Rising Asymmetry in South Asia and Emerging Challenges to (NPT)
PhD DISSERTATION
This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence University, Islamabad in partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in STRATEGIC STUDIES
BY ASHFAQ AHMED NDU-SNS/PhD-11/S-002
SUPERVISOR DR. RIZWANA KAREEM ABBASI
DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC & NUCLEAR STUDIES FACULTY OF CONTEMPORARY STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD-PAKISTAN 2019
DEDICATION
This research is dedicated to my parents.
Table of Contents i Abstract
Abbreviations ii
Introduction 1
Chapter-1
1.1 Nuclear Proliferation/ Non-Proliferation Debate Building 30 Theoretical Understanding
1.2 Realism, the State Security and Conflicts 31 1.3 Nuclear Deterrence Theory 38 1.4 Liberalism 42 Conclusion 43
Chapter-2
Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Development and Incorporation of 45 International Institutions
2.1 Development and Incorporation of International Institutions 45
2.3 Post Cold War Developments: 1995 Review Conference and Non- 62 Proliferation Debate 2.4 NPT Review Conferences: Reassessing the NPT 69
Conclusion 76 Chapter-3
The Genesis of India-Pakistan Nuclear Weapons and Missile System 79 Development
3.1 Introduction 79
3.2.1 India‟s Nuclear Programme: A Historical Reality 1946 to 1974 80 3.2.4 India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 85 3.3.1 Pakistan‟s Nuclear Programme: 1950s to 1980 87 3.4 Missile Developments in South Asia: 1960s to 1980s 93 3.5 Indian Missile Developments 96 3.6. Pakistan‟s Missile Developments 98 3.7 The Establishment of National Defence Complex (NDC) of Pakistan 101 Conclusion 102
Chapter-4 The Role of Non-Weaponised Deterrence in Crisis Situation: Deliberate Nuclear Opacity to Overt Nuclearisation of South Asia (1980 to 1998) 105 4.1 Introduction 105 4.2 The Role of Non-Weaponized Deterrence in Crisis 107 4.3 Nuclear Weapons Development in 1990s and the NPT 112 4.4 The Road to 1998 Nuclear Tests 115 4.6 Nuclear Optimists and Pessimists: The Debate 119 Conclusion 128
Chapter-5
India-Pakistan Nuclear Doctrines 130 5.1 Introduction 130
5.2. The Impact of South Asian Nuclearization on the NPT 132 5.3 Nuclear Doctrines and Policies in South Asia 133
5.4.1 The Development of the Indian Nuclear Doctrines: Vajpayee Era 135
5.4.5 Nuclear Command and Control (C2) System 146 5.4.6 The Genesis of the Indian C2 System 146 5.5 Assessment of Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine 148
Conclusion 159
Chapter-6
Fissile Material Production in South Asia: Implications for the NPT 162
6.1 Introduction 162 6.2 Post 9/11 Era Fissile Material Production Projects and Facilities in
Pakistan 165
6.3 Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Challenges to the NPT 170 6.5 Post 9/11 Era: Indian Fissile Material Production Facilities 175
Conclusion 184
Chapter-7
Rising Asymmetry in South Asia and the Emerging Challenge
to the NPT 187 7.1 Introduction 187 7.2 2001-2002 India-Pakistan Military Stand Off 188 7.3 The Development of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) 192 7.5 Introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) 201
7.6 Missile Developments, New Arms Race and Delivery Means Capabilities Challenges Universality of the NPT 206
7.6.1 Indian Missile Developments 207 7.9 Pakistani Missile Developments 218 7.12 Indian Ballistic Missile Defence System 226
Conclusion 241
Chapter-8
Emerging International Nuclear Order and the Efficacy of the NPT 244
8.1 Introduction 244
8.2 Preexistent Nuclear Order and the NPT 245 8.4 The US- IAEA Additional Protocol Capacitating the NPT 252 8.4.1 India and the Additional Protocol 253 8.4.2 Pakistan and the Additional Protocol 255 8.5.1 Pakistan Compliance with UNSCR 1540 257 8.5.2 India and the UNSCR 1540 261 8.6 How to Address Regional Security Concerns Aligning Non-NPT States 262 Conclusion 271 Conclusion 273 Appendix-I 293
Appendix-II 294
Bibliography 297
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I have a lot to be thankful to Allah Almighty for showering countless blessings and giving me time, vigor and determination to fulfill one of my most crucial tasks in life. I was fortunate to have as my supervisor renowned scholar on South Asian nuclear affairs Dr. Rizwana K. Abbasi; who remained kind in sparing time, rendered directions in addition extended indispensible guidance since the last seven years. She is an impressive mentor for me. Her evaluation of several drafts of this dissertation has been tireless and noticeable.
I am also indebted to Prof Dr. Zulfiqar Khan, Head of Department Strategic Studies, for providing crucial support while handling bureaucratic intricacies to meet various prerequisites prior to submission of this thesis. He indeed has bailed me out in complex situations and rendered excellent advices when I needed the most. He has opened his students‟ mind for a different perspective in the intellectual world. I am also availing opportunity to pay reverence to my praiseworthy mentors Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Dr. Noman Omar Sattar, Dr. Tughral Yameen for enlightening me on the subject matter throughout the coursework that endowed me to compleat this research. I am also thankful to Dr. Zafar Khan, Dr. Mansur Umar Khan and Dr. Aqab Malik for their suggestions and advice. My special gratitude to Director Arms Control and Disarmament (ACDA) Brigadier Zahir Kazmi, Zulfiqar Hussain Awan Director General Legal Affairs President House Islamabad, Dr. Musarat Jabeen, Director City Campus University of Lahore, Sargodha Campus, Dr. Fazal-Ur-Rehman, Director Pakistan Institute of China Studies (PICS), University of Sargodha, Superintendent of Police (SP) Irum Abbasi, Prof Dr. Shaheen Akhtar, Professor Dept of International Relations and Sardar Muhammad Humayun, Lecturer Dept of Strategic Studies, Dr. Moiz Shafi Hali, Assistant Professor Dept of Govt & Public Policy National Defence University Islamabad, Professor Dr. Rajesh M. Basrur, Michael Krepon, Professor Dr. Tom Sauer, Dr. Syed Riffat Hussain, and Dr. Benajmin Kienzle. Their discerning views and valuable critical enquiry on particular aspects of this academic work that helped expanded the study extent in different perspectives.
I must place my thanks on record for the understanding demonstrated by my spouse and children Hassaan, Zukhruff and Mahrush by ungrudgingly letting me dedicate my time and enthusiasm towards my research work so dear to my heart. I am grateful to my parents who have
been a continuous cause of motivation and support during the pursuance of doctoral level studies.
ABSTRACT
The development of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was the result of continuous efforts and by product of liberalism. The treaty provides basis to non-proliferation mechanism aimed at halting spread of nuclear weapons. It is near universal treaty because Pakistan and India never signed the treaty in fact both states applied teachings of realism and off-shoots of realism such as nuclear deterrence theory to develop nuclear weapons as non-NPT states. Following nuclear weapons development India continues to produce weapons grade fissile material and expanding the size of nuclear reactors to be recognized as emerging regional power. India aspires to accomplish this goal with the help of nuclear and non nuclear weapons states signatories to the NPT. Nuclear weapons states are providing assistance to Indian in violation of the Article I of the treaty while non nuclear weapons states are breaking their promise pledged under Article II of the treaty. Indian gigantic military, the provocative Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), growing nuclear stockpiles, massive conventional forces, Theater and Ballistic Missile Defence tilt the favor of rising deterrent force asymmetry in New Delhi‟s favor. It is gradually introducing changes in its nuclear doctrine by replacing Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD) posture with the overkill capacity. It is nuclearizing the Indian Ocean in pursuit to complete nuclear triad to ensure escalation dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan. India enjoys conventional asymmetry and it aspires to perpetually tilt the rising deterrent force asymmetry in its favor. New Delhi thus poses existential threat to Pakistan‟s security. These developments and Indian military modernization program thus disturbs strategic stability. Consequentially, teaching of security dilemma coerced Pakistan to develop battlefield/ tactical missiles, Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVS), Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MRVs) and rely on nuclear deterrent to thwart Indian aggression. India and Pakistan rivalry creates fear of inadvertent and deliberate nuclear war. Further, it poses twofold challenge to the NPT. First, India-Pakistan rivalry is systemically linked with United States and China it prevents Washington and Beijing from implementing Article VI, of the NPT thus poses direct challenge to the treaty. Second, the efficacy, nuclear doctrines and the role of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan national security strategies increases strategic and political significance of nuclear weaponry for non-nuclear weapons states. It is possible that Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) may draw inferences that nuclear weapons provide absolute security hence may decide to develop nuclear deterrent in violation of the Article II and Article IV of the NPT and exercise the withdrawal clause Article X of the NPT. It is therefore stated that New Delhi and Islamabad undermines the efficacy and the future relevance of the NPT. South Asian outlier states thus pose indirect challenge to the NPT. For sustaining regional strategic stability, war avoidance, to address the root cause of trust deficit and to bring India and Pakistan directly or indirectly into the NPT framework to strengthen the NPT formal and informal arms control measures (Abbasi‟s Model or the NPT + the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and India-Pakistan formula) have been proposed.
i
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ABMT Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty
AHWR Advanced Heavy Water Reactors
AP Additional Protocol
BJP Bhartiya Janata Party
BMDS Ballistic Missile Defence System
BOP Balance of Power
C2 Command and Control
C3 Command, Control and Communication
CCCCIISR Computarized, Command, Control, Communications, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate
CD Conference on Disarmament
CJCSC Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
CMD Credible Minimum Deterrence
CSA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
CSD Cold Start Doctrine
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DAE Department of Atomic Energy
DARI Department of Atomic Research in India
DCC Development Control Committee
DG Director General
DIND Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine
ECC Employment Control Committee
ii
ENCD Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
FBRs Fast Breeder Reactors
FBTR Fast Breeder Test Reactors
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEC Indian Atomic Energy Commission
IMF International Monetary Fund
INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IPMF International Panel on Fissile Material
ISIS Institute for Science and International Security
LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty
MAD Mutually Assured Destruction
MAPS Madras Atomic Power Station
MARVs Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles
MIRVs Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles
MLF Multilateral Force
MMRCA Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NCA National Command Authority
NFU No First Use
iii
NSC National Security Council
NNWS Non Nuclear Weapons State
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS Nuclear Security Summit
NWFW Nuclear Weapons Free World
NWFZ Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
NWS Nuclear Weapons States
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PFBR Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
PHWR Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors
PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
PNRA Pakistan‟s Nuclear Regulating Authority
PPP-P Pakistan People‟s Party- Parliamentarian
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
SALT-I Strategic Arms Limitation Talks-I
SECD Strategic Export Control Division
SFC Strategic Force Command
SLBMs Sub-Marine Launched Ballistic Missiles
SORT Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
SPD Strategic Plans Division
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TIFR Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
TNWs Tactical Nuclear Weapons
UN United Nations
iv
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSCR National Security Council Resolution
UK United Kingdom
US United States
WGP Weapon Grade Plutonium
WMDs Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organisation
WW-II World War-II
ZC Zangger Committee
v
Introduction Rising Asymmetry in South Asia and Emerging Challenges to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Introduction
Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia
The genesis of Indian nuclear program is traced soon after partition in the 1948 under the Atomic Energy Act of India. It led to the creation of Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).1 Despite laying foundations of Indian nuclear program Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru rejected the idea of nuclear weapons development.2 However, India‟s humiliating defeat at the hands of Chinese military;3 Indian desire to be recognized as regional power4 and; the NPT compelled India to become NWS,5 and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi permitted the nuclear scientists to manufacture nuclear weapons. In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test “Smiling Buddha,” popularly known as “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE).
Analysts believe that the dismemberment of East Pakistan permanently shifted the balance of power (BoP) in Indian favor. 6 In other words, the1971 war confirmed Indian military superiority. Indian PNEs augmented the then Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto‟s security dilemma, and “efforts to solidify one‟s own security created sense of insecurity in opponent and compelled the opponent to increase its power.”7 Bhutto believed that only credible nuclear deterrent force would provide absolute security to Pakistan against India‟s conventional and nuclear superiority. 8 Thus, Bhutto planned to instigate Pakistan‟s nuclear program. Pakistan‟s case for developing nuclear weapons is security driven.9 Indian PNE became a driving
1 Dr. H. N. Sethna, “India‟s Atomic Energy Programme-Past and Future,” IAEA Bulletin, 2, No. 5, 1. 2Mark Fitzpatrick, Alexander Niktin and SergeyOznobishchev, eds., Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies: National Policies and International Security (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008): 130. 3 Aldo D. Abitbol, “Cause of the 1962 Sino-Indian War,” http://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume1/volume1_abitbol.pdf, accessed on May 2, 2012. 4SumitGanguly, “India‟s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi‟s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” International Security, 23, No. 4, (Spring, 1999): 148. 5 Mario Esteban Carranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order (Cornwall: Ashgate, 2009): 1. 6 Sharon Squassoni, “India and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons,” CRS report for Congress, (February 17, 2005): 3. 7Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, Routledge, (2009): 592. 8MoeedYousaf and Ashley Pandya, “The Quest for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia: A Reality Check,” United States Institute of Peace, (August 6, 2010): 1. 9 Tom Sauer (Senior Lecturer, University of Antwerpen) Emailed interview, (September 16, 2018).
1 force for Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program.10 Later, Indian adventurous policies including capture of Siahin, 11 problem of water sharing, 12 Brass tacks 13 and 1990 crises strengthened Pakistan‟s strategic community‟s conviction that India is an existential threat to Pakistan‟s security and sovereignty. Self-preservation remained primary objective of Pakistani security circles and nuclear deterrence was prescribed as the only potent force to deter Indian adventurism and coercive policies. Preservation of state with the help of robust military power is the dominant theme in realist school of thought.
This study attempts to understand India and Pakistan‟s nuclear proliferation behavior, the budding, persistent modernization of India and Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons, nuclear capable missile arms race and its impact on the sustainability of the NPT. Pakistan and India never signed the NPT but developed nuclear weapons as non-NPT states. Following nuclear weapons development of Pakistan and India continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals and technology in the absence of nuclear restraint regime. This research whilst reviewing the existent literature derived that there is considerable gap to comprehend the changing dynamics and modernization of these technologies in South Asia. India-Pakistan continued vertical proliferation outside the NPT has major impact on the sustainability, efficacy and relevance of the NPT treaty in the present time. This study is an endeavor to focus on the reasons of the failure of the mechanism of non-proliferation with particular reference to South Asia.
Accessing the Existing Literature
The accessible literature on India-Pakistan nuclear weapons development before and after the May, 1998 nuclear tests is produced by the academicians, incumbent and retired security personnel, foreign policy professionals and civilian security analysts serving in world renowned think tanks. Existing material on South Asian nuclearization discusses missile arms race, stability-instability paradox, India and Pakistan cooperation with the IAEA and New Delhi and Islamabad‟s rejection of the NPT. However, no group as a whole has examined the impact of the
10Garima Singh, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Disorder: Weapons Proliferation and Safety (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006): 12. 11 Peter R. Lavoy, ed., Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 67. 12 Daniel Haines, Rivers Divided: Indus Basin Waters in the Making of India and Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 13Abbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo.
2 rising deterrent dynamics in South Asia on the NPT. The accessible literature ranging from books to articles also neglects the NPT‟s effectiveness for conflict resolution and war avoidance between New Delhi and Islamabad. This thesis in contrast attempts to highlight and address the aforementioned gaps in the available literature.
Hans Blix‟s central narrative in, “Introduction: The Present Nuclear Order, How It Came About, Why It May Not Last,” is to analyze the evolution and highlight the significance of the NPT. Blix has explained the IAEA‟s safeguards mechanism and its relevance to the NPT.14 He concludes that the IAEA is a body to ensure implementation of these safeguards and the conjuring of the Article III of the NPT which binds them. The introductory portion of Sverre Lodgaard work Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World? 15 and Hanx Blix‟s research 16 concludes that the deterrent role of nuclear weapons resulted in nuclear proliferation. Hazards of nuclear weapons use evolved the idea to contain nuclear weapons proliferation and resulted in the development of the NPT. Lodgaard highlights the need for nuclear capable states to incorporate WMD in their war-fighting doctrines during the Cold War and in post Cold War era.17 However, Lodgaard research is primarily focused on different experiences learnt in achieving the global nuclear disarmament. It can be divided into the following three major portions:
(a) Lodgaard discusses the case of disarmament of nuclear weapons. (b) Problem of nuclear disarmament complicated by the NPT non-member nuclear capable states. (c) Problem posed by the NPT member states to nuclear disarmament.
Jonathan D. Bergner work “Going Nuclear: Does the Non-Proliferation Treaty Matter?”18 admires the NPT for containing the proliferation of nuclear material and technology. Bergner main argument is efficacy of the NPT dissuaded the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) from
14 Hans Blix, “Introduction: The Present Nuclear Order, How It Came About, Why It May Not Last,” in Olav Njolstad, ed., Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York: Routledge, 2011). 15 Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World? (London: Routledge, 2011). 16 Blix, “Introduction: The Present Nuclear Order,” 17 Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. 18 Jonathan D. Bergner, “Going Nuclear: Does the Non-Proliferation Treaty Matter?” Comparative Strategy, 31, No. 1, (2012).
3 developing nuclear arsenals. Bergner applied Scott D. Sagan‟s proliferation model19 on South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Libya, to carry out and complete the case studies. Bergner‟s central objective is to reach a conclusion why states decide to opt for the development of WMDs. Bergner in conclusion suggests that states either pursue or relinquish nuclear weapons programs on the basis of cost and benefit analysis.20 Bergner work is critique on the established non- proliferation mechanism particularly the IAEA and the NPT for its failure to address the security problems of the potential proliferating states. Despite these shortcomings Bergner has regarded the NPT as a strong valve against nuclear weapons proliferation. Stephen J. Cimbala article “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,”21 serves as a whistleblower. Cimbala in general conclusion suggests terrorist‟s pursuit to get nuclear material and nuclear black market increases the probability of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Cimbala prescribes cooperation and world efforts to strengthen the NPT can make the world more peaceful place. Cimbala warned US government that failure to carryout crackdown against nuclear black market would drag major powers in unnecessary future wars. Cimbala brought into the limelight the dangerous trends in the NPT member states of the Middle East (ME) and Asia. Cimbala opines that if this dangerous tendency is not brought to an end the hope to contain nuclear proliferation will be lost.22 Cimbala urges Asian and Middle Eastern states to review their decision before violating non-proliferation norms and embarking on the path of developing nuclear weapons.
Article “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” provides thorough analysis of the NPT.23 It underscores significant Articles including I, II, III, IV, VI, IX and X that strengthened the NPT. Analysis of review conferences, verification and compliance mechanism have also been briefly carried out to assist the readership in identifying treaty‟s shortcomings and successes. Scott D. Sagan‟s seminal work “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” provides detailed analysis regarding evolution of pro/ anti-bomb lobbies.24 Introductory part of Sagan‟s research concerns detailed analysis of different proliferation/non-proliferation models. It is
19 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-1997). 20 Bergner, “Going Nuclear: Does the Non-Proliferation Treaty Matter?” 21 Stephen J. Cimbala, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 18, No. 4, (2005). 22 Ibid. 23 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” NTI,http://www.nti.org/treaties-and- regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/#, (accessed June 7, 2015). 24 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?”
4 followed by case studies to test efficacy of these theoretical models. Sagan concludes pro or anti- bomb lobbies provide justifications for the development or disarmament of nuclear weapons in pursuit to safeguard or acquire their vested interests. In conclusion Sagan‟s comprehensive analysis serves as a guide for students of arms control and disarmament, strategic studies, nuclear proliferation/non-proliferation studies and nuclear terrorism on the motives behind nuclear proliferation.
This study while analyzing George Bunn research “The World‟s Non-Proliferation Regime in Time,”25 has divided it into two broad segments:
(a) Tools or machinery that helps international non- proliferation mechanism to function. (b) Segment highlights the tendency of non-compliance of the NPT by the member states.
States get peaceful nuclear technology under Article IV of the NPT. It increases prospects of nuclear proliferation/ nuclear weapons development and undermines the relevance and the efficacy of the treaty. Article III of the treaty requires the NPT signatory states to implement the IAEA safeguards. It restricts NNWS from diverting nuclear technology to make clandestine nuclear weapons. The IAEA safeguards system attempts to strengthen the NPT by addressing the treaty‟s inherited flaw. Watchdog agency is essential to timely spot and rollback illicit nuclear weapons program. Camille Grand in “The Non-Proliferation Treaty in an Era of Proliferation Crises,”26 supports non-proliferation activists‟ calls to employ foolproof IAEA safeguard system. Grand concludes NNWS tendency to cheat in pursuit for nuclear weapons development evolved rigorous criterion for NNWS to acquire nuclear material, technology and related information. Michael Krepon assessment of A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order27 provides in-depth analysis and identifies structural flaws in the NPT. Krepon highlights emerging trends in the NPT. He concludes that despite structural flaws the NPT is successfully functioning. However, if treaty‟s fault lines are addressed hawkish nuclear order would emerge.
25 George Bunn, “The World‟s Non-Proliferation Regime in Time,” IAEA Bulletin 46/2, (March, 2005). 26 “The Non-Proliferation Treaty in an Era of Proliferation Crises,” in Nuclear Weapons After the 2010 NPT Review Conference, ed. Jean Pascal Zanders (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2010). 27 Michael Krepon, Review of A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order, by William Walker (Routledge, 2011), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_03/Building_a_Nuclear_Order, (accessed on September 15, 2014).
5 “The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,”28 by T.V. Paul is robust critique on the structural flaws in the NPT. Paul instead of demanding to discard the NPT due to its inherited flaws emphasized to maintain the prevalent nuclear order. Paul regards the NPT as a revolutionary development and prerequisite for maintaining world peace, thwarting nuclear war and nuclear anarchy. Paul has therefore prescribed changes in the prevailing nuclear order. Paul argues India developed nuclear weapons program in reaction to systemic forces that denied rightful place of India in the preexistent world system. Further, May, 1998, tests were conducted as nuclear haves who refused to implement Article VI, disarmament clause of the NPT.
Major amount of the literature available on nuclear proliferation explains the phenomenon of proliferation through security perspective. Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexander Debs in “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,”29 highlights that states pursue nuclear proliferation/weapons development due to their access to nuclear technology and fissile material. Yet, other factors play dominant role in nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. First, states not faced with eminent security threats do not tend to develop nuclear weapon. Second, weak states divert course of civil nuclear program for nuclear weapons development if powerful ally protect it from preventive attacks. Monteiro and Debs claim that nuclear proliferation has decelerated in the post Soviet era. This academic research aims to strengthen security theory of nuclear horizontal proliferation.
In post India-Pakistan nuclear tests era analysts‟ highlighted different patterns of nuclear proliferation. Bhumitra Chakma in Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons30 while analyzing Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program maintained that security concerns played dominant role in Pakistan‟s nuclear weaponisation. Chakma asserts that Indian refusal to sign the NPT, Homi Bhaba‟s claim that India can develop nuclear weapons in 18 months and Indian interference in 1971 Pakistan‟s Civil War, intensified Pakistan‟s security dilemma. Due to these factors Pakistan converted its nuclear program from peaceful purposes to pursue military objectives.
28 T.V. Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Fall, 1998). 29 Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexander Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,” International Security, 39, No. 2, (Fall, 2014). 30 Bhumitra Chakma, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons (London: Routledge, 2009).
6 Samina Ahmed and David Cortright in Pakistan and the Bomb31 (an edited volume) claim that India played dominant role in Pakistan‟s weaponisation process. Growing Indian conventional military power and its interference in Pakistan‟s civil war dominated strategic thinking of Pakistani security apparatus.
Patterns of India and Pakistan nuclear proliferation have divided specialists on the subject matter. „Nuclear optimists‟ believe nuclear weapons thwart intra-state wars. Kenneth N. Waltz in “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” 32 suggests controlled nuclear proliferation. Contrarily, „nuclear pessimists‟ opine that mere presence of nuclear weapons is dangerous. It can be used deliberately or inadvertently by NWS during war.33 Scott D. Sagan is one of the renowned pessimists. Sagan and Miller in “Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation?”34 expressed grave concerns over spread of nuclear technology, reactors and fissile material. Both fear that unconstrained proliferation will result in violation of IAEA safeguard system leading to clandestine nuclear weapons development. The study prescribes that prior to supplying nuclear technology the IAEA should ensure that recipient state enjoys political stability and it has zero tolerance for corruption. It will prevent nuclear black-market access to nuclear material and technology. Second, the IAEA inspectors will ensure that the recipient state abides by the Article II of the NPT. Third, if recipient state is victim of terrorism it will guarantee safety and security of nuclear facilities. It will prevent fissile material from falling into the wrong hands.
Nuclear optimists and pessimists have produced enormous literature on strategic stability/ instability. Mearsheimer in “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” 35 claims nuclear weapons are great equalizers it deter powerful states and prevent armed conflicts. Mearsheimer criticized Ukraine decision to dismantle or transfer inherited WMDs to Russia. Nuclear Ukraine would create fear of deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons fear that Russia would cease to exist as a functioning society would prevent Russian aggression. Mearsheimer claimed nuclear
31 Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Norte Dame: The University of Norte Dame Press, 1998). 32 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” Foreign Affairs, 91, No. 4 (July/August 2012). 33 Joseph M. Grieco, “Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Behavior in East Asia,” Policy Brief, No. 3, (August, 2012): 2. 34 Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?” American Academy of Science and Arts (Fall 2009), 35 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, 72, No. 2, (Summer, 1993).
7 deterrent is therefore vital for preserving peace in Europe and particularly Ukraine‟s sovereignty vis-à-vis nuclear armed aggressive Russia.
Waltz in “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,”36 build the case that economic sanctions and coercive policies cannot dissuade a determined state from developing nuclear weapons. Instead accelerate the pace and Iran may decide to develop and test a nuclear device. Second, Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Waltz highlights nuclear weapon induces caution, stabilizes regional strategic stability. Contrarily, Israel nuclear monopoly has fueled regional instability and tension. Iran development of nuclear deterrent will restore military balance and stabilize the region. Nonetheless, pessimists argue nuclear proliferation/ weapons development increases the chances of accidental wars, unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and results in instability. Harold Brown and John Deutch in “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,”37 aim to convince US government that nuclear deterrent is prerequisite for national security. Disarmament in the light of Article VI of the NPT is a fantasy as the scientific knowledge and technology required for nuclear bomb making cannot be disappeared. Yet, the US should take measures to halt nuclear proliferation i.e. it should reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Second, avoid qualitative changes and reduce the role of WMDs in military doctrine to encourage non-proliferation elsewhere. Third, US and its allies should offer incentives or impose sanction to prevent or slow the pace of nuclear proliferation.
Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan in, “Alternative Nuclear Futures,”38 highlight five problems resulting in nuclear terrorism. The list comprises of non-implementation of IAEA safeguards, insider threat, terrorists access to nuclear material, nuclear proliferation and attack on nuclear facilities. International nuclear marketplace is a politicized web based on interconnected states, non-proliferation regime and institutions. Decisions to provision nuclear material, reactors
36 Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” 4. 37 Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007. 38 Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan, “Alternative Nuclear Futures,” American Academy of Science and Arts (Winter 2010); John Deutch, “A Nuclear Posture for Today,” Foreign Affairs , 84, No. 1,(2005); John Deutch and Ernest Moniz, “Nuclear Power Can Work,” The New York Times, August 14, 2003; George P. Shultz, et al., “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent: Maintaining Confidence in Our Nuclear Arsenal is Necessary as the Number of Weapons Goes Down,” The Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2010; George Perkovich, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October, 2008): http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons.pdf, accessed on November 25, 2012; Hennery A. Kissinger, et al., “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation,” The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2011.
8 and fissile material to states are based on their preferences. It will determine the pace of spread of nuclear power.
Scott D. Sagan, in “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament,”39 argues that nuclear haves decision to disarm under Article VI of the NPT can halt nuclear proliferation. Nuclear haves will have to make the choice whether to live in nuclear weapons free world or under nuclear anarchy. Sagan in “The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security,” applied the “redundancy theory.”40 Sagan central objective is huge funds to secure nuclear facilities can result in nuclear terrorism through insider threat. Sagan concludes organizations can reject an imminent threat considering it as a misperception or low-probability. However, it can result in catastrophe. Second table exercises or discussions on future scenarios can help states to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Waltz in “A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?”41 concluded that nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapon. States posed with existential threat would build nuclear weapons to thwart war, preserve strategic stability and maintain its sovereign status. Sagan views without personnel reliability program nuclear material may fall into the wrong hands. Sagan highlights insider threat to nuclear weapons leading to nuclear nightmare. He believes nuclear weapon state is likely to become aggressor and resort to conventional misadventures. In order to prove his thesis he quoted Pakistan‟s example.
