecr of sa relating '^r* fes sattteg up of ®aeh opsnitleais ear. c$a2y bs

'Hr, Sise© §,E IHassassnt B^^seata-tlve of tfee of t^t ietfeerlaaia 'to the 1/aiteA i K.Y* at the tims of organising tbss. C©ri"sin gesezml prinelplss issder which

'Jn.itet llaticasr p^ee-fespfag epsrafeiess are aor^tactsxl have bses avolveds arsdU a&thoasb'soi K«e©sserily Maiding , do prc«rl&3 useful guideliaes for future op^rati&iis . As you also kae«% the Usjitsd Saiioaa has eirolvso. a [email protected]'l« 0e$y c'F srfeaa&fcn® proesdus*8&» especially in tlie logistical field, -«*&!«& *re usafttl ascl appliosfcla* witSt ©ll^it ^ isew ojsas^tiona. 4 specif ict s.§re$B^?3t» Itow^var, yitfe a gcw future a®e r 1*16 er-sa-tlos of & st&udisg or standbs? Itoitad Ka- foree. GiS?iS3ra3.1y3 p^aee-^ssping operatlos^ of tiu? Uaitcd Matisa® In which asilitary persoiSKel .^ip& smplosrea ^sult fros sj^PKiifio autlmrisatlc?!i "eg- & Uslfced Ssiloj^s ©rgaa. fl^y^fc^'^ „ &^ prssise ccsap-osltloa olf tiie ljfetl.3?- tc- le @stabllshe(S is fs^ciaissKtaliy iriflueac®d, of ssceasity, tfee iss,t«rs of the sit^istloa sM^i fass gives rise to a »sed for & tM1 natives of th-s a fsrt&ar §&ay&fi©stieaa of this im^wages-a-Btj I >ic> ii®t ttetted Ifetioss Sscrota^fet is is a position st the |?^es or fr^s a p^aetieal ^©Jut. e-l" vi:w, to go twgy sy letter of S3 043;% ifes atfesasuaces af BJ M^i Responsibility of Contributing Governments 1. a) Each unit should bring to the theatre of operation the number and type of personnel and equipment stated in the Establishment of a unit of each particular type (in some countries called Tables of Organization and Equipment - TO and E). It should also bring basic load of ammunition as stated in national regulations, and in the case of automatic weapons a second basic load of ammunition. It should be the responsibility of each contributing country to ensure that their units arriving in the theatre of operation are up to war scales in personnel, equipment and ammunition in accordance with their Tables of Organization and Equipment and similar tables. b) The National Governments should supply their men with at least two sets of clothing for their jouaney period and prior to their receiving the UN uniform. All troops should be in possession of their personal weapons and ammunition, authorized in their TO and E. They should also be supplied with those articles of personal clothing and equipment which are not required for their identification as a UN soldier, i.e. undergarments, footwear, shaving kits, etc. These items should be in sufficient quantities to last the soldier during his tour of duty. However, the percentage of wastage should be in accordance with what has been officially accepted by the unit's own government and Initial reserve stocks of that kind should be brought to the theatre accordingly. 2. The contributing country should send two copies of the Tables of Equipment and Organization and national regulations for basic loads of ammunition to the United Nations Headquarters and four copies to the Chief Logistics Officer of the UN Headquarters in the theatre.' 3. Simultaneous with the action in paragraph 2 above, lists should be forwarded detailing any critical materiel the contributing country is unable to supply. This will ensure timely provision by the United Rations from their own sources. k. Once a contributing country's troops have entered the theatre, all supplies required for their support which would involved a charge to the United Nations must be requisitioned through the United Nations Forces' logistical channels so that provision may be made, wherever feasible,-through regular United Nations sources. Units are to be advised not to bring any canteen or welfare stores, as such items can be provided by the United Nations. 5« Where essential items are peculiar to a contingent, as in the case of ordnance stores and ammunition, and the home government is the logical source of supply, arrangements will be made for the requisitions to be placed by United Nations Headquarters under the "Assist Letter scheme" with the government con- cerned. This is a system by which the United Nations requests the provisioning of such special supplies or services from a National Government through the issue of a numbered Assist Letter. All resultant billings must bear reference to th® relevant Assist Letter in order that they may bs identified as an authorised expenditur... e acd to facilitate early paymentw f^>^ .»•-• < M.l :y . i^,jiBA'44- - : . , i •;•'• .;;••••' . , ...... • • e •/• • »

•Bt- :: 6. Governments providing troops will be respdnsible for making payments^ of pay and allowances to their own officers and other ranks in accordance with their own national legislation. The United Nations will reimburse the governments only for any extra and extraordinary costs they incur as' a result of service in the UN theatre of operations. The UN would, of course, when necessary, assist the govern- ments in securing, local currency if, this presents a difficulty, . ,

Responsibility of United Nations - -1 .".. •' ' ' • • '.••'• • The United Nations assumes responsibility for the following when they are not other- vise provided for:- •-.-•• ••••' 7« a) Items of special equipment required under certain circumstances by a unit'to carry out its mission effectively and which

;...• e)-'-Communications services, costs of transporting and issuing supplies* ' • "".."'• i ' * •' ' : f) - Billeting and rations for the troops, including rental, reconditioning and maintenance of the premises. This does not include the cooking utensils and cookers which are authorized in the Equipment Tables, but includes the fuel/electricity. The field messing equipment should be included in every unit's establishment and as such should be brought by them. • ( g) On arrival in the theatre of operations,, all equipment brought in by the'unit will be surveyed as to condition by the United Nations. Subsequent adjustment of the depreciation of contingent-owned materials, supplies and equipment will be '••' determined at-the time of the unit's departure from the theatre. Such determination, prepared on the percentage factor only, will be reviewed by the Property Survey , Board and will be utilized by the United Nah'.ons when, negotiating the settlement'of government claims-for reimbursement. ' .! '' ' ' ' •• •'••'• .-.."• -•*••

h) Payment to each member of the Force of a daily service allp'wance. ' i) : Payment of travel and subsistence allowance to personnel proceeding'on UW • '' official duties, according to existing UN rules. . ' • • - j) ' Payment of subsistence allowance to personnel not provided with free billets • and/or rations, according to existing UN rules. k) Miscellaneous "Extra Services" such as cobblering, tailoring, laundrying and haircutting. Those units who have barbers, tailors and cobblers on their '' Establishment will only be helped in terras of technical equipment for the barbers, tailors and cobblers as laid down in their Equipment Tables. ,•••••.• • ...

