VERMONT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 43 NUMBER 3 SPRING 2019
FROM ENVIRONMENTAL TO ECOLOGICAL LAW: THE FUTURE LIES AHEAD
Papers Presented at a Workshop McGill University Faculty of Law October 17–18, 2017
Introduction L. Kinvin Wroth
Confronting Remote Ownership Problems with Ecological Law Geoffrey Garver
Does the Rule of Ecological Law Demand Veganism?: Ecological Law, Interspecies Justice, and the Global Food System Heather McLeod-Kilmurray
Fiduciary Duties Under the Trusteeship Theory: The Contribution of Canadian Case Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Matters Stéphanie Roy
El Salvador’s Mining Ban and Mining in Ontario’s Ring of Fire from the Lens of Ecological Law Carla Sbert
U.S. Fresh Water Law & Governance in the Anthropocene: A Critique of the Riparian Rights Legal Framework as a Basis for Water Governance in Vermont Courtney R. Hammond Wagner
NOTE
Charging Onwards: Removing Barriers to Energy Storage in Restructured New England States Ian Oxenham VERMONT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 43 NUMBER 3SPRING 2019
FROM ENVIRONMENTAL TO ECOLOGICAL LAW: THE FUTURE LIES AHEAD
PapersPresented at aWorkshop McGill University Faculty of Law October17–18,2017
Introduction L. KinvinWroth 415
ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswith EcologicalLaw Geoffrey Garver 425
Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism?:Ecological Law, InterspeciesJustice, and theGlobalFood System Heather McLeod-Kilmurray 455
FiduciaryDutiesUnder theTrusteeshipTheory: TheContributionof Canadian Case LawinJudicial ReviewofEnvironmentalMatters StéphanieRoy 485
El Salvador’sMiningBan andMininginOntario’sRingofFirefromthe Lens of Ecological Law CarlaSbert 517
U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene:ACritique of theRiparianRightsLegal Framework as aBasisfor WaterGovernance in Vermont Courtney R. Hammond Wagner 549
NOTE
Charging Onwards: Removing Barriers to Energy Storage in Restructured NewEnglandStates IanOxenham 575 VermontLaw Review is published four times each academic year: Fall, Winter,Spring, and Summer. Vermont LawReview’s mailingaddressis: Vermont LawReview,Vermont Law School,P.O.Box 96, SouthRoyalton, VT 05068. Vermont LawReview can be found onthe webathttp://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu. E-mail:[email protected].
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L. KinvinWroth*
Theessays that followarticulateinvarious ways thepropositionthat environmentallaw as we know it must give waytoanew regime— ecological law—that will enable Earth and themany species that inhabitit to survivethe rapidlyincreasingdeteriorationofthe naturalenvironment that is theculmination of centuriesofhuman domination. Beginnings. Environmentallaw emergedinthe late 1960s as afocus of legislative andregulatory activity and academic interest in responseto growingpublic concernfor thethreat that unchecked growth and developmentposed to thenatural environment of thenationand theworld. In theU.S., this phenomenon wasmanifested in aseries of majorfederal enactmentsdesigned to supportregulation of both federal and private activitythat threatened theenvironment, along with avariety of statelaws that supplemented andextendedthe federalregime. Many academic institutions established environmental studies programsthatfocused on boththe scienceand thepolicyofenvironmentalprotection. Lawschoolsin particular brought thescholarshipand activismoftheirfacultiesand studentstobear in assisting—and perhapsmoreoften prodding— governmentstoidentify and rectify specific environmental harms. Vermont’s pioneeringAct 250, enactedin1970, and Vermont Law School’sEnvironmental LawCenter, established in 1978, areearlyand outstanding examples of both dimensions of theenvironmental movement.1 Thecommand andcontrolregulatory regime of environmental lawhas achieved notablesuccesses on acase-by-case basis since theearly 1970s. Yetthat successmay have lulled thepublic consciousness into thinking that threatstothe environmentare undercontrol. Moreover, efforts of the present federal administrationtolimit thereach of existing regulatory agenciesillustrate thepolitical vulnerability threateningthe future of that success. Most important,case-by-case success has not haltedthe continuing degradationofanatural environment beset by global warming, sealevel
*ProfessorofLaw Emeritus and former Presidentand Dean,VermontLaw School;member, E4A Lawand GovernanceSteering Committee. ThisIntroductionisanelaboration of remarks made by theauthor on February 26, 2019, to introduce: Ecological Law and Governance: Introduction and Overview,the opening sessionofa2019webinarseries on EcologicalLaw andGovernance sponsored by theE4A Lawand Governance Initiative and other organizations. Video: EcologicalLaw and Governance: An Introductionand Overview Webinar,ECON. FORTHE ANTHROPOCENE (MAR.13, 2019), https://e4a-net.org/2019/03/13/video-ecological-law-and-governance-an-introduction-and-overview- webinar/. 1. Act250 of 1969, 10 VT.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, §§ 6001–6093; EnvironmentalLaw Center, VT.L.SCH., https://www.vermontlaw.edu/academics/centers-and-programs/environmental-law-center (lastvisited Apr. 14, 2019). 416 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:415 rise,extraction of nonrenewable resources, permissive regulators, and developmentgrowth driven by increasing economic anddemographic pressures. Theemergingrecognitionofthe limits of environmentallaw as presently understood andappliedhas ledtoacallfor aseismic shift inthe means foraddressing thecontinuing and increasing threats faced by the natural environment—a shiftfromenvironmentaltoecological law. The scope andsignificanceofthatshift are summedupinthese wordsfromthe introductiontoacollectionofarticlesintendedtoillustrate thecurrentstate of articulationand analysis of theconcepts of ecological law:
[E]nvironmental law...allows human activitiesand aspirations to determine whetherornot theintegrity of ecological systems shouldbeprotected. [Ecological law] requireshuman activities andaspirations to be determined by theneedtoprotect (and increasingly restore),the integrity of ecological systems. Ecologicalintegrity becomesapreconditionfor human aspirations and afundamental principleoflaw.2
Thepresent group of essays includes papersoriginally presented in a workshop entitled From Environmental to Ecological Law at theMcGill University Faculty of LawonOctober17–18, 2017, sponsored by the Economicsfor theAnthropocene(E4A) Lawand Governance Initiative and theEcological Lawand Governance Association(ELGA).E4A is a graduatestudy and research programjointly conducted by McGill University,the University of Vermont,and York University (Toronto).3 Vermont LawSchool,aspartofits longstanding relationshipwith McGill University,has been apartnerinthe E4A program since theprogram’s inceptionin2013.4 ELGAisanetwork of academics, professionals, and organizations committedtotacklingthe causes,and not just thesymptoms, of globalenvironmental degradation, founded in October2017 in response to the2016 Oslo Manifesto.5
2. Klaus Bosselmann &PrueTaylor, Introduction to ECOLOGICAL APPROACHESTO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xv–xvi (Klaus Bosselmann&Prue Taylor,eds., 2017). 3. SeeWhat is E4A?,ECON. FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE,https://e4a-net.org/what-is-e4a/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (providing therationale and funding support forthe E4A partnership). 4. Partners,ECON. FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE,https://e4a-net.org/steering-committee- 2/about/partners/ (last visitedApr. 14, 2019).For asummary of thebroader Vermont Law School– McGill connection, seeHOI L. KONG &L.KINVIN WROTH,NAFTA AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: HISTORY,EXPERIENCEAND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 6n.20(2015). 5. See EcologicalLaw andGovernanceAssociation, Oslo Manifesto forEcological Law& Governance (June 21,2016)[hereinafter Oslo Manifesto], https://www.elga.world/wp- content/uploads/2018/02/Oslo-Manifesto-final.pdf. 2019] From Environmental to Ecological Law 417
E4Aisanactiveparticipantinthe development of ecologicallaw through its Lawand GovernanceResearch Initiative, thepremise of which is that “[t]he Anthropocene imposes apressingneedtoreframe lawand governancesoasabove alltoadvancetowardamutuallyenhancinghuman- Earth relationship, with rigorous reliance on contemporaryscience and traditionalknowledge systems.”6 E4A’sgoal canbeachievedinpartby assessingthe currentlegalsystemwithits property-based definitionofthe human-Earth relationshipand by creating“new substantiveconcepts and institutionalframeworksthatembodyamore hopeful vision of thehuman- Earth relationshipdemanded forlife’s flourishing in theAnthropocene.”7 TheOctober 2017 workshop hadthree themes that considered these issues: (1)the shortcomings of environmental law—theneedtomove from environmentaltoecological law; (2)the promises andspecifics of ecological law—adeep dive into themeaningofecologicallaw;and (3) how do we get there?—thechallenge of thetransitionfromenvironmental to ecological law. An internationalgroup of twenty-four lawyersand academicsparticipated in six panelscovering thosethemes and in afinal discussion intendedtoprovide abasisfor ongoingdiscussions on bringing ecological lawintopractice on such land useissuesasurban agriculture, mining, wilderness,and infrastructure.8 Theessays that follow address thosethemesinavariety of ways. Geoffrey Garver,who holds aJ.D. cum laude fromMichiganLaw School, andanLL.M. andPh.D. fromMcGill University,isboth
6. See Research Groups: Law and Governance Research Group,ECON. FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE,https://e4a-net.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/LG.pdf (last visitedApr. 14, 2019). Anthropocene has becomeacommon, though not officially recognized, term to describethe current geological epochinwhich human activity hashad asignificant impact on theEarth’s natural environment.Opinions as to its beginning daterange from thebeginning of successful agriculture 8,000 yearsago to the19thcenturybeginnings of theindustrial revolution to the first atomic bombtestin 1945. See, e.g.,Colin N. Waters et al., CanNuclear Weapons Fallout Mark the Beginningofthe Anthropocene Epoch?,71BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 46, 49 (2015) (debating betweenthe “Trinity Test” 1945 detonationand subsequent thermonuclearweapons tests as the “globalsignal thatmarks the beginning of theAnthropocene”);Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen&John R. McNeill, The Anthropocene: Are HumansNow Overwhelming the GreatForcesofNature?,36AMBIO 614, 616 (2007) (calling the Industrial Era“Stage1of theAnthropocene”); Thisisthe Dawning of theAge of the Anthropocene, UCSB:GEOGRAPHY,https://geog.ucsb.edu/this-is-the-dawning-of-the-age-of-the-anthropocene/ (last visited Apr.14, 2019) (“[S]ome geologistsargue that theAnthropocene epoch literally began8,000 years agowhenancientfarmerscleared foreststogrow crops ....”).For additional discussiononthe datingofthe Anthropocene, see Anthropocene,WIKIPEDIA,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropocene (lastvisitedApr. 14, 2019) (providing furtherresources and references). 7. LAW AND GOVERNANCE FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE:ARESEARCH PROJECT OF THE ECONOMICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE (E4A)PARTNERSHIP 2(Sept.26, 2016) (onfile with author). 8.From Environmental to Ecological Law(E4A-ELGA Workshop, Oct. 2017),YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLf37F7xx0zo_kpDDH16p1mIBP2J5lGk2U (last updated Jan. 17, 2018). 418 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:415
Coordinator of theE4A Lawand GovernanceResearch Initiativeand a member of ELGA’sSteeringCommittee. He is also an AdjunctProfessor at McGill andConcordiaUniversities, has worked forthe North American Commission forEnvironmental Cooperation(NACEC),the U.S. DepartmentofJusticeand Environmental ProtectionAgency, and wasa lawclerk forthe late Conrad Cyr, U.S. DistrictJudge forthe District of Maine. Dr.Garver’s work is afittingintroductiontothe remainderofthe essays.9 Initially, buildingonThomas Berry’s conceptofamutually enhancing human-Earth relationshipinwhich “law is an extensionof ecology,”10 he develops abroad definitionofecological lawand its components, contrastingthem in tabular form with thescopeand reach of contemporaryenvironmentallaw,which supports remote privateownership of land andother resourcesand is historically engrained in thecommonlaw of property.Notingthe over-generalscopeofcontemporaryrightsofnature theory, he concludesthat,toobtainthe status of law, thoserightsand other generalconceptsmustbedefined as they haveevolvedinintentionalhuman actsofecological,eco-cultural, and reciprocal (i.e., between ecologyand culture) restoration in specific ecosystems. Thesefactorsappear in examples of successfulsustainable useofcommonpooled resources, epitomized in theconcept of thecommons. Having previously identifiedremoteprivateownershipasthe chief obstacletoatransitiontoaregimeofecologicallaw,Dr. Garver then describes in detailits elementsthathave ledtosignificant ecological disruptions of agriculturalland through theriseofglobal trade and investment supportedbyliberalizinginternationaltrade agreementssuchas theNorth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)11 and others implementedthrough theWorld Trade Organization(WTO).12 He concludes that ecological law, though still largelyconceptual,isan emerging responsetothe increasing understanding that thepotentialfor economic growth is finite. Locally basedrules that wouldimpose ecological limits on growth wouldbeextended to globalprinciples tailored
9. GeoffreyGarver, ConfrontingRemoteOwnership Problems with Ecological Law,43VT. L. REV.425, 425–54 (2019). 10.Id. at 429 (quoting THOMAS BERRY,THE GREAT WORK:OUR WAY INTO THE FUTURE 84 (1999)). 11.NorthAmerican Free TradeAgreement,U.S.-Can,-.Mex.,Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.289 (1993). 12. See,e.g.,Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 16,Apr. 15, 1994, MarrakeshAgreement Establishingthe World TradeOrganization,Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm (establishing guidelines forintellectual property rights, including thosetomedicines). 2019] From Environmental to Ecological Law 419 to thedifferent needs andrequirementsofwidelyvarying complexity and scale. Yetthe entrenched economic,cultural, and social ordersbased on our historic growth-insistent model require significant changes in theglobally diverse power structuresand political systems that sustain them.The ideas to createand sustainastructurefor thosechangesare onlynow being formulated in developmentslikethe 2016OsloManifesto.13 Heather McLeod-Kilmurray,LL.B. University of WesternOntario, LL.M. University of Cambridge,S.J.D.University of Toronto, is an AssociateProfessor on theUniversity of Ottawa Faculty of Law—Common LawSection. Herresearch interestsinclude environmentallaw, environmentalethics, andecofeminism. Professor McLeod-Kilmurray’sEssay analyzes the applicationof ecological lawtofood animalsinthe global industrialfood system,initially from theperspectiveofProfessorKlaus Bosselmann’sthree-partconcept of ecological justiceasincluding intragenerational, intergenerational, and interspecies justice.14 Shethensetsforth theten featuresofecological law identifiedbyDr. Garver15 and appliestheminher analysis. Afterdiscussing theargumentssupportingmaintenanceofthe global industrialfood system, sheargues that ecologicallaw must includeinterspecies justice, citing Bosselman, Garver,and other authorities, and then sheexplores the questionofwhether interspecies justicedemands veganism.She concludes that theanswer depends on resolvingquestionsraisedbythe complex balance between interspecies justiceand intragenerationaland intergenerationaljusticeinspecificinstances of animalproducts consumptionwithin varying contextsofplace,culture,and ethicalconcerns. She then appliesDr. Garver’s tenfeaturesinadetailedassessmentof thequestion in thecontextofindustrialproductionoffood animals. She concludes that thefeaturesthatprimarily address ecologicaljusticeissues raise aserious question as to theoriginofthe food animalproduction system,aswellasits justice. Sheemphasizes that theremaining features callfor recognitionofecological principles in allareas of alegal order that is applicableand enforceable bothgloballyand locally and is adaptableto
13.Oslo Manifesto, supra note5. 14.Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Does theRuleofEcological Law Demand Veganism?: Ecological Law,Interspecies Justice, andthe Global Food System,43VT.L.REV.455, 456 n.5(citing Klaus Bosselmann, Ecological Justice and Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY:A READER (Benjamin J. Richardson&Stepan Wood, eds.,2006)). See Bosselmann&Taylor, supra note 2, at xv (providing the three-partconcept of ecologicaljustice). 15.McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note14, at 457–58 (citingGeoffrey Garver, The Rule of Ecological Law:The Legal ComplementtoDegrowth Economics,5SUSTAINABILITY 316 (2013), reprinted in Bosselmann&Taylor, supra note2,at953).The features are set forth in slightlydifferent tabular form in Garver, supra note9,at428–31. 420 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:415 bothchanging circumstancesand theneedsofparticular places and peoples, includingthosewhere meat productionand consumptionisbothnecessary and sustainable. In conclusion, ProfessorMcLeod-Kilmurraybriefly identifiesother ways of mitigatingthe ecological harms of theindustrial productionoffoodanimals that ecologicallaw might provide, including rightsfor food animals and dutiesfor humans dealingwith them,regulation and educationtosupportsuchmeasures, and empowerment of local endeavors. StéphanieRoy,LL.B. Université Laval,LL.M. McGill University, practiced insurancelaw and civilresponsibility as amember of theQuébec Bar, and is adoctoralcandidateinadministrativeand environmentallaw at Université Laval. Ms.Roy’sEssayconsidersthe concept of trusteeshipasabasis for framingatransitionfromenvironmental to ecologicallaw.16 She summarizes thedutiesofafiduciarythather theory wouldimposeon government—loyalty,personalperformance, investment of trust assets, impartiality,accounting, andproviding information. Shenotes theorigin of theideaofapublic trusteeshipfor theenvironmentinProfessor Joseph Sax’s ground-breakingarticleonthe public trust.17 Aftercataloguing the inadequacies of thepublic trust doctrineasaninstrument of environmental protection, shedescribes at lengthrecent work thatbuilt upon it: Professor Mary C. Wood’scallfor theimpositionoffiduciary obligations forthe environmentonthe governmentand Professor Bosselmann’sproposal fora World EnvironmentalOrganizationtoserve as aglobaltrusteefor the environment—bothsustained by citizen realizationofthe needfor amore ecologically centered regimeofenvironmental lawand governance.18 Recognizingthat these proposalswould facilitate theshift from environmentaltoecological lawbut arenot immediatelyrealizable, Ms. Roynotes anumber of othershortertermbenefits from more gradual changes in thecontextoftrusteeship as an overarchingframework: Onethat embraces statedutiesand responsibilitiesand apublic ethical duty toward theenvironment, theintegrationofother legaldisciplines and science as
16.StéphanieRoy, FiduciaryDutiesUnder theTrusteeship Theory:The Contributionof CanadianCaseLaw in JudicialReview of Environmental Matters,43VT.L.REV.485–516 (2019). 17. See generally Joseph I. Sax, ThePublic TrustDoctrine in Natural ResourcesLaw: Effective Judicial Intervention,68MICH.L.REV.473 (1970)(reframing the debateregarding thepublic trustdoctrine). 18.Roy, supra note 16, at 486–91 (first citing Mary ChristinaWood, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 17 (2013); then citingKLAUS BOSSELMANN, EARTH GOVERNANCE TRUSTEESHIP OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS 116 (2015)). 2019] From Environmental to Ecological Law 421 suggestedbyDr. Garver,19 therecognitionofrightstonature, and astronger ruleoflaw. Ms.Roy then analyzes selected Canadianenvironmentalcase law to provide examples of thepracticalcontent of theexecutive’sfiduciary duties, identifiedbyProfessor Wood,imposed by realizingthese benefits. Thefew Canadian cases recognizing thegeneral concept of governmentas trustee forthe environment didnot embody thepublic trustdoctrine, much less adeveloped idea of governmental trusteeship, butMs. Royfinds duties of accountability, public interest, and loyalty similartothoseofatrustee in doctrines of Canadian administrativeand constitutional law. She reviews twoSupremeCourtand twoprovincialcourt of appeal environmental decisions that invoke andapply various aspects of thedutyofloyalty requiredofprovincial and local governmentstosustain decisions protective of theenvironment. Ms.Roy concludesthat, although abroader reconsiderationofproperty rightswill be necessary to fully realizestate environmentaltrusteeship as an instrument in thetransition to aregime of ecological law, thecases reviewed show that existing legalconcepts provide abasis forthe continuing development of thetrusteeship theory. CarlaSbert,L.E.D.Intituto Tecnólogico AutónomodeMéxico (ITAM),LL.M. HarvardLaw School,isadoctoral candidateatthe University of Ottawa Faculty of Lawand has worked in diverse settings with afocus on sustainabledevelopment and environmental lawand policy. Ms.Sberts’s Essay20 sets fortha“lensofecological law” with three principles: ecocentrism,thatthe interconnectednessand value of allbeings is recognized; ecological primacy,thathuman activity is limitedbythe needtomaintainorrestore theecologicalintegrity of ecosystems; and ecological justice,thatembodiesProfessorBosselmann’sthree-part concept of intragenerational, intergenerational, andinterspeciesjustice.21 In two casestudies,after acareful summary of thedemographic, political,and legalcontext,she uses the“lens” to analyze and critique theecological law componentsofElSalvador’spioneeringlegislationbanning allmetal mining and Ontario’s legal regime to governproposed mineral extractionin its ecologically intact “RingofFire”22 region. El Salvador’s Law
19.Garver, The RuleofEcological Law, supra note15. 20.Carla Sbert, El Salvador’s Mining Ban and Mining in Ontario’s RingofFire from the Lens of Ecological Law,43VT.L.REV.517–47 (2019). 21. Bosselmann&Taylor, supra note2,atxv. 22.With apologies to Johnny Cash. Ring of Fire Lights up Northern Ontario’s Mining Industry,ONTARIO BUS.REP.(Aug.10, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20130810073739/ http://www.mri.gov.on.ca/obr/?p=1529. 422 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:415
ProhibitingMetal Mining,23 though containingnoelement of ecocentrism, partially satisfiesthe testsofecological primacy andecologicaljustice. Ms. Sbert considers it “animportant step” toward aregimeofecological lawbut politically vulnerableinthe absenceofafoundationinecocentrism.24 After reviewingthe complexframework of Ontario’s mining, land use, and environmentalstatutes, and its conflict with ecocentric indigeneous legal traditionand claims,she arguesthat, as interpretedand appliedbythe province, it is not ecocentric.Opportunitiesfor ecological primacy are weakened by provisions that allowthe province to override or amend local land useplans or protectedareas in whichminingisprohibitedand by obstacles to post-mining restoration. Ecologicaljusticeisweakened by the barrierstocommunity participation, theprotectionofexistingmining claims,and thefailure to limit mining to materials that areessentialto satisfy human needs,rather than corporateeconomicinterests. Ms.Sbert concludes that thebasicecological lawquestions remain concerning the frameworkofaneeds-based extractionregimeand its specificterms— questions that can only be resolved in thecontext of amoregeneral shiftto an ecological paradigm. Courtney R. Hammond Wagner,agraduateofDartmouthCollege,is aPh.D. candidate in NaturalResources at theUniversity of Vermont’s Rubenstein SchoolofEnvironment and NaturalResources,where sheisa Graduate Fellow at theGund Institute forthe Environment’sEconomicsfor theAnthropoceneProgram.Her research focuses on decisionmaking and policygoverning waterquality. Ms.Hammond Wagner’s Essayaddressesriparianrightsgenerally and in Vermont,and theneed to restructure thedoctrinewith abasisinan environmentalethic.25 Afteraninitialdescription of changes in theglobal hydrologiccycleattributablebothdirectly to human activity and to climate change, shepostulatesthe needinthe Anthropocene forlegislationthat will curtail environmentaldegradation, restoredeterioratedecosystems, and address increased climate-change-induced effectsonwater quality.She then provides ageneral historicalsurveyofU.S.water lawfocused on the evolution in theeastern states from the“reasonableuse” principle of common-lawriparianrightsdoctrinetostatutory riparianregulation
23.DecretoNo. 639,art.1,Abril4,2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], at 6(El Sal.), https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo-digital-del-diario-oficial/. 24.Sbert, supra note20, at 528. 25.Courtney R. Hammond Wagner, U.S. Fresh Water Law&Governance in the Anthropocene: ACritique of theRiparian Rights Legal FrameworkasaBasis forWaterGovernance in Vermont,43VT.L.REV.549–74 (2019). 2019] From Environmental to Ecological Law 423 systemsproviding forstate permits to be granted for“reasonable use.”26 TurningtoVermont,Ms. Hammond Wagner notes theroleofanearly 19th- century Vermont SupremeCourtcase in establishing economicvalueasa component of reasonable use.27 Shethen describes theState’s current statutorywater rights policyasone that seekstobalance ecological and economic needsinthe interest of maintainingand improving water quality.28 Yetdespite this statutoryschemeand federaland interstate antipollution efforts, shefinds that theproblem of phosphorous andother pollutioninLakeChamplaincontinues unabated. Theregulators,abettedby theLegislature, continue to interpretand apply thepolicyofreasonableuse to favor economic development in case-by-case implementation of the permittingprocess. Ms.Hammond Wagner proposes atwo-pronged solutiontothis problem.First is thedevelopment of an “environmental ethic,” basedon Aldo Leopold’sconcept of a“land ethic,”29 whichwouldgiveprotectionof ecological boundaries priority overeconomic values andprovide abasis for legalsanctions againstactivity that runs counter to thethree legislative goalspreviously laid out.The second prong, echoinganidea expressed by ProfessorPeter Brownand Dr.Garver,30 wouldrestore thedutyofthe water user to protect otherriparianlandowners and extendthatdutytoall life formsonEarth affected by thehydrologiccycle. With thesesteps,the current legalframeworkwill servetoprotectwater quality in theage of the Anthropocene. TheFutureLiesAhead. Theessays presented hereillustrateboththe current state, and thepotential, of ecologicallaw by examiningavarietyof ways in whichthe shiftfromenvironmental to ecological lawmay be characterized and accelerated. Geoffrey Garver emphasizes that thekey componentsofecological lawaslimits on growth-oriented behavior,such as remote ownership of land and otherresources, must evolve over time from locally oriented rules, while overcomingbroadersocial, economic, andpolitical obstacles.Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, appliesProfessor Bosselman’sconcept of ecologicaljusticeand Dr.Garver’s tenfeatures of ecological lawtoananalysisofthe industrialfood animal system,also concluding that thechange to an ecological basiswill havetooccur over
26.Id. at 556–58. 27.Martin v. Bigelow,2Aik. 184(Vt.1827); seealso Johns v. Stevens, 3Vt. 308, 315–16 (1830)(establishing Vermont as ariparianstate). 28.VT.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, §§ 1001,1022, 1023, 1250, 1263–1265, 1267–1268, 7701. 29.ALDO LEOPOLD,ASAND COUNTY ALMANAC 239 (Oxford Univ.Press 1966). 30.PETER BROWN &GEOFFREY GARVER,RIGHT RELATIONSHIP:BUILDING A WHOLE EARTH ECONOMY 6(2009). 424 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:415 time. Stéphanie Royseesprinciples of trusteeshipasrecognized in Canadian case lawaspotentialforerunnersinthe evolutionofaregime of ecological law. Carla Sbert develops a“lens of ecological law” based on Professor Bosselmann’sconcept of ecologicaljusticetomeasurethe degree to whichmininglaw regimesare consistent with ecologicallaw.Courtney Hammond Wagner focusesonthe failures of currentwater quality regulationinaspecific context andcalls fordevelopment of an environmentalethic that will give ecological interestspriorityover economic values in thecurrent legalsystemand extend thedutyofthe riparianlanduser to alllife forms. Publicationofthese essays by the Vermont Law Review will assist lawyersindeveloping an early awareness of theissuesand aprocess for the transitiontothe newregime of ecological law—not onlyinenvironmental law, but in areas such as tort,contract,property,criminal,and corporate law, along with thelaw that defines constitutionaland institutional structure. Thelawyerswill be in thetrenches, at theplanning tables,and in the legalacademyfor that transition. In thetrenches, they can analyze and critique currentlaw and apply, interpret, challenge, andrevise it on an ongoingbasis in light of society’s evolvingecologicalvalues. At the planning table, they can take responsibility forarticulatingthe new ideas and designingand draftingthe newstructures that theecologicalfuture demands.Inthe lawschools, they can helptocreateanewgenerationof lawyerstocarry them out. In theimmortalwords of Mort Sahl,“thefuture liesahead.”31
31.MORT SAHL,THE FUTURE LIES AHEAD (UMG Recordings 2017)(1958), https://www.pandora.com/artist/description/mort-sahl/the-future-lies-ahead/ALt9mnxmwc6h2ZV. CONFRONTING REMOTE OWNERSHIP PROBLEMS WITH ECOLOGICAL LAW
Geoffrey Garver*
ABSTRACT
ThomasBerry’s powerfulappeal foramutually enhancing human- Earthrelationshipfaces many challengesdue to theecological crisis that is co-identifiedwith dominant growth-insistenteconomic,political, andlegal systemsacrossthe world. Thedomains of environmental history, ecological restoration, and eco-culturalrestoration, as well as studies by Elinor Ostrom and othersofsustainableuse of commonpool resources,provide insightsonthe necessary conditions foramutually enhancing human-Earth relationship. Atheme commontothesedomains is theneed forintimate knowledgeofand connectiontoplace that requiresalong-standing commitment of people to theecosystems that sustainthem.Remoteprivate ownership—oftenbylarge and politically powerful multinational corporations financed by investorsseeking thehighest possiblereturns and lacking knowledgeorinterestinthe places and people they harm—is deeplyengrained in theglobal economic system.The historical rootsof remote ownership and controlgoback to territorial extensification associated with thesharpriseofcolonialismand long-distancetradeinthe earlymodernera.Yet remote owners’and investors’ detachment from place poses an enormous challenge in thequest foramutually enhancing human-Earthrelationship. ThisEssaypresents an analysis of how contemporary environmental lawundergirds theremoteownershipproblem and of how limits-insistentecological lawcouldprovide solutions.
ABSTRACT...... 425 INTRODUCTION...... 426 I. AMUTUALLY ENHANCING HUMAN-EARTH RELATIONSHIP:AMORAL GROUNDING FOR ECOLOGICAL LAW ...... 428 II. THE REMOTE OWNERSHIP PROBLEM ...... 436 A. EcologicalDisruptionfromAgriculture...... 437 B. Metabolic Rift andthe Rise of GlobalTrade...... 440
*Dr. GeoffreyGarver,Ph.D.,J.D., L.L.M.,coordinates research on lawand governance for theEconomicsfor theAnthropocene Partnership (e4a-net.org)and teaches environmental coursesat McGill University and ConcordiaUniversity.Heisonthe steeringcommitteeofthe Ecological Law and Governance Association, ELGA(elga.world). 426 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425
C. ModernGlobal Trade and Investment...... 443 D. Trade, Investment,and Remote Ownership Problems ...... 449 III. CONFRONTING REMOTE OWNERSHIP UNDER ECOLOGICAL LAW ...... 450 CONCLUSION ...... 453
INTRODUCTION
Thegrowing tensionbetween theglobally dominant socio-political narrative, based on insistence on economic growth,and thealternative limits-based narrative in whichthe emerging field of ecologicallaw is grounded, createsanurgently needed openingfor transformationoflaw.1 Contemporarylegal systems co-evolved with other socially constructed normativesystems that characterizethe growth-insistent narrative.2 Therefore, theradical transformationthatecological lawcalls for necessarily involves concomitant transformationofthe social,political, economic,and cultural systems with whichlaw interactsacross temporal andspatialscales.3
1. KathrynGwiazdon, We Cannot Fail: The Promise and Principles of Ecological Lawand Governance,11MINDING NATURE 36, 36 (2018) (highlightingthe creationofthe Ecological Law and Governance Association (ELGA)asone response to theneedtostructureprinciples of lawand governance around thefoundations of life). 2. PANARCHY:UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 5 (Lance H. Gunderson &C.S.Hollingeds.,2002) (explaining that co-evolutioninvolves aconstant “interplay between change and persistence, between thepredictableand unpredictable”). 3. See id. (“The cross-scale,interdisciplinary,and dynamic natureofthe theoryhas [led] us to coin theterm panarchy for it.”); RICHARD O. BROOKS ET AL., LAW AND ECOLOGY 36 (2002) (suggesting that “bothecologyand environmental laware undergoing transformations to betteradapt to eachother and to theenvironmental problems they areseeking to resolve”);DonaldT.Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and AdministrativeLaw,54DUKE L. REV.913, 932, 944 (2005) (demonstratinghow transformations that transcendour routinepolitical and social systemsmay come from a“republican moment[]”);J.B.Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: APrimer,24GA.ST.U.L.REV.885, 896–97, 901 (2008) (“[I]n social systems, change veryoften is the specificintent of human intervention, in whichcaseknowinghow thesystemresponds to changeshouldbeanimportant factor in thedesign of theinstrumentofchange.”); J.B. Ruhl, Panarchy and theLaw,17ECOLOGY &SOC’Y,no. 3, 2012, art. no. 31, https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss3/art31/ (demonstratingthatadaptivesystems theoryhas alreadyspread to economics,ecology, and sociology); RobinKundisCraig, Learning to Think About Complex EnvironmentalSystems inEnvironmental and Natural Resource Lawand Legal Scholarship: ATwenty-Year Retrospective,24FORDHAM ENVTL.L.REV.87, 92 (2013) (“Howdowe transform environmentaland natural resources lawintogovernance systems that can cope with continual change, ever-present uncertainty,and thepotential forcatastrophic...thresholdcrossings in socio-ecological systems?”); AhjondS.Garmestani&Melinda Harm Benson, AFramework for Resilience-BasedGovernance of Social-Ecological Systems,18ECOLOGY &SOC’Y,no. 1, 2013, art. no. 9, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss1/art9/(“The primaryproblems with our current framework for environmentallaw are that it does not often account forscale andtends to lock-in‘fixes’ 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 427
Propertyregimes andstate sovereigntyare twoofthe main normative constructsthat will needprofound rethinking and regroundinginany transitionfromcontemporarylaw to ecological law.4 Deeply entrenched protections of privateproperty rightsand strong resistance to stringent supranationallegal regimesfor environmental protectionand othermatters act—often in concert—to impede meaningful,widespread achievement of an ecologically sustainable balance between societal developmentand ecological integrity.5 In particular,remoteprivateownership and absentee landlords associated with land andresource grabbing oftenlodge prevailing power overland usedecisions in decisionmakers whoare geographically farremoved fromthe effected ecological systems andlackinginthe knowledge neededfor managingthem in an ecologically sustainable manner.6 Thomas Berry’s conceptionofamutually enhancing human-Earth relationshipprovidesacompellingcoreobjectivefor ecological lawand the
becauseofthe needfor certainty in the legalprocess.”); RakhyunE.Kim &KlausBosselmann, International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene:Towards aPurposive System of Multilateral Environmental Agreements,2TRANSNAT’L ENVTL.L.285, 307 (2013) (“[T]heultimatepurpose of internationalenvironmentallaw should be aboutsafeguardingthe integrityofEarth’s life-support system, or all identified andpotentialplanetary boundaries, as thenon-negotiable biophysical preconditions forhuman existence and development.”); Olivia Odom Greenetal., Barriers and Bridges to the Integration of Social–Ecological Resilience and Law,13FRONTIERS ECOLOGY &ENV’T 332, 332, 335 (2015) (demonstratingthatadaptivegovernancemay be apart of thetransformationto ecologicallaw). 4. See Geoffrey Garver, ASystems-Based Tool forTransitioning to Law foraMutually Enhancing Human-EarthRelationship,157 ECOLOGICAL ECON.165, 166 [hereinafter Garver, A Systems-BasedTool forTransitioningtoLaw](explaining that “the dominant anthropocentric narrative...[is]reinforced by legal systems built around strong notions of statesovereignty and private property rights”); GeoffreyGarver, The Rule of EcologicalLaw:The Legal ComplementtoDegrowth Economics,5SUSTAINABILITY 316, 319, 321 (2013) [hereinafter Garver, The RuleofEcological Law] (contending that aflawofenvironmental lawand economicsisthe favoring of monetization, leading to primaryeconomic rather than ecological constraints on land). 5.See Garver, ASystems-Based Tool for Transitioning to Law, supra note4(“Prevailing legal systems ...assume[] non-human nature is subjecttohuman dominance ....”). 6. See FRED PEARCE,THE LAND GRABBERS:THE NEW FIGHT OVER WHO OWNS THE EARTH viii,5–6 (2012) (explaining thefirst exampleofthe global “landgrabs” he explored, including Al Amoudi, whorecruitedaformer Zenawiminister—Hail Assegdie—who plans to digacanal through villagers’landwithouttheir knowledge);Jampel Dell’Angeloetal., The Tragedy of theGrabbed Commons:Coercion and Dispossession in the Global Land Rush,92WORLD DEV.1,9(2017) (demonstratingthatthe “broaderdynamicsoflandgrabbing cannot be prevented by acting onlyon property regimeswithoutaddressingpower dynamicsand systemsofproduction”); Marc Edelman, CarlosOya &Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Global LandGrabs: Historical Processes, Theoretical and Methodological Implicationand Current Trajectories,34THIRD WORLD Q.,1517,1528 (2013) (connectingchanges in agrarian economy, capitalism,and other driversofdevelopment with solutions in environmental law). 428 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425 relatedfield of ecological economics.7 This Essay is asystems-based examinationofhow ecologicallaw that supports an ongoing questfor a mutually enhancing human-Earthrelationshipprovidesecologically sound andsocially just answerstoproblemsofremoteownershipaswellasland andresource grabbing. PartIexplainsand justifies amutually enhancing human-Earth relationshipasafoundationalgoal of ecological law. Part II providesamore detaileddescriptionofremoteownership and absentee landlords andhow they areintricatelytiedtoaglobaleconomic system that gives hierarchical normativepriority to:privateproperty and wealth;strong state sovereignty; and commodificationofnon-market values forthe sake of perpetual economic growth.PartIII explains howthe radical reordering of normativepriorities inherent in ecologicallaw wouldseverely restrict or eliminateremoteownership or absentee landlordism that impedesprogress toward amutually enhancing human-Earth relationship. Although ecological lawremains largelyconceptual and socio-politically elusive, it warrantsdetaileddevelopment now in order to be ready when its time comes.Fortunately, ecologicallaw is gaining ground with theemergence of rightsofnatureand other developmentsinlaw andrelated normative domains that will play adeterminativeroleinthe human prospect in these ecologically periloustimes.8
I. AMUTUALLY ENHANCING HUMAN-EARTH RELATIONSHIP:AMORAL GROUNDINGFOR ECOLOGICAL LAW
Berry described amutually enhancing human-Earth relationshipasone that reflectsthat“[i]nreality thereisasingleintegralcommunity of the Earth that includes allits componentmemberswhether human or other than human ...[each of which] has its ownroletofulfill, its owndignity,its innerspontaneity.”9 It is arelationshipinwhich “[e]very being enters into communion with other beings.”10 Berry aligns thetransitiontoamutually enhancing human-Earth relationshipwith theemergence of theEcozoic
7.See THOMAS BERRY,THE GREAT WORK:OUR WAY INTO THE FUTURE 2–3 (1999) (explaining that EuropeanoccupationofNorth America has been unbroken since colonizationand even with new achievementssuch as science, technology, industry,finance, and commerce, environmental devastationresulted, and consequently, anew transition of human-Earth mutual benefitisnecessary). 8.See Oliver A. Houck, Noah’s Second Voyage: The RightsofNatureasLaw,31TUL. ENVT’L L.J. 1, 2–4 (2017) (listinggrants of natural rights to glaciers,rivers, and animals andstating how these grantshavechangedthe views of other countriesorjurisdictions). 9. BERRY, supra note7,at4. 10. Id. 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 429
Era, “the periodwhen humanswill be present to theplanetasparticipating membersofthe comprehensiveEarth community.”11 With regard to law,Berry wrotethat “[e]cology is not apartoflaw; lawisanextensionofecology.”12 In otherwords,law shouldreflect and maintain ahuman role within thebroader community of life that is life- enhancing andrespectfulofthe ecologicalroles of other membersofthat community.13 He argued that “[t]oachieve aviablehuman-Earth situationa new jurisprudencemustenvisage its primarytaskasthat of articulatingthe conditions forthe integral functioning of theEarth process,with special reference to amutually enhancing human-Earthrelationship.”14 Thelaw he envisioned“wouldprovide forthe legalrightsofgeological andbiological as well as humancomponentsofthe Earth community.”15 Each component of theEarth community wouldhavethe right “for habitatand the opportunity ...tofulfill itsroleinthe naturalsystems to whichit belongs.”16 Humans andall other componentsofthe Earthsystemwouldbe mutually responsible to respecteach other’s rights, and“[j]usticewould consist in carrying outthiscomplex of creative relationships.”17 Several juristshavefurther developed Berry’s proposal forlegal systemswithco-equalrightsamong allmembers of theEarth community with detailedelaborations and argumentsfor “wild law,”18 “Earth jurisprudence,”19 “Earth law,”20 and“ecological law.”21 Theserelated,or
11. Id. at 8. 12. Id. at 84. 13.See id. (explaining that ecology is not just asinglecourse of study, but rather the basis for cross-subject studies, including law). 14. Id. at 61. 15. Id. at 161. 16. Id. at 80. 17. Id. at 61–62. 18. See CORMAC CULLINAN,WILD LAW:AMANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 30–31 (2ded. 2011) (explaining that wild lawismoreofan“approach to human governance”than asector of law, and further, that wild lawattempts to encourage ahuman-naturerelationship, withfocusonstrengthening that relationshiptosafeguard wildernessand self-regulation of communities). 19.PETER D. BURDON,EARTH JURISPRUDENCE:PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1(2015) (“[Thomas Berry’s] observationthat lawiscentraltothe present environmental crisis is the motivationbehind agrowing movement in lawcalledEarth jurisprudence.”). 20.Earthlaw wasatermassociated with environmental protectionlawsasfar back as the 1970s, but itsmorerecentuse is more closelyassociated with more radical notions of law,such as rights of nature, that explicitlyorimplicitly containastrongcritique of conventional environmental law. See HomerG.Angelo, Journal Review, ENVTL.CONSERVATION,Winter1975, at 315 (providing areview of EarthLaw Journal:Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law,anewjournal “[c]ombining interestsincomparativeand international law” highlightingissues of environmental protection);Michelle Maloney, Building an Alternative Jurisprudencefor the Earth: TheInternational Rights of Nature Tribunal,41VT.L.REV.129, 131–35 (2016) (asserting that Earth law’smorerecent use is closelyassociatedwithmoreradical notions of law). 430 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425 perhaps equivalent,legal conceptsall make reference to rightsofnon- human components of nature.22 Indeed, theincreasingconstitutional, legislative, or judicial recognitionofrightsofnatureinlegalsystems at local andnationalscales is likely themostconcretetrend in actual adoption of conceptsassociated with thesebroaderlegal framings,which remain largelyconceptual.23 Paramount emphasis on theprimacy of ecologicallimits, not rightsof nature, is nonetheless themostessentialand deep-rooted feature of ecological lawthatseeks to perpetuateamutually enhancing human-Earth relationship.24 Other key conceptual features include:treatment of humans as apartofnature, andnot apartfromit; intergenerational, intragenerational, andinter-species fairness;precautionabout transgressing planetary boundaries and other systemicecological and socio-ecological thresholds;and adaptivenessinthe adoptionand evolutionofnorms over time, based on appropriate monitoring.25 Includinghumans in the understanding of natureembeds ecological lawinahuman-inclusive ecocentric worldview,which is distinctfrombothapurelyanthropocentric worldview that places humanity in aposition superior to nature and apurely ecocentric worldview that maybeindifferent to thehuman prospect.26
21. See Garver, TheRuleofEcologicalLaw, supra note4,at328 (“Under theruleof ecologicallaw,individual humans and artificialentitieslikecorporations wouldbeconsidered interrelationalbeings in ashared ecological context,and not as free agents whosequest to maximize abstract monetarywealth that canbeconvertedintoconsumptiveand waste-producing activities is given priority.”). 22.CULLINAN, supra note18, at 30; BURDON, supra note19; Maloney, supra note 20, at 130; Garver, TheRuleofEcological Law, supra note4,at319. 23.See MIHNEA TANASESCU,ENVIRONMENT,POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, ANDTHE CHALLENGEOFRIGHTS:SPEAKING FOR NATURE 107, 117 (2016) (providing examplesoflegislativeand judicial recognitionofrightsofnature at alocal and national level). 24.See Garver, TheRuleofEcologicalLaw, supra note4,at319 (outlining that ecological law emphasizes thenotion of ecological integrity by stressingthe ecological limits on theeconomyand society in theformofsustainability). 25. Id. at 327, 329; see Johan Rockström et al., ASafe OperatingSpace for Humanity,461 NATURE 472, 472 (2009) (exploringthe idea of “planetary boundaries”that definethe safe operating spacefor humanity, and that some of theEarth-systemprocesses have alreadytransgressed their boundaries: climate change, rate of biodiversity loss, and thenitrogen cycle); Will Steffenetal., PlanetaryBoundaries:GuidingHuman Development on aChanging Planet,SCIENCE,Feb. 13, 2015, at 738 (explaining that applying theprecautionaryprinciplemeans that theplanetary boundary is set at the “safe” end of aspectrumofuncertainty,which means that thefurther society transgresses from the boundary, thehigher the risk of drasticenvironmental changes); KATE RAWORTH,DOUGHNUT ECONOMICS:SEVEN WAYSTOTHINK LIKE A 21ST CENTURY ECONOMIST 95 (2017)(detailing thesocial influences that impact peoples’ consumptive habits). 26. See CAROLYN MERCHANT,REINVENTING EDEN:THE FATE OF NATURE IN WESTERN CULTURE 4(2d ed. 2013) (citinghistorianLynn White Jr.’s article, TheHistorical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,toexplainthat one can blame“Christianarrogancetoward nature”for environmental disruption, in that Christianity is themost anthropocentricreligion that contributes to aworsening ecological crisis). 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 431
Table1summarizes howthese and otherfeaturesdistinguish ecologicallaw from contemporary environmental law.
Feature Environmental lawEcological law Human-nature Humans areseparatefromand superior Humans areapartofnature; goal is a relationship to nature; goalisperpetual progressin mutually enhancing human-Earth human controlofnature, with strong relationship, with humility as to relianceontechnologicalsolutions prospects fortechnology to solve (e.g.geo-engineeringtomitigate complex ecological challenges climatechange)
Enforceable Enforceable limits on pollution and Ecological limits haveprimacy over environmental or developmentare mostlyreductionist, social andeconomic spheres, andare ecologicallimits end-of-pipe, subordinate to economic based on aholistic, integrated,systems- growth,and subordinatetoproperty based understanding of thehuman-Earth rights relationship; open to de-growth/steady stateeconomics
Useofmaterials Promotes efficiency, with acore faith Promotes sufficiency and drastic and energy in perpetual decouplingofenergy and reductioninmaterialand energy material throughput and consequent throughput to keepeconomywithin impacts from perpetualeconomic ecologicalbounds growth Scale Strong commitmenttostate Corecommitment to subsidiarity sovereignty: weak international/global principle:globalregimewith regimes to address ecological enforceable supranational rulesfor challenges; global and regionaltrade global ecological issues,with preference rules encourage competition and for local regulationand respect for local impede strong domesticregimes for regimes perOstrom’scriteria environmental protection Fairness Corebeliefinfairness of markets,with Strong limits on market mechanismsas someneedfor correction (e.g. polluter needed to respectecologicallimits; pays principle,internalizationof bigger role fornon-market decision- environmental externalities, etc.); making; focus on ensuringinterhuman, tendency to monetize valuesin interspecies andintergenerational decision making, e.g.monetary fairness; multi-criteria valuation valuationof“ecosystemservices” methods preferredfor decisionmaking involving incommensuratevalues Research, Effectsonhuman health paramount; Planetary boundaries and“safe monitoring and environmental effectsstudiedbut not operatingspace” are key basis of adaptation determinative; weakprecautionary research, monitoringand adaptation; approach; fewmechanismstoadjust strong precautionaryapproach rules based on monitoring
Table1.Distinguishing EcologicalLaw from EnvironmentalLaw27
27.LAURA WESTRA ET. AL,ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY,LAW AND GOVERNANCE 144 (2018) (internal citations omitted). 432 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425
As noted above, rightsofnature resonate stronglywith coreelements of ecologicallaw.28 However,while promisingfor thoseseekinglaw grounded in amutually enhancinghuman-Earth relationship, rightsof natureraise concernsthat have not yetbeen resolved.29 Resolving conflicts between rightsofnatureand human rights, includingprivate property rights, requirescriteria that inevitablywill reflect ahierarchy of normative principles andvalues.30 Particularly troublingisthe risk that implementing and giving meaning to rightsofnatureinaglobalized worldstill operating according to agrowth-insistent narrative andworldview will lead to their erosionand dilution, rather than to theradical transformationthatrightsof natureadvocateshope for.31 Without fundamental shifts in narrativeaway fromgrowthinsistence, commodification, anthropocentrism,and human exceptionalism—whereever-increasingcreationofwealth in human societies is assumed to provide forthe commongood—conflicts will likely be resolvedsoastogiveprioritytoeconomic interests andprivateproperty rights.32 That has been thecasewith thehuman right to ahealthy environmentenshrined in Pennsylvania’sstate constitution,33 and in several
28.See supra Part I(explaining that theargument forecological lawmakes reference to the rightsofnature, whichistrending through legal systems). 29.See DAVID R. BOYD,THE RIGHTS OF NATURE:ALEGAL REVOLUTION THAT COULD SAVE THE WORLD 104 (Susan Renouf ed.,2017) (suggesting thatecological lawconflicts with differentideas suchasthe “inanimate object[s]”inthe Sierra Club v. Morton (MineralKing) case). 30.See id. at 178 (describingexamples of therights of natureconflicting with property rights suchasshrimpfarming in coastal mangrove foreststhatcauses conflictbetween an ecologicalreserve andthe farm owner’s propertyrights). 31. See id. at 196 (providing evidencethat erosion and dilution exists in bothEcuador and Bolivia); PeterBurdon&Claire Williams, Rights of Nature:AConstructive Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 196, 210 (Douglas Fisher ed., 2016) (stressing thedifficulty of extending alegal righttonature inthe confines of capitalist economics);Garver, The Rule of Ecological Law, supra note4,at 326(“[E]cologicallaw must permeate legalregimes and other disciplines like economics in asystemic, integrated way, and not be seen as a specialty area of thelaw thatappliestoisolatedproblems.”). 32.See BOYD, supra note29, at 230–31 (arguing that rightsofnaturecannot coexist with issues like economicgrowth, consumerism, andlimitless globalization andthat we cannot continue to prioritize property andcorporaterights if the rights of nature aregoing to persist). 33.InPennsylvania, thestate supreme court has heldthat theState’s constitutional right to a healthy environment (a more anthropocentric right regarding thehuman-Earth relationship),mustbe balanced againstother constitutionaland social andeconomic rights.Payne v. Kassab,312 A.2d 86,94 (Pa. Commw. Ct.1973), aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976), abrogated by Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth,161 A.3d 911(Pa.2017)).Asaresult,thatstate constitutional righthas had little impactondecisions affectingthe human-Earth relationship in Pennsylvania. Mary EllenCussack, Judicial InterpretationofState Constitutional Rights to aHealthfulEnvironment,20B.C. ENVTL.AFF. L. REV.173, 192–93 (1993).Theseexamples,along with others, suggestthat if rights of natureor similar rights are adopted within the dominant global paradigm of growth insistence,without clear criteria for when ecologicallimits must be accorded primacy,orhow to interpret theminlight of competingsocial objectives, therisk is high that thegrowth-insistent paradigm will overwhelmorat leastdilute thoserights. Id.; see Mary Elizabeth Whittemore, The Problem of EnforcingNature’sRights 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 433 instancesinvolvingthe constitutionalrightsofnatureinBolivia and Ecuador.34 Counterexamplescan be found but arelessprevalent.35 For justice to carry out the“complexofcreativerelationships”thatBerry envisioned,36 simply resortingtoconventionalbalancingtests that subordinateenvironmental concernsand ecologicalintegrity to economic factorswill not do.37 Ecologicallaw requiresecological limits to have primacy throughout thelegal system,and criteria must be identifiedto reflect this primacy in decisionmaking andresolutionofconflicts.38 Another concern is that without clearercriteria,according rightstoall componentsofthe Earthcommunity,orto“nature”generally,riskscreating asysteminwhich nothing andnobodyhas meaningful rights.39 Also,the rightsofnaturemay havedifferentweight at differentscales.For example, buildingahydroelectric dammay appear to violatethe rightsofnature becauseofharmtolocal ecosystems,but favor therightsofnatureatthe global scalebecause it wouldreduce greenhousegas emissions.40 With such vagueness, conflicts might be decidedbypower and forceratherthanby law, or according to interpretations of lawthat enduperoding thelong-term rightsofnatureinviewofconflictingrightsgroundedinshort-term social or economic interests.41 Emphasisonplace, and on theneeds of theintricatelylinked local componentsofsocio-ecological systemsthatmustbemet in order to maintain amutually enhancing human-Earthrelationship, is also part of the
Under Ecuador’s Constitution: Whythe 2008 Environmental AmendmentsHave No Bite,20PAC.RIM L. &POL’Y J. 659, 659–67 (2011) (pointing outthatEcuador’s constitutional provision is unclearand provides no guidance as to which living organism prevails in court). 34.Nathalie Rühs&Aled Jones, The ImplementationofEarth Jurisprudence Through SubstantiveConstitutional Rights of Nature,8SUSTAINABILITY 174, 182 (2016). 35. See PaolaAndreaAcosta Alvarado &Daniel Rivas-Ramirez, AMilestonein Environmental and FutureGenerations’ Rights Protection:Recent LegalDevelopmentsBeforethe Colombian SupremeCourt,30J.ENVTL.L.519, 519–26 (2018) (analyzing theColombian Supreme Court’s historicdecision toprotect the Columbian Rainforestfrom deforestation, specifically that it was arestrictive approach in applying constitutional rights, and that international environmentallaw influenced the Court’sdecision). 36.BERRY, supra note7,at62. 37.Payne,312 A.2d at 94. 38. See Garver, TheRuleofEcological Law, supra note4,at326 (“[L]egal regimesmust be constrained by ecological considerations....”).Developing decision making criteria that reflectthis primacy shouldbeafocus of research in the emergingcommunity of scholars of ecologicallaw and governance and organizations like theELGA. 39.See LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL &KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE,POLICY FOR LAND:LAW AND ETHICS 224 (1993) (“If everything [is]saidtohave rights, andifthere is no way to adjudicate among conflictingrightsclaims, then(practically speaking)nothing has rights.”). 40.Rühs &Jones, supra note34, at 184. 41.See BURDON, supra note 19, at 79 (demonstrating thepossiblechallenges to using earth jurisprudence as atool for change). 434 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425 bedrock of rightsofnature andother conceptsinecologicallaw.42 As appliedinpractice, rightsofnaturewill onlymake senseiftheyare defined, recognized, and enforced with referencetothe specificecosystemsand historical trajectories in whichthey areembedded.43 Theoryand experience relatedtoecological restoration, eco-culturalrestoration, and sustainable management of commonpool resources(CPRs)will be particularly relevantasthisemphasis on placeisincorporated into themeaning and applicationofecological law.44 Ecologicaland eco-culturalrestoration involve a“process of assisting therecoveryofanecosystemthathas been degraded, damaged,or destroyed,”45 taking into accountcriteria such as ecological integrity, historical fidelity, and community engagement.46 Of thetwo,eco-cultural restorationplaces more emphasisonrecoveryofmutually supportive culturalpractices and ecosystemstructure and functioning.47 Perhaps the most appealingexpression that capturesthe mutually enhancinginterplay betweenhuman societiesand theecosystemsthatsupportthemisthe notion of reciprocalrestoration.48 Reciprocal restorationis“themutually reinforcingrestorationofland and culture such that repair of ecosystem servicescontributes to culturalrevitalization, andrenewal of culture promotes restoration of ecologicalintegrity.”49 In otherwords,any notion of ecosystemservices to humansmustbecounterbalanced with anotionof human services to ecosystems.50 Forecological,eco-cultural, or reciprocal restoration, human inclusion and intentionare key.51 Thesehuman dimensions encapsulatenot onlythe reality of historical human impactsonecosystemsfromthe local to the
42.Garver, ASystems-BasedTool forTransitioningtoLaw, supra note 4. 43.Garver, The RuleofEcological Law, supra note4,at326. 44.ERIC HIGGS,NATURE BY DESIGN:PEOPLE,NATURAL PROCESS, AND ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 1, 4(2003). 45.SOC’YFOR ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION,THE SER INTERNATIONAL PRIMERON ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 3(Oct. 2004),https://www.ctahr.hawaii.edu/littonC/PDFs/ 682_SERPrimer.pdf. 46.HIGGS, supra note44, at 4. 47.See id. at 236–37 (explaining that ecoculturalrestoration combinesbothcommunity activismand therestoration of ecologicalintegrity). 48. See Cathy Geist &Susan M. Galatowitsch, Reciprocal Model forMeeting Ecological and HumanNeeds in RestorationProjects,13CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 970, 974–75 (1999) (diagraming the reciprocal restoration model). 49.SOC’YFOR ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION,HUMAN DIMENSION OF ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION:INTEGRATING SCIENCE,NATURE, AND CULTURE 255 (Dave Egan et al.eds., 2011) [hereinafter HUMAN DIMENSION]. 50.Garver, ASystems-BasedTool forTransitioningtoLaw, supra note 4, at 165–74. 51.HUMAN DIMENSION, supra note49, at 73. 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 435 global level,but also thedeliberatechoice involvedinpursuing“avisionof abetterrelationshipbetween humansand therestofthe world.”52 Flexibility in therange of possible choicesthatwill fosterormaintaina mutually enhancing human-Earthrelationshipcan be incorporatedintothe selectionofreference ecosystems that areused to establishobjectives for restoration.53 Themostappropriate are“locally-tailored historical references, usingall theavailableand appropriate conceptual tools, so as to integratebothlatent and on-going ecologicaland socioculturalprocesses and values.”54 Theelement of intentional choice renders ecologicaland eco- culturalrestoration “inherently (1)value laden, (2)context driven, (3)prone to be immersed in disagreement and compromise,and (4)experiential.”55 Theessentialroleofchoice and intentionprovides afoundationfor incorporatingprinciples fromrestorationtheoryand practiceintothe legal domain.56 Akey challenge will be to scaleuptheseprinciples from the mostly local or landscape scalesatwhich restorationtakes place to broader regional, national, or transnational scales.57 Thenotionofamutually enhancing human-Earth relationshipalso resonateswith studies of social systemsthat havemaintained sustainable, enduringuse of at least some CPRs in supportingecosystems.58 Basedon numerous case studies,Elinor Ostrom identifiedeight essentialfeatures of sustainableuse of CPRs:59 (1)clear boundariesinregardstothe limits of theCPRs and whocan access them; (2)locally-tailored rulesregarding use and management of theCPRs; (3)participatoryrulemakingprocessesthat includethoseaffected by therules;(4) monitoringsystems that are accountabletothe community of CPRusers; (5)graduatedand effective sanctions appropriate forlocal conditions;(6) lost-cost mechanisms to resolveconflicts;(7) non-interference with government authorities external to theCPR; and (8)governance organized in “multiplelayersofnested
52. Id. at 1. 53.Id. at 156. 54.LuisBalaguer et al., TheHistorical ReferenceinRestoration Ecology:Re-Defininga Cornerstone Concept,176 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 12, 13 (2014). 55.HUMAN DIMENSION, supra note49, at 1–2. 56.See id. at 139–40 (explaining that ecologicalrestoration, especiallybecause it is value- laden, requires questioning political power relations). 57.See id. at 142 (describing thatrestoration takes place in communities, or fields of interaction betweendifferent investments, andspecificallythat“communitiesofinterest”involve shared concerns, but mayneedtoconverge or dissipateasissuesappear). 58. See ELINOR OSTROM,GOVERNING THE COMMONS 89 (James E. Alt&Douglas C. North eds.,1990) (notingthatthe resource systemsinlong-enduring CPRs“clearlymeet thecriterion of sustainability”). 59. Id. at 90. 436 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425 enterprises.”60 Acommonthemeinthesefeatures of sustainablegovernance of CPRs is theimportance of astrong communal attachment to placeand thelocal community,and to intergenerational continuity.61 Theseplace- based and intergenerational commitmentsimply aneedtoadapt legal and governancestructures and rules forsustainableand shared human useof supportiveecosystems in responsetoinformationfrommonitoringof relevantsocial andecological indicators at alocal scale.62 Ostrom’s conclusions about sustainableuse of CPRs can be expanded to thebroader notionofcommons in general.63 Although it is generally agreed that thecommons “are neither privatenor public,”64 definingthe commons in general termsiselusivebecause theconcept of thecommons incorporates thenotionthatthey aredefined by thecommunitiesinwhich they arerecognized.65 Yetthe commons canbejuxtaposed broadly to both privateproperty,where rightstoexclusionand controlare paramount,and to government forces,which imposerules fromafar.66 In acommons,the community places limits on “[excessiveproperty]accumulationand [excessive] concentrationofpower.”67 Theroleofthe commons in resolvingremoteownership problemsunder ecological lawwill be revisited in Part III.