Optimists and pessimists schools of thought while discussing the impact of nuclear weapons have narrowed down their discussion to highlight implications of nuclear weapons for the strategic culture of India and Pakistan. Scott D. Sagan in Inside Nuclear South Asia, and edited volume expressed fears that nuclear weapons might be used in future. Sagan rejects nuclear optimists claim that more nuclear proliferation can stabilize strategic stability.42 Instead Sagan anticipates deliberate or accidental nuclear weapon is inevitable. Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way conclude that technological advancements, domestic pressure and alliances enable states to proliferate. In their views economic cooperation and trade rather than nuclear
39 Scott D. Sagan, “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament,” The MIT Press, 138, No. 4, (Fall, 2009). 40 Scott D. Sagan, “The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security,” Society for Risk Analysis, 24, No. 4, (2004): 936-937. 41 Scott D Sagan, Kenneth N. Waltz and Richard K. Betts, “A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?” Journal of International Affairs, 60, No. 2, (Spring/Summer 2007): 139. 42 Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).
9 arms race is a key to South Asian strategic stability. Sasikumar and Way hold major powers responsible for South Asian nuclear proliferation for their failure to provide security guarantees to both New Delhi and Islamabad. War can be thwarted and region stabilized if Kashmir issue is resolved.
Saira Khan in Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India- Pakistan, concludes overt nuclearization altered the pattern of relationship between South Asia‟s nuclear rivals.43 Crises disrupted peace initiatives including the Lahore Peace Process and the Agra Summit. Crisis inherits the probability of all-out war. Saira Khan concludes that serious conflict management technique Gradual Reduction in International Tension (GRIT) by a third party can bring both states on negotiations table to terminate the protracted conflict by resolving the Kashmir dispute. Khan suggests that South Asian states involved in protracted conflict should use deterrent strategies for crisis management and to thwart wars. India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia 44 is a productive dialogue between Sumit Gangualy and S. Paul Kapur. Gangualy and Kapur represent optimists and pessimists schools of thoughts. Gangualy represents proponents of nuclear deterrence theory. His central idea revolves around the belief that the mere presence of nuclear weapons stabilized South Asian strategic stability.45 Contrarily, Kapur asserts that nuclear deterrent emboldened Islamabad to bleed India by launching proxies and maintaining aggressive behavior. Conversely, deterrence breakdown in South Asia is inevitable in future.
E. Sridharan in The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations46 central objective of this edited volume is to prove through pattern of nuclear behaviors of India and Pakistan that they do not adapt to the expectations of deterrence theory evolved during the Cold War. Authors of various chapters in this book applied teachings of Bernard Brodie, Glenn Snyder, Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver. Sridharan asserts that Indian nuclear posture is based on first, prestige and; second to deter/ fight two front wars. Nuclear deterrence theory and neo-realist theory is applied for the completion of this academic research.
43 Saira Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan (New York: Routledge, 2010). 44 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (Columbia University Press, 2010). 45 Ibid. 46 E. Sidharan, The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations (London: Routledge, 2007).
10 Domestic reasons led to India and Pakistan nuclearization. “Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan‟s Posture,” by Rasul Bakhsh Rais views nuclear weapons as instrument of war aversion.
Naeem A. Salik, in Learning to Live with the Bomb asserts tight control over country‟s nuclear program matured rigid nuclear culture. Covert nature creates ambiguity and no credible information is publicly available. Salik asserts objectives of Pakistan nuclear doctrine were made public after May, 1998, nuclear tests. However, nuclear doctrine is deliberately not announced to create ambiguity. In parallel to nuclear doctrine the author was tasked to prepare draft on nuclear command authority (NCA). Later, nuclear doctrine and the NCA were gradually evolved. Salik, in a detail chapter tried to dispel the negative impression regarding the safety and security of Pakistan nuclear weapon and fissile material. Salik claims fissile material, depots and nuclear weapons are heavily guarded to foil outside attacks. Personnel reliability program is designed to thwart insider threats of theft and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Salik concludes, Islamabad could not project its agreements with international organizations and cooperation with global community could not be projected well hence raises concerns globally.
Kalyan Kemburi in “Cruise Missiles in Southern Asia: Strategic Implications for China, India, and Pakistan,”47 while discussing the Indian nuclear deterrent believes that missiles and fighter jets are the main delivery vehicles for India to deliver nuclear weapons. Despite India launched nuclear capable submarine it will take some-time to deploy submarine launch missiles.
South Asia‟s Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective48 by Rajesh M. Basrur concludes that India-Pakistan leadership climbed escalation ladder by issuing harsh statements. However, leadership on both sides acknowledges that crises should be resolved peacefully as war is not a viable option in post nuclearized South Asia. Security analysts have applied numerous models to explain proliferation and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. “The Next Wave of Nuclear Proliferation,”49 by Nader Elhefnawy is based on hypothesis that Sagan‟s Security Model asserts that “states develops and relies on nuclear weapons to deter their nuclear
47 Kalyan Kemburi, “Cruise Missiles in Southern Asia: Strategic Implications for China,, India, and Pakistan,” in Project on Nuclear Issues: A Collection of Papers from the 2011 Conference Series, ed. Stephanie Spies and Mark Jansson Washington:Centre for Strategic and International Studies, August, 2012): 67. 48 Rajesh M. Basrur, South Asia‟s Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge, 2009). 49 Nader Elhefnawy, “The Next Wave of Nuclear Proliferation,” Parameters, 38, No 3, (2008)
11 adversaries,”50 illustrates Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons development. Elhefnawy asserts Islamabad developed nuclear weapons due to Indian nuclear tests. Samuel Black in The Changing Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Threats from 1970 to 201051 also applied security model to comprehend to Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program. Black‟s central argument is Pakistan relies on nuclear first use policy to deter India. Islamabad believes in “rationality of irrationality,” therefore it issued nuclear warnings to New Delhi. Islamabad endeavor to counterbalance India through external balancing failed.52 It employed rational deterrence theory under the umbrella of realist philosophy. Rational deterrence theory encourages states to respond to changes in their strategic environment by introducing strategic reforms.
South Asia‟s Nuclear Security by Bhumitra Chakma underlines excesses of optimists and pessimists‟ viewpoint.53 Chakma prescribes to adapt rational approach regarding nuclear security of the region. Chakma termed South Asia as a nuclear laboratory. South Asian nuclear politics is distinct in nature. Conversely, the Cold War era strategies cannot be applied on it. New Delhi and Islamabad in the second nuclear age are typical cases for horizontal nuclear proliferation so nuclear weapons disarmament is unlikely. Efficacy of nuclear deterrence thwarted India-Pakistan wars in 1980s. Credibility of deterrence was proven during 1999 Kargil Crisi and 2001-02 Twin peaks stand-off. Chakma concludes instead-of employing unattainable policy of disarmament deterrence should be stabilized. However, it seems disarmament is unrealistic as India introduced SLBMs while Islamabad increased (weapons grade) fissile material production. Both nuclear rivals though adhere to credible minimum deterrence yet involved in competition and arms race. Chakma views that terrorists threats and Chinese involvement in the region is problematique.
“India and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons,”54 by Sharon Squassoni underscores competitive “militarization,”55 in Sout Asia. Squassoni believe that India advanced its nuclear program using Uranium for peaceful purposes and Plutonim route to achieve military objectives in future if required. Currently, New Delhi has small proportion of weapons grade fissile material. However,
50 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? 55. 51 Samuel Black, The Changing Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Threats from 1970 to 2010 (Washington: The Stimson Centre, 2010), 4. 52Chris Smith, India‟s AdHoc Arsenal: Direction Or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 267. 53 Bhumitra Chakma, South Asia‟s Nuclear Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2015). 54 Squassoni, “India and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons.” 55 Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century,” 433.
12 spent fuel procured from civilian nuclear complexes can enable India to increase stockpiles of weapons grade fissile material. Indian nuclear program remained under tight control therefore it is difficult to estimate exact number of Indian nuclear warheads. Squassoni while quoting US State Department claims that India will require at-least few days to deploy nuclear arsenals. It relies on fighter jets to deliver nuclear warheads to deal with Beijing and Islamabad. Pakistan, Squassoni notes, short range Hatf-2, medium range ballistic missiles Ghauri and F-16 aircrafts are considered as nuclear warheads delivery vehicles. It acquired missile technology from China and North Korea, Uranium enrichment technology and nuclear reactors were received from the West.
According to Sagan‟s Domestic Politics Model domestic elite advocate strong case for nuclear weaponization in pursuit to remain in power.56 Nuclear Logics: Constraining Paths in East Asia and the Middle East57 by Solingen, statesmen in closed political economies authorize nuclear weapons development to cement their rule. Export based economies aspires to integrate in the global economy so forgo nuclear weapons development. The central argument of this book is why several states develop while others forgo nuclear weapons development.
Statesmen desire to dominate the region also beget nuclear proliferation. According to Maliha Lodhi in “Security Challenges in South Asia,”58 Indian bureaucratic and ruling elite wants to dominate other South Asian states. India maintains 4th largest army in the world and it has also become a defacto nuclear state. Indian nuclear program is thus “status driven.” Sagan in his “Norms Model” asserts that states develop nuclear weapons because they believe that possession of nuclear weapons will boost up their prestige in the international community.59 Karsten Frey in “Nuclear Weapons As Symbols: the Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,”60 states that acquisition of nuclear weapons by new sates is prohibited under the norms of the NPT. However, some states think that they have made profound technological, industrial and military progress therefore they have the right to develop nuclear bomb. Their desire is status
56 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?”63. 57 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Constraining Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). 58 Maleeha Lodhi, “Security Challenges in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2001). 59 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?”, 76. 60 Karsten Frey, “Nuclear Weapons As Symbols: the Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making,” Institute of Barcelona d‟Estudis Internacionals, Working Paper 2006/3, available at http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/4273/WP_IBEI_3.pdf?sequence=1, accessed on December 5, 2012.
13 driven as they want to display their power in the international community. These status conscious states are thus opposed to the NPT preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to new states.
In post 9/11 era, a new trend has emerged as several scholars are discussing possibilities of either to incorporate India and Pakistan in the NPT or India alone. T.V. Paul,61 Rajiv Nayan,62 Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev, eds.,63 Mario Esteban Caranza,64 Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman have discussed this issue and the ramifications of it for the NPT.65 Other for instance, Thomas Graham Jr. and Anver Cohen in “An NPT for Non- members,” believe that instead of rolling back nuclear weapons programs both must be adjusted outside the treaty.66 The writings of Kenneth N. Waltz,67 Olav Njolstad (edited volume),68Clifton W. Sherrill69 and Mathew Kroenig,70concerns nuclear weapons proliferation. Central argument of these experts is statesmen decide to develop nuclear keeping in mind the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Statesmen allow nuclear weapons development owing to their belief that nuclear weapons are absolute security guarantors. Conversely, deter foreign threats.
Abbasi, 71 S. Paul Kapur, 72 Mario Esteban Carranza, 73 Kapur and Ganguly (edited volume), 74 and Zulfqar Khan (edited volume), 75 highlighted India-Pakistan nuclear weapons
61 T.V. Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Fall, 1998). 62 Rajiv Nayan, “The NPT and India: Accommodating the Exception,” Strategic Analysis, 34, No. 2, (March, 2010). 63 Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev, eds., Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2012). 64 Mario Esteban Caranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009). 65 Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, “Israel, India and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Association, (December, 2003), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman (accessed on February 1, 2014). 66 Anver `Cohen and Thomas Graham Jr., “An NPT for Non-members,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 60, No. 3, (May/ June, 2004): 6. 67 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Peace, Stability and Nuclear Weapons,” Policy Papers, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (August 1, 1995);Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” Foreign Affairs, 91, No. 4 (July/August 2012); Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” The American Political Science Review, 84, No. 3 (Sep 1990); Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988). 68 Njolstad, ed., Nuclear Proliferation and International Order. 69 Clifton W. Sherrill, “Why Iran Wants the Bomb and What It Means for US Policy,” Non Proliferation Review, 19, No. 1 (Routledge: March 2012). 70 Mathew Kroenig, “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects on Nuclear Proliferation,” Working Paper No . 2009-14 (November 2009). 71 Abbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo.
14 programs in their scholarly works. Afore-stated scholars generally agree that Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program was matured to deter imminent threat from India. Chronology of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program reveals that determined nuclear proliferating state can overcome technological barriers setup by the international watchdog agencies and non-proliferation norms based on the NPT, to slow the pace or to prevent states from developing nuclear weapons. Karsten Frey,76 Rajiv Nayan,77 Bidwai, Vanaik and Roy (edited volume),78 and Mohammad B. Alam (edited volume)79 agree that Indian nuclear weapons program was driven because of three factors to get major power status, boost security and the domestic reasons.
Bhumitra Chakma,80 Karsten Frey,81 A. Rajaraman,82 Sharad Joshi,83 S. Chandrashekar, Arvind Kumar and Rajaram Nagappa,84 Manpreet Sethi,85 Sverre Lodgaard,86 former Pakistani Brigadiers Naeem Ahmed Salik87 and Feroz Hassan Khan,88 Dennis M. Gormley,89 S. D. Muni
72 S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2008). 73 Mario Esteban Carranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009). 74 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur (eds), Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb (London: Routledge, 2009). 75 Zulfqar Khan, ed., Nuclear Pakistan: Strategic Dimensions (Oxford University Press, 2011). 76 Karsten Frey, India‟s Nuclear Bomb and National Security (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Karsten Frey, “States Interests and Symbolism in India‟s Nuclear Build-Up,” South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Heidellberg, Working Paper No. 8 (Oct, 2002). 77 Rajiv Nayan, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and India, (New York: Routledge, 2012). 78 Praful Bidwai, Achin Vanaik and Arundhati Roy, eds., New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament (New York: Olive Branche Press, 2000). 79 Mohammed B. Alam, ed., Essays on Nuclear Proliferation (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1995). 80 Bhumitra Chakma, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine, and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age,” Security Challenges, 2, No. 2, (July, 2006). 81 Karsten Frey, India‟s Nuclear Bomb and National Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2006). 82 A. Rajaraman, “Battlefield Weapons and Missile Defense: Worrisome Developments in Nuclear South Asia,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 70, No. 2, (2014). 83 Sharad Joshi, “India and Pakistan Missile Race Surges On,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (October, 2007), http://cns.miis.edu/other/wmdi071008d.htm (accessed on February 9, 2014). 84S. Chandrashekar, Arvind Kumar and Rajaram Nagappa, An Assessment of Pakistan‟s Ballistic Missile Programme: Technical and Strategic Capability (Bangalore: National Institute of Advance Studies, 2006). 85 Manpreet Sethi, “Devaluing Nuclear Weapons: Difficult, But Desirable,” in in Nuclear Deterrence and Diplomacy, eds. Jasjit Singh and Manpreet Sethi (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004). 86 Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free- World? (New York: Routledge, 2011). 87 Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Missile Issues in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Summer, 2002). 88 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia,”inEscalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, eds., Michael Krepon (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004). 89Dennis M. Gormley, “Winning on Ballistic Missile but Losing on Cruise: The Missile Proliferation Battle,” Arms Control Association,https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_12/Gormley, (accessed on December 21, 2014); Bharat Karnad, India‟s Nuclear Policy (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008).
15 and Vivek Chadha, eds.,90 Vernie Liebl91 and Debak Das,92 have produced scholarly literature on new military technological trends introduced by South Asia‟s arch rivals. Literature concerns rising asymmetry, deterrence dynamics i.e. nuclear doctrines direct or indirect challenges posed to the NPT by both India and Pakistan.
Experts on war doctrines strategies include, two sets or versions for instance Indian version and Pakistani version. Indian war strategy includes Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), though it was later rejected by Indian government officials.93 It was announced in April, 2004, by Indian General V.P. Malik. Iram Khalid in “Nuclear Security Dilemma of Pakistan,” 94 critically examined the doctrine and termed it dangerous for the future of South Asian strategic stability. Additional features of CSD have been discussed by various other experts on the subject including Vinod Kumar,95 J Sankaran,96 Muhammad Azam Khan,97 Omar Qasim,98 Ladwig III,99 Ali Ahmed,100 Shashank Joshi101 and Gurmeet Kanwal.102 Pakistan‟s response to Indian CSD and military designs is discussed by various experts on the subject matter list includes Zachary Keck,103 Ashok Sharma,104 Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon,105 Khan and Abbasi,106 S. Paul
90S D Muni and Vivek Chadha, eds., Asian Strategic Review (New Delhi: PENTAGON Press, 2013). 91Vernie Liebl, “Indian and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines,” Comparative Strategy, 28, No. 2, (2009). 92 Debak Das, “India and Pakistan Missile Flexing: Cursing Toward Regional Stability,” IPCS, 30, No. 1, (January- March, 2013). 93 “India Has No Cold Start„ Doctrine: Army Chief,” NDTV,(December 2, 2010), http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/india-has-no-cold-start-doctrine-army-chief-70159 (accessed June 13, 2015). 94 Iram Khalid, “Nuclear Security Dilemma of Pakistan,” Journal of Political Studies, 20, Issue, 1, (2013). 95A. Vinod Kumar, “A Cold Start: India‟s Response to Pakistan-Aided Low-Intensity Conflict,” Strategic Analysis, 33, No. 3, (May, 2009). 96Jaganath Sankaran, “The Enduring Power of Bad Ideas: „Cold Start‟ and Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in South Asia,” Arms Control Association, 44, No. 9, (November, 2014). 97Muhammad Azam Khan, “India‟s Cold Start is Too Hot,” US Naval Institute, 137/3/1,297, (March, 2011). 98Omar Qasim, “Too Cold to Start,” Spearhead Research,(December 27, 2010), idsa.in/system/files/jds_4_4_aahmed.pdf, (accessed on December 21, 2013). 99Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army‟s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security, 32, No. 3, (Winter, 2007). 100Ali Ahmed, “Cold Start and the Sehjra Option,” Journal of Defence Studies, 4, No. 4, (October, 2010). 101Shashank Joshi, “India‟s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 36, No. 4, (2013). 102 Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal (New Delhi Knowledge World and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2001). 103Zachary Keck, “India “Cold Start,” and Pakistani Tactical Nukes,” The Diplomat, (May 8, 2013). 104Ashok Sharma, “The Enduring Conflict and the Hidden Risk of India-Pakistan War,” SAIS Review, XXXII, No. 1, (Winter-Spring, 2012). 105Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon, “Lets End the Peril of a Nuclear Winter,” The New York Times (February 11, 2016).
16 Kapur107 and Michael Krepon, Ziad Haider and Charles Thornton108 and Arvind Kumar.109 These experts have discussed possible future war scenarios, development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and the possibility of nuclear exchange in the region based on Pakistan‟s response to Indian military adventurism.
Research Gaps Highlighted by this Study
Now the study assesses and finds gap between the existing literature available on the subject for instance, India-Pakistan, though, are non-signatories to the NPT yet they have posed challenges to the NPT. The post nuclear tests challenges to the NPT stems from conventional and nuclear arms race, and accidental use of nuclear weapons during crisis like situation. Lack of early warning system further increases the likelihood of nuclear exchange due to the border proximity which provides limited time to confirm an attack by the enemy. The complex history further creates suspicion, mutual trust deficit and increased security dilemma. There is also a heightened possibility of preemptive strikes in the backdrop of their continuing hostility. The existing literature shows considerable gaps to understand how India and Pakistan challenges the NPT.
Central Argument
Central objective of this study is to understand rising deterrent force asymmetry in South Asia that marginalizes the status of the NPT and hampers its relevance and efficacy in the future security order. The central argument in this study is that deterrence can be stabilized and war averted in South Asia under the NPT framework.
106Zulfqar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi, “Regional Centric Deterrence: Reassessing its Efficacy for South Asia,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 25, No. 4, (December, 2013). 107S. Paul Kapur, “The Effects on South Asia of Deep US Nuclear Reductions,” The Nonproliferation Review, 20, No. 2, (2013). 108 Michael Krepon, Ziad Haider and Charles Thornton, “Are Tactical Nuclear Weapons Needed in South Asia?” in Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones and Ziad Haider (Washington, D.C: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004). 109Arvind Kumar and Michael Vonnoni, Ballistic Missile Proliferation in Southern Asia: Options for Stabilization (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2004).
17 Research Questions This study also endeavors to examine the causes of vertical nuclear proliferation outside the NPT in South Asia and its implications for the treaty. The research goes beyond the existing literature and also raises the following set of questions,
1. Why do India and Pakistan consider nuclear weapons imperative for their national security? 2. How India and Pakistan pose challenges to the NPT? 3. What is the future status of India and Pakistan‟s membership in the context of the NPT?
What is New in this Research?
Question here arises what is new in this academic research? The available literature reveals that various studies are though available on India and Pakistan nuclear proliferation behavior, nuclear postures, nuclear arms race, India-Pakistan rejection of the NPT and doctrinal developments. However, there is dearth of literature on India-Pakistan‟s nuclear modernization and its challenge to the NPT. Preexistent literature could not highlight internal and external/ direct and indirect challenges posed by South Asia‟s nuclear adversaries to the NPT. Second, theoretical model applied in this study endeavors to encourage the NPT depository states to bring both India and Pakistan into the NPT framework. It suggests that the creation of the NPT Secretariat by the treaty‟s depository states will facilitate New Delhi and Islamabad to sign nuclear restraint regime by offering both the conditional NSG membership (the NPT and the NSG+ India-Pakistan/ 2 formula). It is a completely new approach and endeavors to stabilize deterrence in South Asia, through the NPT. Third, this research discusses and endeavors to relate Indian nuclear doctrine challenges the NPT from futuristic perspective. Fourth, it brings into limelight how various articles of the NPT are being undermined by both India and Pakistan. Fifth, there is no single solution to stabilize deterrence stability findings of this study are completely new. It highlights a new dimension of the NPT for instance the NPT can restore peace and stabilize nuclear deterrence in South Asia. Conversely peace can be achieved in South Asia through the NPT framework. This study has traced the origins of Indian offensive Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). After carrying careful analysis of the CSD, Calusewitz and Herman Kahn‟s strategies it is claimed in this study alone that the aims and the objectives of the CSD have been borrowed from Clausewitz‟s indirect strategy/ approach. Further, popular notion that
18 India should capture narrow strip inside Pakistan through military operation is borrowed from Herman Kahn‟s teachings. Hence, the CSD is merely replica of the Clausewitz indirect strategy and Herman Kahn‟s teachings.
Theoretical Framework
For the completion of this study liberalism, realism and off-shoots of realism were found appropriate theoretical approaches. Liberalism helps in containing spread of nuclear weapons through institutional mechanism. Theory helps in understanding the process that led to the development non-proliferation mechanism based on the NPT. India and Pakistan can be brought directly or indirectly into the NPT framework by developing institutional mechanism in the light of liberal teachings. It will help in strengthening the non-proliferation norms in general and the NPT particularly. Further, institutional mechanism will help in stabilizing the deterrence in South Asia to achieve most warranted peace. Realism and offshoots of realist school were applied to enable the readership in order to understand strategic policies devised by New Delhi and Islamabad. It helps to grasp reason deter for developing India and Pakistan nuclear weapons program, behavior, how both states incorporated nuclear weapons in their national security policies and nuclear doctrines. Further, realism explains vicious cycle of South Asian security dilemma, nuclear arms race and rising asymmetry. It provides understanding that why both South Asian nuclear rivals would remain outside the NPT framework and continue to challenge the non-proliferation norms. Further, liberalism serves the purpose to relate India and Pakistan case with the NPT and it can also stabilize nuclear deterrence in South Asia.
For the in-depth theoretical understanding of the present research, a comprehensive debate is deployed in chapter one. Yet, the succeeding paragraphs precisely analyze the substantial features of liberalism, realism and off-shoots of realism. It endeavors to relate these theories with this thesis.
Realism
Realism explicates about the South Asian non-signatories of NPT relating to their stance for the denial of the treaty and the supporting approach of realism i.e. Neo-realism reveals adequate understanding about the region. It provides guidance to comprehend the strategic competition between India and Pakistan, Indian hegemonic aspirations, Pakistan‟s
19 countermeasures, nuclear arms race, rising asymmetry and in identifying the contours of South Asian strategic stability. It also contributes to estimate the nuclear proliferation, the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and security dilemma in South Asia. John J. Mearsheimer anticipated intensification of nuclear weapons in post Cold War era. In his view, the NPT will be confronted, by aspirant states to acquire nuclear weapons, for avoiding the blackmailing of the military powerful states and states possessing nuclear weapons.110 Mearsheimer‟s calculation verified when India-Pakistan carried out nuclear tests in 1998. India conducted nuclear tests for the second time on11 and 13 May, 1998,111 it tilted South Asian strategic balance in India‟s favor. Indian government officials made best use of their dominance threatening statements against Pakistan. They tried to dictate new rules of engagement to Pakistan.112 L.K. Advani, the then Indian Home Minister while addressing a press briefing stated “Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the world [and] roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir.” 113 Later, Advani threatened that Indian security forces will carry-out operations against Pakistan backed fighters inside Pakistan administered Kashmir if necessary.114Such aggressive statements intensified Pakistan‟s security dilemma that invigorated its commitment on not to compromise its sovereignty. Thus, Pakistani government headed by the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif authorized to conduct nuclear tests on May 28, 1998.115 Nawaz Sharif stated “we never wanted to participate in this nuclear race.” 116 India realized that strategic balance has been restored in the sub-continent after Pakistani nuclear tests.
110John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, 72, No. 3(Summer 1993), 61. 111 Morten Bremer Maerli and Sverre Lodgaard, ed., Nuclear Proliferation and International Security (New York: Routledge, 2007): 152. 112 Ibid. 113 Quoted in Kenneth J. Cooper, “key Indian Official Warns Pakistan,” Washington Post Foreign Service, May 19, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/southasia/stories/indiawarn051998.htm, accessed on June 27, 2012. 114 George Iype, “Advani Wants troops to Strike Across LoC to Quell Proxy War in Kashmir,” Rediff, May 25, 1998, http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/may/25geo.htm, accessed on June 27, 2012. 115 Jonathan Medalia, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments, Congressional Research Service, (December 7, 2011): 10. 116 “1998: World fury at Pakistan‟s Nuclear Tests,” BBC, May 28, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/28/newsid_2495000/2495045.stm, accessed on June 26, 2012.
20 Both nuclear rivals proclaimed to avoid nuclear arms race and to maintain minimum nuclear deterrence. Both countries neither explained nor defined what is meant by minimum?117
The remaining approaches of realism include balance of power (BOP) theory, Kenneth N. Waltz‟s “rational deterrence theory,” security dilemma, and general debate between optimist and pessimist school of thought are applied in succeeding chapters to understand various dimensions of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and their implications for the NPT.
Neo-realism is also known as structural realism is advanced by Kenneth N. Waltz. Structural theory, according to Waltz is that, “survival is the goal of states and that power is one of the means to that end.”118 By structure, neo-realists, refers to international system, which is derived of interaction among international state actors. It is thus based on assumptions that international system is anarchic, “all states possess offensive military capabilities, states can never be certain about the intentions of other states, survival is the basic aim of states and states are rational actors.” 119 Anarchy and uneven distribution of power remains a prominent feature of this structure. These features restrain the states from taking certain steps.120 Due to the absence of international policeman, states are uncertain that “today‟s friend will not be tomorrow‟s enemy.”121 Neo-realism anticipates that powerful states would overrun weak states if they find use of force appropriate. Power accusation deters antagonist from launching attack.122 Waltz emphasizes that according to theory of structural realism uni-polar system is most unstable international system.123 Clouds of mistrust, suspicions and mutual trust deficit occupy policies of international actors.124 Survival, security or self-preservation remains the basic and primary goal for international actors. Weak states either join hands with powerful states, to make coalition, or increase their military muscles. In each case states want to maintain balance their powers against
117 Rodney Jones, “Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: an Overview,” Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2002/04/10/minimum-nuclear-deterrence-postures-in- south-asia-overview/pec, accessed on June 27, 2012. 118 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories”, American Political Science Review, 91, No. 4 (December, 1997): 913. 119 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 120 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neo Realist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs, http://labmundo.org/disciplinas/WALTZ_realist_thought_and_neorealist_theory.pdf, accessed on November 20, 2012. 121 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000): 10. 122 Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” 616. 123Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” 915. 124 Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” 619.