r l) A per capita allowance to individuals not forming part of or not attached?td organized units/detachments' for rations, accommodntiono and extra services they are not available. -Where part of these cervices are furnished by equivalent' portions of the- allowance will be deducted) Ho,221 Ncv? York, 20 January 1969

Sir,

With reference to my predecessor8o letter of 12 October 1967 concerning the Netherlands contribution of military forces to United Nations Peacekeepins ' "Operations I have the honour to state the followings As you may recall, on 24 September 1963* the Motherlands Government placed a contingent of the Marine corps of the Royal Netherlands Wavy at the disposal of United Nations on a stand-by basis. During the general debate of the General Assembly on 5 October 1965 the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced an amplification of units maintaining readiness for assignment to UN duties. In my predecessor's letter of 13 October 1965 It was confirmed that the increased stand-by force would consist Sfocoraponents from the Royal Netherlands Navy, Army and Air Force which were further specified. Since on the one hand, the use of these stand-by forces by the United Nations is conditioned upon prior consultations with and agreement of the Netherlands Government in each particular case and since on the other hand, the United Nations should be in a position to respond promptly and effectively to the need for duly authorised action,, the Netherlands Government has boon seeking means to reconcile these two objectives„ This purpose could,. In its opinion, best bo served by prlo^ . . agreement between the Secretariat and the HetherlaHcGJ concerning basic elements which should be included in any final arrangement governing the actual employment of ar,.:^tl forces. ..;•• It is the hope of the Motherlands Government tL;/t. it will be possible to draw up an agreement of this nature with the United Nations Secretariat in toe near future* . Some basic elements to be Included in such an set forth below5 His r 12 Ebaafcj ' Bao^atapy^Oe&eral of the United Nations. •"Hew J, ^Genc? ra 1_. Tne Ilothorlands should bo roproccntsd en tho c,dviccr7 committee CDS is ting the Secretary-General in the pci/fcr^ianc., of his duties concerning tho eotabllsliniont of a peace- keeping operation, Thio would bo conDidcrcd tho appropriate..' channel for eonimunicatlon. b The Netherlands Government uould ancuniQ to bo assigned asa adequate amount of staff functions in proportion; with Its share in the UN peacekeeping force., 2 . Agreement between the H9thGrland3^nd_thg__UI'I_Socrotariat „ a Sniplpyment_ . , ^he agi'eeinent should specify the task of the [peacekeeping force in general as well aa that of the {Netherlands contingent in particular. The employment of the Netherlands contingent for other purposes than those specif led, should - in the absence of an additional agreement and regardless of any subsequent resolution providing for a d fferent task - be excluded. Elcl lotion* """ r~Mimberi' of the UN peacekeeping force should remain subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending state* Preparatory measures for the application of this juris- diction in praotic© are now being taken in the Netherlands. Disciplinary law is to b© applied and executed by the authorities of the sending state only. c. Withdrawal.. ~~~" He^her lands peacekeeping forces will not be withflratm without prior notification. The Netherlands Government wishes ;> however, in exceptional circumstanced to preserve;;' its right to withdraw its forces at very short tiotlco. "./ d. Repla eemep t s . -4->:' ^iie" Netherlands wishes to maintain the authority to. "'' replace personnel as well as commanders in consultation ' "':• with or after notification to the Chief of staff of 'tho US peacekeeping force e . following expenses ensuing from tho sendins the forces will be charged to the United Nations. 'ii I5 transportation coats of personnel and matorlals outside thst boundaries of the Motherlands <, 2) expenses for additional clothing, materials and 'choir* replacements incurred for the purpose of the peace-* keeping operation. 3) replacement costs of destroyed and oboolots in addition to costs of repair of equipment inBofar -"'' : as all these expenses result from the peacekeeping . ' operation. •.-•'

4) costs of medical treatment by third persons3 also if' •'-•'' treatment is due to other causes than operational ^ activities of the peacekeeping force , .. '<••

5) payments on death (three months salary) and if need bea payments resulting from plane -accidents occurred while fulfilling service orders, 6) transportation costs of the mortal remains,

7) overseas allowance and, as the case may bea extra pay for risks , 8) coats of passports and visa or la is ses -passer. 9) representation costs required in the opinion of the organisation for social functions. 10} advance payment defrayed by the Netherlands for the benefit of the United Nations (e.g. special service allowances) , 11) all other expenses directly resulting from the of the forces .

^f_ ims . • In ease a judicial authority of tho receiving statG' ot the claims-conimisslon has recognised tho legality of & civil claim against a member of the Wether-landa peacGlcoop force,, for an act committed off duty., tho Motherlands G-over-nmont will (l) ensure that th3 person in qucaticn wi be urged to meet such judgment end (2) will cons Ida:? to gratia" payment whGiiovor circunistancoa so She Netherlands Government proposes that c£f«£uty civil claims be settled by the claina°eor::r3.soicr*« Dicr;.v.tcs : Q¥ss* tli© interpretation and, application of tho e~rccr.:;",rb ushich can not be solved, between tho par-ties;» should t-j submitted to an arbitral trjibtmal. re ce_iying s_ta 'ce , This agreement should coraiit tho receiving state to turn over without delay Netherlands military personnel which is found to be under that state's controla to the commander of the I3H peacekeeping force. . ,' 4. Regulations for the, peacekeeping force. - ,:; a. In operational matters,, including administrative.. ;•• aspects concerning these matters, Netherlands contingents,. will function toy orders of the UN commander of the • • peacekeeping operation. In administrative matters nofc regarding operational matters Netherlands contingents should function within the competence of Netherlands authorities. b, Provisiona concerning self-defence should be in- corporated in the regulations in conformity with the principles of self-defence contained in the aide- memoire of 10 April 1964 concerning UNPICYP.