II. THE REMOTE OWNERSHIP PROBLEM
Remote ownership problemsarise when people, corporations,or governments exercise property rightsover places with whichtheyhave
60. Id. By nestedenterprises, Ostrommeans different levelsofgovernance within alayered systemofgovernance, at which rulesare tailored to the conditions at each level. Id. at 101–02. 61. Id. 62. See id. at 92 (stressingthe needfor local rulesthatsatisfy the unique issues presented in different communities or geographical regions); Dell’Angeloetal., supra note6(expressing the need for policies to “take into account themultiple anddiverging values of differentsocieties”). 63.See OSTROM, supra note58, at 90 (listing theeight design principles illustrated by long- enduringCPR institutions); FRITJOF CAPRA &UGO MATTEI,THE ECOLOGYOFLAW:TOWARD A LEGAL SYSTEM IN TUNE WITH NATUREAND COMMUNITY 46 (2015) (explaining theAncient Greek contribution to the notionofthe commons in thatthey are“things belonging to nobody,” but also belongingto everyone). 64. See CAPRA &MATTEI, supra note63, at 46, 106 (explaining theRoman principleofres communisomnium,which stands for “thingsbelonging to everyone”). 65. See id. at 52 (“Life in suchcommon-based organiccommunitieswas difficult for an outsideauthority to organize,discipline, or rationalize.”). 66. See id. at 44 (contrastingthe commons with privateownership, which “divid[es]the whole into individualistic components”). 67. See id. at 52 (explainingthe goalsofthe commons “wereinclusion and community rather than exclusionand individualization;and traditional[ly] promotedthe diffusionof responsibility ...rather than theaccumulationand concentrationofpower”). 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 437 little or no attachment and aboutwhich they have little or no ecological knowledge.68 Although remote ownership,orabsentee landlordism,can arise in awidevarietyofsituations andtake myriadforms,the focus here is on remote ownership in thecontext of land andresourcegrabbingfor agriculturalpurposes.69 Land andresourcegrabbing occurs when remote owners or investors driveconversionofland and resourcesfromgenerally small-scale, traditional,locally controlled uses or relativelyundeveloped wildernesstomassive holdings devoted to industrialagriculture or resource extractionserving global marketsoffinance, goods, and services.70 Afocus on land andresource grabbingfor agriculture shines aspotlight on most,if not all, of themainproblemsassociated with remote ownership.71
A. Ecological DisruptionfromAgriculture
Sincethe Neolithic transition, agriculture has been theroot of many formsofecologically disruptivehuman behavior that strainsscarce resources(renewable and non-renewable) or overwhelms thecapacity of ecosystems to handlethe outputs of humantransformations of material and energy.72 Agriculture is aformofsimplificationand intensificationofland use73 that,even in itsmostprimitiveforms,alters theecosystems it
68.See PEARCE, supra note6,atvii–x (explainingthe purpose forthe author’s global travel andthat differentpeopleand corporations areacquiring large-scale landrights, while simultaneously staying disconnected to thegrabbedland andcontributingtoworld starvation,water scarcity, andover exploitationofresources in thegrabbed lands areas). 69.See id. at 3–16, 29–42 (describing differentexamples of land grabs foragriculturalreasons such as aSaudi billionaire grabbing land in Ethiopia foragricultural reasons,the TabukAgriculture Development Companyover-irrigatinginSaudiArabia, andPhilippe Heilberg’stiestoamega land deal with notoriouswarlords, General Paulino Matip andhis son). 70.See Agriculture at aCrossroads:Findings andRecommendations forFutureFarming: Land Grabbing,GLOB.AGRIC., https://www.globalagriculture.org/report-topics/land-grabbing.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (explainingthat international investors engage in large-scale landacquisitions for agriculture production). 71.See Mercedes Stickler &Alisa Zomer, Agricultral Land GrabsThreaten Local Property Rightsand SustainableDevelopment,WORLD RES.INST., https://www.wri.org/blog/2011/04/ agricultural-land-grabs-threaten-local-property-rights-and-sustainable-development (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (explaining that landgrabs have intensenegativeeffects on theenvironment and ruralliving, specifically that it affects customary andtraditional lands rights and impactslocal ecosystemsthat natives rely on fortheirlivelihood). 72.See VACLAV SMIL,ENERGYINNATURE AND SOCIETY:GENERAL ENERGETICSOF COMPLEX 148, 308 (2008) (noting thatpreindustrial agriculture caused greatenvironmental consequences). 73. See JAMES C. SCOTT,SEEING LIKE A STATE:HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 165, 262, 264 (1998) (discussingdetailed studies showing that industrialization resulted in less economic returns than intensificationofagriculture did,which focusses on manuringand attentive breeding,and further,that “high-modernist agriculture” succeedsinfarm 438 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425 occupies.74 Forexample, farmingtends inherently to reduce biodiversity because, typically,its aimistofocus on asmallerrange of species than wouldotherwise be presentand harvest reduces theoverallamount of energy availablefor life support.75 Furthermore, strategiesfor meeting the basic challenge of finding, creating, or maintainingsuitablesoiland moisture conditions foragriculture include: swidden agriculture,fallow periods,croprotation, multi-cropping, no-tillcultivation, irrigation, and nutrient addition.76 Allhaveecologicalimplications,which mayinclude: loss or degradationofhabitatfor terrestrial andfreshwaterspecies; reduced capacity forcarbonstorage;erosionand salinizationofsoil; desertification; and waterand airpollutionfromnutrientand pesticide run-offand drift, alongwith climateand other ecologicalimpactsassociated with theenergy source used.77 Theenvironmental historyofagriculture duringthe early modern period(roughly1400–1800 C.E.)indifferent parts of theworld is replete with accounts of its significantecological impacts.78 Relianceonenergy frombiomass, wind, andwater placed astrong demand on agriculture,not onlyfor food and fiber forhuman survival,but also theenergyneeded to extractworkfromhumans andanimals that poweredmuch of theever-
simplification, which is the“process of simplifying thefloral profusion of nature” to coaxspecific species of florainsteadofothers). 74.SMIL, supra note 72, at 308. 75.HelmutHaberl et al., ASocio-Metabolic TransitionTowards Sustainability?Challenges forAnother Great Transformation,19SUSTAINABLE DEV.4,5–7 (2009) (detailing thegrowing use of natural resources, suchasland andwater,and itseffect on biodiversity lossand energyreductions). 76.See JOHN F. RICHARDS,THE UNENDING FRONTIER:AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY MODERN WORLD 152 (2003)(demonstrating that Japan intensified cultivationthrough theuse of crop rotation, multi-cropping, and fallow periods); see also SMIL, supra note 72, at 162, 164,292 (detailingdifferentagriculture strategies). 77. See ThorkildJacobsen &RobertM.Adams, Salt and Silt in AncientMesopotamian Agriculture: Progressive Changes in Soil Salinity and Sedimentation Contributed to theBreakupofPast Civilizations,SCIENCE,Nov. 21, 1958, at 1251 (explaining that Iraq’s semi-arid climate andlow permeabilityofthe soils subjected land to saltaccumulationthat was likelydue to irrigation); J.R. MCNEILL,AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORLD 35 (2000) (asserting thatagriculture has caused soil erosion sinceits inception, and that soilerosionfirst occurred with new agriculture practices in theMiddleEast,China,and Indiaand continued as thepopulationgrew); Pichu Rengasamy, World Salinizationwith Emphasis on Australia,57J.EXPERIMENTAL BOTANY 1017, 1019 (2006) (discussinghow irrigation causesthe salinization of soil); SMIL, supra note72, at 308 (considering theimplications of differentagriculturalstratagies). 78. See KennethPomeranz, Political Economy and Ecology on theEve of Industrialization: Europe, China,and theGlobal Conjuncture,AM.HIST.REV.425, 440, 445 (2002) (stating that from around 1400 to 1800C.E., Europeansalmostexperienced similarenvironmental ruintothat which Chinaexperienced in theYangtzeDelta). 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 439 expandingeconomy.79 Thebasic strategiesweretointensify agricultural productionlocally with increased inputsoflabor or othertypes of energy, irrigation, or modified productionmethods;ortoaugment production extensivelybymoving to or relyingon(through trade or conquest) external areas,either nearby (e.g., drainedwetlands)orremote(e.g.,the Baltics, Eastern Europe,Scandinavia, theAmericas,NorthernChina, Taiwan,and South Africa).80 Modernagriculture contributes significantly to climatechange, disruptionofglobal nutrientcycles, biodiversity loss, land usechange,and other pressures on planetary boundaries.81 Since 1800, cropland has tripled; it now takesupabout 12% of theEarth’s ice-freeland surface,and pastures another 22%—a vast transformationsince theNeolithic transition.82 Irrigatedland increased from75millionhectares at theend of World WarII to over275 millionhectares in 2000, mostly in Asia.83 Agriculture globally places significant pressure on accessiblefreshwatersupplies.84 Crop farminguses about 5% of totalprimary energy supplyglobally,requiring fossil-fuel inputs at every stage.85 Methanefromricepaddies andlivestock, nitrous oxide emissions fromnitrogen fertilizationand nitrification
79. See ROLF PETER SIEFERLE,THE SUBTERRANEAN FOREST:ENERGY SYSTEMS IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 23–26 (2001) (arguing that advancesinagrarian technology result in human intensiveenergy centers);SMIL, supra note72, at 155, 164 (notingthat humans and animals expended enormous energy forirrigation); CLIVE PONTING,ANEW GREEN HISTORY OF THE WORLD:THE ENVIRONMENT ANDTHE COLLAPSE OF GREAT CIVILIZATIONS 40 (2007)(providing reasoning for the evolutionand proliferationofagriculture). 80.RichardC.Hoffmann, FrontierFoods forLate Medieval Consumers: Culture, Economy, Ecology,7ENV’T &HIST.131, 136–37 (2001); see Pomeranz, supra note78, at 441–43 (providing examples of how Europegreatly benefitedfromimportsfrom America); ERIC LIONEL JONES,THE EUROPEAN MIRACLE:ENVIRONMENTS,ECONOMIES, AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPE AND ASIA 81–82 (2003) (discussing how widespread extraction economiescreated an advantageous position for Europeancolonialpowers);RICHARDS, supra note76, at 106 (2003)(stating that China expanded into Taiwan to cultivateits “unused” land); SMIL, supra note72, at 164, 166(showing that many countries adopted crop rotationtoincreaseagriculturalproductivity). 81.SMIL, supra note72, at 308. 82. See MCNEILL, supra note77, at 212–14 (describing how theworld’s cropland hasgrown, paralleling that of population growth,and that this growthcontinued throughout thecenturies due to colonization, theinternational grainmarket,and chemicalfertilizers);NavinRamankutty et al., Farming the Planet:1.Geographic DistributionofGlobal AgriculturalLands in theYear 2000,22GLOBAL BIOGEOCHEMICAL CYCLES 1, 14 (2008); Rockström et al., supra note25, at 473 (showingthat“change in land use” is one of theEarth-system processes that has converted11.7% of totallandcoverto cropland use). 83.SMIL, supra note72, at 294. 84. See Ramankutty et al., supra note 82, at 1(expressing that “[h]uman land useactivities are aforce of global significance,”and affectfreshwater resources); Rockströmetal., supra note25, at 473 (stating that humanity is likely to soon approach theboundariesoffreshwater use). 85. See SMIL, supra note72, at 291–92, 303 (showingthat thetotal energy cost of farmingis less than 5% and that farmersaround theworld have mechanizedtheirfarming practices). 440 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425 processes, and basiclossofcarbon storage capacity also contributeto climatechange.86 Anthropogenicconversions of atmospheric nitrogen to reactiveforms that enter ecosystemswerevirtually non-existent beforethe industrialera,but arenow equal to naturalconversions,doublingthe global load.87 Phosphorus,which (unlikenitrogen)derives fromexhaustible fossil minerals, is also heavily used as an agriculturalfertilizer.88 Anthropogenic phosphorus and nitrogen loadscontributetoeutrophicationoffreshwater ecosystems and oxygen-depleteddead zones wheresurface run-offenters ocean waters.89
B. Metabolic Rift and theRise of Global Trade
Around 4,000 years ago, domesticationofanimals capable of transportingheavyloads over long distances(especially camels) led to the developmentofextensivenetworksinAsiafor trading salt, spices, silk, gems, and other valued goods.90 Regional trade networks gradually expanded in similarpatternsinother parts of theworld.91 In Europe, for example, regional trade of grains,fur,stockfish, and other goods in the12th and 13th centuriessolidifiedintothe Hanseatic League.92 TheHanseatic League wasasophisticated network forfacilitatingtrade and protectingthe
86. See Ramankuttyetal., supra note82, at 1(finding agriculture at leastpartially responsible forthe emissions of greenhouse gasesand changing regional climates); Rockströmetal., supra note25, at 474 (explaining that modernagriculture,specifically manufacturingfertilizer,results in additional nitrous oxide in theatmosphere, which causes environmentalchanges). 87. See Rockström et al., supra note25, at 473 (comparingthe pre-industrial levels of nitrogen “removed from theatmospherefor humanuse” at zerotonnes per year,with thecurrent status at 121 milliontonnes per year and theproposed boundaryof35milliontonnes);Steffenetal., supra note25 (arguing that it is important to place boundariesonchangesinbiochemical flows, such as nitrogen, because thesechanges affect the Earth’s capacity for resilience). 88.See SMIL, supra note 72, at 294 (providing thatphosphorus is found in potash, whichwhen dilutedwithH2SO4 createsasuperphosphatefertilizer). 89. See Rockström et al., supra note25, at 474 (emphasizingthatanthropogenicchanges in the nitrogen and phosphorus flowshavealtered marineecosystems, which justifies the needfor planetary boundariesfor nitrogen and phosphorous flows); StephenCarpenter &Elena Bennett, Reconsideration of thePlanetary Boundaryfor Phosphorus,6ENVT’L RES.LETTERS 1, 8(2011) (“Human release of [phosphorus]tothe environment is causing widespread eutrophication of surface freshwaters.”); Steffen et al., supra note25, at 742 (notingthatthere is increasing evidence thatbiochemical flows, such as nitrogen and phosphorous, mayhaveimpacts on sea biodiversity, andfurtherthatthe analysis revealed a needfor another boundarytoavert eutrophicationoffreshwater). 90.Eric C. Ellisetal., Used Plant:AGlobal History,110 PROC.NAT’L ACAD.SCI.U.S.7978, 7981–82 (2013). 91. See DonaldWorster, The VulnerableEarth: TowardaPlanetary History,11ENVTL.REV. 87, 94 (1987) (“[M]arketsand trade had existed in pre-modern times....”). 92.See Hoffmann, supra note80, at 148 (narrating how theherring industry createdatrade revolutionestablishing the Hanseatic League). 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 441 interestsofmerchants in NorthernEurope fromthe 13th to the17th century.93 Beginninginthe late 15thcentury,the long-distance oceanicvoyages of Europeans to East Asia,Africa, and theAmericas initiatedaperiodof significantexpansionintrade.94 European countriesbrought new formsof intensiveagriculturalland usetothe Americas and elsewhere.95 For example, export-oriented Caribbeansugar plantations in the17thand 18th centuriesstood out as anew agriculturalform, with massive local ecosystemicconsequences,aswellasthe social consequencesassociated with theAfrican slavetrade.96 Europeans brought OldWorld domesticated plantsand animalstothe Americas(e.g.,wheat,sheep, horses, and cattle) and introduced NewWorld domesticated plants(e.g., maize, tomatoes,and potatoes)tothe OldWorld.97 They also brought OldWorld diseases, most notablysmallpox, whichkilledoff 50% or more of indigenous populations, thereby temporarily reducing theecosystemic impactsofindigenous agriculture.98 Another feature of this era is theprivateers actingonbehalf of Europeanmonarchs through official charters that evolved into thefirst corporations—essentially,legally recognized artificialentities that allowed investors to reap vastmaterialreturns fromconquest of newterritory and resourcesinAsia, Africa, andthe Americas.99 Theimprimaturofdivinely- rootedroyalright infusedthe violent Europeaninvasions and conquestsof theearly modern erawith moraland legalauthority.Thisauthority implicitlypersistsinthe modern societiesthat emergedfromconquered lands in theAmericas and elsewhere—in thesense that thelegitimacy of
93.GEORGE CAWSTON,THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES 4(W.S. Hein 2008) (1896). 94. See Hoffmann, supra note80, at 135–39(discussingtradeexpansion such as thegrain trade expansion of the1460s and linecattle trades). 95.See id. at 131 (“Acontinual western history of feeding beyond theboundsofnatural local ecosystemsgoes backtoEurope’shigh andlater MiddleAges.”). 96. See Richards, supra note76, at 460(statingthatsugar plantingcaused ecological and social stresses in the Caribbean). 97. Id. at 311–12; see ALFRED W. CROSBY,THE COLUMBIAN VOYAGES, THE COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE, AND THEIR HISTORIANS 8(MichaelAdas ed.,1987) (discussing theexchange of agriculturaland livestock species between the Oldand NewWorld). 98. See CROSBY, supra note97(“The decisive advantage of thehuman invadersofAmerica wasnot theirplantsoranimals—and certainly not theirmusketsand rifles, which Amerindians eventually obtained in quantity—but their diseases.”); Richards, supra note76, at 314 (reviewinghow thesudden onset of new diseases, like smallpox, devastatedindigenous peoples); PONTING, supra note 79, at 215 (describingthe varietyofdiseases brought from theOld World to theNew World). 99.DAVID C. KORTEN,THE GREAT TURNING:FROM EMPIRE TO EARTH COMMUNITY 129–30 (1st ed. 2006) (“Over time, therulingmonarchs turned from swashbucklingadventurersand chartered piratestocharteredcorporations as theirfavored instrumentsofcolonial expansion, administration, and pillage.”). 442 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425 thosecolonial conquests rarely has been comprehensivelyoreffectively questionedorredressed on thebasisofcontemporary notions of theruleof law, human rights, andjustice.100 This is truenot onlyinregardtothose societies domestically, but also in regardtoglobal patternsofmaterialand energy flowsthrough trade channels that have rootsinthe power imbalances andlegal ordersofthe early modernera.101 Notably, the privateersofthe earlymodernera evolved into modern corporations. Corporations continue to play aroleinland and resource grabbingthat transfers wealth from relativelypowerless indigenous peoples and smallholders to remoteowners—often, investors in corporateschemes package land andresources into financial instruments that reap high returns on investment.102 Thus,the earlymodern period beganaglobaltrade and investment regime,inwhich increasinglywealthypopulationcentersinEurope,103 and eventually elsewhere, becameincreasinglydependent on provisioning from remote parts of theworld—inother words, aperiodofrisingmetabolic rift (i.e., theremoval of someportionofbioregionalmetabolismtoremote areas)and reliance on “ghostacre[s]”(i.e.,the amount of land spared from agriculturalorother uses by usingremotelandsornew energy regimes).104 Ever since, through expanding trade,people—especially in wealthy industrialsocieties—have becomeincreasingly detached fromthe ecosystems that maintain them;based on consumption, individual
100.MichaelM’Goningle, Green Legal Theory: ANew Approach to theConcept of Environmental Law,4NEUE KONZEPTE 34, 36 (2008). 101. See JUAN MARTINEZ-ALIER,ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS:ENERGY,ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY 102 (1987) (explaining that thestudy of theflowofmaterial andenergy shows that energyhas not reached a“subsistence limit”); Arturo Escobar, Latin America at aCrossroads:Alternative Modernizations,Post-Liberalism, or Post-Development?,24CULTURAL STUD.1,1(examining the socio-economic changes occurring in Latin America); PONTING, supra note79, at 171–72 (showing how colonialism created aworldeconomy). 102. See PEARCE, supra note6,at41–42 (speakingofPhilippe Heilberg’s tieswithSouth Sudan’sUnity Province, through amega land deal with notorious warlords, GeneralPaulinoMatip and hisson). 103. See Joshua K. Leon, TheRoleofGlobal CitiesinLand Grabs,36THIRD WORLD Q. 257, 258 (2015) (stressing that theconcentration of powerincities continues,with more than half of the world’s populationnow in urbanareas, andcitiesare increasingly the power centersunderlyingland grabs). 104. See Hoffmann, supra note80, at 139, 149 (showcasingthatEuropebecamedependent on long distance trading of cattleand fish from remote locations); Pomeranz, supra note78, at 438 (providing examples of different countriesrelying on imports from remote locations);JONES, supra note 80, at 83 (defining the conceptof“ghostacreage”); Brett Clark&John B. Foster, Ecological Imperialismand theGlobal Metabolic Rift: Unequal Exchange andthe Guano/Nitrates Trade,50INT’L J. COMP.SOC.311, 311, 313, 316 (2009) [hereinafter Clark &Foster](asserting that ecological imperialismcreates ametabolic rift, specifically highlightingthe international guano trade in the19th century that created ametabolicrift from international soiltransfers). 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 443 ecological footprints globally arelessand less local.105 Ongoing patternsof land andresource grabbing exacerbatethesetrends in thecurrent era.106
C. ModernGlobal Trade and Investment
By theend of theearly modernera andatthe onset of theIndustrial Revolution, aworld market waswellestablished, creatinganunprecedented levelofglobalinterconnectednessofagriculturalproductionand itscascade of impacts.107 Yetagriculture and trade priortoabout 1800 were still contained within theenergetic limits on transportand productionmethods achievable in an agrarianenergysystem.108 Poweredbyfossilfuels, populationexpansion, technological innovations, andrisingconsumption, global marketshaveexpandedexponentially sincethe dawn of the IndustrialRevolution.109 As noted above, theecologicalimpactsofmodern agriculture, transformedover thepast twocenturies by fossil fuelsand scientific,industrial, and chemical revolutions,are of another order altogether.110 Fossil-fuelledmodern agriculture depends on mechanization, automation, massiveuse of inorganicfertilizersand pesticides, irrigation that reliesonmajor alterations of aquaticand hydrologicsystems with dams and other watermanagement infrastructure, an industrialapproach that favorsdisease-vulnerablemonoculturesofadwindlingnumber of species of plants andanimals,genetic engineering, and increasing consumptionof
105. See BJÖRN NYKVIST ET AL., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ON PLANETARY BOUNDARIES:ASTUDYFOR THE SWEDISH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 22 (2013) (discussing that humansnow liveinwhat is knownastheAnthropocene—“an erawhen humans have becomethe dominantgeologicalforce”—andthat international trade causes environmentalimpacts elsewhere, as opposed to locally). 106. See, e.g.,PEARCE, supra note6,at93–95 (outliningSusanPayne’s London connection with Africa,specifically that she owns thelargest land holdinsouthernAfrica, while she engagesin buying and sellingAfrican farmland with unlimited rights to irrigation). 107.Rachel Beddoe et al., Overcoming Systemic Roadblocks to Sustainability:The Evolutionary RedesignofWorldviews, Institutions, andTechnologies,106 PROC.NAT’L ACAD.SCI.U.S.2483, 2485 (2009) (explaining that theIndustrial Revolutionbrought fuelstothe nation, whichled to economic growth from factors suchaspesticides,fertilizers, andmechanizedagriculture). 108. See SIEFERLE, supra note 79, at 34 (discussing the natural limitations of traditional agrarian expansiondue to alimitedamount of solar energy);SMIL, supra note 72, at 166 (describing howthe agrarianfood productionsystem ledtocyclical famine). 109. See KARL POLANYI,THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION:THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 42–43 (2ded. 2001) (notingthat theIndustrial Revolution brought anew belief that an unlimitedamount of materialcommoditiescouldresolve societalissues, and further, that growth in populationand industry influenced change inthe market economy). 110.See Lester R. Brown, The SocialImpact of theGreen Revolution,39INT’L CONCILIATION 3, 6(1971) (“The technological breakthrough achieved by agriculturalscientists foreshadows widespread changesinthe economic, social,and politicalorders ....”). 444 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425 meat.111 Along with theseimpacts, themetabolic rift between wherefood andfiber areproduced andconsumedhas widenedsignificantly.112 Themodernglobalized economy is theprogeny of this market.113 Today’sglobalized market operates on theprinciples of capitalism,profit- seeking, andcommitment to perpetual economic growth.114 Capitalnow moves with fewconstraints around theglobe, always seeking to expandand maximize short-term profit. Countries and multinationalcorporations engageinafrenzyofmarket competition that relies on thegreatest exploitationofcheap labor andlowest-cost extractionofmaterialand energy possible.115 In therecent rash of land andresource grabs— particularly in Africa,Latin America,and Asia—and bioprospectingin tropicalforests, theownersand controllers of financial capital, alongwith political leaderstheysupportortolerate, retain authority and controlover theflows of materialand energy.116 Thecontemporaryrationalefor international trade and investment is embedded in thedominant paradigm that gives prioritytoeconomic growth
111.See MCNEILL, supra note77, at 216 (stating that by the early 1990s, most industrialized nations revolutionized theiragriculture practice with fossil fuels, chemicals, monocropping, and machines); Rockström et al., supra note25(suggestingthatreliance on fossil fuels and industrialized agriculture haveresultedindamaging levelsofhuman activity that aredetrimental to thesystems that keepEarth in astable state); Jonathan A. Foleyetal., Solutions foraCultivated Planet,478 NATURE 337, 338–39 (2011) (discussingthe environmental impacts of agricultural expansionand intensification, threatening land and water quality, biodiversity, andthe climate). 112. See Clark &Foster, supra note 104, at 315 (arguing that capitalism, global trade,and intense agricultural practices create ametabolicriftinsoilnutrients). 113.See id. at 313 (“[T]heriseofthe capitalistworldeconomyitselfwas synonymous with the emergence of ahierarchical division of nations through theappropriationofdistant lands, labor, and resources.”). 114.See id. at 314 (finding that theglobalized markets approachofcapitalism is “‘expansion- oriented and accumulation-driven’, whichpushes it to subsumethe entire worldtoits logicof accumulation”). 115. See MCNEILL, supra note77, at 358 (highlightingthatthe extractionofmaterials and energy mayhave left mankind in an “ecological crisis,” which is unsustainableand necessitatesanew regimetoavoidcollapse); JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH,THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY 47–51 (2008) (proclaiming that consumption stimulates a“growth fetish”inthe economy,which now grows exponentially,paralleltonatural resourceuse andpollution output); PEARCE, supra note6,at29–30 (providingone example of amultinational corporation,Tabuk Agriculture Development Company, in Saudi Arabia that is irresponsiblyusing enormous amountsofwater tooperate a90,000-acredairy farm). 116. See Clark&Foster, supra note104, at 312–13 (examiningthe world’s capitalsystem, specifically its vertical flow of energyand matter to more developed countries, negativelyimpacting the socio-ecologicalconditions of theextractivecountries); PEARCE, supra note6,at141 (discussing American fruit companies taking over wholestatesinLatin America andsustaining relationships with corrupt governments). 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 445 and strong protectionofprivate propertyand statesovereignty.117 Trade broadensthe market arenasinwhich privateproprietors can seekprofit, createemployment opportunities, andcontributetoeconomic growth. It also expandsthe goods and services availabletopeopleworldwide—for example, NorthAmerican grocerystoresnow have producefromaround theworld throughout theyear.118 Trade liberalizationreduces or eliminates measures of sovereign states that imposetariffs or other restrictions on imports or foreigninvestments.119 Themaineconomic justificationfor internationaltrade derives from DavidRicardo’s principleofcomparativeadvantage—a country “has a comparativeadvantage if it can produce thegoodinquestion more cheaply relativetoother goodsitproduces than can its trading partners, regardless of absolutecosts.”120 Comparativeadvantage reliesonacountry’s internal cost ratios in producinggoods andservices rather than on absolute advantage; absoluteadvantage is basedonadirect comparison of costsof individualgoods andservices in different countries.121 However, comparativeadvantage is basedonthe assumptionthatcapital is immobile.122 In theglobalized economy,inwhich capitalisincreasingly mobile beyond nationalbordersthrough foreign investmentsand transnationalcompanies, this core assumption is more and more in doubt.123 In contemporarytrade regimes,
[g]lobalizationcreates an increasinglyprominent role for transnational corporations,encouragesthe transportationof resourcesand manufactured goods allover theplanet,facilitates theinstantaneous opportunistic movement of finance capital across national boundariesinsearch of thehighest returns, and
117.See HERMAN E. DALY &JOSHUA FARLEY,ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS:PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 366 (2ded. 2011) (demonstratingthatinternational tradeisnot tradebetweencountries, but rather betweenprivate firms within different countries for the firm’sprivatebenefit andeconomic gain). 118.See id. at 355 (highlightingthat tradeallows ustoexperience “other peoples’traditions, tastes, and capacities”). 119.Cf. id. at 396 (“In therecent eraofliberalization, we oftenwitnessed unpredicted changes in international capitalflowsinand out of countries ....”). 120. Id.at310. 121.See id. at 311 (explaining, with ahypothetical,how comparativeadvantage works). 122. Id. at 312. 123.See id. at 361 (finding that “itisnot impossible forproductivecapacity,capital, to be transferred from one country to another,” eventhoughcapital mobility must be ruledout forthe “comparativeadvantage argument to work between countries”). 446 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425
generallyencouragesthe integrationofregional and national economies.124
In this economic environment,the competitionfor high returns, combined with thedomesticbenefits nationstatesderiveifthey can attract investment and productiveenterprises, createsadisincentivefor strong environmental protectionorother socially or ecologically beneficial measures that reduce profits.125 This dynamicisespecially disadvantageous forlessdevelopedcountries, whichend up trapped in debt and hampered in regard to domestic social andenvironmental programsastheycompeteto exportcommodities to marketsinwealthiercountries.126 Theinternational community hasastrong commitment to enhancing trade andinvestment across nationalborders.The World Trade Organization(WTO) is theinternational institutionthatadministers and enforces internationaltrade rulesatthe global scale.127 Bilateralor multilateraltradeagreements, such as theexpiring NorthAmerican Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA), supplementthoserules at theregional scale.128
124.WilliamE.Rees, Globalizationand Sustainability:ConflictorConvergence?,22BULL. SCI., TECH.&SOC’Y 249, 257 (2002). 125. Id. at 258. 126. See id. (indicating that theprice of primarygoods in developing countries depreciated over 50% from 1980 to 1983). 127.See What We Stand For,WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ what_stand_for_e.htm(last visitedApr.14, 2019)(demonstratingthatthe WTOpromotes trade and investment by lowering tradebarriers and discouraging unfair practices). 128.The NAFTAexperience demonstrates governments’ ability to adopt rigorous,enforceable supranational rules to support theirpriorities. See North American FreeTrade Agreement, Can.-Mex.- U.S.,Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)(showing that Articles 1116 and 1117 allowinvestors to pursue arbitration). Theydid so in NAFTA Chapter11bywaivingtheirsovereignimmunity to allow private investorstopursue binding arbitration seeking judiciallyenforceablemonetary awards that include estimated lost profits forbreach of the NAFTA’s investor protections. Id. at arts. 1101–1138.2. Although acomprehensive review of Chapter 11 cases involving challenges to environmental measures is beyond thescope of this analysis, tworecentcases bear mentionbecause they clearlyillustrate problematic aspects of remote ownershipand control. Forexample, see Clayton v. Canada,CaseNo. 2009.04 (Perm. Ct.Arb.2015), whereaChapter 11 panelofthree arbitrators ruled 2–1 thatCanada violated Chapter 11 as aresult of ajoint federal-provincial environmental assessment process thatled to Canada’srejectionofamarineterminal on theDigby Peninsula in Nova Scotia that aU.S.-based company soughttoshipbasaltfromaquarryinthe area to theU.S.The federal and provincial governmentsconcluded that theproject “poses thethreat of unacceptableand significant adverse effects to theexistingand futureenvironmental,socialand culturalconditions influencing thelives of individualsand families in the adjacent communities.” Letterfrom Mark Parent,Minister of Env’tand Labour,toPaulG.Buxton, ProjectManager, Bilcon of Nova ScotiaCorp. (Nov. 20, 2007).Canadanow facesthe panel’s rulingonthe investors’compensationclaim totalingmore than $475 million. See SCOTT SINCLAIR,CANADIAN CTR. FOR POLICY ALT., CANADA’S TRACK RECORD UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11: NORTH AMERICAN INVESTOR–STATE DISPUTES TO JANUARY 2018, at 5(2018) (reflecting on Canada’seight losesand NAFTA Chapter 11’s interference with Canada’s regulatory authority). In 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 447
TheWTO,established in 1995, aims “to help trade flowasfreelyas possible—so long as thereare no undesirable sideeffects—because this is important foreconomic development and well-being.”129 Theapproach to thehuman-Earth relationshipreflected in theWTO is largelymimickedin regionaltrade andinvestment agreements.130 Expanded liberalized trade and investment is akey component of the internationalcommunity’s dominant commitment to ever-rising economic growth.131 Forexample, in 2014 theG20 leadersstated:
Trade andcompetitionare powerfuldriversofgrowth, increased livingstandards and jobcreation. In today’sworld we don’tjust tradefinal products. We work together to make things by importingand exportingcomponentsand services. We need
Lone Pine ResourcesInc. v. Government of Canada,aU.S. investor claimedinexcess of $250 million to compensatefor theQuebec government’s revocationunder its2011 Act to LimitOil and Gas Activities of theinvestor’s licenses to explorefor oiland natural gas along and nearthe St. Lawrence Rivernear Trois Rivières,Quebec. See Lone Pine Res.Inc. v. Canada, ICSIDCase No.UNCT/15/2. NoticeofArbitration, ¶¶ 49, 58 (Sept. 6, 2013) (stating that LonePine expended millions of dollars and considerabletimeand resources in Quebectoreceivenecessaryminingpermits). The investor anticipated that theexplorationlicensescouldlead to shalegas development in theregion. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Based on astrategicassessmentofthe impacts of shale gasand other hydrocarbon development on the human and biophysical environment in theregion, thegovernment of Quebecconcluded that theregion wasnot suitablefor hydrocarbon development. Id. 129. See Understanding theWTO:Who We Are,WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm(last visitedApr. 14, 2019)(“At[the]heart [ofthe WTO] arethe WTO agreements, negotiatedand signed by thebulkofthe world’s trading nations.”);WTO,ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 4(2016) (providing abasic understanding of theWTO,including who it is,whatitstandsfor, and what it does). These documentsprovide thelegal ground rules forinternational commerce. They areessentiallycontracts, binding governmentstokeeptheirtradepolicieswithin agreedlimits. Although negotiatedand signed by governments, thegoal is to help producersofgoods and services,exporters,and importersconduct their business, while allowing governmentstomeetsocial and environmental objectives. Understanding theWTO:Who We Are, supra.The WTOadministers andenforcestrade rulespursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffsand Trade(GATT),the GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services (GATS), andthe Trade-Related AspectsofIntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). See WTO, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra at 2, 5, 37 (explaining theWTO’scollaborationwith theWorld Bank). A significant change from prior international trade arrangements was theestablishmentofanoverarching dispute settlementprocess coveringall aspects of theWTO. See id. at 5(outlining the dispute settlement process). 130.See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements,https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/ scope_rta_e.htm(last visitedApr.14, 2019) (outlining that regional trade agreementsare essential in international trade relations and specifically that,since 2016, allWTO members have aregional trade agreement in effect). 131. See MANUEL GONZÁLEZ DE MOLINA &VÍCTOR M. TOLEDO,THE SOCIAL METABOLISM:A SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF HISTORICAL CHANGE 137 (2004) (citingthe statistical growth of international trade); G20, G20Leaders’ Communiqué,¶11 (Nov. 16, 2015) (statingthat globaltrade andinvestment areparamount to economic growth and development). 448 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425
policiesthattakefulladvantage of globalvalue chains and encourage greaterparticipationand value additionbydeveloping countries.Our growth strategiesinclude reformstofacilitate tradebyloweringcosts,streamliningcustoms procedures, reducing regulatoryburdens and strengthening trade-enabling services. We arepromotingcompetition, entrepreneurship and innovation, including by loweringbarriers to new business entrantsand investment.Wereaffirm our longstanding standstill androllback commitments to resist protectionism ....Weneeda strong trading system inanopen global economytodrivegrowth andgeneratejobs.Tohelpbusiness make bestuse of trade agreements, we will work to ensureour bilateral, regional and plurilateralagreementscomplement one another,are transparent and contributetoastronger multilateraltrading system under World TradeOrganization(WTO) rules. These rulesremainthe backbone of theglobal trading system that has delivered economicprosperity.Arobustand effectiveWTO thatresponds to current and future challenges is essential.132
Theoutcomedocumentofthe Rio+20 Conference stated that measures to promoteagreen economy or sustainabledevelopment should“[n]ot constituteameans of arbitrary or unjustifiablediscriminationoradisguised restrictiononinternational trade.”133 TheSustainableDevelopment Goals (SDGs)that theU.N.General Assembly adoptedin2015 implicitly endorse theWTO regime134 and include agoal of doublingthe share of theleast developing countries’ global exportsby2020.135 Othershavedone comprehensivereviews of theWTO agreementsand other trade andinvestment agreements andtheir relationshipto environmentalissues.136 Such adetailedanalysis is beyond thescope of this Essay,but some summaryobservations regardingthe WTOare relevant to considerationofhow internationaltrade andinvestment can best promotea mutually enhancing human-Earthrelationshipinthe Anthropocene. First, theWTO and similar regional accordsinstitutionalize aglobaleconomic model that promotes global expansionofeconomic activity founded on
132.G20, G20Leaders’ Communiqué,¶¶8,16(Nov. 15–16, 2014). 133.U.N.Conference on SustainableDevelopment, The Future We Want,¶58, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.216/L.1*(June 19, 2012). 134.G.A.Res. 70/1, at 27 (Sept. 25, 2015). 135. Id. 136.JAMES K.R. WATSON,THE WTO ANDTHE ENVIRONMENT:DEVELOPMENTOF COMPETENCE BEYOND TRADE 2(2013). 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 449 limited interference with privateproperty rights.137 However,thismodel lacks amechanism to understandlocal conditions or to monitorormake adjustmentsaccording to aggregateimpactsonecological limits, such as planetary boundaries.138 Second, thedisputesettlement mechanisminthe WTOmakes clear theinternational community’s capacity to adopt supranationalrules with an enforcementregime that has real impact on national policy.139 Thefinal decisions in WTOdisputes in whichnational environmentalmeasures were held to violateWTO rules demonstratethe power of this judicialization140 of international rules andshow how difficult it is forWTO member states to adopt environmentalmeasures that overcomeconcernsregarding over-regulationand protectionism.141
D. Trade,Investment,and Remote OwnershipProblems
Long-distance trade and internationalinvestment tend to increase the detrimental influence of remote actors on social, economic, and ecological systemsatalocal scale.142 In theforms of remote ownershipthatare the most abstract,investors in privatecorporatelandgrabs forconversion into vastindustrialagriculturaloperations typically have little knowledge of or interest in theculturalhistory,ecological functioning,orlocal-levelhuman-
137.Id. at 4–5. 138.See id. (showcasing how theWTO has ruledtothe detriment of theenvironment). 139.See id. at 93 (providing that theWTO is notonlyresolving specificdisputes between Members, but also making de facto precedent at thesametime). 140. See id. at 89 (demonstrating thejudicialization of the WTOrules). 141.The most notable of thesecases were:(1) theTuna-Dolphincases; see Report of thePanel, U.S.—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,DS21/R(Sept.3,1991), GATTBISD (39thSupp.), at 155, reprinted in 30 I.L.M.1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/DolphinI](rejecting an embargo theU.S.imposed on commercialyellowfin tunaand yellowfin tuna productsthatwere harvested in away thatharmed dolphins); see also Reportofthe Panel, U.S.—Restrictions on ImportsofTuna,WTO Doc. DS29/R (June 16, 1994) (unadopted)[hereinafter Tuna/DolphinII](reviewing the Tuna/DolphinIdecisionafter theE.U.and theNetherlands requested aGATTPanelreview because neither Mexico nor theU.S. requested that theGATT Contracting Partiesadopt thefindings of Tuna/DolphinI); (2) the Shrimp- Turtlecase, see Appellate BodyReport, U.S.—Import ProhibitionofCertain Shrimpand Shrimp Products,WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct.12, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M.121 (1999) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle](rejecting theU.S.’s appealofthe Panel Report’s prior decision toreject the U.S.’s imposed prohibition on theimportationofcertain shrimp and shrimpproductsthat werecaught using methods that harmedsea turtles);and (3)the Brazil Tire cases. See Report of the Panel, Brazil— Measures AffectingImportsofRetreaded Tyres,WTO Doc.WT/DS332/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil Tyres](rejecting Brazil’s import restrictions on certainused tires to reduce negative environmental impactsfrom tire storage and disposal). 142. See PEARCE, supra note6,at115 (overviewing theauthor’svisit with investorCampo Aberto,Aberto’s plans to profitfromBrazilianagriculture,and an exampleofaninternational investment that is likelytocontributetoBrazil’srelentless practiceofmonoculture). 450 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425
Earth interactions of theland underlyingtheir investment.143 They simply want thegreatest financial return possible, regardless of theecologicalor social cost.144 Meanwhile,local peoplepossessing centuries-oldknowledge of,connectionto, andexperiencewith theconvertedland aremoved to new places,nolonger abletomaintaintheirconnectiontoplace or to sustain themselves on local ecosystems—nolonger abletomaintainamutually enhancing human-Earth relationship.145 Breaches of this essential relationshiphave occurredacross historyand acrossthe globe.146
III. CONFRONTING REMOTE OWNERSHIP UNDER ECOLOGICAL LAW
Like ecologicaleconomics, ecologicallaw is still mostly conceptual and notyet widelyunderstood or practiced,largely becausethey both envisionatransitionawayfromthe hard-wiredinsistence on economic growth that undergirdspolicyand decisionmaking globally.147 Yetthe growth-insistenteconomic modeland thelegal and governancesystems that supportitare entirely sociallyconstructed,and therefore subject to change as theflaws in theirconceptual foundations becomemoreand more clear. Ecologicaleconomics andecological laware emerging social constructions that respondtothe increasinglyapparent impossibility of perpetual economic growth on our finite planet (even if economic growthismoreand more decoupled fromthroughput of materialand energyinthe economy andconsequent ecological impacts).148
143.See generallyid. (exposing theauthor’s encounterswith several landgrabbers in different areasofthe globe, and specifically revealingthe human costsoflandgrabbing for thepurpose of large- scale agriculture). 144.Asimilarset of problemscan arise when locally based ownersseek to profit from remote sale of local productsthat exertalocal ecological footprint—local owners whohave not developed institutions forsustainablegovernance of thecommons. 145.See ANDREAS NEEF,LAND RIGHTS MATTER!ANCHORS TO REDUCE LAND GRABBING, DISPOSSESSION AND DISPLACEMENT:ACOMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAND RIGHTS SYSTEMSIN SOUTHEAST ASIA ANDTHE POTENTIALOFNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND GUIDELINES 8, 13 (CarolineKruckow &Maike Lukow eds., 2016) (statingthatland grabshave caused the displacement of more than 770,000 people, and specifically that displacement has affectedthe rights of indigenouspeoples of thesix Southeast Asian countries). 146. See,e.g.,PEARCE, supra note 6(providing specific examples of global landgrabbingdone by thosegeographically disconnected from theland grab); ROBIN WALL KIMMERER,BRAIDING SWEETGRASS:INDIGENOUS WISDOM,SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, ANDTHE TEACHINGS OF PLANTS 259 (2013)(positing that “[r]estoration is imperativefor healing theearth”and that if “[w]erestore the land, ...the land restores us,” providing amutually beneficial human-Earth relationship). 147.WESTRA, supra note27, at 143. 148. See Garver, The Rule of Ecological Law, supra note 4, at 326,330 (finding that ecological lawarises from the tension between our infiniteeconomicgrowth andthe socio-ecological consequences that will occur with such growth). 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 451
Under ecologicallaw,remoteownershipand controlofland and ecosystems wouldgiveway mostly or entirely to institutions favoring locally tailored rules.149 When they incorporateinstitutions and features that areessentialtoreal sustainability, theselocally tailoredrules reflectthe emphasis on attentiontoplace and local ecological knowledgethatis necessary to sustainamutually enhancing human-Earth relationship.150 Moreover,these locally sourcedrules subjecttrade and investment rules to thehierarchicalprimacy of ecologicallimits and theattainment of a mutually enhancing human-Earthrelationship.151 In such aregime, providing investorswith investment opportunitiesinvolving theconversion of land in such away that decreases theprospectsfor amutually enhancing human-Earth relationshipwouldbeinconceivable.152 To serve as thefoundationfor an overarching, globalobjectivethat can be appliedatthe scaleoflandscapes or theentire Earth, amutually enhancing human-Earth relationshipmustencompass not onlythe most pristinewild ecosystems, but also densehuman settlementsand other areas wherehumansortheir impactshavesignificantly transformed the evolutionary trajectoryofthe pre-human or an imagined human-free ecosystem.153 Arigorous yet practicable notionofsustainability must incorporatesomelevel of symbiosisbetween humans and non-human natureinorder to be consistent with amutually enhancing human-Earth relationship.154 Thechallenge is to determine, alongthe spectrumfromthe leastimpacted tothe most anthropogenically transformed ecosystems, wherebenchmarksfor amutually enhancinghuman-Earth relationship(that arepracticableinlaw and governance systems)can and shouldbedrawn at different spatial and temporal scales, while accountingfor humans as an integral ecosystemcomponent.155 Another challenge in applying acohesiveyet practicable notionofa mutually enhancing human-Earthrelationshipisthathuman communities
149.See id. at 317 (explaining that thedegrowth movement emphasizes localautonomy). 150. See Garver, ASystems-BasedTool forTransitioning to Law, supra note 4, at 171 (providing examples of how localcommunities develop tailoredecologicalpolicies). 151.See Garver, TheRuleofEcologicalLaw, supra note4,at321 (stating theeconomic constraints of thecurrent environmental lawsand thatecological lawwould place ecological constraints on themarket instead). 152.See id. (asserting that ecologicallaw placesecological constraints on property). 153. See Erle Ellis &Navin Ramankutty, PuttingPeople in theMap:AnthropogenicBiomes of the World,6FRONTIERS ECOLOGY &ENV’T 439, 445–46 (2008)(discussing that“[s]ustainable ecosystem management”requires“maintaining beneficialinteractions between managed and natural systems”). 154.Garver, The RuleofEcological Law, supra note4,at327. 155.Garver, ASystems-BasedTool for TransitioningtoLaw, supra note 4, at 167. 452 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425 andecosystemsatthe local,landscape,and regionallevel inevitablyand increasinglyare “subject to human impacts that derivefromspatially and temporally diversedrivers—including thosethatare remote geographically or whoseimpactsare temporally delayed.”156 Meanwhile,thoselocal communitiesinevitablycause temporally and spatially remote impactsas well.157 Thus,atwhatevertemporal or spatialscale, practical efforts to promoteamutually enhancinghuman-Earth relationshiprequire an adaptive, multi-scalar systems approach that maintainsanongoingfocus on and connectiontothe local scale.158 This approach requires thehumility inherent in dealingwiththe inevitableuncertaintiesand unpredictability in how systemsevolve by applying aprecautionary approach,and not the hubris of many Western secular and religious traditions that idealizetotal human mastery and perfectionofnature.159 Determiningplace-based benchmarks formutual human-Earth enhancement and implementing an adaptive, systems-based approachto lawwithprimacy forecological limits impliesaneed to place constraints on human choice and to guide human intentiontowardnew goals.160 The human-Earth relationshipwill inevitablybesocially constructed, and human intentionisthus acriticalvariablefor thehuman prospect.161 For example, properly done andimplemented on aregionaland ultimately global scale, reciprocal restorationadherestoanadaptive, systems-based approach and both commits to and recognizes theneed forhuman intention, choice, decision making,and activeintervention to restore damaged human-Earth relationships.162 Ecologicallaw that incorporates abroad vision of reciprocal restorationand similarinnovativeideas is ultimatelya hopeful vision of human societiesorientating this intentionsoastodevelop workablenorms andrules forathrivinghuman community within a thrivingcommunity of alllife on Earth.163
156.Id. 157.See id. at 166 (“Ultimately, how human societycraftslaw andgovernancesystems from the local to the global level will significantly affectwhether humanity will trigger globally or regionally catastrophicshiftsinthe ecosystems on whichhuman societiesdepend.”). 158.Id. at 167. 159. Id. 160. Id. 161.See id. at 168 (emphasizing that theincorporationofhuman intentions and “decision making with ecological systemsatvariousscales can leadeithertolocal or civilizational collapse, at one extreme,ortolong-termresilienceand adaptiveness, at the other”). 162.See HUMAN DIMENSION, supra note49, at 258(providing that reciprocal restoration recognizesthe human role in theecological restoration process). 163.See id. at 1(arguing that ecological restorationneeds human involvement that is value based, involving human knowledge and behaviors). 2019] ConfrontingRemoteOwnershipProblemswithEcological Law 453
CONCLUSION
Significantobstacles standinthe wayofatransitiontoalimits- insistent global legalsystemthat promotes amutually enhancing human- Earth relationship.164 Ecologicallaw encapsulates afuturevisionnot only of law, but also of thesocial,cultural, political,and economiccontexts in whichlaw is embedded.165 It is avisionthat impliesaninevitableevolution away from current political ordersand power structures toward new ones that must emerge as this transition unfolds.166 To attain this vision, the resistance to change in thelegal systemand related systemsishighand will take along timetoovercome.167 This is particularly truewith respectto necessary paradigm shifts—especially thetransitionfromthe dominant growth-insistent paradigm to thelimits-insistent paradigm proposed in this Essay.168 This transitionimpliesasignificant change in deeplyentrenched power structuresand political orders at allscales—change that will likely emerge in unpredictableways and through unpredictableactors.169 Among other promisingrecentdevelopment,the creationofthe EcologicalLaw and Governance Association(ELGA) in 2016 wasan important step toward thetransition fromenvironmentaltoecological law.170 TheOsloManifesto fromwhich ELGAemerged states:
To overcome theflaws of environmentallaw,mere reform is not enough. We do not needmorelaws, but different laws from whichnoareaofthe legal systemisexempted. Theecological
164.See supra Part I(explaining that conflicts arise between therightsofnature andhuman rights,and further explaining thenecessity of afundamental shift away from afocusonwealth). 165. See M’Goningle, supra note100 (showing that,through thelensoflegal pluralism, “a pluralityofsocial structures have internal legalordersthatfunction in acompelling regulatory fashion”). 166.See supra PartI(overviewingthe necessity ofachange from theassumptive need for wealth creationand suggestingthatecological law requires limits to have priorityinalegal system). 167.See Garver, ASystems-BasedTool forTransitioning to Law, supra note4,at167 (explainingthat asystem’s resistance to change can“lock in and lock out”certaincharacteristics of that system, andthatasystem’s resilienceand adaptiveness,together with thedegree of lock-inorlock-out characteristics, reflect that system’s ability to change). 168.See id. at 170 (discussing themerits of alock-in/lock-outassessmentsystem in the transition to alimits-insistent paradigm). 169. See id. at 167 (describingthe cultural humility that will be necessarytotransition to a growth-insistent paradigm);PETER G. BROWNETAL., RIGHT RELATIONSHIP:BUILDING A WHOLE EARTH ECONOMY 141 (2009) (“Peoplemust bear witness, whenworking, playing, transacting, and relatingtoeach other everyday, so that these discussions will turn from talk into the walk of right relationship.”). 170.See Garver, ASystems-BasedTool forTransitioning to Law, supra note4,at167 (discussing themission of theELGA). 454 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:425
approach to lawisbased on ecocentrism,holism, and intra- /intergenerational and interspecies justice. Fromthisperspective, or worldview,the lawwill recogniseecological interdependenciesand no longer favour humans over natureand individualrightsover collectiveresponsibilities. Essentially, ecologicallaw internalises thenatural livingconditions of human existence andmakesthem thebasis of alllaw,including constitutions,human rights, property rights, corporate rightsand statesovereignty.171
ELGAisagrowingnetwork of jurists andotherswho areconvinced of the needtofurther develop ecologicallaw andtoseekopportunitiestoput it into practice.172 Addressing remote ownership problemsshouldbehighon thelist of prioritiesfor ELGAand like-mindedgroups andindividuals seekingamutually enhancing human-Earth relationship.173
171.Ecological Lawand Governance Association, Oslo Manifestofor Ecological Law & Governance,art.V(June 21, 2016),https://www.elga.world/oslo-manifesto/. 172.Garver, ASystems-Based Tool for Transitioning to Law, supra note4,at167. 173.See id. at 169 (statingthat systemswith strong privateproperty rights have historically causedpolitical inequality and ecologicaldetriment). DOES THE RULE OF ECOLOGICAL LAW DEMAND VEGANISM?: ECOLOGICAL LAW, INTERSPECIES JUSTICE, AND THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM
Heather McLeod-Kilmurray*†
INTRODUCTION...... 455 I. DEFINING “ECOLOGICAL LAW” AND THE “GLOBAL (ANIMAL)FOOD SYSTEM”...... 458 II. DOES ECOLOGICAL LAW REQUIRE INTERSPECIES JUSTICE?...... 464 III. DOES INTERSPECIES JUSTICE DEMAND (HUMAN)VEGANISM?...... 465 IV.WOULD ENDING OR REDUCING INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL AGRICULTURE ENHANCEORCHALLENGE INTER- AND INTRAGENERATIONAL HUMAN JUSTICE?THE 10 FEATURESOFECOLOGICAL LAW AND THE INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FOOD SYSTEM...... 468 CONCLUSION:SOME SOLUTIONS THAT ECOLOGICAL LAW MIGHT POINT TOWARD...... 479
INTRODUCTION
Theconceptofecological lawchallengesmany fundamental assumptions andnorms of ourconventionalunderstandingsoflaw and requiresprofound changes to our usualapproachestosustainability.1 A somewhat less explored issueiswhether ecological lawrequiresorleadsus toward interspecies justice. To tacklethisquestion,Ihave chosen thecase study of our global industrialized food system,focusinginparticular on animal foods.Not onlydoeseatinganimalproducts directly raisethe issue of interspeciesjustice, butitacutely demonstratesthe challenges of achieving humanjustice(bothinter-and intragenerational)and justicefor
*Associate Professor, Faculty of Law,and Co-Director, Centre for Environmental Law and Global Sustainability,University of Ottawa.Her research and teaching focus onFood Law,ToxicTorts, and Environmental Justice. She is co-author of The CanadianLaw of ToxicTorts with Lynda Collins, co-editor of theforthcoming CanadianFood Law and Policy with Nathalie Chalifour and AngelaLee, and aformer part-time member of theOntarioEnvironmental Review Tribunal. †With great thanks to twoofmywonderfulPhD students—AngelaLee and CarlaSbert—as well as my colleagues—Lynda Collins andNathalie Chalifour—fortheirextremely helpful insightson earlierdrafts—so privileged to workwith all of you! Ialso thankthe editorial teamatVermont Law Review fortheirhelpful input. 1.See GeoffreyGarver, The Rule of Ecological Law: TheLegal Complement to Degrowth Economics,5SUSTAINABILITY 316, 325 (2013)(theorizing that “[t]he rule of ecologicallaw must overcomethe limitationsofcontemporaryenvironmental law,”namelyits protectionofconsumption- based lifestyles that are “rooted in strong notions of property rightsand personal freedom”). 456 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 other speciesatthe same time.2 It is thereforeinteresting to askthe question: does ecologicallaw demand veganism?3 While this shortEssay does not attempttoprovide acompleteand final answertothisquestion, it providesanexcellent opportunity foraninitialthought experiment on how ecological lawwouldchange one of themostecologically harmfuland unjustaspectsofour globalfood system.4 In understanding and actualizingecological law, several related conceptsare helpful. Onepurpose of thelaw is to achieve justice. Klaus Bosselmann has proposed aconcept of “ecologicaljustice,”which requires threekinds of justice: intergenerational, intragenerational,and interspecies.5 Ourcurrent globalized,industrialized food system is achallenge to all three.6 To overcomethischallenge, our dominantfood system,and thelaws and policiesthat shape it, must be changed. Although it is truethatwhat we eat is oftenapersonalchoice,thischoice, for many of us,issignificantly shaped andlimitedbythe modernindustrialfood system,which is colonial, exploitative, and creates injusticetopresent and futuregenerations of human and non-human animals.7 This is particularly true in relationto industrialanimalagriculture,especially industrialmeatproduction.8 Argumentsinfavor of theindustrialfood system emphasizethe needto increasefood productiontofeed agrowing globalpopulation,9 especially in
2.See infra Part I(explaining howthe globalfood system’s focusonindustrialanimal agriculture contributes to inter- and intragenerational as well as interspeciesinjustice). 3. This Essay is an introductorythought experiment—rather than acomprehensivereview of how ecologicallaw wouldreform the global,regional,and localfood systems—and is certainly not intended to answerthe question of whether each person’s or group’sfood choicesmeets anyparticular ethic of ecological law. 4.See infra Part IV (analyzing howGarver’s ten features of ecological law wouldreform the global food system). 5. Klaus Bosselmann, Ecological Justiceand Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY:AREADER 129, 160 (Benjamin J. Richardson &Stepan Wood eds., 2006). 6.See infra notes 116–21 and accompanying text (explaining howthe developed world’s consumptionofmeatcontributes to food insecurity,thereby causingintergenerational injustice). 7.See infra notes97–101 and accompanying text (outlining theways in whichthe legal systemincentivizesand promotes themodern globalfood system). 8.See Global Meat Productionand ConsumptionContinue to Rise,WORLDWATCH INST., http://www.worldwatch.org/global-meat-production-and-consumption-continue-rise (last visitedApr. 14, 2019) [hereinafter Global Meat Production](discussingthe negativeimpactsthat industrialized meat productionhas on animals, humans,and theclimate). 9. See,e.g., WhoWill Feed Us?The Industrial Food Chain vs thePeasant Food Web,ETC GROUP (Oct. 16, 2017) [hereinafter WhoWill Feed Us?], http://www.etcgroup.org/content/who-will- feed-us-industrial-food-chain-vs-peasant-food-web (“Weare told thatitis bigagribusiness, with its flashytechno-fixes and financial clout,that will save the worldfrom widespread hunger and malnutrition ....”). 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 457 regions wherefinancial wealth is increasing.10 However,thereisverylittle discussion about tacklinghunger by other means, such as addressing human populationgrowth, reducing food waste, enhancing redistributionoffood, andproducingfood with more efficient energy ratios. Therefore, this Essayspecifically asks: (1)Does ecological lawrequire interspecies justice? (2)Doesinterspecies justicedemand (human) veganism?11 (3)Wouldveganism enhance or challenge inter- and intragenerationalhuman justice? Iwill useGeoffreyGarver’sten features of ecological law12 to explore theseissuesand to proposechangestoour food systems, with aparticular focusonindustrialanimalagriculture.13 Iconcludethat ecological law wouldrespect indigenous approaches to food, whichpermitnon-human animalstofulfill theirecological and natural roles.14 Similarly, ecological lawmay permittraditional small-scale animal husbandry, with its system of
10.See Global MeatProduction, supra note8(documentingthat“[w]orldwide meat productionhas tripledover the last four decades,” especially in industrial countriesthat consume“nearly doublethe quantity [of] developing countries”). 11.Another interestingquestiontoconsider is whetherinterspecies justice requires an end to non-human animal unrewarded labor, but thisisbeyondthe scope of this Essay. See Workshop on ‘AnimalLabour: Ethical,Legal and Political Perspectives on Recognizing Animals’ Work,’ ANIMALS PHIL., POL., L. ÐICS (Feb. 21, 2018), http://animalpolitics.queensu.ca/workshop-animal-labour/ (promotingworkshop that “aim[s] ...toexplore thepotentialbenefits and pitfalls of recognizing animals as workers”); CharlotteBlattner On ‘Animals Are(Forced) Workers, Too,’ ANIMALS PHIL., POL., L. ÐICS (Feb.21, 2018), http://animalpolitics.queensu.ca/charlotte-blattner-on-animals-are- forced-workers-too/ (examining “whetheranimals require aright against forcedlabour and explor[ing] how this rightcan be secured”). 12.Garver, supra note 1, at 325–30. 13.See infra Part IV (applying Garver’s ten features of ecological law to the industrialanimal foodsystem). 14.AsAngelaLee has written: Looking to other kinds of belief systemscan helpustoenvision alternative, non- technological ways in whichmeat eatingmight occur ethically,though here, we must be vigilant so as not [to] pick and choosethose elementsofother cultures that are convenient or favourable to our position, whilediscarding those that are not.Wemustalso be carefultoavoid theassumption that“indigenous people cannot maintain traditional values if theiruse of nativeimplements has been supplanted by technology and practicesimported from thedominantwhite culture.” A“primitive” subsistence culture is not theonlyone in whichmeat- eatingcoulddefensivelytake place. Insteadofbeing guided by rigid rulesor absoluteprohibitions, value systemsand worldviewspredicated on different set of principles can teach us to thinkmore relationally about theenvironment we live in andthe food thatitprovides.For example, Aboriginal attitudes towards huntingand meat-eating frequently reflectaprofoundreverencefor animallife within asystem of kinship, and underscorethe ethical responsibilitiesassociated with taking that life away. AngelaLee, The Milkmaid’s Tale: Veganism, Feminism,and DystopianFood Futures,WINDSOR REV. LEGAL &SOC.ISSUES (forthcoming2019) (manuscriptat31–32) (onfile with author) (footnotes omitted)(quotingJ.Douglas Rabb, The VegetarianFox and Indigenous Philosophy:Speciesism, Racism, and Sexism,24ENVTL.ETHICS 275, 286 (2002)). 458 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 mutual dependence between humanand non-human animals.15 However, thesefood systemsalone areunlikelytofeed therapidly growingglobal human population; thus,thesesystemsmay notachieve inter- and intragenerationalequity.16 If ecological lawalsorequiresinterspecies justice, it is difficulttojustify significant human consumptionofanimal productswherehumans canfeed themselves adequately fromplant-based sources—acomplex idea explored in more detail below.17 While adramatic shiftawayfromanimalfood productswill not occur overnight,and may neverbefully achieved, ecologicallaw still demands thedismantlingofthe myriad laws—including environmentallaws—that encourage and perpetuate ourcurrent globalized industrialfood system’srelianceon animalfood products.18 Ashift fromanimal-product consumptionwould also allowustosolve some of themorepressingproblemsofthe industrial- animal-agriculture system.
I. DEFINING “ECOLOGICAL LAW” AND THE “GLOBAL (ANIMAL)FOOD SYSTEM”
Garver explains ecologicallaw as follows:
Systems-basedecologicalboundariesthat promotethe flourishing of life systemsprovide thebase of astructure of ecologicallaw (in thelegal sense) that must be respected and enforced to fend offcatastrophe and enhancethe capacity forlife. Theloomingprospect of transgressing criticalecological points of no return requiresthe global community to fashion asystems- based legal and institutional structurethat is built on the
15.See infra notes 166–73 and accompanying text (highlighting how ecological law could encourage local food movements). 16.See TamarHaspel, WhySmall, Local,OrganicFarms Aren’t the Key to Fixing OurFood System,WASH.POST (Sept. 22,2017),https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/why-small-local- organic-farms-arent-the-key-to-fixing-our-food-system/2017/09/21/146f72b2-9e4d-11e7-8ea1- ed975285475e_story.html?utm_term=.fbd57989db0a (positing thatlocal farmscannot solve issues in the foodsystembecause(i) they do not producethe right crops, (ii) theyare not equipped to grow such crops, (iii) cropland is not situated close enough to populated areas,and (iv) local food is onlyavailable forlimited seasons). But seeWho Will Feed Us?, supra note9(“[A]new report ...showsthat in fact, it is adiversenetwork of small-scale producers, dubbed thePeasant Food Web, that feeds 70% of the world ....”). 17.See infra Part III (discussing whether interspecies justice demandshuman veganism). 18.See infra PartIV(arguing that ecological law requires reducing relianceonindustrial- animal-agriculturesystems). 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 459
foundationofecological lawunder an expanded notionofthe rule of law.19
Many others have used differentterms to describe similarapproaches andchallenges.20 More specifically,Garver proposes tenfeatures of ecological law: (1)ecological lawshouldrecognizehumansare partof Earth’s life systems;(2) ecological limits must have primacyoversocial and economic regimes; (3)ecological lawmustpermeateall areas of law; (4)ecological lawshouldfocus on radically reducing material andenergy output;(5) ecological lawmustbeglobalbut distributed (otherwise referred to as theprincipleofsubsidiarityand commonbut differentiated responsibility); (6)ecological lawshouldensureafairsharingofresources among presentand future generations of humans andother life;(7) ecologicallaw must be “binding ...and supranational, with supremacy over sub-global legal regimesasnecessary”;(8) ecological lawrequires “greatly expanded program[s] of research andmonitoring”;(9) ecological lawrequiresprecautioninrelationtocrossingglobalecologicalboundaries; and (10) ecological lawmustbeadaptive.21 AccordingtoGarver,ecologicallaw growsout of twocompeting impossibilities:
Thecallfor theruleofecological lawemerges fromthe tension between opposing narratives of impossibility.Onthe onehand is theseeming impossibility of ending thecurrent intransigent commitmenttoinfinite economic growth,the primacyofshort- term economicinterests and theoverriding beliefintechnological solutions to ecological challenges ....Onthe otherhand arethe systemic impossibilitiesand long-term catastrophicsocio- ecologicalconsequencesifthe economygrows infinitelyand economic andpolitical trade-offscontinue to outweigh non- negotiableecologicallimits.22
Thecurrent globalfood system’s approach to animalfood products is at exactly this juncture of impossibilities, and this is whyecological law could be particularly relevant in tryingtotransform thesystemtoachieve
19.Garver, supra note1,at317–18; see also id. at 319 (“[T]he‘rule of law’ means that global regulatorylimits requiredtomeet ecological limits and ensurefairsharing ofthe earth’s bountymustbe respected.” (quoting PETER G. BROWN &GEOFFREY GARVER,RIGHT RELATIONSHIP:BUILDINGA WHOLE EARTH ECONOMY 135 (2009))). 20. See id. at 318–19 (explaining various conceptsanalogous to Garver’s theory of ecological law). 21. Id. at 325–29. 22.Id. at 330. 460 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 ecological sustainabilityand justice. Butinfact,what is theglobalfood system?Accordingtothe CommitteeonWorld FoodSecurity:
[A]food system encompasses allthe stages ofkeepingusfed: growing, harvesting, packing, processing, transforming, marketing, consumingand disposingoffood. Themostcommon food system is theagro-industrialfood system that is global.Itis dominated by afew multinational corporations through vertical integration. This is averycomplex systemwith along supply chain and it hasalotofprocessed foods. 23
Theglobal food system,particularly sinceWorld WarII, hasbeen increasinglyfocused on and driven by industrialization, corporatization, and monopolization, includinginthe productionand marketingofanimal-based foods.24 In addition, this modelisbeing exported: industrialanimal operations “are becomingincreasingly prevalent in developing regions.”25 Forexample, “[i]nEast and Southeast Asia ...meat productionincreased by 25 milliontons,or31percent, between 2001and 2007 alone,and most of this growth took placeinindustrialsystems.”26 TheFood and Agriculture Organizationofthe UnitedNations (FAO) “estimates that 80 percent of growth inthe livestock sector now comes from industrialproduction systems. Andinmanydevelopingregions, environmental,animalwelfare, public health,and labor standardsare not as well establishedasinNorth Americaand Europe.”27 Industrialanimalagriculture causes significant harmtothe climateand waterand requiresland usechange—not to mentionthe harmstoanimaland human health.28 It also affects access to healthy, sustainable, andecologically andculturally appropriatefoods.29
23.Myriam Welvaert, TheFutureFood System: TheWorld on One Plate?,COMMITTEE ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.fao.org/cfs/home/blog/blog- articles/article/en/c/448182/. 24.Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, CommoditizingNonhuman Animals and TheirConsumers: Industrial Livestock Production, Animal Welfare,and Ecological Justice,32BULL.SCI., TECH.&SOC’Y 71, 73, 77, 80 (2012) [hereinafter McLeod-Kilmurray, CommoditizingAnimals]. 25.Rising NumberofFarm AnimalsPoses Environmental and PublicHealth Risks, WORLDWATCH INST., http://www.worldwatch.org/rising-number-farm-animals-poses-environmental- and-public-health-risks-0 (last visitedApr.14, 2019) [hereinafter WORLDWATCH INST., FarmAnimals]. 26.WORLDWATCH INST., VITAL SIGNS VOLUME 20: THE TRENDS THAT ARE SHAPING OUR FUTURE 56 (2013) [hereinafter VITAL SIGNS]. 27. Id. (foonoteomitted). 28.FOOD &AGRIC.ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW: ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUESAND OPTIONS 4, 6, 16 (2006),http://www.fao.org/3/a-a0701e.pdf [hereinafter FOOD &AGRIC.ORG., LIVESTOCK]. 29.BRIGHTER GREEN & THE GLOB.FOREST COAL., INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE,LIVESTOCK FARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE:GLOBAL SOCIAL,CULTURAL,ECOLOGICAL, AND ETHICAL IMPACTS OF AN UNSUSTAINABLE INDUSTRY 4, https://globalforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 461
If thecurrent global food system causessomany health and justice problemstothe environment, economy, humans,and animals,why have we structureditthisway to date? While theevolutionofthe current system is a long—though surprisinglyrecent—story, some of thekey argumentsfor maintaining, and even expanding, this systeminclude:(1) thelack of adequatefood formillions of people;30 (2)the increasingwealth of the human population, whichhas ledtorisingdemand foranimalfood products;31 and (3)the risksthat climatechange poses to food production.32 What wouldecological lawhave to sayabout each of thesearguments? First, it wouldquestionmorespecifically why thereisalack of adequatefood forthe currentgenerationand whythe dominant food system’s prescriptionfor fixingthisproblem is so heavilyfocused on increasingthe food supply.33 It is widely documented that theworld currently produces sufficient food to feed everyhuman on Earth, and the problem is one of distribution.34 In addition, food wasteisanenormous problem,and some have estimated that roughly33% of producedfood is wasted.35 Second,ecological lawwouldemphasizetacklingthe human populationgrowthproblem itself, rather than acceptingitand placing the extra burdenonthe ecosystem and other lives within it.36 Third,ifhunger persisted despitereducedwaste,fairer distribution, and humanpopulation control, ecological lawwouldask whetherincreasinggrowththrough
MM_Brighter-Green-and-the-Global-Forest-Coalition_WSF_Industrial_Livestock-FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 30.See FOOD &AGRIC.ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,THE STATE OF FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION IN THE WORLD 2(2018) (“Theabsolutenumber of undernourished peopleinthe worldis now estimatedtohave increased from around 804 million in 2016 to almost 821 million in 2017.”). 31.WORLDWATCH INST., FarmAnimals, supra note25. 32.See ReneeCho, How ClimateChange Will Alter OurFood,COLUM.U.: EARTH INST.(July 25, 2018),https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2018/07/25/climate-change-food-agriculture/(describing how climatechange will likelyresultindecreased yields in allfood productionbecause ofincreased temperatures and extremeweather fluctuations). 33.See Garver, supra note1,at326–27(explaining that ecological lawcalls for botha“fair sharingofresources among present and future generations” as wellasa“radical re-focusing of the economyonreduc[ing]” consumptionand energy). 34.Eric Holt-Giménez et al., We Already Grow Enough Foodfor 10 BillionPeople ...and StillCan’tEnd Hunger,36J.SUSTAINABLE AGRIC.595, 595 (2012). 35. Key FactsonFood Loss and Waste YouShould Know!, FOOD &AGRIC.ORG.UNITED NATIONS,http://www.fao.org/save-food/resources/keyfindings/en/ (lastvisitedApr.14, 2019) [hereinafter Facts on Food Loss]. 36.Garver, supra note1(“The primary concernofthe human community must be the preservation andenhancement of [the community of alllivingspecies].” (quotingTHOMAS BERRY, GREAT WORK:OUR WAY INTO THE FUTURE 58 (1999))). 462 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 animal food products is themostefficient or fair system—bothinterms of justice to humansand theecosystem.37 Second, somehave arguedthat industrialanimalagriculture is themost efficientway to satisfy thedemandsofthe growingglobalhuman populationand its increasingwealth.38 However,ecological lawmight ask whethermoreanimalproductsare aneed or awant.39 ecological lawwould askabout theecological realities of thepeoplesinquestion to answer this. For example, thehuman needtoeat meat is verydifferent in thefar North or in extremedrought conditions than in Western urban contexts.40 In addition, while eatinganimalproductsisapersonal choice,41 thesechoices areveryoften shaped and limitedbythe industrialfood system,the laws and subsidiesthatsupportit,42 and theeconomic realitiesand practical
37.See id. at 327 (“[T]herule of ecologicallaw must ensure fair sharing of resources among present and future generations ....”). 38.See, e.g.,Ron Smith, Population Growth Demands Improved FarmEfficiency, SOUTHWEST FARMPRESS (Apr. 22, 2010), https://www.farmprogress.com/management/population- growth-demands-improved-farm-efficiency (arguing that to feed9billionpeopleby2050, farmers and ranchers “must find ways to make significant improvement in farm productivity and efficiency”). 39.See Garver, supra note1,at326–27 (advocating foraculturalshifttoaneconomythat produces onlythingsthatare needed). 40.See MarceloGleiser, Is aNo-Meat World Really Better?,NAT’L PUB.RADIO (June 28, 2017),https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2017/06/28/532880755/is-a-no-meat-world-really-better (“[I]t is clearthat less meat is good morally andenvironmentally,but no meat maynot be as good as some maythink. Somepoor regions inthe world need all themeat they can get.”); seealso Tiff-AnnieKenny et al., Dietary Sources of Energy and Nutrients in the Contemporary Diet of InuitAdults: Results from the 2007–08InuitHealth Survey,21PUB.HEALTH NUTRITION 1319, 1319–20 (2018) (chroniclingthat “[i]n thelatter halfofthe 20thcentury,”the Inuitdecreased theirconsumptionof“country foods,” whichare those “harvested from northern ecosystems, through culturalpractices, traditionsand detailed environmental knowledge” while increasingtheirconsumptionoffoods “purchased in stores”); Ursula King &ChristopherFurgal, Is HuntingStill Healthy? Understanding the Interrelationships Between IndigenousParticipationinLand-BasedPractices and Human-Environmental Health,11INT’L J. ENVTL.RES.&PUB.HEALTH 5751, 5772 (2014) (arguing foratransdisciplinaryapproachto“better understand” thecomplexity between huntingand “[l]and-human health interrelationships”). 41.Ofcourse,thisassumes that theperson in questionhas theability to exercise choicein relation to food—clearly millions of peopledonot exercise free choice in relationtofood foravariety of reasons, including income,accessibility,and other barriers. See, e.g.,Rebecca Seguinetal., Understanding Barriers and Facilitators to HealthyEatingand ActiveLivinginRural Communities,J. NUTRITION &METABOLISM,2014, at 5–6, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4276670/ pdf/JNME2014-146502.pdf (“Thecost of freshfood wasidentifiedasabarrier to eating healthy, especially among low-incomemembers of thecommunity.”). 42.See, e.g.,Adam Spiers, The Public Health Dilemma of Excessive Meat Consumption, NETWORKFOR PUB.HEALTH L.:PUB.HEALTH L. BLOG (May 9, 2013, 12:14 PM), https://www.networkforphl.org/the_network_blog/2013/05/09/179/the_public_health_dilemma_of_exce ssive_meat_consumption(“Between 1995 and 2009, thefederal government spent approximately $250 billion to subsidize the agriculturalindustry —approximately 63 percent of theseexpenditures supported themeat anddairy industries.”). 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 463 availabilityofoptions forvariously situated people.43 Therefore, ecological lawwouldquestionthisargument as an appropriate solution to global hunger. Third,ifthe goal is to tacklehunger,expanding food systemsthat exacerbate ecological harms will onlyworsenthe problem. For example, animalfood products areamong thegreatestcause of reduced food availability—both currently and in thefuture—due to theirserious role in exacerbatingclimatechange, whichalso challengesfood productionitself.44 Forexample:
Theproductionofanimalproductsgenerates themajority of food-relatedGHG emissions (72–78% of totalagricultural emissions), whichisdue to lowfeed-conversion efficiencies, enteric fermentationinruminants, andmanure-relatedemissions; thefeed-relatedimpactsofanimalproductsalsocontributeto bluewateruse (around 10%) and pressures on cropland, as well as nitrogenand phosphorus application(20–25% each).45
Apartfromits effectsonclimate, theindustrialfood system is colonial, exploitative,and creates injusticetothe current andfuturegenerations of human andnon-human animals.The feed conversion ratio creates inter- and intragenerationalinequalities.46 Fearsoffuturefood scarcity driveland grabbing andother injustices.47 Theindustrialfood system also createspath
43.See Gleiser, supra note40(explaining that in many places,raising animals is easierorthe onlyoption availablegiven thestate of theland). 44.FOOD &AGRIC.ORG., LIVESTOCK, supra note 28, at 4–6. 45.Marco Springmann et al., Options forKeeping theFood SystemWithin Environmental Limits,562 NATURE 519, 520 (2018) (footnote omitted); see also WalterWillett et al., Foodinthe Anthropocene: The EAT–Lancet Commission on HealthyDietsfromSustainableFood Systems,393 LANCET COMMISSIONS 447, 449 (2019) (“Food production is thelargestcause of global environmental change.”).For further details on how industrial meat productionimpactsclimatechange and causes other environmental harm, see Robert Goodland&Jeff Anhang, Livestockand Climate Change:What if theKey ActorsinClimateChange are...Cows, Pigs andChickens?,WORLDWATCH INST., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 10–11, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/6294 (explainingthat livestock contributes between 18 and 51% of annual worldwide greenhousegas emissions);FOOD &AGRIC.ORG., LIVESTOCK, supra note 28, at iii(outliningthe “verysubstantialcontributionofanimalagriculture to climatechange and airpollution, to land, soiland waterdegradationand to thereductionofbiodiversity”); see also Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Vegetarianism andFood Governance:Sustainabilityand Ecological Justice, in GLOBALISATION AND ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY IN SCIENCEAND INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 58-59 (Laura Westra et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafterMcLeod-Kilmurray, Vegetarianism](reportingthat intensive livestock productionisone of the greatestemitters of greenhousegases). 46.See infra notes 115–22 and accompanying text (explaining that because industrial agriculturalhas ahighfeed-conversion ratio it can onlyfeedasmallpercentage of planet). 47.KihwanSeo &Natalia Rodriguez, Land Grab, Food Security and Climate Change:A ViciousCircle in the Global South, in HUMANAND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 165, 167 (Netra Chhetri ed., 2012), https://www.intechopen.com/chapter/pdf-download/40834. 464 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 dependence, making us forget that theremay be other, bettersystems and approaches available48 and causing us to look to economic and technologicalfixes.49 Forexample, some have suggestedthat genetic engineeringcouldreduce methane emissions frommeat production.50 Yet therisks of genetically modified foods have not beenfully testedor understood and couldcreatesystemicecologicalharms,which in turn could harmhumans as well as theanimals,bothfarmedand wild,and plants they rely on.51 Thesetechnologicalapproachesalsohave atendencytocause even furthercorporatizationand concentrationofpower in thefood system.52 Given thechallenges of thecurrent global industrial-animal- agriculturalsystem, how couldecological law, and its commitment to interspecies justice, help?
II.DOES ECOLOGICAL LAW REQUIRE INTERSPECIES JUSTICE?
Many ecological lawscholarsmake reference to some aspectsof interspecies justice. Forexample,asstated above,Bosselmann explicitly argues that ecological justicerequires intergenerational,intragenerational and interspecies justice.53 TheEarth Charter, which“is an ethical
48. See,e.g.,MICHAEL POLLAN,THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA 130–33 (2006) (contrastinga “conventional 500-acrecorn-and-bean operationinChurdan, Iowa”witha550-acresustainable, organic farm in Swoope,Virginia). 49.See, e.g.,Shenggen Fan, Innovations in Food Systems: TheKey to Humanand Planetary Health,INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES.INST.: IFPRI BLOG (Mar. 27, 2018), http://www.ifpri.org/blog/innovations-food-systems-key-human-and-planetary-health(promoting“new and potentially transformativetechnologies” in theglobal food system, such as “lab-grownmeat” and gene-editedseeds). But see AngelaLee, An Ecofeminist Perspective on NewFood Technologies,5CAN. FOOD STUD.63, 69 (2018) (“Giventhe social, political, economic, andethical contextsthat food occupies,technicalevaluationsofnew food technologies areconspicuouslyincomplete, and require a more nuanced considerationoftheirsystemicimplications.”). 50. See,e.g.,Geoff Geddes, Burps and Bovine: Dairy GenomicsProject Cuts FeedCosts, Emissions,GENOME ALTA.: GENOMICS BLOG (Feb. 2, 2016), http://genomealberta.ca/genomics/burps- and-bovines-dairy-genomics-project-cuts-feed-costs-emissions.aspx(describingaresearch initiative “aimed at harnessing genomicstoboost feed efficiencyand reduce methane emissionsindairy cattle”). 51.See JEFFREY M. SMITH,GENETIC ROULETTE:THE DOCUMENTED HEALTH RISKS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS 194 (2007) (“Since GM foodisproclaimed by proponentsand some regulatorstobeassafeasits non-GM counterpart,the pressure on researcherstonot contradictthis assumptionisconsiderable. ...Thishelps explain thelack of serious studiesonGMfoods ....”). 52.See, e.g.,Leonid Bershidsky, Whythe EU Approved Bayer-Monsanto,BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-03-23/bayer-monsanto-analysis-eu- approval-is-about-competition(explaining that,ifamerger is approved, threecompanies will control 61% of theseed andpesticide market); see also Jennifer Clapp, Mega-Mergersonthe Menu: Corporate Concentration and the PoliticsofSustainability in aGlobal Food System,18GLOBAL ENVTL.POL.12, 12 (2018) (examining“theenvironmental dimensions of corporateconcentration in theagricultural input industryaswellasthe challenges involved in establishinginternational policyand governance on this issue”). 53.Bosselmann,supra note5,at160. 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 465 framework forbuildingajust,sustainable,and peacefulglobal society,”54 recognizes theinterdependence of species,and thevalue of alllivingthings, regardless of theirutility forhuman animals.55 Cormac Cullinan claims that “the essential purpose of human governancesystems shouldbetosupport peopletoplayamutually enhancing role within thecommunity of life on Earth.”56 Maintainingthe focusonGarver’sten features,features 1, 2,and 6seemtolead us toward interspecies justice.57 Feature1,requiringusto “recognize[]thathumansare part of Earth’s life systems,”movesusaway fromanthropocentricapproachestofood law.58 “[L]ife systems”seem to includeall species, includingnon-human life,assomething humans must relatetoinabalanced and systemicway.59 Feature6clearly encompasses allthree types of justiceinBosselmann’s definition, when it requireslaws to “ensurefair sharingofresources amongpresent and future generations of humansand other life forms.”60
III. DOES INTERSPECIES JUSTICE DEMAND (HUMAN)VEGANISM?
At first glance, it wouldseem that an ecological lawthat includes interspecies justice wouldmake veganism anon-negotiablenecessity—itis unjustfor humans to subordinateother species’right to life to theirhuman tastesand preferences.61 Afullanalysisofwhether ecological law—or more narrowlyinterspeciesjustice—presumes anon-human animal right to life is beyond thescopeofthisEssay.However,the consumptionofanimal productsmay notundermine thegoal of interspecies justice per se and certainlynot in allcases.62 Thomas Berry argues that:
54.What is theEarthCharter?,EARTH CHARTER INITIATIVE,http://earthcharter.org/ discover/what-is-the-earth-charter/ (last visitedApr.14, 2019). 55. See The Earth Charter,EARTH CHARTER INITIATIVE,http://earthcharter.org/discover/the- earth-charter/ (last visitedApr.14, 2019) (outliningthe foundational principle“that allbeings are interdependent andeveryform of life hasvalue regardless of itsworth to human beings”). 56.Garver, supra note1,at318 (quotingCORMAC CULLINAN,WILD LAW:AMANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 29 (2ded. 2011)). 57.Id. at 325–27. 58.Id. at 325. 59. Id. (explaining that “Earth’s life systems”includes“thecommunity of alllivingspecies” (quotingBERRY, supra note36)). 60.Id. at 327. 61.See Bosselmann, supra note5,at154 (explaining howinterspeciesjustice requires recognizing “the intrinsicvalue of thenon-human natural world”). 62.See Thomas Berry, Rights of theEarth: We Need aNew LegalFramework Which Recognises theRightsofAll Living Beings, in EXPLORING WILD LAW:THE PHILOSOPHY OF EARTH JURISPRUDENCE 227, 229 (Peter Burdon ed.,2012)(acknowledging that “predatory-prey relationships” arepart“of theEarth community”). 466 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455
(2)Every component of theEarth community has threerights: theright to be, theright to habitat, andthe right to fulfil[l]its role in the ever-renewingprocesses of theEarthcommunity.
