DOCSLIB.ORG

Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making Markku Roinila Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki 16 Filosofisia tutkimuksia Helsingin yliopistosta Filosofiska studier från Helsingfors universitet Philosophical studies from the University of Helsinki Publishers: Department of Philosophy Department of Social and Moral Philosophy P. O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20 A) 00014 University of Helsinki Finland Editors: Marjaana Kopperi Panu Raatikainen Petri Ylikoski Bernt Österman ISBN 978-952-92-1992-6 (paperback) ISBN 978-952-10-3896-9 (PDF) ISSN 1458-8331 Vantaa 2007 Dark Oy Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making Markku Roinila Abstract In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of possible worlds. While God's choice is based on absolutely certain knowledge, human decisions on practical matters are mostly based on uncertain knowledge. However, in many respects they could be regarded as analogous in more complicated situations. In addition to giving an overview of the divine decision-making and discussing critically the criteria God favours in his choice, I provide an account of Leibniz's views on human deliberation, which includes some new ideas. One of these concerns is the importance of estimating probabilities – in making decisions one estimates both the goodness of the act itself and its consequences as far as the desired good is concerned. Another idea is related to the plurality of goods in complicated decisions and the competition this may provoke. Thirdly, heuristic models are used to sketch situations under deliberation in order to help in making the decision. Combining the views of Marcelo Dascal, Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, I argue that Leibniz applied two kinds of models of rational decision-making to practical controversies, often without explicating the details. The more simple, traditional pair of scales model is best suited to cases in which one has to decide for or against some option, or to distribute goods among parties and strive for a compromise. What may be of more help in more complicated deliberations is the novel vectorial model, which is an instance of the general mathematical doctrine of the calculus of variations. To illustrate this distinction, I discuss some cases in which he apparently applied these models in different kinds of situation. These examples support the view that the models had a systematic value in his theory of practical rationality. Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................. 9 INTRODUCTION............................................................................ 11 PART I: DIVINE CHOICE 1. God's Rational Choice ............................................................... 19 2. Models of Creation.................................................................... 28 2. 1. Nicholas Rescher's Trade-Off View..................................... 31 2.1.1. Optimums and Calculus of Variations...................... 36 2. 2. David Blumenfeld's Maximum View................................... 41 2. 3. Donald Rutherford's Maximum View.................................. 43 2. 4. Optimum or Maximum? ...................................................... 46 2. 4. 1. Does simplicity produce variety?............................... 47 2. 4. 2. Architectonics and the Principle of Optimal Order in Tentamen Anagogium ................................................ 52 2. 4. 3. The Tiling Problem in De rerum originatione radicali 64 2. 5. Moral Goodness in God's Choice.......................................... 69 2. 5. 1. Optimising and Moral Goodness............................... 74 2. 5. 2. Happiness in the Actual world ....................................... 79 3. A Summary of Part I ................................................................ 84 PART II: HUMAN COGNITION, REASONING AND THE THEORY OF PROBABILITY 4. Human Reasoning and Cognition ............................................ 87 4. 1. Truths of Reason vs. Truths of Fact.................................... 88 4. 2. Innate Ideas......................................................................... 93 4. 3. The Theory of Cognition ..................................................... 95 4. 3. 1. The Theory of Cognition in Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis......................................................... 96 4. 3. 2. Minute Perceptions .................................................... 100 4. 3. 3. Apperception, Attention, Memory and Imagination............................................................................. 105 4. 3. 4. Moral Identity and the Problem of Apperception in Animals ............................................................................... 116 5. An Analysis of Contingent Truths ........................................... 122 6. The Theory of Probability.......................................................... 133 6.1. The Classic Probability Theory ............................................ 135 6. 2. Leibniz's Views on Probability ........................................... 142 6. 2. 1. Calculating Probability............................................. 145 6. 2. 2. Estimating Probability............................................... 150 6. 2. 2. 1. Proofs and Presumptions .................................... 154 6. 2. 2. 2. Some Examples..................................................... 