5. TO? commander;a^^_t_ermSL _ ojT reference. a. As aoon as terms of reference are available they should b© sent to the Netherlands Government In order to ensure that national instructions are in compliance with them. b., If a Netherlands contingent's commander considers | an order by the UN commander to bo at variances trlth bis. i national Instructions,, he should inform the cpir.sQiiclor that he will execute the order "undor protest" and tl;;iu he will notify his Government accordingly. The Hot!:,,.in- lands Government then is in a position to decide or not to communicate with the UN on the matter. I would highly appreciate racsivoig your coniinentis on the above with a view to further developing mutual agreement on these and possibly other points.

Duco G.E. Permanent Heprcacntatlvo cf ths of the Methorlando to tho United NEW YORK TBffiS, Sunday, 2? April 1969

./)' ' /v-1l*¥^;;;6»!^f««i

Ther'war in Vietnam has made ^it evident that the American role as constable to the world is largely played .out. After two decades on a global beat, both the pSliceman and those, policed regard unilateral American intervention abroad as ' ari:. increasingly unattractive prospect, -',.•'.., '•"••':'•,,-•.. " Th6^need to improve multilateral. machinery for conflict control is. intensified by the negotiations now underpay for Middle East and ,Southeast Asian settle-' 'mentg{)ij)*o'th. of which undoubtedly will require;,inter- national policing once achieved. Political' settlements might^. even be expedited in these and other battle areas-%f•'more effective peace-keeping forces1 existed for use there. ' • •• , :-" .'.'':'.': v ' . A mlijor new initiative to provide the United Nations with jfirfifi forces—and to resolve problems of logistics, communications, command channels arid financing—• | is overdue. That the. moment may be, right /for this. and f^r-raising an initial force of perhaps, 40,000 troopjfos suggested in an imaginative new study by a disSnj|uished panel of the •United Nations Associa- ' tion gf; the-United State's headed by Yale's president,. Ki'ngirian Brewster. Jrl ; ••'•' .• '•'. -~ •••..':, The^wenty-six-member partel argues that the key lies ir^'an American approach to the Soviet Union to set uj)', such ,a force under. Article 43 of.; the U.N. Charter.:. The paneljsees "indications that the Soviet Unioiiimky have comparable interests in1 reviving such .nego^atipns." Soviet'proposals |o recruit U.Nr forces fromjmi'ddle and smaller powers and-to include such , nations in the U.N.'s, Military Staff Committee point •. • In thisndirection.' ; '-. ' Mosfe'ow and ^Was'hingtori have frequently disagreed . in the0, past over when and how to authorize peace- " keeping operations. But the United'States now regards Soviet*., emphasis -on Security Council responsibility with.-smore favor. . . >. • ': "SiJccessfui U.N. peace-keeping depends to a sub- stant'r|l,degree on superpower cooperation,'' the Brew- ster panel asserts. The best route to progress now • may be to recognize this /principle, but to concentrate first on readying U.N. forces without trying to resolve . in coiBplete detail1 in advance how those forces will : when .they are needed..,: ; •^•••^;,l^t^;^!. HEW YORK TIMES, Sunday, 2? April 1969