(3)All rightsare specific andlimited. Rivershaveriver rights. Birdshave bird rights.Insectshave insect rights.Humans have human rights. Difference in rightsisqualitative, not quantitative. Therightsofaninsect wouldbeofnovalue to atree or afish.
(6)These rightsare based on theintrinsic relations that the various componentsofEarth havetoeach other. Theplanet Earth is asinglecommunity whosemembersare bound togetherwith interdependent relationships.Nolivingbeing nourishes itself. Each component of theEarth community is dependentonevery other member of thecommunity forthe nourishment and assistance it needs forits ownsurvival.Thismutual nourishment, whichincludespredator-preyrelationships,isintegral with the role that each component of theEarth has within the comprehensivecommunity of existence.63
Also,itisimportant to recallthat not allanimal-productproductionis industrialorexploitative.64 Many societies—such as some indigenous peoples,hunter-gatherers,and fishing groups—havemaintained balanced relationships with other speciesand ecosystems forgenerations as interdependent communitiesoflifewithout captivity,cruelty,or exploitationofother species andecosystems.65
63. Id. 64.See JENNIFER CLAPP,FOOD 181–82 (2ded. 2016) (introducing alternativefood movements,which “seektoaddress theecological damage associated with industrial farming practices by promotingecologically sound farmingmethods”). 65. See Nancy J. Turneretal., Traditional EcologicalKnowledge and Wisdom of Aboriginal Peoples in British Columbia,10ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1275, 1276 (2000) (“Practices of aboriginal peoples to maintain and enhance theirlands, waters,and livingresourcesare derived from generations of experimentation andobservation, leadingtoanunderstanding of complex ecological and physicalprinciples.”). Indigenous nations, cultures, andindividualsobviouslydiffer vastlyintheir approaches to food and thefoodsystem.For example, some indigenous scholars have advocated veganismasnot incompatible with some indigenous cultures. Compare Margaret Robinson, Veganism and Mi`kmaq Legends,33CAN.J.NATIVE STUD.189, 190 (2013) (acknowledging that in Mi’kmaq culture,“[t]hekillingofamooseacted as asymbol of aboy’sentry into manhood,”but “propos[ing]a postcolonial ecofeminist reading of Mi’kmaqlegends as thebasisfor avegan diet rooted in indigenous culture”), with Priscilla Settee, Indigenous FoodSovereigntyinCanada, in TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE:LEARNING FROM INDIGENOUS PRACTICES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 175, 179 (Melissa K. Nelson &Dan Shillingeds.,2018) (“Indigenous peoples holdlands, foods, medicines, and animals as sacred andfreely gifted.Without them,Indigenous values of reciprocity andrelationship diminishand aloss of Indigenous humanity results.”). 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 467
It is important to remember that ecological lawand justicedonot only require interspeciesjustice, but also inter- and intragenerationalhuman justice.66 While veganfood systems, andsomeindigenous or other more symbiotic human–animal systems, mayappear to more adequatelyachieve interspecies justice than theglobalindustrialfood system,wouldtheybe abletoachieve inter- and intragenerationalhuman justice—particularly if we do not address theproblemsoffood wasteand human population growth? Focusingonindustrialanimalfarming practices, it wouldbedifficultto qualify forcibly endingthe lives of animals raisedfor food, reducingthe quality of theirshortened lives drastically,and breeding or genetically alteringanimals to producemoreprotein faster—despite thepainand shortened lifespansthismay cause67—merelytosatisfy human wants,as interspecies justice.68 Thus,although ecologicallaw andits commitment to interspecies justicewouldhave anuanced view of veganism greatly depending on place, culture, and ethical reasons foreatinganimalproducts, ecologicallaw wouldrequire an endto, or adrastic reductionin, industrial animalagriculture.69 However,wouldthisactually lead to inter- or intragenerationaljustice? For example, wouldecological lawalways favor plant-based alternatives to animalproducts?Wouldecological lawlead aparticular human consumer,all other factors beingequal,toopt foramass-produced, processedplant-based burger over awild caught salmon? Rather than providing acomplete, unequivocal answer,Ithinkthatecological lawleads us to askhelpful questions to guide us to possibleanswers, leading to a choice that enhances ecological justicefor allspecies, now and in the future.For example,the plant-based burger does notinvolve theintentional raising, reproducing, and killingofanimals in an industrialenvironment, whichseemstoenhance interspecies justice.70 However,ifproducing the plant-based burgerchallengesthe amountorviability of subsistence crops in adevelopingcountry to provide processed, corporatefoods forwealthier
66.Garver, supra note 1, at 327. 67. See McLeod-Kilmurray, Commoditizing Animals, supra note 24, at 73–74 (highlightingthe animal suffering that occursatintensive livestock operations). 68.Cf. Nigel Barber, Do Humans Need Meat?,PSYCHOL.TODAY (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-human-beast/201610/do-humans-need-meat (“In general, modern-day vegetariansare as healthy as their meat-eating counterparts and actually have lower rates of heartdisease.”). 69.See infra PartIV(analyzing the question of whether ecological justice requires veganism). 70. See Rina Raphael, Meatless Burgervs. Beef:How BeyondMeat’sEnvironmental Impact StacksUp,FAST COMPANY (Sept.26, 2018),https://www.fastcompany.com/90241836/meatless- burgers-vs-beef-how-beyond-meats-environmental-impact-stacks-up(describing the environmental benefitsofplant-based burgers). 468 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 consumersinthe global North, this might not enhance intragenerational justice. Howmuch does theburgercostincomparison to meat burgers? Wherecan theplant-based burger be accessed andbywhom?How much water, energy,transportationemissions,and wasteare involved in producing, packaging,and distributingit? Is themove towardsthesemeat alternatives transferring more power to largeindustrialfood corporations to further controlthe shapeand future of theglobalindustrialfood system? Theanswers to thesequestions might suggestthatthe plant-based burger is not evenenhancingequityamong consumerswithin theWestern market in whichitissold. Whethercatching thewild salmon wouldreduce interspecies justicemay dependonawide range of otherfactors. Wouldthe consumerbecatchingthatfishhim-orherself? Wouldthisreduce reliance on corporatefoods?Woulditalsoreduce theincomeoflarge fish farming companies that maybecreatingunnecessary and uncontrollablerisks to wild fish and other elementsofaquatic ecosystems? Forthe human consumer,which food choice has more nutrients, calories,orother impacts on health?Thus,although theruleofecological lawmay notlead us to one clearand simpleanswer, it providesspecific guiding principles forgetting closer to finding arational, sustainable, and just answer.
IV.WOULD ENDINGORREDUCING INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL AGRICULTURE ENHANCEORCHALLENGE INTER- AND INTRAGENERATIONAL HUMAN JUSTICE?THE 10 FEATURESOFECOLOGICAL LAW AND THE INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FOOD SYSTEM
If we focussolelyonGarver’s ten features of ecological law, they provide helpfulguidanceinrethinking theindustrialproductionofanimal productsfor food. Thefeatures can be helpfully separated intothree sections:features 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9highlight theecological lawinjustices the industrialanimalfood system causes.71 Features 3, 5,7,and 8suggest changes to thelegalsystemtotacklethese problems.72 Finally,feature10 provides anuancedanswertothe question of whether ecological law demands an endtoindustrialanimalagriculture.73
71.See infra notes 76–130 and accompanying text (explaining how Garver’s theory of ecologicallaw illustrateswhy theglobalfood system causesinter-and intragenerational,aswell as interspecies, injustice). 72.See infra notes 112–31 and accompanying text (arguing that Garver’stheory of ecological law requires reducing meat consumption, overconsumptionoffood, and food waste). 73.See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text (asserting that ecological lawrequiresa drasticreduction, but not completeelimination, of meat consumption). 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 469
Feature1provides that ecological law“recognizes that humans arepart of Earth’s life systems.”74 This highlightsthathumans have an interdependent relationshipwith allspecies,suggesting that ecological law does embraceinterspeciesjustice.75 Theidea of “systems”isimportant.76 First, ecologicallaw emphasizes theimportance of Earth’s life systems.77 If our globalindustrialanimalfood system threatens theselife systems, then thefood system shouldchange.78 Some arguethatthe solutiontoglobalhunger is to produce more food; yet,producing even more food, particularlymeat,often79 directly contravenesplanetary boundaries, causing threatstointerspeciesand human justicefor current and future generations.80 This idea of respectingecological limitswill be raisedagain in thediscussionoffeature2below.81 ecological lawalso asks whyweproduce food in aglobal system in the first place.82 What arethe advantagesofaglobalsystemasopposed to a more regional,local, or evenindividualapproachtofood production? Garver suggests that oneway to achieve therelated second featureof ecological law—ensuringthat “ecological limits” have primacy over social, political,and legal concerns83—isbychanging thedriver of human systems (including legalsystems)from“growth-driven economic globalization” to de-growtheconomics(i.e.,ensuringthatwelivewithinthe basic limitsof ecology and planetaryboundaries).84 Afew examples suggestthat industrial animalagriculture is failingtoachieve this.
74.Garver, supra note 1. 75. Id. 76. Id. 77.Id. (“First,and most fundamentally,the rule of ecological lawrecognizes that humans are partofEarth’s lifesystems, not separate fromit.”). 78.See id. at 326 (“[L]egal regimesmust be constrained by ecological considerations necessary to avoidcatastrophicoutcomes and promotethe enhancement of life....”). 79.Somearguefor “[s]ustainableintensification ...asaprocess or systemwhere yields are increased without adverse environmental impact and without thecultivationofmoreland.” Jules Pretty &Zareen Pervez Bharucha, SustainableIntensificationinAgriculturalSystems,114 ANNALS BOTANY 1571, 1578 (2014).Ithank AngelaLee forthis observation. 80.See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text (describing how meat productionand expanding food systemsthreaten ecologicalhealth). 81.See infra notes84–101 and accompanying text (exploring how Garver’s second feature of ecologicallaw wouldchangeindustrial animal agriculture). 82.See Garver, supra note1,at328 (explaining that ecological law has a“preference for establishingpolicyatthe local level”). 83. Id. at 326. Thisisanested sustainability approach. Pretty &Bharucha, supra note79, at 1571. 84.Garver, supra note1;see, e.g.,Johan Rockströmetal., PlanetaryBoundaries: Exploring the Safe OperatingSpace forHumanity,14ECOLOGY &SOC’Y 32, 33 (2009)(presenting the“novel concept”of“planetaryboundaries, forestimatingasafe operatingspace for humanity with respecttothe functioning of theEarth System”). 470 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455
TheCanadiangovernment’s approach to agricultural food policyis largelybased on “growth-driven economic globalization.”85 In 2017, it adopted as onegoalofits national budget to increase agricultural-food exports from $50 billionto$75 billion by 2025.86 Although Canada intends to do this sustainably, ecological balance is not currentlyaspecifictargeted goal of thebudgetinthe same wayasthisenumerated economicgrowth target is.87 In addition, ecological law, similartoGreen Legal Theory,88 wouldask us to examine whyand howour current food system cametobestructured as it is, and,specifically, whywehavemoved so quicklytoincreasing and exportingour industrialanimal-food-productionsystem.89 As Ihavenoted elsewhere, thehistory of corn illustratesamajorreasonwhy theseIntensive LivestockOperations (ILOs)and Concentrated Animal Feedlot Operations (CAFOs)have grown.90 While other scholarshave elaborated on the concept,the main idea is that subsidiesand increased centralizationled to a grainsurplus,which wasfed to livestock.91 This meant that industrial
85.Garver, supra note 1. 86.DEP’TOFFIN.CAN., BUILDING ASTRONG MIDDLE CLASS 107 (2017) [hereinafter2017 Budget],https://www.budget.gc.ca/2017/docs/plan/budget-2017-en.pdf; see also Kelsey Johnson, Ottawa WantsFarmers to Grow theEconomy, Agriculture Exports, IPOLITICS (Mar. 21, 2017), https://ipolitics.ca/2017/03/21/agriculture/ (explaining that theCandian government seekstogrow agriculture exportsfrom $50billion to $75 billion by 2025); Agri-InfoNewsletter–May 2017,AGRIC. &AGRI-FOOD CAN., http://www.agr.gc.ca/eng/about-us/publications/agri-info-newsletter/agri-info- newsletter-may-2017/?id=1493224585244 (lastvisited Apr. 14,2019) (“To support Canada’sfarmers andfood processors, Budget 2017 setsanambitious target to grow Canada’s agri-food exports to at least $75 billion annuallyby2025, and launches several initiatives, from investments in science and innovationtovalue-added processing and infrastructure.”). Canadaset this goal afterthe government asked theAdvisoryCouncilonEconomicGrowthfor areport,which it entitled Unleashing theGrowth Potential of KeySectors,where it identifiedthe agri-food sectorasanarea with potentialfor significant growth.ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ECON.GROWTH,UNLEASHING THE GROWTH POTENTIAL OF KEY SECTORS 2(2017), https://www.budget.gc.ca/aceg-ccce/pdf/key-sectors-secteurs-cles-eng.pdf.Aclearer exampleofGarver’s “growth-driven economic globalization” wouldbehardtofind. Garver, supra note 1. 87. See 2017 Budget, supra note86, at 108 (outlining fundingfor “advanced researchin agriculturalscience and genomics,” “agricultural discoveryscience and innovation, with afocuson addressing emerging priorities, such as climate change,”and the“expanded adoptionofclean technology by Canadian agricultural producers”). 88.See Green Legal Theory,POLIS PROJECTONECOLOGICAL GOVERNANCE, https://www.polisproject.org/projects/greenlegaltheory (last updated Jan. 22, 2013) (“[Green Legal Theory] seeks to understand how to create self-sustaining social, economic andpolitical institutions that are ecologicallybased ....”). 89.See Garver, supra note1,at325–26(explaining that ecological lawchallenges “growth- driven economic[s]” and focuses on reducing thematerial andenergydemands of theeconomy). 90.McLeod-Kilmurray, CommoditizingAnimals, supra note 24, at 73. 91.See DAVID N. CASSUTO,ANIMALS &SOC’Y INST., THE CAFO HOTHOUSE:CLIMATE CHANGE,INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE & THE LAW 3–4 (2010) (citing Pollan, supra note48, at 54–64), http://www.planetaverde.org/arquivos/biblioteca/arquivo_20131031141640_2453.pdf; see also JEREMY 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 471 farmerscouldfeed livestock more cheaplywith cornand soythan small- scalefarmers could with theirown grazing land, creatingstrong economic incentives forcentralizationand industrializationoflivestock production.92 So neither humanhealth, animalwelfare,environmental sustainability,nor human food preferences havebeenthe driving forcebehind industrializationoflivestock production.93 Thetransitiontoanindustrial- animal-agriculture system wasbased on producing more at less cost.94 Theseindustrialefficiencies,and thetechnologiesthatenable them,are best achieved by largecorporations.95
TheFAO reports that industrialanimalproductionsystems are increasing at six timesthe rate of traditional mixed farming systems and at twicethe rate of grazing systems. At least50% of theworld’s pigmeatand over70% of theworld’s poultrymeat andeggs are produced in industrialsystems.96
This is still due in parttothe many economic subsidiesand legalrules that promotethe industrializationofour animal food supply.97 Forexample, theWorld Society forthe ProtectionofAnimals notes that industrialmeat productioninCanadawouldnot be economically viablewithout
RIFKIN,BEYOND BEEF:THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CATTLE CULTURE 93 (Penguin Books 1992) (“America cameupwith aunique scheme. For thefirsttimeinagricultural history, they brought together cattle productionand grainproductionintoanew symbiotic relationship....”). 92.McLeod-Kilmurray, CommoditizingAnimals, supra note 24, at 73. 93. Id. 94. Id. 95.Id. (“The real controlofth[e][industrial livestock] ‘industry’isnow highlycentralized in the handsofasmall numberofverypowerfulcorporations ....”). 96.COMPASSION IN WORLD FARMING,GLOBAL WARNING:CLIMATE CHANGE AND FARM ANIMAL WELFARE 4(2009), https://www.ciwf.org.uk/media/3817777/global-warning-full-report.pdf. The high levelsofconcentrationthat exist in livestockproductionare aresult of twotrendsinthe agribusinessworld:consolidation,orthe joining togetherof firmsthrough mergers or strategicalliances,and vertical integration, theprocess by which one agribusiness buys up controloffirms alongthe production chainfor afood product....The smalland mid-sized operations thatuntil recently suppliedmostofour domestically-producedmeathave disappeared, to be replacedbylarge-scale animal feeding operations. Specialization has replaced diversityonthe farm....And uniformityhas replaced variety—inthe kinds of feed cropsgrown, thebreedsoflivestock raised,and thecompaniestowhich farmers sell their productsand from whichconsumersbuy them. Elanor Starmer, Corporate Power in Livestock Production: How it’sHurtingFarmers, Consumers, and Communities—AndWhat We CanDoAbout It,ISSUE BRIEF 1(AGRIBUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE), at 1–2, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/AAI_Issue_Brief_1_3.pdf (lastvisitedApr. 14, 2019). 97.McLeod-Kilmurray, CommoditizingAnimals, supra note 24, at 73, 74. 472 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 governmentsubsidies, such as the$4billiongiven to hog producerssince 1996 (“with nearly three-quarters going to thelargest corporations”).98 Laws also assist industrialanimalfood producers.99 For example, Canadian animal welfare and transportlawsare veryweak, whichreduces thecostfor producersatthe expenseofanimalwelfare but also creates waste—apresumedpercentage of deaths per voyage.100 Some countries criminalizethose raisingawareness of cruelty to animals raisedfor food, thus legally protectingthe practiceand reducingthe agencyofconsumers by limitinginformation.101 Feature 9ofecological lawalsoreferstoecological boundaries, cautioning that thelaw shouldenforce precautioninrelationtocrossing them.102 Theglobalindustrialized food system is asignificant threat to planetary boundaries.103 Indeed, of thenineplanetary boundariesidentified by Johan Rockströmetal.,104 thefour that havealready been transgressed
98.WORLD SOC’YFOR THE PROT. OF ANIMALS,WHAT’S ON YOUR PLATE?: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL AGRICULTUREINCANADA 19 (2012). Canada’s hog productionsector wouldnot even be viablewereitnot formulti- milliondollartaxpayer-funded subsidies. Since 1996, taxpayers have given more than $4 billion to hog producers,with nearly three-quarters going to thelargest corporations. In 2009, thelargest 28 percent (with annual revenuesgreater than $1 million) collected 72 percent of thesupport. Federal and provincial governmentshavefacilitatedthe proliferationofILOs and thesize of themby steadilyincreasing themaximum subsidyper operation. Each operation cannow receive up to $3 millionper year –triple what they couldhave received13years ago–essentially working to triple thesizeofthe ILO.Inaddition, there aretax exemptions forbuildingmaterials,subsidiestopackersand tens of billions of dollars worthofsubsidies paidtograin farmers whichfacilitate theproduction and saleoffeedgrains below actual costsofproduction. Allofthisdemonstrates that ourfoodsystem is actually veryinefficient.Many ILOs wouldnot be ableto turn aprofitwithout thesesubsidies. Id. 99.Anna Pippus, The Fox Regulatingthe Henhouse: How theLaw Fails AnimalsFarmed for Food, in FOOD LAW AND POLICYINCANADA (Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, AngelaLee &Natalie Chalifour eds.)(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 23–24) (on file with author). 100. Id. 101. See,e.g., What Is Ag-Gag Legislation?,AM.SOC’YFOR PREVENTION CRUELTY ANIMALS, https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/what-ag-gag-legislation(last visitedApr.14, 2019) [hereinafter What Is Ag-Gag](discussing how seven states in theU.S.“penaliz[e]whistleblowers whoinvestigatethe day-to-day activities of industrial farms”). 102.See Garver, supra note1,at329 (“[T]heruleofecological lawrequiresprecautionabout crossing planetaryboundaries, with marginsofsafety to ensureboththat theboundaries arerespected from the global to thelocal level,and that Earth’s life systems have thecapacity to thrive.”). 103.Compareid. (explaining the precautionary planetaryboundaries set forclimatechange), with McLeod-Kilmurray, Vegetarianism, supra note45, at 58-59 (highlightingthe significant contributions industrialized livestock productionmakes to climatechange). 104. Rockström, supra note84, at 37–38 (identifying thenine planetary boundariesasthe “nitrogen, phosphorous, carbon, and water[cycles];the [planet’s] physicalcirculationsystems...(the climate, stratosphere, ocean systems); biophysicalfeatures of Earth ...(marine andterrestrial 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 473 aregenetic diversity,105 biochemical flows (particularly of nitrogen),106 climatechange,and land system change.107 In relationtogenetic diversity—apart fromstronglyencouragingthe consumptionofalimited numberofanimals such as cows,pigs, and chickens—industrialmeat productionalso limits thegenetic diversity within these threemainanimals raised andconsumed as food.108 The WorldwatchInstitute suggests that“as thegloballivestock population increases,its diversity declines,” whichisdangerous forsustainability in theface of climatechange andits resultingeffectsonresources.109 Large- scalemeat farmingalsosignificantly reduces crop diversity andinduces land system change.110 Furthermore,feature 4ofecological lawrequires“aradical re-focusing of theeconomyonreductionofits throughput of materialand energy.”111 Feature 4isreminiscentofSustainableDevelopmentGoal12, which
biodiversity, land systems); and twocritical featuresassociated with anthropogenic global change (aerosolloading and chemical pollution)”). 105.Will Steffenetal., PlanetaryBoundaries:Guiding HumanDevelopment on aChanging Planet,347 SCI.736, 736 (2015). 106.NinaChestney, Meat and DairyConsumption ShouldBeHalved inEuropetoCut Nitrogen: Report,SCI.AM., https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/meat-and-dairy-consumption- should-be-halved-in-europe-to-cut-nitrogen-report/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (“Around 79-88percent of totalemissions in theEUrelated to nitrogenare from livestockproduction. The nitrogen footprintof meat and dairy isconsiderably higher thanthat from plant-based products ....”); see also Henk Westhoeketal., FoodChoices, Health and Environment:Effects of Cutting Europe’sMeat andDairy Intake,26GLOBAL ENVTL.CHANGE 196, 196 (2014) (“Concerns about animalwelfare, reactive nitrogen and greenhouse gas emissionshavestimulated public debateinEurope about eating less meat anddairy products.”). 107.Will Steffenetal., supra note 105. 108.VITAL SIGNS, supra note26, at 55. 109. Id. Industrial meat operations rely on anarrowrange of commercial breeds selected for their high productivity—twocow breeds, Holstein and Jersey, make up 97 percent of theUSdairy-cow herd. As aresult, indigenous livestock breeds, which have evolved to thespecific climate, terrestrial,and diseasecharacteristics of their regions, are rapidlydisappearing: in 2010, FAOreported that at least 21 percent of theworld’s livestock breeds areatrisk of extinction. It is estimated that between 2002 and 2007, one breedofcattle, goats, pigs, horses, or poultrywas lost every monthonaverage. Thisnarrowing of geneticdiversity greatly compromiseslivestock producers’ abilitytowithstandthe challenges of climate change, including watersupplychanges,lackofforage, disease expansion, and increasingtemperature variation. Id. (footnotes omitted). 110.See, e.g., id. (“[C]ountriesinSouthAmerica are clearing large swathsofforestand other land to growfeed crops likemaize and soybean.”). 111.Garver, supra note1,at326. 474 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 requires“[r]esponsible consumptionand production.”112 Garver suggests that to do this,weneed systems that “improve[] resource productivity.”113 Closelyconnected,feature 6provides that ecological lawshould“ensure fair sharing of resourcesamong present and future generations of humans and other life forms.”114 However,anincreased focusonanimalproducts, particularly thosethat areindustrially produced, doesnot seemtoachieve this goal. For onething,many advocates pointout that,ascomparedtoplant- based diets, producing andeatingmeat and dairy isinefficientdue to the “Feed-Conversion Ratio[],”meaning theamount of energy, water, and other inputsneeded to produceand consumeanimals.115 Forexample, “[o]ne kilogramme of ediblebonelessbeef requiresaround 20 kg of animal feed and15,500 litresofwater to produce ....One calorie of food energy obtained frombeef requires inputsof9caloriesoffood energy fromplants and40caloriesoffossil fuel energy.”116 ThePew Commission claims that “the ratioofenergyinput to output forindustrially producedmeat can reach as high as 35:1.”117 Another wayoflooking at this is to saythat“the American diet wouldfeedonly2.5 billionpeopleglobally.”118 This suggests that thedietary choices of wealthierpeople, mainly in the developed world,iscurrently one factor causingthe food insecurity of the poorer in thedeveloping world.119 This is asituationofintragenerational inequity caused by dietshighinproductswith significant environmental footprints,including animalproducts.120 Notonlyisincreasingmeat and dairy consumptionunjusttothe animal victimsofthisfood system,but also to thecurrent and future generations of humansconsumingthem.
112.Goal 12: ResponsibleConsumptionand Production,UNITED NATIONS DEV.PROGAMME, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-12-responsible- consumption-and-production.html(last visitedApr. 14, 2019). 113.Garver, supra note 1, at 327. 114. Id. 115.Animals areInefficientConvertersofFood,AWELL-FED WORLD:NOURISHING PEOPLE/SAVING ANIMALS,https://awfw.org/feed-ratios/ (lastvisitedApr.14, 2019); see also Alon Shepon et al., Energyand ProteinFeed-To-FoodConversion Efficiencies in theUSand PotentialFood Security Gains fromDietary Changes,11ENVTL.RES.LETTERS,Oct.2016, at 5(“Plant-based diets can ...serve as aviablereplacement foranimalproducts, and confer larger mean environmental and foodavailability gains.”(citationomitted)). 116.McLeod-Kilmurray, Vegetarianism, supra note45, at 59 (alterationinoriginal)(footnotes omitted)(quotingCOMPASSION IN WORLD FARMING,BEYOND FACTOR FARMING:SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS FOR ANIMALS AND THE PLANET 19 (2009)). 117. See Cassuto, supra note91, at 7(citingPEW COMM’NONINDUS.FARM ANIMAL PROD., PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE:INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 19 (2008)). 118.McLeod-Kilmurray, Vegetarianism, supra note45, at 59. 119.FOOD &AGRIC.ORG., LIVESTOCK, supra note28, at 6. 120.Id. at 10. 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 475
Responsible consumptionand production—and “a radicalre-focusing of theeconomyonreductionofits throughput of materialand energy”— also bothpoint to reducingfood waste.121 “Roughly one third of thefood produced in theworld forhuman consumptionevery year—approximately 1.3billiontonnes—getslostorwasted.”122 “Foodlossesand wasteamounts to roughlyUS$ 680 billion in industrialized countriesand US$310 billion in developing countries.”123 “Global quantitativefood lossesand wasteper yearare roughly30% forcereals, 40-50% forroot crops,fruits and vegetables,20% foroil seeds, meat and dairy plus 35% forfish.”124 Although food wasteoccursatevery stage of thefood system includingfarming, transporting, selling, consuming, and throwing away food—andwhile thesestatisticssuggest that meat and dairy arearelatively lowcontributor to overall food waste125—ecological law, particularly features 4and 6, wouldrequire significantly reducingfood wastebefore expandingindustrialanimalfood production.126 Features 4and 6wouldalsorequire us to focus on tacklingthe growing problem of overconsumptionoffood.The rates of over-nutrition arerising globally,with numbers in thedeveloping worldrecently almost attaining levels in developedcountries.127 Although itscauses arecomplex and varied, contributingfactors includethe growingavailability of fast and processedfoods,poor nutritionaleducation, lack of timefor homecooking, thecomparativecosts of fast versusfresh food, andthe massive, relentless marketingcampaigns of global food corporations.128 Increased consumption
121.Garver, supra note 1, at 326–27. 122. Facts on FoodLoss, supra note35. 123. Id. 124. Id. 125. Id. 126.Compare Garver, supra note 1, at 316 (summarizing thefourthand sixthfeatures of ecologicallaw,which demand reducingmaterial andenergy, and sharingresourceswith future generations of human life), with FactsonFoodLoss, supra note35(detailing thequantitiesofmaterials wasted each year in thefood system,ofwhich animalfood products areapart). 127. See Paul Allen, OvereatingHits theDeveloping World,GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/apr/22/eat-smaller-and- smarter (“In the past threedecades, thenumber of obese peopleinthe developing world has tripled....”);Daniel Hoffman, Obesity in Developing Countries:Causes and Implications,28FOOD, NUTRITION &AGRIC.REV.35, 38 (2001), http://www.fao.org/docrep/pdf/003/y0600m/y0600m04.pdf (reportingthat therateofobesity is increasingworldwide,partlydue to over-nutrition). 128. See AndreaFreeman, The UnbearableWhiteness of Milk: FoodOppression and theUSDA, 3U.C.IRVINE L. REV.1251, 1253–54, 1270–71 (2013) (detailing how fast foodcontributes to over- nutritionindeveloped nations); see also CookingatHomeTonight?It’s Likely Cheaper and Healthier, Study Finds,SCI.DAILY:SCI.NEWS (Mar. 14, 2017) (mentioning that many lack thetimetoprepare nutritious meals). 476 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 of animalproducts is clearly apartofthesetrends.129 Amoreecological global food system wouldencourage andenablethe productionand consumptionofdiets that promotegood health,which wouldhelpto rebalance thetwo global challengesofunder-and over-nourishment.130 This quick examinationoffeatures 1, 2, 4, 6, and9ofGarver’s ecological lawhaveraisedanumber of questions aboutour industrial- animal-agriculture system:why we created thesystem; whether continuing it advances or reduces interspecies justice; and whether thesystemisfairto present andfuturehumans.The remainingfeaturesguide us more directly to thelegal aspects of this dilemma. Features3,5,and 7–9 focus more specifically on how lawitselfcan helpput ecological lawintopracticetoachieve its goals. Thethird feature demands that ecological law“permeate” alllegal systems.131 Food lawand policyisitselfanexcellent exampleofafield that cannot be reformed without changingmany different areas of law, whichall permeateeach other, such as environmental,health,trade,and social justicelaw.132 In the evolvingdebateonanew nationalfood policyfor Canada, forexample, some arecalling fora“joined-upfood policy”—which tackles both the problemsofgovernment and research silos133 andfood governance—that links health,social,economic,and environmentalconcerns,and moves away fromeconomic growth as its dominatinggoal.134
129.See, e.g., Global Meat Production, supra note 8(explaining that ahigh-meat diet “can lead to ahostofhealth problems,including obesity”). 130.See Garver, supra note1,at327 (highlightingthat ecological lawputsthe “protectionof the global commons and public goods paramount” and “must ensurefair sharing of resources”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE DOUBLE BURDENOFMALNUTRITION:POLICY BRIEF 2(2017) (explaining “[t]he doubleburdenofmalnutrition,” which is “the coexistence of undernutritionalong withoverweight, obesityordiet-related”noncommunicablediseases). 131.Garver, supra note 1, at 326. 132.See What is FoodLaw?,LEGAL CAREER PATH,https://legalcareerpath.com/food-law/(last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (summarizing “the collectionoflawsand regulations” thatrelate to food production, including those governing “pesticide use, tariffsonagricultural imports...restaurant cleanliness,” bottledwater,the claims supplement producers canmake“about theeffectiveness of their products,” andfood stamps). 133.For example, food law and policyinCanada is governed by awide variety of ministries andatthree levelsofgovernment,not including theinternational level. See CENTRE FOR FOOD IN CAN., GOVERNING FOOD:POLICIES,LAWS, AND REGULATIONS FOR FOODINCANADA 13–14 (2011) (“[Policies, laws,and regulations] and bureaucratic structuresexist at alllevelsofgovernment,with multiple agencies responsible forthe numerous functions being carried out.”). Within the federal government alone, forexample, food lawand policy involves, amongother groups, Health Canada, Environmentand Climate Change Canada,Agricultureand Agri-Food Canada,Industry Canada, and the trade department. Id. at 13. Despiteincreasing efforts, coordinationremains difficult. Id. 134.Rod MacRae, AJoined-Up Food Policyfor Canada,6J. HUNGER &ENVTL.NUTRITION 424, 424–25 (2011). MacRae notes: [F]ood policyinthe 21st centurymust be designedand implemented to reflect fully the essential realityofour biological and social dependence on food and the 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 477
Garver’s fifth featureposits that ecologicallaw must be global, but distributed.135 This recalls thelegal doctrines of subsidiarity136 and the commonbut differentiatedresponsibilityapproach in theclimatechange treaties.137 As asidenote, themostrecent IPCC report emphasizes reducing meat consumptionasarapidand effective waytotackle climatechange.138 In addition, Garver’s fifthfeaturereminds us that in developing internationalfood lawand policy—and theglobal food systemstructure— thecurrent food productionand consumptionpatternsofwealthynations,as well as theirinfluence on global food tradepolicies,have resulted in the neglectoftheirheightened responsibilitiestoensureinter-and intragenerationaljusticetofoodproducersand consumersinpoorer countries.139 Feature7,which requires that ecological law“be binding ...and supranational, with supremacyover sub-global legal regimesasnecessary,” reinforces theseideas.140 Feature7also reminds us how trade lawinfluencesglobalfoodsustainability and justiceaswellas how corporateand trade laws aremoreeffectivelybindingand global than
resources needed to produce it sustainably. During the20th century, rulesabout foodwereframed in theindustrialworldbythe dominant view of markets.Food wasprimarily somethingtobebought and sold, rather thanabiological and culturalnecessity.... Overproductionatthe farm level waspositivefor food firmsbecause it helped keep farm and processorprices low.The food system was designed,directly andindirectly, to encourage peopletooverconsumebecause this contributedtofirm profitability, and aggregate levelsoffood waste received limitedattention.Thisconsumption,and thediseases it produced,actually appeared to be economically positivebecause it droveuphealth care costsand made some of Canada’seconomic accounts (eg, grossnational product)look better. Id. 135.Garver, supra note 1, at 327. 136. See 14957 Canada Ltée v. Hudson, 2001 SCC40, [2001] 2S.C.R.241, 249 (Can.) (describing thedoctrine of subsidiarity,which assumes that thelocal level of government is themost efficientlaw-making body becauseitisclosest to thepeople). 137. See UnitedNations FrameworkConvention on ClimateChange, art3.1,May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (“ThePartiesshouldprotect the climatesystem for thebenefitofpresent and future generations of humankind,onthe basisofequity and in accordance with their commonbut differentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities.” (emphasisadded)). 138.INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANELONCLIMATE CHANGE,SPECIAL REPORT:GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C,at327 (2018),https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ (estimatingthat reducing “the demand for meat and other livestock products” could “bringlargeco-benefits, through GHGmitigation and improvementsinthe overall efficiency of food systems”). 139.See Carmen G. Gonzalez, The Global Food System, Environmental Protection, and Human Rights,26NAT.RESOURCES &ENV’T 7, 9–10 (2012) (outlining how international tradelaw “placed small farmers in ruinous competitionwith subsidized agricultural producers in theUnited States andthe European Union”); see also supra notes 71–130 (overviewinghow theglobalfoodsystem produces inter- and intragenerationalinjustice). 140.Garver, supra note 1, at 328. 478 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 human rightsand international environmental law.141 ecologicallaw suggests that internationaltrade,aswellascorporateand environmental laws,shouldbechangedtoaddressthe power of multinationalanimal-food corporations to build amoreecologicalfood system.142 Finally,143 but perhaps most importantly,feature10requiresecological lawtobeadaptive.144 Once again, this captures awiderange of ideasand goals,but twocometomindascrucial.First,ecology adaptstochanges, and ecological lawmustmirror this.145 If our laws are not producing the effects we desire,orare producingsurprisingresults,wemustadapt the laws to thesenew circumstances. For example, if we make aherculean effort toreducefood waste but we still have significant global hunger problems,then perhaps it wouldbetimetoturnback to ideasofincreased growth.Second, being adaptivesuggests that whetherafood is ecologically appropriate depends on theparticular place, society, group, or person.146 This brings us backtoour original question: doesecological lawdemand veganism?Asstatedatthe outset, increasing consumptionofindustrial- animalproducts is not an adaptiveresponsetothe growingrealitiesoffood insecurity that climatechange will create.147 However,whereplant-based dietsdonot provide healthy, nutritious,and culturally appropriate sustenance,sustainable meat productionand consumption—particularly place-basedhuntingand fishing—maybe, as it has always been,the most sustainable, appropriate,and adaptiveresponsetosatisfyfood needs and sustain abalancedecosystem.
141.See Gonzalez, supra note139, at 8–10(“[I]nternational tradelaw has taken precedence over human rightsand international environmental law, to thedetrimentofsmall farmers, agrobiodiversity,and effortstoforestallclimate change.”). 142. See, e.g.,CLAPP, supra note 64 (explaining that someinthe alternativefood movement promote“transnational efforts to make legally enforceable improvementstothe rulesand normsthat govern” theglobal foodsystem); see also JenniferClapp, AgribusinessMega-Mergers Won’t Help to Feed the World,HILL TIMES (Jan.18, 2017) [hereinafterClapp, Agribusiness], https://www.hilltimes.com/2017/01/18/agribusinessmega-mergers-wont-help-feed-world/92980 (arguing that because agribusiness is driven by profits, it will not create“sustainable foodsecurity”). 143.ThisEssay does not allow room to explore feature8,which requires“greatly expanded program[s] of researchand monitoring.” Garver, supra note1,at329. However,aninitialthoughtisthat ecologicallaw requiresustobevigilantabout what we areresearching and monitoring to guard against unexamined technologicalfixes for industrialanimalagriculture andtoappropriately balance the various goalsofanecologicaland just foodsystem. See,e.g.,Lee, supra note49, at 65 (“Although an ecofeminist interrogation of thepolitical,social,and ethical dimensions of new food technologies may be imperfect, it is arguably anecessarycorrective ...[given] thenarrowgrounds on whichthe benefits andimpactsoftechnologies areassessed under apurportedlymore‘science-based’approach.”). 144.Garver, supra note1,at330. 145.Id. at 329–30. 146.Id.at330. 147.See supra notes 23–29 (explaining thevarious problems associatedwith the currentglobal foodsystem). 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 479
CONCLUSION:SOME SOLUTIONS THAT ECOLOGICAL LAW MIGHT POINT TOWARD
Thinking through afew of theimplications of thefeatures of ecological lawhas suggested some possiblealternatives to maintainingand expanding theindustrial-animal-agriculture system,suchasreducing population growth,reducing food waste, andadoptingecological law—ratherthan economic growth alone—as aguiding principlefor food governance.148 The following arefurther measures that ecological lawmight suggestfor improving, reducing,orevenending theindustrial-animal-agriculture system. In ordertomove toward interspecies justice, ecological lawwould consider thelong-term advantages and disadvantages of creating substantiverightsfor non-human animals.There have beenafew attempts at this recently,suchashabeas corpusclaimsbrought unsuccessfully in NewYork,149 but successfully in Argentina.150 If not fullsubstantiverights, perhaps non-human animals shouldenjoy procedural rights, such as legal standing to protecttheirinterests.151
148.See supra PartIV(discussing how ecologicallaw might reform theglobal food system). 149.InreNonhuman RightsProject ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 100 N.E.3d 846, 846(N.Y. 2018). 150.RichardLough, CaptiveOrangutan HasHuman Right to Freedom, ArgentineCourt Rules, REUTERS (Dec.24, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-orangutan- idUSKBN0JZ0Q620141221. Relatedly,inNew Zealand,the Whanganui River has beenrecognized as having thestatus of “a legal person [with]all the [corresponding] rights, powers, duties, andliabilities.” Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River ClaimsSettlement) Act2017, cls12, 14 (N.Z.); seealso DanCheater, Iamthe River and theRiver is Me:LegalPersonhood and theEmerging RightsofNature,W.COAST ENVTL.L.(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.wcel.org/blog/i-am-river-and-river-me-legal-personhood-and- emerging-rights-nature (highlighting NewZealand’s 2017 legislation recognizing theWhanganui River as alegal person);WHANGANUI TRIBUNAL,THE WHANGANUI RIVER REPORT 309–10 (1999), https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/WT/wt_DOC_68450539/Whanganui%20River%20Rep ort%201999.pdf (mentioning NewZealand laws that recognize theintrinsic valueofnatural resources). In addition, in March 2017, theHighCourtofUttarakhand, Indiadeclared the Gangaand Yamuna Rivers “asjuristic/legal persons/livingentitieshaving thestatus of alegal person with all corresponding rights, dutiesand liabilitiesofalivingperson.”Salim v. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Petition(PIL) No. 126of2014, ¶19(UttarakhandHC) (India).InJuly2017, however,the Supreme CourtofIndiastayed theHigh Court’s order.State of Uttarakhand v. Salim,Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (July7, 2017) (India); seealso AVaidyanathan, No,Ganga andYamuna areNot Living Entities, Says Supreme Court,NDTV, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/no-yamuna-and-ganga-are-not-living-entities-says- supreme-court-1721833 (last updated July7,2017) (outliningthe SupremeCourt’s ruling). 151. See ChristopherStone, Should TreesHave Standing?—Toward Legal Rights forNatural Objects,45S.CAL.L.REV.450, 464 (1972) (arguing that natural objectsshouldhavethe legal authority to sue); DavidCassuto,Jonathan Lovvorn&KatherineMeyer, Confronting Barriers to the Courtroom forAnimalAdvocates: Legal Standingfor Animalsand Advocates,13ANIMAL L. 61,61(2006) (examining theissue of “legal standing for non-human animals andtheir humanadvocates”). 480 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455
Alternatively, humans couldhavelegal dutiesnot to cause the suffering of animals farmed forfood. Forexample,several countrieshave bannedcertain industrialfarming practices suchasbattery cages152 and othersare workingtoachieve this soon.153 Laws could be enacted to ensure thefivebasicfreedoms: from discomfort;from hunger and thirst; fromfear and distress;frompain, injury,and disease; andtoexpressnatural behavior.154 Wherethesemeasures areresistedonthe basis that they increasecosts forproducersand consumers, ecological lawwould encourageafull accounting of thecosts,including theexternalized costsof failing to enact theseprotections. Various legal toolscouldenhance supportfor such measures by ensuringgreater accesstoinformationabout theindustrial-animal- agriculture system. So-called“ag-gag” laws couldberevoked.155 Animal “welfare” labelscould be required on animal-based food products.156 To enhance food literacy and consumeragency,which is partofthe broader consumer right to know,labelsonanimalproducts could also indicate: water, soil, antibiotic,and otherinputs; emissions;and feed-conversion ratios.157 Carbon taxes,and othertaxes on industrially producedanimal products, could help to alterproducer and consumer behavior through “free” market mechanisms (indeed,how canthe market be truly free if thereissuchlimited informationabout thefood we eat?).For example, a priceoncarbonwouldimpactthe priceoflocalfoods competingwith those
152. See James Andrews, European Union BansBattery Cages forEgg-Laying Hens,FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/01/european-union-bans-battery- cages-for-egg-laying-hens/(describingthe E.U.’s ban on battery cages). 153. See Canada’sBattery Cage Phase-OutOfficially Begins,HUMANE CAN.(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.humanecanada.ca/canadas_battery_cage_phase_out_officially_begins (“As of April 1, 2017, no new barrenbattery cages willbebuilt in Canada ....”). 154.McLeod-Kilmurray, CommoditizingAnimals, supra note 24, at 76–77. 155.“Ag-gag”laws are“designed to silence whistleblowersrevealing animal abuses on industrialfarms.” What is Ag-Gag, supra note102. In some states, these lawsare being challenged as unconstitutional. See,e.g.,AnimalLegal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 4:17-cv-00362–JEG-HCA,2019WL 140069, at *2, 9(S.D. Iowa Jan.1,2019) (invalidating IOWA CODE ANN.§717A.3A(2012),which “prohibit[s]conduct and speechrelated to agricultural operations,”asfacially unconstitutional under the FirstAmendment). 156. See,e.g., LabellingRelated to Animal Welfare,EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare/other_aspects/labelling_en (lastvisitedApr. 14, 2019) (explaining that despite increasing consumer interest for “informationonhow animals aretreated on farmsand in livestock facilities,”“thereisonlyone EU-widesystemofcompulsory labelingonanimal welfare -for tableeggs”). 157.See DavidAlanNauheim, Food Labelingand theConsumer’sRight to Know:Give the People What They Want,4LIBERTY U. L. REV.97, 99–102 (2009) (discussingthe consumer’srightto know in thecontext of food labeling). 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 481 packagedand transportedlong distancesand might encourage thereduction of food waste.158 Nationalfood guidesare another tool that could significantly raise awarenessofthe ecological lawproblemsthat industrialanimalagriculture creates.Brazil’snewest food guide provides that “[h]ealthy[d]iets [d]erive [f]rom[s]ocially and [e]nvironmentally [s]ustainable[f]ood [s]ystems”and that “[d]ietary recommendations need to take into accountthe impact of the means of productionand distributionoffood on social justiceand environmentalintegrity.”159 Sweden’s 2015 food guidelines take asystemic approach,160 linking human and environmental health.161 Theguidelines linkSwedish consumers’ food choicestoclimatechange, whichhighlights intragenerationaljustice.162 Theguidelines justify theirrecommendationto eat less processed meatsbased upon thebenefitstohuman health,animal welfare, and theenvironment.163 TheCanadian government issuedarevised FoodGuide in January2019,164 and although it doesnot make an explicit linktoenvironmentalsustainability,its recommended food plate is quite similartothe EAT-Lancet Commission’sPlanetary Diet165 in recommending significantreductioninanimal-based foods and significant increases in vegetable, fruit, andgrain consumption.166 TheCanadian governmentisalsodevisingits firstnational food policy.167 It isinteresting
158.Cf. EatYour WaytoaSmaller Carbon Footprint,TERRAPASS:THE FOOTPRINT BLOG, https://www.terrapass.com/eat-your-way-to-a-smaller-carbon-footprint(last visitedApr.14, 2019) (explaining that by eating locally,carbon footprintscan be reducedbyupto7%). 159.MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF BRAZ., DIETARY GUIDELINESFOR THE BRAZILIAN POPULATION 18 (2ded. 2014), http://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/publicacoes/dietary_guidelines_brazilian_ population.pdf. 160.NAT’L FOOD AGENCY,FIND YOUR WAY:TO EAT GREENER,NOT TOO MUCH AND BE ACTIVE 1(2015), https://www.livsmedelsverket.se/globalassets/publikationsdatabas/andra- sprak/kostraden/kostraden-eng-a4-utskriftversion.pdf (“When it comes to food, it’s easy to concentrate on individualnutrientsorfoods to theexclusion of everything else. Butall aspects are interlinked, so it’s important to maintain aholistic approach.”). 161. Id. (“[W]e’vedevised this adviceonhow you caneat sustainably–tothe benefit of both your healthand theenvironment.Sothatyou don’thave to choose.”). 162.See id. (“[O]ne-quarterofthe climate impactofSwedish households comesfromthe food we eat––orthrow away.Economisingonthe Earth’s resourceswill ensurewehave good food to eatin the future.”). 163.Id. at 9. 164. See generally HEALTH CAN., CANADA’S DIETARY GUIDELINES:FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND POLICY MAKERS (2019) [hereinafterCANADA’S DIETARY GUIDELINES], https://food-guide.canada.ca/static/assets/pdf/CDG-EN-2018.pdf (providing Health Canada’s guidelines and considerations on healthyeating). 165.Willett et al., supra note 45, at 447. 166.CANADA’S DIETARY GUIDELINES, supra note164, at 9, 15. 167.Revision Process for Canada’sFood Guide,GOV’T CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/canada-food-guide/about/revision-process.html (last visitedApr.14, 2019) (explaining that Canada is revising its “food guide so that it meetsthe needs of 482 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:455 to imagine how our food system wouldchange if ecological lawwas adopted as aguiding principlefor this new policy. Governmentscouldalso move toward amoreecological lawapproach to food by creatinginstitutionalfood projectssuch as farmtoschoollunch programs.168 Theseprogramswouldrequire food procurement policies, whichcouldenhancelocal and sustainable food production.169 School lunch programscouldalso,asinJapan,beadded to theschoolcurriculumto enhance food literacy fromayoung age.170 This wouldbeparticularly effectiveifthe programsenhanced theplant-based food options in these meals.171 Governmentscouldalsopass laws to improve food sustainability, justice, and sovereignty.172 Forexample, aright to food couldbeenacted.173 Governmentscouldalsopromote an ecological lawapproachbychanging competitionlawstoaddress theconcentration andcorporatizationofthe food system,particularly themassive power of multinationalfood corporations.174 However,ecological lawdoesnot necessarily encourage relyingsolely, or evenprimarily,oncentralized government control. From amorebottom- up perspective, ecological lawwouldalsoencourage empoweringlocal food movements—farmers markets, urbanagriculture,and similar
different Canadian audiences”); see, e.g., Canada’s Food Guide,GOV’T CAN., https://food- guide.canada.ca/en/ (lastvisited Apr. 14, 2019) (showingCanada’snew interactivefood guide). 168.See What is Farm to School?,NAT’L FARMTOSCH.NETWORK, http://www.farmtoschool.org/about/what-is-farm-to-school (last visitedApr.14, 2019) (highlightingthe benefitsofexistingfarmtoschool programs). 169.See id. (noting that farm to school programs “always include[],”among other things, procurement,meaning that “[l]ocal foods arepurchased, promoted, andservedinthe cafeteria”). 170. See Nobuko Tanaka &Miki Miyoshi, School Lunch Programfor HealthPromotion Among ChildreninJapan,21ASIA PAC.J.CLINICAL NUTRITION 155, 156 (2012) (discussingcurriculum objectives forthe Japanese schoollunch program); seealso AlexisAgliano Sanborn, More thanaMeal: School Lunch in Japan,22EDUC.ABOUT ASIA 45, 45 (2017),http://aas2.asian-studies.org/EAA/EAA- Archives/22/1/1468.pdf (discussing how Japan’sschool lunch program focuses around local foods and educatesstudentsabout foodproduction issues). 171.See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text (highlightingthe environmental benefitsof widespreadadoptionofthe plant-based diet). 172.See, e.g.,EarlBlumenauer, AGreen NewDealMustInclude Foodand Farming,10YEARS CIVIL EATS (Jan.30, 2019), https://civileats.com/2019/01/30/a-green-new-deal-must-include-food-and- farming/(“A GreenNew Dealcan startbyincorporatingthe principles of agriculturalreformand applying them to practices that will decarbonize theeconomy, while bringing justice to thefood system.”). 173.See, e.g., What is theHuman RighttoFood?,NAT’L ECON.&SOC.RTS.INITIATIVE, https://www.nesri.org/about/mission-vision (lastvisited Apr. 14, 2019) (listingthe various United Nationtreaties that prove aright to food). 174. See Clapp, Agribusiness, supra note 142 (arguingthatagribusiness mega-mergers allow for corporateconcentration, whichdoes not effectivelytacklehunger). 2019] Does theRuleofEcological LawDemandVeganism? 483 endeavors—through lawand policy, individualand group activism, and regionaland internationalsupport.175 Garver’s ten featuresofecological laware an excellent vehiclefor assessing and proposingalternatives to our current industrial-animal- agriculture system.176 Although ecologicallaw strives to achieve interspecies justice, it also seeksinter-and intragenerationalhuman justice, so it doesnot provide aclear and simpleanswertowhether it “demands” veganism.177 Instead,ecological lawprompts us to askprobing questions to guide us to food systemsthat enhance ecologicaljusticefor allspecies now and in thefuture.
175.See Garver, supra note1,at329 (discussinghow ecologicallaw encourages “global[], regional[]and local[]”connections). 176.See supra notes131–47 and accompanying text (suggesting how ecological lawprinciples wouldreform theglobal food system). 177. See supra notes 40–43, 143–47 and accompanying text (concluding that ecologicallaw wouldpermiteatingmeat in some circumstances).
FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER THE TRUSTEESHIP THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF CANADIAN CASE LAW IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS
StéphanieRoy*†
ABSTRACT
The potentialoftrusteeshiptheoryand relatedfiduciarydutiesin resolvingenvironmental problemsfirstemerged in the1970s.Trusteeship theory suggestsagovernance modelthatwouldallowthe Statetoadopt a holistic approach to nature management andtoconsiderfuture generations’interests. Thetheoryisofparticular interest to researchersin Canada, as it drawsonconceptsthat already exist in Canadian public law, and therefore might allowfor arapidparadigm shift in environmental governance.Itneverthelessremains necessary to define thesubstance and natureofthe fiduciary dutiesthat this shift impliesfor thepublic sector. ThisEssay brings to light aspectsofCanadian jurisprudenceinthe environmental domainthat imposes dutiesofenvironmental protectionon thegovernmentand sets out apathfor advancingthe trusteeshiptheoryto addressthe mountingecological challenges of theAnthropocene.
ABSTRACT...... 485 INTRODUCTION...... 486 I. TRUSTEESHIP THEORY...... 489 A. Foundational Principles ...... 489 B. ThePublic TrustDoctrine...... 491 C. Room forImprovement ...... 495 D. Trusteeship2.0...... 496 II. THE CANADIAN CASE LAW:JUDICIAL REVIEWOFENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS...... 503 A. TheCanadian Contextand theRoleofPublic Law...... 503 B. TheContributionofCaseLaw...... 506 1. TheSupremeCourtofCanada...... 508 2. TheProvincial Courts of Appeal...... 512
*Doctoral Candidate, LL.D., Laval University;2017 Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation Scholar;LL.M. 2015, McGill University;LL.B. 2010,Laval University. †The AuthorisgratefultoProfessor PierreLemieux of LavalUniversitywho is supervising her doctoral workonwhich this Essay is based.She wouldalso liketothank allher colleagues who generouslyshared their thoughts on her workand especially Professors PeterG.Brown, Geoffrey Garver, andRobertGodinatMcGill University.Finally,she wouldliketooffer her specialthanks to Eliza Bateman for her invaluable assistance in proofreadingthisEssay. 486 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485
3. Lessons on theExercise of theDutyofLoyalty ...... 515 CONCLUSION ...... 515
INTRODUCTION
In 1970, when theinternationalcommunity wasbeginning to demonstrateawarenessofthe human impactonits natural environment,1 Joseph L. Saxpublished one of themostcitedarticlesofall time,2 The Public TrustDoctrine in NaturalResource Law:EffectiveJudicial Intervention,3 as areactiontothe increasingnumber of lawsuits brought againstgovernmental agencies that aresupposedtoprotectthe public interest and natural resources in theU.S.4 Sax believed theincreasein lawsuits wasinpartdue to inconsistency in legislativeresponses and administrativeactions.5 Thepublic trustdoctrineisthe legal approach Sax suggestedasthe most likelytoobtaineffectivecourtinterventionrelated to environmentalproblems.6 Other similarconceptsredefining government obligations towardsthe environment have emerged in thelegal andpolitical literatureproposingsolutions to government inactiontoprotect the environment, including parenspatriae,7 stewardship,8 nature’strust,9 and trusteeship.10 These concepts andtheoriesall rely on thecentralproposal of
1. See U.N. Conferenceonthe HumanEnvironment, StockholmReport of theU.N. Conference on theHuman Environment,¶7, U.N. DocA/CONF.48Rev.1(June 16, 1972) (“Agrowing class of environmental problems...will require extensiveco-operationamong nations andactionby international organizations in the common interest.”). 2. FredR.Shapiro &Michelle Pearse, The Most-CitedLaw Review Articles of AllTime,110 MICH.L.REV.1483, 1490 (2012). 3. Joseph L. Sax, The Public TrustDoctrine in Natural Resource Law:Effective Judicial Intervention,68MICH.L.REV.471, 473 (1970). 4. Id. at 473–74. 5. Id. 6.Id. at 474. 7. See Wilfred Estey, Public Nuisance and Standing to Sue,10OSGOODE HALL L.J. 563, 576 (1972) (explaining thehistoric roleofthe governmenttoact as parens patriae,i.e., as legal representative to protectthe public’s rights,includingrightstoenjoy theenvironment,throughthe concept of public nuisance); seealso AllanKenner, The Public TrustDoctrine, Parens Patriae,and the Attorney General as theGuardian of theState’s NaturalResources,16DUKE ENVTL.L.&POL’Y F. 57, 100–01 (2005) (explaining thegeneral concept of parens patriae). 8. Emily Barritt, ConceptualisingStewardship in Environmental Law,26J.ENVTL.L.1,3 (2014);PAULE HALLEY &JULIA SOTOUSEK,L’ENVIRONNEMENT,NOTRE PATRIMOINE COMMUN ET SON ÉTAT GARDIEN:ASPECTS JURIDIQUES,NATIONAUX,TRANSNATIONAUX ET INTERNATIONAUX 14– 15 (2012). 9. See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD,NATURE’S TRUST:ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 17 (2014)(proposingaradical expansion of thepublic trust doctrine to cover all natural resourcesessential to life on Earth,includingthe atmosphere). 10. See EDITH BROWN,IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 123 (UnitedNations Univ.1989) (describing natural resourcetrustees “who arerequiredtobring claimsfor damages to natural resources ....”); see generally KLAUS BOSSELMANN,EARTH GOVERNANCE:TRUSTEESHIP OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS (2015) 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 487 imposingfiduciarydutiesonthe government and considerthe natural environmenttobethe common property of citizens. Thegovernment would thereforehave to act in thebestinterestofits current citizens and future generations.11 In her 2013 book, Nature’s Trust: Environmental Law foraNew EcologicalAge,Professor Mary C. Wood argues in favor of infusing current environmentallaw with trustprinciples in ordertomake it more protective.12 Wood explains that current governmental decision making based on discretionhas proved ineffectivefor environmental protection.13 Discretion-based decisionmaking allows theexecutive—that is, governmentagencies—toconsider singlemonetary interests andshort-term considerations when it exercisesdelegated rulemaking, issues technical determinations of aproject’s impacts,orchooses to enforce regulations.14 By comparison, imposingafiduciaryobligationwouldforce the governmenttoact in thebestinterestofcitizensand futuregenerations and to protectthe naturalassetsonwhich theirfuturedepends,inaddition to making thegovernment more accountable.15 ProfessorKlaus Bosselmann suggested theadoptionoftrusteeshipas an overarching frameworktoestablishbetterinternationalenvironmental governanceinhis 2015book, EarthGovernance: Trusteeshipofthe Global Commons.16 ForBosselmann, “political leadersand thestate-centered structure of international governance appearincapableofresponding to [an emerging ecological crisis] in an effectiveway: thereisnot onlya democratic deficit but an ecologicaldeficit as well.”17 Bosselmann thereforecreates agovernance modelthat wouldreconcile democracy with ecological well-being.18 Thetaskofthisbook, he explains, is to “help establishaculture of democracy powerfulenoughtoachieve sustainable societies.”19 This task includes separatingmarkets fromthe commons by reshaping state sovereignty, empoweringgovernments todefinethe functions and legitimacy of themarket,and restructuringdemocracyto protectthe commons.20 Thesolutiontothe ecological predicamentisto establish avalue-based democracy that should not be confined to nation-
(detailingand advocatingfor an international trusteeshiptogovernglobal environmental decision making). 11.See infra Part I.A (detailing thefundamental principlesbehindtrusteeship theories). 12.WOOD, supra note9,at15–16. 13.Id. 14.Id. at 68–69. 15.Id. at 138–39, 203–04. 16.PETER G. BROWN,RESTORING THE PUBLIC TRUST:AFRESH VISION FOR PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (1994);BOSSELMANN, supra note10, at 116. 17.BOSSELMANN, supra note10, at 1. 18.Id. at 21–22. 19.Id. at 23. 20.Id. at 29. 488 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 states,but rather should be shared internationally,toachieve “earth governance” of this universal concern.21 But what wouldsuch amodel change in our political system?That is, how does thetrusteeshipornature’strust model of governancederivefrom theactual “command andcontrol” approach?22 Some wouldargue that the government—in theCanadianmodel of parliamentarysovereignty— already actsinthe public interest, already is accountabletoParliament, and already must be loyal andequitabletoits citizens according to responsibilitiesset by public law.23 However,what is lackinginthismodel of governmental responsibility is an understanding that thegoalof preserving nature is not setonlytoavoiddamages.24 Rather,governments shouldtake on thegreater responsibility to letnature thrive and to recognize theinterconnectednessofhumanityand nature.25 This interconnectedness shouldinformour obligations towardsfuturegenerations of humans,to ensuretheirsurvivalbypreserving theEarth’s ecosystemsupon whichwe depend.26 In this Essay, Iargue that thetrusteeship theory—whichbuildsonthe experience with,and critiquesof, public trust doctrine—wouldallowfor a rapidparadigm shift towardsecologicalresponsibility in public governance by using toolsand conceptsthatare already knowntojurists. Butthe pragmatists—including me—will ask: howwould governmentsand legislatures applytheir fiduciary dutiesonaday-to-day basis?How would thedutytranslate into administrative lawand action? In this Essay, I provide some answers to these questions by consideringjudicial review casesdecided by theSupremeCourtofCanadaand provincial Courts of Appeals in environmental matters. Idemonstrate that relevantCanadiancase law indicatesapathfor advancing theapplicationoftrusteeshiptheorytoaddressthe mounting ecological challengesofthe Anthropocene. Theresorttothiscase lawto demonstrate aspectsofthe trusteeshiptheoryisjustifiedintwo ways.First, when reviewingadministrativeaction, courts alreadyimposedutiesonthe governmentintheirevaluating the reasonableness of government action. Second, thesimilaritiesbetween theconceptsofpublic interest,
21.Id. at 29–30. 22.COLIN T. REID &WALTERS NSOH,THE PRIVATISATION OF BIODIVERSITY?NEW APPROACHES TO CONSERVATION LAW 14–15 (2016). 23. 1PETER W. HOGG,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 12–2 (5th ed.2007). 24.Cf. REID &NSOH, supra note22, at 15 (2016)(explaining that theissue with the command and control approachisthe reaction once damage is already done to the species ratherthan intercepting thedegradationbeforeitbecomesaproblem). 25.Cf. id. at 4(recognizing that an acknowledgement of an interconnected world is necessary to preservenature). 26.See id. (explainingthatpreservationofecosystemsisnecessary to ensurethat natural heritage of the Earthispassed to later generations). 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 489 accountability, impartiality,and fairness that areusedinCanadianpublic lawand in thetrusteeshipliteratureshow that this caselaw is applicableto trusteeship theorybyanalogy. Extractingdetailedexamples fromthe case lawhelps us to understand how thesepublic lawconceptscouldbeapplied in further cases to establish clear conditions of theapplication, content,and scope of fiduciaryduties. Part Iofthe Essaysets out themostpromising literatureonthe trusteeshiptheorythatdistinguishes it fromthe American public trustdoctrine. Part II studies Canadian judicial review casesthat are relatedtothe environmenttoillustratehow relevant judicial decisions can contributetoapractical,working definitionoftrusteeshipthatcouldbe imposed onthe government.