156 7. Summary of Part II................................................................... 158 PART III: HUMAN RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 8. Practical Reason and Human Action........................................ 161 9. Leibniz's Moral Philosophy ...................................................... 164 9. 1. Goodness, Love, Justice and Pleasure ........................... 167 9. 2. Happiness and Virtue...................................................... 179 10. Deliberation ............................................................................ 187 10. 1. Some Major Influences of Leibniz's Views ....................... 187 10. 2. Leibniz's Views on Deliberation ....................................... 193 10. 2. 1. The Deliberation in the Soul ................................... 200 10. 2. 2. The Passions and Deliberation ............................... 208 10. 2. 3. Weakness of the Will ................................................... 213 11. Models of Decision-Making.................................................... 229 11. 1. Moral Calculus ................................................................. 229 11. 2. The Pair of Scales Model................................................... 232 11. 2. 1. An Example of Balancing For or Against.............. 237 11. 2. 2. Examples on Compromises Achieved by Finding a Balance ................................................................... 240 11. 3. Complicated Decisions...................................................... 248 11. 3. 1. The Vectorial Model of Rational Decision-Making 249 11. 3. 2. More Examples of the Use of the Vectorial Model 262 11. 3. 2. 1. Centres of Gravity ................................................ 262 11. 3. 2. 2. Doctrina conditionum............................................. 264 11. 3. 2. 3. Religious Controversies....................................... 266 11. 3. 2. 4. Political Controversies........................................ 275 12. Summary of Part III................................................................ 278 GENERAL SUMMARY................................................................... 281 ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................... 287 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................... 289 Acknowledgements Writing this study has been a long and multi-phased process and there are many people who deserve my gratitude. First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Lilli Alanen, who has been a kind, yet critical witness of my struggle to express Leibniz's complicated views. No less important has been Academy Professor Simo Knuuttila, who suggested the topic and has since read and commented in depth on the numerous drafts of this work. My pre- examiners, Professors Donald Rutherford (University of California), Olli Koistinen (University of Turku) and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (University of Jyväskylä), gave me considerable help in formulating my views, for which I am most grateful. My thanks are also due to Joan Nordlund M. A. who has put my English into an understandable form. There are a number of other people who have commented on or discussed various parts of my study, or have helped me in other ways. Thus I thank Professor Herbert Breger (Leibniz-Archiv, Hanover), Professor Marcelo Dascal (University of Tel Aviv), Professor Harmut Rudolph (Leibniz-Arbeitsstelle, Potsdam), Professor Jyrki Siukonen (Academy of Fine Arts, Helsinki), Dr. Andreas Blank (The Cohn Institute for the History of Science and Ideas, University of Tel Aviv), Dr. Arto Repo (University of Turku), and Doktorand Peter Myrdal (University of Uppsala). My work with this thesis has benefited from my involvement in various official and non-official circles. First, I have had the privilege of working at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, which has provided a safe haven for me in my labour. My colleagues at the History of Mind Research Unit of the Finnish Academy
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Teaching Plato in Palestine: Philosophy in a Divided World
    © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. 1 TEACHING PLATO IN PALESTINE Can philosophy save the Middle East? It can. This, at least, is the thesis of Sari Nusseibeh as I learn from a friend upon arriving in Israel in February 2006. Nusseibeh is not only a prominent Palestinian intellectual and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s former chief repre- sentative in Jerusalem, but also a philosopher by training (and, I think, by nature, too). “Only philosophy,” the friend tells me he argued during the Shlomo Pines memorial lec- ture in West Jerusalem three years before (aptly titled “On the Relevance of Philosophy in the Arab World Today”). By the time I leave Israel, I’m convinced that he’s on to something. I am here to teach a seminar at Al-Quds University, the Palestinian university in Jerusalem, together with Nus- seibeh, who has been president of Al- Quds since 1995. My idea is to discuss Plato’s political thought with the students and then examine how medieval Muslim and Jewish philosophers built on this thought to interpret Islam and Judaism as philosophical religions. I hope to raise some basic questions about philosophy and its rela- For general queries, contact [email protected] Fraenkel.indb 3 2/17/2015 8:56:12 AM © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.