?1 United-' States repre-1 ; 4; EstablfsKhiient ••' sentative at the United Nations j peacekeeping section- in the ''•:•'. and a former Supreme Court) United Nations Secretariat to justice. assist the Secretary General in A source at the United States carrying out his role as execu- mission said of the repprt: "We tive agent for all field welcome it as a serious initia- operations. tive by serious leaders. The 5. An enhanced role for the United States would not neces- Military Staff Committee: to sarily support all the.points, but advise the Security Council in ^American Leaders Call we are studying It with inter- the exercise of its primary role est." in peace-keeping operations. for 40,000-Man Operation, 6. Establishment of a United Secretary General Thant was Nations peace fund of $60- With U.S. Paying Half on a trip to - Europe and un- millipn to provide adequate available for .comment. ' funding of peace-keeping oper- One diplomatic source said ations in the period between . By SAM POPE BREWER today that soundings of some annual General Assembly ap- Soviet delegates had shown propriations. This fund would • : ...Special to ^The New .York Times that they apparently were not be raised by voluntary gov- ' .UNITED/.NATIONS;,;: N.;'Y., hostile to the panel's proposals ernmental contributions, with April .'2,6-4A' panel of 26 Ameri- and that they were interested the United States providing 50 can leaders has called on the in further details. per cent. United States Government to After 10 months of study, 7. A package settlement of the nonpartisan group has con- the United Nation's debts for take.;the lead, in working for a cluded — in the words of its peace-keeping operations, esti- standing force of 40,000 men own summary—that "substan mated to range from $38-mil- to be • available to the United' tially strengthening the U.N.'s lion to $60-million, with ade- Nations at..any time for peace- peace-keeping capabilities with quate contributions from keeping .•-Operations under :the a 25,000-man stand-by and a France and the Soviet Union 15,000-man reserve force, and the United States contribu- command of the world body; drawn from middle and small tion limited to a third. Article 43 of, the United'Na- powers, is the best way to 8. Double earmarking of cer- tions Charter provides for such avoid future Vietnams and per- tain national forces to serve a force, but one has never been haps Czechoslovaks and to also in regional peace-keeping set up, largely because of anx- cope with the many interna- efforts, such as by the Organi- tional conflicts which, will con- zation of American States and iety among member states that tinue to arise in the 1970's." the Organization of African it might be abused by the The group's report called for Unity. powers that in one way or an a $60-million fund for peace- Others on Panel other came to control it. keeping, of which the 'United In addition to those already All previous peace-keeping States would provide half. But named, the following are also it touched only lightly on one members of the panel: operations of the United Na of the most tjcklish United Na- Harding F. Bancroft, Executive Vice tions have . been organized President, The New York Times. tions peace-keeping problems— Robert S. Benjamin, Chairman of when an emergency arose. The the assessments the Soviet Un- the Board, United Artists Cor- aim of the United States pane! ion and France have refused poration. is to carry out the original in- to pay for peace • keeping Joseph L. Block, Chairman of the in the Congo and the Middle Executive Committee, Inland tention of Article 43 and estab East. Steel Company. lish a standing force. Lincoln P. Blqomfleld, professor of Booklet Published political science, Massachusetts Headed by Brewster The American panel prepared Institute of Technology. William K. Coblentz, partner, The group, headed by .King- a 62-page booklet, made public Jacobs, Sills and Coblentz, San man Brewster Jr., president of today, that summed up its Francisco. findings. . 'Msgr. John J. Dougherty, Presi- Yale University, includes Cyr.u.sj 1 dent, Seton Hall University. R. Vance, former Deputy., Sec-] The ' group did not ', niake Sheltoh Fisher, President, McGraw- ! clear either in its booklet v or Hill; Inc. retary of Defense and former, in a-news conference hoyr the Mrs. Albert M. Greenfield, Philadel- deputy United States represe.pt- Soviet invasion of Czechoslo- phia. vakia might have been averted Ernest A. Gross, partner, Curtis, ative at the Paris peace nego-1 Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle. tiations oh Vietnam, Gen. Mat-j by a United Nations force, Najeeb E. Halaby, President, Pan .since Moscow maintained that American World Airways. tKew B. Ridgway, former Army] it was purely a matter for the Patricia'Robert Harris, professor of Chief of Staff and former Su- socialist nations., law, Howard University. preme Commander, Allied Pow- Joseph E. Johnson, President, Car- The panel's new booklet, en- negie Endowment for Interna- ers in Europe.' titled "Controlling Conflicts in tional Peace. .Also a,member of the panel the 1970's" sets forth an Robert H. Knight, partner, Shear- eight-point program, as follows: man & Sterling. until his appointment in Janu- J. Irwin Miller, Chairman, Cummins ary as United States perma- 1. Establishment of a stand- Engine Company. by United Nations force of Charles P. Noyes, former counselor, nent representative at the 20,000 to 25,000 specially United States mission to the United .Nations was Charles W. trained men, composed of land, United Nations. sea and air units from United John N. Plank, senior staff the Yost. Brookings Institution. The panel was named by the Nation members other than the Nicholas A. Robinson, student,, Co- United Nations Association of permanent members of the Se- lumbia University Law School. curity Council and available to Robert V. Roosa, partner, Brown the /United State? .of America, the United Nations for a mini- Brothers Harriman & Co. of "which?;the-chaifmgnvjs ; mum of one year's service. Kenneth W. Thomps9n, social sci- entist and administrator, New 2. Support of these stand-by York City. units by an earmarked reserve Howard. S. Turner, President, of at least 15,000 men. Turner Construction Company.1 . 3. Provision of logistical sup- Jerome B.'Wiesner, provost, Massa- port, by aircraft, ships, .and so , chusetts Institute of Technology. Joseph C. Wilson, Chairman of this forth,' bjri.th; e permanenftunernr .-'':. Bpard,:-the Xerox", Corp.pration.-v. »'.• *"-$"ot t$e';co1iricilff" '~"""' "' •--••••-" -—g^: &JnK*itfi&lil*-l-''.:X CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Monday, 28 April 1969