I. TRUSTEESHIP THEORY
A. Foundational Principles
Developing alegal doctrinebased on trustisnot anew idea. In additiontothe public trust doctrinealready appliedinthe U.S. and in other commonlaw jurisdictions,27 othercountries have adopted public trust inspiredlegislation,28 and many authors havesuggestedmechanismsor governanceframeworks based on trust at theinternational level.29 The trusteeshiptheoryset outbyMaryC.Wood and Klaus Bosselmann, considered from adifferent perspective, wouldallowthe Statetoadopt a holistic approach in nature management and to consider theinterests of
27.MichaelC.Blumm &Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizingthe Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Lawand Constitutional andStatutory ApproachestoFulfilling theSaxion Vision,45U.C. DAVIS L. REV.741, 745 (2012) (identifyingIndia, Pakistan,and South Africa as countries where“the [public trust]doctrine has becomeequated with environmentalprotection....”). 28. Philippines EnvironmentalPolicy,Pres.Dec.No. 1151 (June6,1979) (Phil.), https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pd1977/pd_1151_1977.html (proclaiming “the responsibilitiesofeach generation as trustee and guardian of theenvironment forsucceeding generations”).Sweden hashad an environmental ombudsman—aroleclose to that of atrustee—since 1909. Thomas Hillmo &Ulrik Lohm, Nature’s Ombudsmen: The EvolutionofEnvironmental Representation in Sweden,3ENV’T &HIST.19, 25 (1997). 29. See, e.g.,Jeanine Gama Sá, Le Trust:delaprotectionpatrimonialeauMoyen Âgeàla protection internationaledel’environnement au XXIe siècle,21.1 REVUE QUEBECOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 97, 98 (2008) (analyzing theuse of environmental trust funds at theinternational level);Peter H. Sand, SovereigntyBounded: PublicTrusteeship for CommonPoolResources?,4GLOB. ENVTL.POL.47, 55–56 (2004) (proposing amodel of international environmental trusteeship where the stateistrustee; thecommunity is trustor; and, thepeopleare beneficiaries); PETER BARNES,WHO OWNS THE SKY?: OUR COMMON ASSETSAND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM xix(2001) (proposing atrustmodel to bringaccuratepricing to shared atmospheric resources, therebyconserving them); Christopher D. Stone, Defending theGlobal Commons, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 34–40 (PhilippeSands ed., 1993) (proposing aglobal system of guardians assigned to advocateonbehalfofthe environment in an international system of guardianship);EyalBenvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity:Onthe Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders,107 AM.J.INT.L.295,295–333 (2013) (articulating “three moralarguments supporting theinterpretationofcontemporary sovereignty as trusteeship”). 490 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 futuregenerations andnatureitselfwhen making decisions.30 Oneofthe goalsofthistheoryistoincrease thedutiesofgovernment towardsthe environmentand future generations,and thereforeremedy thelack of accountabilityofgovernment representatives and theinsufficient number of long-term measures that consider future generations’environmental interests.31 Thedutiesinquestionare thosethattraditionally exist in a fiduciaryrelationship, more specifically that exist underatrust,32 as the nameofthe theorysuggests.Afiduciaryrelationshipisone wherethe holder “has rights andpowersheorshe must exercise for thebenefitof” another person.33 Thefiduciaryhas adutyofloyalty,which means that she must not benefitfromthe positionshe holds unlessexplicitlyauthorized by theother person.34 Other fiduciaryobligations derivefromthisdutyof loyalty.35 Wherefiduciarydutiesprotectrelationships that areof importancetothe public—for instance,solicitor–client,guardian–ward, director–company, andprincipal–agentrelationships—the trust–beneficiary relationshipisthe most stringent becausethe trustee has controlover a propertythat belongstoanother,the beneficiary.36 Thetrusteewill consequently be held to thehighestfiduciary standards.37 Another element that distinguishes the trustfromother fiduciaryrelationships is that “a trust relationshipcannot existwithout trust property.”38 Thetraditional fiduciary dutiesatrusteemustrespect in additiontothe dutyofloyalty are: theobligationtoperform personally,39 thedutytoinvest
30.Cf. WOOD, supra note9,at191 (advocatingfor fiduciarydutiesasaway of ensuring environmental decision makersprotect theinterests of future generations); see also BOSSELMANN, supra note10, at 39–40 (callingfor an international covenant to bind governments in respecting“thegreater community of life”—humanand non-human, present and future). 31.See, e.g.,WOOD, supra note 9, at 191–92 (explaining that thedutyofloyalty to trust beneficiaries wouldimprove legislative accountability by “prohibit[ing] alegislator from votingona particularresource issue if he or she accepted significant campaign contributions froman[interested] industry” and by “prohibit[ing] legislative ‘vote trading’ on environmental matters”). 32. See Trust,BARRON’S CANADIAN LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 2009) (defining “trust”as“[a] right of property heldbyone party forthe benefit of another,” and notingthat theterm“impliestwo interests, one legaland theother equitable; thetrustee holding thelegal title or interest, and the cestui que trust, or beneficiary, holding the equitabletitle or interest”); see also Fiduciary,BARRON’S CANADIAN LAW DICTIONARY, supra (defining “fiduciary” as “[r]elating to or proceeding from trust or confidence”and notingthat “[o]ne stands in afiduciary relationship, with regardtoanother person when he or she hasrights andpowersheorshe must exercise for the benefit of that other person. Consequently, afiduciaryisnot allowedtobenefit personallyinany wayfrom the position he or she holds unless he has therequisite consent”). 33.See Fiduciary,BARRON’S CANADIAN LAW DICTIONARY, supra note32(providing the definitionfor fiduciary). 34.EILEEN E. GILLESE,THE LAW OF TRUSTS 10 (3ded. 2014). 35. Id. 36. Id. at 10–11. 37. Id. 38.Id. at 11. 39.Id. at 130. 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 491 thetrust assets,40 theobligationtoact impartially,41 thedutytoaccount,42 and thedutytoprovide information.43 If governmentsweretoapplythese duties, it wouldobviously translateintotypes of actionother than aprivate trust.44 As an exampleoftheseother causes of action, it couldforce a governmenttotakepositiveactions towardsthe environment,not only conservativeones, as thegovernment wouldhavethe dutytomakenature thrive(that is,to“invest thetrust assets”).45 Thetrusteeshipalso allows citizens to undertake lawsuits againstthe government in caseofomission, in ways similartothe public trust doctrinecurrently appliedinthe U.S.46 This raises questions of how thesetrusteeshipapproaches to environmental lawcan be meaningfullydifferentiatedfromthe public trust doctrine.In fact,the public trust doctrineisatype of “trusteeshipinaction,”47 but the trusteeshiptheoryconsidered in this Essay has broaderapplication, as is suggestedbyWood and Bosselmann.48
B. ThePublic TrustDoctrine
Thepublic trust doctrinedeveloped in theU.S.can be defined as “an ancient Romanlaw doctrine whichprovides that states must holdcertain natural resources, particularly submerged landsunder tidal and navigable waters,intrust forthe useand benefit of thepublic andfuture generations.”49 In short, it means that states oughttoprotect natural resourcesthatare includedinthe trust for future useand enjoyment,and that thealienationofthese resourcesisprohibited.50 States have “some discretioninmanagingtheir trust resources, although many imposea presumptionagainst alienationofpublic resources,requiring clear legislative intent to accomplishsuchalienation.”51 Thealienationof
40. Id. 41. Id. 42. Id. 43.Id. at 155. 44.Cf. BOSSELMANN, supra note10, at 193 (arguing that thestate,astrustee,must consider future generations and actfor beneficiariesbeyond thescope in aprivate trust). 45. GILLESE, supra note34, at 130. 46.See, e.g.,WOOD, supra note9,at221 (describingthe legal theory behind atmospheric trust litigation—that governmentshave harmed trustresources by failing to regulategreenhouse gas emissions). 47.BOSSELMANN, supra note 10, at 180. 48.WOOD, supra note9,at125; see BOSSELMANN, supra note 10, at 183 (offering thepublic trustdoctrineasanexample but distinguishing environmental trusteeship as applying more broadly to become“afundamental principleofgovernance”). 49.Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrineinthe ShadowofState Environmental RightsLaws: ACase Study,45ENVTL.L.431, 432–33 (2015). 50.MichaelC.Blumm &AuroraPaulsen Moses, The PublicTrustasanAntimonopoly Doctrine,44B.C.ENVTL.AFF.REV.1,2(2017). 51.Id. at 17–18. 492 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 resources, parcelsoflandfor instance,will be justifiedwhenitfurthersthe purposes of thetrust or “do[es]not substantially impairthe public interest” in thetrust resource that is remaining.52 TheU.S.SupremeCourtreferredtothe doctrine forthe firsttimein 184253 andarticulatedthe parametersofthe theory fiftyyearslater in the 1892 case IllinoisCentral Railroad Co.v.Illinois.54 Itsapplicationwas then limited to navigablewatersand theirunderlyingbeds,and wasextendedto wildlifefour yearslater in Geer v. Connecticut.55 Courts subsequently appliedthe doctrine to theselimitedcommonresources until 1970, when Sax suggestedthat thecourts shoulduse thedoctrinetocompel the governmenttoapply fiduciarydutiesnot onlytosubmerged lands and navigablewaters, but also to othernatural resources on public lands.56 Sax argued that this extension of thedoctrinewouldallowcourts to balance conflicting privateand public interestswhenthe executiveand legislative branches fail to do so foragreaternumberofresources.57 In thesecond halfofthe twentieth century, mainly in theyears followingSax’sarticle,courts haveextended public trust protectiontoother resources.58 However,asthe public trustisunder stateratherthanfederal jurisdiction, thedoctrinehas evolved in differentways in different state jurisdictions.59 Anumber of states addedecological preservationasatrust purpose.60 Some statecourts (including California,Hawaii, NewYork, and Louisiana) havedeveloped case lawapplyingthe public trust doctrinetoa range of environmental problemsarisingoutside of submergedlands, including: groundwater,61 lakes,62 wetlands,63 parkland,64 thedry sand area
52.Id. at 17 n.104 (quotingIll. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892)). 53.Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee,41U.S.367, 411 (1842). 54. Ill.Cent.R.R.,146 U.S. at 452. 55. Geer v. Connecticut,161 U.S. 519, 535 (1896), overruledonother grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441U.S.322 (1979);Blumm &Moses, supra note50, at 4. 56.Sax, supra note3,at473. 57.Id. at 561–62 (characterizingcourts’role as “democratization” in response to cases “not ...properly handled at theadministrative or legislative level”). 58.See infra notes 61–67 (providing examplesofhow courts have extended thepublic trust doctrinetootherresources). 59. Blumm &Moses, supra note 50, at 25–26. 60. Id. 61.See, e.g., In re WaterUse Permit Applications, 9P.3d 409, 447 (Haw.2000) (declaring no distinctionbetween ground and surface water under thepublictrust doctrine). 62.Id. at 448. 63.See, e.g., Nat’lAudubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty.,658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983) (expanding public trust protectiontonon-navigablewaters under California law). 64.See, e.g., RaritanBaykeeper,Inc. v. CityofNew York,No. 31145/06, 2013WL6916531, at *5 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. Dec. 20, 2013) (assertingthat onlythe legislature may command that parklands be utilized for anything but serving the public interest). 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 493 of beaches,65 archeologicalremains,66 and likelyproblemsarisingout of a hazardous wastedisposal facility’s operation.67 Theongoing caseofJuliana v. United States could also leadtorecognition of theatmosphereasatrust resource.68 In that case, 21 youthplaintiffsbrought an actionagainst the U.S. government foradoptingfossilfuel policiesthat threaten the atmosphere and therefore impedetheir rightstolife,liberty,and property.69 They also claimthese actions violatethe federalgovernment’s dutyto manage public resourcesintrust forthe peopleand future generations.70 At thetimeofwriting, theU.S.DistrictCourtfor theDistrictofOregon has allowedthe casetoproceed,but proceedings arestayed pending an interlocutoryappeal filed by theTrump administration, whichwill be decided beforeany judgment on themerits.71 Despite thesedevelopments, formoststates, thedoctrineremains limitedtothe protectionofuse and access to navigablewaters, submergedlands, and fishing,but hasevolved to include not only commercialbut also recreationalwater-based resources.72 Therefore, thescope of states’jurisdictiononnatural resources is still limitedbythe high-water mark in many places.73 Over thepast fortyyears, theU.S.public trust doctrine hasbeen the subject of many critiques.74 These critiquestouchmainlyontwo themes: thepower of thejudiciaryand thedoctrine’srelianceonprivateproperty.75 Thepower of judges to overturn democratic decisions of theexecutiveor thelegislaturehas been criticized becausejudgesare not accountabletothe public.76 Some commentators, such as Richard Lazarus,who produced one
65.See, e.g., Matthews v. BayHeadImprovement Ass’n,471 A.2d 355, 365–66 (N.J. 1984) (holding that thepublic has an interest in accessingdry sand areas of beaches despite private ownership). 66.See, e.g., Wade v. Kramer,459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ill.App. Ct.1984) (discussing trusteeship of thestate overarchaeological sites). 67.See, e.g., Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La.Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452So. 2d 1152, 1154, 1157 (La. 1984) (describing theresponsibility of government to act as trustee and preventenvironmental pollution by hazardous waste). 68. Juliana v. UnitedStates, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1252–55, 1255 n.10 (D.Or. 2016); see also Meet theYouthPlaintiffs,OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST,https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/federal-plaintiffs/ (last visitedApr. 14, 2019) (providing biographical informationonthe 21youthplaintiffs). 69.Juliana,217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233. 70.Id. 71.Orderat1,UnitedStatesv.U.S.Dist. Ct.for theDist. of Ore.,No. 18-73014 (9th Cir. 2018). 72.Klass, supra note 49, at 437–38. 73. See WOOD, supra note 9, at 147 (explaining that many courts arereluctant to expand the scope of thepublic trustdoctrine forfear of interfering with privateproperty rights). 74.See, e.g.,ErinRyan, Public Trustand Distrust: TheTheoreticalImplicationsofthe Public TrustDoctrinefor NaturalResource Management,31ENVTL.L.477, 484–85 (2001) (summarizing critiques of thepublic trust doctrine from various perspectives). 75.Id. (quotingpublic trust criticswho say that thepublic trust is “vulnerabl[y]dependen[t] on aproenvironment judicial bias”and supports atheory of property that“contradicts the first law of ecology”). 76. Id. at 483. 494 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 of themostinfluentialcritiques of thepublic trust doctrine, believe that it reliesundulyonpro-environmentjudicial bias.77 ForLazarus, thejudiciary lacks thetechnical competence to decide whether fiduciary dutiesare performed adequatelybythe government and its agencies.78 In hisview, agency administrators aremorelikelytohave professionaltraining as resource managers.79 Thesubjectivedefinitions of fundamental concepts such as beneficialuse or public concern exemplify theproblematic reliance on thejudiciary.80 Indeed, foraresource (e.g.,water)tobeheldintrust, therehas to be abeneficialuse of theresource forthe public.81 If the resource is not seen as beneficialorofpublic concern, it is not considered public property and therefore notsubject to thetrust. 82 Shiftingjudicial visions of what constitutesa“beneficialuse”couldbedetrimental to resource protectionand move courts in favor of more development.83 As Wood explains,“[c]ourts must constantly refreshtheirunderstanding of ‘public concern’ in ordertodetermine theappropriate scope of thetrust.”84 As aresult, some courtsmodernizethe scope ofthe trustwhile otherskeep it at its historicdefinition.85 This also demonstrateshow therelianceon propertyasthe basis of thetrust canbeaproblem,which leadsustothe second themeofcritiques:property rights.86 On theone hand, authorsdefendingliberal theories of property argue that thedoctrineisincompatiblewith privateproperty rights, as it can limit theseinfavorofpublic property rights.87 On theother hand, greenproperty theorists also criticizethe fact that thepublic trust doctrineisdeeplyrooted in thenotionofprivateproperty,but foradifferent reason.88 They believe classical liberal property theoryisoutdated, as it fails to take into account
77.Id. at 485; RichardJ.Lazarus, ChangingConceptions of Property and Sovereigntyin Natural Resources:Questioning thePublic TrustDoctrine,71IOWA L. REV.631, 712–15 (1986). 78.See, e.g.,Ryan, supra note74, at 487; Lazarus, supra note 77, at 712. 79.Lazarus, supra note77, at 712. 80.See Ryan, supra note74, at 488 (illustratingthe vulnerabilitiesofthe public trust doctrine to shifting ideas of what constitutes beneficial uses). 81.Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters,19ENVTL.L.473, 476 (1989)(stating that thepublic’s claim to waterdepends on uses considered to be within thepublic’s interests). 82. Id. at 478. 83.Ryan, supra note 74, at 488; see, e.g.,Empire Water&Power Co.v.Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123, 125, 128–29 (8thCir. 1913) (reasoning that theinstream flow that produced a30-foot waterfall with enough spray to turn acanyonthree-quarters of amile longintoalush havenofnative vegetationwas nota“beneficialuse” protected under contemporaryprior appropriationlaw though commonlaw riparianism wouldhave protected thenatural flow of thefalls). 84.WOOD, supra note 9, at 144. 85.Id. at 146. 86.Ryan, supra note74, at 484 (“Themost prominentconcern is therelationship between the doctrineand theoretical constructions of property law.”). 87. Id.;NancieG.Marzulla, StatePrivate Property RightsInitiatives as aResponseto “EnvrionmentalTakings,” 46 S.C. L. REV.613, 613–15 (1995). 88. Ryan, supra note74. 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 495 theinterconnectednessofhumansand non-humans in favorofindividual autonomy.89 Lazarus wasalsoofthe opinion that abetterframework for structuringour relationshipwith nature wouldnot be dominated by property and ownership,nor by theconcept of public interest, whichhefound too vague.90 Rather,Lazarus’sframework wouldinclude aformulationof competingvalues, based on privateexpectations in rightsofuse andsubject to communalconstraints.91
C. Room forImprovement
Critiques of thepublic trustdoctrinehave also suggestedstrategies for its betterment.92 If some see judicial oversight to be aproblem because judgesare unaccountable,then channelingenvironmental decisions through theexecutive—assuming it has more expertise and is accountabletothe public—ispreferable.93 However,our current institutional structuredoes not guaranteethe protectionofenvironmental interests.94 Even if it did, when theexecutive is not pro-environment,thenthe judiciaryisthe branch most shielded fromshort-term majoritarianinterests.95 Thus,the judiciaryis betterplaced to protecttrust resources.96 Governance of theenvironment seemstonecessitate thecontributionofall branches of government,which in turn needsstructural change to governmoreresponsibly. It also appears that “public property,” as understood underthe public trust doctrine,does not comprisesufficient environmental resourcesto effectivelypreservenature forfuturegenerations.97 Michael Blummand Aurora Moses affirmthat, so far, thedoctrinehas served as an antimonopolydoctrine, since it hasprotected against states’attempts to createprivatemonopoliesovernatural resources.98 It hasundoubtedlyhad beneficial impactsonresource protectioninpast decades, but therateof ecosystemdegradationand species extinctionprove that environmentallaw and thepublic trustdoctrineare unsuccessful.99 Thepublic trust doctrine’s
89. Id.at484. 90.Lazarus, supra note77, at 703. 91.Id. at 706–10; Ryan, supra note 74, at 489. 92.Ryan, supra note 74, at 488. 93.See id. at 492–93 (expanding on competingideas regardingwhetherthe judiciaryor executiveisbestequipped to handlenaturalresources concerns). 94.Id. at 493. 95.Id. 96. Id. at 492. 97.Id. at 488, 490 (lamenting that thepublic trust doctrine remains aformidable themeof natural resource lawonlyinarhetorical manner because “ithas not made significant progresstoward protecting natural resourcesunrelated to water”). 98.Blumm &Moses, supra note 50, at 6. 99.Wildlife has declined by 58% since 1970 worldwide due to theexcessive demand of humanity on planetaryresources.WORLD WILDLIFE FUND,LIVING PLANET REPORT 2016: RISK AND 496 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 rootsinliberal property lawlimit itsscope.100 However,modernuse of the doctrine—orofanothertrusteeshiptheory—does not require a“backwards- looking appeal to aproperty lawrationale.”101 As Erin Ryan eloquently put it, “the fact that thepublic trust [doctrine] is in thecommonlaw hardly requiresthatitbeof thecommonlaw.”102 Because as long as thedoctrine reliesonconceptsofpropertytopreserveenvironmentalresources,itdoes not reconsiderthe assumptions on whichthe lawand theeconomy are based,which is necessary to find asustainableapproach to managing our planet.103 What arethe necessary changes?Lazarus notes:“[B]ettersolutions, suggestedbycritics of thejudicial functioninenvironmental matters, may resideinnew modesofadministrativedecisionmaking that areless dependent on effectivejudicial oversight of agency actiontoensurefull representationofcompetingconsiderations.”104 This is exactly what Professors Wood andBosselmann suggestintheirwork.105
D. Trusteeship2.0
To improve theeffectiveness of environmentallaw,Wood suggests a naturetrust that involvesjudicial oversight andthat restsonthe idea that legislatures andagenciesrespect precise duties.106 Thesedutiesare not clearlyarticulated underthe public trustdoctrine, whichlacks “the precisionnecessary to applyittoabroad realmofpractical conflicts arising beforemodernlegislatures andagencies.”107 Wood endeavorstoexplain anddescribesubstantiveand procedural dutiesgovernmentsmustcarry out as trusteesofpublic resources.108 Sheidentifiesthe sixfollowing substantiveduties:
RESILIENCE IN A NEW ERA 6(2016). A2015 study has shownthat theEarth has startedits sixthmass animal extinction. Gerardo Ceballosetal., Accelerated ModernHuman-Induced SpeciesLosses: Entering the Sixth Mass Extinction,1SCI.ADVANCES,June 9, 2015, at 4. Forests arealso underthreat. The forest coverhas declined by 30%, and the rest is either degraded (20%)orfragmented,leaving only 15% of forestsintact. Forests,WORLD RES.INST., https://www.wri.org/our-work/topics/forests(last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 100.Terry Frazier, TheGreen AlternativetoClassical Liberal Property Theory,20VT.L.REV. 299, 300–01 (1995)(“Classical liberalism lacksthe balance that shouldproduce the tension between individualautonomyand theinterests of ...communities.”). 101.Ryan, supra note74, at 496. 102.Id. 103.Lazarus, supra note77, at 633. 104. Id. at 712–13. 105. WOOD, supra note9,at167, 193; BOSSELMANN, supra note10, at 116. 106.WOOD, supra note9,at167, 240. 107. Id. at 337. 108.MICHAEL C. BLUMM &MARY CHRISTINA WOOD,THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 7–8 (2ded. 2015);WOOD, supra note 9, at 337. 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 497
(1)[P]rotect the res;(2) conserve thenatural inheritance of future generations (the dutyagainst waste); (3)maximizethe societal value of natural resources; (4)restore thetrust res whereithas been damaged;(5) recover natural resource damagesfromthird partiesthathave injuredpublic trust assets; and(6) refrain from alienating(that is,privatizing) thetrust except in limited circumstances.109
Shethen identifiesfiveprocedural dutiesthatbothlegislatorsand their agents should apply:
(1)[M]aintainuncompromised loyalty to thebeneficiaries; (2) adequatelysupervise agents; (3)exercise good faith and reasonableskill in managing theassets;(4) use cautionin managing theassets; and (5)furnish informationtothe beneficiariesregarding trust management and assethealth.110
In her framework, citizens arepositionedasethical actorswho owea dutytotheircommunity and thenext generationtoprotect nature,111 as she believes “onlyconstant citizen vigilancewill keepgovernment corruption at bay.”112 Statutory lawserves as aguide to structureand order thetrust obligationfor theexecutive.113 Thecorpus of thetrust isbroaderthanthat of thepublic trust doctrineand includes all ecosystems.114 Consequently, rightsofownership shouldbalance public and privaterights, so that private propertyissubjecttosomecommunalconstraintsthatare justifiedbythe goal of ecologicalprotection.115 Thejudiciarystill enforces fiduciary obligations towards natureand is therefore acornerstone of thetrust.116 Wood also believes that theEarth’s environment shouldbepartofa planetary trust.117 Under aplanetarytrust,nation-states wouldall standas sovereign trusteesofnatural resources and be considered co-tenants of this planetary trust.118 Thetrust wouldencompass resources of planetary concernsuchasthe oceans andthe atmosphere.119 Shespecifies that “[t]hereremains ...the task of extrapolatinggeneral trust principles into a
109.WOOD, supra note 9, at 167. 110.Id. at 189. 111.Id. at 275–76. 112.Id. at 141. 113.Id. 114.Id. at 143, 149. 115.Id. at 311. 116.Id. at 230–35. 117.Id. at 337–38. 118.Id. 119.Id. 498 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 more preciselogicalconstruct that can organize and enforce ecological dutiesamong thenation-states.”120 That is what Bosselmann achieved twoyears later when hepublished EarthGovernance: Trusteeshipofthe Global Commons,inwhich he elaboratesatrusteeship model of governancetomanagethe Earth common corpusofthe trust.121 According to Bosselmann,aglobal-governance model is necessary to manage theenvironmentbecauseenvironmentalissues know no boundaries, and ecosystemsare diffuse and interconnected, regardlessofstates’ sovereignty.122 Hence,thisglobal problem cannot be solved at thestate level,but rather must be solved at theinternational level.123 Privateproperty ownershipofnatural resourcessuchastimber, minerals, or waterleadsprivateorcorporate citizens to seekthe enhancement of theirpersonalbenefits—atthe expenseofglobalwell- being andlong-termenvironmentalhealth.124 Privateownership is also a serious impediment to theglobal health of resources, theirrates of renewal, and thefairand responsible consumption(in termsofmanagement and conservation) of theEarth’s ecosystems.125 Indeed, science has already established thresholds that everyEarth system (suchaswater,minerals, and carbon) shouldnot reach, enablingenvironmentalmanagement that would allowustocalculatewhat canbeexploitedand what wouldneed to be protected.126 This knowledge couldbeintegrated in thegovernance of the Earth’s commons,which is currently unattainableinaglobalsystemwhere everystate decides how to manage theirresources on sovereign land without consideringthe environment as awhole.127 In Bosselmann’svision of thetrusteeship, thedifferent componentsofthe environment wouldbe considered as commons of allcitizens,sothatnoone couldinvoke aprivate right to exploit.128 Bosselmann’sconception, focusing on global governance, nevertheless considersnationalissuesregarding theroleofthe stateand thedefinitionof commons.129 Forexample, he argues that property rightswouldstill existif
120.Id. at 209. 121.BOSSELMANN, supra note 10, at 29, 53. 122.Id. at 155–56. 123. Id. at 4–15 (explaining that globalization, economic crises,and liberalizingfree trade agreements have weakened national in favor of international policy). 124.Id. at 52. 125.See id. at 64, 66 (“Indeed, many goods that were considered inexhaustible have begun to be threatened and to be subtractable,thatis, depletable.”). 126.Will Steffenetal., PlanetaryBoundaries:Guiding Human DevelopmentonaChanging Planet,SCIENCE,Feb. 13, 2015, at 1259855-1. 127.See BOSSELMANN, supra note 10, at 155 (“[W]e operateina‘cramped and mundane vista’ whereinthe earth in allits ecological wholeness has been artificially dividedintoasystem of political territories.”). 128.Id. at 53, 59. 129.Id. at 50, 57–61. 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 499 states were trustees, but landownerswouldhave to actasstewardsto protectresourcesontheir land forthe benefit of allcitizens.130 “Internationally,bothstatesand non-state actors such as large multinationals wouldlikewisebecome stewards,arolewhich woulddefine theirrelationshipwith nature.”131 At theinternational level,environmental resources located beyond states’boundaries—includingthe atmosphere,the biosphere,outer space, thehighseas, and Antarctica—wouldalsobeincluded in the“commons” and be subjecttothe Earth’strusteeship.132 Thebeneficiariesofthe trust wouldbeall livingbeings—including butnot limited to humans—which wouldacknowledge theirinterconnectednessand allowfor aholistic approach.133 Such global governance wouldnecessitatethe contributionof alllevelsofgovernance—global,regional, national,and local.134 These levels of governance wouldcooperate to assess,protect, andconsume the environmentwith thebest local practices and knowledgeoflocal resources, and wouldcommittoprotectand shareresourcesonaglobal level.135 At the global level,Bosselmann proposes thecreationofaninternational legal entity, the World EnvironmentOrganization(WEO),which wouldbe responsible forprotectingthe globalcommons.136 Such aglobal institution wouldnot replacestatesorcompetewith them butwouldratherbe complementarytothem.137 States wouldact as environmental trustees to protectresources on theirsovereignland andwould have to cooperateto protectthe Earth’s commons.138 AccordingtoBosselmann, theU.N.would provide fertilenormativeground to act as trusteetoprotect theplanet’s ecological integrity.139 TheU.N.has experience actingasatrustee (including forthe InternationalTrusteeshipSystem, the World Trade Organization, and theWorld Health Organization) andunderstands the importanceofintergenerationalequity and thesustainabledevelopment nexus.140 TheU.N.wouldmandate or createthe WEO, but theWEO would functionindependently and with the assent of states in ordertoput the
130.Id. at 125. 131. Id. 132.Id. at 248–49, 260. 133.Id. at 152. 134.Id. at 31; see also id. at 35 (explaining that humanity cannot solve global problemswithout local solutions norcan humanity solvelocal problemswithout global awareness—interconnections are thekey). 135. Id. 136.See id. at 257–67 (working withthe proposed WEOasamodel and discussingits creation, authority,legitimacy, funding, andgovernance). 137.Id. at 50. 138.Cf. id. at 200 (expressingconcernthat effortsbyindividual states will be ineffectiveunless states worktogether toimplementglobal solutions to environmental problems). 139.Id. at 199. 140.Id. at 198–99. 500 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 global interest over sectoral or national interests.141 Itsfunctions would include“monitoringand promotinginternational environmental agreements, such as theproposedDraft People’s SustainabilityTreaty.”142 Internationallaw created current institutions to address environmental issues, whichare piecemealand negotiatedbystates.143 According to Bosselmann, theseinstitutions equal “the lowest commondenominator” because“[t]heconsensus-based systemgives each country aveto.”144 Therefore,what he envisages is agovernance framework that necessitates states to rethinktheirunderstanding of sovereignty.145 In theircapacity as trustees,stateswouldinclude other types of wealth and values in theirmanagement of public affairs,146 whichiscurrently focusedonprosperity and economicgrowth, and whichneglectsecological aspects.147 Bosselmannargues that statesovereignty is already fundamentally atrust relationshipbetween governments and their citizens.148 If governmentsare trusteesoftheir territories, and thus part of theglobalenvironment, then “theyare,together,responsiblefor theglobal environment.”149 In order to protectthe globalcommons adequately, states shouldact as agents of humanity as awhole, consider thepublic to be affected by theirdecisions,and “incorporate global interestsintothe formulationofnationalinterests.”150 But howcan we be sure that individual states will fulfill theirfiduciaryobligations to theglobal commons? At themoment,thereare already many countriesthat recognize their governmenthas aspecialresponsibility to protectthe environment.151 The constitutionsofabout 100countriescontain references to environmental protection, and halfofthese includeenvironmental rights.152 Butthe current state of theenvironment and global warmingproves that these protections
141.Id. at 259. 142.Id. at 239. 143.Id. at 245–46. 144.Id. at 246. 145.See id. at 246, 267 (explaining that histrusteeship framework will require states to shift theirfocus fromself-interested competition to thecommongood of theEarth). 146.See id. at 156 (employing abroad concept of wealth,which includes ecological, social, democratic,and moralvalue). 147.Id. at 174–75. 148. Id. at 173. 149.Id. at 173, 196. 150.Id. at 245; see alsoid. at 175–76 (arguing that legitimatestate sovereigntydepends on promotingthe interestsofhumanity broadlyand not just those ofthe sovereign’s citizens); Benvenisti, supra note29, at 306 (“Whyshould agovernment be regarded as thetrustee onlyofits peoplerather than of thewhole of humanity?”). 151.See BOSSELMANN, supra note10, at 179 (identifyingcountries in theE.U.and South America thatcontain environmental provisions and rightsintheirconstitutions). 152. Id. 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 501 areineffective.153 “What remainsisfor allthesestatestopragmatically realizetheir role as environmental trustee.Likeaconstitutionalobligation, this needstobeanon-derogablefunctionofgovernment,tothe extentthat deviatingfromtrusteeshipwouldtriggerthe courts’jurisdictiontoinvoke trusteeshiptohaltcontrary policy.”154 Like Wood, Bosselmann suggests that this canonlyhappen if civilsocietyand itscitizensask forthe protectionofour shared environment on whichour futuredepends.155 Bosselmann andWood argue that to make citizens feel investedin protectingthe environmentand in holding theirgovernmentsaccountable, they have to be imbuedwith theirroleasstewards.156 This includes realizingtheir “common‘ownership’ofthe commons is akindofproperty holding that requiressustainability.”157 This seemsambitious andismaybeidealistic,asitrequiresserious changes to our wayoflife and how we understand economic systems.158 However,thisviewofcitizenshipispromising as it wouldallowfor a necessary paradigm shift in our relationshipwith theEarth and would encourage us to recognize theinterconnectednessofall species.159 Furthermore,atrusteeshipiscoherentwith other mechanisms already suggestedtoimprove environmental lawand couldserve as an overarching framework to implementthesemechanisms.160 Along with theincreased dutiesand responsibilitiesofthe statetowards theenvironment, a trusteeshipprovidesanethical foundation forpublic actionthat acknowledges theresponsibilityofhumans towardsnature and theEarth,as Aldo Leopoldidentifiedin1949.161 It is also consistentwith Geoffrey Garver’s suggestions,inhis article The Rule of Ecological Law,that ecological lawmustbeconstrained by ecological considerations,must
153.See id. at 1(explaining that global climatechange and ecological crises make plainthe weakness of internationallaw and governance). 154. Id. at 179. 155.Id. at 192–93. 156.Id. at 186–94; cf. WOOD, supra note9,at275–76 (notingthe disconnect between environmental policyand individual consumerism and explaining that implementingenvironmental trusteeshipnecessitates citizen participation in therole of trustee). 157.BOSSELMANN, supra note 10, at 194. 158.Geoffrey Garver, The Rule of EcologicalLaw:The Legal ComplementtoDegrowth Economics,5SUSTAINABILITY 316, 325–30 (2013). 159. Id.(proposing tenprinciples to create such aparadigm shift). 160.Sand, supra note29, at 48. 161. See ALDO LEOPOLD,ASAND COUNTY ALMANAC 224–25 (Oxford Univ.Press 1966) (“[Q]uit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem.Examine each questioninterms of whatisethically and esthetically right,aswellaswhatiseconomically expedient.Athingisright when it tends to preserve theintegrity,stability,and beautyofthe biotic community.Itiswrongwhen it tends otherwise.”); see also Peter G. Brown, AreThere Any Natural Resources?, in WATER ETHICS: FOUNDATIONAL READINGS FOR STUDENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 203, 218 (JeremyJ.Schmidt &Peter G. Browneds.,2010) (“The hallmarkofour membership in the commonwealthoflife shouldbethe healthofthe ecosphere:whatAldoLeopoldcalled‘land.’”);BOSSELMANN, supra note10, at 133 (creditingAldoLeopold as one of thefirstadvocates for stewardshipethics). 502 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 integrateother disciplines in asystemicways,and must be adaptiveto science developing knowledge in relation to ecosystems.162 Indeed,the government’s dutyunder atrusteeshipwouldmean that it wouldhave to consider relevant data and science on matters relatingtothe environmentin order to fullyassessthe impactsofits actions on ecosystems.163 A trusteeshipwouldalso be coherentwith theobligationtorecognize rightsto natureinaconstitutionbecausetherewouldbeabody (thetrustee) able to enforce theserights.164 In addition, increasing thegovernment’s dutiesand correlativerecourseswouldlead to astrongerruleoflaw.165 This would includemoreeffective enforcement of establishedlawsand greater accountabilityofgovernments, whichhas been correlated to superior environmentalperformance.166 “While no legal approachoffers a panacea,”167 thetrusteeship hasthe advantage of bringing together many legalsolutions that have been profferedtosolve thecrisis, whilegiving effecttoanethic of responsibilityand areverence towardsnature.168 It is also compatible with arangeoflegal toolsthatfavorindividualinitiatives to implementbettertechnologyand produce less waste,169 while also implementing global,state, and local duties of environmentalprotection and sanctions forbreaches of thelaw. In my view,beforewecan implementatrusteeshipapproach at the nationallevel,wemustresolve twomajor theoretical and practical challenges. Thefirst challenge is how do we move fromalegal system whereprivateproperty is considered an absolute right to one which recognizes abroader setofrights, uses,and obligations of ownerstoact as stewards to manage environmental resources?The secondchallengerelates to thescopeand contentofdutiesofprotectionatthe domesticlevel.Wood has enumerated anumberofsubstantiveand procedural dutiesthat states wouldhavetorespect.170 But what wouldthesedutiesimply forthe executiveonaday-to-day basis?The rest of this Essay focusesonthis second challenge. Here,Iendeavortogiveconcreteexamplesof
162.Garver, supra note 158. 163.Id. at 319. 164.DAVID R. BOYD,THE RIGHTS OF NATURE:ALEGAL REVOLUTION THAT COULD SAVE THE WORLD 173–74 (2017). 165.Id. 166.Jessica Scott, From Environmental Rights to Environmental RuleofLaw:AProposalfor BetterEnvironmental Outcomes,6MICH.J.ENVTL.ADMIN.L.203, 209, 230–37 (2016). 167.WOOD, supra note 9. 168.See supra notes 27–29, 161, 164–66 and accompanying text (reviewingthe numerous legal solutions that trusteeshipembracesand thevalue theseapproaches placeonnature). 169.See, e.g.,WOOD, supra note9,at288–96 (discussingstrategies to endfossilfuel consumption, eliminatewaste,and other similarconcerns within thetrusteeship framework). 170.See supra textaccompanyingnotes 109–10 (quotingWood’s list of thegovernment’s six substantiveand five proceduralduties as trustee). 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 503 environmentalcases wherecourtshave appliedanalogous dutiesinthe Canadian context.
II. THE CANADIAN CASE LAW:JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS
A. TheCanadian Context and theRoleofPublic Law
On fewoccasions,Canadiancourts have recognized theroleof governments as trustees171 or demonstratedanopenness to recognizeit.172 Forexample, in the Scarborough caseof1979, theOntario Superior Court recognized that theBorough wasatrusteeofthe environment andwas thereforeentitled to claimdamages forthe destructionoftrees on aroadfor thebenefit of local citizens.173 In a2004 case, theSupreme CourtofCanada acknowledged that Canadian common lawhad commonrootswith that of theU.S.174 Therefore,therewas “nolegalbarrier to theCrown suingfor compensation as well as injunctivereliefinapropercaseonaccountof public nuisance,ornegligence causing environmentaldamage to public lands,and perhapsother torts such as trespass.”175 In thiscase, British Colombia claimeddamages forthe loss of trees caused by aforestfire,for whichCanadianForestProductswas held responsible.176 However,the Supreme Courtdid not grant thedamages claimedonthisbasis, as the claimwas not fullyarguedinthe first instance.177 TheCourtmentioned that,ifthe Crowncouldsue forcompensationfor damages caused to the environmentonpublic land, thereare clearly important and novelpolicy questions raised by such actions.178 Theseinclude:(1) theCrown’s potential liability for inactivity in theface of threatstothe environment; (2)the existence or non-existence of enforceablefiduciary dutiesowedtothe public by theCrown in that regard; (3)the limits to therole, function, and remedies availabletogovernmentstaking actiononaccount of activity harmful to public enjoyment of public resources;and (4)the specterof
171. Scarborough (Borough) v. R.E.F. HomesLtd.,[1979] O.J. No.78, para. 5(Can. Ont. S.C.) (QL), citedwith approval in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Sociétéd’arrosage)v.Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC40, para. 27 (Can.). 172.Colombiav.Canadian Forest ProductsLtd., 2004 SCC38, paras. 9,79(Can.); see Comeau’sSea Foods Ltd. v. Canada (MinisterofFisheriesand Oceans), [1997]1S.C.R.12, 25 (Can.) (demonstratingthe Court’s openness to consideringthe government as trustee in thecontext of fisheries); Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada,2008 SCC58, para. 14 (Can.) (holding that theMinister has adutytomanage fisheriesasacommonresource). 173. Scarborough,[1979] O.J. No.78, paras. 5, 6. 174. CanadianForestProducts Ltd.,2004 SCC38, para. 81. 175. Id. 176.Id. para. 2. 177.Id. para. 82. 178. Id. 504 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 imposingonprivateinterests an indeterminate liability foranindeterminate amountofmoneyfor ecological or environmentaldamage.179 Thesejudicial developmentsdid not imposeaclear fiduciary obligationongovernmentstoprotect theenvironment,such as thepublic trust doctrine, nordid they suggest theimplementationofamodelof governancebased on theidea of trusteeship.180 Nevertheless,Canadian administrativeand constitutionallaw does useconceptssimilar to thoseof trusteeship, such as accountability,actinginthe bestinterestofcitizens, and loyalty.InCanada, theexecutivebranchofgovernment is accountableto thelegislativeassembly (Parliament), so that theExecutivemusthavethe confidenceofthe legislative branch in ordertostay in office.181 If the Parliament withdrawsits confidence fromthe government,thenthe cabinet must resign or advise the Governor General to callanelectiontoforma new HouseofCommons.182 Individually,ministers arealsoresponsiblefor theiractions.183 They havethe obligationtoresigniftheir actions and omissions,orthoseoftheir ministries, areconsidered to be contrary tothe public interest,the executionofthe law, and an abuse of Parliament’s trust.184 As arepresentativeassembly,the role of theParliament is to ensure thetransparencyand justificationofthe acts of theExecutive.185 In addition to Parliament,other mechanismsand bodies were implementedtoholdthe governmenttoaccount, such as judicial review,public inquiries,and the AuditorGeneral.186 TheCanadiangovernment also has theobligationtoact in the public interest,which refers generally to thecommoninterests of the community.187 Thegovernment’s actions must be taken in thebestinterest of citizens, whoare thebeneficiaries of suchactions.188 According to public
179.Id. 180.Barbaravon Tigerstrom, The Public TrustDoctrineinCanada,7J. ENVTL.L.PRACT.379, 387–88 (1997) (describinglimiteddevelopmentsofthe public trustdoctrine in Canada). 181.HOGG, supra note23, at 9–2. 182.Id. at 9–2 to 9–3. 183.PIERRE ISSALYS &DENIS LEMIEUX,L’ACTION GOUVERNEMENTALE:PRECIS DE DROIT DES INSTITUTIONS ADMINISTRATIVES 343 (3ded. 2009) (stating theresponsibilitiesand obligations imposed on ministers). 184. Id. 185.See HOGG, supra note23, at 9–2 (explaining that theExecutive must continue to receive theconfidence of Parliament to remain in office; in this way, Parliament holds theExecutive responsible). 186.Carol Harlow, Accountabilityand Constitutional Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 195, 203–04 (MarkBovens,Robert E. Goodin&ThomasSchillemans eds., 2014); see also RICHARD MULGAN,HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT:ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 31 (2003) (detailing thedifferenttypes of institutional accountability mechanisms). 187.See generally EVAN FOX-DECENT,SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE:THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 29 (2011)[hereinafterSOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE](explaining theoverarching fiduciaryrelationship between governmentand itscitizens). 188. Id. 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 505 law, thegovernment also has to act fairly and reasonably towards citizens.189 Pursuanttotheirdutyofproceduralfairness, when taking any individualmeasure, public decisionmakers have to provideafairhearingto individuals whoare affected by theirdecisions and decide impartially.190 Theseobligations entail hearing thearguments of individuals either orally or in writing, giving noticeofthe hearing, and allowing an individualthe opportunity to respond to thosefactsand argumentsthatmight ultimately lead to adecision.191 In some cases (depending on thecontext) thedutyof procedural fairness also compelsadecision maker to give reasons fortheir decision.192 Likewise, thedutytoact reasonablyreferstothe wayinwhich an agency exercisesits statutory powers.193 In Roncarelli v. Duplessis, JusticeRandestablished that anylegal powermustbeexercisednon- arbitrarily,taking into account not onlythe Legislature’s intentionin adoptingastatute, but also itspurposeand objectives.194 ProfessorEvan Fox-Decentadvancesthe positionthat these obligations (proceduralfairnessand reasonableness)are the equivalent of thedutyof loyalty in public law.195 He arguesthatthe dutyoffairness owed by a governmenttoits peopleisnot a“free-floatingmoral principle,” but rather one that is justifiedbyanoverarching fiduciaryrelationshipbetween the state andeachperson subject to its authority.196 This fiduciaryrelationship arises fromsovereignty, whichgives thestate attributes such as thepower to legislate,administer, andadjudicate.197 These attributes,along with the power of thestate to use coercive forcetomaintainlegal order,point to a “non-consensual relationship of proclaimedauthoritybetween state and subject,notwithstanding democraticchannels(in democratic states)through whichthe people’svoice maybeheard.”198 Further,the fiduciarynature of therelationshipmeans that it is also legalinnature, and thus it generates legaldutiesfor thestate.199 ForFox-Decent, theobligations of procedural fairnessand reasonableness imposed on governmentsinCanadaare
189.Id. at 25. 190. Id.;Evan Fox-Decent &Alexander Pless, The Charterand AdministrativeLaw Part I: Procedural Fairness, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CONTEXT 238 (ColleenMFlood &LorneSossin eds.,3ded. 2018). 191.Fox-Decent &Pless, supra note 190. 192. Id. 193.Id. 194. Roncarelliv.Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121,140 (Can.); SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE, supra note187, at 25. 195.EvanFox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority,31QUEENS L.J. 259, 265 (2005) [hereinafter Fiduciary Nature]. 196.SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE, supra note187, at 29, 177. 197.Fiduciary Nature, supra note195, at 286. 198. SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE, supra note187. 199.See FiduciaryNature, supra note195, at 290 (arguing that legal authority flows from the state’sfiduciaryobligations). 506 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 thereforeapublic lawtranslationofthe fiduciary dutyofloyalty in private law.200 However,the waythe government hastraditionally appliedthese obligations hasproventobedetrimental to ecosystems.201 Economic growth has oftenbeeninterpreted as beingsynonymous with public interest,even though nature’s resources arefiniteand cannot support constant growth.202 Imposingstricterfiduciary dutiesinaccordance with the trusteeshiptheorycouldcontributetothe transitionfromananthropocentric to amoreholistic legal and governancesystem.203 It drawsonconceptsthat already exist in Canadian public lawand takes them further by imposinga responsibility to protect natureand to identify environmental resourcesas commonproperty.204 Also,the trusteeshiptheoryinternalizes an ethicof mutually enhancing human-Earth relationship.205 However,the questionof determining what it wouldmean foranexecutivetoapplyfiduciary duties on adaily basisremains,atthisstage, unanswered.
B. TheContributionofCaseLaw
Thefirstsections of this Essay set out theknownelementsofthe fiduciarydutyofatrustee206 and howtoarticulatethisdutyinapublic setting.207 However,itischallenging to determinehow theadoptionof fiduciarydutiesinthiscontextwouldaffect an executive’sactivitiesona daily basis.Thisisparticularly challenging in theCanadian context,where therehas been no applicationofapublic trust doctrine of anysort.208 Thus, in an attempttomake thetrusteeshiptheorymoreappealingfor courts or legislatures to apply in practice, this Part of theEssay sets out some case examples wheresimilardutieshave been applied in aCanadian context. Studying theCanadiancaselaw of judicial review in environmental lawisa useful meanstoachieve this task,ascourts oftenimposeobligations in this context that can, in many cases, resemblefiduciaryduties.209
200.Id. at 267–68. 201.Peter A. Victor, Living Well: Explorationsintothe End of Growth,5MINDING NATURE 24, 25 (2012). 202. Id. 203.Garver, supra note 158, at 325. 204.Id. 205.Id. 206.See supra PartI.A (establishingthe foundational principles of trusteeship theory). 207.See supra PartI.D (identifyingsix substantivedutiesgovernmentsmustcarry outas trustees of public resources). 208.von Tigerstrom, supra note 180, at 380. 209.See supra Part II.A (recountinginstances whereCanadian courts have imposed fiduciary- type obligations). 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 507
When performingjudicial review,courts review thelegality of the government’s action, thereforeensuringrespect of theruleoflaw.210 In Canada,the Courtverifies whetherthe government actedwithin its authority and in afairand reasonablemanner.211 Theextent of thelegal authority of agiven administrativebodyonaspecific subjectmatteris determined through the“standardofreviewanalysis,”212 whichwill ultimatelydetermine thestrictness of review to applytoanadministrative decision.213 Thereare twostandardsofreview:reasonableness (deferential) and correctness (not deferential).214 An administrative body must exercise statutory powersthat,atthe veryleast,relyonthe decision maker’s reasonableinterpretationofthe statute.215 This meansthatthe decision reached should be justified, transparent, and intelligiblewithin thedecision- making process and“fall[] within arange of possible,acceptableoutcomes whichare defensible in respect of thefactsand law.”216 When defining what is reasonable,the Courtwill study thelegislativeand factual context, thenature andexpertiseofthe decisionmaker, and thenature of the question.217 In carrying out this review,courts oftenimposedutiesonthe Statewith regardtothe environment.218 Forthe purposeofthisEssay,Ihave selected Canadian Supreme Court cases reviewingenvironmentalmatters and twocases fromAlberta and Quebec’sappellate courts, as thesedecisions aremadeintwo different political climates.219 Thesecases illustrate how theworkofjudgescan assist in defining theobligations of provincialand federal governments towardsthe environmentwhen applyingconcepts—such as accountability, accesstoinformation, reasonableness,and fairness—in ways analogous to fiduciarydutiesand thedutyofloyalty.Analyzing theapplicationofthese conceptsinenvironmental lawcan also help to determinehow to apply
210. FiduciaryNature, supra note195, at 268. 211.Dunsmuirv.New Brunswick, 2008 SCC9,paras.29, 65 (Can.). 212. Id. para29. 213.Id. para. 32. 214.Id. 215.Id. para. 141. 216.Id. para. 47. 217.Id.paras.51–55. 218.Id.paras.47–50. 219.InAlberta,the right-wingConservativeParty of theprovince has been in power from 1976 to 2017 and lost theelections in 2017 to thecenter-left NewDemocratic Party. See Evan Annett& JeremyAgius, The PC Dynasty Falls:UnderstandingAlberta’sHistoryofOne-PartyRule,GLOBE & MAIL (May 5, 2015), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/alberta/albertas-political- dynasties/article24255480/. In Quebec, themore centrist parties, Liberals andParti Québécois, have alternativelybeen in power from 1970 to 2018. Id.; see also QuebecVotes 2014,CBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2014),http://www.cbc.ca/elections/quebecvotes2014/. Note that abroader compilationofcaselaw that encompasses decisions rendered in environmental judicial review after 1970 to clarify theapplication, content,and scope of these dutiesisthe subject of future workbythe author. 508 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 thesefiduciary conceptsinamore stringent and structured wayinafuture trusteeshipframework.
1. TheSupremeCourtofCanada
Thereare twojudicial review cases of theSupreme CourtofCanada that raise theissueofstate obligations towardsthe environment. In 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Sociétéd’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), landscaping andlawncarecompanies were charged with having used pesticides in violationofBy-law270,adoptedbythe Town.220 TheTown has thepower to adopt by-lawsto“securepeace, order,good government, health and general welfare in theterritory of themunicipality”under section410(1) of theCitiesand TownsAct.221 Thepesticides used by the companies were neverthelessallowedunderfederal law.222 Thelandscaping companies broughtamotionfor declaratoryjudgment asking theSuperior Courttodeclarethe by-law “inoperativeand ultravires theTown’s authority.”223 Thequestionbeforethe courtwas thus to determinewhether theTownhad thelegal authority to enact By-Law 270 that regulated and restricted pesticideuse.224 Both theSuperiorCourtand theCourtofAppeal found that theby-lawfellwithin thescope of theTown’spowers.225 Before theSupremeCourt, thelandscaping companiesraised various argumentsagainst theby-law.226 They argued that theby-lawdid not delegate to municipalitiesaspecific power to regulate theuse of pesticides.227 They further arguedthateveniftherewas legislative authority,the by-lawwouldbediscriminatory as it wouldcreate impermissible distinctions that affected theircommercialactivity,228 in this case, thedistinctionbetween essentialand non-essentialusesof pesticides.229 JusticeL’Heureux-Dubé,writingfor theCourt, concludedthat thegeneral provision of section 410(1) authorized theTowntoregulate the useofpesticides to improve thehealth of its citizens.230 As JusticeLeBel explained,absentaspecificgrant of power, ageneral welfare provisionlike section410(1) must be given some meaning.231 Theexisting power must be
220.114957 Canada Ltée(Spraytech, Sociétéd’arrosage)v.Hudson (Town),2001 SCC40, para. 6(Can.). 221.Id. para. 23. 222.Id. para. 5. 223.Id. para. 7. 224. Id. paras.2,5–8; Citiesand Towns Act, R.S.Q.,cC-19,s.410 (Can.) (repealed 2005). 225.114957 Canada Ltée,2001 SCC 40,para. 8. 226.Id.paras.25, 28. 227.Id.para. 25. 228.Id.para. 28. 229.Id.para. 27. 230.Id. paras.22–29. 231.Id.para. 53 (LeBel,J., concurring). 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 509 exercisedfor issuesthatare relatedtothe interest of thecommunity and fall within theterritory of thelocal government.232 Thus,the Courtheldthat the by-lawconcerned theuse and protectionofthe localenvironment within thecommunity and therealmoflocal government activityand was thereforevalid.233 Finally,the Courtconcluded that discriminationherewas anecessary consequence of exercisingthe power delegated by theprovince to improve thehealth of theTown’scitizens.234 In termsoffiduciaryobligations,thiscaseishelpful to understandthe extent of thedutyofloyalty that requireslegislatures andgovernmentsto act in thebest interest of theircitizens.235 It tells us that,whenthe provinciallegislature delegatespowerstomunicipalities, thesepowersmust be interpreted broadlywhen it comes to theenvironment.236 As “[l]aw- making and implementationare oftenbestachieved at alevel of government that is not onlyeffective, but also closesttothe citizens affectedand thus most responsivetotheirneeds, to local distinctiveness, and to populationdiversity.”237 Thedutytoact personally, adaptedina public setting, wouldthereforeallowsuchdelegationwhen it is the favorable means of managinglocal issues.238 Theother case from theSupremeCourtofCanada that is relevantto discuss is ImperialOil Ltd. v. Quebec(Minister of theEnvironment).239 In this case, ImperialOil operatedapetroleum products depot from1920 to 1973.240 In the1980s,asubsequent purchaser wanted to build aresidential complex on theland,but discovered hydrocarbons in thesoil.241 The purchaser consultedthe Ministry of theEnvironment, whorequiredfurther studies and approved thedecontaminationmethod.242 Afew yearslater,the ownersdiscovered othersigns of hydrocarbons in thesoil.243 Theowners filed three actions in court against theseller, againstthe City of Lévis (which had issued thebuildingpermits),and finally against theMinistry, alleging that theMinistryhad been negligent in supervising and approving
232.Id. 233.Id.paras.27, 43 (majority opinion). 234.Id. para. 29. 235.See id. para. 27 (viewing themunicipalities’ actions as an attempt to fulfill its role as trusteefor the environment). 236.Id. para. 3. 237.Id. 238.Id. 239. ImperialOil Ltd. v. Quebec(Ministerofthe Env’t.),2003 SCC 58, para. 8(Can.). 240.Id. para. 3. 241.Id. paras.3–4. 242.Id. para. 4. 243.Id. para. 5. 510 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 thedecontaminationwork.244 In trying to findsolutions that wouldsatisfy theownersand thepublic,the city initiated discussions with theMinistry.245 TheMinisterissued an order undersection31.42 of theEnvironment Quality Act(EQA),thatrequiredImperialOil, as theformerowner and operator of thesite,tohave asoilcharacterizationstudy done by an independent expert at its ownexpenseand to submit areport.246 Imperial Oilrefused to do thecharacterizationstudy and exercisedits right of appeal to theQuebecAdministrativeTribunal, providedfor by theEQA.247 Imperial Oilarguedthatthe Minister’s decisions andactions,including the order,had lost any appearanceofimpartiality because of hisinvolvement in thefaileddecontamination andthe potential legaland financial consequences of that involvementfor him.248 TheAdministrativeTribunal found that thelegislationcreated overlapping functions forthe Minister—to decontaminatethe land and to issueordersofcharacterizationand decontamination—that were exceptions tothe rule of impartiality,and affirmed theMinister’s order.249 TheSuperior Courtset aside theTribunal’s decisionand theMinister’s order finding that theMinisterhad aconflictof interest.250 TheCourtofAppealset asidethe SuperiorCourt’s judgment and dismissed theapplicationfor judicial review,onthe basisthatthe Minister alone couldperformthe functions andexercise thepowers providedbythe Actand hadtoensurethe obligations imposed upon the polluterweremet.251 This obligationcreated astate of necessity that justifiedanexceptiontothe principleofimpartialityapplied to administrativedecisionmakers.252 TheSupremeCourtofCanadaaffirmed this decision fordifferent reasons.253 Afterreviewing thestatutory frameworkand thegeneral rulesof procedural fairness to determine whethertheywerebreachedbythe order,254 theCourtemphasized that safeguarding theenvironment is a growingconcern for societyand legislatures.255 TheCourtnoted that there is an “emerging sense of inter-generationalsolidarity and acknowledgement of an environmental debt to humanity and to theworld of tomorrow.”256
244.Id. 245.Id. paras.5–6. 246.Id. para. 6; seealso Environment Quality Act, R.S.Q.,c.Q-2, s. 31.42 (Can.)(providing theMinister the statutory authoritytorequire ImperialOil to conduct asoilcharacterizationstudy). 247.Imperial OilLtd.,2003SCC 58, para. 7. 248.Id.paras.8,30. 249.Id.para. 9. 250.Id. para. 11. 251.Id. para. 13. 252. Id. 253.Id. para. 39. 254. Id. 255.Id. para. 19. 256.Id. 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 511
TheCourtalsoexplainedthat thedutyofprocedural fairnessnecessarily variesbased on adecision maker’s activities, functions,and the legislature’s intent.257 In this way, theextent of thedutiesimposed on the administrativedecisionmaker will not necessarily be thesameasthoseof an administrativetribunal, whoseadjudicativefunctions aresimilar to those of acourt.258 TheCourtthen examined theEQA to determinethe nature and scope of procedural fairness rules to applyinthe case.259 TheCourt explained that “[t]heroleassigned to theMinisterbythe legislation sometimes inevitablyplaces theMinisterinaconflictwith thosesubject to thelaw he administers,inthe course of theimplementationof environmentallegislation.”260 Accordingtothe Court, theMinisterhad theobligationtocarefully and attentivelyexaminethe observations submittedtohim in ordertomake a decision, but this obligationwas not equivalent to theimpartiality that is requiredofajudge.261 TheCourtrecalledthat“[t]heMinisterhas the responsibility of protectingthe public interest in theenvironment, and must make hisdecisions in consideration of that interest.”262 Thejudges concluded that it waslegitimate forthe Ministertoconsider asolutionthat might savesomepublic money.263 Therefore, theMinister’s attemptto recover costsand compel necessarycleanup by ImperialOil appropriately represented thepublic interest to protect theenvironment,aninterestthat theState hasadutytouphold.264 Hence, therewas no conflictofinterestor abuse of power.265 This case illustratesthe extent of thedutytoact fairly, whichisa public component of thedutyofloyalty.266 Indeed, thecaseshowsthat, when apublic decision maker makes an environmentaladministrative decisioninthe public interest andexercises apower grantedbylaw, the decisionmakerdoes not have thesamedutytoact impartially as woulda court in relation to ajudicial decision.267 Rather,the decisionmaker can act in ordertoprotect theenvironment andsavepublic moneyatthe expense of aprivateactor.268 In other words, thepublic interest takes precedence over theprivateinterestofthe privateactor.269 Here, iteventook precedence
257.Id. para. 31. 258.Id. 259.Id. para. 33. 260.Id. 261.Id. para. 34. 262.Id. 263.Id. para. 39. 264.Id. 265. Id. 266.Fiduciary Nature, supra note195. 267.Imperial OilLtd.,2003SCC 58, para. 34. 268.Id. para. 39. 269.Id. paras.38–39. 512 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 over theinterests of theMinisterhimself, whomight have acted negligently and be sued personally.270
2. TheProvincialCourts of Appeal
Thejurisprudenceofprovincial appellate courts can also provide valuablelessons about thepotentialcontent of fiduciaryduties. The Wallot v. Quebec City case of Quebec’sCourtofAppeal is interestinginthis regard.271 In 2006, theCity wasinformedthatchemical runoffinthe river wascausing blue algae—a proliferationofcyanobacteria—insomeparts of Lake St.Charles, whichisthe principal potablewater supply (with the RiverSt. Charles) for Quebec City.272 Quebec City thus adopted aby-lawto limit the proliferationofalgae andthe pollutionofthe watercourse.273 The by-lawprohibitedconstructionorcuttingtrees within a20-meterzone along thehigh-waterlineofthe lake.274 It also requiredownersofland on theriver’s edgetoplant a10- to 15-meter-wideriparianstrip on their property with plants, shrubs, andtrees.275 This bufferstrip wasmeant to prevent pollutantsfromreaching thelake.276 Thelakesideresidents asked theSuperiorCourtand then theCourtofAppeal to declarethe by-law void and unenforceableonthe grounds that theirpropertyrightsoverthe land shouldtakeprecedence in law.277 They argued that theregulationshouldbe considered illegalpossessionofpartoftheir land.278 TheCourtofAppealconfirmed theSuperiorCourt’s judgment that dismissed theirclaim,onthe basis that theCity wasempowered to adopt theby-lawand that it didnot have theeffect of entirely suppressing the owners’ useofthe land.279 Rather,the by-law’s purposewas to controlthe useofproperty in thecollectiveinterestofQuebec City’s residents.280 Therefore, theby-lawwas valid and applicable, and theCourtofAppeal concluded by reminding theownersthatthe by-lawwas in theirinterest— bothprivateand collective.281 This case also illustrates thedutyofloyalty and showshow actinginthe bestinterestofcitizens and futuregenerations
270. Id. 271.See Wallotc.Québec (Ville de),2011 QCCA 1165, para. 28 (Can.)(mentioning the respondent-City’sresponsibility to protect theenvironment). 272. Id. para. 4. 273. Ville de Quebec, Que.,Règlementdel’agglomérationsur la renaturalisation des berges du lacSaint-Charles,R.A.V.Q.301 (June 3, 2008) (Can.). 274. Wallot,2011QCCA 1165,para. 5. 275.Id. para. 2. 276.Id. para. 10. 277.Id. para. 41. 278.Id. 279.Id. para. 60. 280.Id. para. 53. 281.Id. para. 62. 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 513 canimply adutytolimit propertyrightsfor theprotectionof watercourses.282 Again, thepublic interest took precedenceover theinterest of privateowners.283 Thelast casetobeexamined is Castle-Crown WildernessCoalitionv. Alberta(DirectorofRegulatory AssuranceDivision, Alberta Environment), whichwas handed downbythe CourtofAppeal of Alberta.284 In thiscase, aski facility,Castle MountainResort,had aplanned expansionproject and consultedwiththe Director of Regulatory Assurance and Ministerof Environment of Albertaabout theneed to submit an environmental impact assessment (EIA)report.285 While theDirector had thepower to decide whetherthe projectrequired submission of an EIAunder theEnvironmental Protectionand Enhancement Act, theMinisterhad an overridingdiscretion to direct theproponent of aproject to prepareareport, even when the Director hadnot ordered such areport.286 Afterstudying Castle Mountain’sproject,“theDirector expressed a concernthatsomeofthe proposedexpansionhad asignificant effect on the environment.”287 Sheproposed that theDeputy Minister of theEnvironment require an EIAbecause of thepotentialeffectsthe projectwouldhave on fish and wildlife,cumulativeeffect issues, andthe adequacy of waterand wastewater facilities.288 TheDirector laterchangedher mind aftershe consultedwith theDepartment of SustainableResourceDevelopment.289 Shedecided that thepotentialimpactsweremanageableunder thePublic Land Act(license of occupation) and theEnvironmental Protectionand Enhancement Actapprovalprocess, as well as under thepublic review of theDetailedForestManagementPlan.290 Sheconcludedthat the waterworks system andwastewater system shouldbeexemptfromthe report, providedthatthey were subject to other regulations on potable water.291 TheMinisterdecided nottoexercise hisoverriding discretion, explaining that athorough review of environmental effectswouldbe completedregardlessofhis determination.292 Castle-Crown Wilderness Coalitionchallenged this decisionthrough judicial review,askingthe court to declarethe Ministry’s decisiontobeunreasonable andtoforce the
282.Id. paras.59–60. 283.Id. paras.53, 62. 284.Castle-Crown WildernessCoal.v.Alberta (Dir. of RegulatoryAssurance Div.), 2005 ABCA 283, paras. 1–3 (Can.). 285. Id. paras.2,17. 286. EnvironmentalProtection andEnhancement Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-12, ss.44(1)(b), 47(a) (Can.). 287. Castle-Crown WildernessCoal.,2005 ABCA 283, para.19. 288.Id. 289.Id. para. 21. 290.Id. 291.Id. para. 35. 292.Id. para. 21; Public Land Act,R.S.A.2000, c. P-40, s. 20(1) (Can.). 514 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485
Director andthe Minister to submit theexpansionofthe resort to an EIA.293 Thefirstjudge quashed theirapplications.294 However,the CourtofAppeal concluded bothdecisions were reasonable, as therewereother regulatory authoritiesthatcouldassess the impact of theproposed project.295 TheDirector had takenall therelevant stepstoverifywhether theenvironmental impacts wouldbemanageable, afterconcluding some of thesesteps were exempt fromenvironmental assessment.296 Shedid not conclude that concernsabout environmental impactswouldbeeliminated with theother regulatoryprocesses,and the court affirmed that shewas not requiredtodoso.297 Thecourtalso concluded that theother processesidentifiedbythe Director to manage some environmental concerns hadthe ability to addressthem.298 Finally,the purelydiscretionary natureofthe Minister’s decisioncommanded the highestlevel of deference, and thecourt concluded that theMinister’s decisionnot to exercise hisdiscretionwas also reasonable.299 This decisionisrelevanttointerpret thedutyofloyalty andtoact in the bestinterestofbeneficiaries.300 TheCourtofAppealsaidthatthe public decisionmaker must take allthe relevantsteps to verify whether the environmentalimpactswouldbemanageable according to thestatute’s requirements.301 Furthermore,the decisiondemonstratesthat thecourt cannot intervene to compensate forthe legislation’s weaknesses.302 Here, theDirector could not submit theexpansionproject to an environmental assessment reportfor some environmentalimpactsthatthe legislation excluded fromthe listofthoserequiringareport.303 Parliament could potentially have enacted amoreprotective statute, but thecourtcannot controlthe administration’sactionfor Parliament’s failure,unlessthe statute wasdeemed unconstitutional.304 Theonlyway courtscouldcontrol Parliament’s failure to respect fiduciarydutiestoprotect theenvironment wouldbetoinclude thesedutiesinthe Constitutionand demonstratethat an actioninfringed thoseduties.305
293. Castle-Crown WildernessCoal., 2005 ABCA 283, para. 22. 294.Id. 295.Id. para. 65. 296.Id. paras.48, 65. 297.Id. para. 58. 298.Id. para. 59. 299.Id. paras.57–66. 300.Id. para. 57. 301.Id. 302.See id. para. 35 (statingthat theregulations establish whatimpacts are exempt from consideration). 303.Id. para. 54. 304. Id. 305. HOGG, supra note23, at 15–1 (explaining thepower of thejudiciary to invalidateastatute contrary to theCanadian Constitution, whether on distributionofpowersorCharter of Rightsgrounds). 2019] FiduciaryDutiesUnderthe TrusteeshipTheory 515
3. Lessons on theExercise of theDutyofLoyalty
Theabove four decisions teach us anumberofthings about thedutyof loyalty.First, when theprovinciallegislature delegatespowersto municipalities, thesepowersmustbeinterpreted broadly when they relate to theenvironment, as lawmaking and implementation arebestachievedat alevel of government that is closesttothe citizens affected.306 Second, when apublic decision maker makes an environmentaladministrative decisioninthe public interest, exercising apower grantedbylaw,she does not have thesamedutytoact impartially as acourt wouldhave when issuing ajudicial decision.307 Third,actinginthe best interest of citizens and future generations canimply alimitationonpropertyrightsinorder to protectanatural resource.308 Fourth,the public interest of thecitizenscan take precedence over theinterestofindividuals or privateowners.309 Finally,loyalty requiresthe decision makertotakeall relevant stepsto ensurethe impactsare prevented or manageabledepending on thewords of thestatute.310 If thelatterisconsidered insufficient,there is no valid way forthe courttointervene, unlessthose dutiesbecomeconstitutional.311
CONCLUSION
Thereisagrowingliteraturediscussing thetrusteeshiptheory, how the public trustdoctrinecouldbeenhanced, andhow theresulting modelof governancecouldhelpachieve aparadigmshift fromananthropocentricto amoreholistic legal system thatinternalizes an ethicofmutually enhancing human-Earth relationship.312 Thetrusteeshiptheory is especially relevantto American andCanadianpublic law, as it drawsonlegal conceptsalreadyin useinthisarea, such as public interest,accountability,fairness, impartiality,and reasonableness.313 TheCanadian caselaw in judicial
306.See supra text accompanying note 237 (declaringthat“law-making and implementationare oftenbestachieved at alevel of government ...closest to thecitizens affected” (quoting114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Sociétéd’arrosage) v. Hudson(Town), 2001SCC 40,para. 3(Can.))). 307.See supra textaccompanyingnote268 (identifying that when apublic interestweighson theside of one party it maylessen theneed foradjudicators to show parties impartiality). 308.See supra textaccompanying notes282–83 (showingthat privateinterests mayoften be outweighed by public interests). 309.See Wallotc.Québec (Villede),2011 QCCA 1165,para. 60 (Can.)(concluding that aby- lawthat restrictedproperty rightsfor thebenefit of thepublicwas permissible). 310.See supra text accompanying note 282 (characterizing as loyalty “actinginthe bestinterest of citizens andfuture generations”). 311.See supra notes 303–05 and accompanying text (recognizing that Canada must amend its Constitution in order to impose fiduciarydutiesonParliament and legislatures). 312.Garver, supra note158, at 318–20 (surveying andsummarizing various thinkers’ conceptions of ecologically holistic legal regimes). 313.See generally Fiduciary Nature, supra note 195, at 264–65 (examiningthe interplay of public interest,accountability, fairness, impartiality, and reasonableness). 516 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:485 review of environmentalmatters can make avaluable contributiontothe natureand content of potentialfiduciary duties, becauseitdemonstratesthat courts already imposeobligations on governmentstorealizeenvironmental preservationand promotionwhenthey interpretconceptsofpublic lawthat areanalogoustofiduciary duties, such as reasonablenessinthe circumstances.314 Thecases analyzed in this Essay have demonstrated componentsofthe applicationofthe dutyofloyalty,suchasinterpreting thedelegationtoalocal government broadly as law making, and realizing that implementationisbestachieved at thelevel of governance closestto citizens affected.315 Abroader study of thecase lawhas yettobedone to suggestacomprehensivedefinitionofthe application, content,and scope of thefiduciary duties. Nevertheless, it remainstobeseen whether property rightswouldhave to be redesigned in ordertoadapttoatrusteeship framework.Thisredesigncouldmeanthat ownerswouldact as stewardsto protectthe resourcesontheirland andenvironmental resources wouldbe considered to be commontoall. Theanswertothisquestion will certainly be anecessaryaspect of any solutiontothe greatest challenges of ourtime, thoseofthe Anthropocene.
314.See supra Part II.B (outlininghow thecases examined “illustratehow theworkofjudges can assistindefiningthe obligations of ...governments”). 315.See supra text accompanyingnote237 (drawing on theSupreme CourtofCanada’s holding and dicta). EL SALVADOR’S MINING BAN AND MINING IN ONTARIO’S RING OF FIRE FROM THE LENS OF ECOLOGICAL LAW
CarlaSbert*†
INTRODUCTION...... 517 I. THE LENSOFECOLOGICAL LAW ...... 518 II. EL SALVADOR’S MINING BAN...... 521 A. BriefContext ...... 521 B. TheLaw ProhibitingMetal Mining fromthe Lens of EcologicalLaw...... 523 1. Ecocentrism...... 524 2. EcologicalPrimacy ...... 524 3. EcologicalJustice...... 527 III. MININGINONTARIO’S RINGOFFIRE...... 529 A. BriefContext ...... 529 B. Selected RulesGoverning Mining in theRingofFire from theLens of Ecological Law...... 531 1. AccessingMineralsand Land UsePlanning...... 532 2. Consultationand Free Priorand Informed Consent...... 534 3. Minimizing and RedressingHarm...... 536 C. Lens of EcologicalLaw Analysis...... 537 1. Ecocentrism...... 538 2. EcologicalPrimacy ...... 539 3. EcologicalJustice...... 541 CONCLUSION ...... 545
INTRODUCTION
As thetopicofthe workshop at whichthisEssay waspresented indicates, one of thechallengesofthe Anthropoceneisto shift from environmentaltoecologicallaw.Iunderstandecological lawasanew legal paradigm aimedatconstrainingeconomic activity within ecological limits and at promotingand supportinganecologically just society. To better
*Ph.D. candidate, University of Ottawa,Faculty of Law. ThisEssay waspresented at the Joint E4A Law andGovernance Initiative/ELGA Workshop, From Environmental to Ecological Law: An AnthropoceneChallenge,whichwas heldOctober 17–18, 2017 in Montreal,Quebec, Canada. †Thisresearch wasgenerously supported by the the Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canadaand the University of Ottawa. 518 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517 understandthe challenges and opportunitiesfor ashift to this new paradigm,Ihave proposed a lens of ecological law and hereIapply this lens in twodifferent cases concerning mining. TheAnthropocene wouldnot have occurred without theBronze Age and it will not unfoldwithout minerals.Mineral extractionhas greatly expanded with theGreat Acceleration,1 contributingtoecological degradationand grave social impacts.2 We maybeunabletoimagine human civilizationwithout minerals, but we have to reimagine their extractionand usetoavoid harm to thelandscape, water, wildlife, workers, women, and communities. Ecological lawisone important leverto transform mining in theAnthropocene. Understanding how current laws differfromecologicallaw can contribute to this transition. To shed some light on this question, this Essay appliesalens of ecological law to twocase studies:ElSalvador’smetal mining banand theproposed mineral developmentinOntario’s Ring of Fire.