    [Show full text]
  • Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin
    Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato Volume 6 Article 5 2006 Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin Ryan Feldbrugge Minnesota State University, Mankato Follow this and additional works at: https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Feldbrugge, Ryan (2006) "Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin," Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato: Vol. 6 , Article 5. Available at: https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur/vol6/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Research Center at Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato by an authorized editor of Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato. Feldbrugge: Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin INTENTIONALITY IN KANT AND WITTGENSTEIN Ryan Feldbrugge (Philosophy) Dr. Richard Liebendorfer, Faculty Mentor, Philosophy How is thought about and experience of a world possible? This has been the framing question of the present work and it is generally understood as the problem of intentionality. The more specific problem dealt with has been whether or not intentionality has an internal structure that can be made explicit through science, particularly cognitive science. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant outlines an internal, mental structure that, when imposed on our sensory data, makes thought about and experience of a world possible, which can be viewed as highly anticipatory of modern cognitive science. On the other hand, there are a number of philosophers who have it that the structure of intentionality cannot be made explicit nor can it be understood within science, notably Ludwig Wittgenstein.
    [Show full text]
  • David Lewis on Convention
    David Lewis on Convention Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone Center for Cognitive Science Rutgers University David Lewis’s landmark Convention starts its exploration of the notion of a convention with a brilliant insight: we need a distinctive social competence to solve coordination problems. Convention, for Lewis, is the canonical form that this social competence takes when it is grounded in agents’ knowledge and experience of one another’s self-consciously flexible behavior. Lewis meant for his theory to describe a wide range of cultural devices we use to act together effectively; but he was particularly concerned in applying this notion to make sense of our knowledge of meaning. In this chapter, we give an overview of Lewis’s theory of convention, and explore its implications for linguistic theory, and especially for problems at the interface of the semantics and pragmatics of natural language. In §1, we discuss Lewis’s understanding of coordination problems, emphasizing how coordination allows for a uniform characterization of practical activity and of signaling in communication. In §2, we introduce Lewis’s account of convention and show how he uses it to make sense of the idea that a linguistic expression can come to be associated with its meaning by a convention. Lewis’s account has come in for a lot of criticism, and we close in §3 by addressing some of the key difficulties in thinking of meaning as conventional in Lewis’s sense. The critical literature on Lewis’s account of convention is much wider than we can fully survey in this chapter, and so we recommend for a discussion of convention as a more general phenomenon Rescorla (2011).
    [Show full text]
  • KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING to IDEALISM Idealism As a Philosophy
    KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING TO IDEALISM Idealism as a philosophy had its greatest impact during the nineteenth century. It is a philosophical approach that has as its central tenet that ideas are the only true reality, the only thing worth knowing. In a search for truth, beauty, and justice that is enduring and everlasting; the focus is on conscious reasoning in the mind. The main tenant of idealism is that ideas and knowledge are the truest reality. Many things in the world change, but ideas and knowledge are enduring. Idealism was often referred to as “idea-ism”. Idealists believe that ideas can change lives. The most important part of a person is the mind. It is to be nourished and developed. Etymologically Its origin is: from Greek idea “form, shape” from weid- also the origin of the “his” in his-tor “wise, learned” underlying English “history.” In Latin this root became videre “to see” and related words. It is the same root in Sanskrit veda “knowledge as in the Rig-Veda. The stem entered Germanic as witan “know,” seen in Modern German wissen “to know” and in English “wisdom” and “twit,” a shortened form of Middle English atwite derived from æt “at” +witen “reproach.” In short Idealism is a philosophical position which adheres to the view that nothing exists except as it is an idea in the mind of man or the mind of God. The idealist believes that the universe has intelligence and a will; that all material things are explainable in terms of a mind standing behind them. PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALE OF IDEALISM a) The Universe (Ontology or Metaphysics) To the idealist, the nature of the universe is mind; it is an idea.