Sifieflcan friends of tJN see EW3 for larger standby army

By Bertram B. Johansson stration and to the Soviet Union. S^s the su- Ambassador to the UN; and a dozen other would depend upon future levels of UN op- must ... be that a decade of turmoil, revo- men in various fields and disciplines. erations. Staff correspondent of perpowers most responsible for keeping the lution, small wars, and attempted take- The Christian Science Monitor peace, UNA is saying, they must face up to Basically, UNA recommends: The UNA report states that the United overs lies ahead. The inherent impossi- the likelihood in the '70's of rising conflicts • Establishment of a standby UN peace- States should take the lead in reopening bility of 'overnight modernization' will be United Nations, N.Y. among other nations that must be controlled keeping force of 20,000 to 25,000 men, com- negotiations with the Soviet Union under fertile soil for wars of liberation, and the in order to avoid their escalation. posed of land, sea, and air units from non- Article 43 of the UN Charter to develop latter, while arising frequently out of genu- A new campaign to strengthen its peace- UNA, through its contacts at the United permanent members of the Security Coun- such a peace-keeping force. ines popular discontent, will often be stimu- eeping and crisis-management functions Nations, and among Soviet scientists and cil, and another 15,000 reserves. Service It cited indications that the Soviet Union lated by, or dabbled in by Peking, Hanoi, firough an enlarged standby peace army academicians, feels the time has come in would last for a year instead of the current may have comparable interests in reviving or Havana—and in all probability by the as blown a fresh breeze through the 'UN. which the "U.S.S.H. may be interested in a six months or less. such negotiations, as manifested by Russian U.S.S.R. despite its increasing interest in | It has already stirred considerable en- revival of negotiations on the provision of • Members having military assistance proposals for making up UN forces from international stability." tmusiasm—and, to be sure, some wry cyni- national military units to the UN Security programs in countries undertaking interna- middle and smaller powers, and for includ- For this reason, a definite strengthening Ism as well. Council." tional peace keeping should make arrange- ing such nations in the UN's military staff of the UN peacekeeping capability, dimin- committee which advises the Security Coun- jThe new spring booster comes from the Associated with drawing up the -UNA re- ments for training and equipping of forces ished since World War II, is in order, is in [?N Association of the U.S.A. through pro- cil on military requirements for mainte- port on "controlling conflicts in the 1970's" to be available to the Security Council. This, fact a necessity, UNA asserts. osals for an enlarged UN peace-keeping in effect, would divert some military, aid nance, of international peace and security. were Arthur J. Goldberg, chairman of the In the course of its reports, UNA notes Examining UN performance in peace- brce of 40,000 men. Current UN contingents being given some countries to UN purposes. keeping operations in Cyprus, Kashmir, the |dd up to about 11,000 men. board of UNA; Kingman Brewster, presi- that there is clearly at present no reliable - dent of Yale University and chairman of the • The larger powers on the Security Coun- multilateral approach to the control of in- Congo, Suez, and other theaters of fighting, '•New methods of financing, of recruitment panel that drafted the report; Cyrus R. cil would undertake to maintain and provide ternational conflicts. UNA said that the inherent advantage oi and training, which long have been barriers Vance, recent U.S. negotiator on Vietnam logistic support, such as types of aircraft, the multilateral method of controlling con- to successful UN peacemaking, are sug- While the UNA report does not pretend in Paris; Najeeb E. Halaby, president of ships, etc., to be made available on short to provide solutions to the current Vietnam flicts in a strengthened United Nations gested, as well as broader UN functions in Pan American World Airways; Jerome B. notice if required. would: controlling the spread of conflict. or Middle East conflicts, it notes that the Wiesner, provost of the Massachusetts Insti- • The UN's present shortwave communi- former has forced a searching re-examina- Help defuse the immediate crisis and buy The-effect of UNA's proposals is to throw tute of .Technology; Charles W. Yost, who cation facilities should be modernized with tion of U.S. security strategy. time for peaceful settlement. thg|feaiiii^tet(BifeB!fe the new Nixon admini- served on the panel until he was appointed new electronic equipment so that messages The UNA report notes that because of Reduce factual uncertainty about the ori- m> JSOSB.iMM33.Ei could be transmitted more instantly. Vietnam especially "there is some indication gin and initiation of the conflict, through • A special peace-keeping section should that the pendulum of concern and appeal third-party factfinding and peace observa- be established within the UN Secretariat to within the United States, and within the in- tion. help the Secretary-General. It would be con- ternational community, is swinging back to- Reduce the risk of direct U.S. and U.S.S.R. cerned with the administering, under the ward efforts to develop the collective peace- confrontation, with its ominous risk of es- Secretary-General, of field peace-keeping keeping capacity of the United Nations and calation. Operations; assistance to member states of regional organizations. . . . This renewed Introduce other countries into the sharing which are providing standby or earmarked interest, however, comes at a time when of political and peacekeeping responsibility. contingents, initiation of an inservice train- multilateral agencies are weak and divided." And reduce the financial cost. ing program, and establishment of appro- After two years of research, the writers of Total U.S. contributions to all UN peace- priate liaison arrangements with regional the UNA report state: "Our assumption keeping activities are $200 million, as con- organizations such as the Organization of trasted with total costs of more than $12E American States and. the Organization of billion in Vietnam. African Unity. Bearing in mind that the UN is still saddled with some of the unpaid expenses of the Congo peace-keeping operation, UNA recommends that a UN peace fund be es- tablished, primarily with voluntary gov- ernmental contributions. It suggests an initial fund of $60 million. It states that, since past UN peace-keep- ing operations have been so clearly in the United States interest, the United States .|hp7uld'-cbenwilHng to provide 50-percent of TS-this HEW YORK POST, Monday, 28 April 1969

sponsorship of a group that members of the Security Council-); it would- former UN comrnandej in be pledged logistical support ny the bigger orea Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway to presi- powers. It could "help defus^ the imme- dent Kingman .Brewster of Yale, the non- diate crisis and buy time for immediate partisan United Nations Assn. has urged settlement"; it also could "reduce factual a major new effort to creale a UN peace- uncertainty about the origin and initiation keeping force of 40,000 men drawn in large of t-he conflict through third-party fact- measure from "middle and smaller pow- finding and peace observation." Obviously ers." Such a fire-fighting force, it is per- such1 a special body would enhance U. S.- suasively argued, is urgently needed for Soviet cooperation in areas of mutual con- assignment to many small conflagrations cern (where confrontation might other- that may assume dangerous proportions wise develop). Finally it would reduce our , unless quickly controlled. role of "world policeman"—one which ere- ; The case for such a representative, ates distrust abroad and distemper at mobile international unit has long been home. clear, pomposed of 26,000 standby troops • No time is ever wholly. cpjpgeniaL.tp: a; \ aftd £ ^QOO-jman reserve force provided bold new move. But ^'-'~^^^-*-*±-~-> by'UN members (other than permanent pressing this subject • •" '-• ; -- cc: Mr. Baaebe Mr. Bols-Beraiett Kr. Turner Mr, Ysaghan Mr. 0rquhart Col. Koko Mr. lemleux

JO 1962

^o is temporarily absent from Hs has iss to 2^|Jdy to your letter !o« 1278 of li April J$6£,,. the !et!i@2*]U3&dif eoatingsat for service with Uaitad Baticss

f position of the lottiarlsj^la GcfreissmeEEt. *?s ssoa1 im&srs't&sS that tlis ' a aele inteatioa is to reach as, iEfaKasJL wafers tarsliSig ort a of poiats whidi jai^tt. t>s iaal»Se4 Is a jsossibls future i-jgressest «m tiis ^therlaMs asid ths knifed Ifatiosie relating to a apacif ie fatesca -Jsit<3d Satioas peacs«»i£@-spijss operation. You 4?ill recall tfes;t #a baa a cea^ersstKai on this saxtter eojaa "ttee ago i» relatlors to your first letter,, assii 1 •aMorstasd that sjas&srs of 'your Kissien have reHewes! this up ^ith fEtrtaer scast-asts t^itli sjsasbers of the Gserotariat who ar-c with this Esttsf. Oa oar part. w& would » ©f course, te glad to purstss th© ravlstf of ths poiata iasntiassd in je'or lefcter of 20 Jaaaax-y 19&9 at as^ tlea whic^ Accent » Sir, the assaisnance® of ^ highest

-J for Political His Mr. Bwc© G,E. of of tse Hetlseslands 1&® 713, T&lr^ Av^me gas^ York, fi,Y. 10017 Ho* 12?8 lew ¥orka 11 April 1969