I. THE LENSOFECOLOGICAL LAW
The lens of ecologicallaw is an analytical tool forcritiquing existing lawtoidentify majorobstacles and opportunitiesfor ashift to ecological law.3 It is comprisedofthree interconnectedprinciples:
1. Ecocentrism: “[r]ecognize and [r]espect the[v]alue of all [b]eings” and theinterconnectednessamong them,equally “[p]romotingthe [i]nterests of [h]umanand [n]on-[h]uman [m]embersofthe Earth community.”4
1. MARINA FISCHER-KOWALSKI ET AL., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME,DECOUPLING NATURAL RESOURCE USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTSFROM ECONOMIC GROWTH 10 (2011);Will Steffen et al., The Trajectory of theAnthropocene:The Great Acceleration,2ANTHROPOCENE REV.81, 89 (2015). 2. See,e.g.,CLIVE PONTING,AGREEN HISTORY OF THE WORLD:THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE COLLAPSEOFGREAT CIVILIZATIONS 325, 327–28 (1993) (“The massive increase inmining operations to produce metals ...has inevitably made amajor andhighlyvisible impact on the environment.”); THE GAIA FOUND., UNDER-MINING AGRICULTURE:HOW THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES THREATEN OUR FOOD SYSTEMS 9(2014), https://www.gaiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ UnderMiningAgriculture_Report_lowres.pdf (“Given theEarth’s current ecological fragility, anyfurther devastationand ‘toxification’ of lands, soils,watersand biodiversity by mining wouldbeplanetary suicide”). 3. For adetailed discussion of ecological law,see Carla SbertCarlsson, AmparosFiled by Indigenous CommunitiesAgainst Mining Concessions in Mexico: Implications foraShift in Ecological Law,10MEXICAN L. REV.3,7(2017). 4.Id.at8. 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 519
Theprinciple of ecocentrism considers the view of thehuman-Earth relationshipunderlyingthe law; whether theinterconnectedness of all membersofthe Earth community is recognized; and whether human and non-humanbeings areequally valued.5
2. EcologicalPrimacy: “[e]nsurethat [s]ocial and [e]conomic [b]ehavior and [s]ystems are[e]cologically [b]ound, [r]especting PlanetaryBoundaries.”6
Theprincipleofecological primacy involvesseveral relatedelements: ensuringhuman development is pursued without irreversiblyimpairing ecologicalintegrity7 or crossing planetaryboundaries;8 constraining materialand energyuse within ecologicallimits;9 and restoring and maintainingecological integrity.10 Some ecologicallaw scholars arguethat the“Holocene concept”11 of ecologicalintegrity shouldbealignedwith the concept of theAnthropocene.12 Iuse theParksCanadaAgency’s definition of “ecological integrity,” whichstatesthat“ecosystems haveintegrity when they havetheir nativecomponents(plants, animals and otherorganisms)
5.Id. 6.Id.at9. 7. See,e.g.,Stephen Woodley, Ecological Integrityand Canada’sNational Parks, 27 GEORGE WRIGHT F. 151, 158-59 (2010) (“In Canadian national parks, ecological integrity has evolved from ascientific idea into amanagement system.”);JackManno, Whythe Global EcologicalIntegrity Group? The Rise, Declineand RediscoveryofaRadicalConcept, in CONFRONTING ECOLOGICALAND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE:ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY FOR LAW,POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 36–37 (Laura Westra, PrueTaylor &Agnès Michelot eds.,2013) (recognizing how theindustrial use of chemicals affectsecologicalintegrity); Kate Turner&Karen Beazley, An ExplorationofIssues and Values Inherent in theConcept of EcologicalIntegrity,32ENVIRONMENTS 45, 46 (2004) (exploringthe “various controversies andperceptions associated with thedefinitionofecologicalintegrity and of the rolesofscience and philosophyembodied in theconcept”);ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY:INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENT,CONSERVATION, AND HEALTH 22 (DavidPimentel, Laura Westra &ReedF.Nosseds., Island Press2000) (“[T]hereisagrowingbody of policyand lawthat mandates theprotectionand restorationofecologicalintegrity.”). 8. JohanRockström et al., PlanetaryBoundaries: Exploringthe Safe Operating Space for Humanity,14ECOLOGY &SOC’Y 32, 37, 52 (2009),https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/ art32/. 9. SbertCarlsson, supra note3,at11. 10.Id. at 20. 11.For example,Peter Burdon referred to ecological integrity as a“Holocene concept”during aquestionand answer session following an Economicsfor the Anthropocene Presentation. Carla Sbert, The Ring of Fireand theElSalvador Mining Ban fromthe Lens of Ecological Law,YOUTUBE (Jan.17, 2018),https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_zuIVL4DqI&feature=youtu.be. 12.Geoffrey Garver, AComplex Adaptive LegalSystemfor the Challenges of the Anthropocene, in ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS INTEGRITY:GOVERNANCE,LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 232, 235 (LauraWestra et al.eds.,2015). 520 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517 andprocesses (such as growth and reproduction) intact”13 with the understanding that “ecosystemsare inherently dynamic, and have ahistory of human interventionand evenmanagement.”14
3. EcologicalJustice: “[e]nsure [e]quitable[a]ccess to theEarth’s [s]ustaining[c]apacity for[p]resent and [f]uture [g]enerations of [h]umans and [o]ther [l]ife [f]ormsand [s]ystems,and [a]void the[i]nequitable[a]llocation of [e]nvironmental [h]arms.”15
Theprincipleofecological justice is basedprimarilyonKlaus Bosselmann’sconcept,which includes intragenerational,intergenerational, and interspeciesequity.16 Theprincipleofecological justiceprobeswhether thelaw provides ethical grounding fordecisions that lead to theequitable useofthe planet’ssustainingcapacity and promotes taking onlywhatone needs and thefairdistributionof—and restrainton—wealth.17 Finally,this principleaskswhether environmental harms areequitablydistributed among current and future generations of humansand otherbeings.18 In thecasestudies that follow,Iusethis lens of ecological law to reflect on theimplications of ashift from environmental to ecological law in thecontextofmining. By looking to El Salvador, Iconsiderwhether the first attemptbyacountry to banmetal mining is astepinthe direction towardsecological law.19 In considering themineral extractionproposed in Ontario’sRingofFire—whichiswithin one of themostecologically intact regions of theworld20—I searchfor elementsofecological lawinalegal framework that purportedlyensures mineral extractionissustainable.21
13.PANEL ON THE ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY OF CAN.’S NAT’L PARKS,UNIMPAIRED FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS?: CONSERVING ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY WITH CANADA’S NATIONAL PARKS 2 (2000),publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/R62-323-2000-1E.pdf. 14.Woodley, supra note7,at159. 15.Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at11. 16.Klaus Bosselmann, Ecological Justiceand Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY:AREADER 150-52 (Benjamin J. Richardson&Stepan Wood eds., 2006) [hereinafter Bosselmann, EcologicalJustice and Law]; Klaus Bosselmann, THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY: TRANSFORMING LAW AND GOVERNANCE 102–04, 106 (2ded. 2017) [hereinafter Bosselmann,THE PRINCIPLE]. 17.See Bosselmann, Ecological Justice and Law, supra note 16, at 157 (“[R]esource distribution is determined by sustaining thepotentialofresources in view of future needs ....”). 18.See id. (“[D]ecisions regardingthe distributionofresources must sustain the needs of future generations.”). 19.See infra PartII.B (evaluating El Salvador’sLaw ProhibitingMetal Mining through a lens of ecological law). 20.FAR N. SCI.ADVISORY PANEL,SCIENCE FOR A CHANGING FAR NORTH ii (2010) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL], www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/24006/302262.pdf. 21. See infra PartIII.C(applying a lens of ecological law to mining lawinOntario’s Ring of Fire). 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 521
II. EL SALVADOR’S MINING BAN
A. BriefContext
TheRepublic of El Salvador is thesmallest country in CentralAmerica and themostdensely populated,with approximately 6.5millionpeople livinginanareaof21,040 square kilometers.22 Between approximately 1980–1992, thecountry experiencedabrutal civilwar in which70,000– 80,000 peoplewerekilledand one-fifthofthe populationwas displaced.23 Amountainous country with high seismic activity andextreme weather events, El Salvador also suffers fromserious environmentaldegradation, includingminimal forest cover, high erosion,and waterscarcity and contamination.24 Thecountry’s high vulnerability is exacerbated by climate change and deforestation, whichincreasethe likelihood of landslides and floods,25 and by poverty,which aggravates thenegativeimpactsofnatural disasters.26 HistorianChristopher M. White describes El Salvadorasa country “which simultaneously hasendured great hardshipwhile maintainingavibrantculture and an optimistic outlook forthe future.”27 El Salvador is also the first country in theworld to enact alaw prohibiting metalmining.28 Mineralextraction hasoccurred in El Salvador since themid-18th century,29 but mining has not beenamajoractivity in thecountry.30 Mining operations allbut came to ahaltinthe 1980s mostly due to thecivil war.31
22. See RenéSantamaria Varela et al., El Salvador,ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, www.britannica.com/place/El-Salvador (last updated Feb. 4, 2019)[hereinafter El Salvador, ENCYCLOPAEDIA](estimatingthe populationofElSalvador at 6.5million). 23.CHRISTOPHER M. WHITE,THE HISTORY OF EL SALVADOR 9, 109 (2009); El Salvador, ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 22. 24.MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA DE EL SALVADOR (MINEC) [EL SAL.MINISTRY OF ECONOMY], SERVICIOS DE CONSULTORÍA PARALAEVALUACIÓN AMBIENTAL ESTRATÉGICA (EAE) DEL SECTOR MINERO METÁLICO DE EL SALVADOR,INFORME FINAL 5–6, 9–10, 12 (2011) [hereinafter METAL MINING SECTOR SEA]. 25.WHITE, supra note23, at 5; cf. Kristin Stranc,Note, Managing ScarceWater in theFace of Global Climate Change: Preventing Conflictinthe Horn of Africa,39HOFSTRA L. REV.245, 259 (2010) (“Scholarshave warnedofthe potentialfor increased natural disasters due to global climate change. The damagedonebysuch disasters is exacerbated by deforestationand over-cultivationof land.”(footnoteomitted)). 26.METAL MINING SECTOR SEA, supra note24, at 12. 27.WHITE, supra note23, at xvi. 28.NinaLakhani, El Salvador Makes History as FirstNationtoImpose Blanket Ban on Metal Mining,GUARDIAN (Mar.30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/mar/30/el- salvador-makes-history-first-nation-to-impose-blanket-ban-on-metal-mining. 29.METAL MINING SECTOR SEA, supra note24, at 33. 30.WHITE, supra note23, at 37. 31.METAL MINING SECTOR SEA, supra note24, at 33. 522 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517
ReconstructioninElSalvadorafterthe waraligned with neoliberal trends throughout Latin Americatoencourage foreigninvestment.32 El Salvador reformed its mining laws in 1996 andadoptedmechanismsprotecting foreigninvestorstoattract mining companies.33 From 1995 to 1999 there wasmodestindustrialgoldand silver production,34 but currently only artisanalminingisongoing.35 By theearly 2000s,approximately 29 companies had obtained explorationconcessions in El Salvador, but no exploitationconcessions were active.36 At thesametime, environmental organizations,communities,and civil society groups beganopposingmetal mining due to therisks to waterand health,especially given thegrave waterpollutionand scarcity issues facing El Salvador. In 2006, theNational RoundtableAgainstMetal Mining (La Mesa NacionalFrentealaMineríaMetálica) submittedthe first proposal to ban metalmininginthe country.37 In 2007, La Mesa gainedthe supportof theinfluentialSalvadoranCatholic Church forapermanent prohibitionof metalmining,38 and apollfound that almost 65% of thepopulationopposed metalminingintheircommunity.39 A de facto moratoriumwas established in March2008 when thePresident publicly said he wouldworkwith the legislature to reform thelaw to permit miningonlyonceithad been shown
32.WHITE, supra note23, at 112; see Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, Canadian Mining in Latin America (1990 to Present): AProvisionalHistory,41CAN.J.LATIN AM.&CARIBBEAN STUD.95, 100 (2016)(explaining that in the1990s, “[n]ew mining codes, new regulatory regimes, andnew institutional arrangementsbetween stateand industry were developedtochannel international capital into”Latin America’s mineralsector). 33.DecretoNo. 544, arts.1,3,Enero 24, 1996, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], at99(El Sal.), https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo-digital-del-diario-oficial/; see also DecretoNo. 732, art. 1, Noviembre 11, 1999, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.],at7(El Sal.), https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo- digital-del-diario-oficial/ (outliningagoal of promotingforeigninvestment); Michael L. Dougherty, El Salvador Makes History,N.AM.CONGRESS ON LATIN AM.(Apr.12, 2017), https://nacla.org/news/ 2017/04/19/el-salvador-makes-history(explaining that in 1995, “El Salvador established a3%royalty rate for mineral production” to “secure foreign direct investment”). 34.Commerce Grp. Corp.v.Republic of El Salvador,ICSIDCaseNo. ARB/09/17, Noticeof Arbitration, ¶14(July 2, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/cases/296. 35.METAL MINING SECTOR SEA, supra note 24, at 34. 36. Id. 37. Nueva propuesta de Leyparaprohibir la minería en El Salvador,FUNDACIÓN DE ESTUDIOS PARA LA APLICACIÓN DEL DERECHO [FoundationofStudies forthe ApplicationofLaw] (Sept. 18, 2013) (on file with VermontLaw Review). 38.Press Release,Conferencia Episcopal de El Salvador [Episcopal Conference of El Sal.],La Explotación MineraenElSalvador: CuidemoslaCasadeTodos (May 3, 2007), http://www.caritaselsalvador.org.sv/documentos/otros/65-cuidemos-la-casa-de-todos/file. 39. See INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA,ENCUESTA SOBRE CONOCIMIENTOS YPERCEPCIONES HACIA LA MINERÍA EN ZONAS AFECTADASPOR LA INCURSIÓN MINERA EN EL SALVADOR (2007), www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/Web/2008/finalmineria040208.pdf (reportingthat when peoplewereasked whether they agreed or disagreed that more mining projectsshouldbeopened, 49.5% responded they disagreedstrongly, while 14.5% responded that thedisagreed somewhat). 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 523 that “gold [could] be exploitedtoboostthe economywithout damaging resources.”40 Thegovernment completed aStrategicEnvironmentalAssessment (SEA)ofthe metalminingsectorinSeptember 2011, documentingmultiple serious obstacles foreffectivelyaddressing theenvironmentalimpactsand risksofmetal mining activitiesinElSalvador.41 Theseobstacles included gravepotentialimpactstohealth and waterresources andthe government’s insufficient capacity to manage them.42 Thefact that thecountry wasbeing sued by foreignminingcompanies in twointernational investor–state disputes,43 and the2016arbitrationaward infavorofElSalvadorinone of them,44 contributed to strengthening supporttoban mining.45 Finally,in March 2017, El Salvadorbecamethe firstcountry to adoptalaw prohibitingall surface andsubsurfacemetal mining.46
B. The LawProhibitingMetal Mining fromthe Lens of Ecological Law
TheLaw ProhibitingMetal Mining (LPMM) bans allmetal mining activitiesaswellasthe useoftoxicchemicalsinmetal mining; cancelsall pending licensing procedures;and prohibits future politicians frompassing laws that allowmetal mining.47 TheLPMMcharged theMinistry of Economywith closingall minesand coordinatingthe remediationof mining sites—thelatterincollaborationwith theMinistry of Environment
40.Pac RimCayman LLC v. RepublicofElSalvador,ICSID CaseNo. ARB/09/12, Award, ¶6.125(Oct. 14, 2016),www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7640_0.pdf. 41.METAL MINING SECTOR SEA, supra note 24, at 72. 42. Id. 43.In2009, theminingcompanies Pacific Rimand Commerce Group,Inc. separately initiated investor–statedisputesagainst El Salvador. Pac Rim Cayman LLC,ICSIDCase No.ARB/09/12 ¶6.125; Commerce Grp. Corp. v. Republic of El Salvador,ICSIDCase No.ARB/09/17, Award,¶3 (Mar. 14, 2011). 44. Pac RimCayman LLC,ICSIDCase No.ARB/09/12¶11.17. In theothercase, the tribunal determined in March2011 that it didnot have jurisdiction because Commerce waspursuing thesame matters in courtwithin El Salvador (unsuccessfully,asitturned out). CommerceGrp. Corp.,ICSID CaseNo. ARB/09/17 ¶¶ 134, 138, 140. The SupremeCourtofElSalvador decided two domesticcases againstCommerce in 2010. PROCURADURÍAPARA LA DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS [ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS], INFORMEESPECIAL DE LA PROCURADURÍA PARA LA DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS –ELLEGADO DE LA MINA SAN SEBASTIAN YSUS IMPACTOS EN LA POBLACIÓN 46 (Jan.2016), issuu.com/pedrocabezas/docs/informe_especial_pddh__legado_de_la. 45. See Robin Broad&JohnCavanagh, El Salvador Votes forWaterOverGold,NATION (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/el-salvador-votes-for-water-over-gold(explaining how attempts by corporations to undermine El Salvador’sminingban “sparked renewed resistance” and supportfor thelaw). 46.DecretoNo. 639,art.1,Abril4,2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], at 6(El Sal.), https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo-digital-del-diario-oficial/. 47. Id. at arts. 2–4. 524 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517 andNatural Resources.48 Theban includes artisanalminingand establishes atwo-yearperiodfor thosepracticingittotransition to othereconomic activities with thesupportofthe state.49 TheLPMM“is of public orderand its provisions shallprevailoverany othertothe contrary.”50 Given that ecologicallaw aims to ecologically constrain economic activity,doesthisfirst lawprohibitingmetal mining signalashift to ecological law? Theanalysisthat followsreflectsonthe LPMMfromthe perspectiveofeach of theprinciples comprisingthe lens of ecological law.
1. Ecocentrism
In theminingban,thereare no elements of ecocentrism.The preamble to theLPMMstatesanunambiguously anthropocentricvisionunderlying theSalvadoran legalsystembynotingthatthe ConstitutionofElSalvador “recognizes thehuman personasthe origin and end of theactivitiesofthe State.”51 Moreover,the LPMM does not recognize theinterconnectedness of humans with otherbeingsorthe interests of non-human membersofthe Earth community.52
2. Ecological Primacy
Ecologicalprimacy impliesthat lawshould be informed by the scientific understandingofEarth systems,ecosystems,and theirrelationto human activities.53 El Salvador’s prohibitionofmetal mining is an example of ecological primacy,eventhough theLPMMdoes not usethe term ecological integrity or make any referencetoplanetary boundaries. The LPMMdecree notes that in establishing theban,the legislatureconsidered scientific knowledge concerning theecologicalvulnerability of El Salvador (especially relatedtowater), the impacts of metalminingonhuman and ecosystemhealth,and theenvironmental degradationproblemsfacing El Salvador.54 Thelaw aims to avoid pushing thecountry’s waterresources
48.Id. at art. 6. 49.Id. at art. 2. 50. Id. at art.9(translation providedbyCarlaSbert). 51. Id. at pmbl.I(translationprovided by Carla Sbert). 52.See id. (emphasizing that thelaw is designed to protect human persons). 53.See Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at9(“Ecologicalprimacy provides clarityabout the need to ensure human development is pursued without irreversibly impairing natural systems....”). 54.DecretoNo. 639, at pmbl.IV–VI.The Preamble of theLPMMstates: IV.Thatin2010, theUnited Nations Environment Program ranked El Salvador as thecountry with thesecond worst environmental degradationinthe Americas after Haiti. Because of this, metalminingdue to its environmental 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 525 beyond ecologicallimits andacknowledgesthat metalmininginvolves an unacceptableriskoftransgressing theselimits.55 As thecampaign to ban mining calledfor,56 theLPMMeffectivelyprioritizes water(ecological values)over gold(short-term economic gain).57 Also,the LPMM addresses at its source theproblem of ecological degradationfrommining.58 Rather than attemptingtomitigatethe negativeimpactsofmetal miningthrough “sustainablemining” standards,59 El Salvadorchosetoprevent further potentialharmtoecologicalvaluesbyprohibitingthe activity altogether.60 At thesametime, although theLPMMtakes aprecautionaryapproach in linewith ecological primacy,the banisnot quite ashift in paradigm. Rather,itappears to be arareexampleofthe sustainable development calculation(whereby environmental,social, and economic concerns are balanced) turningout in favorofenvironmentalconcerns because the ecological and social costsofmetal extractionwerefound to be so much greaterthan thepotentialeconomic benefits, especially giventhe absenceof astrong mining traditioninElSalvador.61 Another concurrence with ecological primacy is that while theLPMM seemstonarrowlyfocus on banningthe extractionand productionofmetals
impact on water resourcesbecomes athreat to thesustainabledevelopment and wellbeing of theSalvadoranfamily. V. That the activities of explorationand exploitation of metal mining, constitute athreattothe health of theinhabitantsofthe country, carry severerisks for the environment,characterized by endangeringforests,soils and water resources, due to aciddrainage, heavy metals and highlytoxicwastes, like mercury,cyanide and others; and by consumingimportant amountsofwater in all its operationphases,with the probability of destroying landscapes, polluting the airand generatingsocial conflict. VI.Thatthe StrategicEnvironmental Assessmentofthe Metallic Mining Sectorconductedin2011 by theMinistryofEnvironment and Natural Resources, concluded that theconditions of vulnerability in El Salvador implyanimportant barrier to the possibilitythatthe countrycouldguarantee metal mining that effectively controls itsenvironmental andsocial risks and impacts,orachieve a positive contributiontosocial andeconomic developmentofthe country. Id. (translation provided by CarlaSbert). 55. Id. 56.See Broad&Cavanagh, supra note45(emphasizingwater degradation as amotivationfor theLPMM’spassage). 57. Id. (explaining that El Salvador’s mining ban chooses “water over gold”). 58.DecretoNo. 639, at pmbl.V. 59.METAL MINING SECTOR SEA, supra note24, at 79. PacificRim vowed to apply “sustainablemining” standards in its El Doradoproject.Pac RimCaymanLLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No.ARB/09/12, Award, ¶3.8 (Oct.14, 2016), www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7640_0.pdf. 60.DecretoNo. 639, at art. 1; Broad &Cavanagh, supra note45. 61.DecretoNo. 639, at pmbl.VI; METAL MINING SECTOR SEA, supra note 24, at 55. 526 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517 within thecountry,62 it also indirectly constrainsmaterialand energy use in El Salvador. Presumably, theconsumptionofenergyand materials,and the generationofwaste, that wouldhave resulteddirectly and indirectly from metalminingwill be averted.63 Yetnothing indicatesthat El Salvador intends to uselessmetal or to substitute theforegone locally sourcedmetals with metals produced elsewherewith less ecologicalimpact.64 Indeed, the net effectofthe ban couldbeworse forecological sustainability ifEl Salvador’smetal consumptiondoes not decrease andthe metals it could have producedlocally areimportedfromajurisdiction that hasworse practices or involves additional ecological impacts fromtransport.65 In contrast,ajurisdictionapplying ecologicallaw wouldarguablylimit the consumptionofmetalstothoserequiredfor basic needswithin that jurisdiction, userecovered and recycled metals (from landfills and other existing stocks within that jurisdiction) to satisfy thoseneeds,and only allowthe importofmetalsthat couldnot be obtained from thesesources.66 Lastly,asnoted,the LPMMalso ordersthe remediationofareas affected by mining, whichisconsistent with ecological primacy.67 However,the standard adopted—“to return to thepopulationthe conditions of ahealthyenvironment”68—does not conformwith ecologicallaw,which wouldinstead require restoringthe health of theecosystemasawhole—for
62.DecretoNo. 639, at art. 1(providing that thepurpose of theLPMMis“to prohibitsurface and subsurface metalmininginthe territory of theRepublic[of El Salvador]” (translationprovided by Carla Sbert)). 63. See,e.g.,GeoffreyBlight, Mine Waste: ABrief OverviewofOrigins,Quantities, and Methods of Storage, in WASTE:AHANDBOOKFOR MANAGEMENT 77 (Trevor M. Letcher &Daniel A. Vallero eds., 2011) (explaining that the“volumes of waste” produced from mining “are commensurately large”); The Market Underestimates theTremendous Energy Consumptionbythe Gold Mining Industry, SRSROCCO REP.(Feb.3,2019),https://srsroccoreport.com/market-underestimates-tremendous-energy- consumption-gold-mining-industry (calculating theenergy and productioncostsofvariousmetalsand materials). 64.See DecretoNo. 639, at art. 1(banning metalmininginElSalvador without explaining wherethe country wouldacquire metals). 65.Cf. Tiina Häyhä et al., From Planetary Boundaries to National Fair Sharesofthe Global SafeOperatingSpace—HowCan theScales be Bridged?,40GLOBAL ENVTL.CHANGE 60, 62 (2016) (“[I]nternational trade...allows acountry’senvironmental impacttobeexternalized, forexampleby relocating resource-intensive or highly polluting industries inother countries.Asaresult, theproduction (and potentialrelated environmental impacts) and consumptionofgoods increasinglyhappens in different locations andpartofthe territorially reduced environmental pressure in one country maycome at thecost of increasingimpact elsewhere.”). 66.For apreliminary discussion of need-basedmineralsuse, see CarlaSbert, Re-imagining Mining: The Earth Charter as aGuide forEcological Mining Reform,6IUCN ACAD.ENVTL.L. EJOURNAL 66, 84 (2015) [hereinafter Sbert, Re-imagining](explaining how societycould extractnon- renewable resources“based on thereasonableneeds of livinggenerations (equitablyconsidered) without jeopardizing theability of futuregenerationstoenjoy similaraccesstothose resources”). 67.DecretoNo. 639, at art. 6. 68. Id. (translation providedbyCarla Sbert). 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 527 its human andother inhabitants—as well as reestablishing ecological integrity tothe greatestdegree possible.69
3. EcologicalJustice
TheLPMMdoes not make any referencetointragenerational, intergenerational, or interspeciesequity.70 Yetthe metalminingban is the result of asocialmovement groundedinconcerns regarding accesstoclean water, exploitationofthe country’s resources by foreigncompanies,and environmentaldegradationand pollutionthreatening health and livelihoods.71 These concerns areall relevant to ecological justice’s focus on equitableaccesstothe planet’s sustaining capacity and its questioning of unfairexposuretoenvironmental harms;although, under ecologicallaw they wouldnot be limitedonlytohumans.72 Also,asnoted above, theLPMMbansthe extractionofmetalswithin El Salvador,but it does not addressthe use of metals generally,73 which under ecologicallaw wouldbebased on needs andthe fair distributionof wealth.74 Finally,animportant aspect fromthe perspectiveofecological justice is thecommitment to supportartisanal miners—knownasgüiriseros—to transitiontoother economicactivities.75 Thereare serious,yet insufficiently studied anddiagnosed,health impacts relatedtoartisanalminingfor güiriseros,their families, neighbors, and othersinnearby communities.76 More broadly, thearea’ssustainingcapacity is underminedbythe pollution generatedfrommining, andthus not accessibletosupportthe flourishing of humansand otherbeingstodayand in thefuture.77 From theperspectiveof ecological justice,the transitionofgüiriseros to otheractivities wouldhave
69.Sbert Carlsson, supra note 3, at 11 (“Governments andindividualsshalltakeall available measures to enhanceand sustainthe capacity of social and natural systemstomaintaintheirintegrity.” (quotingNicholas A. Robinson, The Resiliency Principle,5IUCN ACAD.ENVTL.L.EJ. 19, 24 (2014))). 70.See DecretoNo. 639, at arts.1–11 (finding no reference to theterms intragenerational, intergenerational,and interspecies equityinthe LPMM). 71.METAL MINING SECTOR SEA, supra note 24, at 26–27. 72.Sbert Carlsson, supra note 3, at 11. 73.See DecretoNo. 639, at art. 1(providing onlythat mining is prohibitedinElSalvador); see alsosupra notes 62–66 and accompanying text (outlininghow El Salvador’smetal mining ban does not addressmetalsconsumptiongenerally). 74.Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at12. 75.VLADIMIR PACHECO CUEVA,AN ASSESSMENTOFMINE LEGACIES AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM:ACASE STUDYFROM LATIN AMERICA 28–31, 40–41 (2017). 76. See id. at 41 (speculatingthat “the handlingofmercury maybeaffectingthe long term healthofthe Güiriseros,theirfamiliesand theenvironment”because“no toxicity pathway study [nor] serology of the region...ha[s] taken place”). 77. Id. 528 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517 to ensurethe newactivitiesare ecologically viableand consistent with the equitablesharingofthe sustaining capacity of theregionbetween current andfuturehumans and other beings.78 Thetransitionshouldfurther be complemented by restoration of thesites,forests,and waterways that have beenimpacted, with thegoal of restoring thegreatest possiblelevelsof ecological integrity.79 Details arenot yet availableonhow thegovernment will supportthe transitionawayfromartisanal mining, and thereseems to be no progressonremediation of contaminated mine sites.80 Instead, artisanal miners appear to be working topermanently exemptartisanal mining fromthe metalminingban.81 In summary, theLPMMdoesnot represent afullshift in paradigm towardsecological law, but it is an important step in this direction. By foreclosing metalextractionand orderingthe restoration of El Salvador’s stressed ecologicalsystems,thislaw establishesaprecedent that recognizes ecological sustainability as apreconditionfor flourishingsocietiesand economies.82 At thesametime, however,becausethe ban is not grounded on an ecocentricworldview,itismorevulnerabletoshiftingshort-term human interests.83
78.Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at7–11. 79.Id. at 9, 11–12. 80.The regulations implementingthe LPMM, publishedinJune2017, onlyadd that the Ministry of Economy will provide creditunder preferentialconditions and other types of support for güiriseros to “reconvert” to otherproductiveactivities. DecretoNo. 25,art.3,Junio2,2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] at 7(El Sal.); seealso AlfredoCarías, La minería aún es causadedisputas en El Salvador,CONTRAPUNTO (Feb. 1, 2018), contrapunto.com.sv/sociedad/periodismociudadano/la- mineria-aun-es-causade-disputas-en-el-salvador/5784 (explainingthat theuncertainty surrounding the transitionfromartisanal mining generates distrust among the güiriseros). 81.AndrésMcKinley, Cuidado El Salvador:la‘minería verde’ es un mito,NOTICIAS DE AMERICA LATINA YELCARIBE (June 14, 2018), https://www.nodal.am/2018/06/cuidado-el-salvador-la- mineria-verde-es-un-mito-por-andres-mckinley/. 82.DecretoNo. 639,arts. 1, 6, Abril4,2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.],at5–6 (El Sal.), https://imprentanacional.gob.sv/archivo-digital-del-diario-oficial/. 83.For example, environmental groups arecalling for the metalminingban to be constitutionally enshrined, fearing thatchanges in thelegislature might lead to therepeal of theLPMM, especially given OceanaGold’s attempts “to influence thepopulation...with theidea of ‘Responsible Mining.’” MirinaGarcia, Threats to the LawAgainstMetallic Mining,VARGUARDIA (May 7, 2018), www.stopesmining.org/news/salvadoran-mining-ban/532-threats-to-the-law-against-metallic- miningvanguardia;McKinley, supra note 81. 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 529
III. MININGINONTARIO’S RINGOFFIRE
A. BriefContext
Ontario’sFar Northisalightly populated region that coversabout 40% of theprovince’s territory.84 FirstNations make up more than90% of the region’stotal populationof24,000.85 Theregion is exceptional forits ecological features.86 In 2008, mining companies discoveredsubstantial mineral potential in an area of approximately 5,000 square kilometers inthe centralpartofthe FarNorth region, now knownasthe Ring of Fire.87 This area lieswithin thetraditionalterritoriesofnineOjibway and Cree First Nations unitedunderthe Matawa Tribal Council.88 Many companiesand individuals holdminingclaimsinthe area,89 but onlyone is currently activelypursuing aminethere.90 Despite theRingofFire’smineral potential, some questionthe feasibility of its development,primarilydue to thelack of transportand energy infrastructureinthe remote area and the challenge of negotiatingwith thearea’s FirstNations.91 TheFar NorthAct of 2010 wasmeanttoestablishacollaborativeland use planning process fordevelopmentofthe Far North,92 but it appears to have ledtofurther disagreementbetween theprovinceofOntario andFirst
84.Far North of Ontario,GOV’T ONT., www.ontario.ca/rural-and-north/far-north-ontario(last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 85. Id. 86. See ADVISORY PANEL, supra note20, at xi (providing that “[l]arge intactlandscapeslike theFar North are rare”). 87.JED CHONG,LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT,PUBLICATION NO.2014-17-E, RESOURCES DEVELOPMENTINCANADA:ACASE STUDY ON THE RING OF FIRE 1–3 (2014); ADVISORY PANEL, supra note20, at 65 (providing ahistoryofdiamond mining in theFar North). 88.Unity Declaration, Chiefs CouncilMamow-Wecheekapawetahteewiin (2011), http://www.matawa.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Mamow-Wecheekapawetahteewiin-Unity- Declaration-Signed-July-13-2011.pdf.The member First Nations areAroland,Constance Lake, Eabametoong, Ginoogaming, LongLake#58,MartenFalls,Neskantaga, Nibinamik,and Webequie. Id. 89. See MINISTRY OF ENERGY,N.DEV.&MINES,ONTARIO MINERAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 10 (2015) [hereinafter N. DEV.&MINES], https://www.mndm.gov.on.ca/sites/ default/files/mndm_mds_english_2015.pdf. 90. See LetterfromMark Baker,ProjectsEng’r,Noront Res. Ltd.,toDavid Bell, Project Manager,Can.Envtl. AssessmentAgency(Jan.22, 2012), https://www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents/ p63925/89363E.pdf (detailing the company’s ongoing environmental assessment in preparationfor mining). 91.Jody Porter, Ring of Fire Mining Development StillYears Away from Delivering on a Decade of Hype,CBC NEWS (Jan.30, 2017), www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/ringof-fire-talks- 1.3955236. 92.See Far North Act, S.O. 2010, c. 18, s. 5(Can.)(“The following are objectives forland use planning in theFar North: 1. Asignificant role for FirstNationsinthe planning.”). 530 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517
Nations93 and is “viewedbyFirstNations in [theNishnawbeAskiNation] as an invalid lawand anew form of colonialism.”94 Still, the2014 Regional FrameworkAgreementbetween theMatawaFirst Nations andthe Ontario governmentestablishedacommunity-based negotiationprocessfocusing on land management,revenuesharing, and capacity building.95 Information on how theagreement will be implementedisscant,96 but dissatisfaction among someFirstNations is apparent.97 Mining andrelated developmentinthe Far Northwill have multiple environmentalimpacts, including: loss and fragmentationofhabitat, major rivers, wetlands andpeatlands;impactsongroundwater flowand surface waters; pollutionofthe air, soil,and water; and disturbance of wildlife.98 Mineral prospectinginthe Ring of Fire hasalready impacted theregion.99
93.Holly L. Gardner et al., The Far NorthAct (2010) ConsultativeProcess: ANew Beginning or theReinforcementofanUnacceptable Relationship in Northern Ontario, Canada?,INT’L INDIGENOUS POL’Y J., Aug. 2012, at 11–12; Peggy Smith, AReflection on First NationsintheirBoreal Homelands in Ontario:Between aRockand aCaribou,13CONSERVATION &SOC’Y 23, 26 (2015) (explaining that certain environmentalnon-governmental organizations “negotiat[ed] behind thescenes with government and industry, while avoiding any direct negotiations with FirstNations whomight oppose theirdirection”); see Catie Burlando, Land UsePlanning Policyinthe Far North Regionof Ontario:ConservationTargets, PoliticsofScale, and theRoleofCivil SocietyOrganizations in Aboriginal–StateRelations, at i(2012) (unpublishedPh.D. dissertation, University of Manitoba), https://umanitoba.ca/institutes/natural_resources/canadaresearchchair/thesis/PhD%20Thesis%20Burland o%202012.pdf (“Aboriginal organizations have condemned new comprehensive legislationfor opening theFar North Region to development ....”). 94. See Ontario’s FarNorthAct,NISHNAWBE ASKI NATION,www.nan.on.ca/article/ontarios- far-north-act-463.asp(last visitedApr. 14, 2019) (“In spite of its Treaty andinternational obligations, thefederal government of Canada didnot intervenetoprotect FirstNations in theprocess leadingupto th[e] [FarNorth] Act.”). 95. Regional FrameworkAgreement,First Nations-Ont., Mar. 26, 2014, Ministry of Energy, N. Dev. &Mines. 96. See,e.g.,Letter from Michael Gravelle,Minister of N. Dev. &Mines, to Kathleen Wynne, Premier of Ont. (Jan. 11, 2016),www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/30001/333372.pdf (providing scarce informationonthe FarNorthAct’s implementation). 97. See,e.g.,Press Release, Nishnawbe Aski Nation, Neskantaga and EabametoongDenounce Wynne Government’s Failure on Ring of Fire Planning; SuggestitisTimetoRe-set the Regional Process(May31, 2018),www.nan.on.ca/article/may-31-2018-22595.asp(outliningthe FirstNations’ criticismofhow thegovernment has implemented theagreement); ChiefCorneliusWabasse, What Really Needs to Happen to Make theRingofFire aReality,HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/chief-cornelius-wabasse/ring-of-fire-development_b_6367606.html (“[D]evelopmentinthe Ring of Fire must be partofthe ongoing processofTreaty implementation. No longercan our Treatybeignored and violated. Newagreementscannot be reached while existingones aretreated as if they don’t exist.”). 98.ENVTL.COMM’ROFONT., SERVING THE PUBLIC:ANNUAL REPORT 2012/2013, at 66 (2013) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT], docs.assets.eco.on.ca/reports/environmental-protection/2012-2013/2012- 13-AR.pdf. 99. Compare Wildlands League, Flying Over the RingofFireinCanada,VIMEO (Dec. 12, 2015),https://vimeo.com/148702660 (documentingthe Ring of Fire Region priortoany mining activity), with JodyPorter, Mining ExplorationCausingPermanent Damage in Ring of Fire, Wildlands 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 531
In July 2008, theOntario government announceditwouldprotect at least225,000 square kilometers of theNorthernBoreal region in an interconnected network of conservationlands100 and laterformalized this in theFar NorthAct of 2010.101 Ontario’sapproachinpracticetothe regional developmentofthisareahas beendeeplycriticized by theEnvironmental Commissioner of Ontario102 and otherswho hadpraisedthe conservation aims of theFar NorthAct of 2010.103 Oneofthe main concerns hasbeen thegovernment’s failuretoconductaRegional StrategicEnvironmental Assessment(R-SEA) beforeany development in theRingofFire.104
B. Selected RulesGoverningMininginthe Ring of Fire from theLens of EcologicalLaw
In contrast to theconciseSalvadoran LPMMreviewed earlier,105 the legalframework governingmininginthe Ring of Fire involvesasuite of lengthy andcomplex laws and regulations.106 Without attemptinga comprehensiveanalysis,Ireview below—fromthe lens of ecological law— some key provincial rulesthat applytomininginthe Ring of Fire.
League Says,CBC NEWS (June29, 2015), www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/miningexploration- causing-permanent-damage-in-ring-of-fire-wildlands-league-says-1.3129705 (describinghow “mining activity is causingpermanent damage in [theRingofFire’s] fragileecosystem”). 100.Press Release, Office of the Premier, Protecting Ontario’s Northern BorealForest(July 14, 2008),https://news.ontario.ca/opo/en/2008/07/protecting-ontarios-northern-boreal-forest.html. 101.Far North Act, S.O. 2010, c.18, s. 5(Can.) (providing that one objective of the Far North Actisthe protectionofculturalvalues and ecological systems“by including at least 225,000 square kilometres of the FarNorth in an interconnectednetworkofprotected areas”). 102.ANNUAL REPORT, supra note98, at 63–75. 103.Cheryl Chetkiewicz &JustinaRay, Ontario’sRing of FireDevelopment Plan HasMajor Flaws,TORONTO STAR (May 29, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2017/05/29/ ontarios-ring-of-fire-development-plan-has-major-flaws.html(criticizinghow Ontario has implemented theFar North Act). 104.ANNUAL REPORT, supra note98, at 72; see also CHERYL CHETKIEWICZ &ANASTASIA M. LINTNER,GETTING IT RIGHT IN ONTARIO’S FAR NORTH:THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN THE RING OF FIRE [WAWANGAJING]4(2014), www.wcscanada.org/Portals/96/Documents/ RSEA_Report_WCSCanada_Ecojustice_FINAL.pdf (“R- SEA ...isadecision-supporttooland participatory process that addressesenvironmental sustainability at aregionalscale.”);ColeAtlin &RobertB.Gibson, LastingRegionalGains fromNon-Renewable Resource Extraction:The Role of Sustainability-Based Cumulative Effects Assessmentand Regional Planning forMining Development in Canada,4EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES &SOC’Y 36, 46–50 (2017) (explaininghow sustainabledecision making couldbeimplemented in theRingofFire). 105.See supra PartII.B(analyzing El Salvador’s LPMM). 106.See infra Parts III.B.1–3 (explainingthe legal frameworkthatregulates mining in theRing of Fire). 532 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517
1. AccessingMineralsand Land UsePlanning
Under Canadian law, theprovinceofOntario owns themineralsinthe Ring of Fire and has jurisdictiontoregulatetheirextraction.107 While not beforethe courts,thisjurisdictioniscontested. According to Ontario, the Matawa FirstNations surrendered theirtraditionalterritoriestothe Crown under theJames BayTreaty (Treaty9), butmembersofthe FirstNations maintained aright to usethe lands “until [they] might be ‘taken up’ by the governmentfor avariety of purposes includingsettlement,miningand lumbering.”108 For theirpart, theeight Matawa First Nations party to Treaty 9(allexcept Long Lake #58 FirstNation) “assertthat they nevergave up theirland or theirright to governthemselves ....[A]ndthat they have shared jurisdictionwith Ontario.”109 Recognizing this important difference of interpretation, theanalysis below focuses primarily on thelegal framework in placeper Ontario’s interpretation. TheMiningAct governs dispositionofCrown-owned mineralsin Ontario.110 Consistent with thefreeentry system,111 prospectingonCrown lands,which arenot subjecttorightsheldbyothersorexcludedfrom mining, is open to anyonewho obtains aprospectinglicense.112 Licensees can then register mining claims.113 The2009 reform of theMiningAct114
107. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 &31Vict. c. 3, s. 92A(1) (U.K.) (“In each province, the legislature mayexclusivelymake laws in relationto(a) explorationfor non-renewablenaturalresources in theprovince ....”), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, c. 40 (Can.);BARRY J. BARTON,CANADIAN LAW OF MINING 151–52 (1993) (describing the twomaintypes of laws regulating mineral extraction in Canada). 108.Nigel Bankes, TheImplications of theTsilhqot’in (William)and Grassy Narrows (Keewatin)Decisions of theSupreme CourtofCanada forthe NaturalResourcesIndustries,33J. ENERGY &NAT.RESOURCES L. 188, 208–09 (2015); Treaty: James Bay TreatyNo. 9,MATAWA FIRST NATIONS MGMT., http://www.matawa.on.ca/66-2/ (lastvisited Apr. 14, 2019) [hereinafter JamesBay Treaty]. 109. James Bay Treaty, supra note 108; TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’NOFCAN., HONOURINGTHE TRUTH,RECONCILING FOR THE FUTURE 1(2015) [hereinafter HONOURING THE TRUTH], http://caid.ca/TRCFinExeSum2015.pdf (“The negotiationofTreaties, while seemingly honourableand legal,was often marked by fraud and coercion, and Canada was,and remains, slow to implement theirprovisionsand intent.”). 110. Mining Act,R.S.O.1990, c. M.14, ss.18–19 (Can.).For purposes of theAct,“‘minerals’ means allnaturally occurring metallic and non-metallic minerals, including coal,salt, quarry and pit material, gold, silver and allrare and precious mineralsand metals,but does not include sand.” Id. s. 1. 111.“The free entrysystem,alsocalledthe free miner or locationsystem, permitsthe mineral operator to enterlands where mineralsare in thehands of theCrown andobliges the government to grant explorationand development rightsifthe miner appliesfor them.” BARTON, supra note107, at 151. 112.MiningAct, c. M.14, ss.18–19, 27, 30. 113.Id. s. 27. 114. The provisionsofthe Mining Act cited hereinare those in forceorthat will enter into force following the completionofthe modernizationprocess. Forcritiquesofthe reform of theMiningAct andofthe Far NorthAct of 2010, seeKaren Drake, The Trialsand Tribulations of Ontario’s Mining 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 533 and theFar North Actof2010 introduced limitations on mineral prospectingand extractioninthe FarNorth.Theseactsbar prospectingand extractioninareas wherecommunity-based land useplanning has not been completedorwhereminingisinconsistent with thecorresponding community-based land useplan.115 Also,nominingactivity is allowedin protectedareas.116 However,the province has discretiontoallow prospectingifitdecides mining is in “the social and economicinterests of Ontario,”regardlessofitbeing barred by acommunity-based land useplan or located in aprotected area.117 In addition, existingminingclaimsinthe Ring of Fire predate thesereforms andare protected by Section205 of the Mining Actand Section14(3) of theFar NorthAct of 2010.118 TheFar NorthAct of 2010 further regulatesthe development of community-based land useplans in theFar North, includingsubjectingthe plans to theguidanceset in theFar North Land UseStrategy.119 Under the Far NorthAct of 2010, thereare twoecologically basedobjectives forland useplanning in theFar North:
2. Theprotectionofareas of culturalvalue in theFar North and theprotectionofecologicalsystems in theFar North by including at least 225,000square kilometres of theFar North in an interconnectednetwork of protectedareas designated in community based landuse plans.
3. Themaintenance of biological diversity,ecological processes andecological functions,including thestorage and sequestration of carbon in theFar North.120
Act: TheDutytoConsultand Anishinaabek Law,11MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV.L.&POL’Y 183, 185 (2015)(“This paperargues that, despitethe[][2013] amendments, the Mining Act is still unconstitutional,asitruns afoul of theCrown’s obligations to consultAboriginal peoples and accommodatetheirrightspursuant to section 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct,1982 ....”(footnote omitted)); see also, e.g.,PenelopeSimons &Lynda Collins, Participatory Rights in the Ontario Mining Sector: An International Human Rights Perspective,6MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV.L.&POL’Y 177, 183 (2010)(“Although the[Mining] Act hasrecentlybeenamended...itcontinues to under- emphasize public participation andprivilege the rights of mining companies to explore andexploit mineral resources.”);BrucePardy &Annette Stoehr, The FailedReform of Ont.’sMiningLaws,23J. ENVTL.L.&PRAC.1,1(2011) (“Ontario’s mining reformsperpetuate andextend aregimeofpolitical management in whichdiscretionreigns,uncertaintypersists andapolitically-driven hierarchyof interestsispursued.”). 115. Mining Act,c.M.14,ss. 30(g), 204(2);Far North Act, S.O. 2010,c.18, ss. 12, 14(1) (Can.). 116. Mining Act, c. M.14, s. 31; Far North Act, c. 18,s.14. 117. Mining Act, c. M.14, s. 204(3);Far North Act, c. 18, s. 14(4). 118.MiningAct, c. M.14, s. 205; Far North Act, c. 18,s.14. 119. Far North Act, c. 18,s.8. 120.Id. s. 5(2)–(3). 534 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517
2. Consultationand FreePrior and Informed Consent
TheEnvironmentalBill of Rightsestablishes mechanisms to inform andallowthe public to comment on decisions by theOntario government that mayaffect theenvironment, including many regardingmining.121 If an Environmental Assessmentiscarriedout foramining project,the process involvessomeformofpublic consultation.122 Consultationwith indigenous communitiesisgoverned by Section35ofthe ConstitutionAct of 1982; whereby, theCrown hasadutytoconsultindigenous communitieswhen consideringdecisions or actions that mayaffect treatyand Aboriginal rights—including mineral extractionprojects, but not prospectingand registering mining claims.123 The2009 Mining Actamendments require the governmenttoconsult indigenous communitiesbeforecertain stepsinthe mining processand “delegated certain proceduralaspectsofthe consultation processtoproject proponentsthrough its statutory scheme.”124 Forits part, theUnitedNations Declarationonthe Rightsof Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) establishesthe needtoobtainthe free prior and informed consent (FPIC) of indigenous peoples to carry out activities affecting theirterritories, includingmining.125 Although Canada has signed andpromisedtoimplement theUNDRIP, as per Recommendation43ofthe Truthand ReconciliationCommission,126 it recognizes FPIConlyasa
121.See Environmental Bill of Rights, S.O. 1993,c.28, s. 3(1) (Can.) (“This Partsets out minimumlevelsofpublic participationthat must be metbefore theGovernment of Ontario makes decisions on certainkinds of environmentally significantproposalsfor policies, Acts, regulations, and instruments.”);Classification of Proposalsfor Instruments, O. Reg. 681/94, s. 12 (Can.)(detailing regulations under theEnvironmental Bill of Rightsfor developing mining projects). 122.EnvironmentalAssessment Act,R.S.O.1990, c. E.18, s. 6(1),(3) (Can.) (providing that “[t]he proponent shallgivethe Ministry proposed termsofreference governing thepreparation of an environmental assessment,” which “shall give public noticeofthe proposedterms”).Provincial environmental assessmentsare not required for mining but couldbecarriedout on avoluntarybasis. Far North Act, c. 18, s. 8(4) (“[T]he Far Northland use strategy is not an undertaking as defined in the Environmental Assessment Act.”); Environmental AssessmentAct,c.E.18, s. 5(1) (“Every proponent whowishes to proceed with an undertaking shallapplytothe Minister forapproval to do so.”); see also MININGWATCH CAN., THE BIG HOLE:ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTAND MINING IN ONTARIO 6 (2014) (explaining that environmental assessments have “extremely limited public consultationand an assumptionthat impacts will be minimaland onlyroutinemitigationmeasures maybeapplied”). 123.MINISTRY OF ENERGY,N.DEV.&MINES,MNDM POLICY:CONSULTATIONAND ARRANGEMENTS WITH ABORIGINAL COMMUNITIES AT EARLY EXPLORATION 2, 5–8 (2012)[hereinafter MNDM CONSULTATION POLICY], www.mndm.gov.on.ca/en/mines-and-minerals/mining-act-policies- and-standards. But see id. at 4(“Aboriginal communitiesand provincial and federal governmentsdonot always sharethe same perspectivewhich cancreate challenges in consultationprocesses.”); Drake, supra note 114, at 186 (arguing that in “someareas in Ontario ...recording aminingclaim does in fact satisfy thetest for triggering the duty to consult”). 124.MNDMCONSULTATION POLICY, supra note123, at 2. 125.G.A.Res. 61/295, art. 28, UnitedNations Declarationonthe RightsofIndigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). 126.HONOURINGTHE TRUTH, supra note109,at20, 191 (outlining recommendation43, which “call[s] upon federal,provincial,territorial, andmunicipal governmentstofullyadopt and implement 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 535 guidingprinciplethat doesnot amount to theability of indigenous peoples to deny consenttoanextractiveproject in theirterritories.127 Theprovince of Ontario has asimilarposition.128 In contrast,the Chiefs-in-Assemblyof Nishnawbe Aski Nation(NAN),including theMatawaFirst Nations, passed aresolutionestablishingthat“[p]roposed private development or Canadian government policythat affects anypartofthe NAN territory cannot proceed without theFPICofthe affected NAN First NationorFirst Nations.”129 Despite Canada’sadoptionofUNDRIP, theconstitutional duty to consult is, as Martin Papillonand ThierryRodon describeit, “at best a weak versionofFPIC.”130 Fortheirpart, Bruce Pardyand Annette Stoehr argue that theFar North Actand Mining Actamendments—which restrict mining to areas consistent with community-based land use plans—effectivelyamount to arequirement of consentfromthosecommunitiesfor mining in theirterritories, establishingan“Aboriginal ‘planning veto.’”131 YetasWapshkaa Ma’iingan observes,132 thegovernment ultimatelycontrols theland use planning processand canapprove aminingproject and otherdevelopments that areintheinterestofOntario,despite aconflictingcommunity-based land useplan.133
theUnitedNations Declarationonthe RightsofIndigenous Peoples as theframeworkfor reconciliation”). 127. See,e.g.,Philippe Hanna &Frank Vanclay, HumanRights, Indigenous Peoples andthe Concept of Free,Prior and InformedConsent,31IMPACT ASSESSMENT &PROJECT APPRAISAL 146, 151 (2013) (explaining Canada’s reluctance to supportthe UNDRIP); see also TaraWard, The Right to Free, Prior, andInformed Consent: Indigenous Peoples’ParticipationRightsWithin International Law, 10 NW.J.INT’L HUM.RTS.54, 54–55, 70 (2011) (exploring theevolutionofindigenous peoples’ developmentrights in Canada). 128. See MNDM CONSULTATION POLICY, supra note123, at 4(“Canadiancourts have generally not recognized alegal rightofFirst Nationsto...require FirstNationconsent to proposed activities.”). 129. Requirementfor Free, Prior and Informed Consent in NAN,NISHNAWBE ASKI NATION, www.nan.on.ca/article/requirement-for-free-prior-andinformed-consent-in-nan-496.as (lastvisitedApr. 14, 2019). 130.Martin Papillon&Thierry Rodon, Proponent-IndigenousAgreementsand the Implementationofthe RighttoFree,Prior, and InformedConsentinCanada,62ENVTL.IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV.216, 218 (2016). 131.Pardy &Stoehr, supra note114, at 8. 132. See Wapshkaa Ma’iingan (Aaron Mills), Aki, Anishinaabek,Kaye Tahsh Crown,9 INDIGENOUS L.J. 107, 113 n.15 (2010),https://ilj.law.utoronto.ca/volume-9-issue-1-2010 (“The[Far North] Actgives theMinisterofNatural Resources absolutediscretionover theterms of reference and over final approval of aland useplanand requires that landuse plans be developed pursuant to theFar North landuse strategy....”). 133. Mining Act,R.S.O.1990, c. M.14, s. 204(3) (Can.) (providing theLieutenant Governor in Council with thepower to approve anew mine “ifthe project is in thesocial and economic interests of Ontario”); FarNorthAct,S.O.2010, c. 18, s. 14(4)(Can.). 536 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517
3. Minimizing and RedressingHarm
Anumber of statutes andregulations—including theMiningAct,the OntarioEnvironmentalProtectionAct (OEPA),the Ontario Water ResourcesAct,and theSpecies at Risk Act—aimtominimize environmentalharmand establish liabilityduringand aftermining operations.134 Generally,personscarryingout mining activitiesare responsible formaking notifications;submittingdocumentation; obtaining authorizations;and complyingwith thesubstantiverequirementsinthe different statutes,regulations,and theirapproved plans and permits.135 Government officialsgrant,deny, or amend authorizations;investigate compliance; issue orders requiringorstopping certain actions;and otherwise carryout work to prevent harm, as established in the regulations.136 Iwill touchonlyontwo examples:rehabilitationobligations under theMiningAct andeffluentdischarge limits underthe OEPA. TheMiningAct requiresprogressive rehabilitationupon closureof mining sites, includingfor advancedexploration.137 “‘[R]ehabilitate’means measures,including protectivemeasures,takeninaccordance with the prescribed standards to treat asite or mine hazardsothat theuse or condition of thesite,(a) is restoredtoits former useorcondition, or (b)is made suitablefor ause that theDirector seesfit.”138 Rehabilitationmust comply with thestandardsestablished in theMineRehabilitationCode of Ontarioorhigherstandards that maybespecifically authorized (for example, in aclosure plan).139 However,asPardyand Stoehr note, no substantivestandards actually exist, and therehabilitation requireddepends on it being “practicable” forthe proponent.140 Forits part, theOEPA generallyprohibits thedischarge of contaminantsintothe naturalenvironmentinamountsgreater than the regulations alloworifthe discharge“causes or is likelytocause an adverse effect.”141 Specific regulations implementing theOEPA applytominingof
134.Pardy &Stoehr, supra note114, at 9–11. 135.See, e.g.,MiningAct, c. M.14, s. 19(1) (“Any person who is 18 yearsoroldermay obtaina prospector’s licence onlinethrough themining lands administrationsystemifthe person has successfully completedthe prescribed Mining Act awarenessprogram ....”); id. s. 26(7) (allowinga Tribunal to cancel amining claim uponfinding “a willful contravention of any of theprovisions of this Actorthe regulations”). 136.See, e.g., id. s. 26(1) (authorizing the Tribunal to revokealicense); seealsoinfra notes 139–42 and accompanying text (describing mandatory rehabilitation measures). 137. Mining Act, c. M.14, ss.139.1(1), 140(1). 138.Id. s. 139(1). 139.MineDevelopment and ClosureUnder PartVII of theAct, O. Reg.240/00, s. 4(Can.). 140.Pardy &Stoehr, supra note114, at 12–13. 141.Environmental ProtectionAct,R.S.O.1990, c. E.19, s. 15(1) (Can.). 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 537 metals and industrialminerals.142 These regulations establisheffluent discharge limits foranumberofparameters;143 lethality limits;144 and sampling, monitoring, 145 assessment,and reportingrequirements.146
C. Lens of Ecological Law Analysis
In contrast to El Salvador’s conclusions that mining couldnot be carried out without causingserious harm to peopleand transgressing ecological limits,147 Ontariohas developed alegalframeworkthat purportedlyensures mineral extractioninOntario’s Ring of Fire will be sustainable.148 However,asthe analysis below shows, some of theelements of Ontario’sframework arefar fromanexampleofecological law. Generally speaking,the Ring of Fire’s framework has no elementsof ecocentrism;149 containsimportant obstacles for ecological primacy and ecological justice;150 and opensonlyafew modestopportunitiesfor ecological lawfromthe perspectiveofthe thesethree principles.151
142. See,e.g.,EffluentMonitoring and EffluentLimits —Industrial MineralsSector, O. Reg. 561/94, s.2(Can.) (providingthat“[t]hepurpose of this Regulationistomonitorand controlthe quality of effluent discharged from” plantsthat produce, among other things,cement,lime, magnesium, graphite,and gypsum); Effluent Monitoringand Effluent Limits —Metal Mining Sector,O.Reg. 560/94, s. 3(1) (Can.) (“ThisRegulationapplieswith respect to every plant that is ametal mining plant and that ...dischargesatotal volume of process effluent ...ofmore than 50 cubicmetres.”). 143. See,e.g.,Effluent Monitoringand Effluent Limits —Metal Mining Sector, O. Reg. 560/94, s. 18(1) (Can.) (“Each discharger shall ensure that each analyticalresult obtained foreach limited parameter from eachsamplecollected fromaprocess effluent monitoringstream at thedischarger’s plant does not exceed the daily concentrationlimit specified for the parameter ....”). 144.See, e.g., id. s. 19 (providing that “eachrainbow trout acutelethality test andeach Daphnia magna acutelethalitytest performed on any grab samplecollected at aprocess effluentsampling point ...atthe plant results in mortality fornomore than50per cent of thetest organisms in 100 per cent effluent”). 145. See,e.g., id. ss. 20–30 (providing adetailed set of monitoringand samplingrequirements). 146.See, e.g., id. ss. 20–30 (describing requirementsfor collectingand reportingeffluent samples). 147.See supra Part II.B.2 (summarizing howElSalvadorbanned mining due to numerous environmental and health concerns). 148. See N. DEV.&MINES, supra note89, at 18 (explaining that Ontario adopted a “comprehensive mineral development strategy” with thegoal of being a“global leader in sustainable mineral development and production”). 149.See infra PartIII.C.1(contrastingthe principle of ecocentrismwith Ontario’s mining framework). 150.See infra Parts III.C.2-3(consideringwhether Ontario’s mining framework contains elementsofecologicalprimacy and justice). 151.See supra PartI(summarizing thethree principles of ecological law, which are ecocentrism, ecologicalprimacy, and ecological justice). 538 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517
1. Ecocentrism
Thelegal framework governingmininginOntario is anthropocentric and utilitarian. Land andmineralsare the property of humans—either directly or through thestate andcorporations.152 Regulationofmineral extractionfocuses on theinterestsofpeople;land and other beingsare not legalpersons.153 Thehuman-Earth relationshipunderlying theMiningAct is about ownership and useofthe land by humanswith no reciprocal responsibilitiesowedtothe land.154 In contrast,the principleofecocentrism hassomeresonance with indigenous legal traditions that mayberelevant in theRingofFire.For example, theChief of WebequieFirst Nationhas noted that at thecoreof hisnation’slawsisabeliefinthe interconnectednessofbeings.155 Also, legalscholar John Borrowshas described Anishinabek beliefs concerning theEarth as alivingbeing and theagency of rocks,156 bothofwhich resonate with ecocentrism.157 Among thespecificrules noted,the mine effluent regulations underthe OEPA standout as incompatible with ecocentrism.Effluent monitoring requiresroutinelysubmerging rainbow trout and Daphniamagna in mine effluent to test its toxicity,with an acceptablemortality rate of “no more than 50 per cent of thetestorganismsin100 percent effluent.”158 Under the principleofecocentrism,itwouldnot be justifiedfor alaw to require the routinekilling of other beings to determinecompliance with an acceptable limit of toxicdischarge into theenvironment.159 Theseprovisions reflect an
152.ConstitutionAct,1867, 30 &31Vict., c. 3, s. 92A(1)(U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, c. 40 (Can.). 153.See, e.g.,MiningAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.14, s. 2(Can.)(“ThepurposeofthisAct is to encourage ...the development of mineralresources,inamanner consistent with the recognitionand affirmationofexistingAboriginal and treatyrights...and to minimize theimpact of these activitieson public healthand safetyand theenvironment.”). 154. See,e.g., id. s. 19 (authorizing“[a]ny person” over 18 years of age to obtainaprospector’s licenseprovided certain criteriaare met); see also id. s. 1(defining“owner”as“everycurrentowner, lesseeoroccupierofall or part of amine, mine hazard or mining lands”). 155. See Wabasse, supra note97(“Webelieve that allthings in creationare connected. As part of our responsibilitiestothe Creator, we worktoprotect and nurture theseconnections and relationships.”). 156. See JOHN BORROWS,CANADA’S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION 244–45 (2010) (“The active natureofrocks meansthat they have an agency of theirown that must be respected when Anishinabek peopleuse them.”). 157.Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at8. 158.EffluentMonitoringand EffluentLimits —Metal Mining Sector, O. Reg. 560/94, s. 19 (Can.). 159.See SbertCarlsson, supra note3,at8–9 (“Ecocentrism primarilyilluminates the law’s abilitytosupportand promoteaworldview in whichhumans arepartofnature andnomore important than other lifeformsand systems.”). 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 539 anthropocentric and utilitarianviewofthe human-Earth relationship, where theenvironmentisareceptaclefor toxiceffluent andfishand crustaceans aredisposable “testorganisms.”160 These testsare alsounacceptable from an ecological justice perspective, as they negateinterspeciesequity.161 Ecologicallaw would, instead, allowonlythe generationofrecycled or neutralizedeffluent beforedischargeand require testingprocedures that do not involve destroying livingbeings.162
2. Ecological Primacy
To recall, restoringand maintainingecologicalintegrity is akey element of theprincipleofecological primacy.163 Because of therelative intactness of theFar North,the standard of ecological integrity seems particularly appropriate in this case;although, much remains to be learned to establishproperbaselines formonitoringecosystemresponses to changing conditions in theFar North (includingthoselinked to climate change and humanactivities) and to understand thepotentialimpactsof different types of development.164 ADraft FarNorth LandUse Strategy (Draft FNLUS) wasreleased in September 2015,which explicitly refers to ecological integrity in its description of theFar Northas“one of theworld’s largest,mostintact ecological systems, reflectingahigh levelofecological integrity and providing ecosystem servicesofglobalsignificance farbeyond its borders.”165 TheDraft FNLUSprovides some supportfor prioritizing ecological values, even though it doesnot establish constraints on developmentinthe Far Northtomaintainits ecologicalintegrity.166 For example, theDraft FNLUS’sguidance forcommunity-based land useplan developmentinareas whereminingisadesired land userecognizes
160.See, e.g.,Effluent Monitoringand EffluentLimits —Metal Mining Sector,O.Reg.560/94, s. 19 (Can.) (allowing fishand crustaceans to be used as testorganisms foreffluent monitoring). 161.See SbertCarlsson, supra note3,at12(explainingthatecologicallaw is based on the notionthat“humansand other species hav[e] equalintrinsicvalue”). 162.See id. at 20 (“The challenge of incorporating ecological primacy into lawinvolvessetting benchmarks forecologicalintegrityand mechanismstomeasure whetherecological integrityisbeing maintained and restored.”). 163. Id. 164. See,e.g.,ANNUAL REPORT, supra note98, at 75 (expressing concerns with impactsfrom mining in theRingofFire). 165.ONT.MINISTRY OF NAT.RES.&FORESTRY,FAR NORTH LAND USE STRATEGY:ADRAFT 7 (2015)[hereinafter DRAFT FAR NORTH LAND USE STRATEGY], www.ontario.ca/page/far-north-land-use- strategy. 166.See id.at25(identifying“[c]aringfor theland,”protecting watersources, and sustainability as guiding principles). 540 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517 ecological constraints mayrender areas that have mineral potentialoff limits(except for areaswherethereare existing rights).167 Another opportunity for ecologicalprimacy is theFar North Science Advisory Panel recommendationtouse a“conservation-matrix model”for land useplanninginthe FarNorth.168 As described elsewhere:
TheConservationMatrixModel represents aparadigm shiftfrom reactiveconservationplanning in degraded systemstoproactive conservation planning in large, intact systems. Rather than addressing “how much is enough?” with regards to protection, this model addresses “how much is toomuch?” with regards to human development on thelandscape.169
Despite these opportunitiestofavor ecologicalconsiderations in determining how land maybeused, theFar NorthAct of 2010 also includes provisions that areinconsistent with ecological primacy.Inparticular,as already noted, it prioritizes mining interestsbygrantinggovernment discretiontoallowmininginareas subjecttoacommunity-based land use plan—that doesnot allowmining—andinprotected areas if themining“is in thesocialand economicinterests of Ontario.”170 Also,the Actprovides processestoamend community-based land use plans, including the boundariesofplanning areas, independent of ecological considerations.171 Ecologicalprimacy wouldrequire allamendments to considerthe impact on ecologicalintegrity(taking into account cumulative effects).172 Inow turn to therehabilitationrequirementsapplicabletominingin theFar North. From theperspectiveofecological primacy,rehabilitation measures fornew,ongoing, andabandoned mines(likethoserequiredby theMiningAct173)wouldbeimportant toolsfor restoring and maintaining ecological integrity, if they were tied to substantive, ratherthanprocedural,
167. Id. at 42. 168.ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 20, at xv. The Draft FarNorthLandUse Strategy proposes a “stewardship” approach that it deems similartothismodel.DRAFT FAR NORTH LAND USE STRATEGY, supra note165, at 28. 169. Conservation Matrix Model,CAN.BEACONS PROJECT,www.beaconsproject.ca/cmm(last visited Apr. 14, 2019) [hereinafter Conservation Matrix Model]. 170. Far North Act, S.O. 2010, c. 18, s. 14(4) (Can.); Mining Act,R.S.O.1990, c. M.14, s. 204(3) (Can.). 171.See Far North Act, c. 18, s. 10(3) (allowing theMinistertoamend “theboundariesofa planning areaafter acommunity basedland use plan is approved” provided certain criteria are met, including FirstNations approval). 172.Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at11. 173.See Mining Act, c. M.14, s. 139–139.1(outlining therequirementsfor rehabilitating mining sites). 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 541 standards.174 Also,the standards forremediationshouldbebased,not on what is achievable by theproponent,but on what is neededfor functioning ecosystems to retain theirintegrity.175 However,while some heavily contaminatedformerminingsiteshave been reclaimed,176 actually restoring them is adifferent matter: “‘Restoration’,especially of mining disturbances, is essentially impossible.Nomatterhow much moneyisspent on the‘reclamation’,the completerestorationofthe previous ecosystemis impossible.”177 Instead, thebest to be expectedis“aproductiveand suitable ecosystemthatwill replace thepre-mineecosystem andachievethe desired post-miningland use(PMLU).”178 Clearly,iffully restoringamined site is deemed impossible, then—fromthe perspectiveofecological primacy— mining shouldnot be allowedinareas with high levelsofecological integrity.179 Under thecurrent legal framework within theRingofFire, however, even areas critical to ecological integrity maynot be excluded fromminingbecause they arecovered under pre-existing mining claims.180
3. EcologicalJustice
Community participationinmineral extractionisacritical elementof ecological justice becauseitallows thoseimpacted to influence decisions on whether to disrupt theland andhow to distributethe benefits and harms
174.Compare Pardy &Stoehr, supra note114, at 13 (“Thepurpose of the[Mining] Actisnot to protect against environmental impact or provide forpublicsafety, but to facilitate mining.”), with supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text (outliningsubstantivestandards basedonecological primacy forauthorizingminingand restoringold mines). 175.Compare Pardy &Stoehr, supra note114, at 12–13 (explainingthatthe Mining Act “does not containstandards for rehabilitationofmining sites” andthatthe regulationsonlyapplytomines if “theyare found to be ‘practicable’”), with SbertCarlsson, supra note 3, at 10–11 (providing that one of thepurposes of ecological lawistorestore and maintain ecological integrity); seealso supra notes 6–14 and accompanying text (describing how ecologicalprimacyfocuses on promotingecological integrity). 176. See NAT’L ORPHANED/ABANDONED MINES INITIATIVE,NOAMI PERFORMANCE UPDATE 2009-2015, at 13 (2015),www.abandoned-mines.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NOAMI-2015- UPDATE-ENG-WEB.pdf(“[Ontario’s Abandoned Mine RehabilitationProgram] has conducted rehabilitationprojects on more than 80 of thehighest priority abandonedminessites locatedthroughout Ontario.”). 177.SubijoyDutta,Raj Rajaram &BonnieRobinson, Mineland Reclamation, in SUSTAINABLE MINING PRACTICES –AGLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 179 (VasudevanRajarametal. eds., 2005) (citation omitted). 178. Id. 179.See Sbert Carlsson, supra note 3, at 11 (explaining that ecological primacyrequires governmentsto“forego non-essentialbenefits that maybeharmful to theEarth community”). 180.See FarNorthAct,S.O.2010, c. 18, s. 14(3) (Can.)(“Ifacommunitybased land use plan is made or amended after aminingclaim ...isrecorded, issued, or granted in an area to which theplan applies...[it] shall[not]affect, (a)the validity of themining claim....”). 542 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517 thedisruptionentails.181 In theRingofFire,thismeans, at aminimum, requiringthe FPIC of Indigenous communities. But, as described above, the rulesand practices currently in place in Canada do notmeet this standard.182 Another aspect of theframework that is not consistent with ecological justice is theprotectionofexistingminingclaimsbecauseitfavors extractionofresources mostlyfor theshort-term gainofminingcompanies andtheirshareholders,instead of promotingthe equitableuse of theFar Northregionbypresent and future humans and otherbeings.183 Considering theimportanceofthe region for(pre-existing) biodiversity,184 no mineral extractionshouldbecarried outinthe Ring of Fire,regardlessofpre- existing mining claims.185 More fundamentally,fromthe perspectiveof ecological justice,ifminingdraws on theEarth’s sustaining capacity by extractingnon-renewablemineralsand destroyingthe land, thereshouldbe averygood reason to undertakeit.186 Yetaquestionrarelyposed of aminingproject is what arethe minerals for? This questioniskey fromthe perspectiveofecologicaljustice.187 If it is impossibletominewithout causingharmtoother beingsand restoring mined sitesisdeemed impossible,188 then mining canonlybejustifiedto obtainmineralstosatisfy basic human needs andwhenthere areno
181.See Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at12(explaining thatecologicaljusticerequiresfair distribution of benefitsand harms and“includesthe concept of environmental justice”). Cf. Gabriela Ratulea &DanielSorea, Ecological Justice andthe MatterofFairDistribution, in LEGAL PRACTICE & INTERNATIONAL LAWS 297, 298 (2011) (“‘[S]ocial justice focuses on distributionbut is also concerned with individual recognition, participationand thefunctioning of thecommunity’, which means that socialjustice equallyappliestoecological problems. Hence we can extrapolateand speak aboutan ‘ecological justice’, as subset of social justicewhich is adistributiveone.”(footnoteomitted) (quoting DAVID SCHLOSBERG,DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 8(2007))). 182.See supra Part III.B.2 (describing how Canada hasimplemented theconcept of FPIC into its regulations governing mining). 183.See Far North Act, c. 18, s. 14(3) (exempting existing mining claims from community- based land useplanning); ANNUAL REPORT, supra note98, at 149 (commentingthat “the environmental sensitivity of an area” and“the potentialfor environmental impacts” “play no role in determining whether apermitisrequired”). Cf. MINING ASS’NOFCAN., FACTS AND FIGURES OF THE CANADIAN MINING INDUSTRY 12 (2017)(“The extractiveindustry, whichcombines mineral extraction with oiland gas extraction, contributed $124.8billion, or 7.5%,toCanada’sGDP in 2016.”). 184. See ADVISORY PANEL, supra note20, at xi (detailingthe Far North’s unique natural landscapes). 185.Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at11. 186.See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text (explaininghow ecological justice is centeredaround fair distributionand taking of theEarth resources fornecessaryreasons). 187.See Sbert, Re-imagining, supra note66, at 84–85 (articulating aneeds-based approachto mining, whichwouldonlypermitthe extraction of non-renewable resourcestosatisfy “the reasonable needs of living generations”). 188.See supra notes176–79 and accompanying text (explaining whyfully restoring mines is basically impossible). 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 543 alternativemeans of obtaining them.189 Under thecurrent system,the reason forminingisthat companiesand theirshareholdersprofit from extracting mineralsfor awidearray of uses,including speculationthatmay or maynot relate to thesatisfactionofbasic needs.190 This is trueinthe Far North, wherecommodity markets—not community needs—drive extraction,191 and thebenefits accrue to mining companies.192 Many basicneedsare not metinthe communitiesofthe Far North, includingsafedrinking water,193 and someargue that mineral extractioninthe regionwill contributeresourcestoaddress these basic needs.194 However,the wealth frommineral extractionusually benefits corporations andtheirshareholders, rather than thecommunities, despite arrangementsthatcouldbeput in place formines to be “bridgestomore desirableand sustainable futures,” as ProfessorRobert Gibson suggests.195 Moreover,there areother sourcesofwealth that couldbemoreeasily tappedtosatisfy thesebasic needs;for example, corporations andthe extremelyrich could be taxedmoreeffectively.196 Proponentsargue that mining contributes to economic growth;provides revenue to governments andcommunities; and provides mineralsthatare needed forinfrastructure,
189.Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at11. 190.Id. at 20 (“Globally,the [mining] sector is driven by thedemand forcommoditiesand the pursuitofprofit ....”). 191.Under theFar North Actof2010, forexample, community needs arenot thestartingpoint forthe land use planning process, but onlyaconsiderationinadecision to allowsometypes of developmentinthe absenceofalanduse plan. See,e.g.,Far NorthAct,S.O.2010, c. 18, s. 14 (Can.) (allowing theLieutenant Governor to approve mining in bothprotected areasand whenminingwould be inconsistent with acommunity-based land use plan). 192. Cf. MINING ASS’NOFCAN., supra note183 (highlightingthat mining makes up a significantportion of the Canadian economy). 193.Most MatawaFirst Nations communitiesare under boilwater advisories. SeeAdvisories for Ontario,WATERTODAY,www.watertoday.ca/maptest4.asp?province=8(last visitedApr. 14, 2019) (indicatingthe communitiesthat lack access to safedrinking water). Neskantaga hasbeen under aboil wateradvisory since 1995. Advisory forNeskantagaFirst Nation,Ontario,WATERTODAY, http://www.watertoday.ca/textm-a.asp?province=8&advisory=989 (lastvisited Apr.14, 2019). 194.CHONG, supra note 87, at 7–8. 195.RobertB.Gibson, Turning Mines into Bridges: GainingPositiveLegacies from Non- renewableResourceProjects,J.ABORIGINAL MGMT., Oct. 2014, at 4, 7; see also Atlin &Gibson, supra note104, at 49 (“Whileitischallenging forminingdevelopments to generate sustainable outcomes ...miningdevelopment can be designed and undertaken in ways that enhance prospectsfor lastingregional wellbeing.”). 196.See, e.g.,MAX LAWSON ET AL., OXFAM INT’L,REWARD WORK, NOT WEALTH 8(2018), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-reward-work-not-wealth- 220118-summ-en.pdf (reportingthat the2017 increase in wealth of the“2,043 dollarbillionaires worldwide” could “end extreme poverty seven times over”); seealso id. (“82%ofall of thegrowthin global wealth in the last yearwenttothe top 1%,whereasthe bottom50% saw no increaseatall.”); see also Atlin &Gibson, supra note104, at 49 (explaining how the Canadian Governmentshouldallocate a portionofits funds to creatingsustainableminingfeatures). 544 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517 goods,and services that maintain and increasewellbeing.197 TheLibrary of Parliament estimates that “[t]hechromite in theRingofFire couldmeet NorthAmerican needs fortwo centuries.”198 Also,the mineralsdiscovered in theRingofFire include copper and nickel199—which areusedinlithium- ionbatteriesfor electricvehicles200—and copper andtitanium,which are needed forsolar panels.201 Thesemetalsare supposedlyneeded forthe fight againstclimatechange.202 Thequestioniswhether solarpanelsand electric carsare basic needs that should be satisfiedtoensurewellbeing or mere wants, whichare theresultofdemandgeneratedbycommodity marketsand consumer preferences,includingfor individually owned(electric) cars. What wouldthe need forchromite and theother metals in theRingofFire look like in adegrowth economy?Overcomingprofit-based extractionis one of themajorchallenges in ashift to ecological lawand an ecologically sustainableeconomy.203 Butdeveloping an alternativeframework for needs-based extractionrequiresmuchfurther research, debate, and experimentation. In summary, theframework governing mining in theRingofFire region is largelyinconsistent with ecological law.204 However,toolsthat various groups have recommendedtoguide development in theregion, like theconservationmatrix and sustainability-based regional assessments, provide an opportunity to further ecological primacy.205 Moreover, if
197. See,e.g.,CHONG, supra note87, at 5, 7–8 (discussingmultiple waysmining in the Ring of Fire could benefit FirstNations); N. DEV.&MINES, supra note89, at 11, 18 (proclaiming that mining in the Ring of Fire “presentsamulti-generational economic opportunity”that will “[a]ttract jobs and investment”). 198.CHONG, supra note87, at 3. 199.ADVISORY PANEL, supra note20, at 16. 200.Mark Burton&Eddie van der Walt, Electric-Car Revolution ShakesUpthe Biggest Metals Markets,BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-02/electric- car-revolution-is-shaking-up-the-biggest-metals-markets. 201.CLEAN ENERGY CAN., MININGFOR CLEAN ENERGY:TRACKING THE CLEAN ENERGY REVOLUTION 4(2017), http://cleanenergycanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ MiningCleanEnergy2017.pdf. 202.See WORLD BANK GRP., THE GROWING ROLE OF MINERALS AND METALS FOR A LOW CARBON FUTURE 26 (2017) (identifyingcopper,nickel, andtitaniumas“commodities assumedtoplay a potentiallyprominentroleinthe energy shifttoacarbon constrained future”). 203.See SbertCarlsson, supra note3,at12(positing that ecologicallaw “impliesasocietythat aims to attain sufficient––not maximum––wealth”). 204.See supra PartsIII.C.1–3 (describinghow theelementsofecological laware absent from Canada’s framework). 205.See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text (describinghow the Far North Science AdvisoryPanelrecommended theuse of theconservation-matrix model in theFar North); see also supra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining theidea of Regional Strategic Environmental Assessments). 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 545 demands forindigenous jurisdictionover theRingofFire succeed,206 indigenous laws might fostervalues that resonate with ecological law207 or present different obstacles.208 Butasitstands today, theOntario framework that purportedlyensures that mining in theRingofFire is sustainableis anthropocentric;prioritizeseconomicinterests overecologicalintegrity; and favors afew mining claims over currentand futuregenerations of humans—themajority of whom areFirstNations on whosetraditional territoriesthe mining wouldoccur regardless of theirFPIC—and other beings.