    [Show full text]
  • A Cardinal Sin: the Infinite in Spinoza's Philosophy
    Macalester College DigitalCommons@Macalester College Philosophy Honors Projects Philosophy Department Spring 2014 A Cardinal Sin: The nfinitI e in Spinoza's Philosophy Samuel H. Eklund Macalester College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/phil_honors Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Eklund, Samuel H., "A Cardinal Sin: The nfinitI e in Spinoza's Philosophy" (2014). Philosophy Honors Projects. Paper 7. http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/phil_honors/7 This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Cardinal Sin: The Infinite in Spinoza’s Philosophy By: Samuel Eklund Macalester College Philosophy Department Honors Advisor: Geoffrey Gorham Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without my advisor, Professor Geoffrey Gorham. Through a collaborative summer research grant, I was able to work with him in improving a vague idea about writing on Spinoza’s views on existence and time into a concrete analysis of Spinoza and infinity. Without his help during the summer and feedback during the past academic year, my views on Spinoza wouldn’t have been as developed as they currently are. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the hard work done by the other two members of my honors committee: Professor Janet Folina and Professor Andrew Beveridge. Their questions during the oral defense and written feedback were incredibly helpful in producing the final draft of this project.
    [Show full text]
  • Noumenon and Phenomenon: Reading on Kant's
    NOUMENON AND PHENOMENON: READING ON KANT’S PROLEGOMENA Oleh: Wan Suhaimi Wan Abdullah1 ABSTRAK Makalah ini membahaskan satu dari isu besar yang diperkatakan oleh Kant dalam epistemologi beliau iaitu isu berkaitan ‘benda-pada-dirinya’ (noumenon) dan ‘penzahiran benda’ (phenomenon). Kaitan antara kewujudan kedua-dua hakikat ini dari segi ontologi dan kedudukan kedua-duanya dalam pengetahuan manusia dari segi epistemologi dibincangkan berdasarkan perspektif Kant. Semua ini dikupas berdasarkan penelitian terhadap suatu teks oleh Kant dalam karya agung beliau Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will be Able to Present Itself as a Science. Kant secara umumnya tidak menolak kewujudan noumenon walaupun beliau seakan mengakui bahawa pendekatan sains sekarang tidak mampu menanggapi hakikat noumenon tersebut. Huraian makalah ini membuktikan bahawa tidak semua hakikat mampu dicapai oleh sains moden. Keyakinan bahawa sains moden adalah satu-satunya jalan mencapai ilmu dan makrifah akan menghalang manusia dari mengetahui banyak rahsia kewujudan yang jauh dari ruang jangkauan sains. 1 Wan Suhaimi Wan Abdullah, PhD. is an associate professor at the Department of `Aqidah and Islamic Thought, Academy of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya. Email: [email protected]. The author would like to thank Dr. Edward Omar Moad from Dept. of Humanities, Qatar University who have read the earlier draft of this article and suggested a very useful remarks and comments some of which were quoted in this article. Jurnal Usuluddin, Bil 27 [2008] 25-40 ABSTRACT The article discusses one of the major issues dealt with by Kant in his epistemology, that is the issue related to the thing-in-itself (noumenon) and the appearance (phenomenon).