Sir, On 17 February last you were goo<3 enough to reply to lay letter of 20 January 1969* concerning the Netherlands contingent for service with United Nations Peaces-Keeping Operations, In your letter you explained for what reasons it would not "be feasible to enter into a prior agreement with regard to future use of this eantingsnt. Since my letter of 20 January may have created the impression that the Netherlands Government wishes to draw up a formal agreement of this nature, I think it useful and neatssary to clarify the position of my

The sole intention of the Netherlands Government at this stage is to reaeh some informal understanding on a number of elements which, in its opinion, should be included in. ® possible future agreement between th© Netherlands and ths United nations governing th© assignment of a Netherlands contingent to a specific nations Peace-Keeping Operation* In the light of this clarification 1 hope it viill be possible to review the elements enumerated in my aforementioned letter in orcler to achieve the limited object which nay dovemssfcmt has in mind. Sir., the assurances of my highest consideration*

Middelburg His Excellency Permanent Representative of ths Kingdom U Thaaatj. of the Netherlands to the United Se.eretary-Cfsner&l of the United Kattons, York CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Thursday, 1 May 1969

A permanent peace force Again^iCh'.as been proposed, and this suggest that a permanent force, once re- time by .an impressive panel of Americans, sponsibly .proposed, might receive & i that the United Nations be equipped with bigger welcome than at sortie'past periods. a permanent force for peace-keeping oper- For one thing the':1 two superpowers are ations. This recommendation, by a panel discovering. serious limits .to their own of 26 leaders drawn from the.diplomatic, •writs of: global authority., academic, business; and .military: com- • ''The..United: States -wishes it'had never munities, merits enthusiastic study, all entered Vietnam. The Soviet Union has around the globe. lost face seriously in Czechoslovakia. A All United Nations peace-keeping oper- chastened Washingtonseems more will- ations up to now have been organized on ing today to entrust global peace initia- an emergency basis. Article-43•'•of the UN tives to the United Nations. Tb those who Charter provides for a permanent'force, have believed that Washington-Moscow but none has' ever been established, rivalry, in the Security Council wbuld rule mainly because of uncertainties as to how out any constructive future for :a perma- it might be used by the big powers whose nent force,; it 'should be'.noted that possi- veto looms large on the UN- Security bilities are increasing; for Soviet-American Council. : cooperation in; global ' peace-keeping. But Britain, Canada, and. other-nations Again;, a permanent force would-allow the have from time to time stated their will- iriedium-sized arid .smaller nations' more ingness to contribute to a permanent, force, opportunity to contribute 'tangibly to and it is high time, that the usefulness of peace—they would supply the" troops. such a contingent'tie carefully pondered. Some serious'obstacles remain. The So- The panel headed: by Yale president. King- , viet Union and' France-have refused, up man Brewster r ^recommends 20,000: to to'now, to pay their share "for emergency 25,000 teamed iiieri; oh standby, plus a peace operatipns;in the Corigo and Middle 15,000reserve.';/v ^J ; ;: :; v :. East. Will they 'do better by a'permarient ; Most certainty i ;the 'UN emergency force? So far, .Moscow has expressed'inter- forces thrust into: the breach in the Mid- est in'knowing "further details" about the dle East, the Congo and elsewhere, have American'proposal. - served to damp; -down tensions, maintain Is -this not .the moment to supply the some semblanceS/of peace, and giyediplo- eyidetice, via a permanent iorce, that the , macy time to -operate. That diplomacy United Nations will be ready; willing,;and ,r hasn't always operated is another matter. immediately able, when u^But changes on the world's power fronts make its BOSTON GLOBE, Sunday, k May 1969

Force

By DARIUS S. JHABVALA Globe U.N. Bureau i > 'I fc"£W"' &XWF"•?" ~-'~-—'---,-' UNITED NATIONS .—, A: j^mide.p^H^todayiJseeks to : : national policy-panel of emi- I'provide 'tBie Jv?orId'organiza- nent Americans has pro- tion with peacekeeping ma- posed the creation . of a chinery that was visualized "standby: 'United Nations •by the founding fathers and 1 peacekeeping force" to con- embodied in article 43 of the trol future international |-U.N. charter. i • . conflicts. • ' : The participants did not It proposed that "a reason- i go into the politics of au- able initial objective" would thorization for use of a U.N. be a standby force of 20,000 force an issue that is the to 25,000 trained men and an source of: many of the U.N.'s i earmarked reserve of at problems- in maintenance of least 15,000 more to be peace and security. I- drawn from national contin- fThe . report .is therefore gents of U.N. member/states. considered by experts to be In addition to the force, a no more than an articulation . special peacekeeping section of what is desired rather would be established within than what is achievable. The .the U.N. secretariat to .assist premise of the panel is that the secretary general in di- "international conflicts will be endemic in the 1970's," recting the operations of the given the "rising tide of ex- force. • . pectations in the developing Ths panel also .••.recom- \ areas. . . And the • rise -of na- mended . that A U:N.: peace tionalism. fund be established with an "Our assumption must ! initial goal of $60 million to therefore be that a decade of j which "the U:S. should be turmoil, revolution, small i willing to provide 50 percent wars and attempted take- of the amount." ' overs lies ahead," the report Thus,j... it" concludes,' th>T The 26-member panel, said. "the time has-"come for a major initiative by the Unit- headed by Dr, Kingman The group argued that the ; ed States to strengthen the Brewster Jr., president of big powers now have limits peacekeeping and crisis Yale University, offered its management capabilities of placed on the extent , to the U.K." recommendations in a study which each can act as a po- entitled ''controlling con- liceman and therefore there The initial effort toward flicts of the 1970s," under is "the need for institutional : this objective should be "to the sponsorship' of the Unit- substitutes for the great reach an understanding with ed Nations Association of the Soviet Union and other power peacekeeping role on I key members of the Security the U.S.A. the past." Council on greater reliance on U.N. peacekeeping ma- Other members are Cyrus While recognizing that chinery. R. Vance, former Deputy "successful U.N. peace- Secretary of Defense and keeping depends to a sub- Such an agreement, the I U.S. representative in the panel concluded, "might stantial degree on superpow- offer a chance for wider ' Vietnam peace talks in er cooperation," the panel cooperation which, over the Paris, Ambassador Charles ' makes the point that it is years, might reduce suspi- Yost, M.I.T. Prof. Lincoln also unrealistic to think in cion, develop mutual confi- Bloomfield and provost Je- terms of any major U.N. op- dence and con tribute,.tOi.the.q eration.,w.hich -either,, super-; J 1 i, •-*. -i-v.ijiiiL.i-a^J rome B. Wiesner and How- nmimr.', Jstr<5ngl^^^sfiypr s."' ard -University:,.Jaw. ..nrofes- power - •is.1,.1 •irn'i'^ii^r-^.^ ^_-1-.,...._,L^-:.J'_^ cc: Mr. Bunche Mr. Rolz-Bennett PERMANENT MISSION OF Mr . Turner THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS Mr. Vaughan TO THE UNITED NATIONS 711 THIRD AVEN u E Col. Koho NEW YORK.N.Y. 10017 Mr. Lemieux Registry TELEPHONE: OXFORD 7-5547 <~