CONCLUSION
This paperuses the lens of ecologicallaw to consideraspectsoftwo verydifferentlegalframeworks governing mining to considersomeof challengesand opportunitiesassociated with ashift to ecological law. El Salvador’s mining banprovidesanexampleofanopportunity to adopt ecological lawthatarises in thecontextofcritical environmental problems, such as waterpollutionand scarcity.209 However,itis questionablewhethertheseopenings provide solid foundations fora transitiontoecological law. Although thedecision to banmetal miningwas based in great part on theneed to avoidbreaching ecologicallimits, especially regardingwater,itdoesnot appear that this derived froman understanding of sustainability as ecological sustainability.Rather, the decisiontoban metalminingseemstohave resulted fromacalculationin whichthe government determinedthatthe negativeecological and social impactsofminingwerenot worththe economic benefits.210 Thus,this calculationmight have ledtoadifferent result ifElSalvadorhad atradition
206.See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text (discussingindigenous jurisdictional claims to land in theRingofFire). 207.For example,Patrick Glennargues that underindigenous–chthonic–law:“Youdon’t simply have to repair damage tothe environment;you and your kind have to live entirelives which accord as much respect to the natural worldastoyourself.”H.PATRICK GLENN,LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD:SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 76 (OxfordUniversityPress 5thed. 2014). 208.Atthe sametime, other scholarscautionthat indigenouslegal traditions should not be assumed to be either ecologically basedorinherently sustainable. See,e.g.,BenjaminJ.Richardson, The Ties that Bind: Indigenous Peoples and EnvironmentalGovernance, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE LAW:COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 337, 340–44 (Benjamin J. Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil eds.,2009) (arguing that indigenous lawdoes not always result in environmentally sustainableoutcomes). 209.See supra Parts II.A–B (describing some of the reasons whyElSalvadordecided to ban metalmining). 210.See supra Parts II.B.1–3 (outlininghow El Salvador’smetal mining ban lacks the elements of ecocentrism,ecological primacy, and ecologicaljustice). 546 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:517 of mining andifprofitablemines were operating at thetime.211 Still, choosing “water over gold” andthe role of scienceinenactingthisban are important precedentsfor ecological law.212 TheRingofFire casestudy focuses on opportunitiesfor an ecological lawframework whichpromisessustainable mining in one of theplanet’s last remainingareaswith ecological integrity.213 Despite some toolsthat couldpromote ecological primacy and ecological justice,214 this framework ultimatelyprioritizes economicinterestsover bothecologicalimperatives and First Nations’consent foractivities that might impacttheirtraditional territories.215 Finally,the case study also demonstratesthatthe framework, and various environmental laws,governing mining in theRingofFire have anthropocentric and utilitariancharacteristicsthatare incompatible with ecological justice.216 Theunderlyingquestionisunderwhat circumstanceswouldecological lawallowmineral extraction. These twocasestudies showthatmining wouldnot be permittedinareas whereecological limitsare beingpushed to thebrink(as in El Salvador)and in areas whereecologicalintegrity remains high (asinthe Far NorthofOntario). Yetamining ban cannot be theonly possibleway to observe ecological primacy.Someformofminingcouldbe allowedinalready disturbed sites with ecologicalconditions determinative in each case. In addition, another decisive element is what purposethe extractedmineralsare used for, whichisaquestioncurrent lawdoesnot address.217 Minerals are used directlyand as part of goods andservices to satisfy basic human needsand will likelyalways be requiredfor this to some extent.218 Thus,key questions forecologicallaw and democratic
211.See supra PartII.B.3(arguing that themetal mining ban is subject to shifting interests becauseitisbased on an anthropocentricworldview). 212.Broad &Cavanagh, supra note45; see also supra PartII.B.2 (discussing someofthe ways El Salvador used science in deciding to ban metal mining). 213.See supra PartIII.A(describingCanada’s efforts to balance mineral development with environmental protection). 214.See supra notes 104, 168–69 and accompanying text (discussingtools such as conservation-matrixmodel and Regional StrategicEnvironmental Assessments). 215.See supra Parts III.C.1–3 (explaining how Canada’s framework governing mineral developmentprioritizes the economic interests of corporations); see also supra PartII.B.2 (criticizing the FarNorthAct andMining Actbecausetheyfailtorequire theFPIC of FirstNations over decisions that mayaffecttheir lands). 216.See supra PartsIII.C.1–3 (concluding that thelawsgoverningmineral development in the Ring of Fire areneither ecocentricnor based on ecologicaljustice). 217.See, e.g.,Far North Act, S.O. 2010, c. 18, s. 14(4) (Can.) (allowing theLieutenant Governor to approve mines that are“in thesocialand economic interests of Ontario”). 218.See WORLD COMM’NONENV’TAND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE,FROM ONE EARTH TO ONE WORLD,CH.8:INDUSTRY:PRODUCING MORE WITH LESS,¶2(1987) (“Many essentialhuman needs canbemet onlythroughgoods and services provided by industry.”). 2019] Mining from theLensofEcological Law 547 debate are: (1)whataneeds-based extractionframework wouldlook like and (2)the specific conditions underwhich ecologicallaw wouldallowfor mineral extractiontosatisfybasic needs. Ihave suggestedelsewherethat needs-based mining impliesreducing mineral demand; relyingprimarily on existingstocks andlandfillmining; and only allowing new extraction in exceptionalcircumstances andunder strict measures to avoidserious harm.219 Ecologicallaw wouldrequire the consent of potentially impacted people and theFPICofindigenous peoples if extractionwouldaffect theirtraditionalterritories.220 Ecological lawalso considersthe implications forthe abilityofother beings to accessthe sustaining capacity of theEarth.221 Perhapsbylimitingextractiontosmall volumes overlong periods of timeand usinglow impacttechnologies, mining is possiblewithout diminishingthe ecological integrity of the ecosysteminwhich minerals arelocated.222 However,thisisunthinkable under thecurrent capitalistlogicthat drives mining—a reminderthatashift to ecological lawispartofamuch broader shiftinworldview andsocio- economic paradigm.223
219.Sbert, Re-imagining, supra note 66,at85. 220.See supra notes 125–33 and accompanying text (discussing theconcept of FPIC of indigenous peoples). 221.Sbert Carlsson, supra note3,at11. 222.Sbert, Re-imagining, supra note66(outlininghow mining couldpromote “sustainability and equity”). 223.JOEL KOVEL,THE ENEMY OF NATURE:THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD?97(2007); see, e.g.,GeoffreyGarver, The Rule of EcologicalLaw: The Legal Complement to Degrowth Economics,5SUSTAINABILITY 316, 317 (2013) (claimingthat“contemporaryenvironmental lawisdeficient as ameans to enclose and regulatethe human enterprise”and advocatinginstead fora “degrowth movement,” which “provides aspecific context forthe emergence of theruleofecological law”); CORMAC CULLINAN,WILD LAW:AMANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 59–61 (2ded. 2011) (“Shifting the paradigm of thehomospheretoanEarth-centredworldviewwill take theefforts of many peopleinmanyfields....”);MichaelM’Gonigle &PaulaRamsay, Greening Environmental Law: From SectoralReformtoSystemic Re-formation,14J. ENVTL.L.&PRAC. 333, 335 (2004) (developing a“green legal theory,”which “examine[s] therole of law ...inbothcreating systemicunsustainability, andinimpeding or facilitatingits resolution”).
U.S. FRESH WATER LAW &GOVERNANCE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE: ACRITIQUE OF THE RIPARIAN RIGHTS LEGAL FRAMEWORK AS ABASIS FOR WATER GOVERNANCE IN VERMONT
CourtneyR.Hammond Wagner*†
INTRODUCTION...... 549 I. THE CHALLENGE OF THE ANTHROPOCENETOFRESH WATER LAW ...... 550 II. THE HYDROLOGIC CYCLE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE ...... 552 ClimateChange and theHydrologicCycle...... 553 III. BRIEF SURVEYOFFRESH WATER RESOURCE LAW IN THE U.S...... 554 A. TheNature of Riparian Rightsand thePrincipleof ReasonableUse ...... 556 B. Riparian RightsToday: Regulated Riparianism ...... 558 IV.THE CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR WATER RIGHTS IN VERMONT ...... 560 Current StateofWater in Vermont ...... 562 V. DECONSTRUCTIONOFTHE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLE USE IN VERMONT...... 565 ReasonableMisuse...... 568 VI.ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS FOR VERMONT WATER LAW IN THE ANTHROPOCENE...... 569 A. Implementing an Environmental Ethic...... 570 B. Expandingthe Concept of Riparianism...... 573 CONCLUSION ...... 574
INTRODUCTION
Theera of theAnthropocene1 will challenge governments, legal frameworks, and resource management regimes to reexamineunderlying
*Ph.D. in NaturalResources fromthe Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural Resources, UniversityofVermont andGraduateFellowatthe Gund Institute for Environment, University of Vermont. B.A. DartmouthCollege (2011). †The author wouldlike to acknowledge support from theEconomicsfor the Anthropocene partnership with funding fromthe Social Sciences andHumanities Research CouncilofCanadaand the Gund Institute forEnvironment at theUniversity of Vermont.The author wouldalso like to thankDr. PeterBrownand Dr.Geoff Garver for their encouragement in pursuing this Essay and feedback on earlier essay versions. 1. The “Anthropocene”isaproposedtermtodescribe thecurrent geological epoch to capture “the centralrole of mankindingeology and ecology.” It wasfirstsuggested as anew geological epoch by P. J.Crutzen &E.F.Stoermer’s The “Anthropocene.”See Paul J. Crutzen&EugeneF.Stoermer, The“Anthropocene,” GLOBAL CHANGE NEWSL.(Int’l Geosphere-Biosphere Programme(IGBP), 550 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549 structures andassumptions fromthe perspectiveofenvironmentallimits.2 Onesuch system that will challenge these structures is theglobal hydrologiccycle.3 Within theU.S., issues of wateruse are traditionally viewed as relating to theconceptsofownership and property rights, and wateruse is primarily allocatedtoachieve economic development.4 As such,the legal framework andpolicyfor addressing issues of water allocation, use, and quality is inadequateinthe faceofthe ecological crises of theAnthropocene,and in fact played adirect role in creatingthesesame crises.5 In this Essay,Iexamine thelegal system of riparian rights, one of the primarydoctrines in theU.S.for governing waterrights, andits evolution to theregulatedripariansystem.6 Through an investigationintothe current state of theriparianwater rightssysteminVermont,Iexaminehow,in practice, thedoctrine and corresponding statutorylaw do not adequately protectwater resources. Thesystemdoes not accuratelyaccountfor the ecological limits embedded in thehydrologiccycle in deciding questions of waterallocation, use, and quality in Vermont.7 Instead,the principleof “reasonableuse” is employedtoweigh economic developmentmore heavily than ecologicallimits.8 Isuggestthat theripariandoctrine in Vermont,and in theU.S.morebroadly, requiresrestructuringbased on the principles of an environmental ethicinorder to face thechallenges of the Anthropocene to thehydrologiccycle.9
I. THE CHALLENGE OF THE ANTHROPOCENETOFRESH WATER LAW
“Sicutere tuo, ut non alienum lædas.”
–Justice Story, CircuitJustice10
Stockholm, Swed.), May2000, at 17 (discussing thereasoningbehind coining and using theterm “Anthropocene”). 2.See Mary ChristinaWood, Nature’s Trust:ALegal,Political and Moral Framefor Global Warming,34B.C. ENVTL.AFF.L.REV.577, 577–78 (2007) (articulatinghow thecurrentclimate crisis requireshumans to redefinethe government’s obligations to protectingthe environment). 3.See id. at 577 (stating that climatechange willhavedetrimental effects on waterresources). 4.See infra PartIII (overviewing waterlaw andits origins in theU.S.). 5.See infra PartII(analyzing theeffect of thecurrent legal regimeonwater issues). 6.See infra PartIII.A (examining the evolutionofriparianrights in U.S. jurisdictions). 7.See infra Part II (discussing the changing hydrologic cycle in theAnthropocene); infra Part IV (describing the current problemsVermont faces regarding waterquality). 8.See infra notes132–36 and accompanyingtext (notingthat Vermont has long used a “reasonableuse” standardwhen allocatingwater use permits). 9.See infra PartVI.A (explaining thefoundational elements of alandethic); see also infra PartVI.B (proposing to modify riparianism to supportalandethic). 10.Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312). 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 551
As theglobal community begins to comprehend thesocial,political, and environmentalchallengesofthe Anthropocene,11 we must bringinto questionthe ability of traditional naturalresource laws to allocateresources in away that respectsand restoresthe ecological boundariesofEarth’s biophysical systems.12 Theabove quote, so useyour ownasnot to injure another’s property,isthe definingprinciple of onesuchset of laws,those based on theripariandoctrine in U.S. waterlaw.13 Accordingtothe doctrine, ariparianlandowner is given certain rightstothe useofwater abuttingthe landowner’s land,but canonlyuse watertothe extentthat it does not degrade thequality or quantity of theresource for anyother riparianlandowner.14 Duetothe global natureofthe hydrologiccycleand thefact that waterisanessentialresourcefor life, theentire human population, as well as themillions of speciesmaking up life on Earth,have astake in thequantity and qualityoffresh water.15 In this Essay,Iexplorethe questionofwhether or not theriparian doctrine is capable of facing thethreats to thehydrologiccycle—and thereforethe threatstohumanity’s fresh waterresources—inthe Anthropocene.16 As IdescribeinPartII, thischallenge consists of two generalissues: currentand historical levelsofenvironmental degradation, such as waterpollutionorover-allocation, andincreasingrisk of extreme weathereventsand uncertaintyinwater suppliesdue to climatechange.17 Through examiningthe historical foundations of theripariandoctrine andthe modern day system of regulated riparianism,Iargue that the ripariandoctrinewill need amendmentstoprotectour watersystems in the
11.See, e.g.,Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen &John R. McNeill, The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelmingthe Great Forces of Nature,36AMBIO: J. HUM.ENV’T,Dec. 2007, at 614 (stating that “[i]nterestin[the Anthropocene] has escalated rapidly”). 12.See Wood, supra note2,at592, 595 (discussing how to reframetraditional environmental laws to protect natural resources). 13.See infra PartIII.A(overviewing theprinciples of riparianrightsinthe U.S.). 14. See DAN A. TARLOCKETAL., WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:ACASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 111, 116 (5thed. 2002) (quotingMeng v. Coffey,93N.W.713, 717–18 (Neb. 1903))(discussingthe rightsofownersoflands abutting waterwaysand notingthat “[t]he lawdoes not regardthe needs and desiresofthe person taking thewater solely to the exclusion of allother riparian proprietors”). 15.See infra Part II (analyzing theeffectsofthe Anthropocene on thehydrologicsystemand theU.S.systemofgovernment). 16.See infra Part II.B (listing requirements for waterlegislation in theAnthropocene to address climatechange). 17.KENNETH D. FREDERICK &PETER H. GLEICK,PEW CTR. ON GLOB.CLIMATE CHANGE, WATER &GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE:POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON U.S. WATER RESOURCES 2–4 (1999), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/1999/09/clim_change.pdf. 552 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549
Anthropocene.Iwill beginPartIIbyexploringthe challenges of environmentaldegradationand deteriorationtothe globalhydrologic system in theAnthropocene.InPartIII, Iprovide an overviewoffresh waterlaw andthe riparian doctrine in theU.S.InPartIV, Itrace the evolutionofthe riparian doctrine to thecurrent, modern-day system of regulated riparianism,using thefresh waterlegalsysteminVermont as a casestudy. In PartV,Idraw uponevidence—again from Vermont—to demonstrate flawsinimplementationofthissystemfor protectingfresh waterresources in theState.Finally,inPartVI, Isuggestmodifications to thedoctrineofriparianrightsbased on legally instatinganenvironmental ethicthatprioritizes ecological boundariesand enforces consequences when economic ends arepursued to thedetriment of ecosystems.
II. THE HYDROLOGIC CYCLE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
Humans arenow theprimary forcealtering theglobal freshwater cycle.18 This manipulationhas dramatic impacts, affectingbiodiversity, ecological functioning, food production, human health,and theregulation of theglobal climatesystem.19 Thehuman interruptionofthe hydrologic cycleisone of theprimary pieces of evidence citedfor theformal recognitionofthe Anthropoceneasthe current geologicalepoch in Earth’s history.20 Humans aremodifyingboththe terrestrial watercycle—through alteringstream flow—and changing patternsofwater evaporationand transpiration—through land useand land cover change.21 More specifically,
18. See generally Will Steffenetal., PlanetaryBoundaries: Guiding HumanDevelopment on a Changing Planet,SCIENCE,Feb.13, 2015, at 1259855-3, 1259855-7 [hereinafter Steffen et al., PlanetaryBoundaries](depictingmodelsoffresh waterboundaries due to human consumption).The USGS providesaconcise but important summary of thewater cycle. The WaterCycle:Summary, From USGS WaterScience Basics,U.S.GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://water.usgs.gov/edu/ watercycletouzbek.html (last visitedApr. 14, 2019).The energy of thesun moves allofEarth’s water throughthe globalhydrologiccycle. Id. Though the cycle has no endorbeginning, aproper explanation has afirst step,sowebegin with bodies of water, like the ocean or freshwater lakes. Id. Evaporation removes waterparticlesfrom these bodies of waterand transformsthe waterintovapor. Id. Then, as waterprecipitates in theformofrainorsnow,iteither entersastream as surfacerunoff,infiltratesthe ground, or solidifies into asnowpack, which mayeventually melt as spring runoff or stay frozenasa glacier. Id. The water thatinfiltratesthe ground mayentergroundwater,orwill be taken up by plants. Id. Next,water molecules either reenter theatmosphere through evaporationfrom awater body or the soil,orreenter theatmospherethrough evapotranspiration. Id. Finally,gaseouswater in the atmosphere condensesintoclouds and theprecipitation cycle begins anew. Id. Thekey point of this cycles is that it is globaland it is not restricted to political boundaries. Id. 19.See Steffenetal., Planetary Boundaries, supra note18, at 1259855-2(explainingthe changesinthe Earth system and theirvarious impacts). 20.Will Steffenetal., The Anthropocene: Conceptual andHistoricalPerspectives,369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A842, 843 (2011)[hereinafterSteffen et al., The Anthropocene]. 21. Id. 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 553 human development modifies thequantity and quality of runoff, infiltration ratesofwater into groundwater,general flowofwater,and thespatialand temporal patternsofevapotranspirationofwater back into theatmosphere.22 Humans arealsosignificantly altering thenitrogen and phosphorous biogeochemical cycles,which areintricatelytiedtothe watercycle and have dramatic effectsonthe health of lake ecosystems.23 In thecontextofthe Anthropocene,itisimportant to recognize that current andhistorical governance regimes allowedfor theactions that significantly alteredthe planet’s biophysical processes,suchasthe hydrologiccycle.24 Therefore, to face thechallenge of theAnthropocene to thehydrologiccycle,water governance regimesmustrestore thehealth of rivers, streams, andlakes to allowecosystemstofunction. Furthermore, they must curtail current actions that continue to degradewater quality and quantity.25 In additiontothese issues,climatechange exacerbates ecosystemdegradationand deterioration in theAnthropocenedue to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in theatmosphere.26
ClimateChange and theHydrologic Cycle
Themostrecent assessmentreport of theInternationalPanelon ClimateChange states that changes in precipitation and snow melt are alteringthe quantity and quality of hydrologicalsystems.27 Accordingtoa reportonclimatechange andU.S.water resources, climatechange will have largeimpactsonthe spatialand temporal variabilityofprecipitation, evapotranspiration,and runoff.28 This translatesintochanges in the frequency,intensity,and costofextremeevents,suchasapotentialincrease in theoccurrenceofand devastationdue to flooding.29 As temperature rises, ratesofevapotranspiration will increase, whichcouldlead to changes in
22.FREDERICK &GLEICK, supra note 17,at7. 23. See Johan Rockström et al., PlanetaryBoundaries: Exploringthe Safe Operating Space for Humanity,14ECOLOGY &SOC’Y,no. 2, 2009, Article No. 32,http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/ iss2/art32/ (explaining theeffect that altering the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles has on lakes). 24. Id. 25.See id. (outlining theconsequencesofwhat happens when thehydrologiccycleisallowed to degrade). 26.ClimateChange and Environmental Degradation,EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/foresight/topic/climate-change-environmental-degradation_en (lastvisited Apr. 14, 2019). 27.Working Group II Contributiontothe Fifth AssessmentReportofthe Intergovernmental PanelonClimateChange [IPCC], ClimateChange 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability,Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects 4(Christopher B. Fields et al. eds.,2014). 28.FREDERICK &GLEICK, supra note 17, at 4. 29.Id. at 23. 554 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549 patternsofprecipitation, runoff, and, paradoxically,anincrease in both drought and flooding throughout thecountry.30 With regard towater quality,climatechange couldcontributetowarmerwater temperatures and increased stormevents.31 Warmer watertemperaturesthreatenaquatic ecosystems.32 Additionally,the increase of urban and agriculturalrunoff fromstorm eventsincreases pollutionand sediment runoffintowater bodies,which also threatens aquatic ecosystems.33 Uncertainty in climate models makesitdifficulttopredict precise regionalimpactsofclimate change, but it is clear that runoffissensitive to variationinboth temperatureand precipitation.34 Therefore, in theAnthropocene,werequire waterlegislationthat: (1) acts to curtail current environmentaldegradation; (2)actstorestore deterioratedecosystems; and (3)addressesthe potentialincrease of extreme events and waterquality issues duetoclimatechange.35 Therefore, the questionthat Iwill exploreinthe remainderofthisEssay is: Will the ripariandoctrine, and themodernregulated ripariansystemofstatutory permitting, be capable of protectingour fresh waterresources and ecosystems in theAnthropocene?
III. BRIEF SURVEYOFFRESH WATER RESOURCE LAW IN THE U.S.
Watergovernanceregimes arediverse andhighlycontextualized within historical,geographical,and political contexts.36 In the U.S.,water lawwas bornout theincreaseofwater-driven mills duringthe Industrial Revolutionand theneed to applyconsistentlaw to disputes over access to waterand theflowofthe stream.37 With arelativelysparse earlypopulation in theEastern U.S. and abundant watersources,moststateshad few restrictions on wateruse as long as thediversion or use didnot obstruct the natural flow of theriver.38 Thedoctrine of riparianrightsemerged in this waterabundant region, whichgives certainrightsunder lawtoriparian
30.Id. at 7. 31.Id. at 29. 32.See id. (explaining that warm waterholds less oxygen,which threatens aquatic life). 33.Id. at v. 34.Id. 35.Id. at 22, 29. 36.Joseph W. Dellapenna, UnitedStates: The AllocationofSurface Waters, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICSOFWATER 189 (Joseph W. Dellapenna &JoyeetaGuptaeds., 2009) [hereinafter The AllocationofSurface Waters](providing context forthe stateofU.S.governance regimes). 37.DAVID GETCHESETAL., WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 16 (5th ed.2015). 38.Id. at 18. 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 555 landownersborderingawatercourse.39 Theripariandoctrine is thebasisof waterlaw in twenty-ninestates.40 This stands in contrasttothe otherdominant watergovernance doctrine in theU.S.: priorappropriation.41 Under thedoctrine of priorappropriation, waterrightsare afforded to an individual when that personputsaquantity of watertoa“beneficial” use, landowner or not.42 Thedoctrineofprior appropriationfollows theprincipleof“firstintime, first inright,” giving superiority of rightstothe earliest, or earlierusers,whereas riparianrights treatsall riparianlandownersasequalinterms of righttowater quality and quantity.43 In allwater governanceregimesinthe U.S.,the nature of waterasa moving resource challenges thetraditionallegal notions of property.44 Tarlock, Corbridge,Jr.,and Getchessuggestthat“[b]ecauseofthe physical natureofwater,all waterrights—riparianorappropriative—arecorrelative; theuse of watermustbesharedamong awideclass of claimantsand water rightshaveagreater dimension of non-exclusivity compared to rightsto land or to personalproperty.”45 Thecourts inventedtheseoriginal doctrines to meet society’s needsatthe time andplace wheretheywereneeded.46 Over thelast century,associety’sneedschanged, U.S. waterlaw evolved.47 Waterlaw has transitionedfromabasisincustomary lawand judicial decisions to asystemofstatutory lawgoverningwater allocation.48 As legislatures started passingstatutory law to govern water, buildingonthe original commonlaw doctrines,the systemsofriparianrightsand prior appropriationhavebecomemoredifficulttodiscern.49
39.Id. at 19. 40.See id. at 5–8 (describing the states’ variedimplementations of theriparian doctrine). 41.See id. at 4. The doctrineofprior appropriation wasdeveloped in the Western states during the19thcentury as minersand farmersexpanded into an aridterritory made up mostly of federally held lands. Id. at 4–6. Riparian rights, besidesrestricting rights to property owners, also restricted rights to those landsbordering astream,river,orlake. Id. These restrictions didnot make senseinthe West with less wateravailableand less privateproperty. Id. This led to the developmentofadifferent set of governing principles. Id. 42.Id. at 5. 43.Id. 44.Id. at 1. 45.TARLOCK ET AL., supra note14, at 388. 46.See id. at vii(addressingwhy thevarious states have developed different waterregimes). 47.See GETCHES ET AL., supra note37, at 1(explaining how water law is adynamic and ever- changing field). 48.Id. (highlightinghow agencies and legislatures arethe driving forces behind waterlaw). 49. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note14, at 262–63. 556 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549
A. TheNatureofRiparianRightsand thePrincipleofReasonableUse
Theriparianrightsdoctrinedeveloped into auniquelyAmerican doctrine primarily throughtortcases in theeastern states.50 Thedoctrine is a form of common propertyinwhich allindividualswith legal access, based on riparianland ownership,are entitledtouse the resourcesolong as they do notimpinge on anotherriparianland owner’s right to do thesame.51 Thenatureofthe riparian rightsdoctrineiswellestablished.52 A riparianlandowner’s rightstowater useinclude:
[T]heright to theflowofthe stream;the right to make a reasonableuse of thewaterbody, provided reasonableuses of other riparianusers arenot injured; theright of accessto thewaterbody; theright to fish; theright to wharfout;the right to prevent erosionofthe banks;the right to purity of thewater;the right to claimtitletothe bedsofnon- navigablelakes and streams.53
Theoretically,the right to theflowofthe stream prescribes the American doctrine of riparianrightstoaruleof“natural flow.”54 This declaresthatevery riparianhas theright to undiminished quantity and quality of waterthatflows past agiven property.55 Therefore, embedded within ariparianlandowner’s rightstouse wateristhe duty to respect other riparianlandowners’ rights.56 Additionally,because of thehistorical importanceofnavigationtocommerce, thepublic hasthe right to useany navigablewaters.57 Alandowner’s riparianrightsare subject to the landowner’s dutytothe public’s commonneeds.58 Theprinciple of naturalflowand thedutytorespect other riparian landowner’s rightswouldpresumptivelyban any development or useofthe
50.See JosephW.Dellapenna, The EvolutionofRiparianism in theUnitedStates,95MARQ. L. REV.54, 57–58, 60 (2011) [hereinafter The EvolutionofRiparianism](describingthe tort case, Merrittv.Parker,1N.J.L.460 (1795),and subsequent cases that defined riparianisminthe U.S.). 51. The Allocation of SurfaceWaters, supra note36, at 192. 52.GETCHESETAL., supra note37, at 21. 53. Id. at 21–22. 54. See The AllocationofSurface Waters, supra note 36, at 193 (explaining thetheoreticaland historical basis for“natural flow”inAmerican jurisprudence). 55.Id. 56.See id. (inferring that permissionmust be given by allwho have riparian rights, because A’sriparianrightscannot “compel”Bto submit B’sriparian rights to A’sriparianrights). 57.Merritt Starr, NavigableWaters of theUnitedStates—Stateand National Control,35 HARV.L.REV.154, 154 (1921). 58.Id. at 162. 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 557 water.59 However,even in early expression of theripariandoctrine, as courtsdefined waterlaw in responsetothe burgeoningnumberofnew industrialusesofwater in the19thcentury,the “naturalflow” principlewas subject to exceptions on thebasis of economicdevelopment.60 Acase in 1827, Tyler v. Wilkinson,remediedthisissuebyintroducing theprincipleof“reasonableuse.”61 In this dispute, anumber of riparianmill ownersclaimed that theconstructionofanupstream dam diminished the quantity of water availabletothem.62 In deciding thecaseinfavorofthe defendants, JusticeJoseph Storystated:
Theremay be, and theremustbeallowedofthat, whichis commontoall, areasonableuse.The truetestofthe principleand extent of theuse is,whether it is to theinjury of theother proprietors or not.Theremay be adiminution in quantity,oraretardationoraccelerationofthe natural current indispensablefor thegeneral and valuable useof thewater,perfectly consistent with theexistenceofthe commonright.The diminution, retardation, or acceleration, not positivelyand sensibly injurious by diminishingthe value of thecommonright,isanimpliedelement in the right of usingthe streamatall ....The maximisapplied, “Sic uteretuo, ut nonalienum lædas.”63
Theprincipleofreasonableuse is adeliberatedeparture from the natural flowprinciple, but an essentialelement of theU.S.’sriparianrights doctrine.64 Therefore,ownersofland abuttingawatercourse areentitledto make “reasonableuse”ofthe water, so long as the usedoesnot cause unreasonableharmtoanotherriparianlandowner.65 TheAmerican RestatementSecondofTorts formalizes thestandard principles applicable to defining“reasonableness” in ripariantortcases today, whichare as follows:
(a)The purposeofthe use,
59.See GETCHES ET AL., supra note37, at 19 (explainingthe natural-flow-uses effect on riparianismduring the industrial revolution). 60.Anthony Scott&Georgina Coustalin, The EvolutionofWater Rights,35NAT.RES.J.821, 891–92 (1995). 61.Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312). 62.Id. at 472. 63.Id. at 474. 64.See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 37, at 18–19 (overviewingthe transitionfrom natural flow to reasonableuse). 65. Id. 558 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549
(b)the suitability of theuse to thewatercourse or lake, (c)the economic value of theuse, (d)the social valueofthe use, (e) theextent and amount of theharmitcauses, (f)the practicality of avoidingthe harm by adjusting the useormethodofuse of oneproprietororthe other, (g)the practicality of adjustingthe quantity of water used by each proprietor, (h)the protectionfor existingvaluesofwater uses, land, investmentsand enterprises, and (i)the justiceofrequiringthe user causingharmtobear theloss.66
In theapplicationofthe reasonable useprinciples—thepurpose, the suitability,the economic value, and thesocial value of theuse (principles (a)through (d))—areused to determineifauseisreasonable.67 However, as evidenced in principles (e)through (i), reasonablenessisalso determined in relationtoother riparianland ownersand competingusesofwater.68 All riparianstatesfollowsomeformofthe reasonable useprincipletoday.69
B. RiparianRightsToday: Regulated Riparianism
Around themiddleofthe 20th century, increased demand on waterdue to urbanizationand industrializationchallenged thejudicial-based enforcement andlimitationofwater rightssolelyfor riparianlandowners.70 Additionally,inthe 1970s, recognitionofwater’s instream and ecological needs forced states to amend thetraditionalripariandoctrine.71 In response, many eastern states begantoimplement anew form of theripariandoctrine: regulated riparianism.72 Regulated riparianism takes apublic property approach to allocatingwater systemsthatallows formorecomprehensive watermanagement.73 Under regulated riparianism,water is allocated through acollectivedecision-makingprocess;typically astate agency or
66.TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 14,at124 (quotingRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: REASONABLENESS OF USE OF WATER §850A (AM.LAW INST.1979)). 67.GETCHESETAL., supra note37, at 34. 68.Id. at 34–35. 69. The Allocation of SurfaceWaters, supra note 36,at194. 70.GETCHESETAL., supra note37, at 60–61. 71. The EvolutionofRiparianism, supra note50, at 83. 72. Id. 73.See id. at 87 (highlightingthat stateshave movedfrom acommon property approach to a public property approach). 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 559 department issuingpermits for time-limitedusesbased on the reasonableness of theproposed use.74 These permitsystems arefounded upon theprinciples of riparianrightsand adopted theprincipleof reasonableuse as an essentialcriteria forallocatingapermit.75 Another important evolutioninthisregimeisthatregulated riparianism determines thereasonablenessofause before ause is granted.76 This is in contrast to thetraditionalstructureofthe riparian doctrine, wherecourts determine reasonablenessofuse onlyafter useischallenged.77 In asystem of regulated riparianism,the state holds waterintrust forthe public.78 State agencies enact this responsibility in planningfor and protectingthe public interest in waters andprovisioning thewater forpublic use.79 In provisioning abody of waterfor public use, theState reliesonthe key principles of reasonableuse: thepurpose, thesuitability,the economic value, and thesocialvalue of theuse.80 In 1997, theAmericanSocietyofCivil Engineers published The Regulated Riparian WaterCode to provide ablueprint foramodernized ripariansystem.81 TheSociety developedthe Code specificallytoface the challengesofpopulationgrowth, environmentaldegradation, climate change, and increased waterdemand—without theavailabilityofnew water sources—in the21stcentury.82 About halfofthe country’s riparianstates now allocatewater using regulatedriparianism,but most riparianstates have implemented somedegree of regulated riparianism through statutory permittingsystems.83
74. The AllocationofSurface Waters, supra note 36,at200. 75.Id.;GETCHESETAL., supra note37, at 62. 76.See GETCHESETAL., supra note37, at 62 (explaining that states have shiftedfrom commonlaw,which is retroactive, to statutorylaw,which is adopted ahead of time). 77. See The EvolutionofRiparianism, supra note 50, at 87 (emphasizing thatreasonablenessis determined aheadoftimerather than at thetimeofachallenge in court). 78. Id. 79. The AllocationofSurface Waters,supra note36, at 200. 80.See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS:REASONABLENESS OF USE OF WATER §850A (AM.LAW INST.1979) (setting out thelisted factors as wellasfive otherconsiderations). 81. See THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE:FINAL REPORT OF THE WATER LAWS COMMITTEE OF THE WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS iii–iv (Joseph W. Dellapenna ed.,1997) (stating that the goal of theModel Water Code Project“wastodevelop proposed legislationfor adoptionbystate governments”and attempting to, as much as possible,standardize thedisparatelanguage usedby Easternand Western states). 82.Robert E. Beck, The Regulated RiparianModel Water Code: Blueprint For Twenty First Century WaterManagement,25WM.&MARY ENVTL.L.&POL’Y REV.113, 113(2000). 83. The Allocation of SurfaceWaters, supra note 36,at200. 560 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549
IV.THE CURRENT LEGALAND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR WATER RIGHTS IN VERMONT
As showninthe previous section, thetraditional ripariandoctrine and theevolving system of regulated riparianism considerpublic value, economic value, and suitabilityofauseinallocatingwater.Ascompared to privateproperty systems,whereaproprietorhas nearly unlimitedfreedom in determiningwhether or not to develop an owned resource,botha commonproperty (traditional riparian doctrine) andpublic property (regulated riparianism)systemappearbettersuitedfor tacklingthe social and ecological challengesofthe Anthropocene.84 In order to better understandthe modernday ripariansystemand themechanisms through whichwater in theAnthropocene is allocated in theU.S., this sectionlooks at thecurrent stateofthe riparian doctrine in Vermont. TheState of Vermont abides by theriparianrightsdoctrineand allocates watertodaythrough aformofregulatedriparianism.85 Notably, in an 1827Vermont SupremeCourtdecision, theState played akey role in the formationofthe early ripariandoctrine.86 In Martin v. Bigelow,87 the Vermont SupremeCourt found that theneed to develop theeconomy superseded theprotectionofpriorusesofwater.88 Today, theAgencyof NaturalResources andthe AgencyofAgriculture, Foodand Markets share thegoverningofwater allocationinVermont through statutorypermitting systems.89 Additionally,federal legislationand acts affectingthe environmentare important componentsofwater lawinVermont.90 TheVermont Statutesprescribe theState to boththe principleof natural flowand reasonable useingoverning theregulationofstream
84.See TheEvolution of Riparianism, supra note50, at 86 (discussing the acceleration of pressureonwater systemsdue to climatechange and theshortcomings exhibitedbytraditional riparian systems). 85.See Johns v. Stevens,3Vt.308, 315–16 (1830) (establishingthatthe State of Vermont wouldfollowthe riparian rightsdoctrine). 86.See Martin v. Bigelow,2Aik. 184,197 (Vt. 1827) (definingVermont’s jurisprudencein favor of riparianrightsand rejectingthe commonlaw approach). 87. Id. 88. The Allocation of SurfaceWaters, supra note36, at 194 (citing Martinv.Bigelow,2Aik. at 187). 89.See Gail Osherenko, Understanding theFailure to Reduce Phosphorus LoadinginLake Champlain:Lessons forGovernance,15VT.J.ENVTL.L.97, 128 (2013)(stating that theVermont Agencies of NaturalResources and Agriculture, Food andMarketsare responsiblefor enforcement under amemorandum of understanding). 90.See L. KinvinWroth, SixFlagsOverChamplain: StartingPointsfor aComparative Analysis,38J.GREAT LAKES RES.167, 167–68 (2012)(discussingthe sixlegal regimesand various federal frameworks that affect waterquality in Vermont). 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 561 flow.91 TheState then enforces this policythrough apermitsystem, certifiedbythe Agency of NaturalResources, for anyartificialregulationor alteration of stream flow.92 Priortograntingapermit, theAgency of NaturalResources determines if thepermitiswarranted by weighing whetherthe change will adverselyaffect public safety, significantly damage fish or wildlife,significantly damage therightsofriparianowners, or adversely affect thosewatersdesignatedasoutstanding resource waters.93 Title 10 of theVermont Statutes describes asimilar permittingprocessfor other waterusesand createsthe Department of Conservationatthe Agency of NaturalResources to establishthe State’swater management policy.94 With regard to waterquality,Chapter 47 of theVermont Statutes defines theState’s waterquality policyand thestatutory permitting system forwater pollutioncontrol.95 Thewater quality policyofVermont is to:
(1)protectand enhance thequality,character and usefulness of its surfacewatersand to assure the public health; (2)maintainthe purity of drinking water; (3)controlthe dischargeofwastestothe waters of theState,prevent degradationofhighquality waters andprevent,abateorcontrolall activities harmful to waterquality; (4)assurethe maintenance of waterquality necessary to sustainexistingaquatic communities; (5)provide clear, consistent,and enforceable standardsfor thepermittingand management of discharges; (6)protectfromriskand preserve in their natural state certainhighquality waters,including fragile high-altitude waters,and theecosystems they sustain;
91.VT.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, §1001 (2018). 92. Id. §1022. 93. Id. §1023. 94.Lara D. Guercio, Struggle Between Manand Nature—Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and CleanWater: How to Implement theState of Vermont’s PhosphorousTMDL Within the Lake ChamplainBasin,12VT.J.ENVTL.L.455, 493–94 (2010)(discussing Vermont’s Title 10 in the context of theState’sstormwater management program). 95.See VT.STAT.ANN.tit.10, §1250 (detailing Vermont’s water qualitypolicy); Id. §§ 1263, 1265, 1267–68 (detailing Vermont’s permitting system). 562 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549
(7)managethe waters of theState to promotea healthyand prosperous agricultural community, to increasethe opportunitiesfor useofthe State’sforest, park,and recreational facilities, and to allowbeneficialand environmentally sound development. It is further thepolicyofthe Statetoseekover thelong term to upgradethe qualityofwatersand to reduce existing riskstowater quality.96
Vermont’s waterquality policycan be seen as areinterpretationofthe principleofreasonableuse.97 It is evident from theabove policythatthe waterlegislationinthe Stateseeks to accomplish thefollowing: protect the usefulnessand quality of waterfor societal use; controlpollutionof waterwaysfor ecologicalcommunities; andregulatepollutiontopromote economic value through “environmentally sounddevelopment.”98 Furthermore,the policyexplicitly goes above and beyond theprincipleof reasonableuse to improve waterquality over thelong term.99 To enforcethe State’swater quality policy, theAgency of Natural Resourceshas thepower to grantdischargepermits.100 TheAgency of NaturalResources vets andgrantsapplications based on an investigative processsimilar to thepreviously describedstream-flow-alterationpermit.101 Theapplications arealso subjecttothe federal Clean WaterAct’s National PollutionDischarge EliminationSystem.102
CurrentState of WaterinVermont
As illustrated in theprevious sections,the statutory languagedefining Vermont’s modernregulated riparianism suggests that it is well equipped to balancethe needsofecosystems, society, and theeconomyinthe Anthropocene.However,ifweshift our perspective fromthe legislation and language definingthe system to theactual functioning of thesystemin
96. Id. §1250. 97.See supra PartIII.B(exploring the modernchanges to thereasonable usedoctrine). 98.See VT.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, §1250 (describingthe goalsofVermont’s water qualitypolicy, including theability to provide standards for permitting and managing discharges). 99.Compare note96and accompanying text (quotingVermont’s waterquality policy), with notes 65–69 and accompanying text (summarizing thereasonableuse principle). 100.VT.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, §1263. 101.See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text (describingVermont’sstream-flow- alterationpermittingsystem). 102.See, e.g.,33U.S.C.§1313 (2012) (discussingthe National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permitting system andthe requirementsitplacesonstates). 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 563 practice, we seeadifferent pictureemergeofregulated riparianism in the Anthropocene. TheState of Vermont hasaserious waterquality problem in theLake ChamplainBasindue to excessivephosphorous loading.103 Lake Champlain is located on thenorthwesternborderofVermont and spans the internationalboundary between theU.S.and Canada,and,within theU.S., between Vermont and NewYork.104 Thelake is one of Vermont’s most prized natural resources, but forthe last few decades it hasfaced major environmentalthreats,including mercurypollution, invasivespecies,and, most notably, eutrophicationfromphosphorous pollution.105 Eutrophication is theprocessinwhich excess phosphorous in alake leads to an increasein plant andalgae growth,producing algae blooms.106 Algae blooms, in turn, negativelyaffect other aquatic life as thedecompositionofthe plant and organicmatterdecreases oxygen andsunlight levelsinthe lake.107 This processcontinuestocause seasonal beach closuresand threatensorkills fishthroughout lake segments.108 Theprimary sourcesofphosphorous in theBasin aredischarges fromwastewater treatment facilites,stormwater runofffromdeveloped areas, and agriculturalrunoff.109 On topofthe statutorylawsgoverning waterpollutioninthe State, multi-party effortshave beenmade to tackle theissueofexcess phosphorous in Lake Champlain.110 In 1988, theU.S.and Canada signeda Memorandum of Understanding to developajointapproach to environmentalprotection of theBasin.111 Then,in1996, theLake ChamplainBasinProgram wasestablished to facilitate abasin-wide management approach to reducing phosphorous pollution.112 Ultimately, in 2002, Vermont and NewYorkcreated ajoint phosphorous TotalMaximum Daily Load (TMDL),ornutrientbudget,for Lake Champlainasrequired by
103.LAKE CHAMPLAIN BASIN PROGRAM,2018 STATE OF THE LAKE AND ECOSYSTEM INDICATORS REPORT 1(2018), http://lcbp.org/sol18dev/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-State-of-the- Lake_web.pdf. 104.Osherenko, supra note89, at 97–98. 105.Daniel D. Dutcher &DavidJ.Blythe, WaterPollutioninthe Green MountainState:A CaseStudy of Law,Science, and Culture in theManagement of Public WaterResources,13VT.J. ENVTL.L.705, 712 (2012). 106.WilliamBowden, Background Facts:RoleofPhosphorus in Lake ChamplainPollution,17 VT.J.ENVTL.L.501, 502 (2016) (explaining that high phosphorous content can lead to algae blooms). 107.Osherenko, supra note89, at 99. 108. Id. at 98. 109. Id. at 99. 110.See Wroth, supra note90, at 172 (discussingthe multiple players on thefederal, state, and international levels, involved in lowering the phosphorouslevels in Lake Champlain). 111.See id. (describing the 1988 MemorandumofUnderstanding). 112.See id. (reviewing theestablishmentofthe Lake ChamplainBasin Program). 564 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549 theFederal Clean WaterAct.113 Then,in2011, theEnvironmental ProtectionAgency, whichoversees implementationofthe Clean WaterAct, disapproved Vermont’s portionofthe TMDL forLake Champlainover concerns that it didnot provide sufficient reasonableassurances that the plan wouldachieve its target reductions in phosphorus runofflevels.114 Finally,in2016,the Stateproduced anew TMDL to achieve aclean Lake Champlain, and also passed legislation in 2015—Act 64:the Vermont Clean WaterAct—toachievethe targetsinthe newTMDL.115 In Act64, thereare anumberofnew permits forwater quality, such as ageneral permitfor stormwater discharges from municipal roads116 and ageneral stormwater permit fordischargesfromimpervioussurfaces threeacres or larger in area.117 It shouldalsobenoted that arecent 2018updatetothe Title 10 statue includes revisions to theDepartment of Environmental Conservation’spermittingprocess, suchasstandardsfor public notice, public meetings,and otherforms of transparencyinpermittingdecisions.118 However,thesenew permits,permittingprocedure revisions, and the legislation do not alterthe principles upon whichpermits areapprovedand allocated.119 With multiple decadesofwork, and millions of dollars of investment, many of Lake Champlain’sthirteenlake segmentsstill have average phosphorous concentrations in excessofestablishedtargets.120 We expect this to be thecasefor many years, even if land management improves, due to timelags in themovement of phosphorus throughout thewatershed.121 Additionally,flooding in 2011 caused phosphorous levelstospike to some of thehighestconcentrations observedsince 1990.122 Despite Vermont’s effortstocreatesocially,ecologically,and economically sound legislation, theregulatedripariansystemhas been failingVermont in protectingthe State’swater fromphosphorous
113. Id. 114.KariDolan, The ImportanceofInter-AgencyCollaboration and Public Engagementinthe Development of theImplementationPlanfor theNonpoint Source-FocusedVermontLakeChamplain Phosphorus TMDL,17VT.J.ENVTL.L.663, 664, 667 (2016). 115.Id. at 676–77. 116.VT.STAT.ANN.tit. 10,§1264(g)(1)–(2)(2018). 117. Id. §1264(g)(3). 118. See id. §7701 (detailing permitting procedures forthe Department of Environmental Conservation). 119.See Osherenko, supra note89, at 111 (givinganexample of an agencyissuingpermits based on compliance with technological standardsrather than based on the receivingwaterconditions). 120.LAKE CHAMPLAIN BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 103, at i, 10–11. 121.DonaldW.Mealsetal., Lag Time in WaterQuality Response to Best Management Practices: AReview,39J.ENVTL.QUALITY 85, 85 (2010). 122.N.Y.STATE DEP’TOFENVTL.CONSERVATION,LAKE CHAMPLAIN PHOSPHORUS REDUCTION PLAN NEW YORK 11 (2014),http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water_pdf/lcbprp2014draft.pdf. 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 565 pollution.123 This suggeststhatregulatedriparianism—asimplemented in Vermont—isnot yet capableofprotectingfreshwaterresources in theState giventhe challengesofthe Anthropocene.124 Iexplore thisfurther in the following section.
V. DECONSTRUCTIONOFTHE PRINCIPLEOFREASONABLE USE IN VERMONT
Recallthe threenecessitiesintroducedearlierfor waterlaw in the Anthropocene:(1) curtailing current environmental degradation; (2) restoring deterioratedecosystems; and (3)addressingthe potentialincrease of extreme eventsand waterquality issuesdue to climatechange.125 The regulated ripariansysteminVermont is strugglingtomeet thesethree requirements.126 Vermont statutorypermittingsystems have yet to significantly decreasethe current levelofphosphorous enteringLake Champlain(requirement 1).127 Thepermittingsystems have not restored deteriorated lake ecosystemsfromthe damage of historical phosphorous pollution(requirement 2).128 Finally,the system hasyet to protect against thepotentialimpactsofclimatechange,including increased eutrophication from risinglake temperatures and increased stormwaterrunofffrom extremeweather events (requirement 3).129 Although therehave been significantupdates,bothinlegislation to protectclean waterand in increased capacity of agenciestotrack and enforcethe State’s cleanwater laws,there have notbeen significantchanges to theregulatedriparianism permittingprocessinthe State.130 Daniel Dutcher and DavidBlythesuggestthat in Vermont,the legal structure forregulatingwater use and pollutionissound, but the implementationofthe regulatoryframework is flawed.131 This flawin implementation, they suggest, is due to thefactthat thedevelopmentpolicy of theState heavily influences decisionmaking regarding waterpolicy:
123.See Wroth, supra note 90, at 172 (discussing howVermont state lawstillallowsanexcess of phosphorous toenterintoLake Champlain). 124.See infra Part V(analyzing the effectsofregulated riparianism in Vermont andits effectivenessinprotectingfreshwaterresources). 125.See supra note35and accompanying text (listingthreerequirementstofix thewater system in the Anthropocene). 126.See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text (examininglimitations in Vermont’s efforts to prevent degradation, restoreecosystems, and prepare for issues causedbyclimate change). 127.LAKE CHAMPLAIN BASIN PROGRAM, supra note 103, at 11. 128.Id. at 14. 129.Dutcher &Blythe, supra note105, at 713, 715. 130.See supra Part VI (analyzing the currentstate of Vermont’s waterlaws). 131.Dutcher &Blythe, supra note105, at 723. 566 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549
“For ageneration, government officialshavebeen tellingVermonterswhat they have wanted to hear—that thestate is workingtobringVermont’s waters back, but that,atthe same time, government regulationand planning will not standinthe wayofanyone’seconomicinterest.”132 This preference canbetraced back to theearly ripariandoctrineinthe StateofVermont.133 In thecase of Martin v. Bigelow,the Vermont Supreme Courtdefined economicvalue as akey component of theprinciple of reasonableuse.134 As showninPartIVabove, thestatutory permitting system regulatingwater quality in Vermont employs theprincipleof reasonableuse to determinewhether or not to allocateawater useor discharge permit.135 Theoretically,the four coreconsiderations of the principleofreasonable use(thepurpose,suitability,and economicand social values of theuse)are to be weighedequally in determining if agiven useisreasonable.136 However,ifastateagency, electedofficial,or administrationfavors economic development overthe ecological boundariesand public interest in awater body, thetestofreasonable useis thelegal tool through whichthe permit grantingauthoritycan legally enforce this bias.137 During Vermont Governor JimDouglas’s 2003–2011 administration, a veryheatedtimefor waterquality policyinthe State,the governor promoted a“Third Way” of managing environmental problems in the State.138 Douglas’s “Third Way” is one in which“protectingthe environmentwouldnot interfere with economic growth.”139 Dutcher and Blythe140 and Gail Osherenko141 bothpoint to aseries of court cases in the early2000s that clearly demonstrate this preferencefor economic developmentover thepurpose, suitability,and social value of wateruses on behalf of theadministration. While this series of lawsuits occurreda numberofyearsago andshouldnot be takenasanexample of thecurrent administrationinVermont,itdoesclearly demonstrate thechallengesin
132.Id. at 754. 133.See, e.g.,Martinv.Bigelow,2Aik. 184, 185, 187 (Vt. 1827) (reasoning that theright to operateamill waswithin“theordinarypurposes of life”). 134. The Allocation of SurfaceWaters, supra note36, at 194 (citing Martinv.Bigelow,2Aik. at 187). 135.VT.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, §1001 (2018). 136.See supra text accompanying note68(explaininghow these principles of reasonableuse are weighed by adecision maker when determining reasonableuse). 137.See VT.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, §1011 (stating thatadministrationofwater policyistobe consistent with reasonableuse of riparianrights). 138.Dutcher &Blythe, supra note105, at 738. 139. Id. 140. Id. at 724, 728, 732. 141.Osherenko, supra note89, at 111. 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 567 applying thereasonableuse principleinaregulated riparianism systemto protectwater resources.142 In the2001 In re Hannaford case, theConservationLaw Foundation sued theVermont Agency of Natural Resources over astormwater discharge permit issued foraproposed commercial shopping development in SouthBurlington.143 TheConservationLaw Foundationcontended that thenew development woulddischarge into stormwater impairedwatersthat didnot have cleanup plans in place, as requiredunder theClean Water Act.144 TheWater ResourcesBoarddecidedinfavor of theConservation LawFoundationand no new discharges permits wouldbeallowedthat discharge into impairedstreamsinthe absence ofaTMDL.145 In response, developerswent up in arms claiming that thedecision wouldshut downall new development.146 Following the Hannaford147 decision, theVermont Legislaturecreated new stormwaterlawstoallowthe Agency of NaturalResources to issue WatershedImprovement Permits.148 This permitprocessbypasses theneed foracleanupplanorTMDLfor impairedstreamsand allows continued issuing of stormwaterdischarge permits to new developments.149 Then in 2002, againenvironmental groups challenged theAgencyofNatural Resourcesinthe case In re MorehouseBrook,thistimewith regardto issuanceofWatershed Improvement Permits.150 Theenvironmental groups claimedthatWatershed Improvement Permits essentially allowedthe Agency to issuedischarge permits into impairedwaterswithout acleanup plan.151 Again, theWater ResourcesBoardsided with environmental groups andrequiredthe Agency of NaturalResourcestodevelop TMDLs.152 TheAgency of NaturalResources finally agreedtoundertake thetime- consumingprocess of developing TMDLsfor stormwater-impaired
142.See Dutcher &Blythe, supra note105, at 724–25, 728 (discussing the Hannaford Bros. and Morehouse Brook decisionsbythe Vermont Water Resource Board); see also Osherenko, supra note89, at 112 (examiningthe Conservation Law Foundation’sattempttoforce theVermont WaterResource Board to adoptaTMDL). 143. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., No.WQ-01-01, at 1(Vt.Water Res. Bd.June 29, 2001). 144. Id. at 2; see 33 U.S.C. §1313(d) (2012) (discussing theTMDLrequirements in theClean WaterAct that were at the heartofthe Conservation Law Foundation’ssuit). 145.Dutcher &Blythe, supra note105, at 725. 146.Osherenko, supra note89, at 111–12 . 147. In re HannafordBros. Co.,No. WQ-01-01,at1. 148.Dutcher &Blythe, supra note105, at 727. 149. Id. 150. In re Morehouse Brook, Nos. WQ-02-04,WQ-02-05, WQ-02-06, WQ-02-07, at 1(Vt. WaterRes. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). 151.See id. at 3–4(discussing how theState issued Watershed ImprovementPermits without therequiredcompliance plans). 152.Osherenko, supra note89, at 112. 568 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549 streams.153 Ever conscious of shuttingdownthe development process, the Agency immediatelyset to work developing an interimpermittingprocess duringTMDLdevelopment.154 TheLegislatureagreedtoallowpermits to be issued andallowedfor theuse of offsets to maintain thestandardofno new or increased pollution.155 Essentially,the Agency of NaturalResources achieved thegoalofallowing stormwater discharge permitsfor new developmentatthe expenseofwater quality.156 Under regulated riparianism,itisillegal foralandowner to discharge stormwaterintopollutedwaters or to degrade thequalityofawatercourse without proving “reasonableuse.”157 In these twocases,the judicial system acted in an effort to upholdthe social and ecologicalprinciples of reasonableuse, but theAgencyofNatural Resourcesand thelegislative branch continuedtocreatework-aroundstofavoreconomic development.158 With theweightof“reasonableness” firstinthe hands of agenciesissuing permits, society must pay greater attentiontohow reasonableuse is appliedinpracticeinorder to preventecological degradationbeforeitbegins.159
ReasonableMisuse
Thecurrent articulationofriparianrightsinVermont allows agencies to useabroad range of interpretations in decidingwhat constitutes a reasonableuse.160 This flexibility of interpretation—if theState’s goalis environmentalprotectionand restoration combinedwith,but neveratthe cost of, economic development—allows agencies to continue to grant permits that increasedischarges into theState’s impairedwaters.161
153.See Dutcher &Blythe, supra note 105, at 731 (stating that theAgency of Natural Resources agreed to developTMDLs). 154.See id. (explaining thatthe Agency of NaturalResourceshad to develop interim permitting while developing TMDLs); cf. VT.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, §1264c (2010) (providing forthe interimnature of §1264c by including adate of repeal). 155.Dutcher &Blythe, supra note105, at 731. 156.Id. 157.See TheEvolutionofRiparianism, supra note50, at 85–87 (explaining how reasonableuse worksinregulated riparianism). 158.See Dutcher &Blythe, supra note 105, at 728–29 (discussinghow theAgencyofNatural Resources attemptedtoworkaroundenvironmentallaw requirements in favorofeconomics). 159.See GETCHESETAL., supra note 37, at 4(highlightinghow agencieshave theauthority to allocatepermits in most riparian systems). 160.EvanMulholland, Groundwater Quantity RegulationinVermont:APath Forward,8VT.J. ENVTL.L.1,1–12 (2006). 161.See id. (noting theleniency in Vermont’s waterpermittingsystem); see also Wood, supra note2,at592 (examining theissues with today’spermitting system). 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 569
Discharge permits areinessence theright to pollute.162 In thecontext of the Anthropocene,thisright to pollute must be determined by thehydrologic cycle’sability to absorband dilute nutrients or pollutantstoadegree that it is not harmfultothe ecosystemsorthe social systems dependent onthe water.163 Theright to pollute shouldalsoinclude considerationofthe potentialalterations in thehydrologiccycle due to climatechange.164 This preference foreconomic development is not newinwater resource policy, norisitunique to regulatedriparianism in Vermont.165 In the1990s,water policyanalystDavidLewis Feldmandefined thenation’s waterresourceproblemsas“causedbyareliance upon narrowand often inappropriate acquisitivevalues that areharmful to nature and to the satisfactionofawide range of human needs,including biological exigency andlivinginharmony with natureand in community with other people.”166 Therefore, thecurrent modelofregulatedriparianism andthe principleof reasonableuse must be modified in ordertocreateawater doctrine appropriate forprotectingour globalfreshwaterresourcesinthe Anthropocene.167
VI.ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS FOR VERMONT WATER LAW IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
Mary Christina Wood suggeststhatratherthancreatenew environmentallegislation to face ourclimatecrisis, we reframethe role of governmentintoatrust framework.168 In doing so,wecouldutilizethe current legalframework to transitionthe government’s discretion to destroy theenvironmentintoanobligationtoprotect natureunderthe auspices of collectiveproperty rights.169 In asimilarway, Cormac Cullinan, in hisbook Wild Law,expressesaneedtoreframe our wholeperceptionofthe legal
162.See CleanWater Act, 33 U.S.C. §1342 (2012) (describing the structure of theNational PollutantDischarge Elimination System). 163.See supra PartVI(explaining theimportance of shifting legal frameworks in the Anthropocene). 164.See supra Part VI (discussing theimportance of these considerations within thecontext of theAnthropocene). 165.See Jarret C. Oeltjen &Loyd K. Fisher, Allocation of Rights to Water: Preferences, Priorities, andThe Role of the Market,57NEB.L.REV.245, 247, 254–55 (1978)(detailing thetheory of choosing economic development over waterrights). 166.DAVE FELDMAN,WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:IN SEARCH OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 2(1995). 167.See Wood, supra note2,at594–95 (arguingthat thefutureofthe nation’s resources depends on reframing the government). 168. Id. 169.See id. at 595 (arguing that by drawingonancient trust conceptsinproperty law, rather than statutory law,the government can more easily focusonprotecting nature’s rights). 570 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549 system andsociety.170 Cullinan advocates shifting focus fromthe welfare of humanstothe welfare of theEarth Community.171 As apublic property system,regulated riparianism is alreadyimbued with astronger sense of public trust than thetraditional privateproperty regimes, as referredtobyMary Christina Wood.172 Thelegal framework exists in Vermont to supportwater allocationthatbalances social, ecological,and economic well-being.173 Butinpractice, theprincipleof reasonableuse is vulnerable to interpretation by economically biased decisionmakers.174 This economic preference has ledtothe currentstate of environmentaldegradationand continuing deteriorationthatwesee in Lake Champlain.175 To resolve this flaw in thedoctrine, Iproposetwo modifications that seek to reframethe role of waterlaw in riparianstates, while workingwithin theexistingregulatory structure: (1)legally define and enforce an environmentalethic,and (2)reintroduce theexpanded concept of riparianintoregulatedriparianism.
A. ImplementinganEnvironmentalEthic
To reframe regulated riparianism into adoctrinethat reduces pollution, restoresdegraded ecosystems,and decreases vulnerabilitytoclimate change, theState of Vermont shouldimplement an environmental ethicand enforceitwith an anti-environmentaldegradationlaw.Tobegin,the State could define an environmentalethic based on Aldo Leopold’sland ethic.176 Leopold’sfoundationalprinciplefor guiding aland ethicis: “A thingis right when it tends to preserve theintegrity,stability,and beautyofthe biotic community.Itiswrong when it tends otherwise.”177 Leopold’sland ethicreflects aresponsibilityfor thehealth of theland—asharpdeparture from thinking solelybased upon economic terms.178 Instead, theethic encourages an examinationofquestions “interms of what is ethically and
170.CORMAC CULLINAN,WILD LAW:AMANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 117 (2ded. 2011). 171. Id. 172.Wood, supra note2,at601–02 (explaininghow thetrust frameworkisaproperty concept, and how theproperty conceptssupport environmental protectionwhile affirmingone’s property rights). 173.See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (outliningthe statutory frameworkin Vermont that allows reasonable use principles to be appliedbyagency discretion). 174.See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text(discussing various practicesusedby Vermont agencies that have enabled thedeterioratedlakeconditions). 175.See supra Part IV (discussing the flexibility in administrationofwater laws and the historical preferencefor economic development). 176.See ALDO LEOPOLD,ASAND COUNTY ALMANAC 239 (OxfordUniv. Press1966) (proposing that ethics be extended to include theland as well as humans). 177. Id. at 262. 178.Id. at 262–63. 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 571 esthetically right,aswellaswhat is economically expedient.”179 This is not to saythatthere is no room foreconomicthought in theevaluationofa wateruse: in fact,Leopoldrecognizes that it is an important consideration.180 However,economicvalue shouldbeevaluated in conjunction with,and secondarilyto, theimpact of ause on theintegrity, health,and functioning of thebroader ecological community.Leopold suggests that “a system of conservation basedsolelyoneconomic self- interest is hopelessly lopsided.”181 Thecurrent system in Vermont demonstrates thelopsidedness of asystemdriven by economic value.182 However,anenvironmental ethicwill take timeand reinforcement to gainlegitimacy within society.183 To ensurethat citizensand corporations actinaccordance with theenvironmentalethic,Vermont coulddrawfrom Polly Higgins’s Ecocide Acttolegally define acrime againstthe environment.184 Higgins proposes to add ecocide as afifth international CrimeAgainstPeace, joiningthe already existingcrimesofgenocide, crimes against humanity, warcrimes, and crimes of aggression.185 Higgins’s Ecocide Actcreates alegal framework through whichparties can be heldaccountableand prosecuted forenvironmental destructionand degradation.186 Additionally,Higgins has draftedthe full text of alegalact to define, describe, and prosecuteecocide.187 Vermont candrawfrom Higgins’s Ecocide Acttocreate astate level anti-degradationact.Such an actwouldenforce theuse of an environmental ethicindefiningreasonable useinregulatedriparianism andpunish individuals that degrade water resources.188 Finally,toenforce astate-level anti-degradationact,the Statemust defineenvironmentaldestructionand degradationbased on ecological
179.Id. at 262. 180.Id. at 263. 181.Id. at 251. 182.See Osherenko, supra note 89, at 111 (discussinghow theAgencyofNatural Resources favors technology-based effluentlimitationsover environmental improvement). 183.See generally POLLY HIGGINS,EARTH IS OUR BUSINESS:CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME XI (2012) (explaining allofthe steps that arenecessaryfor an environmental ethictotakeplace in thepresent economic-oriented legal landscape). 184.Id. at 159. 185. Id. at XI. 186.See generally id. at 171–78 (laying out thesentencingguidelines for those convicted of ecocide). 187.See generally id. at 157–78 (outlininghow theEcocideAct defines,describes,and prosecutes Ecocide). 188.See generallyid. (suggesting various methods theState of Vermont couldpotentially draw on to craft better anti-degradation legislation). 572 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549 boundaries.189 Here,Vermont can refertoplanetaryboundaries, which includegloballimits for, among others, climatechange,biodiversity loss, thephosphorous cycle,the nitrogen cycle,and global freshwateruse.190 Researchers in theState canworktoadapttheseglobalsystemboundaries to state-level and watershed-levellimits. Thisworkisalready underwayin Vermont under theClean WaterAct.191 Theresearch into theassimilative capacity of waterbodies, as mandated under theClean WaterAct,can be used to legally define environmental degradation.192 This three-part proposition—environmentalethic,anti-degradation law, and regionalecological-boundariesresearch—mayseemunrealistic in thecurrent political context.193 However,small stepscan be taken now to initiate achange in course towards awater doctrinethatprioritizes the ecological challengesofthe Anthropoceneand an environmentalethic over economic development.194 Onesuch change wouldbetoimplement atwo- stagetest forreasonableuse thatenforces ecologicalboundariesasthe first stepindetermining reasonable use.195 In thistwo-stage test, thefirst testof reasonableuse wouldbetoinvestigatewhether theproposed permit contributes to ecological degradationorinhibits ecologicalrestoration. The test proceeds to thesecondstage if thepermitwouldnot contributeto ecological harm. In thesecond stage, theAgencyconsidersthe remaining threestandard principles of reasonableuse (the purposeand economic and social values) and determines thepermitallocation. This initialchange to a two-step test forreasonableuse couldstart theprocessoftransforming the Vermont permittingsystemintoone based on an environmental ethic. Eventually,Vermont will require alegally enforced environmental ethic, anti-degradationlaw,and clear regionalecological boundariestosupport life in theAnthropocene.196
189.See id. (defining environmentaldestruction anddegradation based on ecological boundarieswithin the contextofthe Ecocide Act). 190.Rockströmetal., supra note23; Steffenetal., PlanetaryBoundaries, supra note18, at 860. 191. See supra PartIV(describingand analyzing Vermont’s permitting systemand how this systemcomplieswith the Clean Water Act). 192. Id. 193.See supra notes177–88 and accompanying text (discussing Leopold’slandethic and suggestingthe Ecocide Act as an enforcementmechanism); see alsosupra notes 187–92 and accompanying text (arguing for theestablishment of anti-degradation lawsand ecologicalboundaries). 194.See supra Part VI.A (proposing two-stages that canbeused to addressbalancing water qualityand the principles of reasonableuse in the eraofthe Anthropocene). 195.See supra PartVI.A (proposing atwo-stage testfor determining reasonableuse of water resources). 196.See supra PartV(showingthe deteriorationofreasonableuse principles in Vermont that will need to be addressed in theera of the Anthropocene). 2019] U.S. Fresh WaterLaw &Governance in theAnthropocene 573
B. Expanding theConcept of Riparianism
Thesecond modificationIproposetothe principleofreasonableuse is to reintroducethe concept of ariparianlandowner into regulated riparianism and expandthe definitiontoinclude thewholeofEarth’s commonwealth of life.Thismodificationworks in conjunctionwith enforcing an environmentalethic.197 In thetransitionfromthe traditional ripariandoctrinetoregulated riparianism,the conceptofariparianlandowner waslost.198 Although riparianrightsstill exist in theirtraditionalsensefor landownersinriparian states,the rightsand dutiesofariparianlandownerare now embedded in a permitfor most wateruses.199 Thedutytorespect other riparian landowners’ rightsand therightsofthe public is replaced by thethreatofa fine.200 As Higgins suggests, “[p]ermits to pollute protect thepolluter, not theearth.Fines levied afterthe event,when caughtexceeding acceptable levels of destruction, canbesidestepped, litigated or paid-off.”201 By reintroducingthe concept of ariparianlandowner into theregulated riparian system,the Statecouldreinstateasense of duty and responsibility forthe wateruser. However, thenarrowdefinitionofriparianlandowner needs to be expandedtoaccuratelyaccountfor thefullrange of life investedinthe fresh watersystem.202 AccordingtoPeter Brownand GeoffreyGarver, theidea of apolitical commonwealth,“established to promotethe commongood,”can be extended to thewholeoflife on Earth to promotethe principles of mutual respect and fairness.203 As waterisanessentialelement formuchoflife on Earth, if theriparianconcept were expandedtoinclude Earth’s commonwealth of life,the conceptwouldmoreaccuratelyreflect thevested interest of alllife formsinwater as aresource andthe globalnatureofthe hydrologic cycle.204 When theexpanded ripariannotionofEarth’s
197.See supra PartVI.A (expanding thediscussion on potentialenforcementofenvironmental ethiclegislation). 198.See TheEvolution of Riparianism, supra note 50, at 85 (describing regulated riparianism). 199.Id. at 85, 87. 200.See id. at 87 (noting how regulated riparianism involvesadministrativeprocesses andlocal government). 201.HIGGINS, supra note183, at 6. 202.See supra PartV(discussing the “right to pollute” in thecontext of maintaininghealthy ecosystems). 203.PETER BROWN &GEOFFREY GARVER,RIGHT RELATIONSHIP:BUILDING A WHOLE EARTH ECONOMY 6(2009). 204.Cf. id. (statingthat the“commonwealth stressesthe shared features of thecommunity and interdependenceofits members,”and thehydrologiccycleisashared featureofEarth’s biological community). 574 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:549 commonwealth of life is appliedtothe foundationalmaxim of theriparian doctrine—so useyour ownasnot to injure another’s property—the maxim transformsintoanenvironmental ethic.205 Through implementinganexpandedriparianconcept to regulated riparianism andlegally enforcing an environmental ethic, Vermont could createanew context in whichstate agencies prioritizeecological boundariesand theEarth’s commonwealth of life overeconomic development. With thesechangesinplace, theState couldworkwithin the existing legalstructure forregulatedriparianism to appropriately allocate waterfor thechallenges of theAnthropocene.