21 potential aggressors and ensure their survival.125 Barry Buzan defines security as “pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile. The bottom line for security is survival.”126 However, efforts to maximize one‟s power creates sense of insecurity known as security dilemma- efforts to solidify one‟s own security creates sense of insecurity in opponents and compel the opponents to increase its power. “Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power completion ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on-”127 in opponent. In completion of this study neo-realism is applied as a model, which creates basic instinct in states to increase their powers not to pursue hegemonic designs rather to survive in international system. Realism helps in the understanding of the international structure and struggle of the international actors to survive in this system. Theory suggests that states can defend themselves by grasping more and more power.128 Neo- realism also argues that states interests combined with their power play dominant role in signing of various international statutes.129Neo-realism is interlinked with issues concerning national security. Theory is therefore granted the status as best theory that assists in explaining why states develop nuclear weapons. 130 Neo-realism best identifies common factors which led India- Pakistan to develop their nuclear weapons.
Deterrence Theory
Deterrence is procedures which enable a state in international arena to persuade another state or an alliance of states from taking a course of action. Potential offender is stopped from taking unpleasant act through potential or actual use of force.131 Credibility of deterrence can be based on:
i. Danger of application of force.
125 Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” 915. 126 Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century,” International Affairs, 67, No. 3 (Blackwell, July 1991): 432. 127 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 2, No. 2 (Jan 1950): 157. 128 James Whitcomb Riley, “How Realistic is Realism,” E-International Relations, (March 2, 2008), available at, http://www.e-ir.info/2008/03/02/how-realistic-is-realism/, accessed on September 12, 2012. 129Abbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo, 29. 130 Solingen, Nuclear Logics, 11. 131 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden, Polity Press, 2004): 8.
22 ii. Second, enemy should realize that force would be applied if unwanted action is taken. Credible deterrence works as an anticipatory mechanism, maintains the status quo and finally overcomes the danger of “caught by surprise” by the enemy or potential aggressor.132 Deterrent strategy is best suited for states that are under constant threat from powerful enemy. During the Cold War, US and its NATO allies feared of Soviet aggression against Western Europe. US policymakers devised comprehensive strategy, based on enormous conventional military might and nuclear deterrence, to deal with the Soviet threat in order to secure US mainland, its allies and interests.133 Bernard Brodie best expressed the phenomenon of deterrence backed by nuclear forces. He asserted that “the chief purpose of US military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them.” 134 This model can also be applied on India- Pakistan‟s rivalry.
Glenn Snyder‟s theory of „deterrence by denial‟ that states “deterree is certain that the deterrer will fight and expose denied action if he has appropriate (nuclear) forces. Fundamental question for the aggressor is whether these forces are strong enough to prevent him for making gains?”135 It would help in understanding and explaining;
a. Pakistan‟s declared nuclear posture, which is based on first use.136 b. Failure of major powers and international institution to change Pakistan‟s stance about the possession of nuclear weapons. c. Why Pakistan would prefer to strengthen its nuclear forces rather than joining the NPT as NNWS.
Liberalism
Liberalism offers basic understanding for the development of non-proliferation mechanism based on the NPT. Likewise liberal philosophy is applied on Indo-Pak strategic architecture to investigate and link it to the NPT. The prerequisites for the endorsement of NPT
132 Ibid, 11. 133 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly, 110, No. 2, (Summer, 1995): 166. 134 Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security, 2, No. 4, (Spring, 1978). 135 Carranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order, 19. 136 Rodney W. Jones, “Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia,” SASSU Research Paper, No. 1, (March, 2005): 13.
23 on India and Pakistan are also incorporated to bring India and Pakistan into the NPT framework directly or indirectly to strengthen the treaty and deter potential nuclear proliferation.
Liberal theory is a dominant theme of international relations. International politics once dominated by sovereign states is transformed according to liberal‟s philosophy. Presently, even non-state actors also have a significant role in manipulating and determining diplomatic, military and economic affairs. The supporting approaching of liberalism i.e. Neo Liberalism and Political Liberalism also contribute in transforming the existing global scenario. Prominent scholars of liberalism include John Locke,137 Jean Jacques Rousseau,138 Thomas Hobbes139 and Immanuel Kant 140 are considered as the founding fathers of liberalism. Liberal theorists assert that cooperation integrates sovereign states, generates interdependence and ultimately exacerbates stability and peace at the global level. Liberal institutionalism and offshoots of liberalism are selected for accomplishment and it will be applied for the ultimate understanding of the institution building particularly for the signing of the NPT. Major work on theory was carried out in 1950s and 1960s.141 However, work on regionalism in the 1980s, led to the development of the regime theory. Nonetheless it was renamed as neoliberal institutionalism.142 Robert Keohane, Lisa Martin143 and Joseph Nye Jr. are the noticeable advocates of liberal institutionalism in contemporary era. Keohane and Martin uphold the concept of cooperation, importance of institutions in international politics and explicate mechanisms of institutions. It is argued that “cooperation among nations,” is an art. 144 The key to successful cooperation lies in the professionalism of representatives negotiating on behalf of the participating or concerned states. It is the responsibility of mediators to explore the mechanism of cooperation for dominant states.
137 John Locke, The Second Treaties of Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967 ([1689]). 138 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, G. D. H. Cole (trans) (New York: Dutton, 1973 [1762]). 139 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948 [1651]). 140 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, John Ladd (trans) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965 [1797]). 141 “Compare and Contrast Neoliberal Institutionalist and Constructivist Approaches to International Organisations,” https://barbradozier.wordpress.com/2012/12/19/compare-and-contrast-neoliberal-institutionalist- and-constructivist-approaches-to-international-organizations/, (accessed on December 20, 2015). 142 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook on International Relations, eds. Christian Reus- Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 203. 143 Robert Keoane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, 20, No. 1, ( Summer, 1995). 144 Zulfiqar Hussain, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Cabinet Division, Islamabad (December 17, 2017).
24 This study demonstrates that the enormous material is available, intellectually elaborated and defined rising deterrent force asymmetry in South Asia, challenges to the NPT, future role of the NPT and India-Pakistan, non-NPT states, nuclear behaviour and potential dangers posed by South Asian nuclear states to regional peace. Study correlates rising deterrent force asymmetry of India-Pakistan with the NPT. It further analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the NPT with relevance to nuclear behavior of India-Pakistan. This study in the light of realism explains how India and Pakistan are cracking various Articles of the NPT and undermining the efficacy of the treaty. Finally this study attempts to apply liberalism in pursuit to stabilize nuclear deterrence in South Asia.
Plan of Research
This study comprises of seven chapters. Chapter one, discusses the significance and relevance of the aforementioned theories for accomplishing of this study. It also confers the structure of the international system and explains the phenomenon of nuclear weapons development from realist perspective. However, liberalism is also applied to explain collaboration of international community to fight against nuclear proliferation. Effort is made to explain why states make decisions either to develop or forgo nuclear weapons program.
Chapter two, attempts to explain the development of the NPT and its supportive non- proliferation mechanism including, the IAEA, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the NPT review conferences.
Chapter three, discusses historical events from realist lens to explain the development of India-Pakistan nuclear weapons programs. It highlights the technological, economic, political and strategic problems confronted by the NPT outlier states. A brief section highlights missile programs of South Asian nuclear competitors.
Chapter Four, highlights the role of non-weaponized deterrence in South Asia. A brief segment brings into limelight the debate between nuclear optimists and pessimists. It highlights dangers and stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons on South Asian strategic milieu. Kargil war, the resurgence of stability/instability paradox and India-Pakistan May-June, 1999 crisis are discussed in the context of South Asian strategic environment.
25 Chapter Five, highlights India and Pakistan 1998, overt nuclearisation. It briefly discusses the impact of South Asian nuclear tests on the NPT. Debate also focuses on the development of India-Pakistan nuclear doctrines and how these doctrines pose challenges to the NPT. Nuclear weapons cannot be managed without a proper set of rules. Therefore; the development of India- Pakistan nuclear command and control (C2) system is also discussed with relevance to its significance about nuclear stocks of both nuclear rivals. India-Pakistan C2 System is discussed within realist perspective. The development of Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrine is evaluated according to deterrence by denial model.
Chapter Six, examines the contradictory policy of mainly US and Australia, members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), through facilitating India to acquire nuclear technology and material from international community and challenge the NPT. In broader term this section highlights Indian involvement in horizontal proliferation. It evaluates how these states facilitate India to produce additional stocks of fissile material, qualitatively and quantitatively expand its nuclear force structure. This chapter aspires to prove that Pakistan and China are cooperating in nuclear arena in the light of the IAEA directions.
Chapter Seven, starts with India-Pakistan military standoff 2001-2003, followed by the Indian development of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) to punish Pakistan which further exacerbates threats to Pakistan‟s security. Pakistan responded by increasing production of nuclear capable missiles, introducing more compact solid fuel propelled battlefield nuclear missiles to deter India. However, developments such as “Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MARVs) by Islamabad threatened New Delhi and resulted in countermoves by India for instance short range battlefield Prahar missile, nuclear cruise missile Nirhbay, short range Brahmos cruise missile, the long range Agni-V missile and New Delhi‟s pursuit to modernize Indian air force through the purchase 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). A joint collaboration between IAF and DRDO enabled India to integrate Astra missile with Su-30 fighter jet and Tejas. New Delhi‟s substantial efforts include attempts to complete nuclear triad by developing short range surface to surface Dhanush missile, nuclear capable short range K-15 ballistic missiles and medium range K-4 missile. Indian deployment of nuclear submarines in Indian Ocean and sub-marine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The enduring India-Pakistan competitiveness results in more dangerous conventional
26 and nuclear arms race. The region has become one of the most volatile and dangerous place of the world.
Chapter Eight, is focused on accessing the changes and developments occurring in international arena, with regard to non-proliferation efforts of the international community. Introductory portion claims that the traditional nuclear order which was evolved during Cold War era by superpowers is under stress particularly by the holdout states in their own favor. It is also asserted the development of neo-international order is the outcome of steady developments in nuclear arena. This section also discusses about perks and privileges enjoyed by India due to American influence. It also evaluates the efforts of international community to strengthen the NPT‟s hold on the activities of the states to prevent or slow down nuclear proliferation/ weapons development.145 This section precisely evaluates the future role of the NPT and the membership status of India and Pakistan. Concluding part draws the outcome of this thesis and confirms the hypothesis thereby, testing the adequacy of the theories.
Methodology
This thesis proceeds along three interconnected tracks: first Conceptual and Theoretical Innovation: the theme taken from liberalism and guidelines borrowed from realism and theory‟s offshoots such as neo-realism and nuclear deterrence theory. Liberalism helped in understanding the developmental process of the NPT and non-proliferation mechanism based on the treaty. Theory also helped in testing the role of international institutions in regulating states, members of non-proliferation mechanism, behavior to thwart nuclear proliferation. The teachings of liberalism are applied in concluding section to stabilize nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan through the NPT‟s framework. Second, Comparative Analysis: To fully understand India-Pakistan‟s nuclear proliferation behavior and their rejection of the NPT. India‟s nuclear program, which is prestige driven case due to New Delhi‟s search for global status and regional hegemonic designs yet security parameters played minimal role, changed Pakistan‟s behavior towards global non-proliferation. Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program and rejection of the NPT cannot be dealt with separately from that of India. To change Pakistan‟s stance towards the NPT it is prerequisite to change India‟s behavior. To change India‟s behavior there is a need to change
145 Michael Krepon, (Co-Founder, Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.) Emailed interview, (September 17, 2018).
27 the behavior of the NWS overall. This is why the study argues that India and Pakistan case is systemically linked with other members of the international community. The increased role of India and Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons in their national security policies prevents NWS from implementing Article VI, disarmament clause of the treaty. On the other hand the efficacy and efficient deterrent role of India and Pakistan nuclear weapons provokes non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to clandestinely develop nuclear weapons in violation of the Article II of the NPT. Change in the behavior of states at the global level that can bring change in Indian state behavior in South Asia. A change in Indian nuclear proliferation behavior would provoke and lead to a change in Pakistan‟s behavior. This aspect of the research employs a qualitative approach.
Qualitative research method is prescribed as an appropriate method to investigate and explore event, institutional functioning or processes. It enables researchers to deeply understand and explain a particular phenomenon in terms of what, why and how. In pursuit to complete this research qualitative method endowed this researcher to understand Indian nuclear proliferation behavior on one hand and Pakistan‟s strategic choices to rely on nuclear weapons vis-à-vis India for its security on the other. Qualitative method draws on recent work on India nuclear developments, nuclear accords and conventional military buildup that tilts deterrent force asymmetry vis-à-vis Pakistan in its favor. It resultantly examines how Pakistani policymakers interact on the issue of using nuclear weapons to deter Indian aggression and discards the NPT. Third, Regime Analysis: this examines the significance, role and structure of the non- proliferation mechanism and its impact on the NPT. It includes the IAEA safeguards, the NPT review conferences and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) special wavier granted to India. These are matters of significance as these tools are significant in changing state behavior.
For the completion of this thesis Contemporary Case Study Methodology is utilized. Interdisciplinary literature from international relations, strategic studies, security studies and history provides insights for the case study method in qualitative research. Available literature on India and Pakistan nuclear weapons program was analyzed with an aim to assess the past turbulent relations and understand the ongoing conventional and nuclear competition. The data on the subject, in the form of analysis of the experts on the subject published in the form of
28 interviews, journals, magazines, books, articles and seminar held on the subject, was consulted. The data collected are organized with an eye toward the bodies of literature reviewed above. Conceptual and theoretical analysis is framed within the theoretical schools of liberalism and realism, offshoots or realist school including neo-realism, security dilemma, rational deterrence theory and balance of power theory.
The form of triangulation in this research project is investigative i.e. personal, Skype, telephonic and emailed interviews, examining academic and policy literature; primary material as well as secondary sources stretching from the date of efforts started to contain nuclear proliferation to the finalization of the NPT were consulted. The significant portion stretches since the May, 1998 nuclear tests by India-Pakistan. This study focuses on how India-Pakistan nuclear tests and their nuclear modernization challenged the NPT. How can deterrence be stabilized and peace achieved in South Asia? Preceding questions are formulated in an effort to illuminate both abstract and concrete ideas. The limitations which were faced while conducting this research includes fist, keeping in view the security aspects there was question of access to military practitioners owing to highly fortified offices aimed to prevent outsiders‟ entry. Secondly, I consulted relevant material available in libraries at national defence university, Quaid-i-Azam University, on internet in the form of memoirs, a disclosure of declassified documents, leaking of diplomatic cables by Wikileaks, US Congressional research reports, debates and hearings provided substantial assistance. However, it was inadequate and exact information could not be accessed due to the sensitivity of the issue and access to archives is not permissible. Third, the available literature on subject matter is written from Indian and Pakistani perspectives. Consequentially, it exhibits personal biases of the authors to manipulate, distort facts or hold the opponent statesmen responsible for military spending and competition. Fourth, I am serving in periphery city of Sargodha as an assistant professor. It lacks universities, think tanks, libraries and experts on the subject. Consequently, it was difficult to access libraries and conduct numerous interviews. Further, I could not avail study leave because of the strict policy and procedure set by the institution. This dissertation moves beyond the existing literature and bring into limelight how India and Pakistan‟s nuclear proliferation behavior undermines various aspects of the NPT. Most importantly it endeavors to fill an important gap how deterrence can be stabilized in South Asia by engaging the NPT.
29 Chapter One
1.1 Nuclear Proliferation/Non-Proliferation Debate: Building Theoretical Understanding
Nuclear proliferation is indisputably a dreadful task. It entails provocations and defiance. Nuclear proliferation is a unique challenge posturing indisputable threat to international peace, security and strategic stability. In contrast the anti-bomb lobby including S. Paul Kapur1 believes South Asian nuclearization has the potential to test the NPT‟s strength. Concurrently, international community endeavors to halt nuclear weapons proliferation, related technology and trying to persuade India and Pakistan to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). However, it is a recalcitrant mission.
The basic objective of this chapter is to understand and explain states nuclear behavior concerning why states decide to develop or relinquish nuclear weapons development. Distinct theoretical models i.e. realism, offshoots of realism and nuclear deterrence theory are found appropriate to grasp why states develop nuclear weapons? The realist paradigm explicate that states develop nuclear deterrent owing to strategic or conventional weakness. Nuclear weapon states (NWS) dependence on nuclear deterrent increase if it is conventionally weak. Nuclear weapons stabilized the protracted Cold War and India-Pakistan crises in non-weaponized era of 1980s, after nuclearization during 1999 Kargil crisis and during twin-peak stand-off 2001-02. Literature on nuclear proliferation offers four arguments for nuclear weapons development first, security/ self preservation; second, power maximization or to acquire prestige and; third domestic reasons.
Liberalism provides basis for cooperation from institutional platforms enabling states to achieve definite national security objectives without going to war and relinquishing the right to develop nuclear weapons. Liberalism offers effective academic framework it provides reasoning
1 Gaurav Kampani, “Living with the Bomb: In Praise of Indifference,” http://cns.miis.edu/reports/pdfs/indbomb.pdf, (accessed on November 28, 2014); T.V. Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Fall, 1998); Scot D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” Asian Survey, 41, No. 6, (November/ December, 2001): Sumit Ganguly and S Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2010): Muhammad Shafiq Ur Rahman, “The Probabilities of Nuclear War in South Asia,” Margalla Papers, (2010).
30 that non-proliferation mechanism based on the IAEA, the NPT and NSG cannot be evolved in isolation.
This segment strives to accentuate the point of difference between liberalism and realism on the phenomenon of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. However, major portion of this chapter discusses causes of nuclear proliferation in South Asia through realist‟s worldview. Thus this section debates the following questions:
How liberalism encourages cooperation? How peace can be preserved and war avoided? What are the requirements of credible nuclear deterrence?
1.2 Realism, the State Security and Conflicts
1.2.1 Classical Realism
This thesis examines how Indian growing military buildup, growing stockpiles of weapons grade fissile material, the development of land, air and sea-based missiles, the Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS), gradual increase in nuclear warheads are considered offensive capabilities by Islamabad. Conversely, Indian capabilities rather than intentions create fear of Indian aggression and security dilemma for Pakistan. The realist paradigm is used to understand changing dynamics of India-Pakistan strategic competition. Policymakers in Rawalpindi consider nuclear weapons are imperative for Pakistan‟s security. Pakistan acknowledges the realist philosophy theorizes that nuclear deterrent licenses states to thwart external threats. Nuclear weapons facilitate states to accrue national interests in lawless system. Failure to receive external security assurances against India; second, rising Indian centric military asymmetry and; third, New Delhi‟s gradual development of nuclear weapons helped Islamabad to draw inference from realism that self defence is the only recipe to ensure states existence.
India rejected the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) gradually increased numbers of nuclear reactors to keep the door of nuclear weapons development open. Pakistan while applying the teachings of security dilemma refused to join the treaty. India-Pakistan rejection of the NPT undermined regional arms control efforts.2 Both states decided to buildup conventional arms and
2 Rashid Ahmad Khan, Interviewed by Asfaq Ahmed, Lahore (September 5, 2018).
31 nuclear capable missiles outside the NPT framework. Outlier states thus challenged the treaty from outside. This section precisely elaborates, in the light of realism states tendency to raise militaries or develop nuclear weapons.
Realists believe that international system is composed of sovereign states essentially states stand above individuals and institutions.3 However, realism based on Classical realism is divided into several branches. Political realism was evolved by Thucydides. Hans Morgenthau, John Herz and Henry Kissinger are the leading proponents of political realism. It is based on the premises that first states are key actors; second power is an end in itself and; third, states act rationally.4 Realism asserts that anarchy breeds insecurity. State preservation is the basic national interest under the condition of anarchy. Further, self-help and power maximization is a key to survive.5
Indian policymakers‟ aspirations to be recognized as a regional hegemon in South Asia can be explained from Morgenthau‟s perspective. Morgenthau believed that human nature leads the states towards conflict because statesmen inheritably desire to take control over (limited) resources.6 Indian statesmen can be regarded as power hungry statesmen. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi‟s declaration of Indira doctrine7 was aimed to declare South Asia as an Indian sphere of influence. New Delhi has invested huge financial resources to raise most powerful military in the region. Morgenthau laid the foundations of realism by explaining why the WWII broke out in Scientific Man versus Power Politics. 8 He explained the behavior of states in international anarchy in Politics among Nations. Realists disregard moral values.9 India as a regional hegemon disregards arms control measures, nuclear restraint regime and the establishment of the NWFZ. It aspires to avoid abiding by non-proliferation norms based on the NPT but wants regional neighbors and particularly Pakistan to follow them. It is a potent technique devised to prevent, slow down the rise or militarily weaken its arch rival without going to war. Waltz assertion that
3 Quoted in Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 72. 4 Robert O. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): 7. 5 Keohane, ed, Neorealism and its Critics, 260. 6 Quoted in Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988):616, 617. 7 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001): 137, 138. 8 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1985): 3. 9 M. J. Balogun, Hegemony and Sovereign Equality: the Interest Contiguity Theory in International Relations (Ontario: Springer, 2011): 8.
32 the great powers use international institutions to transmit their dominance and seek national interest explains New Delhi‟s behavior.10 It wants the United States (US) to impose embargos on rival state geographically located in the East, as an efficient strategy to achieve goals without going to war. For acquiring sophisticated technology and cement its national security New Delhi has signed strategic partnership agreements with US11 and Israel.12
Contrarily, Islamabad is seeking guidance from classical realism that states military strength determines national interests, states standing in the international system either as a great power, a competitor or third tier states. Military might regulates adversary behavior and preserve peace.13 In Barry Buzan‟s assertion Pakistan is an independent political and unique unit.14 Its decision makers have decided to raise and maintain powerful military,15 backed by nuclear deterrent first to use it as a guard; second, to deter enemy from taking hostile action or to punish the aggressor. Third, neutralize rising deterrent force asymmetry and Indian conventional military superiority. New Delhi‟s revisionist designs to undo the partition, lust for power and militarily superior position provide basic impetus for Pakistan to resist India. Since status quo is not favorable to Indian grand designs therefore Islamabad is viewed as a threat. From realist perspective this is a conflict between forces of status quo and change. Capabilities, interests and intentions determine rule of engagement for states. Development and the resolve to use nuclear weapons wear down the revisionists‟ morale. The latter realizes that the potential benefits would outweigh the cost in case war breaks out. Consequentially, status quo is maintained in South Asia. The aforementioned notion thus gave birth to the concept of BoP.16 It best functioned in the 1980s and after May, 1998, nuclear tests.
10Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, 25, No. 1(Summer, 2000): 25. 11 V. Rangaraj and Vaibhavi Palsule, US-India Forward Leap- The Partnership Building (New Deli: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2017): 51. 12 Cherian Samuel, “India, Israel and the US Factor,” in US-Israel Relations in a New Era: Issues and Challenges after 9/11, ed. Eytan Gilboa and Efraim Inbar (New York: Routledge, 2009): 211. 13 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances Tripolarity and Hitler‟s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998): 16. 14 Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military technology and International Relations (London: The Macmillan Press, 1989): 6. 15Jeannie L. Jhonson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insight into Comparative National Security Policy Making (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 6. 16 Quoted in Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M Arreguin-Toft, Essentials of International Relations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011): 70.
33 However, international anarchy remains at the core of international system. Anarchy provides opportunities to power hungry Indian statesmen to attain escalation dominance against its adversary by making alliances and introducing qualitative changes in its military technology. Pakistan therefore cannot ignore Jeffrey W. Taliaferro caution that anarchy can result in the policy of conquest if it suits opportunist state.17 Hence, militarily powerful India can neither be trusted nor its military strength be ignored. Anarchy breeds feelings of insecurity, distrust and antagonism between the NPT outlier states. It results in arms races due to vicious cycle of security dilemma, constant competition for power accumulation and on the other hand quest for self preservation. Possibility of inadvertent or deliberate war hovers over South Asia.
1.2.1.2 Neo-Realism
Neo-realism is a notable contribution by Kenneth N. Waltz. In 1979 Waltz‟s claimed in Theory of International Politics,18 that international system is anarchic and composed of states. Waltz believed that self preservation is the primary interest of every state. Neo-realism is applied in this dissertation to explain interstates conflict considering sources of conflict instead of focusing on a particular dispute. Second, it accentuates that anarchy encourages competition, conflict of interest and mitigates cooperation among states. It breeds insecurity, generates security dilemma, results in arms race and promotes self-help. Third, it serves the purpose to systemically link South Asian nuclear rivalry with the NPT and nuclear weapon states (NWS). For example, Pakistan borrowed neo-realist philosophy the modus-operandi to guard state in global anarchic system is self-help and power accumulation. Islamabad theorizes strategic weapons deter India. Indian Prime Minister late Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998, 19 regarded Chinese hostile designs as vital security threat to India to carryout and legitimize Indian nuclear explosions. New Delhi thus posed security dilemma for China. Sense of vulnerability stops China from applying Article VI, of the NPT to abandon nuclear weapons. This local nuclear rivalry damages the essence of the NPT. It systemically undermines established nuclear order based on the NPT. Nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons, nuclear blackmail and hostile military postures. Consequently, NWS retain nuclear weapons to warrant state security. Co-
17 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security, 25, No. 3 (Winter, 2000/01): 128. 18 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesely Publishing Company, 1979). 19“Nuclear Anxiety: India‟s Letter to Clinton on Nuclear Testing,” New York Times (May 13, 1998); Bhumitra Chakma, ed., The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (Faranham: Ashgate, 2011 ):104.
34 relation established between the NPT and South Asia helps this researcher to claim that the South Asian nuclear rivals are directly and from outside of the NPT are marginalizing the strength of treaty. It helps the researcher to build an argument that South Asian outlier states are preventing the treaty from acquiring universal status.
Indian defence planners applied neo-realist teaching to modernize its military and expand nuclear forces. However, they have ignored Waltz‟s caution. First, military muscle itself is not an evil rather its offensive projection creates problems. Consequently, alliance may be formed (against it) to maintain the status quo. Waltz highlighted, the risks associated with the access of state power. Second, excess of power i.e. India produced weapons grade Plutonium stockpiles sufficient for developing 150-200 nuclear warheads. It likely has 120 to 130 nuclear warheads in its possession. New Delhi can launch these deterrent forces from rail-mobile platforms up-to 5500 kilometers.20 It results in Indian favored rising deterrent force asymmetry resultantly New Delhi suspended composite dialogues. Second, Pakistan is faced with existential threat. Nuclear signaling, offensive military capabilities and war fighting doctrine creates security dilemma for Pakistan. Conversely, the region is prone to unending military tension, crisis, bilateral trust deficit and arms competition so fear of war has becomes a constant factor.
In tit-for-tat response Islamabad attempts to stabilize South Asian strategic stability backed by nuclear deterrent. It pursues policy based on full spectrum credible minimum deterrence (CMD) during peacetime to prevent crisis from transforming into war and; second the adversary is restrained from making unexpected demands during crisis. Pakistan abides by Waltz‟s advice to rely on self-help, avoid arms racing. Likewise, it emphasizes war avoidance and knit defensive security policy thus Pakistan qualifies the rank of defensive state. It is based on neo-realist philosophy such as to accrue power for self-preservation rather than becoming hegemon.21
In order to correlate neo-realism with India-Pakistan adversarial relationship, Waltz‟s belief in international system needs to be highlighted. Waltz believes that bi-polarity stabilizes international relations as major power in uni-polar or multi-polar system wants to dominate the
20 Zafar Khan, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 24, 2018). 21 Waltz, The Theory of International Politics.
35 system. 22 In uni-polar or multi-polar system fear of external aggression and uncertainty about future dominates the thinking of the decision making circles in small states.23 Bi-polar system stabilized the relations of the NWS and ensured long peace during the Cold War era.24 This study will examine India-Pakistan case from neo-realist perspective as it emphasizes the notion of BoP to preserve peace and ensure state existence. Attempt will be made to examine assumptions related to neo-realism in India-Pakistan case. Furthermore, deterrent effects of WMDs on India- Pakistan relations will also be examined.
1.2.1.3 Offensive Realism
Mearsheimers‟ remarkable work, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics evolved offensive realism25 based on five core principles,
o International system lacks central authority. o States can resort to use of force against other states. o Every state wants to preserve its sovereignty. o States are rational actors and, o Military power of a state creates fear of use of force in the minds of opponents. Fear of external aggression creates uncertainty and compels the states to raise and sustain militaries.