New York,, 16 May 1969

Dear Brian., i Enclosed please find a corrected version of a collection of elements which, in the view of the Netherlands Government,, should "be included in a possible future agreement governing the employment of armed forces. This document could usefully served as a "basis for future discussions on this matter. This Mission has not failed to bring to the attention of the Government in The Hague the remarks you have made on this document., in particular those relating to Terms of Reference and Selfdefence.

Yours sincerely.

L. Quarles van Ufford

Mr. Brian Urquhart United Nations Headquarters Room 3853C New York, N.Y. 10017 Elements to be included in a future agreement governing the employment of armed forces of the Netherlands.

1. General. a. The Netherlands should be represented on the advisory committee assisting the Secretary-General in the performance of his duties concerning the establishment of a peace- keeping operation. This would be considered the appropriate channel for communication. b. The Netherlands Government would assume to be assigned an adequate amount of staff functions in proportion with its share in the UN peacekeeping force. 2. Agreement between the Netherlands and the UN Secretariat. a. Employment The agreement should specify the task of the peacekeeping force in general as well as that of the Netherlands contingent in particular. Without special consent of the Netherlands government , the Netherlands contingent shall not be employed for a mandate different from that conferred upon the peacekeeping force concerned. This will also apply in case a later resolution would enlarge the mandate of the force. ,b. Criminal Jurisdiction Members of the UN peacekeeping force should remain subject to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the sending state. Preparatory measures for the application of \ this criminal jurisdiction in practice are now being taken in the Netherlands. Disciplinary law is to be applied and executed by the authorities of the sending state only. c. Withdrawal Netherlands peacekeeping forces will not be withdrawn without prior notification. The Netherlands Government wishes^ however^ in exceptional circumstances to preserve its right to withdraw its forces at very short notice. d . Replacements The Netherlands wishes to reserve the authority to replace personnel as well as the commander of the contingent, either in consultation with or after notification to the commander of the UN force. : ; e . Expenses ; ':. ,

The following expenses ensuing from the sending of \,-:- :. the forces will be charged to the United Nations. >v ' 1) transportation costs of personnel and materief l outside the boundaries of the Netherlands. - -a.'-- - 2 - 2) expenses for additional clothing, equipment and their replacements required for the purpose of the peace- keeping operation. 3) replacement costs of destroyed and worn out equipment .„.„ ...in addition to costs of repair of equipment insofar 'as these replacements and repairs rasuljb from the peacekeeping operation. 4) _ costs of medical treatment by third persons, also if treatment is due to other causes than operational activities of the peacekeeping force. 5) payments on death (three months salary) and if need "be, payments resulting from plane-accidents occurred while fulfilling service orders. 6) transportation costs of the mortal remains. 7) overseas allowance and, as the case may be, extra pay for risks. 8) costs of passports and visa or laissez-passer. 9) representation allowances for social functions, if desired by the UN. 10) advance payment defrayed by the Netherlands for the benefit of the United Nations (e.g. special service allowances). 11) possible other expenses, not mentioned above, which are directly related to the sending of the contingent. f. Civil claims With regard to the settlement of civil claims against a member of the Netherlands contingent for an act committed off duty, the Netherlands government will (1) ensure that the person in question be urged to meet the judgment in case a judicial authority of the host state or a claims- commission has recognized the legality of the claim and (2) consider to grant an "ex gratia" payment if special circumstances so require. The Netherlands Government prefers that off-duty civil claims be settled by the claims-commission. g. Arbitration Disputes over the interpretation and application of the agreement between the Netherlands and the United Nations which cannot be solved by the parties, should be submitted to an arbitral tribunal. 3. Status of Forces agreement between the UN and the host state This agreement should commit the host state to turn over without delay Netherlands military personnel which is found to be under that state's control, to the commander of the UN peacekeeping force. , ••;'•• - 3 -

• • ...... • . ^ "•• - 3 -

4. Regulations for the peacekeeping force. a. The Netherlands contingent will be under the ' operatricnal command of the commander of the UN peacekeeping force. In administrative matters not pertaining"to the operational task of the force, the contingent will remain under the competence of the Netherlands authorities. b. Provisions concerning self-defence, such as those contained in the aide-memoire of 10 April 1964 concerning UNFICYP, should be incorporated in the Regulations. 5. Terms of reference of the commander of the UN peacekeeping force. a. As soon as terms of reference are available they should be sent to the Netherlands Government in order to ensure that national instructions are in compliance with them. b. If a Netherlands contingent's commander considers an order by the UN commander to be at variance with his national instructions, he should inform the commander that he will execute the order "under protest" and that he will notify his Government accordingly. The Netherlands Government then is in a position to decide whether or not to communicate with the UN on the matter. NEW YORK TIMES, Friday, 7 August 1970