CONCLUSION
Despite awell-writtenlegal framework forbalancingecological, social,and economic needsinallocatingwater,the regulatedriparianism regime in Vermont ultimatelyfalls shortofmeetingthe ecological priorities necessary forthe Anthropocene.206 Vermont provides just one exampleof thechallengesfaced by theregulated riparianism doctrineinthe Anthropocene,and it is likelythatmany other statesface similaroreven more dramatic challenges.207 Thefact that,inpractice, such environmentallysound legislationdeferstoeconomic,anti-ecological decisions,suggests that regulated riparianism as adoctrineneedstobe revised.208 To updatethe doctrine,Vermont,and otherriparianstates, shouldreframethe role of government—and theriparianregime—around an environmentalethic that prioritizes respectfor ecological boundaries over economic growth and development.Fromthisre-grounded riparian regime,the currentlegalframeworkiswell equipped to curtailcurrent environmentaldegradation, restoredeterioratedecosystems,and protect againstincreased vulnerabilitytoclimate change in theAnthropocene.209
205.See id. (stating that acommonwealth promotes theinterestsofthe common good rather than the individual); see also supra Part IV (discussingthe principles of aland ethic); supra PartIII.A (discussing the principles of riparianrights). 206.See supra PartIV(overviewing thecurrentlegal and regulatory framework for water rights anddescribing thecurrent stateofwater in Vermont). 207.See supra Part IV (showingthe shortcomings of Vermont’s statutes at creating ecologically sound legislation forwater resources). 208.See supra PartVI(explaining issues in Vermont underthe ripariansystem). 209.See supra Part IV (describing the currentlegal framework in Vermont); see alsosupra Part V(applying anew theoryofreasonableuse to Vermont’s framework). CHARGING ONWARDS: REMOVING BARRIERS TO ENERGY STORAGE IN RESTRUCTURED NEW ENGLAND STATES
INTRODUCTION...... 576 I. ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS AND ECONOMICSOFENERGY STORAGE...579 A. Reducing theEnvironmental HarmsofFossil Fuels...... 579 1. ClimateChange andOther EnvironmentalHarms of Burning Fossil Fuels...... 579 2. HowEnergy StorageCan Curb ClimateChange and AirPollution...... 582 B. TheEconomics of EnergyStorage ...... 585 1. TheEconomic Benefits of Energy Storage forConsumers...... 585 2. HowEnergy Storage CanProvide Valuetothe Grid and Revenue to Investors ...... 586 II. ELECTRICITY REGULATIONAND RESTRUCTURING...... 588 A. Traditional Utilitiesand Regulation...... 589 B. CompetitioninWholesaleGenerationand Restructuring ...... 593 III. ENERGY STORAGE UNDER CURRENT NEW ENGLAND STATE LAWS...596 A. Current StateLawsRegarding DistributionUtility Ownershipof Energy Storage...... 596 1. Does Energy Storage Constitute Generation?...... 596 2. Rhode Island...... 598 3. Massachusetts...... 599 4. Maine...... 599 5. Connecticut...... 601 6. NewHampshire...... 603 B. Inability of Non-Utility Energy StorageProjectstoReceive Compensationfor Avoided T&DCosts ...... 608 IV.WAYS STATES CAN REMOVE BARRIERS TO ENERGY STORAGE ...... 611 A. Exempt Energy Storage fromUtility-OwnershipRestrictions...... 611 B. Enable Shared Ownership or ControlofEnergy Storage Projects ...615 1. Utility as PrimaryOwner ...... 616 2. Third Party as PrimaryOwner ...... 618 C. TheBestPathForward ...... 624 CONCLUSION ...... 626 576 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575
INTRODUCTION
Unchecked climatechange will have disastrous consequences for humanityand theglobal environment.1 Theworld’s currentgreenhousegas (GHG) emissions pathway will likelylead to 3–4˚Cofglobal warming.2 That levelofwarming couldmake over halfofall livingspeciesextinct, sink hundreds of coastalcitiesbeneaththe ocean, render parts of theEarth virtually uninhabitable, and kill billions of people.3 Curbing climatechange is imperative andrequiressubstantialreductions in Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emissions from burning fossil fuels.4 Replacingfossil-fuel powerplantswith zero-emission sourcesof renewableenergy—such as wind and solar—is acost-effectiveway to 5 reduceCO2 emissions. Increasing theuse of wind andsolar energy will also reduceair pollutionthat kills tens of thousands ofAmericans every
1. JamesHansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: RequiredReduction of CarbonEmissions to ProtectYoung People, FutureGenerations and Nature,8PLOS ONE 1, 5(2013). 2. The standard projection is “fourdegrees of warming by the beginningofthe next century, shouldwestay the present course.” David Wallace-Wells, The UninhabitableEarth,N.Y.MAG.(July 9, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html. However,atleast one analysissuggeststhat recent and continuing cost declines in solarand electric vehicletechnology willlikely limitglobal warming to 2.8–3.1˚C, evenwith weak climate policy. CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE &GRANTHAM INST.CLIMATE &THE ENV’T,EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED: THE DISRUPTIVE POWER OF LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY 3, 34 (2017), https://www.carbontracker.org/reports/expect-the-unexpected-the-disruptive-power-of-low-carbon- technology/.Ifall countries also take theclimatemitigationactionsthey pledged to do in their nationallydetermined contributions, such cost declineswouldlikely limitglobal warmingto2.4–2.7˚C. Id. 3. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 6–7; Wallace-Wells, supra note 2; Paddy Manning, Too Hot to Handle: CanWeAfford a4-DegreeRise?,SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 9, 2011), http://www.smh.com.au/environment/too-hot-to-handle-can-we-afford-a-4degree-rise-20110708- 1h7hh#ixzz2LyOvFCeo (notingthat possiblyless than onebillionhumans couldsurvive on an Earth that is 4˚Cwarmer). 4. See IPCC, Summary for Policymakers(2014), in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE:CONTRIBUTIONOFWORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 10–12 (Ottmar Edenhoferetetal. eds.,2014) [hereinafter INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE], https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/ uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_frontmatter.pdf (prophesizing future mitigation pathways and the importance of reducingCO2 emissions to promotesustainabledevelopment); see Hansen et al., supra note1,at1(notingthat CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels arethe principal driver of climate change and arguing that humanity must reduce theseemissions). 5.See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note4,at20(discussing that usingmore renewable energy is acost-effectiveway to reduce emissions); Wind Explained: Wind Energy and theEnvironment,U.S.ENERGY INFO.ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/ index.cfm?page=wind_environment (lastupdated Dec. 19, 2018)(statingthatwindisazero-emission source of energy); Energy Explained: Solar Energy and theEnvironment,U.S.ENERGY INFO.ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=solar_environment (last updatedAug. 31, 2018) (stating thatsolar is azero-emissionsource of energy). 2019] Charging Onwards 577 year.6 However,renewable energy sourcesare also intermittent sources of energy: they areonlyavailablewhenthe sunshinesorthe wind blows.7 Intermittency limits theshare of electricitydemand that wind and solarcan feasibly meet without energystorage.8 Thus,energy storage will play akey roleinmitigatingclimatechange.9 Energy storage can also replacethe most pollutingpower plants that only runwhen demand forelectricity is at its highest.10 Likewise, energy storage canhelpexistingpower plants to operatemoreefficiently,thereby reducingtheir emissions.11 Energy storage thus providesnumerous environmentalbenefitsbyreducing fossil-fuel emissions.12 Energy storage canmake electricity cheaper by avoidingthe need to build expensivenew powerlines andpower plantstosatisfyperiods of high electricity demand.13 In doing so,energystorage could collectivelysave consumers hundredsofmillions of dollars annually.14 Recognizingthese benefits, theFederal Energy RegulatoryCommission (FERC) recently promulgated Order 841 to enableenergy storagetofairlycompetewith traditionalpower plants.15 However,maximizingthese savings—and the
6.See Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 100% Cleanand Renewable Wind, Water, and Sunlight (WWS)All-Sector EnergyRoadmaps forthe 50 United States,8ENERGY &ENVTL.SCI.2093, 2105, 2107 (2015)(asserting that convertingtoa100% renewable energy system would saveatleast45,800 American livesannually). 7. KEVIN B. JONES ET AL., THE ELECTRIC BATTERY:CHARGING FORWARD TO A LOW- CARBON FUTURE 9(2017). 8.Id. Thisisnot to say electric grids cannotaccommodate significant amounts of renewable energywithout storage. Id. at 122. In practice, gridoperators havesuccessfully integrated renewable energy by using traditional power plants that can altertheir output on demand to compensatefor fluctuatingrenewableoutput. Id. at 9. Most analyses indicatethat existinggrids can handleintermittent renewablegenerationproviding 25–40% of theelectricity supply on average. Id. at 122. Still, integrating higher levelsofintermittent renewables willprobablyrequire energy storage. Id. at 9, 122. 9.Id. at 4. 10.Janice Lin&Giovanni Damato, HowStorage CanHelpGet Rid of Peaker Plants, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 28, 2010),https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/energy-storage-vs- peakers[hereinafter Lin &Damato]. 11.MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., STATEOFCHARGE:MASS.ENERGY STORAGE INITIATIVE 94–95 (2016),http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/state-of-charge-report.pdf. 12.See id. at 3(“[E]nergystorage is an economically and technically viablesolution for alleviating...environmentalchallenges ....”). 13.JUDY CHANG ET AL., THE BRATTLE GRP., THE VALUE OF DISTRIBUTED ELECTRICITY STORAGE IN TEXAS:PROPOSED POLICY FOR ENABLING GRID-INTEGRATED STORAGE INVESTMENTS 9– 11 (2014),http://files.brattle.com/files/7589_the_value_of_distributed_electricity_storage_in_texas.pdf. 14.Id.at13; MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 77 (“[T]hetotal value of storage over 10 years couldbearound $3.4billion.”). 15.See Electric StorageParticipation in MarketsOperated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 83 Fed. Reg. 9580, 9582 (Mar. 6, 2018) (tobe codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 841] (explaining that theOrder remedieshow current wholesaleelectricity marketrulesmeant for traditional resourcesunjustly and unreasonablylimit the servicesenergy storage resourcescan provide). 578 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 environmentalbenefits of energy storage—requiresthatenergystorage projects receive paymentbothfor thevalue of thepower lines and the power plants they replace.16 If energystorage projects onlyreceive compensationfor oneand notthe other, investors will build onlyasmall fractionofthe energy storageprojects they otherwise would.17 However,mostNew England states have passed electricity restructuringstatutesthat create legal barrierstoelectricutilities owning or controllingbothpower plantsand power lines.18 This Note will show that— absent mechanisms that compensate non-utility energystorage projects for avoidingtransmissionand distribution(T&D) costs—theselawscreate significantlegal barriers to energy storage projects receiving compensation forthe full rangeofservices they can provide.19 Moreover,removing such state-levelbarrierstoenergy storage wouldgreatly magnify theimpact of Order 841.20 Although Order 841 will enable 7,000 megawatts (MW) of energy storage deployment by itself, national deploymentlevelscould reach 50,000 MW if states ensureenergystorage projectsreceive compensation forall thebenefits they offer.21 Staterestructuringlawsascurrently written thus placesignificant constraints on energystorage economicsthat severely limit the amount of energy storage privateactorscan deploy.22
16.CHANG ET AL., supra note 13, at 17. 17.Id. at 2. 18.See, e.g.,ME.REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 35-A, §3204 (2018) (prohibiting investor-owned utilities that deliver electricity from owning non-nuclearpower plants, except forthose it needs to perform itsdelivery functions “inanefficientmanner”);N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:1(2018) (targeting “functional separation” of electricity deliveryfrom electricity generation);MASS.GEN.LAWS ch. 164, §1A(2018) (prohibiting utilitiesthat deliverelectricityfromowningorcontrollingnon-nuclear power plants). 19.See infra Part IV.B (explaining howthe lackofmechanismstocompensate non-utilities for avoided T&Dcostscombined with restructuring laws create barrierstoenergy storage investment). Technicallythe combination of restructuring laws andthe lack of suchmechanisms create the barriers forenergy storage. However,thisNotewill at times refertosuchbarriersasrestructuring barriers for the sakeofbrevity. ThisNote’suse of thatterm,however,shouldnot be read as an implicit critique of restructuring or its goals. 20.ROGER LUEKEN ET AL., GETTING TO 50 GW?: THE ROLE OF FERC ORDER 841, RTOS, STATES, AND UTILITIES IN UNLOCKING STORAGE’S POTENTIAL 19 (2018), http://files.brattle.com/ files/13366_getting_to_50_gw_study_2.22.18.pdf. 21.Id. Note that in themany states that have not restructuredtheirelectricity systems, the relevant barrierstoenergystorage receiving fullcompensationare of course not due to restructuring. See id. at 11 (highlightingotherstate-levelbarriers energy storage faces); JIM LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF,ELECTRICITY REGULATION INTHE US:AGUIDE 18, 90 (2d. 2016) [hereinafter LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF], http://www.raponline.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/07/rap-lazar-electricity-regulation-US-june-2016.pdf (showingcartographically whichstateshave and have not restructured). 22.CHANG ET AL., supra note 13, at 17 (notingthat neither utilitiesnor independent investors can independently earnsufficient revenue to justifyinvestinginenough storagetomaximize system- wide benefits in arestructuredstate). 2019] Charging Onwards 579
This Note will analyze these barriers andsuggest ways that New Englandpolicymakerscouldremove them.First, PartIwill detailthe environmentalbenefitsand economics of energy storage.23 Second, PartII will provide an overview of electricity regulationand restructuring.24 Third, PartIII will show that current NewEngland restructuringlawsgenerally preclude utility ownership of energy storage projects that participatein wholesaleelectricity markets.25 At thesametime, non-utility energy storage projects cannotreceive payment forthe value they provide to theT&D system.26 Thecurrent legalregimethus retardsenergy storage investment by preventingany singleentity from monetizingthe full valueofenergy storage.27 Finally,Part IV will suggestpotentialstatutory changes legislatures couldmake and regulatoryactions public utility commissions couldtake to remove or bypass thesebarriers.28 Specifically,legislatures could amend restructuringstatutestoallowutility-owned energy storage to participateinwholesaleelectricity markets, subjecttocertainsafeguards.29 Legislaturesorcommissions couldalsoenableashared-ownershipmodelin whichutilitiesown an energy storage project’s T&Dattributes while athird party owns its generation attributes.30
I. ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS AND ECONOMICSOFENERGY STORAGE
A. Reducingthe EnvironmentalHarms of FossilFuels
1. ClimateChange and Other EnvironmentalHarms of BurningFossilFuels
Failingtomitigateclimatechange will have devastatingeffectsonthe world.31 Among other things,climatechange causes more frequent and destructiveforestfires, flooding, droughts, andheat waves.32 These environmental impacts affect humanhealth,leading to increased
23.See infra Part I(outlining theenvironmental and economic benefits of energy storage). 24.See infra Part II (providing background on electricity regulationand restructuring). 25.See infra PartIII.A(explaining how NewEngland restructuring lawsgenerally preclude utilityownership of energystorage projectsthatparticipate in wholesale electricity markets). 26.See infra PartIII.B(overviewingwhy non-utility energy storageprojectscannot capture thevalue they providetothe T&Dsystem). 27.See infra Part III.B(articulatinghow thecurrentlegal regimeinrestructured New England states producesunderinvestment in energy storage). 28.See infra PartIV(discussing ways to remove therestructuring-createdbarrierstoenergy storage). 29.See infra PartIV.A(examiningmodelswhich exempt utility-ownedenergy storage from restructuring restrictions). 30.See infra PartIV.B(discussing shared-ownershipmodelsfor energy storage). 31.Hansenetal., supra note1,at15. 32.Id. at 6, 8. 580 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 malnutrition, disease, and even death.33 Additionally,climatechange destroys critical habitatfor numerous plantsand animalspecies.34 Global warmingof2.9˚C couldresultinamass extinctionthat killsover50% of all current species.35 Furthermore,warming beyond 2˚Cwouldeventually triggermulti-meter sealevelrise.36 That amountofsea levelrise would result in “the loss of hundreds of historical coastal citiesworldwide with incalculableeconomicconsequences,createhundreds of millions of global warmingrefugeesfromhighly-populated low-lyingareas,and thus likely cause majorinternationalconflicts.”37 Higher levelsofglobal warmingwouldfurther intensifythese impacts.38 Some scientists believe that if globalwarming of 4˚Coccurred, less than abillionhumanscouldsurvive on Earth.39 Such alevel of warmingcouldcause mass famine, economiccollapse, and make large portions of theEarth effectivelyuninhabitable.40 Yetthe worldiscurrently heading towardsasmuchas4˚C of globalwarming, absentadditional actiontocurbclimatechange.41
GHG emissions—especially CO2 emissions—fromthe burning of fossil fuelsare theprincipal driver of climatechange.42 Furthermore, burning fossil fuelsalso emits significant airpollutionthatkillstens of thousands of Americans everyyear.43 Additionally,certain methods of
33.Id. at 8. 34.Id. at 7. 35.Id. 36.Id. at 6. 37.Id. 38.Manning, supra note3. 39.See id. (implyingthat climatechange wouldkill over 8billionpeople, assumingaglobal populationof9billionby2050). 40.Id.; Wallace-Wells, supra note2. 41.Wallace-Wells, supra note 2; but see CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE &GRANTHAM INST. CLIMATE &THE ENV’T, supra note2,at34(projecting that evenwith weak climate policycost declines in solarand electric vehicle technology wouldlimit global warming toabout3˚C). 42.Hansenetal., supra note1,at1–2. The three most significant fossil fuels are coal, oil (petroleum), andnaturalgas. See FossilFuelsStill DominateU.S.EnergyConsumptionDespite Recent Market Share Decline,U.S.ENERGY INFO.ADMIN.(July 1, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ detail.php?id=26912.
43.Jacobson et al., supra note 6. Theseair pollutants include sulfuroxides(SOX), nitrogen oxides (NOX), particulates, and—in thecaseofcoal—heavy metals such as mercury. SulfurDioxide Basics,EPA, https://www.epa.gov/so2-pollution/sulfur-dioxide-basics (last visited Apr.14, 2019);
BasicInformationAbout NO2,EPA, https://www.epa.gov/no2-pollution/basic-information-about-no2 (lastvisitedApr. 14, 2018); Coal Explained:Coal and theEnvironment,U.S.ENERGY INFO.ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal_environment (lastvisited Apr.14, 2019). However,one shouldnotethat burning natural gas produces farless air pollutionthan burning coal or oil. See Environmental Impacts of NaturalGas,UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/environmental-impacts-of-natural- gas#.WhpyakqnFPY (lastvisited Apr.14, 2019) (“[T]hecombustion of natural gas produces negligible 2019] Charging Onwards 581 extractingfossil fuelshave significant environmental and humanhealth impacts.44 Therefore,reducing fossil fuel use both reduces pollution-related mortality and helpsstemclimate change.45 Theburning of fossil fuelsinpower plantsisthe second largestsource of CO2 emissions in theU.S., emittingalmostasmuch CO2 as allfuels Americansburnfor transportation.46 Replacingfossil-fuel powerplants with zero-emission renewableenergy sources—likewindand solar—isa cost-effectiveway to reduce such emissions.47 Limitingglobalwarming to less than 2˚Crequireszero-emission and low-emissionenergy sourcesto produceatleast 80%ofthe world’s electricityby2050.48 Currently such sourcesonlyprovide 30% of theworld’s electricity.49 Energy storage can providesubstantial climateand pollutionreductionbenefitsbyenabling more renewableenergy and helping fossil-fuel powerplantstooperate more efficiently.50 Indeed, “electricitystorage has been calledthe ‘holy grail’ foraneconomy-widetransitiontolow-carbon, renewable energy sources.”51
amountsofsulfur, mercury, andparticulates. Burning naturalgas does produce nitrogen oxides (NOX), whichare precursorstosmog, but at lowerlevels than gasolineand diesel used formotor vehicles.”). 44.For example, MountaintopRemoval (MTR) mining forcoaldeforestsminingregions, buriesheadwater streamsunder mining debris,and “contaminate[s] surface and groundwater with carcinogens and heavymetals.”PaulR.Epstein et al., FullCost Accountingfor the Life Cycle of Coal, 1291 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.SCI.73, 77 (2011).Not surprisingly, researchershave associated MTR mining practices with cancer clusters. Id. Similarly, unconventional oil and gaswells that employ hydraulic fracturing posenumerous healthrisks to nearby communities. Environmental Impactsof Natural Gas, supra note43. Hydraulicfracturing—or fracking—injectsnumerous chemicalsand vast quantitiesofwater underground to access unconventional sources of oiland gas. Id. If drillers improperly construct unconventional wells,they maycontaminatelocal groundwater with fracking chemicals, naturally occurring radioactivematerials, or underground gases. Id. Furthermore, improper disposal of fracking chemicals can contaminate surface watersupplies. Id. Unconventional oiland gas wells mayalsoemithazardous airpollutantsthat cause “respiratory symptoms,cardiovascular disease, and cancer.” Id. 45.Jacobson et al., supra note6;See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANELONCLIMATE CHANGE, supra note4(describingmitigationscenarios likelytoslow climate change). 46.Sources of Greenhouse GasEmissions,EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/ sources- greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Apr. 14,2019). 47.See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANELONCLIMATE CHANGE, supra note4,at20(notingthat using more renewableenergy isacost-effectiveway to reduce emissions); see Wind Explained: Wind Energy and theEnvironment, supra note5(noting that wind is azero-emissionsource of energy); Solar Explained: Solar Energyand theEnvironment,U.S.ENERGY INFO.ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/ energyexplained/index.cfm?page=solar_environment (lastupdated Aug. 31, 2018) (notingthat solar is a zero-emission source of energy). 48.INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note4,at10, 20. 49.Id. at 20. 50.See JONES ET AL., supra note7,at4(“[T]he electric battery is acore climatesolution.”); MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11. 51.JONES ET AL., supra note 7, at 4. 582 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575
2. HowEnergyStorage CanCurbClimateChange and AirPollution
Energy storage52 can reducethe environmental harmsofclimate change and conventional pollutioninnumerous ways.Mostnotably,itcan enable electricgrids53 to integratemuchhigher levelsofrenewable energy sources, such as wind andsolar.54 It can also replace inefficient and disproportionatelypolluting peaker power plants.55 Furthermore,itreduces theneed forfossil-fuel powerplants to inefficiently ramp—i.e., quickly change howmuchelectricity they generate—and can thus reducefuel use and emissions fromexisting power plants.56 Wind and solarenergy arenow cheaper on average than electricity from newfossil-fuel powerplants.57 Indeed, in many casesbuildingnew wind and solarpower plantsisnow cheaper than continuing to runexisting coal power plants.58 However,theirintermittent naturestill limits theirfull potentialbecause wind and sunlight arenot availableondemand.59 Yetthe natureofelectricity requiresconsumerstouse it at virtually thesame
52. Energy storage in itsbroadest sensereferstoany system that storesenergy forlater use. Forits purposes,however, this Note uses theterm to refer to technologies such as batteries and flywheels, whichcan convert electricity into another form of energy and then convertthat energy back into electricity at alater time. See,e.g., Energy Storage Technologies,ENERGY STORAGE ASS’N, http://energystorage.org/energy-storage-1 (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 53.Anelectricalgrid is thesum of allinterconnectedelectrical infrastructurethat produces, transports,and deliverselectricity in agiven region. It includes everythingfromlarge centralized power plantstorooftopsolar panels to the switchboxes in individual homes,aswellasthe millions of milesof wires thatlinkitall together. Electricity Explained:How Electricity is Delivered to Consumers,U.S. ENERGY INFO.ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_delivery (last updated Aug. 31, 2018). 54.MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at 98–102. 55.Lin &Damato, supra note10; FlexiblePeaking Resource,ENERGY STORAGE ASS’N, http://energystorage.org/energy-storage/technology-applications/flexible-peaking-resource (last visited Apr. 14, 2018); MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 47. Peaker or peaking power plantsare power plantswhich thegriduses to meet peakdemandand levels of demand near it.Robert Rapier, TheLoad Following PowerPlant:The New Peaker,TRANSFORM (June 21, 2017), https://www.ge.com/power/transform/article.transform.articles.2017.jun.load-following-power-plant. Peakdemand in turn refers to the maximumamount of instantaneousdemand for powerinagiven periodoftime. Demand forElectricity ChangesThroughthe Day,U.S.ENERGY INFO.ADMIN.(Apr. 6, 2011),https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=830. 56.MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at 78,86. 57.LAZARD,LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS-VERSION 12.0, at 2, 7(2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/450784/lazards-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-120-vfinal.pdf. 58.Id.at6;seealso CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE,POWERING DOWN COAL:NAVIGATING THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RISKS IN THE LAST YEARS OF COAL POWER 24 (2018), https://www.carbontracker.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/CTI_Powering_Down_Coal_Report_Nov_ 2018_4-4.pdf (estimatingthat thecost to continue operatingasmuch as 70% of U.S. coal-generation capacity now exceeds thecost of building new renewablegeneration capacity). 59.JONES ET AL., supra note 7, at 9. 2019] Charging Onwards 583 moment that apower plantgenerates it.60 Consequently,the traditional “grid still relies on constant generation that is responsivetodemandand availableatthe precise moment of that demand.”61 Intermittencyisthus “the singlebiggestobstacletopoweringour homes,businesses, and even thegrid with renewablegeneration.”62 Energy storageisthe key to integratinglarge amountsofintermittent renewableenergy.63 Forpractical purposes,the ability to storeenergy and send it backontothe grid when necessary meansthe aggregate output of power plantsdoes not always have to exactly and instantaneouslymatch the end-use demandfor electricity.64 Energy storagesystems cancharge during periods when thereisexcess renewablegenerationand dischargethat energy when thegridneeds it most.65 Energy storagethereforeremoves—or at leastsubstantially alleviates—the limits intermittencyimposeon renewables’contributiontoour electricitysupply.66 That in turn will reduce fossil fuel use and emissions.67 Energy storage’sabilitytoreplace peaker plantsisanotherway it can reducefossilfuel emissions.68 Peaker plantsrun infrequently andthey tend to be theleastefficient—andthe most polluting—power plants.69 Thus, when energy storage systemscharge during off-peakperiods and discharge duringpeakperiods,they cansubstantially reduce emissions of bothCO2 and conventionalair pollutants.70 This maybetrueevenifthe source of the
60.Id. at 6. 61.Id. at 9. 62.Id.at9.Thisisnot to sayelectric gridscannot accommodatesignificantamountsof renewable energywithout storage. Id. at 122. In practice, gridoperators have successfully integrated renewable energy by usingtraditional power plantsthat can altertheiroutput on demand to compensate for fluctuatingrenewable output. Id. at 9. Most analysesindicatethat existinggrids canhandle intermittentrenewablegenerationproviding 25–40% of theelectricitysupplyonaverage. Id. at 122. Still, integratinghigherlevels of intermittent renewables will probablyrequire energystorage. Id. at 9, 122. 63.Id. at 9. 64.MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at i. 65.JONES ET AL., supra note 7, at 10. For simplicity, this Noteuses the terms charge to mean store energy and discharge to mean releaseenergy,regardless of whether or not theenergy storage systeminquestion isabattery. 66.Id. at 9. 67.See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANELONCLIMATE CHANGE, supra note4,at20(notingthat using more renewable energyisacost-effectiveway to reduce fossil fuel use and emissions). 68.Id. at 23. 69.Flexible PeakingResource, supra note55. 70.See Lin&Damato, supra note10(“For example, assumingPacific Gasand Electric’s base load electricmix as theoff-peak source of electricity,energystorage wouldprovide 55% CO2 savings, 85% NOx savings, andupto96% savingsofCOper MWh of on-peakelectricity delivered.”). 584 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 off-peakenergyisabaseload fossil-fuel powerplant,71 though thebenefit is even greater if thesource is arenewablepower plant.72 However,such peaker replacement onlyreduces emissions when the off-peaksource of electricityisnot coal.73 Consequently,inthoseparts of theU.S.wherecoal power plantsprovide off-peakelectricity, deploying energy storagewithout also deploying renewableenergy wouldincrease emissions.74 Fortunately, NewEngland has verylittle coal generation; it accounts foronly1%ofgeneration, while renewables accountfor 18.6% (countinghydroelectric), nuclearfor 30%,and natural gas for49%.75 Furthermore,inNew England,coalplantsgenerally act as peaker plants, and thus energy storage wouldlikelydisplacecoalgeneration.76 As such, even with thecurrent generationmix,displacingpeaker plantswith energy storage in NewEngland wouldreduceemissions.77 Finally,energy storagealsolowersGHG andother emissions by reducingthe needfor fossil-fuel powerplantstoramp.78 Currently,a portionoffossil-fuel powerplantsneed to constantlychangetheiroutput levels in ordertobalance changes in demand or renewablegeneration.79 However,mostfossil-fuel powerplantshaveanoptimal outputlevel at
71.Baseload power plants“are theproduction facilities usedtomeet someorall of agiven region’scontinuous energy demand, and produces energy at aconstant rate,usually at alow cost relative to other productionfacilitiesavailabletothe system.” Energy Dictionary: Baseload Plant, ENERGY VORTEX,https://www.energyvortex.com/energydictionary/baseload_plant.html(last visited Jan. 23, 2019) [https://web.archive.org/web/20180723073034/https://www.energyvortex.com/ energydictionary/baseload_plant.html]. 72.Lin &Damato, supra note10. 73.See Naga Srujana Goteti et al., How Much Wind and Solar Are Needed to Realize Emissions Benefits From Storage?,SPRINGER LINK (Dec. 11, 2017), https://link.springer.com/ article/10.1007%2Fs12667-017-0266-4 (analyzing acoal-heavy grid and arelatively coal-freegridand findingenergy storagedecreased emissions in thelatterbut increased emissions in theformer); see id. (“Storage increasescarbon emissions when it enables ahighemissions generator, suchasacoalplant,to substitute foracleanerplant,suchasnatural gas.”). 74.See id.(statingthat deploying energy storage in thecoal-heavy Midcontinent ISOgrid “willnot be carbon neutraluntil wind or solar power reach around 18%ofthe [region’s]generation capacity”). 75.Resource Mix,ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/resource-mix/(last visited Apr. 14, 2018). 76.See id.(“Coal- and oil-fired resources also make valuablecontributions ...when demand is veryhigh or majorresources are unavailable.”); MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at 41 (“Storage can also reduce theoverallenergy systememissionsbyreducing thetimeoil andcoal generators areutilizedtomeet peak demand,particularly in winter.”). 77.See MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11,atxi (calculating thatin Massachusetts deploying theeconomically optimal level of energy storage wouldreduce “GHG gas emissionsbymore than1MMT CO2e overa10year timespan” and equates “totaking over223,000 carsoff theroad”). 78.Id.at86. 79.Id. at 92; JONES ET AL., supra note 7. 2019] Charging Onwards 585 whichthey aremostfuel-efficient.80 Necessarily,suchpower plantsoperate less efficiently when they havetofrequently changeoutput levels.81 Energy storage can perform this balancingrole, oftenmuchmoreeffectivelythan fossil-fuelpower plants.82 Therefore, energy storagecan enable existing fossil-fuelpower plantstooperate at or closetotheiroptimal levelsmore often, therebyreducing theiremissions.83 By thesametoken,energystorage canalso remove theneed to build fossil-fuel powerplants specifically to balanceincreasing levels of intermittent renewables.84
B. TheEconomicsofEnergyStorage
1. TheEconomic Benefits of Energy Storage forConsumers
Energy storagecan reducethe costofoperatingelectricgrids,thereby making electricity cheaper forconsumers.85 This is especially truewhen an energy storagesystemcan avoid theneed fornew transmission86 and distribution87 infrastructureinaddition to providing wholesaleelectricity market services.88 Forexample, theBrattle Group89 calculates that deploying an efficient levelofenergy storage couldreducethe net cost of operatingthe Texasgrid by about $300 millionper year.90 The Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources (DOER)has likewise calculated that an investment of approximately $970 millionto$1.4billion in energy storage wouldsave$3.4billionover tenyears.91 Over $2 billion
80.MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at 94. 81.Id. 82.JONES ET AL., supra note 7, at 125–26. 83.MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11. 84.Id. at ii. 85.Id. at 88. 86.Transmission refers to the infrastructure “that moves bulkelectricityfromthe generation sitesover long distances to substationscloser to areasofdemand forelectricity,”ortothe service such infrastructure provides. Transmission &Distribution,PJM LEARNING CTR., https://learn.pjm.com/ electricity-basics/transmission-distribution.aspx (lastvisited Apr.14, 2019). 87.Distributionreferstothe wires andsupporting infrastructure that carry electricityfrom the point of connection with the transmission system to thehomes andbusinesses that consumethe electricity,ortothe service such infrastructure provides. See id. (creatingananalogy that describes distribution). 88.CHANG ET AL., supra note 13, at 17. 89.The BrattleGroupisaneconomic and financial consultingfirm that hasexpertiseinenergy matters. See About,BRATTLE GRP., http://www.brattle.com/about (last visitedApr.14, 2019) (explaining thefunction of the Brattle Group). Oncor Electric DeliveryCompany, aTexas utility, commissioned them “to explore theeconomicsofgrid-integrated storagedeployment in Texas.” CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 1. 90. CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 12. 91.MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at xi. 586 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 of thosesavings wouldflowtoMassachusetts’s electricityconsumers.92 However,achieving such optimum benefit levelsrequiresenergy storage systemstoreceive revenue bothfromparticipatinginelectricitymarkets and fromproviding valuetotransmission or distributionsystems.93
2. HowEnergy StorageCan Provide Valuetothe Grid and Revenue to Investors
Energy storage systemscan provide wholesaleelectricity market services.94 Wholesaleelectricity marketsencompass thegenerationsideof theelectricity system, providing revenue to power plantsfor:(1) generating electricity;(2) beingabletogenerateitwhen needed;and (3)helping to controlpower quality and providing reserves to maintain grid stability.95 In NewEngland,96 therespectivemarket categoriesfor each of theseservices are: (1)the energymarkets;97 (2)the forwardcapacity market;98 and (3)the ancillary servicemarkets.99 Energy storage systemsare capable of providing alltheseservices; however, fromapractical standpoint,energy storage systemsparticipateinthe first market by arbitraging rather than generatingelectricity.100 Energy storagecan also reduce theneed fornew transmission or distributioninfrastructure.101 Just as electricalreliability requiressufficient generatingcapacity to satisfy peak demand, agridmust also have sufficient
92.Id. at 88. 93.CHANG ET AL., supra note 13, at 17; MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at 115, 117–19. 94.CHANG ET AL., supra note 13, at 2. 95.Administering the WholesaleElectricity Markets,INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/three-roles/administering-markets (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 96.InthisNote, NewEngland means thesix states of Maine, Massachusetts,Rhode Island, Connecticut, NewHampshire,and Vermont. 97.The energymarkets consist of theday-ahead and real-timeenergymarkets.The former “allows marketparticipantstosecure pricesfor electricenergy theday before deliveryand to hedge against pricefluctuations that occur in real time.” Administeringthe WholesaleElectricityMarkets, supra note95. The latter “balancesthe dispatchofgeneration anddemand resources to meet the instantaneous demandfor electricity throughout NewEngland.” Id. 98.The forwardcapacity market “ensures the system has sufficient resources to meet the future demand by paying resourcestobeavailabletomeetthe projected demand forelectricitythree years out and operatewhen neededonce thecapacity commitmentperiod begins.” Id. 99.Ancillary servicescomprise amiscellaneous set of functions, including frequency regulation(rapidly changing generationoutput up or down to keepthe gridbalanced),providing reserves to compensate forunexpected power plant outages or spikes in demand, maintainingthe voltage of thegrid, andre-energizing thegridfollowing ablackout. Id.;JONESETAL., supra note 7, at 125–27. 100.JONES ET AL., supra note 7, at 124–27. 101.Id. at 127–28; MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note7,at115. 2019] Charging Onwards 587
T&Dinfrastructuretotransportenough electricity to meet peak demand.102 Consequently,increases in peak demand have traditionally required constructionofadditionalT&D infrastructurethatthe grid onlyusesduring peakhours.103 However,strategically placed energy storage systemscan substitute forsuch infrastructure by charging duringoff-peak hours— making useofexistinginfrastructure when it is underutilized—and discharging duringpeak hourstorelieve thestrain on T&Dsystems.104 This allows energy storage systemstosubstitutefor both apeakerplant and the infrastructurethatwouldotherwise carry electricity fromthatpeaker plant to consumers.105 Providing wholesalemarketservices andavoiding T&Dcosts each comprise significant portions of thepotentialvalue of energy storage systems.106 In Texas,for example,the Brattle Group calculated that avoided T&Dcosts and associated reliability benefitsaccountedfor 30–40% of energy storage’svalue.107 Theother 60–70%camefromproviding wholesalemarket services.108 Conversely,inMassachusetts,the ratio isthe opposite:DOERcalculatesthat avoided T&Dcosts account forabout 60– 70% of thepotentialvalue to aproject owner.109 Providing wholesale market servicesaccountsfor theother 30–40%.110 Regardless,either piece constitutesatleast 30%ofthe totalvalue. This is significantbecause if energy storage projectscannot capture either value stream then theamount of energy storage deploymentwill drop dramatically.For example,in2014,the Brattle Group calculated that the optimal levelofstorage in Texas is 5,000MWwhen accountingfor both value streams.111 However,ifinvestors can onlycapture one valuestream,
102.JONES ET AL., supra note 7, at 127–28; MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 115. 103.JONES ET AL., supra note 7, at 127–28; MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 115. 104.JONES ET AL., supra note 7, at 127–28; MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 115. 105.See MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at 121 (providing an exampleof how an energystoragesystem can reducebothpeak demand and avoidtransmission costs). 106.CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 2; MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 117–19. 107.CHANG ET AL., supra note 13, at 2. 108.Id. 109.MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 119. However,mostofthe consumer savings come fromcost reductions on thewholesale market or generationside. Id. at 87. 110.Id. 111.CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 2, 11–12. More precisely, this is theoptimallevel of energy storage assumingthe average cost of buildingasystemis$350 per kilowatt-hour (kWh)of storagecapacity. Id. at 2. If systemcostsfall below that price, theoptimum level of storage would presumablyincrease. Forcontext,2018 costsfor lithium-ion batteriesdirectly integrated into thegrid 588 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 they wouldonlybuild about1,000 MW of energy storage—just 20% of the optimum level.112 TheBrattle Group laterextrapolated thesefindingstothe entire U.S.113 Nationally,compensatingenergy storage forall value streams could lead to 50,000 MW of energy storage,asopposed to just 7,000 MW if energy storagecould onlyparticipateinwholesalemarkets.114 In other words, allowing investors to capture allvalue streams couldincrease energy storage deployment more than sevenfold.115 This leads to thecruxofthe problem this Note seeks to address:the generalinability of investorstocapture allofanenergystorage project’s generation, transmission, and distribution valueinrestructured electricity markets.116 States that have restructured theirelectricitymarketsrestrictthe abilityofentities that providedistributionservices to also provide wholesalemarket services.117 In doing so,suchstatescreatebarriers to energy storageprojectscapturingbothvalue streams.118
II.ELECTRICITY REGULATIONAND RESTRUCTURING
In theU.S., boththe federal government and thestatesshareregulatory authority overelectricity.119 As ageneral rule,the federal government regulates wholesaleelectricity salesand transmission while states regulate distributionand retail sales.120 Traditionally,primarilystate-regulatedand
ranged from $277 to $544 per kWh, depending on systemsizeand configuration. LAZARD,LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF STORAGE ANALYSIS—VERSION 4.0, at 10, 13 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/ media/450774/lazards-levelized-cost-of-storage-version-40-vfinal.pdf.Lazard predicts lithium-ion battery project coststofallanother 28% on average in thenext fiveyears. Id. at 14. 112.CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 8(showinggraphicallythat themoneyprivateinvestors couldmake from energy storage from wholesale marketsalone wouldonlyjustify building1,000 MW of energystorage); seeid. at 12 (indicatinggraphically that avoided T&D costsalone wouldnot even justifybuilding1,000 MW of energy storage). 113.Lueken et al., supra note 20,at19. 114.Id. 115.Id. Note,however, that thesevenfoldincreasemay depend on removing other statelevel barriersaswell. See id. at 11 (indicatingthat states mayneedtoprovide stablerate designand further clarify regulatory treatment of energystorage, particularly energystoragepairedwith renewables, to unlock itsfull potential). 116.See infra Part III.A (discussinghow NewEnglandrestructuring statutes limitthe ability of energy storage projects to captureall of theirproject’s generation, transmission, and distributionvalue). 117. See Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability,87U.COLO.L.REV.887, 957–58 (2016) (explaininghow restructuringrestricts utility ownershipofgenerationassets that provide wholesale market services). 118.See id. at 958 (highlightingproblems with restricting utility ownershipofgeneration assets). 119.JOSEPH P. TOMAIN &RICHARD D. CUDAHY,ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 385 (3ded. 2017). 120.Id.;Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1)(2012).Technically, theFederal Power Act only givesthe federal government jurisdiction over interstate transmission and wholesalesales. Id. 2019] Charging Onwards 589 vertically integrated utilities provided most Americans with electricity.121 As such,the entireelectricindustry from generationtodistributionwas subject to acomplex system of rate regulation.122 However,inthe 1990s, federal regulatorychangesenabled substantialcompetitioninwholesale electricitygeneration.123 At thesametime, many states—especially in New England—enacted restructuringlawstointroduceretail competition.124 To helpestablishalevel and competitiveplaying field,theselawsalso prohibitedorrestricted utilitiesfromowninggenerators.125 Thecurrent regulatoryregime in most of NewEngland thus separates thegeneration and distributionofelectricity,tothe detriment of energystorage.126
A. TraditionalUtilities andRegulation
Vertically integrated electricutilities—entitiesthatgenerate, transmit, and ultimatelydistributeelectricity to retailratepayers127—served most Americansprior to the1980s.128 Such utilitiesweremonopoliesthat operated in state-defined exclusive service territories.129 Electricutilitiesare “natural monopolies,” as theeconomiesofscale in buildingelectrical grids makesitwastefulfor competingfirmstoduplicatesuchinfrastructure.130 Consequently,societyminimizes electricitycostsbyhaving asinglefirm
However,“[t]he accepted view today is that any transmission or saleofelectric energy within the interconnected UnitedStatesisin‘interstate commerce,’ even if the transaction’scontractualoriginand destination arewithin asingle state.”SCOTT HEMPLING,REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE: THE LAW OF MARKET STRUCTURE,PRICING AND JURISDICTION 393 (2013). Consequently, “all wholesalesales and unbundledtransmissionservice aresubject to theFederal Power Act—unlessthey occur within Alaska, Hawaii, or the majority of Texasthat is not interconnected with other states.” Id. 121.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 72. 122.See infra PartII.A (explaining utilityrate regulation). 123.See infra PartII.B (discussing federal electricity regulation reformsinthe 1990s). 124. See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 18 (identifying states that adoptedrestructuring); HEMPLING, supra note 120, at 75 (mentioning the possibility of retail markets due to restructuring). 125. See generally LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note 21,at10, 90 (notinghow restructuring lawsinmanystatesrequiredutilities to divest their powerplants); see, e.g., 39 R.I. GEN.LAWS §39-1-27(d) (2018) (prohibiting utilitiesfromowning generators). 126.See infra Part II.B (discussing the effects of restructuring andfederal regulatorychanges in NewEngland); see generally Stein, supra note 117, at 958(outliningthe variousroutes that states have takentoaddressdistribution andgeneration). 127.Retailratepayersorsimplyratepayersare utilitycustomers,i.e., people and businesseswho buy electricity fromutilities for their ownuse. See Definition of Ratepayer,MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ratepayer (last visitedApr. 14, 2019) (“[Aratepayer is] one who pays forautilityservice and especially electricity accordingtoestablished rates.”). 128.HEMPLING, supra note 120, at 72. 129.Id. 130.RICHARD F. HIRSH,POWER LOSS:THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 17–18, 20 (1999). 590 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 build and operate theelectric grid in agiven area.131 Even today,utility monopoliescontinue to provide distributionservice.132 However, monopoliesalsohavethe power to charge unreasonably high prices,asthey lack competitorsbydefinition.133 States, therefore, establishedpublic utility commissions134 to regulatethe ratesthatutilities maychargetocheck their monopolypower.135 Commissions have astatutory dutytoensurethatrates are“just and reasonable.”136 Acommission must balanceconsumer and utility investor interestsinorder to setjustand reasonable rates.137 Thus,acommission must ensurethatratepayersdonot pay exploitativeorotherwise excessive prices.138 However,rates must also be high enough to provide utilitieswith revenue to recover theiroperating and capitalcosts,and earn areasonable return on theirinvestments.139 Returnsare just andreasonableifthey are “commensuratewith returnsoninvestmentsinother enterprises having corresponding risks” andare “sufficient to assure confidence in the financialintegrityofthe enterprise.”140 Thejustand reasonablestandard
131.Id. 132.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 75. 133.HIRSH, supra note130, at 27. 134.The precise namestates givesuchbodies vary. For example, NewHampshirecalls its regulator thePublic UtilitiesCommission,while Massachusetts calls its regulator theDepartment of Public Utilities.N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§363:1(2018); MASS.GEN.LAWS ch. 25, §1(2018).ThisNote usesthe termspublic utility commissions, utility commissions, or justcommissionstorefer to allsuch entitiesgenerically. 135.Id. at 21–23, 26–27. FERCisthe federalanalogue that regulatesinterstate transmission and interstatewholesale sales of electricity. FederalPower Act, 16 U.S.C. §824(a)(2012); What FERC Does,FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp?csrt=16689007847031614432 (lastupdated Aug. 14, 2018). The FederalPower Actdefines the“saleofelectricenergy at wholesale”as“asaleof electricenergy to anypersonfor resale.” §824(d).Consequently,FERC has jurisdictionover therates a power plant selling electricityfor resaleininterstatecommerce charges. It does not,however,have jurisdictionover therates avertically integrated utility charges its ratepayers forthe electricity itsown power plantsgenerate. 136.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 216. 137.Fed. PowerComm’nv.Hope Nat. GasCo.,320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).Inthiscase the Supreme Court wasrulingon“thevalidity under the Natural GasAct ...ofarate order issued by the FederalPower Commission.” Id. at 593. However,the term “just and reasonable” has thesamemeaning under federal and statelaw.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 216. Thus, the content of theFederal Power Commission’s (now FERC’s)dutyand state commission’s dutytoensure justand reasonablerates is the same. Id.; HistoryofFERC,FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2019); seealso Appeal of Pub.Serv. Co.ofN.H., 547 A.2d 269,271 (N.H.1988) (“In settingrates,a regulatorycommissionfollows aprocess of identifyingconsumer and producer interests competing for recognition, with an ultimategoal of strikingafairbalance ...that maybedescribed as just and reasonablebothtothe customer and to theutility.”). 138.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 220–21. 139.Hope Nat. Gas Co.,320 U.S. at 603. 140.Id. This requirement also has aconstitutional dimension.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 221. Utilityregulatorystatutes legally obligate utilities “toserve all customers in [their] service 2019] Charging Onwards 591 also provides commissionswith discretion in settingrates,asmany potentialrates could provide utilities with areasonablereturnwithout gouging ratepayers.141 As aconsequence, allrates that fall within a“zone of reasonableness”are just andreasonable.142 Furthermore,commissions are freetochooseany methodology they wish to establishrates, so long as the endresultisjustand reasonable.143 Yetdespite this discretionary authority,mostutility commissions usea largelystandardized processtoset ratesknown as “rateofreturn” rate- making.144 First, “the regulatorycommission considers theannual expenses of theutility,capitalinvestmentsthe utility hasmade, and arange of returns achieved by utilitiesand other businesseswith similarrisk profiles.”145 The commissionthenusesthisdatatodetermine theutility’srevenue requirement:the totalamountofmoney autility must collect to cover its expenses and earnafair return.146 Thecommission then allocates coststo customersand designs rates that enableautilitytocollect itsrevenue requirement.147
territory,” and “maintaininfrastructure sufficienttoprovide ...service” to prescribed qualitystandards. Id. at 14, 34, 44. This constitutesatakingfor the purposesofthe Fifth and FourteenthAmendmentsthat requiresjust compensation, as “[s]hareholder investment in theutility is ‘privateproperty.’” Id. at 221. The revenueautilitycollectsfromits authorized rates provides the compensation. Id. That compensationisonlyjust,however,ifautility’s rates provideitwith “the opportunity to earnafair return.” Id. (quotingMissouri ex rel.Sw. Bell Tel.Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’nofMo.,262 U.S. 276, 290 (1923)(Brandeis, J.,concurring)).Consequently,“[r]ates whichare not sufficienttoyield areasonable return ...are unjust,unreasonableand confiscatory, and theirenforcement deprives thepublic utility company of its property in violationofthe FourteenthAmendment.” Bluefield WaterWorks & Improvement Co.v.Pub. Serv. Comm’nofW.Va.,262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923). However,inpractice this constitutional requirement does not impose any additional constraints on commissions. Hope Nat. Gas Co.,320 U.S. at 607. Any rate lowenough to be unconstitutional wouldalso not be just and reasonable; thereforeajust and reasonablerateisconstitutional. See id.(“Sincethereare no constitutional requirementsmoreexactingthan thestandards of theAct,arate order whichconforms to thelatter does not runafoul of theformer.”). 141.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 220–21. 142.Id. 143.See Hope Nat. GasCo.,320 U.S. at 603 (stating that onlythe end result of aratematters when determining if it is just andreasonable); seealso HEMPLING, supra note120, at 230 (“Both the ‘just andreasonable’ standard and Hope’s focus on ‘end result’ lead to thesameplace: regulatory discretion over methodselection.”). 144.Inara Scott, TeachinganOld DogNew Tricks: AdaptingPublic Utility Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges,38HARV.ENVTL.L.REV.371, 381–82 (2014). 145.Id. 146.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 217. 147.Scott, supra note144, at 382. Theregulatoryprocesses for allocatingcostsand designing ratesare complexand beyond thescope of this Note.Readersinterested in thedetails of suchprocesses shouldsee JONATHAN A. LESSER &LEONARDO R. GIACCHINO,FUNDAMENTALS OF ENERGY REGULATION 175–268 (2ded. 2013). 592 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575
Autility’srevenue requirement has twocomponents:operating expenses and capitalexpenses.148 Operatingexpenses includeall ongoing costsincluding depreciation, i.e.,the costofgradually recoveringautility’s investment expenditures.149 In contrast,capitalexpenses provide the“return on thefirm’sundepreciatedcapitalinvestment, calledthe rate base.”150 In principle, utilitiesonlymake aprofitonwhatisintheirratebase, as they merely recoveroperatingexpenses.151 Furthermore,the more investments they include in theirratebase, themoreprofitthey make.152 However, commissions maybar autilityfromincluding imprudent investmentsinits rate base, andlikewise prevent theutilityfromrecoveringimprudently incurredoperatingexpenses.153 Such “[p]rudence review is regulation’s substitute forcompetitiveforces” as it allows commissions to protect ratepayersfrompaying unreasonableexpendituresthat aprudent competitivebusinesswouldnot incur.154 Utility rate regulationiscomplex,155 but forthisNote’spurposes,only afew pointsare material.First,inthe past,vertically integrated monopolies generated, transmitted, anddistributed electricity to consumers.156 Second, utility commissions price-regulated this entire value chainunderrate-of- return ratemaking.157 Third,utilitycommissions have discretiontochoose anyratemakingmethodology they wish,solong as theresultingrates are
148.LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 63. 149.Id. at 63, 67. 150.Id. at 63. Capital expenses also include “anallowance for workingcapital,which is the amount of money afirmneeds to have on hand everyday to pay its bills.” Id. 151.Inpractice,autility can make aprofitonthe operatingsideifoperatingexpenses unexpectedlydecline afteracommission sets its rates for agivenperiod. See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 88 (explaining how “regulatory lag”works,leading one to inferhow autility can still make aprofit due to this phenomenon). Duetothe “regulatory lag” between when costs change and acommissionsetsnew rates, autility can then collect more in ratesthan it needs to cover itsoperatingcosts. Id. (defining the term “regulatory lag” as the“timebetween the periodwhencosts change forautility, and thepoint when the regulatory commission recognizes these changesbyraisingorlowering theutility’s ratestoconsumers”). 152.See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 49 (notingthatutilities canartificially increase theirrates through excessively investinginequipment). 153. Id. at 48. Autility’s investmentsorcosts areprudent onlyifautility’s decision to make or incur themwas reasonable, considering industry normsand what theutility knewatthe time. HEMPLING, supra note120, at 236–37. However, autility’s“operatingand investmentdecisions are typically considered prudent unless proven otherwise.” LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 48. Consequently, regulators bear the burdenofestablishingimprudence. Id. However, commissionsmay also disallowrecoveryfor prudent but uneconomic investmentsonthe separate basisthat they arenot “usedand useful.” See HEMPLING, supra note120, at 251–56 (discussing cost disallowance under the usedand useful standardand itslimits). 154.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 235. 155.LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 205. 156.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 72. 157.Scott, supra note144, at 381. 2019] Charging Onwards 593 just and reasonable.158 Fourth,regulatedutilities—whichcontinue to manage electricity distributioneven today159—make theirprofitsbyearning arate of return on the physical infrastructure in theirratebase.160
B. Competition in WholesaleGenerationand Restructuring
By the1990s,the traditional view that electricitygenerationwas a natural monopolywas fallingout of favor with policymakers.161 Seekingto createcompetitivewholesaleelectricity markets,Congress removed the main federalregulatory barrierstonon-utilitygenerationinthe Energy PolicyAct of 1992 (EPAct 1992).162 TheAct and subsequentregulatory actions also led to thecreationofIndependent SystemOperator New England(ISO-NE) to manage NewEngland’sregional transmission system and wholesaleelectricity markets.163 Maine, NewHampshire, Massachusetts,Rhode Island, andConnecticut also enacted restructuring laws to enableretailelectricitycompetition.164 These developmentscreated thecurrent legallandscape forelectricity in NewEngland.165 In additiontoremoving restrictions on non-utility generators,the EPAct1992 also sought to provide non-utility generators with access to the transmission system.166 Thus,the ActgaveFERC theauthority to order transmission line owners to carry electricity “for others—generatorsand purchasersofwholesalepower—atjustand reasonable rates.”167 In 1996,
158.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 230. 159.Id. at 75. 160.LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 63. 161.See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 9(“Following developments in thestructure of the telecommunications and naturalgas industries ...somestates ‘unbundled’ theelectricity-supplyfunctionfromdistribution,onthe theorythat onlythe wires(the fixed networksystem)constitutedanatural monopoly, whereas the generationofpower didnot.”). 162.Jeffrey D. Watkiss &Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992—A Watershedfor Competitioninthe WholesalePower Market,10YALE J. ON REG.447, 447,449, 464–65 (1993). 163.LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 54; OurHistory,INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/history (last visited Apr.14, 2019). 164.LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note 147, at 75; see generally LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 9–10, 18 (highlightinghow in 1994, afterEngland and Walesbegan restructuring, somestatesand regions,including NewEngland, followedsuit). 165.See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note 21, at 18, 21–22 (notingthat most NewEngland states arerestructuredasof2010; that ISOs and RTOs arose because of FERCOrder 888, andISOsand RTOs—including ISO-NEcurrently exist). 166.Watkiss &Smith, supra note162, at 449. 167.Id. Transmission lines are “bottleneck”facilities, as theyare “essential for competition, controlledbythe incumbent andnot economically duplicable by competitors.”HEMPLING, supra note 120, at 74. This givesthe transmission-owning utilitysubstantial market power over non-utility generators andconsumersalike. LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 33. Even worse, autility with itsown generators might trytorefuse access to itsgenerationcompetitors or otherwise unfairly favor 594 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575
FERC issued Order 888, requiring alltransmission-owningutilitiestooffer transmissionservice to others underthe same termsand conditions they providedtothemselves.168 Order 888 also encouragedtransmission-owningutilitiestoform voluntaryorganizations knownasIndependent SystemOperators(ISOs), to further foster wholesalecompetition.169 When utilitiesformanISO—ora similarentity knownasaRegionalTransmission Organization(RTO)170— theutilitiestransfercontrolovertheirindividualtransmissionsystems to the ISOorRTO in exchangefor ratesthat providecostrecoveryand areturnon investment.171 ISOs and RTOs also administerwholesaleelectricity markets in theirregions.172 ISO-NE is theRTO fornearlyall of NewEngland,173 responsible formanagingthe region’s transmission system and its wholesaleelectricity markets.174 In thecontext of thesefederal changestopromote wholesale competition, many states alsobegan to restructuretheir electricity systems to introduceretailcompetition.175 Retail competitionallows ratepayersto choose frommultiple generatorsorsuppliers of electricity whocompete against each other.176 Ratepayers’ traditional regulated utility continues to perform distributionand billingservices.177 Thus,inprinciple, theutility merely transports and deliversthe electricitytheirratepayerspurchased fromathird party, rather than sellingelectricity theutility generated itself. Id. Hence, federal policymakersdetermined that assuringnon-utility access to thetransmission system requiredregulatory intervention. HEMPLING, supra note120, at 74. 168.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 74–75. 169.LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 21. 170.Id. AfterISOshad been operatingfor afew years,FERC“concluded that further refinements wereneeded to address lingeringconcerns about competitiveneutrality and reliability.” Id. FERCdevelopedthe RTOmodelasarefinement of theISO modelinresponse to these concerns. Id. at 21–22. In 1999, FERC issued Order2000, which included standards forRTOs andencouraged, but did not requireutilities to form them. Id.;HEMPLING, supra note120, at 75.ISOs andRTOsare very similar; their differencesdonot matter for the purposes of this Note. See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 21 (outliningthe similaritybetweenthesetwo entities). 171.LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 21 (explaining that ISOsand RTOs need functional controloftheirrespective transmissionsystems). 172.See id. (charting ISOs’ and RTOs’attempts to neutralize wholesale electricity markets). 173. See AllcoFin.Ltd.v.Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 93 (2dCir. 2017) (notingthat ISO-NE’s jurisdictionencompasses“Connecticut, Massachusetts,Vermont,New Hampshire, Rhode Island,and most of Maine”).ISO-NE began as an ISOwhenitwas founded in 1997. OurHistory, supra note163. It becameanRTO in 2005, but didnot change its name. Id. 174.Our ThreeCritical Roles,INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., https://www.iso- ne.com/about/what-we-do/three-roles(last visitedApr. 14, 2019). 175.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 75; see LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 18. 176. See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 18 (detailing electricity supplyoptions for consumersinrestructured states). 177.See id. (outliningbillingservices under restructuring). 2019] Charging Onwards 595 itself.178 That said,restructured states also allowdistributionutilitiesto provide “defaultsupply” or “defaultservice”toratepayers whodonot or cannot chooseacompetitive supplier.179 However,restructured states still require distributionutilities to competitivelysource theelectricity they use to supplydefault service.180 Restructured states generally requireutilitiestodivest theirgenerators, or at least functionally separatetheirdistributionservicefromgeneration.181 Therationalebehindthisistwofold.First, doing so deregulates generation, as it means powerplantsare no longer subjecttorateregulation.182 This eliminates theproblemsrateregulationofgenerationposes,such as potentially requiring ratepayers to payfor uneconomic power plants.183 Second, it helps createalevel playingfield forcompetitionbytakingaway theutility’s incumbent advantage.184 States in turn expect increased competitiontodecreasecosts forconsumers.185 Unfortunately, barring utility involvement in generationalsocreatesbarriers forenergystorage,as it means utilitiescannotcaptureall of energy storage’svalue streams.186
178.See generally id. at 18–19 (highlighting thegeneralprinciplesofrestructured states and how distributionand billing workinsuch states). 179.Id. at 18, 73. In fact,inrestructured states most residential andsmall business customers remain on defaultservice. Id. at 18. 180.See id. at 91 (explaining how distributionutilities buy power from “wholesale power supplymarkets” to supply defaultservice); see, e.g.,N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(V)(c) (2018) (“Default service shouldbeprocured through thecompetitivemarket ....”). 181. See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 90 (highlightinghow somerestructured states have required utilities to divest from generation); see, e.g., N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(III)(“Generationservices shouldbesubject to market competitionand minimaleconomic regulationand at least functionally separated from transmissionand distribution services....”). 182. See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 90 (notingthat this divestment eliminates rate regulation of generation). 183.Id. at 90–91 (“[T]his eliminates ...possible problems with gold-platingand cost-plus regulationinthat segment (although it maycause otherproblems).”). 184.See, e.g.,N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:1(I)(2018) (“[T]he development of competitive markets for wholesaleand retail electricity services arekey elements in arestructured industry that will require ...at leastfunctional separationofcentralized generationservices from transmission and distribution services.”). 185.See, e.g., id. (“The mostcompellingreason to restructure theNew Hampshireelectric utilityindustry is to reduce costsfor allconsumersofelectricity by harnessingthe power of competitive markets.”). 186.See Stein, supra note117, at 958 (“Although requiringutilities to divest theirgeneration assets facilitates more competition, it also ...[createsbarriers] ...tomulti-functioning resources like energy storage, whose value can onlybefully realizedwherethe user is able to capitalize on its multiple value streams.”). 596 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575
In sum, NewEngland’scurrent electricity system largelyconsists of non-utility generatorscompetinginISO-NE’swholesalemarkets,187 ISO- NE managing thetransmission system,188 and traditionalutilitiesproviding physical distributionservice.189 Furthermore,all NewEngland states (exceptVermont)prohibitorrestrictutility involvement in generationin order to promotecompetition.190 As aresult, restructuring hasalmost entirely eliminated thetraditionalvertically integrated utility model in the region.191 Unfortunately, while restructuringrequirements facilitate competition, they also createbarrierstocapturing thefullrange ofbenefits energy storageprojectscan provideabsent furtherreforms.192
III. ENERGY STORAGE UNDER CURRENT NEW ENGLAND STATE LAWS
A. CurrentState Laws Regarding DistributionUtility OwnershipofEnergy Storage
1. Does Energy Storage Constitute Generation?
Restructuringlawsrestrictdistributionutility ownership and controlof generationassets.193 As such,restructuring laws only limit distribution utility ownership of energystorage if energy storage constitutes generation.194 Whetherenergy storage constitutesgenerationisnot immediatelyclear.195 Arguably, energy storage shouldlogically qualifyas generationifitactsasagenerator by providing generationservices.196 Conversely,energystorage projectsonlystore energy that someother
187.Administering the WholesaleElectricity Markets,INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/three-roles/administering-markets (last visited Apr. 14, 2019); OurThree Critical Roles, supra note174. 188.Our Three Critical Roles, supra note174; HEMPLING, supra note120, at 75. 189.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 75. 190.See infra PartIII.A (discussing how current NewEngland restructuring statutes restrict utilityinvolvement in generation). 191.See Stein, supra note117 (notingthatareas thathave restructured have broken up the traditional vertically integratedutility structure). 192.See id. at 958 (stating that while divestinggeneration assetsmay create more competition forutilities, it mayimpede multi-functioning). 193. See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 90–91 (discussingwhat utilitieshave had to do under restructuringlaws). 194.See Stein, supra note117 (explainingthe restrictions on utility ownershipofenergy storage whenitconstitutesgenerationinarestructured state). 195.See INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., HOW ENERGY STORAGE CAN PARTICIPATE IN NEW ENGLAND’S WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 3(2016), https://www.iso-ne.com/static- assets/documents/2016/01/final_storage_letter_cover_paper.pdf (notingthat energy storage is aunique resource that can bothsupplyand consumeelectricity). 196.See id. at 3–4 (statingthatenergystorage canprovide generationservices). 2019] Charging Onwards 597 facility previously generated,and thus do not generateany new electricity.197 Nonetheless, energy storageprojects—or at least thosethat participate in wholesaleelectricity markets—in alllikelihood qualify as generationfor thepurposes of NewEnglandrestructuringstatutes.198 Indeed, theMaine Public Utility Commission (MPUC) has recently impliedthat it considers energy storagetoqualify as generationfor thepurposes of Maine’s restructuringstatute.199 Additionally,asofthiswriting, ISO-NE has determined that energy storagemay onlyreceive fullcompensationfor wholesaleservices if it participatesasagenerator in wholesaleelectricity markets.200 To theextentthat an energystorage project is participatingor seekstoparticipateinNew England wholesale electricitymarketsasa
197.See JONES ET AL., supra note7,at124 (“Energy market opportunities forstorage technologies involve ...purchasing energy (and rechargingbatteries)whensystem marginal costs are low andthensellingenergy back to thesystem(dischargingthe batteries) when system marginal costs are high.”). 198.See Order at 12, In re Emera Me.Requestfor Approval of Hampden MicrogridProject, No.2017-00027 (Me. Pub. Util.Comm’nJune 16, 2017), 2017 WL 2691245 [hereinafterEmeraOrder] (stating thatthe while this issue hasnot been address by theCommission, theMPUCimpliesthat energy storage mayqualifyasgeneration). 199.See id. (referring to the battery in aproposed utility-owned, solar-plus-storagesystem “as a source of backup generation” while considering whetherMaine’s restructuring statute allowsautilityto ownsuchasystem). 200.See INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., supra note195, at 4(statingthatenergy storage mayonlyparticipateinall wholesalemarketsasagenerator).Note, however,that FERC’s recentOrder 841 requiresall ISOs andRTOstodevelopnew participation modelsthat compensate energy storage projects for“all capacity, energy,and ancillaryservicesthat [they are] technically capable of providing.”Order 841, 83 Fed. Reg. 9580, 9582 (Mar.6,2018).Such participation models must also recognize “the unique characteristicsofelectricstorage resources,”specifically “their ability to both inject energy to thegrid andreceive energy fromit.” Id. at 9583, 9589. Yetdespite this,ISO-NE’s proposed Order841 implementationplanrequires energystoragesystems “to register as generation resources.”Peter Maloney, As Grid Operators File FERC Order841 Plans,Storage FloodgatesOpen Slowly,UTIL.DIVE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/as-grid-operators-file-ferc-order- 841-plans-storage-floodgates-open-slowly/543977/.FERC mayultimately require ISO-NEtochange this aspect of its plan, though it is also possible FERC mayallowISO-NE to treatenergystorage as a non-traditionalformofgeneration. See id.(suggestingrequiring energy storage to register as generation does not complywithOrder 841); but see Order 841, 83 Fed. Reg. at 9583 (“[E]xisting participation modelsdesigned for traditional generation...donot recognize electric storageresources’unique physicaland operational characteristics....”(emphasisadded)).Furthermore,even if FERCdoes require ISO-NE to change this aspect of its implementationplan, it wouldnot matterfor energy storage’s status under state law if other states followthe MPUC’s lead. See EmeraOrder, supra note 198 (referring to an energy storagesystem “as asource of ...generation”). Notably, the MPUC interpreted Maine’srestructuringstatute as restricting the entitieswhich couldprovide generation services. See id. at 11 (“At its core, the Restructuring Actwas intended to open generationservicesto market forces....Itisthrough this prism whichthe generationownershipprohibition must be viewed.”).Thus, if other commissionsfollowthis serviceslogic, they might preclude utility ownership of any energy storage projectthat providedwholesale market servicesonthe basisthat such utilities wouldthen be impermissibly providing generationservices. 598 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 generator, it wouldpresumablyconstitute generationunder NewEngland state restructuring laws.201 Theselawsthereforerestrict utility ownership of energy storage projects that act as agenerator.202 Thefollowing Subsections will analyzehow theindividual restructuringlawsofeachrestructured New Englandstate affectutility-owned energy storage.203
2. Rhode Island
When Rhode Island restructured its electricity system,itstatutorily requireddistributionutilities to transfertheir generationassetstoeither an affiliate or an unrelated company.204 It prohibiteddistributionutilities“from owning, operating, or controllinggenerating facilities” once they completed theirrestructuringplans.205 However,Rhode Island allowedits public utilitiescommission to exemptcertain utilitiesfromits restructuring statute.206 TheCommission canonlyexempt autility if it didnot sell or distributeelectricityoutside theCommission’sservice territorypriorto restructuring, andifitsells or distributes less than 5% of theelectricity consumedinRhode Island.207 Thus,large utilitiescannot ownoroperate energy storageprojectsthatact as generators.208 Smallutilitiescan build and operateenergy storage projects if they convincethe Commissionto exempt them.209 TheCommission’s authority to exempt smallutilitiesfromthe restructuringstatute has little practical significance, however,asasingle
201.See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 90 (stating that restructuringlawsrequire utilitiestodivestgeneratingassets). 202.ThisNoteuses actasagenerator andsimilarphrases as shorthand forparticipateinNew England wholesale electricity marketsasagenerator or otherwise providegeneration services. 203.See infra Parts III.A.2–6 (analyzing how therestructuring statutes of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut,and New Hampshireimpactutility-ownedenergystorageineach respectivestate). 204.39R.I. GEN.LAWS §39-1-27(a)–(b) (2018). However,Rhode Islanddid allowits regulatory commission to exempt somedistribution utilities fromthe requirement to transfer their existing generationassets under Section39-1-27(a). Id. §39-1-27(g).Nonetheless,itdid not allowthe Commissiontoexempt utilitiesfrom Section 39-1-27(d)’sprohibition on distributionutilitiesowning or operatinggeneratingassets. Id.§39-1-27(d), (g). As such,the Commissioncannot use Section39-1- 27(g) to allowautility to build or acquire new generationassets, such as energy storage projects. See id. §39-1-27(g) (setting forthrequirementsthat the Commissionmust follow). 205.Id. §39-1-27(d). 206. Id. §39-1-2(5), (26) (2018). 207.Id. §39-1-2(26). 208.See id. §39-1-27(d) (barring utility ownership or controlofgenerating facilities). 209.See id. §39-1-2(26) (allowing theCommission to exempt smallutilitiesthat distribute less than 5% of the electricity consumed in thestate). 2019] Charging Onwards 599 distributionutility,National Grid,currently serves 99% of theState.210 As such,NationalGrid cannotqualify forthisexception.211 Thus,Rhode Island effectivelyprohibits distributionutility ownership of generation in 99% of theState.212 By extension, Rhode Islandeffectivelyprohibits utility ownership of energystorage projects that providewholesalegeneration services throughout virtually theentire State.