Offensive realism in this research serves the purpose to explain Indian military bellicose posture directed towards Pakistan. New Delhi‟s procurement of qualitatively improved military hardware, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), nuclearization of the Indian Ocean, ability to launch cruise and K-15 missiles from the sea enables it to complete nuclear triad and achieve second strike capability vis-à-vis Pakistan.26 Indian expanding nuclear force structure tilted balance of terror in its favor. It enjoys escalation dominance and upper hand over Islamabad. Indian arms buildup is disrespect of classical logic of deterrence based on mutual vulnerability. It is in Mearsheimer assertion rejection of cooperation in security affairs.
22 Martin Griffiths, ed. International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2007): 14. 23Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review, 91, No. 41 (December, 1997): 915. 24Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization, 52, No. 4 (Autumn, 1998): 984. 25 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,30-32. 26 Tauqeer Hussain Sargana, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 24, 2018).
36 Indian coercive behavior, antagonist policy, claim to have carried-out surgical strike in Pakistani territory,27 offensive Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) and bellicose designs is rejection of cooperation in security realm.28 Indo-US strategic enterprise, transfer of sophisticated technology, revolution in military affairs and fissile material production aims at ensuring self sufficiency. However, it catalyzes nuclear arms race, rejects disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.
Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons offset Indian military superiority, preserves its sovereignty. Dissatisfied India therefore pursue policy based on power maximization to become regional hegemon and change the status quo. Hegemony can enable it to replace unfavorable policies with for example more favorable policies articulated to get benefit from the system; prevent the rise of competitor.29
To conclude this section Indian policy based on offensive realism in pursuit for power maximization is in staunch contrast of Pakistan‟s defensive security policy. Nuclear weapons possession rather than external security guarantees Pakistan‟s survival as nuclear weapons are viewed as an absolute security guarantor. It certifies the realist notion that only nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons. This notion emphasizes on the proliferation of WMDs and nuclear doctrines based on the fear of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Competing nuclear doctrines based on MAD stabilized South Asian strategic milieu. However, Indian aggressive security policies based on the teachings of offensive realism resulted in hostilities, crises, nuclear arms race, missiles proliferation, and security dilemma and affects South Asian strategic stability. This study examines Indian behavior, South Asian account of stability-instability paradox, Indo-Pak nuclear capable missile arms race and nuclear crises. This study analyzes New Delhi-Islamabad interest in fissile material production, nuclear doctrines, military force posture and military behaviors. Realism helps in understanding NPT‟s fault lines, why treaty failed to address South Asian security dilemma and halt India-Pakistan arms race. It endeavors to prove deterrence can be stabilized and war averted in South Asia under the NPT mechanism.
27 Ibid. 28 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,30-32. 29 Colin Elman, “Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America‟s Rise to Regional Hegemony,” The American Political Science Review, 98, No. 4, (Nov, 2004): 567.
37 1.3 Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Deterrence means to halt an enemy from taking an undesired course of action through use or threat of use of force.30 Deterrence manifests aggressive security posture, coercive foreign policy and functions between adversaries. Deterrence is theoretical and psychological in nature because intimidation rather than actual use of force drives it. Hostile government carefully analyses the cost and benefit analysis prior to taking forbidden action. Deterrence is credible if undesired action does not take place. Proponents of nuclear deterrence including Keith Krause, Kenneth N. Waltz and Gregory S. Jones have emphasized on different requirements for credible nuclear deterrence. Keith Krause claims that in order to make nuclear deterrent credible nuclear managers delegate the authority to launch nuclear weapons to junior ranking military officers, if necessary.31 Waltz asserts that nuclear management authorities may authorize limited strikes against counterforce targets to convey the message that massive attack may follow.32 However, such strategy inherits the possibility of retaliation from enemy thus such an action would result in a war leading to mutual suicide. Gregory S. Jones requirements of credible nuclear deterrent include; first, the adversary should have no doubt about the capability (nuclear forces) of the deterrer; secondly, the credibility of nuclear forces to reach their targets; thirdly, the development of survivable second strike forces. Development and overhaul of large size nuclear forces enables state to maintain second strike forces. Fourthly, C3 requires nuclear establishment authority to survive nuclear or conventional strike and; fifthly, leadership determination and ability to effectively communicate the message that surviving nuclear forces will be used to inflict unprecedented damage upon the enemy.33 Today the concept of deterrence is synonymous with and confined to nuclear deterrence. Deterrence advocates the maintenance of credible nuclear forces against the adversary‟s first strike or decapitating attack. It resultantly necessitated the process to raise nuclear deterrent based on the first strike forces followed by the development of second strike forces. The residual capacity of nuclear forces creates fear of punishment. Consequently, deter the potential aggressor from waging war. Waltz summarized that, the fear of
30 Karsten Frey, India‟s Nuclear Bomb and National Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2006):11. 31Keith Krause, “Rationality and Deterrence in Theory and Practice,” in Contemporary Security and Strategy, ed. Craig A Snyder (London: Deakin University, 1997): 124. 32Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” 733. 33 Gregory S. Jones, “From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan,” RAND, (2000): 2.
38 losing precious belongings restrain the enemy from taking undesired action.34 The realization to prevent the use of nuclear weapons is also known as nuclear taboo. Likewise, nuclear deterrence maintains the strategic status quo in South Asia. As a result, it enables both states to coexist peacefully.
Deterrence is functional in South Asia because Pakistan‟s deterrent forces create fear of punishment in the mind of New Delhi based policymakers. Indian decision makers are thus convinced that the price would outnumber the desired objective, if prohibited action is taken.35 The theory of nuclear deterrence, in Robert Powell‟s words, is thus a central problem in the study of India and Pakistan relations. 36 Pakistan deliberately pursues nuclear first use posture to convince the enemy that war will be costly and; second, unsuccessful hence futile activity. It wants to secure national interest without going to war. For this reason Bernard Brodie in 1946 maintained that, “thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose.”37 Pakistan‟s adherence to nuclear deterrence theory aims at, convincing the enemy that there is no defence against nuclear weapons and nuclear war cannot be won. Hence, war should be avoided. Conversely, peace is preserved. Hence, nuclear deterrence theory is an antithesis of classical logic of war.
Islamabad adheres to nuclear deterrence theory to address the problems concerning fear of surprise attack, decapitating strikes and to protect nuclear complexes, counterforce and counter value assets. Pakistan‟s adherence to nuclear deterrence theory, in William Kaufmann‟s assertion, inherits duality of purpose. 38 It discards the advantages associated with enemy‟s preemptive strike and stabilizes strategic stability. 39 Second, theory asserts that nuclear war invites mutual catastrophe hence, it should not be fought. Third, nuclear war cannot be won therefore, it should be avoided. The possession and Pakistan‟s reliance on nuclear weapons for
34Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review, 84, No. 3, (September, 1990): 732. 35 Ranjit Singh, “Nuclear Weapons as a Deterrent in South Asia: An Analysis,” Asia Pacific Journal of Social Science, II, No. 2, (July-December, 2010): 36. 36 Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 1. 37 Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946). 76. 38 William W. Kaufmann, Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956): 262. 39 Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 4.
39 its security, Ward Wilson prescribed, aimed at deterring invasions and nuclear attacks against mainland40 (Brodie labeled it “basic deterrence).”41 The role of nuclear weapons in Pakistan‟s security policies can be understood in the light of Morgenthau‟s teaching. Morgenthau believed statesman endeavors to grab military power to deter wars, preserve peace and maintain the status quo.42 Islamabad‟s reliance on first strike can be defined in Patrick M. Morgan‟s assertion. First strike is a calculated military posture to liaison threats to deter India.43 It involves war fighting doctrine and credible threats to realize the enemy that the potential cost of war will exceed potential benefits if war breaks out. India therefore takes nuclear threats seriously into consideration thus peace is preserved. It is fair to claim that nuclear weapons possession induces caution and demands the adversaries to avoid confrontation during crisis due to the threat of MAD. It also helps the South Asia‟s nuclear arch rivals to coexist peacefully. Caution is thus a guiding principle for contemporary and future nuclear adversaries.
This study draw the inference from the efficacy of Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrent posture, based on first strike that, crisis prevention is based on effective communication to dissuade the enemy from taking undesirable action by realizing him catastrophic results if deterrence fails. Pakistan sent clear nuclear signals to India, by carrying missile tests, terminating leaves of armed forces personnel, putting armed services on alert status, deploying conventional forces and intimidating statements were publicly issued by high officials. It was aimed to elucidate the dire consequences adversary had to bear for taking forbidden actions. Policymakers in Rawalpindi expressed firm resolve to carryout first strike, as weakness would have otherwise vitalized the enemy to constantly pose existential threat and; secondly, undermined the efficacy of Pakistan‟s deterrent strategy. This technique, rationality of irrationality, was originally evolved by Phil Williams,44 to ensure control over crisis. Pakistan nuclear posture based on first strike is an extreme manifestation of will and resolve. Instead of backing down or relinquishing its position Islamabad deliberately pushed the crises to the brink of war by taking irrational step, amid to ensure effective control over the situation. It had to behave rationally to avoid head on collision. James M. Acton assertion that the aggressor is needed to be assured that the defender is
40 Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,” Nonproliferation Review, 15, No. 3, (November, 2008): 421. 41 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1959): 273. 42 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 27. 43 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 8. 44Phil William, “Crises Management,” in Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts, et al., eds., John Baylis (London: Croom Helm, 1987): 243.
40 determined to take punitive action if deterrence fails,45 explains the determination of Pakistani leadership.
This section draws the second inference from Islamabad‟s deterrent posture that state survival is considered as sacred objective. Yet, its defensive deterrent posture aspires to thwart the outbreak of crisis. Second, prevent continuing crisis from transforming into war and; third, dissuade New Delhi during crisis from imposing demands.46 Fourth, objective is offensive form of deterrence for instance; it endeavors to break the enemy‟s resistance.47 During India-Pakistan 2001-02 military standoff, Islamabad relied on nuclear deterrence to prevent Indian forces from invading Pakistan. Rawalpindi has drawn lessons from India and Pakistan Crisis48 for instance, to develop tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs); second, evolved nuclear policy based on first use. Despite inherited dangers associated with the nuclear deterrent and possibility of nuclear exchange, Pakistan relies on nuclear deterrence.49 Since, strategic interests were secured without going to war, Pakistani policymakers‟ belief that WMDs deter external aggressions50 cemented. Nuclear weapons deter enemy from launching conventional and nuclear attacks against one-self.
In conclusion of this section, deterrent strategies prevented direct military confrontation and enabled South Asian outlier states to preserve peace. Efficient deterrent posture has set the foundations and cultivated classical deterrence theory. It focuses on strategic stability and India- Pakistan bilateral affairs.51 However, the efficacy of classical deterrence theory, Arvind Kumar asserts, depends upon BOP, as it makes use of force counterproductive.52 BOP thus deters wars in South Asia. This phenomenon is also synonymous with the strategic stability. Other concepts including vertical nuclear proliferation, missile arms race, the nuclear taboo, the risk of nuclear terrorism, accidental deterrence breakdown, and ballistic missile defence (BMD) undermines the
45James M. Acton, “Chapter One: Central Deterrence,” Adelphi Series, 50, 417, (2010): 27. 46 Frey, India‟s Nuclear Bomb and National Security, 11. 47Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1965): 25. 48Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World? (New York: Routledge, 2011): 54. 49 Rob Van Riet, ed., Moving Beyond Nuclear Deterrence to a Nuclear Weapons Free World, Nuclear Abolition Forum- Issue No. 2 (2013): 1. 50 Barry R. Posen, “US Security Policy in a Nuclear- Armed World Or: What if Iraq Had Nuclear Weapons?” Security Studies, (Spring, 1997): 4. 51Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 4. 52Arvind Kumar, “Theories of Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence in the Subcontinent,” http://eprints.manipal.edu/1397/1/India-Pakistan_Nuclear_Relation-Book-AK.pdf, (accessed on October 19, 2014): 241.
41 efficacy of strategic weapons. 53 However, aforementioned trends could not prevent India and Pakistan from developing and modernizing WMDs.
1.5 Liberalism
Liberalism serves the role in this dissertation to understand and build the case for the development of the NPT and its related mechanism. Liberalism can prevent war and stabilize the NPT, directly or indirectly, in South Asia. Liberalism ascertains that states play paramount role in world affairs. It emphasizes on synergy among states through institutions building to shape state behavior. It persuades cooperation among states to effectuate security objectives. Comprehensive security mechanism (CSM), 54 framework enabled India and Pakistan to acknowledge possibility of wars and the existence of vicious cycle of security dilemma. It is claimed here that liberalism can provide basis for bilateral cooperation. However, institutional mechanism is required in the light of liberalism to mitigate suspicion, bilateral rivalry, security dilemma and enemy images. The NPT in the light of liberalism can provide basis to establish institutional framework, serve the role to slowdown the pace of India-Pakistan arms race and reduce the chances of nuclear deterrence breakdown. Consistent efforts from the NPT platform can pave the way to bring South Asia‟s outlier states into the NPT framework by providing out of the box solution or incentives to both states. Cooperation through the treaty‟s framework will gradually result in rejection of offensive and defensive realist teachings in South Asia.
Institutional mechanism will gain prominence, Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin believes, because of its effectiveness. First, it will identify common grounds for cooperation between the two outlier states. Second, the institutional framework will guarantee incentives.55 Hence, both states will voluntarily agree to negotiate confidence and nuclear security building measures (CNSBMs), cooperate to avoid crisis and the outbreak of deliberate or inadvertent violence. Voluntary adherence will reflect acceptance and affirm the willingness of both states to reduce their share by devising mutually accepted rules necessary to allow competing states to secure or
53Tom Sauer, “A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32, 5, (October, 2009): 747. 54Nihar Nayak, ed., Cooperative Security Framework for South Asia (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2013): XVI. 55Robert Keoane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, 20, No. 1, (Summer, 1995): 42.
42 achieve sustainable national interests and decisive advantages peacefully. This approach echoes the emerging powerful role of the NPT framework in stabilizing the deterrence, as an equalizer, the treaty‟s ability to limit persisting problems and suspicions between New Delhi and Islamabad. From this perspective regional peace and stability thus depends upon institution building rather than BOP.
The organization, successful performance and preservation of institutions in some instances require major powers support. Conversely, Major Powers will have to play significant role to setup and bring India-Pakistan into the NPT based institutional mechanism. Consistent involvement of major powers will discard feelings of betrayal and prevent cheating. Major Powers have already developed, financed and preserving prominent institutions including the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), IAEA and related non-proliferation mechanism. Development and the successful functioning of these institutions strengthened liberal teachings that cooperation reduces anarchy, overcome trust deficit and mutually distribute incentives among cooperating states. Liberal teachings direct states to create workable environment.
Proponents of liberalism, Keohane and Martin, have raised concerns while applying for liberal teachings56. For instance, cooperating states fear that the other members may cheat in the garb of cooperation. The would be cooperating states may forcefully advocate different opposing proposals to maximize personal gains. The chances of refusal are as equal therefore Major Powers role bears significance and cannot be ignored. These fears and suggestions are thus important in summing up discussion on liberalism.
Conclusion Chapter highlights liberalism and realism directs states how to survive in international anarchic system and benefit from it. Liberalism rejects isolation instead emphases cooperation as an answer to the prevailing security challenges including nuclear proliferation. The Development of the IAEA, Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), signing of the NPT, creation of the NSG and the IAEA led safeguards system evolved due to liberal teachings.
56Ibid, 45.
43 Non-proliferation mechanism based on the NPT has become the key hurdle in halting the nuclear proliferation. Liberalism rejects realist notion that cooperation is not possible under international anarchy as it breeds insecurity, advocates self-help and rejects cooperation. The CSM framework helped India and Pakistan to identify bilateral security challenges including security dilemma, deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons, missile and nuclear arms race. Consequentially, liberalism can help New Delhi and Islamabad to cooperate, evolve institutional mechanism, reduce security dilemma and decrease the probability of deterrence breakdown.
Contrarily, realists believe military might is a prerequisite to preserve state sovereignty. Nuclear deterrence theory assures militarily weak states that nuclear weapons deters aggression, provide absolute security guarantees hence answer states search for absolute security. It enables rival states to preserve strategic stability theory therefore project nuclear weapons are weapon of peace. Nuclear deterrence theory encourages proliferation in the NPT signatory states. Nuclear proliferation is consequently rooted in nuclear realism. Waltz therefore emphasized „controlled,‟ horizontal proliferation of WMDs.
Nuclear deterrence theory persuades Pakistan to offset Indian military modernization by relying on nuclear weapons. Contrarily, Indian nuclear weapons development is prestige driven case to be accepted technologically advanced, a regional hegemon, get United Nations Security Council (UNSC) membership, the NSG and declare South Asia as an Indian sphere of influence. India discarded regional arms control proposals i.e. creation of NWFZ, nuclear restraint regime. It rejected the NPT. New Delhi and Islamabad‟s competing goals, formative stage of nuclear force building, Indian military modernization, involvement of systemic forces i.e. China and US breeds mutual suspicion, distrust, fuel ongoing arms race and intensifies preexistent security dilemma. It is difficult to convince both states to abide by arms control measures. Consequentially, possibility of nuclear war hovers over South Asia so there is dire need to thwart war through NPT platform and bring India and Pakistan directly or indirectly into the treaty to stabilize it.
44 Chapter Two
Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Development and Incorporation of International Institutions
2.1 Development and Incorporation of International Institutions
In post World War II (WWII) era victors of war used arms control measures in pursuit to halt nuclear proliferation and to prevent war. During the Cold War numerous arms control initiatives were introduced in theory and practice with mixed record. However, these measures were concentrated on controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and to avoid the breakdown of nuclear deterrence.1 The Cold War era prominent futile initiative to halt nuclear proliferation includes Baruch Plan. Likewise, successful initiatives include the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Anti-bomb lobby launched these initiatives to express their abhorrence for war it wanted to achieve several objectives first, to halt nuclear proliferation, second stabilize superpowers relations, third stabilize strategic stability by eroding chances of decapitating strike and; fourth to decrease chances of the outbreak of nuclear war or reduce hazards of war if deterrence fails. Principles developed in the light of covenants developed in Cold War are successfully working today and provide basis to halt nuclear proliferation.
This chapter underscores that efforts to create non-proliferation mechanism are rooted in four key reasons. First, United States (US) officials feared that nuclear proliferation can result in probable nuclear attack on US. Second, J.F. Kennedy feared that peaceful nuclear technology can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons leading to nuclear anarchy. Third, fears that nuclear weapon in the hands of third world states poses threats to international peace and security. Fourth, intelligence sources reckoned that several threshold states can build nuclear weapons which may result in accidental nuclear war. Unquestionably, safeguard mechanism should be developed to prevent states from changing the route of peaceful nuclear technology for nuclear weapons development.
1 Bhumitra Chakma, “Nuclear Arms Control Challenges in South Asia,” India Review, 9, No. 3, (July-September, 2010): 364.
45 This chapter proceeds in the following manner. First, it illustrates the development of the IAEA. It is followed by the section illustrating the process which led to the development of the NPT. Third subsection interprets various Articles of the NPT and assesses the structural efficacy of the treaty. It bring into the limelight that how different international institutions are integrated to strengthen the non-proliferation mechanism based on the NPT. Fourth section discusses post Cold War developments particularly review conferences.
This segment also endeavors to highlights that liberalism persuaded the evolution of the aforesaid measures. Likewise, it tends to draw attention at the efficacy of liberalism as it offers positive account of international system. Liberalism incites international efforts to halt vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation and declare the possession of nuclear weapons as illegitimate. This section examines the following questions:
How does IAEA stop states from horizontal nuclear proliferation? Why non-proliferation norm bears significance? What are the loopholes in the NPT? What prevents the implementation of Article VI of NPT? Why indefinite extension of NPT and review conferences bear significance?
2.2.1 Development of the IAEA
Hazards of nuclear weapons use conscripted US and Soviets during the Cold War era to cease the proliferation of nuclear weapons in collaboration with allies. Cooperation, basic premise of liberalism, was predetermined to prevent the explosion of nuclear weapons. Concentrated efforts manifest the earnestness of the humanity to actuate judicial scheme considering non-proliferation goals.
US policymakers‟ confounded nuclear proliferation could contrive nuclear attack on the US. Correspondingly Baruch Plan of 1946 was articulated.2 It was the first attempt to halt horizontal proliferation through the judicious application of power. In 1953, the US President Dwight E. Eisenhower envisioned Atom for Peace Plan in UNGA‟s session.3 Plan stressed on the
2 Ian Bellany, Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013): 173. 3 Ira Chernus, Eisenhower‟s Atoms for Peace (Texas A&M University Press, 2002): 15.
46 peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In 1954, the US amended domestic laws4 to obstruct peaceful uses of nuclear technology from perfecting nuclear weapons. Consternation because peaceful nuclear technology conceivably transferred for manufacturing nuclear weapons persuaded Darwinism of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)5 in 1957. Consistent struggle laid grounds for judicious institutionalization of non-proliferation apparatus. It demonstrated willingness of the international community to distribute shares equally or unequally in a peaceful way. In 1959 UNGA‟s forum was reused to emphasize on the elimination of nuclear weapons in addition institutionalization of the non-proliferation mechanism. 6 Liberalism rejects power politics. It considerably emphasize that international institutions are playing pragmatic role in the world affairs. Liberalism differs from realism. Former emphasizes on the existence of non-state actors, various channels of communication between state and non-state actors and all issues are contemplated equivalently significant. In 1961, UNGA approved Ireland tabled resolution 16657 which has extensive application of liberal teachings that national interest can be accomplished without going to war. The resolution demanded of nuclear capable states to stop nuclear weapons development and abstain from transferring nuclear technology or information to other states. The resolution underpinned that nuclear weapons constitute dangers to international peace hence, beseech other states not to acquire/ bud nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation efforts were intensified as US President J. F. Kennedy expressed fears that over twenty states would become nuclear capable by 1970s.8 The availability of enormous literature on fusion, easy access to nuclear technology and plutonium9 made the Department of State alert. The US feared that nuclear weapons in the third world countries would destabilize international strategic equation. The US intelligence sources guesstimated that approximately fifteen states had the potential to
4Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995): 26. 5 Ryoko Kusumi, “Recent Developments in the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency,” Journal of Sciences and World Affairs, 1, No. 2, (2005): 88. 6 Randy Rydell, “International Humanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Humanitarian Approach to Nuclear Disarmament,” Nuclear Abolition Forum, Issue No. 1, (2011): 25. 7 Johan Kaufman, Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis (London: MACMILAN Press Ltd, 1996): 65. 8 Avner Cohen, “Most Favored Nation,” The Bulletin, 51, No. 1, (January/February, 1995): 44. 9“Milestones: 1961-1968, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 1968,” U.S. Department of Statement Office of the Historian, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/npt (accessed on November 25, 2013).
47 manufacture nuclear weapons10and feared inadvertent or intentional nuclear weapons use with global repercussions.
During the session of Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD), President Johnson advocated a scheme on January 21, 1964.11 The plan suggested stopping nuclear arms race by imposing check and balances on nuclear commerce and peaceful nuclear activities. The proposal provided basis for INFCIRC/66.12 IAEA produced 1965 document. The budding of safeguards mechanism was ordained mandatory solution to prevent states from diverting dual use of nuclear technology from developing nuclear weapons. Consequently, IAEA was empowered with Article III. A.5. It aspires to evolve and implement safeguards mechanism to prevent horizontal proliferation. 13 Agency‟s mandate and responsibilities are defined in Article XII. Initially agency‟s scope was confined and could have been applied if for example, a state is signatory to the IAEA and accepts agency‟s safeguards. Secondly, nuclear supplier and recipient states mutually approach the agency to administer their nuclear activities. The state also needs to voluntarily adhere to agency‟s statutes.
Signatories to the IAEA are required to submit reports to the agency concerning their nuclear activities. Verification of reports requires four different types of on-site inspections,14 visits and evaluation by the agency‟s officials.
Ad hoc inspections: determines authenticity of state‟s initial report, nuclear behavior, material and transport.
Routine inspections: are carried out on a short notice once agency completes comprehensive inspection plan. Watchdog agency‟s officials visit nuclear complexes, facilities and depots.
10 “The Impulse Towards a Saer World: 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” The National Security Archive, (July 1, 2008), http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/, (accessed on November 25, 2013). 11 Betty Goetz Lall, “Questions and Answers on The U.S. Production Freeze Proposal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 20, No. 10, (December, 1964): 30. 12“The Agency‟s Safeguards System (1965): INFCIRC/66,” International Atomic Energy Agency,http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1965/infcirc66.pdf, (accessed November 7, 2014). 13“The Statute of the IAEA,” International Atomic Energy Agency,https://www.iaea.org/about/statute, (accessed July 8, 2017). 14“IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,” International Atomic Energy Agency,http://www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/iaea-safeguards-overview, (accessed on November 8, 2014).
48 Special inspections: are carried out if agency doubts credibility of the report submitted by signatory.
Safeguard visits: are to substantiate designs of under construction nuclear facilities.
Fears of the use of nuclear weapons and inherent dangers associated with them, superpowers rivalry and technological advances led to the evolution of the IAEA. Antecedent reasons forced superpowers rendezvous on the signing of the covenant to prohibit nuclear proliferation with international support. Global partnership additionally states inclination to comply with IAEA and future non-proliferation agreement was in fact a set-back for the ideas of the realists. For example Thomas Hobbes‟ philosophy15 that states perpetually buttress for crusade was falsified. Consequently, angst of nuclear defiance replaced the realist philosophy of self-help and power maximization with the cooperation and interdependence.
2.2.2 Development of the NPT
In 1960s, realist‟s philosophy that survival is the ultimate goal of every state became the driving force. Security policies of superpowers based on power maximization and power politics resulted in the nuclear arms race. Nuclear proliferation was therefore acknowledged imminent threat to international peace. Preference to evolve a peaceful world free of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons required application of liberal philosophy based on cooperation. Superpowers agreed to regulate nuclear commerce, prevent nuclear anarchy and maintain international strategic stability by developing world‟s first nuclear order. It was an expression of the fervor of the states to institute regulations to obstruct the awful features of WMDs. Liberalism justifies superpowers cooperative behavior i.e. prevention of nuclear anarchy became common cause. It matured working collaboration between the two. Both conceded to accrue their interests without resorting to war rather by restricting the adversary in the shadow of moral values through effectuating legal obligations concerning nuclear non-proliferation. Enforcement of legal obligations by states to seek national interests differentiates liberalism from realism.
US concentrated efforts to obliterate the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Non- proliferation was also hailed by US Congress in May 1966 in the wake of the resolution tabled
15Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (St. Pauls Church-Yard: Green Dragon, 1651): 78.
49 by Senator Pastore.16 In 1966, superpowers cooperation produced provisional agreement on non- transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons and related material.17 Prior to the signing of the treaty on non-proliferation, signatories to NATO started questioning the reliability of the US provisioned deterrence guarantees against the Soviet‟s intimidation to convince allies. The US elaborated the agreement. The US assured partners that the final covenant will not constrain the US from deploying nuclear forces in Europe. It is claimed here that superpowers wanted to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons for non-European nations. Secondly, the protection of European continent was preferred over non-proliferation mechanism. Thirdly, the tranquility of the Soviets and signing of the agreement is viewed here as a rational decision and attempt to halt horizontal proliferation on European continent. In March, 1967, prior to finalizing the draft agreement, the US convened conference to take input from all the stakeholders. The final draft of the NPT was approved by the ENCD. The statute of the NPT asserts state that tested nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967, is de-jure nuclear weapon state (NWS)18 including the US, Russia, UK, France and China. All other states are non nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Draft treaty was approved by the UNGA in June, 1968.19 It was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on March 5, 1970.20 The NPT is Cold War era strategy jointly formed by the superpowers to outlaw the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It provides the understanding of the proliferation behavior and gives details of inhibition strategies. It poses challenge to the realist philosophy and provides understanding that how non-proliferation mechanism can best utilize the strategy of inhibition. Cooperation results in interdependence, reduces the likelihood of wars and enables the states to get benefit from the global system.
2.2.2.1 Interpreting the NPT Articles and Assessing its Structural Efficacy: Integrating International Institutions and the NPT
The NPT Articles I, II, III, IV, VI and X aims at achieving the objective of non- proliferation, WMDs free world and bring an end to the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. The NPT barred states from manufacturing nuclear weapons without exercising
16 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” 17Ibid. 18 Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (Wiltshire: The Cromwell Press Ltd, 2002): 101. 19 Dombey, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” 20 Ibid.