    [Show full text]
  • Why Essentialism Requires Two Senses of Necessity’, Ratio 19 (2006): 77–91
    Please cite the official published version of this article: ‘Why Essentialism Requires Two Senses of Necessity’, Ratio 19 (2006): 77–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00310.x WHY ESSENTIALISM REQUIRES TWO SENSES OF NECESSITY1 Stephen K. McLeod Abstract I set up a dilemma, concerning metaphysical modality de re, for the essentialist opponent of a ‘two senses’ view of necessity. I focus specifically on Frank Jackson’s two- dimensional account in his From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). I set out the background to Jackson’s conception of conceptual analysis and his rejection of a two senses view. I proceed to outline two purportedly objective (as opposed to epistemic) differences between metaphysical and logical necessity. I conclude that since one of these differences must hold and since each requires the adoption of a two senses view of necessity, essentialism is not consistent with the rejection of a two senses view. I. Terminological Preliminaries The essentialist holds that some but not all of a concrete object’s properties are had necessarily and that necessary properties include properties that are, unlike the property 1 Thanks to John Divers, audiences at the Open University Regional Centre, Leeds and the University of Glasgow and an anonymous referee for comments. 2 of being such that logical and mathematical truths hold, non-trivially necessary. It is a necessary condition on a property’s being essential to an object that it is had of necessity. In the case of concrete objects, some such properties are discoverable by partly empirical means.
    [Show full text]
  • Feng Youlan's Interpretation of Western Philosophy
    ASIANetwork Exchange | Fall 2014 | volume 22 | 1 Feng Youlan’s Interpretation of Western Philosophy: A Critical Examination from the Perspective of Metaphysical Methodology Derong Chen Abstract: This paper concentrates on Feng’s interpretation of Western philosophy from the perspective of metaphysical methodology and aims to display a limited observation of Feng’s interpretation of Western philosophy through the window of metaphysical methodology. Based on a brief review of the recent studies of Feng Youlan and Western philoso- phy, this paper analyzes the progress and insufficient aspects in current studies on this issue and particularly clarifies what are the metaphysics and metaphysical methods in the context of Feng Youlan’s philosophy. In clarifying Feng’s interpreta- tion of Western philosophy from the perspective of methodology, this paper further critically analyzes Feng’s positive metaphysical methods and negative metaphysical methods, and assumes that Feng’s negative metaphysical methods essentially is a kind of attitude towards metaphysics but neither a kind of metaphysics nor a kind of metaphysical methods. Instead of characterizing metaphysical methods as positive and negative as Feng did, this paper suggests an alternative division of metaphysical methods: direct and indirect methods of dealing with metaphysical issues. Keywords Feng Youlan; metaphysics; metaphysical methods; Western philosophy; negative metaphysics In the twentieth century, Feng Youlan was one of the Chinese intellectuals most deeply Derong Chen is a Sessional involved in the dialogue and interaction between Chinese and Western philosophies. In Lecturer II at the University of addition to studying Western philosophy at Columbia University, he systematically con- Toronto Mississauga. ducted research on Western philosophy, specifically the philosophy of life.
    [Show full text]
  • On Popularization of Scientific Education in Italy Between 12Th and 16Th Century
    PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION IN THE 21st CENTURY Volume 57, 2013 90 ON POPULARIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION IN ITALY BETWEEN 12TH AND 16TH CENTURY Raffaele Pisano University of Lille1, France E–mail: [email protected] Paolo Bussotti University of West Bohemia, Czech Republic E–mail: [email protected] Abstract Mathematics education is also a social phenomenon because it is influenced both by the needs of the labour market and by the basic knowledge of mathematics necessary for every person to be able to face some operations indispensable in the social and economic daily life. Therefore the way in which mathe- matics education is framed changes according to modifications of the social environment and know–how. For example, until the end of the 20th century, in the Italian faculties of engineering the teaching of math- ematical analysis was profound: there were two complex examinations in which the theory was as impor- tant as the ability in solving exercises. Now the situation is different. In some universities there is only a proof of mathematical analysis; in others there are two proves, but they are sixth–month and not annual proves. The theoretical requirements have been drastically reduced and the exercises themselves are often far easier than those proposed in the recent past. With some modifications, the situation is similar for the teaching of other modern mathematical disciplines: many operations needing of calculations and math- ematical reasoning are developed by the computers or other intelligent machines and hence an engineer needs less theoretical mathematics than in the past. The problem has historical roots. In this research an analysis of the phenomenon of “scientific education” (teaching geometry, arithmetic, mathematics only) with respect the methods used from the late Middle Ages by “maestri d’abaco” to the Renaissance hu- manists, and with respect to mathematics education nowadays is discussed.