3. Massachusetts
Massachusetts outright prohibits distributionutility ownership of all non-nucleargeneration.213 When it implemented restructuring, Massachusetts statutorily required its distributionutilitiestoeitherselltheir non-nucleargenerationassetsortransferthem to an independent affiliate.214 Massachusetts’s restructuringstatute now barsadistributionutility from “directlyowning, operating,orcontrolling...[non-nuclear] generating facilities.”215 Instead, thestatute requiresutilitiestorestructure by separatingtheirdistributionand generationbusinesses into independent affiliatestomaintain“strict separationbetween suchgenerationaffiliate and thedistribution and transmissionoperations of such electric company.”216 As such,adistributionutility in Massachusetts canneither ownanon-nucleargenerating assetnor participateinoperatingthe non- nucleargenerationasset of an affiliate.217 As energy storage is non-nuclear, Massachusetts prohibits distributionutility ownershipofenergystorage projects that act as generators.218
4. Maine
Maine’s restructuringstatute generally requires investor-owned distributionutilitiestodivestall non-nucleargenerationassets locatedinthe U.S.219 Thestatute prohibits investor-owned utilitiesfromowningor
210.Learn AboutElectricity,STATEOFR.I. OFF.ENERGY RESOURCES, http://www.energy.ri.gov/electric-gas/electricity/learn-about-electricity.php (lastvisitedApr.14, 2019). 211.See 39 R.I. GEN.LAWS §39-1-2(26) (allowing the Commission to onlyexemptsmall utilities). 212. LearnAbout Electricity, supra note210. 213.MASS.GEN.LAWS ch. 164, §1A(b)–(c) (2018). 214.Id. 215.Id. §1A(b)(1). 216.Id. §1A(c). 217.Id. §1A(b)–(c). 218.Id. 219.ME.REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 35-A,§3204(1) (2018). 600 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 controlling “generationorgeneration-related assets.”220 However,italso authorizes MPUC to allowaninvestor-owned distributionutility to ownor control“generationand generation-related assets” undercertain circumstances.221 Specifically,the Mainestatute authorizes MPUC to allow this if it finds that such ownership or control“is necessary forthe utility to perform its obligations as atransmission and distributionutility in an efficientmanner.”222 An energy storage projectthatbothactsasageneratorand provides T&Dbenefits shouldarguablyqualify underthisexception.223 Areasonable interpretationofperformingT&D obligations “inanefficient manner” wouldbeproviding T&Dservice at thelowestpossiblenet cost.224 To the extent an energy storage projectcan earnrevenue by actingasagenerator, it effectivelyreduces thenet cost of theproject as apotential transmission or distributionasset.225 Moreover,the energystorageproject would have to act as agenerator in ordertominimizethe netcostofthe project.226 Consequently,operatingthe energy storage projectasagenerator wouldbe “necessaryfor theutility to perform its obligations ...inanefficient manner.”227 Thus,MPUCcouldallowautilitytobuild and operate such an energy storageproject if it is thecheapest optionfor meetingaparticular transmissionordistributionneed. Unfortunately,MPUCisunlikelytoadopt such areading of Section 3204(6).228 To date, MPUC hasinterpreted Section3204(6) “very narrowly.”229 Specifically,inCentralMaine PowerCo.,MPUCdetermined that “a fundamental purposeofthe RestructuringAct wastoprohibit [T&D]utilitiesfromusing generation or generation-related assets to
220.Id. §3204(5). 221.Id. §3204(6). 222.Id. 223.See id. (authorizingthe Commissiontoallow utility ownershipofgenerationassets necessary forefficiently transmitting or distributingelectricity). 224.Id. 225.See CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 17 (notingthat wholesalemarket revenue can reduce thenet costtoratepayers of an energy storage project that provides T&Dbenefits); see MASS.DEP’TOF ENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at 119 (clarifyingthatallowing utilitiestocapture wholesalemarket revenue wouldreduce theinvestment that wouldneedtobeincluded in autility’s rate base). 226.See MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 117–18 (arguing that energy storage must be used to provide multiplebenefits in order to be cost-effective). 227. Order at 5, In re Cent. Me.Power Co., 234 Pub. Util. Rep.4th (PUR) 170 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n May4,2004) (No. 2004-21) [hereinafterCent.Me. PowerCo. Order] (quotingME.REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 35-A,§3204(6)). 228.See id. (stating theCommission believes that Section3204(6) does not allowdistribution utilities to provide generationservices). 229.Emera Order, supra note198, at 8. 2019] Charging Onwards 601 provide servicestothird-parties.”230 Thus,MPUCbelieves that Section 3204(6) wasnever intended to allowutilitiestouse generationwithin their systemsfor grid support, nor to provide generationservices under any circumstances.231 Yetany energy storage project actingasagenerator wouldbeproviding generationservices to third parties by definition.232 Thus,MPUCinterpretsSection3204(6) in away that would never allowan investor-owned distributionutility to provide generation services.233 In other words, Maineprohibits investor-owned distributionutilitiesfrom operatingenergystorage projectsthat act as generators. However,Maine only prohibits investor-owned distributionutilities fromowninggeneration.234 Unfortunately, investor-owned utilitiesserve about 75% of Maineelectricity customersand deliver about 79%ofthe electricityconsumedinthe State.235 As such,thisexceptionhas limited significance, as it onlyappliestoutilitiesthat serve aboutaquarterofthe State.236 Therefore, in practice, Mainecategorically prohibits distribution utilitiesfromcapturing thegenerationvalue of energystorage projects throughout themajority of theState.237
5. Connecticut
Connecticut lawgenerally prohibits distributionutilitiesfromowning or operatinggeneration assets.238 However,Connecticut lawalsoprovides several exceptions to this general rule.239 Most importantly,ifthe State’s Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) callsfor newgeneration, Connecticut’s Public UtilitiesRegulatory Authority (PURA) must solicit proposalsfor such generation.240 Adistributionutility maythen submit proposalsfor
230.Cent.Me. Power Co. Order, supra note 227, at 6. 231.Id. at 5. 232.See INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., supra note95, at 4(defining act as agenerator). 233. Cent. Me.Power Co. Order, supra note 227, at 4. 234.ME.REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 35-A,§3204(5) (2018). 235.See Delivery Rates,MAINE:ME.PUB.UTIL.COMMISSION,http://www.maine.gov/mpuc/ electricity/delivery_rates.shtml (lastvisitedApr.14, 2019) (notingthat investor-owned utilities serve 605,052 of theState’s 809,239 totalcustomers). 236.Id. 237.See ME.REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 35-A, §3204(5) (prohibiting theinvestor-owned utilitiesthat supply most of theState’selectricity from owning generatingassets). 238.CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN.§16-244e(a)(2018). 239.See id. (“Anelectricdistributioncompany shall not ownoroperategenerationassets, exceptasprovided in this sectionand sections 16-43d, 16-243m,16-243u, 16a-3b and 16a-3c.”). 240.Id. §16a-3b(b).AnIntegrated Resource Planisaplanthat “[t]he Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection” develops “inconsultationwith theelectricdistributioncompanies”for meetingthe State’selectricity needs in thecheapestway possible thatis“consistent with thestate’s environmental goalsand standards.” Id. §16a-3a(a). 602 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 buildingnew generation assets “onthe same basis as otherrespondentsto thesolicitation.”241 Additionally,ifPURA does not receive enough proposalstomeet theIRP’sgoals, it maydirect autility companytomake “a proposaltobuild and operateanelectricgenerationfacilityinthe state.”242 Importantly,Connecticut lawrequiresIRPstoidentify generation, transmission, and distributionneeds and determine how best tomeet them.243 More specifically,suchplans must “assess andcomparethe cost of transmission lineprojects, new powersources, renewablesourcesof electricity,conservation and distributed generation projects to ensurethe state pursues only theleast-cost alternativeprojects.”244 Furthermore,such plans must alsoassess whether distributed generationprojectscan meet reliabilityneeds before autility mayconsider building newpower lines.245 Connecticut allows adistributionutility to build andoperategeneration assets, provided that an IRPcalls fornew generatingassetsand theutility makesacompetitiveproposal.246 Connecticut’s IRPstatute also contemplates distributed generationprojectsproviding bothgeneration services and avoidingtransmissioncosts.247 To theextent adistribution utility can ownand operatedistributed generationprojects—because they areatype of generationasset—adistributionutility could also capture the benefits of anyT&D costs such projectsmight avoid.248 Thus,under certain circumstances, Connecticut allows adistributionutility to capturea generator’s generation, transmission, and distributionvalue.249 Accordingly, Connecticut lawdoes allowadistributionutility to own an energy storage projectthat actsasagenerator under certain circumstances. 250 Specifically,adistributionutility coulddosoifthe
241.Id. §16a-3b(b)(1).However,Section 16a-3b(b)(1)also requires adistribution utilityto demonstrate“that its bidisnot supportedinany form of crosssubsidization by affiliatedentities,” presumablytoprevent it from unfairlyunderbidding non-utilityproposals. Id. 242.Id. §16a-3c(a). 243.Id. §16a-3a(c). 244.Id. §16a-3e (emphasis added). 245.Id. 246.Id. §16a-3b(b). 247.See id. §16a-3e (requiringIRPstocomparethe costs of distributed generationwith both transmission projects andother newpower sources). 248.See MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 117–18 (providing an example of how autility coulduse an energy storage projectproviding wholesaleservices to also avoid distribution costs). 249. CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN.§16a-3b(b)(1) (allowing autility to build generatingassets if it submits awinning competitive proposal). 250.See id. §16a-3b(b) (“When the Integrated Resources Plan containsanoption to procure new sourcesofgeneration, theauthority shall developand issuearequest for proposals.”); id. §16a- 2019] Charging Onwards 603
State’sIRP calledfor such an energy storageproject andthe distribution utility made asuccessfulcompetitiveproposal to build it.251 Additionally, PURA couldorder adistributionutility to build such an energystorage projectifnoone submittedaproposal to build it.252 Thedistributionutility wouldthen capturethe benefit of any avoided T&Dcoststhe energy storage project might create.253 As such,Connecticut allows adistribution utility to build and ownanenergystorage project, as well as capture its generation, transmission, and distributionvalue. Connecticut is an outlieramong restructured NewEngland states becauseitnow allows distributionutilitiestopotentially build and own any generationproject in its IRP.254 Indeed, this exceptionarguably swallows thegeneral rule that “[a]nelectric distributioncompany shallnot own or operategenerationassets.”255 Thus,distributionutilitiesinConnecticut can ownenergystorage projects that actasgeneratorsbecause Connecticut partially reversed restructuringwhenitadded this exceptionin2007.256
6. NewHampshire
NewHampshire’s restructuringstatute statesthat “generationservices shouldbe...atleastfunctionally separated from transmission and distributionservices.”257 Functional separationgenerally refers to “requiringutilitiestoseparatetheircompetitive generationfunctions from theirregulated transmissionand distributionfunctions.”258 It is “a less drasticalternativetodivestiture,under which‘autility wouldhave to divest itself of alloraportionofits generatingassets to another entity or entities
3b(b)(1) (“[A]nelectricdistribution company maysubmit proposalsinresponsetoarequestfor proposalsonthe samebasis as other respondentstothe solicitation.”). 251.Id. 252.See id. §16a-3c(a) (“[I]f thePublic Utilities RegulatoryAuthority does not receive and approve proposalssufficient to reach the goal setbythe Integrated Resources Plan,the authority may order an electric distributioncompany to submit...a proposal to build and operateanelectric generationfacilityinthe state.”). 253.Indeed, theIRP statute’spolicywouldseemtofavor placing an energy storage project in a locationwhereitcould substitute fornew transmission projects. See id. §16a-3e (“TheIntegrated Resources Plan ...shall...assess the least-costalternativetoaddressreliability concerns,including, but not limitedto, lowering electricitydemandthrough conservation anddistributed generationprojects beforeanelectricdistribution company submitsaproposal fortransmission linesortransmission line upgrades ....”). 254.Id. §16a-3b(b)(1). 255.Id. §16-244e(a). 256.2007 Conn. Acts 1051 (Reg.Sess.). 257.N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(III) (2018). 258.InreAlgonquin GasTransmission,L.L.C., 186 A.3d 865, 878 (N.H.2018) (Hicks, J., dissenting) (quotingSonnet C. Edmonds, RetailElectric Competition in Kansas: AUtilityPerspective, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 603, 632 (1998)). 604 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 in ordertoremaininthe distributionbusiness.’”259 NewHampshire’s Public UtilitiesCommission previously interpreted this statutorylanguage as requiringfunctionalseparationand thus barring utility involvement in generation.260 However,inMay 2018, theNew Hampshire SupremeCourtreversed theCommission’sdecisionthatinterpreted this statutory language in In re AlgonquinGas Transmission, LLC. 261 It instead heldthat thestatute does not require “‘functional separation’ of generationservices from transmissionand distributionservices.”262 TheCourtexplained that functional separationwas oneofjust 15 interdependentand thus mutually qualifyingrestructuring policyprinciples thestatute lists.263 Furthermore, thestatute didnot “reflect any legislative intent that the‘functional separation’ policyprincipleismeantto‘direct’the PUC in theexercise of its authority in implementing thechapter to theexclusion of the14 remainingprinciples.”264 Therefore,the statute doesnot “require ‘functional separation’ in allcircumstances.”265 Furthermore,the Courtfound “that the primaryintent of thelegislature”inenactingthe restructuringstatute “was to reduceelectricity coststoconsumers.”266 Thus,the Algonquin Court interpretedthe state’srestructuringstatute as authorizingthe Commission to allowutility involvement in generation when doingsoadvances other restructuringpolicyprinciples that outweigh functional separationand reduces costsfor consumers.267 But when and how other restructuringpolicyprinciples could outweigh functional separationisrather unclear,as10ofthe remaining14principles emphasize or incorporate the importance of fosteringcompetition,268 which
259.Id.(quoting Edmonds, supra note258, at 631). 260. In re Pub. Serv. Co.ofN.H.d/b/a Eversource Energy, 333Pub. Util. Rep.4th (PUR) 163 (N.H. Pub. Utils.Comm’nOct.6,2016), rev’d In re Algonquin GasTransmission, L.L.C.,186 A.3d 865, 875 (N.H.2018). 261.Algonquin,186 A.3d at 874–75. 262.Id. 263.Id. at 873. 264.Id. 265.Id. at 874. 266.Id. 267.See id. at 874 n.4(indicatingthat theCommission can authorize utility involvementin generationservices when“other policy principles identified in the statute clearlyoutweighed functional separationand [doing so]wouldproduce more reliable electric service at lower rates forNew Hampshire consumersthan presently existswithout any significant adverse consequences”). 268.See N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(II) (2018) (“Allowing customerstochoose among electricity suppliers will helpensure fullycompetitiveand innovativemarkets.”); id. §374-F:3(IV) (“Comparability shouldbeassured forgenerators competingwith affiliates of groups supplying transmission anddistribution services.”); id.§374-F:3(V)(c) (“Default service should be procured throughthe competitive market ....”); id. §374-F:3(VI) (“Anonbypassable andcompetitivelyneutral 2019] Charging Onwards 605 is thepurposeoffunctional separation.269 Thus,insofar as violating functional separationundermines competition, violatingthe functional separationprinciplealso undermines what many of theother principles try to achieve. Furthermore,eventhe statute’s“rate relief”principleseems to rank competitivemarketsasequally if not more importantthan rate reduction.270 It flatlystatesthat “[t]hegoal of restructuringistocreate competitivemarkets,” while also notingthese marketsare merely “expected to producelower prices forall customers.”271 Thus in aprinciple-weighing analysis, theprinciple most relevant to reducingconsumer costscutsinboth directions—and arguablymoretowards competition and functional separation. These points wouldlogically weighstronglyagainstallowing a functional separationviolationunder the Algonquin principle-weighing test. As apractical matterthen, the Algonquin test makes it theoretically possiblebut extremely difficultfor theCommission to authorize utility involvement in generationservices and thus violatethe functional separationprinciple.272 Algonquin doesatleast establishthatthe restructuringstatute doesnot automatically bar utilitiesfromowningand operatingenergystorage projects that act as generators while also providing T&Dbenefits.273 However,manyofthe restructuring statute’sprinciples
system benefitscharge applied to theuse of thedistribution system maybeusedtofund public benefits relatedtothe provision of electricity.”); id. §374-F:3(VII)(“The rulesthatgovern market activity should ...ensureafully competitivemarket.”); id. §374-F:3(VIII) (“Increased competition in the electricindustry shouldbeimplementedinamanner that supportsand furthers thegoalsof environmental improvement.”); id. §374-F:3(XI)(“The goalofrestructuring is to create competitive markets ....”); id. §374-F:3(XIII) (“NewEnglandPower Pool (NEPOOL) shouldbereformed and efforts to enhance competitionand to complement industry restructuringonaregional basis shouldbe encouraged.”); id. §374-F:3(XIV)(“The market framework for competitive electricservice should, to the extent possible, reducereliance on administrativeprocess. NewHampshire should move deliberately to replace traditional planning mechanismswith market driven choice as themeans of supplying resourceneeds.”); id. §374-F:3(XV) (“The commissionshould seek to implement full customer choice among electricity suppliers in themostexpeditious manner possible....”). 269.See Ne.Energy Partnersv.MaharReg’l Sch. Dist.,971 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Mass. 2012) (notingthatfunctional separationis“anecessaryfirst step in” implementingafully competitivemarket forelectricitygeneration); Algonquin,186 A.3d at 878 (Hicks, J.,dissenting) (“The importance of at least functionally separatinggenerationservices from transmission anddistributionservices is that achieving and maintainingacompetitivemarketingeneration services depends upon it.”). 270.See N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(XI) (“The goal of restructuring is to create competitivemarkets that are expected to producelower prices forall customers than wouldhave been paidunder thecurrentregulatory system.”). 271.Id. (emphasisadded). 272.See Algonquin,186 A.3d at 874 n.4(indicating that other principlesmust outweigh the functional separationprinciple beforethe Commissioncouldauthorize aviolation of the latter). 273.See id. at 874 (stating that therestructuring statutedoes not require “‘functional separation’ in allcircumstances”); id.at878 (Hicks, J.,dissenting) (quotingEdmonds, supra note258, at 632) (explaining that functional separationrefersto“requiring utilitiestoseparatetheircompetitive generationfunctions from theirregulated transmission anddistributionfunctions”). 606 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 lean in favor of competitionand thus functionalseparation.274 The Commission wouldthus find it difficult to authorizeutility ownership of such energy storage projects.275 The Algonquin decisionwill thereforebeof little practical benefit to energy storage deployment. Yetone other provision of therestructuring statutewouldseem to offer some hope forenergy storage.Thisprovision states that “distribution service companies shouldnot be absolutelyprecluded fromowningsmall scaledistributed generationresourcesaspartofastrategy forminimizing transmissionand distributioncosts.”276 Indeed, aseparatestatute explicitly permits distributionutilitiesto“invest in or owndistributed energy resources.”277 NewHampshire defines “distributed energy resources”as includingenergystorage projectsconnected to thelocal distribution systemsthathelpreduceT&D costs.278 Thus,though NewHampshire generally prohibits distributionutilitiesfromoperatinggeneration,279 it explicitlyexempts distributed generationprojects—including energy storage—thatreduce T&Dcosts.280
274.See N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(listingtheseprinciples). 275.See Algonquin,186 A.3d at 874 n.4(indicating thatother principles must outweigh the functional separationprinciple beforethe Commissioncouldauthorize aviolationofthe latter). 276.N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(III). 277. Id. §374-G:4(I). 278.Id. §374-G:2(I)(b). 279. Id. §374-F:3(III). 280. Id. §374-G:2(I)(b). Note,however, that though this Sectionclearly defines energy storage as adistributed energy resource, theSectionislessclear on whether energy storage constitutes generation. Section374-G:2(I)(b) in full states: ‘Distributed energy resources’means electricgeneration equipment, including clean andrenewablegeneration, energystorage, energy efficiency, demand response, load reductionorcontrol programs, and technologies or devices located on or interconnectedtothe local electric distributionsystem for purposes including but not limitedtoreducinglinelosses, supporting voltage regulation, or peakloadshaving, as part of astrategy for minimizing transmission and distribution costsasprovided in RSA 374-F:3, III. Id. Whether energy storage constitutesdistributed “electricgenerationequipment”matters because many of thestatute’s restrictions on utility ownership applyonlytodistributed generation. See, e.g., id. §374-G:3–4 (limitingwhenautility canown or investindistributed generation). Conceivably, one might read Section374-G:2(I)(b) as definingonly“clean and renewable generation” as “electric generationequipment”such that energystorage is a“distributed energyresource” but not necessarily distributedgeneration. Id. §374-G:2(I)(b). However,the lack of any semicolon separating“renewable generation” from “energy storage” indicatesthatthe commassurrounding thephrase“including clean and renewablegeneration” arenot internal commas. See BRYAN GARNER,THE REDBOOK:AMANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE 14 (3ded. 2013) (“[S]emicolons...separate elements of aseries of phrases or clauses if one or more of theelements contains an internal comma.”).Thatindicates “energy storage,”like “cleanand renewablegeneration,”ispartofan“electricgenerationequipment”seriesrather than just partofa“distributed energy resources” series, which makes energystorage aformof“electric generationequipment.” N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.§374-G:2(I)(b).The crossreference further bolstersthis conclusion, as thecross-referencedSectionmentions using only“distributed generation resources as 2019] Charging Onwards 607
However,New Hampshire severelylimits thescope of this exception.281 First, autility can onlyuse theelectricity that distributed generationfacilitiesproduce to offsetdistributionsystemlosses,282 forits ownuse,orfor acustomer’suse if thegenerator is sited on that customer’s property.283 This limits theamount of distributed generationutilitiescan ownorcontrol, andtheirability to usesuch generationtoreduce transmissioncharges.284 This exhaustivelist of authorized purposes also means autility could not bidsuchaprojectintowholesalemarkets.285 Second, utilitiescan only ownorinvestindistributed generationwith a capacity of 5MWorless.286 This limits thepotentialeconomiesofscale larger system sizes couldprovide.287 Third,the combinedcapacity of all distributed generators that autility either owns or invests in cannotexceed “[six] percent of theutility’s totaldistributionpeak load.”288 That inefficiently limits thepeak load reductions distributed generationcan provide.289 Indeed, an efficient level of energystorage capacity alone— excludingall otherdistributed energyresources—wouldlikelyreducepeak demand by nearly 10%.290
partofastrategy forminimizing transmission anddistributioncosts.” Id. §374-F:3(III)(emphasis added).Assuch, themostnatural reading of thestatute is thatitdefines energy storage as “electric generationequipment”and thus as distributed generationwhenitis“located on or interconnected to the local electricdistribution system.” Id. §374-G:2(I)(b).Consequently,the statute’s limitationsonutility ownershipofdistributed generationmost likely applytoenergy storage. See, e.g., id. §374-G:3–4 (limitingwhen autility can ownorinvestindistributed generation). 281. N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.§374-G:3–4 (2018). 282.Distributionsystem losses refertoelectricitylost in thedistributionsystem for either technical reasons inherent in electricity distribution or commercialreasons. JigneshParmar, Total Losses in Power Distributionand Transmission Lines,ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING PORTAL (Aug. 19, 2013),http://electrical-engineering-portal.com/total-losses-in-power-distribution-and-transmission- lines-1. About 70%oftotal lossesfromboththe T&D systemsoccur on thedistributionsystem. Id. On average,5%ofelectricity is lostasittravelsfrompower plantstoconsumersinthe U.S. HowMuch Electricity is Lost in T&Dinthe UnitedStates?,U.S.ENERGY INFO.ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=105&t=3 (last updated Jan. 9, 2019).Consequently, distribution system losses onlyaccount forabout 3.5% of theelectricity adistribution utility handles. Offsetting such losses thus canonly support alimited amount of distributed generation. Id. 283.N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-G:3(I)–(III). 284.Id. 285.Id. 286.See id. §374-G:2(II)(excludinggeneratorswith acapacity of 5MWormorefromthe definitionofdistributed energyresources). 287.See LAZARD, supra note 57, at 10 (implying that many efficientlysized energy storage projects on adistribution system would be about 10 MWs). 288.N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-G:4(II). 289.See MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note 11, at 91 (assertingthatanefficient level of energy storage would reduce peak load by nearly10%). 290.Id. 608 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575
Thus,though NewHampshire lawexplicitly allows utilitiestoinvestin energy storagewhenitreduces T&Dcosts,291 it effectivelyprohibits utilitiesfromdeployingwhatwouldlikelybeanefficientlevel of energy storage or bidding energystorage projectsintowholesale markets.292 Consequently,New Hampshire’s restructuringand related statutes still significantly constrain energystorage development.293
B. InabilityofNon-Utility Energy Storage Projects to Receive Compensationfor AvoidedT&D Costs
Restructuring statutes do not legally prohibitcompensatingnon-utility generators foravoided T&Dcosts;they onlyrestrict utility ownershipof generators.294 However,inall states “[p]hysical distribution, due to its natural monopolycharacteristics, remains amonopoly serviceprovidedby traditional utilities.”295 Furthermore,ISO-NE chargesdistributionutilities forthe costs of running thetransmission system based on howmuchtheir ratepayerscontributetoregional peak load.296 YetISO-NEdoes not provide amechanism that directly compensates independent non-transmission projects forreducing theneed or substitutingfor newtransmission investment.297 Thus,distributionutilitiesare theonlyentity that can directly
291.N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-G:2(I)(b). 292.See id. §374-G:3–4 (limitingwhen autility canown or investindistributed energy resources and thepurposes forwhich autility can use distributed energy resources). 293.Id. 294.See supra Part III.A (discussing how NewEnglandrestructuring statutes restrict utility ownership of generators). 295.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 75. 296.INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., §II: ISO NEW ENGLAND OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF,at§II.21 (n.d.), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/regulatory/tariff/sect_2/oatt/ sect_ii.pdf(last updated Jan. 29, 2019). Specifically,adistributionutility pays ISO-NE “anamount equal to its MonthlyRegional NetworkLoad forthe monthtimes theapplicableLocal Network RNS Rate.” Id. §II.21.1. RNS stands forRegional Network Service, whichisessentially ISO-NE’s terminology fortransmission service. See id. §II.11 (“Regional Network Service ...includes transmission service...for thedeliverytoaNetwork Customer of itsenergy and capacity ....”).A utility’sMonthlyRegional NetworkLoadisessentially the amount of power it drawsfromthe regional grid duringthe hour of greatest region-wide power demand in agiven month. See id. §II.21.2 (“[A] Network Customer’s ‘MonthlyRegional Network Load’ is its hourly load ...coincident with the coincident aggregateload of allNetwork Customers served in eachLocal Network in the hour in which thecoincident load is at its maximumfor themonth(‘MonthlyPeak’).”).This structure allows autility to reduce its transmission servicecharges by reducing the poweritdraws from the regionalgrid during the monthlypeak hour. See id. §II.21.1(explaining that adistributionutility’s transmissioncharge is proportional to itsMonthlyRegional NetworkLoad). 297.See id. ATTACHMENT KREGIONAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS §3.5 (notingthat ISO-NE only“account[s]for market responses” in its transmission planning process, differentiating market responses from transmission solutions, andindicatingitwill solicitonlytransmission solutions to meet reliabilityneeds); ISO-NE defines “market responses” as “investmentsinresources (e.g., demand-side 2019] Charging Onwards 609 benefitfinancially from reducedtransmission costs.298 Consequently,anon- utility energy storageproject will only receive compensationfor avoided T&Dcosts if adistributionutilitypays it forproviding such value.299 However,distributionutilitieshavenoincentivetodoso. Consistent cost savings proportionallyreduce autility’s revenue requirementsand the totalamount of revenue it earns through rates.300 Consequently,unlike competitivebusinesses, utilitiesoperating under cost-of-serviceregulation have little financialincentivetoreduce costs.301 Moreover, distribution utilitiesonlyearnareturnontheir rate-base: theundepreciatedvalue of theirphysical infrastructureand equipment,plusworking capital.302 If a third-party energystorage projectremoves theneed fornew distribution infrastructure, it reduces adistributionutility’s rate base and thus,its total profits.303 Such third-party energystorage projectsworkagainst autility’s projects,generationand distributed generation);” energy storage wouldthus fallintothiscategory. Id. Furthermore,ISO-NE will only“seekgeneration, demand-sideand merchant transmission alternatives” when it is unabletofindaviable transmission solution tomeet atransmission systemreliability need. Id. §7.3(b)(i). Therefore,ISO-NEwouldsolicit energystorage to meet atransmission reliabilityneed “as alast resort,” but wouldnot directly compensateanenergy storage projectfor helpingtoprevent a reliabilityneed from arising. Id. §7.3(a). However, ISO-NE’s wholesaleenergy markets andForward Capacity Marketdoprovide higherpaymentstosupply anddemand resources in transmission- constrained areas. See FAQs:LocationalMarginalPricing,INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/support/faq/lmp(last visitedApr.14, 2019)(explaining how local wholesaleenergy prices incorporate transmission system constraints); About the FCM andIts Auctions, INDEP.SYS.OPERATOR NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/markets/forward- capacity-market/fcm-participation-guide/about-the-fcm-and-its-auctions (lastvisitedApr.14, 2019) (outlining how theForwardCapacity Market pays more forresources in capacity-constrained zones). ISO-NEthus compensates non-transmission resourcesfor relievingtransmission constraints, thereby indirectlycompensatingsuch resourcesfor avoiding some transmission costs. FAQs:Locational Marginal Pricing, supra; About the FCM andIts Auctions, supra. 298.Reduced transmission costs forthe utility wouldindirectlyresultinlower ratesfor ratepayers. See supra PartII.A (discussing utility rate regulation). 299.See CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 17 (notingthat independent investors do not havea wayoffinancially benefitingfromreducing autility’s T&Dcosts). 300.See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 45–46, 63 (explaining that aregulated utility’srevenue is proportional to its costs); but see LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 87 (“However, theutility does stillhave some incentive to reduce expenses. Once therates areset,they stay in placeuntil changed, regardlessofwhether theoperatingexpenses are thesame, higher, or lowerthaninthe test year;sothe utilityearns more if it incurs lower costs.”). 301.Regulators do subject utility spendingtoprudence review and maypreventutilitiesfrom collecting moneyfrom customerstocover excessive spending. LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 48–49. As such, utilitiesstill have someincentivetocontrolcosts in order to ensure regulators will allow them to recover costs. However,regulators presumethat autility’s operatingcostsand investmentsare “prudentunlessproven otherwise.” Id.at48. Consequently,prudence review provides utilities with aweaker incentive to controlcoststhan market competition providestocompetitive businesses. 302.Id. at 63–64. 303.See id. (highlightingthat utilitiesmake theirprofitsbyplacing physical infrastructure in their rate base). 610 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 business interest,and therefore utilitieswill not willinglyfacilitate such projects.304 They will not compensatethird partiesfor removing theneed fortraditionaldistributioninfrastructureunlessregulators obligatethem to do so.305 Currently, no such regulatoryrequirement appearstoexist.306 Granted, “somestates have made reformstoopenthe distributionsystemtothird- party products and servicesthat enable consumerstobuy less distribution service from [utilities].”307 However,thesereformsenableconsumersto directly contract forcertain energy services fromthird parties,and do not require utilitiestocompensatethird partiesfor avoided costs.308 Theclosest existingmechanism is a“ValueofSolar”tariff, whichinpartrequires utilitiestocompensateratepayerswho generatetheir ownsolar energyfor any resulting avoidedT&D costs.309 However,asthe nameimplies, such a mechanismonlyappliestosolar,and no NewEngland statehas yetadopted such atariff.310 Moreover, theexistingscholarlyliteraturethatdiscusses potentialwaystocompensatenon-utilities foravoided T&Dcosts implicitly presumes no such general method currently exists.311 Under current NewEnglandstate laws, non-utility energystorage projects appear to have no meanstocompel utilitiestocompensatethem for thevalue of avoided T&Dcosts.312 Though restructuringstatutesdonot limit theability of theseentitiestoearnrevenueinwholesaleelectricity market,current NewEnglandregulatory regimeseffectivelyprevent them
304.See id. at 49 (noting that utilitiesmay have afinancial incentive to gold-plate,that is, invest in unnecessary infrastructure to artificiallyinflate theirratebase and thus increasetheirallowedrates); LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note21, at 86 (“[T]heAverch-Johnson effect ...suggests thatutilities will spendtoo much on capitalinvestments becausetheir allowedreturn is afunctionoftheirinvestment.”). 305.LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 49. 306.See, e.g.,Ari Peskoe, Unjust,Unreasonable,and UndulyDiscriminatory: ElectricUtility Rates and theCampaign Against Rooftop Solar,11TEX.J.OIL GAS &ENERGY L. 211,292–96 (2016) (implying that no mechanism requiring utilitiestocompensate third parties foravoided T&Dcosts exists). 307.Id. at 287. 308.See id. at 287–88 (discussingsuchreforms in thecontext of third-party ownership of distributedsolar-power systems). 309.See id. at 279 (explaining what a“Value of Solar”tariff is). 310.See id.(notingthat onlyMinnesotaand thecity of Austin, Texashave adopteda“Valueof Solar”tariff). 311.See, e.g., id. at 292–96 (implying that no suchmechanism currently exists). 312.See, e.g., id. (implyingthat no such mechanism currently existsbydescribingthe problems of thecurrentsystemand suggesting wayspolicymakers could require utilities to compensatethird parties forthe value theyprovide tothe grid). 2019] Charging Onwards 611 frommonetizingthe full range of valueenergystorage provides.313 Consequently,non-utilitieslack theincentivetoinvest in and deploy an economically efficient level of energy storage in NewEngland.314 Because utilitiesalsolack this incentivefor themostpart,315 current NewEngland regulatoryregimeseffectivelyguaranteethat alltypes of electricity sector participants will underinvest in energy storagetothe detriment of both consumersand theenvironment.316
IV.WAYS STATES CAN REMOVE BARRIERSTOENERGY STORAGE
Statepolicymakershavetwo main options forremoving restructuring barrierstoenergystorage.First, states couldenact newlegislationsimply exemptingenergystorage fromthe restrictions restructuringplaces on utility-owned generation.317 Or second,policymakers couldcreate ashared- ownership model in whichanon-utility captures an energy storage project’s wholesalemarketrevenue, while autility capturesits T&Dbenefits.318 This Partaddressesthe advantages and drawbacks of bothoptions.
A. Exempt Energy StoragefromUtility-OwnershipRestrictions
Thesimplestsolutionwouldbetoexemptenergystorage fromall restrictions restructuringplacesonutility ownershiporoperationof generators.319 In principle, such an approach shouldminimizeproject developmentcosts: utilitieswill know themostabout wheretolocatean energy storageproject to provide thegreatestdistributionortransmission cost savings.320 However,itcouldalsoundermine restructuring, and
313.See supra Part III.A(showing how NewEnglandrestructuringstatutes restrict utility ownership of generators); see, e.g.,Peskoe, supra note306 (discussingthat nocommissionsrequire utilities to compensatefor avoided T&Dcosts exists). 314.See, e.g.,Peskoe, supra note306, at 294–96 (demonstrating how decliningtocompensate third partiesfor thevalue their products andservicesprovide to the grid hamstrings competitive developmentofenergy storage and similar technologies). 315.See supra Part III.A (describing how NewEnglandrestructuringstatutes restrict utility owned energystorageprojectsfromearning revenue in wholesaleelectricitymarkets). 316.See CHANG ET AL., supra note 13,at17–18 (arguing that restructuredelectricitymarkets, as currentlystructured, lead to inefficiently low levelsofenergy storage deployment). 317.See infra PartIV.A(discussinghow an energy storage exemptionmight impact storage deployment). 318.See infra PartIV.B(outlining how shared ownershipmodels might function). 319.See supra PartIII.A(describing theways in whichrestructuring statutes restrictutility ownershipofenergystorage projects). 320.See Peskoe, supra note306, at 294 (notingthatutilities know more abouttheir costs than anyone else);Stein, supranote 117, at 958–59 (arguing that utilityownershipwouldreduce transaction costsaswellas“minimize bothcoordinationand visibilityproblems”). 612 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 potentially provide utilitieswith a de facto monopolyovernon-customer- owned distributed energy storage.321 Alegislature wouldhavetoenact such achange becausestatutory language restricts utilityownership of energystorageprojectsthatact as generators.322 Generally,statescoulduse language such as “notwithstanding [citationtostate’s restructuring statute],distribution utilitiesmay ownand/or operateenergystorage projectsthat participatein wholesaleelectricity markets.” Suchlegislationwouldalsohavetoaddresshow autility couldrate base an energy storage projectthat acts as agenerator,and howitwould handlethe revenue theprojectearns in wholesaleelectricity markets.323 One optionwouldbetoallowautility to rate basethe entire cost of theproject, butthenuse all revenuethe projectraises to reduce its customers’ rates. Unfortunately, this approach places therisks of theproject underperforming in wholesalemarketsonratepayers.324 It also arguably gives regulated utilitiesanunfairadvantage on thewholesaleelectricity market.325 Under this regime,utilitiescouldpotentiallyuse ratepayer moneytosubsidizean energy storageproject’s participationinwholesalemarkets, bidding the project in at prices belowwhatthe utility needs to recover theproject’s costs.326 Autility couldthus exploitthe benefits it enjoys as aregulated monopolytoundercut competitivegeneratorsinwholesalemarkets.327 This is preciselywhy NewEngland restructuringstatutesrestrictedutility ownership of generatingassets.328 Consequently,suchanapproach could
321.See supra PartIII.B(explaining that restructuringwas meant to encourage competitionand avoidriskingratepayer money on generatingassets). 322.See supra PartIII.A(overviewing the restrictions imposedbyNew England restructuring statutes on utility-ownedenergy storage projects). 323.See Lueken et al., supra note20, at 11, 18 (notingthat states need to defineways of valuing T&Dbenefitsaswellasaccounting forthe wholesalevalue of energystoragewhile avoiding conflicts between thetwo roles). 324.See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 56 (highlightingthat allowing aregulated utilitytorecover the costofuncompetitiveinvestments in rates shifts market risk from the utilitytoits ratepayers). 325.See id. at 71–72 (explaining how forcingratepayerstocross-subsidize autility’s competitiveactivities unfairlyhurts theutility’s competitors). 326.See id. (emphasizing how cross-subsidies canresult in ratepayerspaying more,and how utilities canthen use that ratepayer money to undercut theirnon-utility competitors). 327.See id. (“When aregulated firm provides severalproductsorservices,some that are regulatedand somethatare not, it is important to ensurethat thenonregulated costs arenot tagged with theregulated costs. Doing so ...can nobble thefirm’s unregulated competitors ....”). 328.See, e.g.,N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:1(2018) (statingthat restructuring is meant to createfreeand faircompetitivemarkets, which require the separation of generationfrom T&D). 2019] Charging Onwards 613 severelyundermine therestructuringpolicyoffostering competitionin electricity generation.329 Abetteroptionfor states that wish toavoidthisoutcomewouldbeto allowthe utility to rate base only thevalue of theproject’s avoided distributionortransmission costs,330 while allowing it to keepthe wholesale market revenue.Anexampleofsuch statutory languagemight be:
Autility shallonlyrecover thevalue of transmission and distribution systembenefits andavoidedcosts of authorized and prudent utility-owned energystorage project(s)inits distribution ratesasacomponent of rate base. The utility shall keep the portionofthe incomethe energystorage investment earns from participationinwholesaleelectricity markets.
This places thebusiness risks of theproject underperforminginthe wholesalemarkets on theutility,not its customers. It also prevents the utility from usingratepayermoneytounfairly undercut otherwholesale market participants. This approach thus providesgreater consumer protection and is more in keepingwith restructuring principles.331 Regardlessofwhich approachtoratebasinganenergystorage project astate chooses,utilityownership wouldlikelyminimizecosts and facilitate
329.See, e.g., id. (pronouncing the goalofrestructuring: to “harness[]the power of competitive markets”). 330.Ofcourse, either thestate legislatureorits utilitycommission wouldthen need to determinehow to calculate this value. See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 69 (notingthere are multiple ways to calculatethe value of utility assetsevenwhen autility rate bases the entire asset). A state could let autility rate basethe avoided cost of any other infrastructurethe utility would have built but-for theenergy storage project in amanner somewhat akintoa“[v]alueofservice” approach. See id. (“Valueofservice is based either on aprior periodoftime...oronthe projected value of theassets for afuture regulatory period.”).However,inthe event that an energystorageproject is much cheaperthan traditional infrastructure—atleast after subtracting wholesale market revenues from theproject’s cost— this could causeratepayerstounjustly and unreasonablyoverpay forthe project. See Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co.ofN.H., 547 A.2d 269, 271 (N.H.1988) (definingthatrates are only just and reasonableif they fairlybalance utility and consumerinterests). Astate could allocate more of thefinancial benefits of energystorage to ratepayers by limiting theutility to rate basing onlyapercentageofavoided costs. But suchablunt instrument mayfailtoadequatelycompensatemarginalbut stilleconomically efficient energystorage projectsand thus render them nonviable. See CHANGETAL., supra note13, at 17; MASS. DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at 115, 117–19 (explaining that deploying an optimal level of energy storage requires adequatelycompensating energy storage projects forall the benefits they provide).Abetterapproach might be to rate base thevalue of allavoided T&Dcosts, but then cap thetotal combined returnautility couldmake on an energy storage project, including revenue from wholesalemarketsand ratepayers. See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 139–41 (overviewing howregulatorsdetermine arate of return forutilities). The state couldthenrequire autilitytouseany revenue in excess of theallowedrateofreturn to reduce customer rates. 331.See supra PartII.B (asserting that restructuring wasmeanttoshieldratepayersfrom the costs of uneconomic generatingassets as well as promote competition). 614 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 optimal sitingofstorage projects.332 Having autility,asasingleintegrated entity,handle such aproject reduces transactioncosts.333 Utilities––unlike third partiesand regulators––alsohavedirectaccesstodataabout their distributionsystemand cost structure.334 Therefore,theydonot need to spendtimeormoney acquiring such data from another source.Autility can thus optimizeenergystorage project sitingtomaximize T&Dbenefits more readily and efficiently than any other entity.335 Monopolyutilitiescan also borrowmoneyatlower interest ratesthan competitivebusinesses,which reduces thefinancing costsfor an energystorage project.336 In sum, these factorscouldmake utility-owned energy storage quickerand cheaper to build than third-party owned energy storage. However,such an approachwould de facto leave energy storageinthe hands of monopolyutilities.337 With no mechanism for anyone else to monetizeavoidedT&D benefits, utilitieswouldhaveanimmense advantage over non-utility energystorage developers.338 Even allowing a utility to partially rate base an energy storageproject wouldsignificantly reducethe costs autility needs to recover fromwholesalemarkets.339 In contrast,anon-utility developer wouldonlybeabletobuild projectsthat couldbeprofitablewith just wholesalemarket revenue.340 That advantage could lead utilities’energystorage projects to crowdout otherprojects, destroying much of themarketfor non-utility energy storage.341 State
332.See Stein, supra note117, at 958, 960 (noting that utility ownership canavoid inefficiencies andhigh transaction costs); id. at 959 (“Anew world of utility-owned [distributed energy resources] wouldminimizebothcoordinationand visibility problems....”). 333.Id. at 958, 960. 334.See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 38 (“From the regulator’s perspective...the exactshape and locationofthe firm’s average cost curve will be uncertain.”); Peskoe, supra note306, at 294 (notingthatutilities know more about theirown costs than anyone else). 335.See Stein, supra note117, at 959 (“Anew world of utility-owned [distributed energy resources] wouldminimizebothcoordinationand visibility problems, as theutility wouldhave as much knowledge about theresourcesasthey would of their other,moretraditionalresources.”). 336.HIRSH, supra note130, at 23–24. 337.Id. at 23. 338.See supra Part III.B(overviewingwhy non-utilitiescannot monetizeavoided T&Dcosts under thecurrentregulatorysystem). 339.See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 71–72 (explaining how enablingautilityto recover thecostsofanunregulated activity from ratepayersallows it to undercut its non-utility competitors). 340.See supra Part III.B(overviewingwhy non-utilities canonlymonetizewholesale market revenue under thecurrent regulatory system). 341. LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 71–72. The lack of competitionwouldalsomean utilityenergy storageprojects would not be subjecttomarket pressures to controlcosts. See Matias Busso &SebastianGaliani, The Causal Effect of Competition on Prices and Quality:Evidence from a Field Experiment 3(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.,Working Paper No. 20054) (2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20054.pdf (“[T]heentry of new competitors leads to pricereductions by puttingmorecompetitive pressureonmarket incumbents.”).Suchalack of market pressure could offset 2019] Charging Onwards 615 policymakers that wish to fostermorecompetitioninthe electricity sector wouldalsodislikethisresult.342 Moreover, non-utility developerswould likelyopposethe passage of such legislation, thereby decreasing thechance astate could implementsuch asolutioninthe first place.343 Thus,exemptingenergystorage fromrestructuring limitations would likelylead to distributionutilitiesdominatingenergystorage deployment. This offers thebenefits of simplicity,lower transactionand financing costs, and thus potentially faster andgreater levels of energy storage deployment.344 However,itcouldalsoput non-utilitydevelopersatasevere disadvantage andsignificantly curtailcompetitioninenergystorage.345 Allowing distributionutilitiestoratebase projectsthat act as generators also violates restructuringprinciplesthatfavorusingcompetitivemarkets ratherthan ratepayermoney to fund generation.346 It also raisesconsumer protectionissues,especially if autility could rate baseall thecosts of the project.347 Consequently,astate that wishes to pursuethissolutionshould onlylet autility includethe value of an energy storage project’savoided T&Dcosts in its rate base. Doingsowouldproperly require theutility to bearthe risksofthe project’s wholesalemarketperformance, and prevent it from usingratepayer moneytoundercut othermarket participants.348
B. EnableShared Ownership or ControlofEnergyStorage Projects
Another waystate policymakerscouldremoverestructuringbarriersto energy storage wouldbetoallowutilitiesand thirdpartiestoshare
someofthe benefitsbylowering transactionsand financing costs utilityownershipoffers. See id. (reportingempirical findings that introducingincreased competitionreduces theprice of goods). 342.See, e.g.,N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:1 (2018)(establishing that competitioninthe electricity sector is an important legislativepolicygoal for NewHampshire). 343.See, e.g.,Stein, supra note117, at 960 (notingthatNew Yorkrestricted utility ownership of distributed energy resources in part because of non-utility developers’ opposition). 344.See id. at 958–60 (explaining that utility ownershipofdistributed energyresources simplifiesthe deployment processwhile alsoenablinglower financing andtransactioncosts). 345. LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 71–72. 346. Stein, supra note117, at 960. AmyStein also argues that “[w]hile there is some inherent appeal to theefficiencies associated with areintegrationofthe ownership of [distributed] reliability resources with theutility,itisunclearifthereisaprincipledend point to suchareintegration.” Id. Thus, “[e]ven if valid justificationsexist,regulatorsmay be hesitant to carve out an exceptionfor reliability resources forfearofaslippery slope.” Id. 347.See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 56 (overviewingthe impact ofcostshifting on ratepayers). 348.See id. at 71–72 (“When aregulated firm provides severalproductsorservices...it is important to ensure that the nonregulated costs arenot tagged with theregulatedcosts. Doingsowill not onlyunfairlyincreasethe regulated prices the firm’s customers pay, but it cannobblethe firm’s unregulated competitors ....”). 616 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 ownership or controlofanenergystorage project.349 In such amodel, a distributionutility wouldreceive thebenefits of avoided T&Dcosts, while thethird party wouldhandle theenergystorage project’s participationin wholesaleelectricity markets.350 This model preventsdirect utility involvement in wholesaleelectricity markets, and preserves arolefor competitivenon-utility entitiesinenergystorage.351 Consequently,this modelbettercomports with restructuring principles than amodelinwhich utilitieshandleall aspectsofanenergystorage project.352 However,italso increases project complexity,potentiallyincreasingthe costsofdeploying energy storage.353 While non-utility developers will likelyprefershared ownership,utilitieswill prefer amodelover whichtheyhave sole control.354
1. Utility as PrimaryOwner
TheBrattle Group hasproposed one approachtoshared ownership of energy storage.355 In this model,utilitieswoulddeploy andown energy storage projects but auctionoff theright to wholesalemarketrevenues to a third party.356 Theutility woulduse theincomeitreceives fromauctioning offsuchrightstoreduceits customer’s rates.357 Thethird party wouldthen handlebidding theproject into wholesale marketsand meetingthe project’s wholesalemarketobligations.358 Thethird party wouldretainall wholesale market revenuestocoverthe costs of purchasing theproject rightsand make aprofit.359 In this model, theutility wouldnot participateinwholesale markets, maintainingthe restructuringpolicyofseparatingdistributionand generation.360 Likewise,the third party wouldbearall therisks of the
349.See SKY STANFIELD,JOSEPH “SEPH”PETTA &SARA BALDWIN AUCK,CHARGING AHEAD: AN ENERGY STORAGE GUIDE FOR STATE POLICYMAKERS 30 (2017) (notingshared ownership’s potentialand outliningone form it couldtake). 350.Id.;CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 18. 351.CHANG ET AL., supra note 13, at 18. 352.See supra PartII.B(outlining that restructuringwas meanttoshieldratepayersfrom the costs of uneconomic generatingassets as well as promote competition). 353.See Stein, supra note117, at 958–60 (notingthatutilityownershipcan avoidinefficiencies andhightransaction costs). 354.See id. at 960 (notingthat due to non-utility developers’ opposition,New York restricted utilityownership of distributed energyresources). 355.CHANG ET AL., supra note 13, at 17–18. 356.Id. at 18. 357.Id. 358.Id. 359.See id. (implying that third partieswouldkeep wholesalemarket revenue). 360.Id. 2019] Charging Onwards 617 projectunderperforminginthewholesalemarket, rather than theutility’s ratepayers.361 TheBrattle Group’sapproachstill requires changes to NewEngland restructuringstatutes.362 Afterall, in this system,utilitiesstill ownenergy storage projects that actasgenerators, even if someoneelsemanages the project’swholesalemarket participationand retainsthe resulting revenue.363 Moreover,byauctioning offthe rightstothe project’s wholesale market revenue,autility derives revenue fromthe project’s generation functionality.364 Utilitiesthereforefinancially benefit fromtheirownership of generationassets, whichwouldviolate NewEngland’srestructuring statutes.365 Enablingsuchasystem wouldthereforerequire legislative action. Statutorylanguage to enable such system wouldlook likethis:
Notwithstandingany provision of [citationtostate’srestructuring statute] ...a utility maydevelop andown energy storage projects that reduce transmission or distributioncosts ....A utility maycontractually sell theright to bidsuch utility-owned energy storage projectsintowholesaleelectricity marketstoa non-utility.Any such contract shallprovide that thenon-utility shallretainany wholesalemarket revenue theenergy storage projectearns, and bear allriskofproject underperformance in the wholesalemarket ....The utility shalluse allcompensationa
361.See id. (“Under theenvisioned policyframework, theTDSPs will continue to be only transmission anddistribution service providerswith no wholesale market participation.”). However,the utility’sratepayersmightstillbear the risk of theauction not raisingsufficient money to coverproject costs autility does not recoup through T&D cost savings. See id. at 17–18 (acknowledgingthisrisk implicitlybyproposing asafetymarginrequirement by whichexpected benefits wouldneed to exceed expected costs). 362.See 2015 Texas Legislatureand ElectricPower Policy: ARecap,HUSCH BLACKWELL (July 2, 2015),https://www.huschblackwell.com/newsandinsights/2015-texas-legislature-and-electric- power-policy-a-recap (notingthat theTexas legislature wouldhave to enact statutory changes beforea utilitycouldimplementthe Brattle Groupproposal). 363.See CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 17–18 (describingamodel in which utilitieswould invest in andpresumablyown theenergy storageproject, but “auctionoff” the rights to bid it into wholesalemarkets). 364.See id. at 18 (notingthat utilitieswould“‘auction off’the wholesalemarket value of distributedstorage”). 365.See supra Part III.A (discussinghow NewEnglandrestructuring statutes restrict utility owned energystorage projectsfromearning revenue in wholesaleelectricitymarkets). However, the current version of Connecticut’s restructuringstatute wouldpermitthisarrangement,provided autility made acompetitiveproposaltoshareownershipofanenergy storage project called for in the State’s Integrated ResourcePlan. See supra Part III.A.5(discussing the conditions under which autility may owngenerationassets in Connecticut). 618 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575
non-utility pays theutility forthe contractualright ...toreduce retail electricity rates.366
2. Third Party as PrimaryOwner
Another shared-ownership approachhas thethird party as theprimary owner of theenergystorage project,with thethird partyproviding T&D benefits as aservice to theutility.367 Astate couldtreat thethird party as sellingthe project’s T&Dattributes to theutility.368 However,the third party wouldneed to know wheretodeploy aprojecttomaximizeT&D benefits.369 As utilitieslikelypossess more of this informationthan anyone else,370 this modelrequiressomemechanismtoinduceutilities to tell third partieswhereoptimal deploymentsites are.371 Statepolicymakerscouldrequire utilitiestolocatesuch sites, and determine what T&Dcosts an energy storage projectlocatedthere might avoid.372 Astate couldthen require or allowits utility commission, or the utilities themselves, to solicit competitiveproposalstoconstruct energy storage projects in primelocations.373 Such acompetitiveprocess could specifythe maximumpayments theutilitycan likely provide to third parties, based on theutility’s avoided-cost estimates.374 Theutility or the commissioncouldselect theproject proposal that provides thegreatestnet
366.H.B.715-FN, 2019 Gen.Court, Reg. Sess.,sec.2,§374-H:3(III)(N.H. 2019). 367.See, e.g., id.sec. 2, §374-H:3(II)(b)–(c) (proposing asystem to enablesuch an approach legislatively). 368.Cf. id.sec.2,§374-H:3(II)(b) (“[T]he rulesshall require autility to compensateanon- utilityfor the value of alltransmission anddistributioncoststhe utilitywill likely avoidbecauseofthe [non-utility]energystorageproject.”). 369.Cf. Lueken et al., supra note 20, at 11 (arguing that states shouldfind ways to integrate energystorage into T&Dprocessesand address thelackofaccepted waystocompensatethe T&Dvalue of energystorageprojects). 370.See Peskoe, supra note306, at 294 (notingthat utilities know more about their owncosts than anyone else). 371.See, e.g.,H.B.715-FN, 2019 Gen. Court,Reg.Sess., sec. 2, §374-H:3(II)(N.H. 2019) (proposing to legislativelymandateacertain amount of non-utility-owned energy storage); id.§374- H:3(II)(a)(proposing to order theCommission to prioritize non-utility-owned energy storage projects that avoidT&D costs); id.§374-H:3(I)(proposing to order theCommission touse itsrule-making authority to createprogramsthatimplement these provisions). 372.Cf. id. §374-H:3(I), (II)(a) (proposing to order theCommission to to create programs that facilitatedeveloping non-utility-ownedenergy storageprojects that avoidT&D costs). 373.See id. §374-H:3(I),(II)(a) (proposingtoorder theCommission tocreateprograms that facilitatedeploying non-utility-owned energystorage projects that avoid T&Dcosts, thereby grantingit authority to createsuch acompetitivesolicitation program). 374.See id. §374-H:3(I),(II)(a) (proposing to order theCommissiontocreate programs that implement theseprovisions, thereby granting it authority to create such acompetitivesolicitation program). 2019] Charging Onwards 619
T&Dcostsavings.375 Such adesignensures that theutility—and ultimately its ratepayers—will not overpay forthe project.Inasmuch as thethird-party owner secures financingtobuild theproject andhandlesthe project’s wholesalemarketparticipation, it wouldbearthe projectdevelopment and market risks.376 This wouldshieldratepayersfromall risks associated with theproject’s generation side.377 It also keeps theutility’s role in theproject completelyseparatefromthe project’s generation side, in accordance with restructuringprinciples.378 Thepotentialproblem with this modelisthe financial implications for theutility.Distributionutilitiesonlymake areturnontheirratebase, which is traditionally just theirown physical infrastructure, equipment,and workingcapital.379 They recover—but make no profit on—any othercosts, such as contract paymentstoathirdparty.380 Autility wouldforego all of theprofit it wouldhave made by buildingtraditionaldistribution infrastructureifitinstead contracted third-party-owned energystorage to perform thedistributionfunction. In principle, policymakerscould still require autility to contract forthird-party-owned storage.381 However, tryingtoforce utilities to do somethingdirectly againsttheirfinancial interestsposes practicalproblems. First, utilitieswouldobviously dislikesuch asystemand probably opposeany effort to createit.382 Generally,earning arateofreturnonrate- based investments is theonlyway autility profits fromproviding distributionservice.383 Requiringautility to forego such profit whenever energy storageisthe cheapestsolutionmay createamajor threat to their core business model.384 As such,utilitieswouldlikelytry to derailsuch a
375.Cf. id. §374-H:3(II)(a)(“The commission’sregulations shallcreate apreference fornon- utilityenergy storageprojects that avoid or reduce transmission anddistribution costs.”). 376.See id. §374-H:3(VI) (emphasizing that utilitieswouldnot have any role regardingthe wholesalemarket side of theprojectunder theproposed system). 377.See id. (implyingsuch ashieldbynoting utilitieswould not participate in the wholesale markets, andthus wouldnot expose themselves to generation risks they couldpass on to ratepayers). 378.See id. (“Nothing in this sectionshallgive autility theright to ...directly participate in wholesaleelectricity markets.”);N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(III)(2018)(“Generationservices shouldbe...atleast functionally separated from transmissionand distributionservices ....”). 379.LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 63–64. 380.Id. at 48, 63. 381.See, e.g.,H.B.715-FN,2019 Gen. Court,Reg.Sess., sec. 2, §374-H:3(II)(N.H. 2019) (proposing to legislativelymandatenon-utility-ownedenergystorage). 382.See supra PartI.A.2 (explaining how investor-owned utilities prefer modelsthat grant returns to theirinvestors). 383.LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note147, at 63. 384.See id. at 63–64 (explaining that utilities make their profits by placingphysical infrastructureintheirratebase). 620 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 system before it ever cameintoexistence.385 Establishing such asystem wouldbepolitically costly forstate policymakers, andmay well be politically infeasible.386 Second, even if astate were to implement such asystem, utilities wouldhavethe means, motive, and opportunity to undercut it. Afterall, such asystemwoulddepend on theutilitiesthemselves providing information—whichprobablyonlythey possess—about theextent of the costsanenergy storageproject wouldavoid.387 Moreover, utilitiescan “exploit[such]anobvious informationasymmetry”and “moldacost-of- service study to meet [their] owngoals, such as [creating entry barriers] for alternativeservice providers.”388 In otherwords,utilitiescan strategically misrepresent thedetails about theircoststructures,and thus undervalue potentialthird-party energystorage projects.389 Granted, theregulatory oversight of utility commissions maycheck this practicesomewhat. However,commissions have limitedresources,and thus maynot detect everymisrepresentation.390 Consequently,state policymakers shouldexpect that under such asystem, this strategic utility behaviorwill lead to inefficiently lowlevelsofenergy storage deployment.391 However,asimple solutiontothisproblem exists—allowutilitiesto includethe valueofsuchcontract paymentstothird-party owners in their rate base.392 This wouldallowthe utilitiestoearnaprofit on such
385.Cf. Peskoe, supra note 306, at 260–75 (discussing how many investor-owned utilities have sought to undermine distributed energyresources,particularly rooftop solar,becausetheyperceived them as athreat to theirbusiness). 386.Cf. id.at260 (quotingKARL BOYD BROOKS,PUBLIC POWER,PRIVATE DAMS:THE HELLS CANYON DAM CONTROVERSY 131 (2009))(notingthat, with regard todistributed energy resources, utilities have employed tacticsthat“arereminiscent of campaigns launchedinthe twentieth century against government-backed utilities, which were smearedwith ‘the most lurid McCarthyite fantasies of theearly 1950s’”). 387.See id. at 294 (acknowledging that utilitieshavethe most knowledge regardingtheircosts). 388.Id. 389.See ShelleyWelton, Public Energy,92N.Y.U.L.REV.267, 317 (2017)(“[I]nformation asymmetriesallow utilitiestoexploitcommissions in rate casesand earnrates of return higher than necessary to cover costs.”). 390.See LAZAR ®ULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, supra note 21, at 87 (“Although commissionsdoreview...expenses to determine if they arereasonablebefore approving them,they maynot have thestaff adequatefor them to really examine them in detail....”). 391.Cf. Peskoe, supra note306, at 294 (“An IOUcan mold acost-of-servicestudy to meet its owngoals....”); id. at 247 (notingthat in thepastutilitieshave “resorted to vindictive and mendacious tactics” to opposethreatstotheir business model). 392.See, e.g.,H.B.715-FN,2019 Gen. Court,Reg.Sess.,sec. 2, §374-H:3(II)(b)(N.H. 2019) (“If thenon-utilityenergy storage projectavoids theneedfor anew distributionortransmission project the utilitycouldhave added to its rate base, the commission mayallowthe utility to include ...the value of thecorresponding portionofits payment to thenon-utilityinitsrate base.”). 2019] Charging Onwards 621 contracts.393 As such,utilitieswouldlikelyevaluateenergy storage projects on more of an equalbasiswith traditionaldistributioninfrastructure, rather than tryingtoblock astorage solution.Moreover,insofar as energy storage projects act as distributioninfrastructure, it is arguablyreasonabletoallow utilitiestomake aprofit on them as with any other distribution infrastructure.394 Apositivefeature of this model is that,unlikethe Brattle Group model, utility commissions have theauthority to implement such asystem themselves.395 They possess the authority to allowutilitiestoratebasesuch contractsaspartoftheir discretionary ratemaking authority.396 Thestandard cost-of-servicemethodology is not astatutoryrequirement;state commissions possess “the authority ...todevise unique systemsfor setting rates.”397 Consequently,state commissions can changeaspects of theirrate- settingmethodology, provided that theresultingrateisjust and reasonable.398 That in turn means acommission can changehow it calculates a utility’s rate baseand revenue requirement,solong as thenew method fairly compensates utilitiesand does not produceexcessive rates for consumers.399 Grantingutilitiesanew ability to rate basecontractswith a third-party energystorage project owner wouldnot harmits financial interests.400 Thus,suchachange wouldcontinue to fairly compensate utilities.401 Likewise, acontractthat provides net savings to ratepayers relativetotraditional distributioninvestmentswouldreduce rates.
393.See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note 147, at 63–64 (overviewing how utilities make their profitsonphysical infrastructure). 394.Cf. H.B. 715-FN,2019 Gen. Court,Reg. Sess., sec. 2, §374-H:3(II)(b) (N.H.2019) (authorizing theCommission to allow suchratebasingifthe Commission finds it is “just” and “reasonable”). 395.Ofcourse, astate legislature couldstatutorily requireacommissiontoimplement such a systemifthe latterdoes not do so on its owninitiative. See,e.g., id. (“If the non-utilityenergystorage projectavoids theneed foranew distributionortransmission project the utilitycouldhave addedtoits rate base,the commissionmay allowthe utility to include ...the value of thecorresponding portion of itspayment to thenon-utility in itsrate base.”). 396.See Scott, supra note144, at 381 (notingthat statecommissionspossess thelegal authority “todevise unique systems for setting rates”). 397.Id. at 381; see also HEMPLING, supra note120, at 230 (explaining that “statutory- constitutional deference”givescommissionsdiscretionaryauthority to choose different ratemaking methodologies). 398.HEMPLING, supra note120, at 230. Remember thatarate is just and reasonableifitfalls within a“zone of reasonableness” that fairly balancesthe financial interestsofautility and its ratepayers. Id. at 220–21. 399.Id. at 220–21. 400.See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supra note 147, at 63–64 (explaining that theanadditiontothe rate base would increaseautility’s profits). 401.Id. at 63–64. 622 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575
Therefore,allowing utilitiestoratebasecontractswouldstillproducejust and reasonablerates.402 Commissions canalsorequire utilitiestodetermine optimal sitesfor energy storageprojects, the costssuchprojectsmight avoid,and to solicit third-party energystorage projectsthrough acompetitiveprocess.403 Utility commissions possess “broad authority to regulateutilities” in order to “keep[] rates as lowaspossible” forcustomers—provided utilitiescan still earnfaircompensationfor providing service.404 For example,the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Courtheldthatthe State’sDepartment of Public Utilities“hasthe authority as arateregulator to ...require that [a] utility pursueacourse likelytobeless costly to ratepayers inthe long term.”405 Utility commissions alsohave theauthority to require that utilities determine when andwhere third-party ownedenergystorage projects are themostcosteffectivemeans of providing distributionservice to ratepayers.406 On thesamebasis, utility commissions couldalsorequire utilitiestosolicit projects through acompetitiveprocess,and contract for theirT&D benefits when doingsowouldsaveratepayersmoney. Finally,allowing utilitiestocontractually procureT&D benefits from third-party energystorage ownerswouldnot violateNew England restructuringstatutes.407 Unlikeinthe Brattle Group model,inthissystema utility wouldneverown theenergy storage projectitself. Thethird party wouldremainthe main owner of thesystem. Depending on how autility commissionchosetotreat thearrangement,the utility wouldeither buya service or acquire ownership of just theT&D attributes of an energy storage project. Either way, theutility wouldnot ownthe project’s generation attributes or any rightstothem; theutilitywouldnot participateorderive
402.See Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co.ofN.H., 547 A.2d 269, 271 (N.H. 1988) (“In setting rates, a regulatory commissionfollows aprocess of identifying consumer and producer interests competing for recognition, with an ultimategoal of strikingafairbalance...that maybedescribed as just and reasonablebothtothe customer and to theutility.”). 403.See, e.g.,N.H.REV.STAT.ANN.§374:3(2018) (grantingthe NewHampshire Public UtilitiesCommissionthe broad power to supervise utilities). 404.Scott, supra note144, at 392. Furthermore, “most states’ utility codes include general authority clauses,extending theauthority of thecommissions to allactsnecessarytocarry out their statutoryauthority.” Id. at 383–84. For example, New Hampshire statutory law provides that“[t]he public utilitiescommission shall have the generalsupervision of allpublic utilities andthe plants owned, operated or controlledbythe samesofar as necessarytocarry into effect theprovisions of this title.” N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.§374:3(2018). 405.Mass. Elec. Co.v.Dep’t of Pub. Util., 643 N.E.2d1029, 1034(Mass. 1994). 406.See Scott, supra note 144,at392 (statingthatutility commissions possess “broadauthority to regulate utilities” in orderto“keep[] rates as lowaspossible” for customers). 407.However,inthe case of NewHampshire, itsseparatestatute restrictingutility investment in distributedenergyresources—including energy storage—wouldstill apply. See supra PartIII.A.6 (discussing the conditions under whichautility canown distributed generationinNew Hampshire). 2019] Charging Onwards 623 anyrevenue from theproject’s generationside. Unlikethe Brattle Group modelorsoleutility ownership,autility commission couldimplement this modelofsharedownership even in theabsence of any statutory change. Both shared ownership models possess severalother advantages over thesoleutility ownershipmodel. Theybetteradhere to thespirit of restructuringprinciples by keeping utilitiesuninvolvedinthe generation side of an energystorage project.408 They also preserve acompetitiverole forthird partiesinthe energy storage space.409 Such competitionwouldalso exertmarket pressure on energystorageprojects, potentially helpingto controltheircosts.410 Competitivenon-utility businesses interested in developing andoperatingenergystorage projects arealsolikelytosupport rather than opposesuch asystem.411 Maintainingutilities’ abilitytorate basethe distributionortransmission valueofsuchprojectswould, at the veryleast,blunt utility oppositiontosuch asystem.412 Consequently,shared ownership models mayoffer amorepolitically workablecompromise between restructuring proponents, utilities, andthird partiesthan asole- utility-ownership model. Shared ownership does sacrifice thecost savings autilitymight capture by not involving athird party and financing theproject itself.413 As noted above, monopolyutilitiescan borrow moneyatlower ratesthan competitivebusinesses.414 Likewise,not involving athird party reduces the transactioncosts of developing theenergy storage project.415 Consequently, ashared-ownershipmodel wouldlikelyinvolve greater transactionand financingcosts than sole utility ownership.416 If these cost increases outweighthe downwardcost pressureofmarketcompetition, shared
408.See H.B. 715-FN,2019Gen. Court,Reg. Sess.,sec. 2,§374-H:3(VI) (N.H.2019) (“Nothing in thissection shall give autility the rightto...directly participate in wholesale electricity markets.”); N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(III)(“Generationservices shouldbe...atleast functionally separated from transmissionand distributionservices....”). 409.CHANG ET AL., supra note 13, at 18. 410.See Busso &Galiani, supra note341 (“[T]heentry of new competitors leads to price reductions by puttingmore competitivepressure on marketincumbents.”). 411.See Stein, supra note117, at 960 (providing NewYork’srationalefor restricted utility ownership ofdistributed energy resources). 412.See LESSER &GIACCHINO, supranote 147, at 63–64 (overviewingwhatgoes towards calculating autility’s profits). 413.See Stein, supra note117, at 958,960 (notingthat utility ownershipcan avoid inefficiencies andhigh transaction costs). 414.HIRSH, supra note130, at 23–24. 415.See Stein, supra note 117, at 958, 960 (addressing methodstoavoidinefficienciesand high transaction costs). 416.See id. (implyingthat economies of scale andensured returns exist helputilitiesavoid inefficiencies andhightransaction costs). 624 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575 ownership couldincrease project costsand lead to lowerlevelsofenergy storage deployment. In short, shared ownershipmay be more politically feasible,417 enable more competitioninenergystorage deployment,418 and betteradhere to restructuring principles than sole-utility ownership.419 In addition, commissions couldimplement oneversionofsharedownershipeven in the absence of statutorychange.420 Thetrade-off, however, is higherfinancing and transactioncosts forenergystorage projects,421 though downward pressure on costs fromgreater market competitionmight offsetthese increases.422 Nonetheless,shared ownership maystill entail higher costs and thus lead to less energy storage deployment than soleutility ownership.
C. The Best Path Forward
Whether sole-utility or shared ownership is preferablewill depend upon astate’s policypriorities.Ifsimplymaximizing energystorage deployment is theonlygoal,sole-utility ownershipislikelythe best option.423 Conversely,shared ownership provides thebestoptionto policymakers whowishtoprivilege restructuringand competition.424 Shared ownershipalsohas theadvantage of not requiring statutorychange, unlikeasole-utility-ownership model.425 Policyexperiments with the different models wouldallowpolicymakers toevaluatethe relativemerits
417.See id. at 960 (overviewingoppositiontoutility ownershipofdistributed energyresources). 418.See supra PartIV.B(explaining whyshared ownershipleadstomorecompetition). 419.See H.B. 715-FN,2019Gen. Court,Reg. Sess.,sec. 2,§374-H:3(VI) (N.H.2019) (emphasizing that under theproposed shared-ownership framework,utilitieswouldnot be involved in the generation side of energystorage projects); N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.§374-F:3(III)(2018) (“Generation services should be ...atleastfunctionally separated from transmissionand distribution services ....”). 420.See supra notes 396–408 and accompanying text (assertingwhy commissionshave the ability and authority to implement one version of theshared-ownershipmodelontheir own). 421.See Stein, supra note117, at 958, 960 (notingthat non-utility ownership can be less efficient than utility ownership). 422.See Busso &Galiani, supra note341 (“[T]he entryofnew competitors leadstoprice reductions by puttingmore competitivepressure on marketincumbents.”). 423.See Stein, supra note117, at 958–960 (explaining that utility ownershipofdistributed energy resourcessimplifiesthe deployment processwhile also enabling lower financing and transaction costs). 424.See supra Part IV.B (arguing how sharedownership bettercomports with restructuring principles and enablesgreater competition). 425.See supra Part IV.A (notingthat enablingsole-utility ownershipwould require statutory change); see supra Part IV.B (clarifyingthatenabling shared ownershipwouldnot require statutory change).New Hampshire is apartialexception, as it allows utilitiestoown generation assetsunder some restrictive conditions. See supra Part III.A.6 (discussing theconditions under whichautility can own generation assets in NewHampshire). 2019] Charging Onwards 625 of each model under real-world conditions.426 This will provide policymakers with theinformation needed to balancecompetingpolicy priorities anddetermine bestpractices.427 In ordertoachieve optimal levels of energystorage deploymentinthe shortest possibletimeframe,thisNoteproposes that states pass legislation authorizing theadoptionofseveral different models.Such legislation shouldallowsole-utility ownership of energy storage, with alegalcap on market sharetoprevent crowding out non-utilitycompetitors.For example, thelegislationcouldlimit utility-owned energystorage to no more than 50% of deployed energystorage projects.428 Allremaining energystorage projects wouldbeshared ownershipprojects or projectsthat do not involve utilities. Thelegislationwouldpermitutilitiestoratebaseonlythe valueof avoided T&Dcosts andthe reliability benefits of theirenergystorage projects.429 Utilitiesorthird parties, rather than ratepayers,wouldthus shoulder theriskofproject underperformance in wholesaleelectricity markets.430 Such apolicydesign hasthree main advantages.First,onpassage it immediatelyenables deployment of energy storagefree of restructuring restrictions.Second, it allows policymakerstogather real-worlddataonthe practicality of each model. In particular,itwouldprovide dataabout the relativecosts of developingutility-owned and shared-ownershipenergy storage projects that wouldgivepolicymakersdataonthe size of any cost premiumshared-ownershiprequires. From that,policymakerscould reasonablyestimatewhateffect barringsole-utility ownershipmight have on energystorage deploymentlevels.Third,thispolicydesignavoids prematurelylocking astate into either asole-utility-ownershiporshared- ownership model.
426.Cf. H.B. 715-FN, 2019 Gen. Court,Reg.Sess.,sec.2,§374-H:2(II) (N.H. 2019) (directing theNew Hampshire Public UtilitiesCommission to study thebenefits of energy storage after astorage deployment program using different ownership modelshas begun). 427.Cf. id. §374-H:2(IV) (directing theCommission touse such informationinsettingahigher energy storage target). 428.See, e.g., id. §374-H:3(II) (proposing to requirethat non-utilities own at least50% of energy storage projects). Note,however, that H.B. 715only enables thetwo shared-ownershipmodels— utilityasprimary owner andthird party as primary owner—because it expresslymaintainsthe restructuring restrictions on utility participation in wholesale electricitymarkets. See id. §374-H:3(VI) (“Nothing in this section shall give autility theright to ...directly participate in wholesale electricity markets.”). 429.See supra Part IV.A (identifying whyutilitiesshouldnot be allowedtoratebase theentire cost of an energy storage project). 430.See supra PartIV.A(describinghow thisallocationofriskprotectsratepayers). 626 Vermont Law Review [Vol.43:575
In practice, however, thebestpolicyiswhateverismostpolitically feasible in agiven state.431 Recallthat removing restructuringbarriersto energy storage couldpotentiallyincreaseenergy storagedeployment fivefoldtosevenfold.432 That extra energy storage deployment could significantly reduceair pollutioninNew England,433 while saving ratepayersbillions of dollars.434 Therelativedifferencesinthe benefits, costs, and deploymentlevelsofsole-utility and shared ownership likely paleincomparison. In other words, themarginal benefit of picking the betterway to remove restructuringbarriers is smallcompared to the benefits of simply removing thebarriers. As such,policymakersshouldnot make theperfect theenemyofthe good. They should onlyseektooptimizethe policydesigntothe extent that doing so does not decrease thechances of actually implementingthe policy. Policymakers’ primarygoal shouldbesimplytoremovethe barriers.
CONCLUSION
Energy storagecan reducethe costofelectricity while playingakey role in thefightagainst climatechange.However, policymakers didnot designthe current electricity regulatory system with its unique characteristicsinmind. This problem is particularly acuteinNew England’srestructured markets. By maintainingmonopolydistribution utilitieswhile restricting autility’s ability to owngeneration, such states have inadvertently restrictedthe rangeofbenefits energystorage canoffer thegrid.New England might needlesslyoverpay billions forits electricity and undermine thefightagainst climatechange if no legalchangesoccur to remove thesebarriers. This Note offers multiple ways policymakers couldaddressthe barriers preventingoptimal utilizationofenergystorage in NewEngland. Both exemptingenergystorage fromutility-ownership restrictions or enabling shared ownershipofenergystorage providepotentialsolutions.Aseach solutionhas itsown advantages anddrawbacks, states shouldinitially enable bothtoflourishunderatime-limitedmarket share cap. Doingso
431.See, e.g.,H.B.715-FN (proposing to allowshared-ownership but not sole-utility ownership to comportwith staterestructuringprinciples). 432.CHANG ET AL., supra note13, at 8; LUEKEN ET AL., supra note20, at 19. Note, however, that thesevenfold increase maydependonremoving other statelevelbarriers as well. See LUEKEN ET AL., supra note20, at 11 (indicatingthat states mayneed to provide stableratedesign and further clarify regulatory treatment of energy storage,particularly energy storage pairedwith renewables,tounlock its full potential). 433.See supra Part I.A(noting theenvironmentalbenefits of energy storage). 434.MASS.DEP’TOFENERGY RES. ET AL., supra note11, at 77,88. 2019] Charging Onwards 627 wouldallowpolicymakers to evaluatethe real-world performance of both models without committingtoeither or stallingenergy storage deployment in theinterim.However,policymakers shouldimplement some solutionin thenear future.The benefits of removing thebarriersoutweighthe potential inefficienciesofdoing so in aless-than-perfectmanner.Fortunately, in the worldofpoliciesthat helpaddressclimatechange, doing so shouldbe relativelyeasy. Enablingmoreenergystorage through regulatorychanges offers awin-win-win forNew Englander’s pocketbooks,the environment, andfuturegenerations.
–Ian Oxenham*†
*Ian Oxenham is amember of theVermont Law School Class of 2019, whereheisajoint Juris Doctor andMaster of Energy Regulationand Lawstudent.Heisalso an ArticlesEditor for the VermontLaw Review,and while in lawschool draftedstate energystorage legislationasavolunteer legislativeassistanttoamember of the NewHampshire HouseofRepresentatives. †Special thanks to Professor KevinB.Jones, directorofthe Vermont LawSchool Institute forEnergyand theEnvironment,aswellasSylviaI.Duluc-Silva andElizabethA.Bower, former membersofthe VermontLaw Review,for helpful feedback and advice on thevarious drafts of this Note. Additional thanks to AllysonMoore, CaitlynKelly,Simonne Valcour, GordannaClevenger,LauraLee, RyanMitchell, Carly Orozco, DavidRiley, and ColetteSchmidtfor allthe meticulous work they performed inediting thisNoteintoits finalstate.