50 military instrument. It is believed to be the most efficacious, convincing and near universal nuclear arms control treaty. From the perspective of liberalism, the NPT reduces the anxiety of insecurity as it tries to protect humanity from the disastrous consequences of nuclear weapon use
Article I bears significance as it is the first pillar of the NPT. The Soviet-US arbitrations to cease nuclear weapons development resulted in the genesis of the NPT. Negotiations were organized in hostile environment. Perhaps Article I was outlined to provision the legal basis to superpowers to decline the request of the ally states asking for control or transfer of nuclear weapons, equipment or technology. Synchronously, NWS have been morally and legally bound to avoid involvement in the horizontal proliferation. It preserved strategic stability; thwarted deliberate/ inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and halted nuclear proliferation. Superpowers preserved the status-quo by controlling the non-nuclear allies from challenging the NPT. Further, they prevented the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.
The literature available on the development of nuclear weapons, access to nuclear technology, fears of nuclear weapons spread to third world, nuclear anarchy, WMDs use and nuclear terrorism mushroom the feelings of insecurity amongst the nations. Drawing a protection layer became the primary principle after the introduction of the NPT. It aimed to ensure that NNWS are neither deceiving nor violating the spirit of the NPT. A set of principles was required to prevent the member states from diverting nuclear technology and material to accomplish strategic objectives. The superpowers speculations that global strategic equation would disrupt provided the basis for writing of the Article II to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation. Article II morally, socially and legally binds the NPT non-nuclear member states to relinquish their right of nuclear weapons development. It was speculated that member states will neither abrogate their moral and legal commitments nor cheat. It reflects both the consciousness and fears of the superpowers that signatories to the NPT can divert nuclear technology for nuclear weapons development. It legally abstain NNWS from receiving assistance in any form to develop or to get control over nuclear devices. The effectiveness and successful implementation of the NPT requires threat of penalty in terms of travel ban, economic embargos and diplomatic isolation for the behavior of cheating. However, NPT lacks the authority to use force and ensure NNWS compliance with their moral and legal commitments. Weakness of the NPT reveals that it is
51 based on liberalism. Liberalism ignores the possibility of cheating and war among states.21 The IAEA was made responsible to certify the nature of the nuclear activities of NPT signatories in an attempt to deal with the inherent weakness of the treaty. Despite being an established institution the agency lacks the authority to use force for implementing statutes of the NPT. The agency proposed to regulate nuclear trade to ensure peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Hence, in April, 1971, the IAEA produced INFCIRC/15322 applicable on the activities of NNWS under Article III.I of the NPT.
It is imperative for NNWS members to the NPT to sign safeguard agreement with the IAEA under Article III. Article III empowers the agency officials to carryout inspections of nuclear facilities, material, equipments and research centers of the NPT signatories. Article III connects the NPT member states and the IAEA to execute safeguard role23 while preventing states from diverting nuclear resources from achieving military objectives. Article III.A.5 24 empowers the IAEA to measure stockpiles of radiological/ fissile material in NPT member states. It aims at determining the credibility of NPT member state‟s submitted report to IAEA and nature of their nuclear program. The seriousness to verify the compliance of the member states with the NPT stemmed from the realist philosophy of human nature. Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Morgenthau assert humans attempt to maximize their gains as they are selfish by nature.25 Ever since humans have started representing states it is feared that states cheat other members of the global system after signing treaties. The agency agreements with the NPT member states fall in three different categories;
1. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA).
21Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993). 22Johan Simpson, ed., NPT Briefing Book (Southampton: The Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 2004): 7. 23“IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” IAEA,http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf, (accessed on April 24, 2014). 24“The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/safeg_system.pdf, (accessed on April 26, 2014): 1. 25Niccolo Machiavelli and Maurizio Viroli, The Prince (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Thomas Hobbes, Levithan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008):4; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations:”The Struggle for Power and Peace (Nova York: Alfred Kopf, 1948).
52 2. Item specific safeguards agreements. IAEA regulates recipient and supplier state activities concerning fissile material, heavy water and nuclear technology to certify that nothing is used for the development of nuclear weapons. 3. Voluntary agreements.26 It is applicable to nuclear complexes, facilities and material in NWS. The agency signs Additional Protocol (AP) with the NPT signatory states to cement its grip on particular state nuclear activities. IAEA safeguard role is decisive in regulating nuclear commerce, manipulating and controlling state nuclear behavior/ activities. It reduces the velocity of nuclear proliferation and promotes disarmament.
Non-proliferation mechanism based on the NPT substantiates the existence of global governance and global nuclear order. The NPT provides basis to global governance in nuclear realm. Global governance in return determines the success of the NPT.
Article IV ensures the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology to NNWS signatories to the NPT. In return, state has to sign and relinquish the right to develop nuclear arsenals. It is branded as the second pillar of the NPT and attests the liberal views that states can collaborate and benefit from anarchy. Article IV of the NPT gives provisions to the member states to get benefits from the nuclear apparatus. Signatories to the NPT can master indigenous technology or collaborate to exchange nuclear fabric for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. It provides lawful grounds to the NPT signatories to acquire radiological fabric, sensitive nuclear technology and scientific knowledge. A state access to the necessary ingredients of nuclear weapons under Article IV gives birth to the fear of the development of nuclear bomb. The NPT has an inborn problem of probable nuclear proliferation by the member states. Albert Wohlstetter forewarned that in future many states would be in a position to develop nuclear weapons27 without violating legal barriers because of their access to nuclear assets. Despite identifying this inbuilt flaw, pioneers of the NPT could not rectify it. Probability can become reality if nuclear threshold state faced with existential threat determines to divert nuclear technology for making bomb considering the realist view of self-help. The NPT is inept of deterring dangers confronted to the existence of the state. A threatened state exposed to foreign aggression would prefer to ensure its existence. It can determine to develop nuclear deterrent to
26“The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” 1. 27Albert Wohlstetter, “Spreading the Bomb Quite Breaking the Rules,” Foreign Policy, 25, (Winter, 1976): 88.
53 ensure self-preservation rather than adhering to moral values and legal obligations. Prominent realist scholars attach paramount importance to state security. For instance Morgenthau asserted that the basic responsibility of statesman is to guarantee state‟s survival. 28 Waltz likewise believed that states prefer and ensure self preservation over all other national interests.29Thucydides presupposed that morality does not exist in foreign policy.30 Paramount theme in realism is might is right.31
Under current circumstances the NPT cannot restrict its signatories to accede to sensitive nuclear technology. The NPT cannot whip member state if found involved in cheating. Primarily, answer to inbuilt flaw is embedded in the notion of grand bargain based on rights and obligations. NWS assures NPT signatories that NWS will neither use nuclear weapons against NNWS nor spread them. NNWS pledges to abstain from developing nuclear weapons. Inseparably they gain access to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful uses. Further, this academic work professes that the conceptualization of security community32 bestows additional justification. Community members share common cause, norms, and values. Perception prevail that nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons manufacturing will be dealt with diplomacy instead of violent tactic. Likewise principle objective of the NPT is to halt nuclear proliferation in the light of liberal philosophy.
2.2.3 The Zangger Committee
The Zangger Committee (ZC) was created in 1971 to draw up a catalogue of dual use of nuclear technology.33 The preparation of the list was made to restrict the horizontal proliferation, prevent NNWS from cheating and to strengthen the NPT. The report compiled and published in
28Hans J. Morgenthau, “Another „Great Debate:‟ The National Interest of the United States,” The American Political Science Review, XLVI, (December, 1952): 972. 29Kenneth N. Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979). 30Quoted in A. H. M. Jones, “The Athenian Democracy and Its Critics,” Cambridge Historical Journal, 11, No. 1, (1953): 20. 31Ibid, 21. 32Quoted in Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, “Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities,” Ethics & International Affairs, 10, (1996): 66. 33“Zangger Committee (ZAC),” NTI,http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/zangger-committee-zac/, (accessed on April 24, 2014).
54 1974 laid three principles for nuclear trade in the light of Article III.2 of the NPT34 for nuclear and NNWS.
1. A non-explosive use assurance; 2. An IAEA safeguards requirement and; 3. Re-transfer provision that requires the receiving state to apply the same conditions when re-exporting these items.35
The re-transfer provision is a double edged weapon mastermind by the ZC as it empowered the NPT and strengthened the mechanism of the IAEA safeguards. In an anarchic world, horizontal proliferation can be prevented by discouraging deterrent role of nuclear arsenals.
2.2.4 The Nuclear Suppliers Group
In reaction to 1974 Indian nuclear tests, nuclear supplier states established London Club36 to thwart the diversion of peaceful nuclear technology for military purposes. It persuaded the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).37 The NNWS have voluminously mastered the technology to produce heavy water, light water reactor fuel cycle, utilize spent fuel and engineer fast breeder reactors (FBRs). NNWS technological breakthroughs resulted in September 3, 1974 trigger list38 enshrined in IAEA document INFCIR/209. It pinpoints agency‟s concerns concerning nuclear fuel, reactors, reactor pressure vessels, reactor fuel charging and discharging machines, reactor control rods, and reactor pressure tubes etc.39 The NPT, the IAEA and the NSG are evolved as non-proliferation norms. Non-proliferation norms attempt to ensure the implementation of Article II and IV of the NPT. They prevent the clandestine development of nuclear bomb in the states signatories to the NPT. The trigger list further cemented this norm and evolved as a significant obstacle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT is
34Ibid. 35Ibid. 36Tadeusz Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group,” The Nonproliferation Review,1, Issue. 1, (Fall, 1993), 37Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Posture: Arms Race Instabilities in South Asia,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 25, No. 2, (1998): 69. 38“IAEA Information Circular: INFCIR/209,” (September 3, 1974), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf209.shtml, (accessed on April 24, 2014). 39Ibid.
55 devised with twofold purpose of arms control and disarmament. However, non implementation of Article VI by the NWS is undermining the NPT40 and makes it an arms control treaty.
In 1978, the IAEA director general circulated a report INFCIRC/254.41 It incorporated the ZC‟s trigger list in NSG. Heavy water was also comprehended in the list. The NSG list falls within the NPT framework.42 Ergo, it is peculiar from the ZC‟s trigger list. NSG list has two subcategories; first list includes export items and second sub-category includes the dual use of nuclear fabric. 43 The list attempts to fill the intrinsic gaps within the NPT to achieve the objective of a world free from nuclear weapons. Nevertheless trigger lists could not capacitate the NPT. Conversely intrinsic imperfection within the NPT persists indefinitely does the apprehension of clandestine development of nuclear bomb.
The IAEA inspectors use NSG trigger list to prevent the states from misusing Article IV of the NPT or crossing the threshold. It restricts the spread of nuclear technology and reprocessing of spent fuel for plutonium production. NSG‟s trigger list provides direction to the IAEA inspectors to obstruct the diversion of the dual use of technology for nuclear weapons manufacturing. The synergism of the IAEA and the NSG exposed the diversion of the dual use of nuclear technology for developing nuclear bomb by NNWS members to the NPT. Non- proliferation statistics reveals that the rejection of IAEA concerns by the alleged NPT signatory states led to the controversies and tension like situations. Iranian case is one notable example in this regard as it was viewed as an internal crisis of the NPT. It is fair to acknowledge that the NSG emerged as an antidote to the inherent Achilles' heel of the NPT. Crux of the matter is that NSG tough criteria evolved due to the violations of the NNWS of the NPT. However, timeous detection of Libya, North Korea and Iran‟s suspicious activities44 by the IAEA empowered by the NPT prevented the violations and the making of nuclear bomb. Violation of the great bargain by NNWS can prohibit the inalienable right of the states to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
40 Tom Sauer (Senior Lecturer University of Antwerpen) Emailed interview, (September 16, 2018). 41Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group.” 42Danielle Peterson et al., eds. “Export Controls and International Safeguards: Strengthening Nonproliferation through Interdisciplinary Integration,” Nonproliferation Review, 15, No. 3, (November, 2008): 517. 43“IAEA Information Circular: INFCIRC/539/Rev.5,” (December 4, 2012): 1. 44John R. Bolton, “The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance,” U.S. Department of State, (April 27, 2004), https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/31848.htm (accessed July 14, 2017).
56 2.2.5 Conference on Disarmament Intensifying the NPT Statutes
The origin of Conference on Disarmament (CD) is traced to the establishment of ENDC in 1962. ENDC was replaced by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1983, powerful institution that evolved into CD.45 The CD objective is to gradually recede and eradicate nuclear weapons. However, it permanently focuses on;46
The rollback of nuclear weapons, nuclear war avoidance and bringing an end to nuclear arms race. Arms race prevention in outer space. Measures to prevent NWS from the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against NNWS. Promote arms control through CBMs, verification process, decline in military budgets and deployments of armaments. Rule out the production of weapon grade fissile material.
The CD works under UNGA and present reports to it. It endeavors to promote the UN‟s mission to achieve world peace. Further, it strives to execute the implementation of Article III (requires NNWS to sign safeguards agreement with the IAEA) and Article IV of the NPT. CD aims to prevent the vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. The substance of the matter is that it focuses on implementing Article I, II, III, IV and VI of the NPT. The non-proliferation norm explains that NNWS believes that nuclear weapons are illicit hence, adheres to the NPT in good faith. The rejection of the development of the WMDs by the state is acknowledged as a rational behavior. The normative strength of the non-proliferation norm is based on the NPT. It explains why NNWS decided to forgo their right of the development of the WMDs.
The Article VI promises the NNWS that NWS are obligated to systemically rollback their program of nuclear weapons. The NNWS are assured that NWS will neither threaten nor use nuclear weapons against them. This branch of great bargain attracts the NNWS to sign the NPT. It is regarded as a third pillar of the NPT. In 1995, NWS reemphasized that the importance
45“Conference on Disarmament,” Researching Critical Will ,http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament- fora/cd (accessed on November 29, 2015). 46Beatrice Fihn, “Guide to the Conference on Disarmament,” Reaching Critical Will, (Geneva: 2012): 3.
57 of Article VI is aimed to protract the mandate of the NPT for an immeasurable time. The NPT pressurizes the non-signatories to rationalize their position outside the treaty hence, making it unique. Non-proliferation norm further exert pressure on outlier states to accede to the NPT as NNWS. The extension and normative strength of the treaty enhanced its significance in the global system. The features of the NPT authenticate the liberal assertion that non-state actors underpin significance in world politics. The extension validates the claim that dominant states employ policies by developing institutions, employing coercive policy and offering incentives. The NWS abide by the nuclear policies, conventions and rules which protect their interests. The NWS coerce NNWS to strictly abide by the NPT.47 However, the NWS are weakening the non- proliferation norms based on the NPT due to their involvement in the vertical proliferation. The US marginalizes the NPT by providing extended deterrence; incorporates nuclear weapons in military doctrine and increases the significance of nuclear weapons for the NNWS.
In post Cold War era, the US is being criticized for weakening Article I, II and VI of the NPT for providing an extended deterrent commitments it provided to NATO members, such as, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.48 The US deployment of strategic forces in allied countries is in violation of Article I. The US justifies its action on grounds that the US military officials manage nuclear forces in allied states. The US also provides nuclear umbrella to its allies even prior to the signing of the NPT. The US claims that it sought special wavier for extended deterrence prior to the signing of treaty.49 It raises questions on the US whether the US and its allies are de-facto members of the NPT? The US defiance breeds resentment and accordingly, provides justification to the NNWS to criticize non-proliferation mechanism particularly the NPT. The substance of the matter is that the US is providing security assurances to its allies at the cost of the NPT. The US rejects the aforementioned critique on the basis that extended deterrence halts horizontal proliferation in Western Europe and East Asia. Furthermore, the US defence pacts strengthened the non-proliferation norms, helped the NPT to blossom and survive.
47 Goldblat, Arms Control, 101. 48Jeffrey Record, “Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counter Proliferation,” Policy Analysis, No. 519, (July 8, 2004): 7. 49Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2012): 19.
58 The US pretence is an exaggeration as Britain and France developed indigenous nuclear weapons due to distrust in the US security assurances. The US positioned nuclear arsenals in the Western Europe to restore ally‟s conviction. The US allies allowed nuclear weapons deployment on their soil in breach of Article II of the NPT. The incorporation of the nuclear weapons in the US military doctrine for deterrent purposes revitalizes the significance of the WMDs for the NNWS signatories to the NPT. Consequently, the nuclear disarmament goal under Article VI of the NPT is becoming distant. End of the Cold War, collapse of competitive security structure,50 and the preparedness of NATO forces to deter Russia, requires the removal of the US nuclear forces from Europe. The positioning of the US nuclear forces abroad undermines the NPT. The Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Anatoly Antonov while condemning the US on August 14, 2013, demanded the removal of the US TNWs from the European states.51 Antonov lamented that the US and NATO affiliates undermine the NPT. On March 24, 2015, 52 Alexander Lukashevich spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the US for ignoring the Russian concerns over US deployed TNWs in Europe. On April 17, 2015, Mikhail Ylyanov, Foreign Ministry‟s head for non-proliferation and arms control and Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu expressed concerns over US-NATO joint military exercises to carryout nuclear attacks.53 On April 22, 2015, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov conjointly denounced the US on coinciding grounds.54 The US positioning besides corrode the cooperation amongst the signatories to the NPT. It breaches Article I and Article II of the NPT, actualizes apprehensions and poses security dilemma for Russia. It originates internal crisis for the NPT. The treaty has been inefficacious to accomplish the disarmament objectives under Article VI, ease tension, insecurity and international anarchy.
50Steven Pifer, et. al., “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges,” Brookings Arms Control Series, Paper, 3, (May, 2010): 20. 51“U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Must Be Withdrawn from Europe- Russian Defense Ministry,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, (August 14, 2013), http://asia.rbth.com/news/2013/08/14/us_tactical_nuclear_weapons_must_be_withdrawn_from_europe_- _russian_defe_28898.html, (accessed June 4, 2015). 52“US Deployment of Nukes in Europe Violates NPT: Russia,” Press TV, (March 24, 2015), http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2015/03/24/403186/US-nuclear-arms-in-Europe-violate-NPT, (accessed June 3, 2015). 53“Issue of NATO Non-Nuclear States Violating NPT To Be Raised at Conference in New York,” TASS Russian News Agency, (April 17, 2015), http://tass.ru/en/world/790091#, (accessed June 5, 2015). 54“US Breaching NPT By Deploying Nuclear Arms in European Countries- Lavrov,” Sputnik International, (April 22, 2015), http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150422/1021239802.html, (accessed June 3, 2015).
59 The deployment of approximately five hundred TNWs in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey, and Netherlands undermines non-proliferation norms of horizontal proliferation and the NPT. For example, abovementioned the NNWS signatories to the NPT, signed agreements of Program of Cooperation55 in 1964 with the US. These states in breach of the NPT statutes authorized the deployment of TNWs on their soil. The US Congress declared that the NPT ceases to exist in the war time.56 (The US cripples Article X as withdrawal from the treaty requires ninety days prior notice). Hence, the US supervised military trainings to host states to operate, launch and deliver nuclear bombs to their targets. The inclination of the NNW host states to launch nuclear strikes against enemy violates the established standards of the non-use of strategic weapons. US evolved contrasting principles on the NPT. It is a transgressor, a proliferator and Belgium, Italy, Germany, Netherlands and Turkey are opaque/ de-facto NWS in breach of the NPT.
The NPT requires the NWS to hold deliberations for complete disarmament. However, US in breach of the NPT is involved in the vertical proliferation. The US considers as insignificant the sanctity of the NPT. In 2014, President Obama authorized the qualitative improvements in the US nuclear forces.57 Overhaul of missiles, long range bombers, aircraft careers and nuclear submarines deployed in the US and abroad would continue for three decades. The US is substantially, morally and legally bound by the NPT to adhere to negotiations on the nuclear disarmament. However, the US in violation of the legal and moral obligations would approximately spend $ one trillion. The US endeavors to deter foreign threats posed to the US national security by preserving and incorporating strategic weapons in US war fighting doctrine. Decision opposes President Obama‟s dream of nuclear weapons free world. It fractures the NPT. US ICBMs pinpoint accuracy poses existential threat to Russia and China. Consequently, the requisites characterized by the national security and security dilemma coerce vertical proliferation in Russia and China. It is only the nuclear weapons which deter nuclear weapons. Deterrence is based on the capability (nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles) and credibility
55Martin Butcher, et. al., “NATO Nuclear Sharing and the NPT- Questions to be Answered,” BITS, Research Note, 97.3, (June, 1997), http://www.bits.de/public/researchnote/rn97-3.htm#, (accessed June 4, 2015). 56 George Perkovich, Principles for Reforming the Nuclear Order (Paris: IFRI Security Studies Center, 2008): 102. 57Howard Friel, “Obama‟s Commitment to Nuclear Weapons Violates the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Global Research, (November 20, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/obamas-commitment-to-nuclear-weapons- violates-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty/5415222, (accessed May 30, 2015).
60 (ability to deliver warheads to their targets). Russia and China rely on nuclear deterrent and have incorporated their nuclear forces with the conventional force structure. As a consequence, tit-for- tat vertical proliferation, nuclear deterrence and plans to preserve robust nuclear forces damage the NPT. It provokes the fear of MAD, harms the grand bargain by reviving the feelings of dramatic discriminatory character of the NPT. Moreover, it may provide justification to NNWS to abandon the NPT individually or collectively.
Article X empowers signatory states to walk away58 after issuing ninety days prior notice if the sovereignty of the signatory state is at risk. The walk away state is lawfully bound to return nuclear fabric it procured earlier under Article IV, for peaceful purposes. North Korea exercised Article X59 however; it did not return nuclear fabric. The global community also failed to coerce North Korea to comply with the withdrawal clause. This peculiar case exposes the inborn weakness of the treaty for instance NPT‟s failure to address genuine security concerns of the signatory states. The treaty lacks mechanism to retrieve nuclear equipment and material from withdrawing states. As a result, the withdrawal clause poses serious challenges to the future of the NPT. Nonetheless, despite inherent weaknesses the NPT is a legal obstacle containing proliferation of nuclear weapons. The global community unanimously agrees to preserve it.
2.2.6 The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The 34 countries manufacturing missile related technologies established voluntary group MTCR in 1987. It attempts to restrict proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles60 beyond 300 kilometers range and ability to carry 500 kilograms payloads. The group restricts missile proliferation by maintaining monopoly whilst technology remains within the group. Hence, it successfully slowed the pace and in several instances obstructed missile developments. However, MTCR is disapproved for enjoying strategic and technological advantages over non-member states. Prevention of WMDs use binds the MTCR and the NPT. The in-capabilities of the MTCR and the NPT escalate the potentiality of nuclear and missile proliferation thus challenges the non-proliferation norms.
58The NPT Articles Can be Found at the UN Website: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html, (accessed October 23, 2014). 59 Robert Rauchhaus, Mathew Kroenig and Erik Gartzke, eds., Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Routledge, 2011): 32. 60Kelsey Davenport, “The Missile Technology Control Regime at A Glance,” Arms Control Association, (November 6, 2015), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr, (accessed on December 6, 2015).
61 2.3 Post Cold War Developments: 1995 Review Conference and Non-Proliferation Debate
The vigor of illicit nuclear trade, interest of the NNWS in nuclear energy, vitality of nuclear proliferation combined with the fear of diverting peaceful nuclear technology for military purposes in post Cold War era forced the global community to strengthen the NPT by modifying non-proliferation norms. The epicenter of these efforts was to strengthen the NPT and enable it to obstruct or completely stop nuclear proliferation. The logic of cooperation is based on the philosophy of liberalism. It tends to believe that mutual cooperation results in war avoidance and absolute gains. Moreover, security competition can be reduced through international treaties and institutions. Liberalism, contrary to realism hails institutions in international system.
Fear of the revived role of nuclear weapons and expanded proliferation challenged the liberal precept of cooperation which has been the basis of the NPT. Iraq was alleged of illicit nuclear activities and its nuclear facilities were dismantled after 1991 Gulf war. 61 The war validated neo-realists „belief that excessive military power invites attack62 and weak countries are invaded by powerful states. For war avoidance neo-realists prescribed to avoid excessive military power. It authenticated the realists‟ curriculum that states suffer consequences if national security is ignored. It also exposed lacunas in IAEA‟s safeguards system. In February, 1992, Agency‟s Board of Governors professed known array of CSA was not restricted to the declared complexes of the signatory states; preferably IAEA can access all nuclear activities and complexes if required.63 Iraqi case in point empowered IAEA in 1993 to finalize voluntary reporting scheme on import and export of the nuclear material.64 The global society‟s consensus based decision to empower agency exhibits that anarchy nourishes psychological problems including uncertainty, fear and insecurity in the states. The NPT is not an institution hence, inherently lacks the mechanism to prevent states from cheating. The agency was empowered to prevent the signatories of the NPT from deception and to strengthen the NPT. The nightmare that the NPT signatories may violate legally binding agreement set aside morality and proliferates
61Michael Kort, Global Issues: Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2010): 30. 62Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18, No. 4, (1988): 616. 63“The Safeguard System,” 2. 64Richard Hooper, “The System of Strengthened Safeguards,” IAEA Bulletin, 39/4, (1997) 26.
62 provided that cheating is suitable. Contrarily, the countermeasures to prevent states from cheating demonstrate that no human order is proof against violence.65
To conclude, the rise of uni-polarity divided arms control and disarmament activists by producing divergent analysis on non-proliferation and future role of nuclear arsenals. For instance, NWS would integrate nuclear and conventional forces so that the strategic and diplomatic position of the nuclear deterrent is increased.66 It revives the realists premise that anarchy breeds antagonism, complicates relations among nations and inhibits states from entering into agreements. It reinstituted the neo-realist view that global anarchy requires states to raise military strength as it pledges state security. Neo-realism holds anarchic structure rather than the states themselves who are responsible for the states rivalry and aggressive security policies. It attempts to explain dangerous state behavior and the characteristics of international system. Realism embeds vigilance and forewarns the statesmen to setup safeguards against the intimidating designs of enemy states. The slumbering antagonism amongst states is fixed in an anarchic global system which breeds insecurity and stops states from cooperating.
2.3.1 The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
The study has reached three basic conclusions;
1. The world leaders curbed nuclear proliferation by devising the NPT along with restricting nuclear technology. 2. The sovereign states on purpose relinquished intrinsic freedom to develop nuclear bombs. Deliberate compliance commissioned the NNWS to utilize nuclear material for peaceful purposes. It proved liberal assumption that manmade global structure can be improved67 by convincing the states to sign accords. The NPT lawfully and morally binds states to abstain from cheating and peacefully resolve problems. 3. The scientifically advanced countries made voluntary efforts to impede proliferation of the WMDs and requisite delivery vehicles. Cooperation through institutions and accord
65Waltz, The Theory of International Politics. 66Ivan Oelrich, “Mission for Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War,”Occasional Paper No. 3, Federation of American Scientists (January, 2005): 9. 67Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security, 24, No. 1, (1999): 43.
63 enable the states to address mutual fear, insecurity and antagonism. Liberalism thus categorically rejects anarchy, security dilemma and the possibility of war.
The concentrated global efforts to cease nuclear proliferation contributed to the perspective to regulate the fissile material commerce. The US President B. Clinton‟s address to the UNGA68 supported the efforts to restrict the production of the weapons grade fissile material. UNGA resolution 48/75 L passed on December 16, 1993, advocated the development of the treaty on fissile material69 to thwart the threat of the development of the WMDs by regulating fissile material trade. On January 25, 1994, CD appointed Gerald Shannon to inquire about views of the CD signatories on the subject matter. 70 Shannon report known as “CD/1299,” was submitted on March 24, 1995. It proposed that;
1. The CD would settle the fate of the proposed FMCT. 2. In the light of the UNGA resolution 48/75 L, Ad Hoc Committee should be established. 3. The Committee will present findings to the CD.
Despite Shannon‟s hard-work, the CD participants were divided on the text of draft treaty as few participants suggested that the future of the production of fissile material should be included. Other argued to include previously produced fissile material. Conversely, the draft treaty could not be produced. Participants are still divided on the issue.
2.3.2 The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
In 1995, the IAEA Department of Safeguards put in motion a security of material program71 to forestall the menace of nuclear terrorism by discarding the prerogative of non-state actors to sensitive nuclear fabric and information. Decisions were also taken to restrict the access of the sovereign state to dual-use nuclear technology by devising tough rules, transparency and increase the sense of responsibility to prevent nuclear terrorism and circumstantiate strategic
68“Address by President Bill Clinton to the UN General Assembly,” U.S. Department of State, (September 27, 1993), http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207375.htm, (accessed December 6, 2015). 69“UNGA Resolution A/RES/48/75, (December 16, 1993), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r075.htm, (accessed on December 6, 2015). 70John Borrie, “Cooperation and Defection in the Conference on Disarmament,” Disarmament Diplomacy, 82, (Spring, 2006). 71Pierre Goldschmidt, “Strengthened Safeguards Meeting Present & Future Challenges,” IAEABulletin, 43/4, (2001), http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull43-4/43403450611.pdf, (accessed on November 8, 2014): 6.