    [Show full text]
  • Leibniz' De Arte Combinatoria
    Leibniz’ De arte combinatoria John N. Martin Department of Philosophy University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, OH 45221 [email protected] John N. Martin, 2003 Page 1 Leibniz’ De arte combinatoria I. INTRODUCTION Logicians, philosophers and to judge from the Internet even the general public are vaguely aware that Leibniz held views about logic that anticipate modern ideas of proof system and algorithm. Though there are many places in Leibniz’ works that might be cited as evidence for such claims, popular works cite virtually only two of Leibniz’ shorter papers, Characteristica universalis and De arte combinatoria. Curiously, though there are hundreds, maybe thousands, of references to these papers, nothing serious has been written in recent decades about the papers themselves that could be called a professional exegesis or discussion of their logical content. The purpose of this short paper is to remedy that lack by offering a “reconstruction” of the system Leibniz sketches in De arte combinatoria, which of the two essays is the one more focused on the notions of proof and algorithm. A point of caution about method should be made at the outset. Any modern “reconstruction” of views in the history of logic is by its nature a compromise. It is an attempt to preserve as much of the original content, including its terminology and formulas, as is possible while simultaneously meeting the standards of modern metatheory. For example, if it is possible to do justice to the original by observing standard formats, then they should be Page 2 followed. For example, if it is fair to the text, it is desirable to define the syntax inductively, state definitions set theoretically, develop notions of proof within an axiom or natural deduction system, and define semantic ideas in a recursive manner parallel to syntax.
    [Show full text]
  • The Shortcomings of a Concept Inertia and Conatus in the Philosophy of Spinoza
    http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8142-286-4.36 Alexandre Rouette Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada THE SHORTCOMINGS OF A CONCEPT INERTIA AND CONATUS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA n the third part of the Ethics, Spinoza express the desire to talk about “human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes, and bodies” (E3, Appendix).1 With this sentence, it seems clear that Spinoza sides with Hobbes and Descartes and that he wants to con- struct a mechanistic theory of the affects. In the same part of the Ethics, Spinoza also introduces the concept of conatus: “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being” (E3P6), Spinoza says. One will immedi- ately understand this concept of conatus as the core concept of his mechanistic theory of the affects, the concept without which this mechanistic account of the affects would be impossible. However, in the second part of the Ethics, there is another concept that could have accomplished that same goal, namely, the principle of inertia. In the words of Spinoza, “A body which moves or is at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which has also been determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on, to infinity” (E2L3). Inter- estingly enough, in the philosophy of Hobbes, the concept of endeavour/conatus is much nearer to the Spinozistic principle of inertia in its meaning than it is to the Spinozistic version of the conatus.
    [Show full text]
  • On Categories and a Posteriori Necessity: a Phenomenological Echo
    © 2012 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2012 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 43, Nos. 1–2, January 2012 0026-1068 ON CATEGORIES AND A POSTERIORI NECESSITY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ECHO M. J. GARCIA-ENCINAS Abstract: This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philo- sophical categories and the structures they form. Keywords: a priori, categories, intuition, metaphysical necessity. Fantasy abandoned by reason produces impossible monsters. —Francisco de Goya (1746–1828), The Caprices, plate 43, The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters 1. Introduction Statements of fact are necessarily true when their truth-maker facts cannot but be the case. Statements of fact are contingently true when their truth-maker facts might not have been the case. I shall argue that modal knowledge, that is, knowledge that a (true/false) statement is necessarily/ contingently true, must be a priori knowledge, even if knowledge that the statement is true or false can be a posteriori. In particular, justified accept- ance of necessary facts requires a priori modal insight concerning some category which they instantiate. In this introduction, the first part of the article, I maintain that Kripke claimed that the knowledge that a statement has its truth-value as a matter of necessity/contingency is a priori founded—even when knowl- edge of its truth/falsehood is a posteriori.
    [Show full text]