Soviet Reported Easing

Stand on Peace-Keeping Thant May Report Today "nrail to The Xr.i York Time* UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., By HEDRICK SMITH Aug. 6 — Secretary General Special LJ The Now York Tim^s Thant is expected to report to WASHINGTON, Aug 6—Sec- Until tlic nvfiil round of the Security Council tomorrow retary of State William P. discussions, Soviet officials liad refused even to discuss suih on plans for renewing Middle Rogers informed a House sub- questions. But at the working East peace efforts through his committee today that the Soviet special representative. Dr. level, they have reportedly Gunnar V. Jarring, diplomatic Union had shown increased in- shown interest in American pro- sources said tonight. terst recently in United Nations posals without making any peace-keeping operations. He commitment. "It may well be that the voiced the hope that Moscow Soviet Union will feel in the would relax its past opposition future that it is to their ad- to supporting them financially. vantage to take a more active Mr. Rogers, appearing before part in the peake-kceping," Mr. Rogers said, alluding to the Israeli Ts Skeptical the House Foreign Affairs Sub- 1 committee on International Or- contacts with Soviet diplomats. SptclU to Thi Ntw Tarl T1nw« ganizations and Movements, did He said he hoped Moscow TEL AVIV, Aug. 6—A lead- not link his remarks to future would take this approach. iinp Israeli military authority peace-keeping in the Middle Secretary Rogers told sub- [said here tonight that an open- East, though Moscow is known committee members that the sky policy of mutual inspection to have advanced proposals for Nixon Administration would to enforce an Arab-Israeli cease- a settlement that would require again oppose Communist Chi- fire would not work. international peace-keeping na's membership in the United The authority, Maj. Gen. forces. Nations this fall since Peking Yeshayahu Gavish, now retired, insists on the ouster of Na- who commanded Israeli forces Quite independent of that, ion the Egyptian front in the American and Soviet diplomats' tionalist China as a condition six-day war of 1967, was com- at the United Nations have been for its membership in the in- talking privately for the last six menting on proposals made by months about American pro- ternational body. officials in Washington • posals for strengthening the But Mr. Rogers skirted any The general, interviewed detailed discussion of the cur- over the Israeli armed forces operational authority of the radio, said that the main diffi- Secretary General of the United rent American efforts to obtain culty would be in Controlling Nations in managing peace- agreement on the mechanics of changes in deployments, which keeping operations. a cease-fire in the Middle East, he believed should . be pro- "We are trying to develop an though he said he was; "en- hibited under any cease-fire understanding on new ground couraged" by the Arab and rules," Samuel DePalma, Assist- agreement. ant Secretary of State for In- Israeli responses to the-Apieri- From Israel's point of view, ternational Organizations, told cari cease-fire proposal.' the main problem is assuring the House subcommittee. The Robert J. McClQskey,. the that Soviet missile bases are American idea, he said, is "that State Department- spokesman, not moved closer to the Sues later said that American con- Canal and that men and equip' i major powers that vote for ' peace-keeping operations would tacts with Israel., and Egypt ment for an amphibious offerj pay their share" of supporting were continuing but that the sive are not moved fqrward, them. timing and means, (Jf policing In the past, the Soviet Union the cease-fire "have not been Egyptian Rejection Reported. has refused to finance peace- determined." : ' . . CAIRO, Friday, Augt'? (A?) keeping operations in the To go beyond such a com- —Egypt has rejected a United Congo, the '^Middle East and ment, with diplomacy now in States proposal -for Egyptians Cyprus. '' , a very delicate stage.i'ihef isaid, and Israelis to police a.MlcJdle Washington's i objective is "would be speculative, im- -East cease-fire themselves, £lie first to geV'an .understanding prudent, and; possibly1 Jnislead- semiofficial newspaper ' AI that the Secretary General cap ing, as I believe that some of Ahram said today. ; '• manage future (peace-keeping the news reports I>aw last ' Al Ahram reported the'Fgyp. operations UVconsultatibn with night and'this morning were." tian refusal without elabora- the major powers and other in- He declined to. say which re- tion, but the reported rejection terested nations, without hav- ports or';h'dw'thejrmight have i apparently centered'on objec- ing to seek special Security been misleading. . . jtions to flights by Igraeli'rocon- Council approval, as the Char- naissance planes pver Egyptian ter requires. positiorts. ,s, '\ ,-.' ••' i'";•»>•. '•'*••} If that is achieved, the United " . ' •' States would then like to see .' arrangements made for middle- sized countries to train and maintain standing peace-keep- ing'um'ts, ready for crises, and . establishment , of permanent v. headquarters machinery for ; such operations in the United Rations Secretariat. NEW YORK TIMES, Thursday, 22 October 1970

in U.S. Favor U.N. Peace Army

, Special ta Th« Ntw York Times States try to make the United or poor job in solving the prob- Nations a success, 75 per cent PRINCETON, N. J., Oct. 21— Nations a success. These find- lems it has had to face, drew of those polled said it was According to the Gallup Poll, ings emerged from interviews the answer "good" from 44 per "very" important, 12 per cent most Americans favor the idea with 2,968 adults questioned in cent of the American adults said it was "fairly" important, ;6f establishing a United Nations two national surveys made last sampled. The answer "poor" 7 per cent said it was "not so" ^peace-keeping army of 100,000 month for the 25th anniversary was given by 40 per cent, and important and 6 per cent had .men. of the United Nations, 16 per cent had no opinion. no opinion. >j Although many Americans The Gallup organization said On the question of the estab- The Gallup organization that attitudes toward the lishment of a peace-keeping noted that in surveys in the have reservations about the United Nations in other coun- army, 67 per cent answered last 25 years, the American -•United Nations' success in tries were being measured by "yes," 30 per cent answered public has consistently favored problem-solving, according to affiliated organizations and "no" and 3 per cent had no the United Nations but (has at .the poll, an overwhelming ma-, would be reported soon. opinion. times expressed dissatisfaction ^jority-"'believe-'•that ifeis/ very The question whether the On the question of the im- with,., its. achievements and Important: organization was doing a good portance of making the ' • -