64 stability. The technically advanced states formed the WA to stop transfer of military hardware and twofold usage of the items and technologies. 72 It focuses on the non-state actors and individuals in pursuit to make the world a peaceful place. The NPT does not address possible hazards in the wake of transfer of the dual-use technology. The WA was devised to strengthen the NPT by addressing the inherent loopholes in the treaty.
2.3.3 The 1995 NPT Extension Conference
The NPT signatory states granted life time extension to the treaty during the May, 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.73 The Extension Conference determined to convene three preparatory meetings, if needed fourth conference prior to convening review conference after every five years.74 Decision gave an indefinite life to the review conference. It endowed the NPT signatories to enforce decisions taken during review conferences. The NPT likewise strives to abolish nuclear weapons globally hence, non signatories were asked to adhere to the NPT75 as the NNWS. The timeless extension of the NPT aimed to systemically lower nuclear anarchy, fear of aggression and empower states to collaborate. The NPT signatories legally rejected the incentive for cheating, agreed to enforce liberal principles and discouraged the strategic importance of the nuclear weapons. The belief of the global community believe in the norms of the NPT reflect normative thinking borrowed from liberalism. The liberal enterprise of peace through institutions and treaties is a modern recipe to make the world peaceful. The collapse of the NPT could have provided an opportunity to technologically advanced states to cross the nuclear threshold. Protracted process to devise new nuclear order could have resulted in the nuclear anarchy. For instance, former Soviet republics and roughly twenty five other states could have joined the nuclear club. Many others would have pursued the development program of the WMDs. Nuclear anarchy could have possibly resulted in nuclear war.
The NWS legalized the NPT under the aegis of providing assurances to disarm by the implementing Article VI. Further, NWS provided negative security assurances to all the
72http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/, (accessed on November 8, 2014). 73T.V. Paul, “The Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Fall, 1998): 6. 74“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” NTI,http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty- on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/# (accessed June 6, 2015). 75Ibid.
65 NNWS. 76 The NWS revealed 77 to the NPT signatories that agreement on confirmable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be concluded. Fissile material manufacturing would be regulated through an accord. The NWS provided assurances to dismantle nuclear warheads and fissile materials. The NPT Conference adopted the Middle East Resolution,78 to constitute impression that nuclear proliferation in the region is near closure in pursuit to get recognition of the NPT from the Arab world.
The promises made during the Conference had profound impact on non-NPT member states wherein Andorra, Brazil, Angola, Comoros, Chile, Cuba, Djibouti, UAE, Oman and Vanuatu became NNWS 79 signatories to the NPT. Brazil and Argentina permanently relinquished their right to develop nuclear weapons while strengthening the NPT even further. The success stories include the roll back of the South African nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine decided to dismantle inherited nuclear forces from Soviet Union.80 Latin America, Southeast Asia, Africa and the South Pacific were declared as the NWFZ.81 The NPT proved to be a successful arms control accord. It abandoned nuclear arms to lessen the danger of nuclear weapons use. Anti-bomb lobby built political and psychological pressure on the outlier states to join the treaty as NNWS. The political, psychological and legal barriers82strengthened an anti-bomb. Consequently, the cost of the development of the nuclear weapons and noncompliance increased.
The 175, NPT signatories conciliatingly determined the conceivable benefits and losses. The NNWS accepted the NPT‟s discriminatory framework and declined right to develop nuclear arms to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful ambitions. The treaty transformed into a core and distinguished stumbling block in preventing the nuclear proliferation. The NPT signatories
76Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham Jr., “An NPT for Non-Members,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May/June, 2004): 41. 77Bonnie Jenkins, “Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Addressing Nonstate Actor Motivations,” Analysis of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science, 607, No. 33, (2006): 37. 78“Resolution on the Middle East,” NPT/CONF.1995/32/RES/1, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt, (accessed July 9, 2015). 79Rajiv Nayan, “The NPT and India: Accommodating the Exception,” Strategic Analysis, 34, No. 2, (2010): 311. 80T.V. Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Fall, 1998): 1. 81Cohen and Graham Jr., “An NPT for Non-members,” 2. 82 Victor Gilinsky, “Nuclear Proliferation After the Indian and Pakistani Tests,” in Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation: Are We Ready, eds. Henry Sokolski and James M. Ludes (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001): 3.
66 transmitted sincerity to assist each other in pursuit to decline rivalries, eradicate mutual threat perceptions, stop nuclear proliferation and avoid arms race.
However, the participants did not denounce the Indian PNEs regrettably. Nor did they devise any plan to punish it for diverting the peaceful nuclear technology for military purposes to prevent future nuclear proliferation. India took the pretext of the inequitable character of the NPT for rejecting it. It considers the accord permanently divides the signatory states into nuclear haves and have-nots.83 The indefinite extension of the NPT permanently closed the door for New Delhi to accede to the treaty as a NWS. The global treaties and institutions generally fail to function either completely or partially if they are unable to provide incentives to targeted audience. India lamented the NWS for their failure to take practical steps in achieving the objectives of disarmament of the NPT. Moreover, India also reserved the right to develop WMDs. Indian opaque nuclear status and conventional asymmetry posed security dilemma for Pakistan. The state of war, persistent rejection of great powers and failure of the NPT to provide security assurances coerced Pakistan to reject the NPT. The dictum that nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons forced Pakistan to keep the option of WMDs development open. Pakistan‟s narrative is very pertinently explained by the realists‟ notion of self-help, nuclear deterrence theory and rational decision making. Though Pakistan‟s official stance was not opposed to the established nuclear order. It therefore conditioned the signing of the Treaty with the internationally official commitment of India.84
In conclusion, the triumph of the NPT thwarted the fear of nuclear anarchy, terrorism, planned or inadvertent launch of nuclear weapons. The increased tendency of states to sign the NPT as NNWS was a major blow to the teachings of the realists that the states do not cooperate. Near universality introduced slight changes in the realists‟ philosophy. Hence, both schools of defensive and offensive realists emerged. John J. Mearsheimer an offensive realist claimed that the countries collaborate and develop global institutions85 to;
a) Help hegemon make policies guidelines and if required changes established norms; b) Ability to control institutional policies determine state ranking in the global system and;
83Strobe Talbot, ”Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 78, No. 2, (March/April, 1999): 113. 84Bhumitra Chakma, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons (New York: Routledge, 2009): 35, 36. 85John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 19, No. 3, (1994/95): 13.
67 c) The global institutions enable the dominant power to pursue national interests in an anarchic system.
The hegemonic approach elaborates cooperative behavior of the states. For instance, signing of the agreement. However, despite the dawn of reinforced nuclear order, Article VI could not be implemented and universality of the treaty remained a dream. However, nuclear order has distinct focus (non-proliferation), based on the set of institutions (IAEA, NSG) and promotes civilian uses of nuclear energy.
2.3.4 The Additional Protocol (AP)
The unearthing of Iraq‟s covert nuclear weapons development program intensified the anxiety of NPT signatories. It fostered feelings of cheating among NPT member states. An anti- bomb lobby headed by IAEA introduced an Additional Protocol (AP)86 INFCIR/54087 on May 15, 1997. It is designed to stop the NNWS signatories to the NPT from cheating or developing bomb secretly. This devised Protocol aims to control in-house crisis of the NPT. However, the concern of nuclear domino effect emerges since, if a NNWS is left unchecked to build nuclear weapons by cheating, it can provoke the NNWS signatories to the NPT and bring nuclear spring. The Protocol was evolved to engineer mechanical capabilities, bud judicious right and discover the non-compliance of the NPT member states at premature stage. It aims to tackle the Achilles' heel of the NPT and to enable the treaty to thwart illicit diversion of nuclear technology. AP also extended the scope of the IAEA to have nuclear facilities, complexes, research centers activities and information88 pursued by signing states declared. The AP empowered the IAEA‟s inspectors to visit assumed places, gather environmental samples and apply remote monitoring techniques. It empowered the agency to resolve questions arising from the information.89 AP serves the role of the protection layer. Apprehension of the development of nuclear bomb in violation of the legal obligations of the NPT would prevail as far as strategic significance of the WMDs is not reduced. Consequently, incentive to build nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes would embed internal crisis in the NPT. The IAEA aspired to apply rigorous judicial inspection mechanism
86John Carlson, “Five Decades of Safeguards, and Directions for the Future: An Australian Perspective,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management,https://www.dfat.gov.au/asno/publications/five_decades_of_safeguards.pdf, (accessed on April 26, 2014): 3. 87“IAEA Safeguards.” 88Peterson et al., “Export Controls and International Safeguards,” 516. 89Carlson, “Five Decades of Safeguards,” 3.
68 however; the AP could not be fully implemented. It is functional in hundred and twenty eight states.90 Several signatories are not ratifying it due to tough inspection procedures of the Agency. The disarmament objectives decrease strategic value of nuclear arms. The NPT member states mandatory adherence to AP enables them to get access to civilian nuclear fabric. It would further reduce strategic significance of nuclear deterrent. Hence, the NNWS signatories to the NPT would not attempt to cheat it would ease the internal crisis of the treaty
2.4 NPT Review Conferences: Reassessing the NPT
The NPT review Conferences is organized after every five years. It conducts key tasks to deal with the anxiety of the treaty‟s signatories, analyse progress made on proposals, to prevent proliferation of nuclear technology and to adapt the treaty to the changing strategic environment. This section attempts to analyze the NPT review conferences.
2.5 The NPT Review Conference in 2000
India-Pakistan nuclear tests; Indian nuclear draft doctrine; active nuclear arms race and; Kargil War increased strategic value of nuclear deterrent. Islamabad-New Delhi categorically rejected disarmament calls and NPT. However, the deterrent role poses the security dilemma for de-jure NWS. Hence, prevent the implementation of the Article VI. India-Pakistan nuclear deterrent aggrandizes the strategic significance of the WMDs and encourage the NNWS to take possession of the WMDs. The indicated phenomenon additionally intensified external pressure on the NPT. It demanded the NPT signatories to absorb the external and in-house pressure and preserve sanctity of the non-proliferation norms. During the sixth review conference arranged in the light of Article VIII, paragraph 3, the NPT signatories demanded India-Pakistan to sign the NPT as NNWS, place their nuclear programs under the IAEA supervision, to take steps towards the creation of NWFZ in South Asia, 91 dismantle the WMDs, and implement the UNSC resolution 1172. Likewise, India-Pakistan entrance into the NPT as NWS was rejected. An anti-
90“Conclusion of Additional Protocols: Status as of 14 May 2015,” https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/AP_status_list.pdf, (accessed June 6, 2015). 91“Preparatory Committee for Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to Meet, 8-9 April,” Press Release DC/2826, (April 3, 2002), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/dc2826.doc.htm, (accessed on September 20, 2014).
69 bomb lobby utilized the NPT platform to reject92 India-Pakistan self proclaimed NWS status and discouraged the NNWS from budding nuclear weapons. The Lobby wanted to manifest strength of nonproliferation norms.
The conference was a success as the NPT signatories collectively accepted the concluding report. However, universality of the NPT is a pending task as the treaty is nor-yet offering any incentives to the South Asian belligerents. The incapability of the NWS to implement Article VI, led to the evolution of Thirteen Practical Steps to systemically achieve the disarmament goals. The NPT signatories decided to end the illicit nuclear trade.93 Perhaps, the religious decree of Bin Laden in1998, efforts to get and use nuclear weapons evolved consensus in the participants to thwart nuclear terrorism through procedural justice. However, the NNWS were convinced of their inviolable privilege guaranteed under Article IV of the treaty. Further, depository states also reiterated commitment of 1995, to establish MENWFZ to escape critical remarks from the stakeholders. The incentives consequently determined the success of the Conference. Such inducements strengthened the belief of the NNWS in the NPT. It advanced the arms control objectives. It determines that non-proliferation apparatus revolves around the treaty.
The NPT endeavors to stop nuclear weapons use. However, disinterest of nuclear haves to dismantle nuclear weapons inhibits the treaty from accomplishing the disarmament objective. The NWS forces the outlier states to reject the NPT and prevents the treaty from becoming universally accepted. Nuclear weapons increase the potential for nuclear proliferation, undermine nuclear safety culture and increase the probability of weakening the IAEA safeguards system. The NWS encourages nuclear proliferation in NNWS it undermines the treaty.
2.6 The NPT Review Conference in 2005
During the 2005, Conference, primarily discussion revolved around themes pertaining to NPT‟s Articles I, II, III, IV & VI threat of use of nuclear bombs, non-proliferation and IAEA Safeguards were discussed. Vertical proliferation for instance incorporation of nuclear deterrent in military planning and national defense policies by NWS contradicts Article VI, disarmament
92Rebecca Johnson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise,” The Acronym Institute, 46, (May, 2000), http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd46/46npt.htm, (accessed on September 20, 2014). 93“2000 NPT Review Conference Addresses Threat of Nuclear Trafficking,” NTI, (May 25, 2016), http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/2000-npt-review-conference-addresses-threat-nuclear-trafficking/ (accessed October 28, 2016).
70 clause and undermine the NPT. NNWS urged the NWS to diminish the deterrent role of WMDs, reduce deployed nuclear warheads, and begin nuclear disarmament in pursuit to reduce dangers of nuclear war.
The NPT, signatories also underlined the challenges, 94 including threat of nuclear terrorism, the disobedience of few signatories, unsafeguarded radioactive material, and treaty‟s failure to get a universal recognition. Likewise North Korean withdrawal, Iran‟s suspicious nuclear activities, the disinterest of the NWS to implement Article VI, and the issue of negative security assurances were discussed. Pyongyang‟s walkout from NPT unveiled treaty‟s limits. For instance, safeguards proved insufficient in discovering the diversion of civil nature of nuclear programs for military objectives. Nuclear black-market and illicit nuclear trade capacitated North Korea to manufacture nuclear bomb. Despite North Korea‟s refusal to return nuclear technology, the NPT signatories did not evolve mechanism to retrieve it. Furthermore, no recipe conceivably was devised to retrieve nuclear material from walk away state in future. North Korea‟s walkout, Iran‟s distrustful actions and illicit nuclear trade all were included in the catalogue of recent challenges.95 It was acknowledged that illegal nuclear trade contributes to nuclear proliferation and challenges the world security. World cooperation was set as guide to overcome the recent challenges. In an attempt to ease the external pressure on the NPT, the participants reaffirmed the outlier states without offering any incentive to join the treaty as the NNWS. The NWS though provided negative security assurances; they were urged to reaffirm their commitments. The NWS disregard for Article VI poses security dilemma and creates suspicions in the minds of the have- nots. The substance of the matter is non-compliance of signatories put in-house pressure on the NPT and led to internal crisis.
Despite comprehensive knowledge of the challenges, the Conference failed to issue consensus based final document. Considerably,
94“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” CNS, (April 3, 2011), http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/npt.pdf, (accessed August 4, 2015). 95 United Nations:2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2005/57(Part I), (New York, 2005), https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp- content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/2005%20-%20NY%20- %20NPT%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Part%20I.pdf, (accessed August 8, 2015).
71 1. The US opposition to working agenda96 and refusal to take account of the past promises mainly led to the failure of the NPT Conference. 2. Have-nots lamented the NWS for vertical proliferation, inability to implement thirteen steps and noncompliance with Article VI. Whereas, North Korean withdrawal, Iran suspicious nuclear activities and illicit nuclear trafficking forced US to eye on halting horizontal nuclear proliferation. 3. Further, the Russians opposed the US‟s 2002 abandonment of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) and subsequent Iraqi invasion. The 2003 worsening situation in Georgia, Sino-US confrontation in South China Sea created fears of the revival of Cold War. Consequently, the participants urged NWS to ratify the CTBT, cease WMDs development and take steps to avert accidental or deliberate nuclear war. However, indefinite extension weakened the position of the NNWS hence; the NNWS lost the opportunity to institutionalize the distinction between haves and have-nots.
Multilateral disarmament dialogues, withdrawal of TNWs and adherence to NPT statutes also averted war and ensured peace. Possibly the 2004 discovery of nuclear black market, the UN‟s approved nuclear terrorism treaty97 helped the participants to regard nuclear terrorism as a grave threat. 98 Participants approved Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and G8 Global Partnership Initiative. The Participants‟ speculated that the terrorists can acquire unsafeguarded radioactive material to manufacture dirty bombs and carryout nuclear terrorism. An effective implementation of IAEA safeguards and stringent domestic laws were viewed necessary to obstruct illicit nuclear trade and to secure unsafeguarded nuclear material.
2.7 The NPT Review Conference in 2010
The NPT signatories convened a successful Conference in 2010. They produced a collectively approved sixty four steps final document. Document aimed to invoke and preserve the NPT and get universal recognition. It aimed at ensuring a nuclear weapons free world. The
96 Jonathan Granoff, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Its 2005 Review Conference: A Legal and Political Analysis,” International Law and Politics, 39, (September, 2007), http://nyujilp.org/wp- content/uploads/2013/02/39.4-Granoff.pdf, (accessed August 4, 2015). 97“Timeline of the Nuclear Age,” Atomic Archive,http://www.atomicarchive.com/Timeline/Time2000.shtml, (accessed October 30, 2016). 98United Nations: 797.
72 participants agreed to strengthen Article I, Article IV and Article VI also recognized as three pillar of the NPT. Further, adherence to Article II & III99 was determined as a prerequisite for the NNWS to benefit from Article IV. The NNWS particularly underdeveloped countries were offered the advantages of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as compensation to support the IAEA.
Israel was given an invitation to join the NPT as a NNWS. However, Israel realized that it will have to rollback WMDs program, sign CSA, the CTBT and permit IAEA to validate Israel compliance with the NPT. Hence Israel rejected the NPT.
The participants considering the rough behavior and doubtful nuclear activities of Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korean walkout stressed the need amongst the participants to resolve the future disputes in conformity with the UN Charter and the NPT statutes. 100 The secret manufacturing of nuclear weapons intensified pressure on the NPT signatories to assist in sternly applying the IAEA safeguards including AP and CSA. The NPT signatories stressed to act indigenously and seek agency support to empower the NPT, safeguard radioactive material, and curb illicit nuclear trade. The participants agreed that unsafeguarded radioactive material and nuclear terrorism was the gravest threat to humanity, world security and build consensus to prevent terrorists from acquiring radioactive material. They stressed to take steps to stop nuclear terrorism i.e. to fund IAEA in pursuit to stop illicit nuclear commerce, expose nuclear black market, secure nuclear fabric and prevent nuclear terrorism. To avoid the concerns of the NNWS and ensure success of the Conference following measures were taken;
1. The NWS were urged to ratify the CTBT, stop vertical proliferation, dismantle and withdraw deployed nuclear weapons. 2. The NNWS were recalled that the US-Russia signed bilateral accords i.e.101 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-I), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-), the
992010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (2010, New York), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I) (accessed August 7, 2015). 100David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “After the 2010 NPT Review Conference: Advancing the Non-Proliferation Pillar,” ISIS, (July 15, 2010), http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/after-the-2010-npt-review-conference- advancing-the-non-proliferation-pillar/, (accessed August 6, 2015). 101Janne E. Nolan, “The INF Treaty,” in The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification, et al., Michael Krepon (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1991): 355; “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance,” Arms Control Association,https://www.armscontrol.org/print/2556, (accessed July 21, 2017).
73 START-II, the START-III Framework, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the New START to dismantle or withdraw deployed nuclear weapons. 3. The NWS announced to cease manufacturing of fissile material and submit the reports to IAEA. 4. Chinese delegation announced China‟s adherence to NFU policy.
2.8 The NPT Review Conference in 2015
The revived US-Russian rivalry over Ukraine, the contrariety over the creation of the Middle East NWFZ, divided the signatories to the NPT in 2015 review Conference. Consequently, the Conference was a failure.102 The Russian delegation reiterated the proposal to setup MENWFZ.103 It proposed dialogues to create Middle East NWFZ. Further, each Middle Eastern state should annex the NPT as NNWS. Russia, pleaded the UNGA to convene a conference on NWFZ in Middle East prior to March 1, 2016. A deadline however, could not be imposed and the Conference failed because;
1. The US disagreement to the creation of the Middle East NWFZ. 2. US blocked a proposal submitted by 107 NPT signatories demanding a ban on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons.
The US disinterest to take meaningful steps on the Middle East NWFZ besides preferential treatment of Israel, a non-NPT signatory resented the NPT signatories. Egypt and Iran expressed discomfort over the US double standards in the working paper presented at the Conference.104 Perception prevails that the NWS are status quo power. The NWS aspires to use the NPT to validate acquisition of nuclear weapons, missile system and thwart NNWS from budding nuclear bomb.
102“Disappointing NPT Conference,” The Japan Times,http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/26/editorials/disappointing-npt-conference/#.VcdEEPmqqkp, (accessed August 9, 2015). 1032015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (May 14, 2015, New York), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/WP.57, (accessed June 14, 2016). 104“Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons: Working Paper Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran,” NPT?CONF.2015/WP.19, (March 26, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/WP.19, (accessed June 15, 2016).
74 To conclude, one may say that the treaty deters horizontal nuclear proliferation alone. The NPT failed to cease arms race, vertical nuclear proliferation and convince the NWS to implement Article VI. First generation of the NWS fixation with the nuclear arms raises value of strategic arsenals and fear of an inadvertent or deliberate use of nuclear weapons. Further, the US though aspire WMDs free world but it relies on nuclear (extended) deterrence for self and allies defence. The anomaly in US nuclear non-proliferation policy for example preferential treatment of Israel and disregard to create the Middle East NWFZ is weakening the NPT. The US discarded the fact that the Arab states who voted for the extension of the NPT due to the pledge that the Middle East NWFZ will be created. Unfortunately, the biased approach of the US as a self-proclaimed custodian of the NPT ceased the cooperation. The anxiety and frustration amongst the Arab states developed a feeling of inequality and discrimination. It also revived the feelings of nuclear apartheid amongst the Arab states. As a result, stress was caused in the NPT. Hence, divided the participants between the US led Western bloc and the Arab states led by Egypt demanding the creation of the Middle East NWFZ. The Conference failed due to rifts. However, Egypt was made the scapegoat it was held responsible for the failure of the review Conference. Arab states were in addition condemned for their inflexibility shown to address the concerns of Israel. Eventually, the US partiality may push the Arab states to withdraw in pursuit of the development of the nuclear weaponss and rely on nuclear deterrent. The US soft corner for Israel increases dangers of nuclear anarchy leading towards nuclear war. Failed Conference exposed in-house crisis, groupings in the NPT and internal rifts among the signatories. The collapse of the Conference enabled the NWS to refuse to submit two reports on the steps taken to employ with Article VI, prior to 2020 NPT‟s scheduled review Conference. The NWS achieved their aim to out rightly reject a document on humanitarian pledge.105 It reflected the concerns of 159 NNWS, in the wake of the use of the WMDs. The NWS disinterest to implement Article IV, of the NPT evolved the idea among NNWS to settle contentious matters in the UNGA or adhoc committees106 by majority votes.
105“Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Outcome A Warning Sign, Say Arms Control Experts,” Arms Control Association, (May 22, 2015), https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/press-release/2015-05-22/Nuclear- Nonproliferation-Treaty-Review-Conference-Outcome-a-Warning-Sign-Say-Arms-Control-Experts, (accessed August 10, 2015). 106Andrey A. Baklitskiy, “On the Outcome of the 2015 NPT Review Conference,” PIR Center, (August 12, 2015), http://www.pircenter.org/en/news/6775-on-the-outcome-of-the-2015-npt-review-conference, (accessed August 27, 2015).
75 Conclusion
Superpowers rivalry, nuclear arms race and missile competition dominated the Cold War. Fear that the mishandling of the crisis can result in nuclear exchange encouraged arms control efforts, to lower the likelihood of deterrence breakdown. Both superpowers applied teachings of liberalism. Cooperation is a basic premise of liberalism it asserts global institutions, treaties mitigate trust deficit, alter states behavior and considerably impede nuclear proliferation. Treaties and institutions can function well if signatory states are confident of equal status. Further, a sense is developed that genuine anxiety of all the states is equally addressed. The success of nuclear non-proliferation, survival and working of the global institutions for instance the IAEA and accords i.e. the NPT depends upon recognized fairness and non-discrimination. The application of liberalism by superpowers was thus rejection of realist school of thought to, first, stop nuclear proliferation. Second, stabilize superpowers relations. Third, erode chances of deterrence failure. Fourth, if deterrence fails minimize the cost of war and; fifth, strengthen the concept of mutual vulnerability to cement strategic stability.
Superpowers developed the NPT to prevent nuclear terrorism, inadvertent or deliberate nuclear weapons use, disarmament and cease horizontal nuclear proliferation. Flaws in the NPT, differences amongst the member states as was observed during the review conference, NWS disregard for Article VI and NNWS non-compliance with Article II, it failed to function or achieve non-proliferation objectives effectively. This consequently, integrated the IAEA with the NPT. The WA, MTCR and the NSG were evolved to cement the non-proliferation norms based on the NPT. The depository states tried to expand the treaty and enlarged its membership and evolved first generation nuclear order. Nuclear proliferation was slowed down, strategic stability was achieved and nuclear war was prevented. However, only a few states dared to refuse to go along with it.
Contrarily, realism discards cooperation John J. Mearsheimer prescribed that fright of relative gains, fear that rival can increase military mussels in the guise of mutual cooperation prevent substantial cooperation among states. 107 In the 1980s, Keohane claimed that the
107Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 13.
76 dominant power set-up organizations to achieve or protect their national interest. 108 Basic premise of realism is major powers create institutions and preserve their lives to attain national interests. The neo-realism explains great powers vow, conduct and concerns to halt nuclear proliferation quite vividly. Initially, the state security and personal interest required great powers to stop the horizontal proliferation and prevent the NNWS from challenging the status-quo. They relied on the nuclear arsenals to prevent the rise of the revisionist state. NWS avoided implementation of the Article VI to vertically proliferate by exploiting ambiguities in the NPT. However, the double standards of the NWS augmented a sense of discrimination and apartheid amongst the NNWS. The de-jure NWS also ignored sense of deprivation amongst the NNWS unjustifiably and thus created a divided the world. They pursued diverse goals and set conflicting preferences. Hence, the spirit of the NPT is undermined. For instance, the resolution calling for the founding of the NWFZ in Middle East resulted in the failure of the 2005 and 2015 NPT review Conferences. Inequitable treatment is pushing the NNWS signatories of the NPT to the brink of reconsidering the compliance and justifying the development of the nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the US, Canada and the UK are causing internal crisis for the NPT as well by giving unfair preferential support to Israel. This may eventually compel Arab countries to walkout from the treaty.
This study raises questions on the readiness of the US in particular to deal with this future challenge. Furthermore, though the outlier states adhere to the non-proliferation norms so far but they are constantly involved in the vertical proliferation. The continued reliance of the NWS on nuclear deterrent requires military doctrine. It encourages the incorporation of nuclear forces with conventional force structure yet poses challenge to the NPT. The signatories to the treaty also could not solve the inherent problems in the NPT to prevent its signatories from cheating. The NPT depository states failed to work out arrangements to persuade the NWS to dismantle their nuclear weapons. The treaty failed to penalize treaty‟s cheating signatories. Geo-economic and strategic policies prevailed over non-proliferation objectives so nuclear weapons free world could not become a reality. The NPT today confronts three different challenges. First, it inherits internal challenges created by the NPT signatories. Second, external challenges evolved by the
108 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
77 outliers‟ states and; third, the worrisome aspirations of terrorist groups/ nuclear jihadis to acquire fissile material or nuclear weapons.
78 Chapter Three The Genesis of India-Pakistan Nuclear Weapons and Missile System Development
3.1 Introduction Nuclear deterrence theory hypothesizes core principles explaining nuclear proliferation, deterrent mission of deterrent forces in war fighting strategies and states proliferation behavior. Nuclear weapons are developed to repel foreign threats, counterbalance militarily powerful foe, to address security dilemma and preserve peace. Deterrence is credible if it is believed that deterring state would inevitably launch nuclear arsenals if prohibited action is taken. Irreparable loss of nuclear weapons use, war abhorrence and fear of nuclear anarchy mobilized global efforts to advance non-proliferation apparatus to employ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and halt or slowdown nuclear proliferation. However, non-proliferation apparatus could not prevent determined India and Pakistan from developing nuclear bomb.
South Asian nuclear proliferation reveals the genesis of Indian nuclear deterrent is rooted in prestige, to exhibit technological edge and the domestic reasons. Indian though signed nuclear accords to get nuclear material and technology for civilian program/ peaceful purposes. However, New Delhi socially, morally, legally and practically violated bilateral nuclear accords for military purposes i.e. to develop and test nuclear devices.109 Islamabad remained devoted and abided by nuclear accords to make use of nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes. Dismemberment of East Pakistan, Pokhran-I nuclear tests and weaponless posture created Indian favored nuclear deterrent force asymmetry vis-à-vis Pakistan. Further, occupation of Siachen and New Delhi‟s repeated attempts to impose war on Pakistan created existential threat in the minds of Pakistani policymakers. Fear that India wants to engross Pakistani territory coerced Islamabad to preserve country‟s sovereignty by developing nuclear deterrent. Pakistan diverted peaceful nuclear technology to develop India specific nuclear deterrent while applying the notion of self- help and nuclear deterrence theory as superpowers and the nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) failed to address Islamabad‟s genuine security concerns. Islamabad applied teachings of basic deterrence posture that only nuclear weapons can preserve state sovereignty. In conclusion, Islamabad rejected the NPT in response to Indian choice to keep the doors of nuclear weapons
109 Benjamin Kienzle, Skype interview by Ashfaq Ahmed, (September 19, 2018).
79 development open. Yet, Pakistan tried to create nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) and to pursue nuclear disarmament in South Asia.
This section precisely highlights afore-claimed efforts, rejects Nehru as nuclear pessimist instead exhibits that Nehru, the architect of strategic and nuclear culture of post colonial India, laid the foundations of Indian nuclear weapons program, opaque nuclear proliferation era, proliferation behavior, nuclear cultures, nuclear force structure and related delivery mechanism. Chapter draws conclusion that rigid leadership divert the course of peaceful nuclear technology for nuclear weapons development. This section debates the following questions: How does realist school explain India-Pakistan nuclear weapons development program? What is India-Pakistan rationale behind rejecting the NPT? What is the significance of missile developments in restoring strategic stability?
3.2.1 India’s Nuclear Proliferation: A Historical Reality 1946 to 1974
Jawahar Lal Nehru is the architect of Indian nuclear policy and weapons program. Nehru in 1946 asserted that, “every country will have to devise and use the latest scientific devices for its protection…no doubt India will … use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.” 110 Conceivably, Nehru inferred Hobbs state of nature- due to absence of authority statesmen succumb to mutual suspicion, uncertainty including insecurity and decide to prepare for war. It is characterized by war of all against all- and global anarchy incubates conflicts and paves way for colonialism. Nehru prescribed merely self-help ensures state‟s existence.
Nehru set the course for nuclear weapons development by enacting Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) Act on April 15, 1948.111 Nehru warned that, “we must develop this atomic energy…if we are compelled…to use it for other purposes possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way.” Conceivably, India-Pakistan war,
110 George Perkovich, India‟s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (California: California University Press, 2001): 3. 111Claude Arpi, “France and Nuclear Disarmament between Vision and Realism,” Indian Defence Review, 25, No. 4, (October/December, 2010): 133.
80 Kashmir partition, mutual hostility and international anarchy rejuvenated fear of colonial rule in Nehru‟s mind. Changes in Indian strategic environment perhaps induced Nehru to refer to two- fold usages of atom. Nehru aimed to convince Indian public that foreign pursuit to impose colonial rule in India will be repelled with nuclear deterrent. Presumably, Nehru appealed Indian masses to pressurize leaders not to succumb to foreign demands and continue development of nuclear weapons program. Intuitively Nehru promulgated Indian scientists particularly Dr. Homi Bhaba to actuate nuclear weapons program. Nehru, asserted here, left the legacy for Indira to develop nuclear weapons and buttress Indian security. Crux of the matter is that, Nehru realized the deterrent role of nuclear bomb. Hence Nehru laid foundations of the Indian nuclear weapons program. Nuclear weapons development for security reasons is also known as security model proliferation.
The nuclear establishment harbors confidentiality if nuclear weapons development turn into national objective. Dr. Bhaba aspire nuclear weapons development. Dr. Bhaba perceived Nehru‟s aforementioned warning was threatening it could have sabotaged clandestine nuclear weapons development program. Consequently Dr. Bhaba in a note entitled, “Organization of Atomic Research in India,” directed to Nehru to maintain confidentiality of nuclear program.112 Nehru comprehended the fact that strategic environment did not favor India. He realized sensitivity of nuclear proliferation and also discerned non-proliferation efforts of the global community. Nehru‟s following statement endorses the above claim. Nehru stated that “the advantage of research would go to others before we even reaped it,” and “it would become impossible … to cooperate with any country … because it will not be prepared for the results of researchers to become public.”113 Later, Nehru avoided publically discussing nuclear weapons development and their deterrent role. Moreover, the right to question the activities of nuclear authorities was categorically rejected. Secrecy became the trademark of evolving Indian nuclear culture. Realist notion that states are rational actor take steps in the wake of cost and benefit analysis explains the policies of the Indian government.
112Quoted in Mohit Kumar Gupta, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Major Legal Issues,” (Master of Philosophy thesis, Jawahar Lal Nehru University, 2007), https://www.reading.ac.uk/web/FILES/123agreement/Gupta_Dissertation.pdf, (accessed on January 9, 2015). 113Quoted in M.V. Ramana, “Nehru, Science and Secrecy,” http://www.reocities.com/m_v_ramana/nucleararticles/Nehru.pdf, (accessed on January 9, 2015).
81 3.2.2 Nuclear Opacity: A Crucial Feature of India’s Nuclear Program
In December, 1953, the US president presented Atoms for Peace program before the UNGA. India insinuated it the West endeavors to control nuclear technology and material. Further, step towards nuclear colonization of India. Aforementioned fear stems from Soviets strategy to use science and technology as a tool to colonize Central Asian republics, Armenia and Georgia.114 On August 3, 1954, Nehru enacted inception of the Department of Atomic Research in India115 (DARI) to debar the West, from nuclear colonization of India. Nehru weighed nuclear opacity as the first pillar of Indian nuclear culture. The succeeding reasons cements the abovementioned claim, first, opaque proliferation enabled India to avoid global condemnation. Opacity endowed India to acquire nuclear material and necessary technology conveniently. Declaration that India is budding nuclear weapons would have resulted in economic, technical and military embargos. Opaque nuclear proliferation expedited the Indian nuclear weapons development program. By 1954, India‟s nuclear program had matured enough to divert it towards the development of the nuclear weapons.116 Opacity helped India to achieve twofold objectives first, it enabled India to become a threshold states. Second, opacity patronized India to be acknowledged as civilized and responsible state. Nuclear opacity evolved as fundamental feature of Indian evolving nuclear culture.
Instead Dr Bhaba, ensured watertight control over Indian nuclear program through IAEC Act. It empowered Bhaba with executive powers.117 Further he could not be held accountable by anyone including the Indian Parliament except Nehru himself. Dr. Bhaba maintained sovereign status. He could decide issues of vital importance. Bhaba managed nuclear activities beyond government control. In 1954, Nehru established Department of Atomic Energy (DAE).118 DAE licensed Nehru to first stop political and bureaucratic interference in Indian nuclear program. Second, hold personal meetings with Dr. Bhaba concerning nuclear affairs. Consequently, assertive oversight ensured opacity at the state level and matured rigorous nuclear culture.
114 Paul R. Josephson, Red Atom: Russia‟s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005): 204. 115Sumit Ganguly, “India‟s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi‟s Nuclear Weapons Program,” International Security, 23, No. 4, (Spring, 1999): 151. 116Claude Arpi, “France and Nuclear Disarmament,” 135. 117Arpi, “France and Nuclear Disarmament between Vision and Realism.” 118Perkovich, India‟s Nuclear Bomb, 13.
82 Significantly Nehru-Bhaba enterprise evolved nuclear secrecy. In addition, assertive control at national and organizational level matured.
In 1955, Dr. Bhaba presided over the UN‟s first Conference on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy.119 This gave him an access to the declassified nuclear research work of the west. In April 1956, a nuclear accord between India and Canada120 enabled India to overcome its depleting uranium resources. Canadian assistance in the construction of Canada-India reactor US (CIRUS) enabled India to produce weapons grade plutonium. Bhaba from outset rejected safeguards agreements. However, in 1956, Bhaba signed safeguards agreement with Canada.121 Aforeknown decision helped India to get heavy water from Canada and send Indian scientists for training to US.122 Indian scientists covertly continued progress and matured nuclear weapons program. For instance in 1956, Nehru stated that constant supply of nuclear material will substantiate nuclear weapons development in three or four years. 123 Nehru‟s announcement ratifies that India embarked on the path of nuclear weapons development. India became “virtual threshold state” as heavy water nuclear reactor enabled India to reprocess spent fuel and procure plutonium.
3.2.3 Nehruvian Nuclear Realism
Evolution of the IAEA in the 1957, heightened Nehru and Bhaba‟s anxiety that the West delineated imperial policy to handle the third world. Nehru lay-out Indian nuclear weapons program. Nehru publicly condemned nuclear weapons development and demanded nuclear disarmament. Professedly Nehru mimicked nuclear disarmament to fend off the IAEA safeguards and ensure training of Indian nuclear scientists abroad. Aforesaid policy helped India to acquire nuclear material in the pretext of right of entry to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. It helped India to determine plutonium route for secretly developing nuclear weapons. Nehru-
119 Ibid, 30. 120 Rajesh Rajagopalan and Atul Mishra, Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts (London: Routledge, 2014): 88. 121Ibid. 122 Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU Exports (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006): 201. 123Quoted in V. Suryanarayan, “Reflection on India‟s Nuclear Policy During the Nehru Era,” Eurasia Review, (March 11, 2010), https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.indian/C9jebSwmd5k, (accessed on January 9, 2015).
83 Bhaba efforts to covertly manufacture nuclear weapons determine the realist belief that statesmen take necessary steps to ensure state‟s survival.
Succeeding paragraph ascertain Nehru-Bhaba enterprise diverted peaceful nuclear technology to build nuclear weapons. On March 10, 1959, motion was presented in the Indian Parliament. It demanded of the government to utilize nuclear technology for defence purposes. However, Nehru first shunned Chinese nuclear threat. Later, he claimed India is ahead of China in nuclear research and development.124 In 1960, Nehru ordered Dr. Bhaba to freeze progress on nuclear weapons development until Nehru asks him to develop.125 On January 9, 1961, Nehru disclosed India eventually became nuclear threshold state.126 Lip service i.e. public rejection of nuclear weapons possession and disarmament calls evolved as permanent feature of Indian nuclear culture. Contrary to disarmament calls Nehru authorized construction on Plutonium reprocessing plant at Trombay. 127 In 1961, contrary to disarmament calls Nehru authorized construction on Plutonium reprocessing plant.128 In January, 1962, Bhaba chartered a group of physics researchers at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) to execute secret study on the “implosion weapon.”129 Despite the fact India was not faced with existential threat it mastered the technology to become threshold state. Substance of the matter is Indian nuclear deterrence has nothing to do with Chinese nuclear weapons. Moreover, Nehru-Bhaba enterprise was entangled in clandestine nuclear weapons development.
In 1962, Sino-India war, India lost 14,000 square miles near Himalayan border. Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) so denounced the Indian government and demanded nuclear weapons development in following words “eunuch government… in its ahimsic idiocy for the criminal folly of not pursuing nuclear weapons.”130 Crux of the matter is Indian nuclear weapons program was progressed under opacity. In 1964, Chinese nuclear tests changed Indian strategic environment. Further it tilted the balance of power (BOP) in communist China‟s favour
124G.G. Mirchandani, India‟s Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968): 13. 125Quoted in “India‟s Nuclear Weapons Program on to Weapons Development: 1960- 1967,” (March 30, 2001), http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaWDevelop.html, (accessed on January 10, 2015). 126Ibid. 127 Rajagopalan and Mishra, Nuclear South Asia, 223. 128Ibid.. 129Ibid. 130Quoted in Vijay Vikram, “Lotus and the Dragon,” IPCS Special Report, No. 59, (New Delhi: October, 2008): 2.
84 consequently Chinese nuclearisation endowed US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Department of Defence officials to build consensus that India requires nuclear weapons to deter the US enemy.131 India received tacit authorization from the US for opaque proliferation. Prime Minister Shastri disseminated directives to Bhaba to continue opaque proliferation and develop a nuclear bomb.132 India‟s Plutonium route for nuclear weapons development was confirmed by the CIA in 1965. The CIA also warned that India‟s plutonium stock for nuclear weapons development is sufficient.133
3.2.4 India and the NPT
Development and accretion of the NPT was aimed at containing the threat of nuclear anarchy. The treaty embarked the world on the path to evolve new nuclear order for example; the United States (US) emerged at the top, followed by the NATO allies, the Soviets and China. The NPT adjudicated testing of nuclear device by a state before January 1, 1967, was set to acquire de-jure NWS status. NNWS signatories to the NPT relinquished their inherent privilege to make nuclear deterrent. Despite Indian involvement in the development of the NPT, its upshot was contrary to Indian expectations. First, the NPT recognized China as NWS. Second, the NPT perpetually outlawed India as NWS. Third, India was considered as second class citizen. Fourth, the NPT permanently prohibited India from manufacturing nuclear weapons. Eventually in 1968, Indira Gandhi, Indian Prime Minister dismissed the NPT while addressing the parliament as it imposed restraint on Indian nuclear weapons program. It rejected the treaty.134 Indira declared the NPT as discriminatory bargain. Indira stated that, “India‟s refusal to sign the NPT was based on enlightened self-interest and the considerations of national security,” she added… “nuclear weapon powers insist on their right to continue to manufacture more nuclear weapons.”135
131 Quoted in “Bhutto‟s Visit to Washington a Success in Every Way But One,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, http://www.wrmea.org/1995-june/bhutto-visit-to-washington-a-success-in-every-way-but-one.html, (accessed on December 28, 2014). 132Leonard S. Spector, with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-90 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990): 64. 133 Director of Central Intelligence and US Intelligence Board, Special Intelligence Estimate: India‟s Nuclear Weapons Policy (October 21, 1965, Release Date, May 2001): 1, 2. 134Jita Mishra, The NPT and the Developing Countries 135“Debate on Foreign Affairs,” Lok Sabha, (New Delhi, April 5, 1968); P.V. Narasimha Rao, ed., India and Disarmament: An Anthology of Selected Writings and Speeches (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1988): 176-77.
85 Article IX of the NPT divides constituents of the treaty into nuclear weapon state (NWS) and non-NWS. India could have remained NNWS outside the NPT. However, India conditioned its accession to the NPT with Chinese accession to the treaty and global disarmament,136 to preserve the right of nuclear weapons development. Biased nature of the NPT reinforced Indian leadership aspirations to secretly change the course of peaceful nuclear activities for nuclear weapons development. From realist perspective New Delhi‟s resolve to depend on strategic forces for Indian security was based on rational decision making approach. However, Indian categorical rejection of the NPT and public criticism of the treaty undermined the normative strength of the treaty. Since, India was aware that it cannot be adjusted as a NWS in the NPT it raised the slogan of nuclear apartheid. It also criticized the treaty for dividing the states enjoying perks and privileges on one hand and carrying the burden of obligations on the other. Perhaps India wanted the constituents of global society to criticize basis of the evolving nuclear order or to out rightly reject and fracture it.
In 1971, Indira Gandhi licensed manufacturing of Indian nuclear device. It was completed in 1972, and in September, 1972, approved for tests. 137 Initially, Indian nuclear doctrine, role of nuclear armory, size and structure were kept secret. Following the 1974, nuclear device tests138 India adopted weaponless deterrent posture however, had the contradiction against the spirit of the NPT. New Delhi challenged the evolving multilateral nuclear order as states signatories to the NPT could have decided to withdraw from the treaty and rolled back it. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) drew clear line demarcating India as a regional nuclear weaponless hegemon. The PNE gave birth to the Indian rising deterrent force asymmetry in the region. Indira was well aware of global condemnation for carrying out horizontal proliferation. It was therefore decided to name Indian nuclear tests explosions as PNE. The phrase PNE was used as a cover to legalize nuclear tests in pretext of Article V of the NPT. From offensive realist perspective PNE were prestige/status driven, ensure India‟s regional dominance, manifest Indian military might to pressurize and direct behavior of a region‟s small states. Genuinely, Chinese nuclear tests accelerated Indian aspirations to dominate the region. Offensive realism and Indira
136 “Evolution of India‟s Nuclear Policy,” Press Information Bureau Government of India, (January 12, 2010), http://pib.nic.in/focus/foyr98/fo/Foc2705982.html, (accessed on November 28, 2013): 2. 137 Ibid, 155. 138Ranjit Singh, “Nuclear Weapons as a Deterrent in South Asia: An Analysis,” Asia Pacific Journal of Social Science, II, No. 2, (July-December, 2010): 37.
86 doctrine suggests that India required unrivaled nuclear forces to induce caution and prevent outside powers from meddling in South Asia. India could not rely on the NPT to acquire first class citizen‟s status in international community. New Delhi therefore rejected the NPT to keep its option of nuclear weapons development open. Indira matured and added novel features to Indian nuclear culture. Her key contribution includes cessation of the autonomy enjoyed by the scientists. The elected representatives were given the ownership of nuclear weapon program and made them responsible to provide input in final decision making. However, the final authority or veto power was vested in the Prime Minister. Military was denied the right to provide input regarding nuclear affairs. Indira replaced secrecy with consultation on issues pertaining to nuclear testing, fissile material production, types of delivery vehicles, WMDs use and evolved neo-orthodox nuclear culture.
3.3.1 Pakistan’s Peaceful and Nuclear Weapons Program: 1950s to 1980
The following section attempts to reconnoiter different phases in Pakistan‟s nuclear program. This academic research has predominantly divided it into two segments; I. The formative stage. During this period, Pakistan acquired nuclear material, technology and equipment for peaceful purposes. In 1954, Pakistan developed Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) presided over by Dr. Nazir Ahmed.139 II. The second phase started in post 1971, era focused on the development of WMDs. Notwithstanding it is further divided into four sub-categories; i. First, from the post 1971, dismemberment trauma to 1974. Bhutto indoctrinated engineers and nuclear scientists to bud nuclear bomb; ii. Second Bhutto intensified control over nuclear management authority (NMA) by laying down the foundations of WMDs program and nuclear culture. iii. General Zia‟s martial law initiated the third phase in 1977 and; iv. The May, 1998 nuclear tests led to the start of country‟s fourth period.
139 Zafar Khan, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015): 20.
87 3.3.2 The Formative Phase: Civilian Nuclear Programme1956 to 1971
Socio-economic development140 and power production was a primary focus of Pakistan‟s nascent nuclear program. Peaceful nature of nuclear program enabled Pakistan to acquire nuclear technology and material. In 1956, Nikolai Bulganin, the Soviet leader proposed to assist Pakistan in developing nuclear weapons because Prime Minister Suharwardy prescribed nuclear weapons development to deter India.141 Nonetheless, Pakistan joined the US bloc in 1957, by signing the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).142 On August 11, 1957, Pakistan and the US signed nuclear agreement143 to construct Karachi power plant for peaceful purposes. It also agreed to train Pakistani engineers in the US. After the completion of Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) in 1961, the 5 mega watt light water nuclear reactor was installed at PINSTECH in 1963.
Noticeably Pakistan rejected nuclear weapons development in the formative phase. Corresponding with the theories of classical realism, the leadership decides either to develop or forgo nuclear weapons development while keeping in view the seriousness of external threats.144 In response to; first Nehru‟s claim that India has become a nuclear threshold state and; second due to repeated demands of BJS to develop nuclear weapons, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto proposed to make nuclear bomb145 to thwart Indian aggression. Conventional asymmetry with India also intensified Ayub‟s threat perceptions. However, Bhutto‟s proposal was dropped. In fact, Ayub Khan signed South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with the US on September 8, 1964. It was a collective security agreement against aggression. The US elaborated “aggression” as communist aggression.146
140 Olav Njolstad, et al., Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York: Routledge, 2011): 13. 141“Start: Sometime Good, Many Time Bad,” Wonders of Pakistan,http://wondersofpakistan.wordpress.com/2013/02/20/pakistan-russia-relations-1-of-5/, (accessed on November 13, 2014). 142Safdar Mahmood, International Affairs (Lahore: Feroz Sons, 1969): 51. 143Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012): 29. 144 Tanya Ogilvie- White, “Is there A Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall, 1996): 44. 145Feroz Hassan Khan, “Pakistan: Political Transition and Nuclear Management,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, (February 27, 2012), http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1156&rid=6, (accessed on November 11, 2014). 146 Mahmood, International Affairs, 46.
88 There was stark contrast in the strategic beliefs of Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Ayub Khan intrinsically placed confidence in the strategic depth and the conventional superiority of bi-regional Pakistani state- comprising of East and West Pakistan. Ayub duly relied on the US supplied military hardware. He posited noticeable defence pacts will obligate the US to salvage Pakistan in difficult times. Bhutto remained disturbed due to the strategy of external balancing. Nonetheless, Ayub‟s security policy proved out to be less impactful. The ominous transition in Pakistan‟s strategic surroundings continued. For example, in October, 1964, Homi Bhaba expressed Indian quest to develop nuclear weapons; 147 India decided to opt for plutonium route. CIA also spills the beans that India can develop nuclear bomb in short span.148 Ensuingly, India received arms from the US after the Sino-Indian war. Contrarily, in 1965, US obtruded arms sanctions on Pakistan. Misperceived and misinterpreted alliance umbrella proved futile for the national security perceptions of Pakistan. The 1965, war with India further established the insignificance of external balancing. Thereby the curve in Pakistan‟s strategic policy was determined.
3.3.3 Pakistan towards Nuclear Weapons Program Development
In 1965, PINSTECH started plutonium production.149 The same year Pakistan signed an accord with Canada to set up Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) for peaceful purposes. Though, Indian nuclear program worrisome, however, it was difficult for Bhutto to delve into the international nuclear politics. He could not conceive eloquent significance of opaque nuclear proliferation. Reactionary as it was circumstantially desired; Bhutto in 1965,150 declared that if India develops WMDs Pakistanis would eat grass but develop nuclear weapons. He appreciated the deterrent role of the WMD vis-à-vis restoring regional balance against India. However, Ayub enduringly refused to sanction progress on nuclear bomb making. This resulted in resignation of
147 Leonard Weiss, “India and the NPT,” Strategic Analysis, 34, No. 2, (March, 2010): 259. 148“Indian Government Policy on Development of Nuclear Weapons,” Intelligence Information Cable, Central Intelligence Agency, (October 24, 1964), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB187/IN05.pdf, (accessed on July 23, 2013). 149Pakistan: Intelligence, Security Activities and Operations Handbook (Washington, D.C.: International Business Publication): 114. 150 Richard N. Haass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes (Durhan: Yale University, 1988): 82.
89 Bhutto on June 21, 1966,151 as foreign minister since he was a staunch supporter of nuclear deterrent.
In 1968, Pakistan rejected the NPT due to Indian refusal and discriminatory nature of the treaty. Indian rejection of the treaty and growth in Indian nuclear program was a cause of concern for Pakistan. Bhumitra Chakma claimed Pakistan‟s dismissal of the aforementioned accord transmitted shockwaves that Islamabad would transform civilian nuclear program in violation of the established non-proliferation norms to build nuclear weapons.152 True to the revisionist approach, Pakistan consistently opposed and demanded for the amendment in the NPT. Rejection of newly evolved accord endowed Islamabad to keep the doors of diverting peaceful nuclear program for nuclear deterrent development open. The rejection of the NPT, claimed here, evolved as paramount pillar of Pakistan‟s nascent nuclear culture. Bhutto candidly highlighted hazardous direction of Indian nuclear program along with ambitions to join nuclear club.153 Bhutto placed emphasis on India‟s evolving nuclear threat posing existential threat to Pakistan‟s security. Conclusively, Ayub refused to allow nuclear weapons development due to the tenet in the US defence covenant. Consequently, short-lived self imposed nuclear restraint became second pillar of Pakistan‟s evolving nuclear culture at its initial stages. However, Bhutto‟s election campaign for the elections of the 1970, after Ayub‟s resignation the nuclear program was extensively politicized.
3.3.4 The Secondary Phase: Pakistan Decides to Develop Nuclear Bomb 1971 to 1974
Bhutto became the Chief Martial Law Administrator on December 20, 1971. Defeat in war demoralized armed forces. Indian favored conventional military asymmetry mushroomed threat of future Indian armed intervention in Pakistan‟s internal affairs. Indian offensive military capabilities threatened Pakistan‟s existence. In January, 1972, Bhutto tabled the idea of nuclear weapons development during discussion with scientists in Multan.154 Bhutto desired to restore Indian favored deterrent force asymmetry by developing credible nuclear weapons to deter
151 Robert D. Mcfadden, “Bhutto Considered Tough and Politically Ambitious,” The New York Times, (December 19,1971). 152 Bhumitra Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia: A Historical Analysis (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2004): 134. 153 Zulfiqar Ali Butto, The Myth of Independence (Karachi: 1967): 85, 130. 154J.N. Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace (New York: Routledge, 2002): 332.
90 Indian aggression in future. He replaced Dr. Usmani, the head of the PAEC with Dr. Munir Ahmed to unquestionably dominate country‟s nascent nuclear weapons program. Bhutto decision to maximize Pakistan‟s military might by budding India centric nuclear weapon was implementation of perfect deterrence theory. Pakistan believed that nuclear deterrent induces caution. Fear of punishment will deter future Indian adventurism and ensure Pakistan‟s sovereignty. Bhutto‟s order to mature nuclear deterrent was formed on realist belief that conventional deterrence based on conventional military capabilities is prone to breakdown hence is fragile. Further, states rely on self-help for their security. Bhutto was absolutely inflexible and discouraged political, military, bureaucratic and scientific interference in the nuclear activities during his tenure. Bhutto became the architect of Pakistan‟s rigid nuclear culture. Bhutto exercised the nuclear card to control the distribution of country‟s resources and strengthened his office against eternally strong military establishment.155 Bhutto safeguarded, promoted and made nuclear deterrent as a central piece of country‟s security structure. It denies strategic advantages of conventional superiority to India in future crisis. Bhutto wanted to stabilize deterrence and to avoid wars between India and Pakistan. However, his approach was outside the NPT framework hence undermined treaty‟s significance. In the 1973, Bhutto constituted a council to identify obstacles including scientific, budgetary and technical issues hindering nuclear weapons development.156 Yet, Pakistan continued with its efforts for arms control and denuclearization of sub-continent. It proposed creation of Southern Asia as a NWFZ to reverse the negative impact of Indian PNEs. 157 On September 27, 1974, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defense Aziz Ahmed while addressing the UNGA proposed creation of NWFZ in South Asia.158 India rejected Pakistan‟s proposal. 159 Correspondingly, Bhutto launched project 706 and Uranium
155George Perkovich, “Could Anything Be Don‟t to Stop Them? Lessons from Pakistan‟s Proliferating Past,” in Pakistan‟s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (U.S. Army War College, 2008): 60. 156Khan, “Pakistan: Political Transition.” 157In September, 1972 Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan proposed the creation of NWFZ in South Asia. Khan was representing Pakistan in sixteenth annual General Conference of the UN Atomic Energy Agency in Mexico. Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan‟s Proposal for A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia,” Pakistan Horizon, 32, No. 4, (1979): 96; Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, on November 28, 1972 urged for the creation of NWFZ in South Asia. Bhutto was inaugurating KANUPP in Karachi. The Daily Dawn News, (November 29, 1972). 158“Chronology September-November 1974,” Pakistan Horizon 27, No. 2, (1974): 82. 159Zulfqar Khan, “India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Mutual Deterrence,” IPRI Paper 9, (January, 2005), http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ipn.pdf, (accessed on November 14, 2014).
91 enrichment program 160 for the development and perfection nuclear weapons under opacity. Bhutto‟s decision to authorize nuclear weapons develop is regarded as categorical rejection of the NPT. He is alleged of undermining the spirit of the treaty. Further, the NPT lost its relevance for South Asia in future evolving nuclear order. It is argued that grounds were thus prepared to marginalize the status of the NPT and hamper its efficacy. It was first practical step Pakistan took against the spirit of the NPT and evolving nuclear order. However, Pakistan cannot be held responsible for damaging the spirit of the treaty. First, Pakistan decided to develop nuclear weapons under opacity. Bhutto‟s decision to carryout opaque nuclear proliferation was based on the premise to restore the BOP and deny strategic advantages to India. Second, Pakistan unlike Indian did not launch campaign nor raised slogans against the inequitable character of the treaty. Third, Pakistan was non-signatory to the NPT, Bhutto‟s decision to effectuate Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrent was neither in violation of any legal agreement nor it break moral values.
3.3.5 The Development of Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: Practical Phase 1975 to 1977
In 1975, Dr. A. Q. Khan started working under Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan. In 1976, Dr. Khan started to lead Uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL).161 KRL functioned without any outside interference of civilian bureaucracy and military intervention. Khan achieved a breakthrough in centrifuges project. Second, he evolved impenetrable control over KRL. Considering Dr. Khan‟s sovereign position, he added two notable contributions to Pakistan‟s nuclear culture i.e. opacity and organisational autonomy. It was a practical step Pakistan took against the objectives of the NPT to counterbalance anxiety of rising deterrent force asymmetry created by Indian PNE and weaponless deterrent posture. Pakistani decision to develop nuclear weapons program under opacity was deemed necessary to neutralize conventional supremacy and newly developed nuclear asymmetry. Pakistan decided to restore regional strategic stability that was eroded after Indian dismemberment of East Pakistan. Indian aggressive posture backed by its conventional military superiority resultantly pushed Pakistan to preserve sanctity of its borders backed by nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapon serves the role of force multiplier, deter militarily power states from aggression and preserve peace. Pakistan
160Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Pakistan‟s Growing Nuclear Programme,” BBC New, (December 1, 2001), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11888973, (accessed on November 14, 2014). 161Pakistan: Intelligence, Security Activities, 114.
92 decision to develop nuclear weapons was reaction to Indian action. It manifests that Bhutto believed nuclear weapons are weapons of peace and war aversion. 3.3.6 Military Government and Continued Nuclear Opacity: Third Phase 1977 to 1979
In July, 1977, General Zia imposed martial law. US President Jimmy Carter‟s administration conveyed a notice to General Zia to halt nuclear weapons program.162 Later, the Carter administration imposed Glenn and Symington sanctions to stop Pakistan from enriching Uranium. Contrarily, General Zia appointed Lt. General Khalid Mahmood Arif to seize stringent control of nuclear arms program and ensure nuclear arsenal development. In addition to originate effective nuclear command center to smoothly administer nuclear activities. General Arif, professed here, ensured that nuclear enterprise remain outside of the purview of civilians. Opaque nuclear weapons development continues. Further command centre remain secretive. In conclusion General Arif raised strong pillar of Pakistan‟s nuclear culture; army‟s stringent control over Pakistan‟s nascent nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile Zia disquieted that the West would conceivably experiment to sabotage Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program. Zia therefore launched personnel reliability program for employees running nuclear laboratories, complexes and nuclear facilities. Zia thus made a notable contribution in the country‟s evolving nuclear culture. In August, 1979, Zia‟s fear resulted in systematized deployment of military at KRL and KANUP to deter possible pre-emptive strike of India, Israel and US.163 Pakistan tried to overcome fear of preemptive strike by dispersing country‟s nuclear facilities. Dispersed nuclear assets create uncertainty complicates enemy strategy and induces caution.
3.4 Missile Developments in South Asia: 1960s to 1998
In the 1960s, Indian government sent its nuclear scientists and engineers to National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), in US and Intercoms and “Voronzeh nuclear power plant” in the Soviet Union.164 India aimed to develop missile apparatus to deter threats
162 Mushahid Hussain and Akmal Hussain, Pakistan Problems of Governance (New Delhi: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1993): 38. 163 Muthiah Alagappa, edr., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008): 220. 164 Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Sergey Oznobishchev, eds., Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2012): 11, 12.
93 stemming from Chinese missiles. In the 1970s, India launched “project valiant,” to develop longer range ballistic missile and “project devil.”165 In 1983, Indira launched Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP)166 to develop wide range of missiles including Agni series, Nag (an anti tank guided missile), Prithvi, Akash and Trisul.167 This was yet another feature enabling India to ensure its dominance against Pakistan. IGMDP was launched with an aim to capacitate India to deliver nuclear warheads in enemy‟s heartland. Further, success of this feature was aimed to ensure rising asymmetry in New Delhi‟s favor. Indian government interest in missile program manifests its determination to ensure escalation dominance against its arch rivals. China centric IGMDP, however, set India on path to lay the foundations of credible deterrent force. Indian hegemonic designs created a fear that India is embarked on the path of war fighting doctrine and may carryout decapitating strikes against Pakistani in future.
The introduction of the IGMDP by India raised concerns in Pakistan that the regional strategic balance would be further destabilized. Indian aspirations to introduce new technology were believed to be disturbing the conventional balance. It was perceived existential threat by the Pakistani defense planners because it laid the foundations of New Delhi favored conventional and deterrent force asymmetry. The step taken by India was rejection of Pakistani proposals to sign regional arms control treaty. Missile inventories capability to carryout nuclear warheads meant that India has put Pakistan‟s earlier proposal to refrain from developing nuclear weapons and establish South Asian region as NWFZ in the light of the Article VII of the NPT. Deterrence cannot be stabilized in the absence of the countervailing deterrent force. Contrarily, Pakistan started developing Abdali, Ghaznavi, Ghauri and Shaheen missiles to counterbalance India and to deliver nuclear weapons if necessary. Pakistan countermeasures clarifies that the Indian IGMPD was inextricably linked with Islamabad‟s missile system due to its far reaching strategic implications for Pakistan‟s security.
Genesis of India and Pakistan missile program is a noticeable evidence of the NPT‟s bankruptcy. The treaty failed to bring South Asian arch rivals into its framework. It endorses that
165 “Defence Research and Development Laboratory,” NTI, http://www.nti.org/facilities/37/, (accessed on December 14, 2014). 166 Muhammad Shoaib Pervez, Security Community in South Asia: India-Pakistan (Oxon: Routledge, 2013): 96. 167Ibid.
94 the NPT could not prevent both states from their involvement in horizontal nuclear proliferation. To impede (India-Pakistan) missile race the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) signatories denied transfer of missile technology. MTCR aims to prevent states from developing missiles able to carry 500 kilograms payload up to 300 kilometer.168 However, India-Pakistan in defiance of the MTCR developed and extended the range of missile inventories. Undoubtedly MTCR could not prevent missile race in South Asia. India premised that unspecified impediment in the missile program would endanger Indian national security. Fear of disastrous consequences, discriminatory treatment and biased approach of MTCR increased the pace of Indian missile developments. Indian aspirations to dominate the region provided additional impetus to Indian missile developments. Consequently, the BOP shifted in Indian favor. Further, it started enjoying dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan. It aspired to enact escalation dominance against Pakistan. Escalation dominance refers to a situation in which an adversary possess potential to rise a conflict in directions that will be unfavorable or hazardous to the opponent whilst the opponent cannot adapt identical move in response, either considering it has no escalation alternatives or for the reason that the accessible alternatives would not improve the opponent‟s position.169
Theoretically speaking military modernization program and qualitative improvements capacitated India to destroy counter value and counterforce targets deep inside Pakistan. Indian threat was mounting due to the growing strategic imbalance. Qualitative improvement enabled Indian forces to easily overrun Pakistan in future probable war hence posed strategic threats to Pakistan‟s existence. Rising Indian military might created twofold threats for Pakistan first, it created fear of Indian occupation of Pakistani territories in future major conventional war. Second, Indian military posture backed by rising deterrent force asymmetry was hence destined to change from deterrent posture to compellence. Security dilemma propelled Pakistan to take countermeasures and repel existential threat to its sovereignty. Indian through its hegemonic designs attempted to drag Pakistan into costly arms race. Islamabad exercised unilateral restraint. However, Pakistan embarked on the route to develop credible deterrent force necessary to create fear of punishment, establish credibility of deterrent forces and restore the BOP vis-à-vis India.
168Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “New Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation Policy,” Science, 256, No. 5061, (May 29, 1992): 1294. 169 Forrest E. Morgan, et al., Dangerous Threshold: Meaning Escalation in 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008): 15.
95 Eventually, missile developments upset India-Pakistan strategic stability, increased probability of deliberate and inadvertent nuclear war. South Asian adversaries contrary to pursuing arms control measures or convening confidence building measures (CBMs) increased missile and nuclear arms stockpiles. It was evident from the outset that Indian growing conventional military force structure created a gap between military capabilities of India and Pakistan.170 Asymmetric military buildup augmented Pakistan‟s determination to build India centric nuclear deterrent to mange rising deterrent force asymmetry. 171 New Delhi‟s rapid military buildup jeopardized regional arms control and disarmament efforts, dragged Pakistan into nuclear and conventional arms race and incapacitated non-proliferation apparatus based on the NPT. The nuclear proliferation trends induced fear that the NNWS may follow South Asian nuclear proliferation route based on opacity and directly challenge the NPT.
3.5 Indian Missile Developments
3.5.1 The Prithvi Missile
In February, 1988, India successfully test fired Pakistan specific liquid fuel propelled 150 kilometers short range Prithvi ballistic missile. 172 India built Prithvi missile despite global pressure to abandon it. Indian Foreign Minister Indar Kumar Gujral claimed that the Prithvi was designed to launch conventional strikes as a substitute for nuclear strikes. Its radio guidance system is replaced with more sophisticated GPS system 173 to effectually control it. Further, accomplish precision strike capability against its targets. Prithvi, however, is doubted for its accuracy despite GPS system. Keeping in view the absence of Pakistan anti ballistic missile system Prithvi could easily penetrate in Pakistani airspace and explode in the vicinity of the target. Possible targets of Prithvi included missile deployments, runways and command centers near border. India used Prithvi as a terror weapon against Pakistan by pointing it against civilian population centers. Since the short range of missile required to be deployed near Pakistani
170 Feroz Hassan Khan, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad, (September 18, 2018). 171 Rajesh M. Basrur, (Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies) Emailed interview (September 17, 2018). 172Robert S. Norris, “India and Pakistan, At the Crossroads,” Paper presented at The Sixth ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, (October 28, November 2, 1998), http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_10289801a_039.pdf (accessed on February 10, 2014): 5. 173 Vipin Narang, “Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia,” in Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009): 147.
96 border. It therefore required delegation of authority to junior ranking Indian military officers. Delegation of authority inherited dangers of unauthorized or deliberate use of Prithvi missiles by junior ranking officers during crises situations.
3.5.2 The Agni Series
In May, 1987, India successfully tested medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) Agni- I174 with 700 kilometers (KMs).175 It can be launched from road-mobile platforms. In 1992, India started developing solid fuel propelled with 1500 KMs range Agni-II. It can be launched from rail and mobile platforms.176 Distinctive feature of Agni-II development by India is that it was developed in response to Sino-Pak defence collaboration. Indian scientists aimed to manufacture movable missile launching platforms to insure dispersal of missile vehicles. Further to perfect the ability to launch missiles from various movable missile platforms. Dispersed missile forces are difficult to be located and destroyed. The disposition of positioning deters enemy‟s preemptive strike. Invulnerability ergo ensures deterrence stability. Keeping in view small missile force structure Agni-I endowed Indian military to launch first strike against Pakistan.
Extensive reach of Indian missiles accredited it to destroy counter-value and counterforce targets particularly airbases177 across Pakistan. It could now carryout decapitating strike against Pakistan. The missile could also prevent Pakistan to launch any nuclear strike against India. Professedly India fostered hazardous counterforce targeting strategy. Essentially it requires perfect and synchronized intelligence system of missile system to work.178However, counterforce strategy inherits the problem of inviting enemy first strike. It is perpetuated against counterforce conventional and nuclear forces. However, efficient strategy to neutralize the enemy is to pose a similar threat to enemy therefore, Pakistan started developing its own missile system. Extended
174Haass, Conflicts Unending, 92. 175Monika Chansoria, “India‟s Missile Programme: Augmenting Firepower,” (October, 2009), http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/English/dpi/2009/oct09.pdf (accessed on February 9, 2014). 176Ian Williams, “India Striving to Enhance Nuclear Forces,” Arms Control Association, (September, 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/India-Striving-to-Enhance-Nuclear-Forces, (accessed on July 29, 2013). 177 Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Posture: Arms Race Instabilities in South Asia,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 25, No. 2, (1998): 79. 178 Kerttunen, A Responsible Nuclear Weapons Power, 137.
97 range of Agni-II missile enabled India to target Chinese cities. 179 Consequently, Indian threatening moves further strengthened the Sino-Pak strategic partnership to neutralize the Indian threat.
3.5.3 The Sagarika Missile
In the 1990s, India regardless of the US reservations expanded its strategic collaboration with Russia to engineer missile force with a view to build an effective deterrent capability. The US raised the issue of MTCR guidelines with Russia to express its reservations over Indo- Russian missile cooperation. In June, 1993, 180 Indo-Russian joint venture resulted in the development and testing of sea-launched missile program Sagarika, with a range of 300-500 kilometers. Sagarika enabled India to destroy targets in Pakistan‟s Sindh and Balochistan provinces. Pakistan specific missile manifested Indian desire to increase damaging ability against Pakistani assets from air, sea and land based missile inventories. It however, enlarged the financial cost of arms race in pursuit of futuristic designs to achieve second strike capability and dragged missile race into the Indian Ocean. Qualitative changes increased conventional asymmetry in Indian favor. Foreign support enhanced lethality of the Indian navy. On the other hand, the opaque proliferation of Pakistan was directly proportional to increased threat perceptions in order to ensure credible deterrent vis-a-vis India, preserve sanctity of national frontiers and deny benefits i.e. strategic supremacy to India.
3.6. Pakistan’s Missile Developments 3.6.1 Hatf-I Missile
Prithvi missile coupled with threats already posed by India in the 1980s, was contemplated essentially a credible existential threat by Pakistani security establishment. Deterrence strategy based on rationality prescribed Pakistan to mature vigorous missile force to destroy counterforce and value targets inside India. Islamabad decided to transmit unambiguous message to policymakers in New Delhi that Indian strategy formed on compellence and
179 Bharat Karnad, India‟s Nuclear Policy (London: PRAEGER Security International, 2008): 78. 180Norris, “India and Pakistan, At the Crossroads,” 5.
98 endeavors to coerce will be denied by Pakistan by developing credible nuclear deterrent capabilities. True to its reactionary policies, Pakistan approached China and North Korea to carryout research and develop missile forces and essential storage facilities.181 In the 1980s, Pakistan acquired ballistic missile system plus necessary technology from China.182 In February, 1989,183 Pakistan developed and test fired Hatf-I missile. Despite the difficulties created by MTCR to narrow the gap between military capabilities of the two states, Pakistan achieved the milestone. Pakistan made this progress due to decision makers heightened threat perception. It was part of efforts to counterbalance India military might. Proportionately a categorical message was transmitted to India that rising asymmetry cannot go unnoticed. Indian endeavors to expand its nuclear, conventional military capabilities, its efforts to improve quality and increase range of its missile forces are viewed as a challenge. Indian attempts to achieve military victory would only result in dire consequences.
3.6.2 Pakistan’s Short Range Ballistic Missiles Program 1991
The discriminatory policies and hurdles of the US and the MTCR could not stop Pakistan‟s missile program. The biased approach of the West even increased the Sino-Pak strategic partnership and progress in the field of missile development. Pakistan received M-11, 186 miles range Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)184 technology from China. Conversely, the US imposed embargo on two Chinese companies and SUPARCO of Pakistan. Besides it rescinded the transfer of military supplies to Pakistan. US unrighteous modus operandi heightened Pakistan‟s anxiety. US incipiently maintained a bigoted approach. It endorsed Pakistan‟s earlier decision to search for an alternative supplier to resuscitate its military and accomplish routine armed forces requirement. China‟s sustained patronage capacitated Pakistan to handle the uncertain strategic equation and rising strategic instability. It galvanized Pakistan to perfect missile inventories. China aided Pakistan engineer solid fuel propelled M-9 Intermediate
181 Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues (DIANE Publishing: 2011); Garima Singh, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Disorder: Weapons, Proliferation and Safety (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006); “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter Trades,” IISS Strategic Comments 8, No. 9, (November, 2002). 182 Stephanie Lieggi, “From Proliferator to Model Citizen?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, (Summer, 2010): 43. 183Rajaram Nagappa, An Assessment of Ballistic Missile Production Capacity in Pakistan, (Bangalore: NIAS, 2007): 1. 184Angathevar Baskaran, “India and Pakistan: Danger of Nuclear and Missile Arms Race?”http://www.epsusa.org/publications/newsletter/2003/nov2003/baskaran.pdf, (accessed on January 18, 2014).
99 Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and Shaheen185 M-11 SRBMs. Pakistan built Intermediate and SRBMs liquid fuel propelled Ghauri with North Korean assistance No-Dong-1 and Taepo-Dong- 1.186 Extended range endowed Pakistan to accomplish annihilative knack to carryout strikes against New Delhi, Mumbai and valuable counterforce assets.187 The development of the missile squadrons‟ revitalized the balance of terror considering Pakistan could hold the Indian cities hostage. Correspondingly, the region was stabilized and strategic stability was restored. To conclude one may say that the discriminatory attitude of the international community and their failure to contain Indian hegemonic designs instigated Pakistan to devise a counterbalancing strategy.
3.6.3 Shaheen-I Missile Correspondingly, the Agni-II, solid fuel propelled missile impelled Pakistan to procure missile technology from China over again. In 1993, Pakistan test fired Shaheen-I,188 solid fuel propelled missiles in Pakistan. The US imposed sanctions against Chinese companies and Pakistan‟s Ministry of Defence for missile proliferation. It was built under the leadership of Major General (retired) Sultan Habib and Major General Shujjat.189 Habib took measures to train North Korean scientists in Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons. Clandestine cooperation with Pyongyang in the field of missile development, training of scientists, procurement and shipment of technology continued. Although, Pakistan national security needs prompted all measures and all steps were defensive in nature. Nuclear deterrent and related delivery mechanism was characterized as great equalizer to overcome strategic asymmetry created by gigantic Indian military. Pakistan was embarked on path of missile developments as country‟s defence planners identified that nuclear deterrent and related delivery mechanism can restore Indian favored conventional military imbalance. It was prescribed as a recipe to avoid expensive arms race with India. South Asian region was going through profound qualitative and quantitative changes. Aforementioned trends in South Asia reveal that both states were pursuing long-term program of
185Lieggi, “From Proliferator to Model Citizen?” 43. 186 Ibid. 187Narang, “Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis,” 146. 188“Pakistan Missile Milestones-1961-2014,” The Risk Report, 20, No. 5, (September-October, 2014), http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/miss-miles2005.htm, (accessed on December 21, 2014). 189B Raman,Intelligence: Past, Present & Future (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2002): 50.
100 conventional and deterrent force modernization to achieve or preserve strategic objectives vis-à- vis the opponent.
3.7 The Establishment of National Defence Complex (NDC) of Pakistan
Indian conventional military buildup, nuclear weapons stockpiles and rejection of Islamabad‟s proposal to sign the NPT for the establishment of zero missile zone in the sub- continent buttressed Pakistan‟s precept that India is an adversary. Indian favored rising nuclear and conventional deterrent force also requires Pakistan to discard the NPT. Further, compellence induced Pakistan to preserve realist self-help recipe, mature structured mechanism to answer provocations, stabilized deterrence in light of nuclear deterrence theory and avoid the outbreak of war. Pakistan established the NDC190 to make missiles and diverse types of arms. The NDC was assigned to develop, test, increase range and precision of missile forces. In 1995, NDC launched Shaheen-I missile program. In 1996, engineers were integrating nuclear warheads with missiles.191
Critical view affirms difference of organizational behavior. For instance, in India, scientists take account of the political chieftains in nuclear and missile affairs. Besides, in Pakistan military top brass administers the NDC. The nuclear warheads mated with nuclear capable missile with higher precision deter the adversary from bravado. Considering Pakistan military was familiarized with operational and wartime preconditions, hence ordered mating of nuclear warheads with missiles. Pakistani elite thus divorced policy of nuclear restraint. Indian favored conventional military imbalance and rising nuclear deterrent force coerced Pakistan marginalize the status of the NPT by discarding the probability to become signatory to the NPT. It manifests decision makers in Pakistan lost trust in peace accords particularly in the treaty. Further, the NPT perpetually lost its relevance for South Asian nuclear rivals as Hobbseian state of nature embarked Pakistan on quintessential trajectory of war preparedness to preserve its sovereignty.
190 Nasra Talat Farooq, US-Pakistan Relations Pakistan‟s Strategic Choices in 1990s (London: Routledge, 2016): 145. 191 Verghese Koithara, “Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia,” CISAC Working Paper, (March 2003), http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Koithara.pdf, (accessed on November 16, 2014): 11.
101
Missile competition exhibits India-Pakistan appetite to mount the expense of armed conflict to exacerbate the believableness of deterrent threat. Missile experiments fulfill the aspirations to transcend powerful signals to antagonist that potential cost will outweigh expected benefits provided that war breakouts. Clear communication is essential feature to persevere deterrence stability. Government‟s incompetency to decode or decorously respond to adversary‟s threat may cause deterrence breakdown and jeopardize its national security. However, Prime Minister Gujral could not discern the loss of domestic support and strategic consequences of failure to respond to Pakistani threat. In summer, 1997, Gujral took Hatf-III test lightly. This turned the tables against Gujral in his domestic politics. Congress withdrew support from the coalition government192 and Gujral‟s government was toppled. In conclusion, Though, India and Pakistan made efforts but could not establish mature missile force structure due to inherent problems including lack of effective C2 system. 193 Immature command structure failure to identify whether the incoming enemy missile is conventional or nuclear capable and brief response time intensified chances of inadvertent and deliberate nuclear exchange. Initially, missile inventories on both sides were deployed near enemy border due to their short range. Missile forces on both sides were therefore vulnerable to enemy decapitating strikes. Vulnerability resulted in competitive security environment, fear, mutual suspicions and distrust. Missile race undermined arms control and disarmament efforts. In fact South Asian arch rivals rejected international community‟s calls to avoid arms race and join the NPT as NNWS.
Conclusion In conclusion, India became nuclear threshold state in December, 1962. Bhaba though asked Nehru to authorize nuclear test in Ladakh.194 Nehru though laid the basis of Indian nuclear weapons program yet prohibited nuclear tests. Nehru‟s death on May 27, 1964,195 few months before Chinese nuclear tests was a major setback to Indian nuclear weapons program. Had China
192 Kerttunen, A Responsible Nuclear Weapons Power, 165. 193 Dinshaw Mistry, “Missile Proliferation and Deterrence Stability in South Asia,” in Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Center, 2013): 123. 194http://www.andhrafriends.com/topic/611761-indias-nuclear-weapons-program-1944-1999-full-history-must-read/, (accessed May 23, 2017). 195“India Mourning Nehru, 74 Dead of A Heart Attack: World Leaders Honor Him,” The New York Times (May 27, 1964).
102 tested nuclear devices in Nehru‟s life the latter would have authorized Bhaba to “use the latest scientific devices to protect India.” Dr. Bhaba‟s sudden death on November 24, 1966, crippled Indian nuclear weapons program.196 Instead Indian engineers and nuclear scientists were divided into pro-bomb Raja Ramana and P. K. Iyengar and anti-bomb lobby led by M. R. Srinavasan and Vikram Sarabhai. Internal differences, orthodox nuclear culture evolved at organizational level and opacity progressed by Bhaba delayed progress on the Indian nuclear weapons program.197 Bhaba‟s successors took longer time to comprehend the route to nuclear weapons development. Indira challenged the normative strength of the NPT. First, Indira rejected the NPT. Second, she authorized nuclear weapons development, third, authorized the PNEs in 1974. Fourth, Indira administration launched campaign to highlight the intrinsic defects of the NPT. It posed twofold challenges to the treaty. First, the External Challenge: Indian campaign could have stopped non- signatories to the NPT from signing the treaty. Second, Internal Challenge: NPT signatories could have withdrawn from the treaty due to the Indian propaganda. To conclude Indian nuclear weapons program is rooted in multifaceted factors Nehru‟s aspirations to utilize nuclear energy for civil purposes, to attain self sufficiency, to project India as technically advanced state and to gain prestige in international community. Indira advanced nuclear weapons program and authorized PNEs to grasp domestic unrest and extend her tenure.
Pakistan nuclear program from outset was focused on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Turbulent past, unsettled territorial disputes with India, dismemberment, arms buildup, hostile posture and rejection of the NPT posed security dilemma to Pakistan. Yet, Islamabad proffered the creation of NWFZ in South Asia and various others arms control proposals. However, New Delhi rejected Islamabad‟s proposals. It coerced Pakistan to reject the NPT in response to keep the doors of nuclear weapons development open. Bhutto visualized the idea of robust deterrence based on self-help and laid foundations of India specific nuclear weapons program. Islamabad evolved nuclear posture, incorporated nuclear weapons with conventional weapons and introduced missile programs to thwart Indian bellicose designs.198 However, it is reactive instead of proactive approach. Joseph Cirincione rightly asserts that any state‟s development of nuclear
196 “1966 Air India Crash Victim Reborn,” Times of India, (December 6, 2009). 197 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons? Comparing the Cases of India and France,” in Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century, eds. D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 142. 198 Basrur, interview.
103 bomb triggers another country to start developing nuclear bomb.199 Further, IGDMP and Indian military modernization program first created conventional military asymmetry in Indian favor. Second, these developments were aimed at dragging Pakistan into costly missile arms race. Third, Indian military accomplishments posed existential threat to Pakistan‟s security and sovereignty. It was therefore imperative for Pakistan to avoid costly arms race and rely on nuclear deterrent to ensure sanctity of its borders and prevent India from engrossing Pakistani territories. The treaty was deprived of obtaining universal status.
199Joseph Cirincione, “The Impact of Nuclear Posture on Non-Proliferation,” in In the Eyes of the Experts Analysis and Comments on America‟s Strategic Posture, ed. Taylor Bolz, http://ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/Cirincione%20- %20The%20Impact%20of%20Nuclear%20Posture%20on%20Non-Proliferation.pdf, (accessed on August 12, 2013): 193.
104 Chapter Four The Role of Non-Weaponised Deterrence in Crisis Situation: Deliberate Nuclear Opacity to Overt Nuclearisation of South Asia (1980 to 1998)
4.1 Introduction
The national security strategy, strategic preferences and purposefulness of the strategic culture has been a tough slot for Pakistani decision makers yet they invariably concluded that India wants to undo the 1947 partition.200 Indian massive conventional and nuclear arms buildup, nuclear run submarine acquisition, development of ground, air, sea launched ballistic and cruise missiles, plans to reconfigure Agni-V Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), designs to deploy S-400 missile system tilts the balance of power (BOP) in Indian favor. Pakistan considers it as a menace to its lifeline and indispensable security risk to its existence. The robust military built up and credible nuclear deterrent is prescribed as an unprecedented deterrent against India. Islamabad‟s pursuit to narrow the gulf between India and Pakistan militaries required Islamabad to eternally discard the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). It highlighted Indian refusal of the NPT and kept option of nuclear weapons development open to retain the right to defend itself. Second, Islamabad rejected the treaty owing to its inherited biased nature.201 In the 1980s, Pakistan spent US endowed financial aid for covert nuclear weapons development202 to restore the BOP. Islamabad‟s policy was aimed at denying tactical and strategic advantages to Indian military. Islamabad‟s policy to evolve passive deterrence203 was rooted in Indian rejection of the NPT and nuclear tests. Clandestine nuclear weapons development and decision to stay out of the treaty by South Asian arch rivals eroded the relevance of the NPT for the prospective sob-continental security order. Hence, treaty lost its efficacy to halt nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent.
200Feroz Hassan Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan, Strategic Insight, IV, No. 10, (October, 2005): 2. 201 Zafar Khan, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed (September 24, 2018). 202 Charles F. Gritzner, ed., Pakistan (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2007): 69. 203 Phil Williams, “Nuclear Deterrence,” in Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts John Baylis et al., (Croom Helm, 1987): 122.
105 Pakistan developed nuclear weapons considering it imperative to deter India, preserve its sovereignty and enforce advanced security parameters to preferably substantiate perpetual peace. Efforts in the direction to stockpile residual capability of nuclear forces to survive and punish the enemy using retaliatory strikes stemmed from technological innovations, resolute surveillance, enemy abhorrent image and arms race. The strategic temperature albeit heightened nonetheless fear of reciprocal vulnerableness induced caution on both sides hence obviated armed conflict. Thanks to strategic compulsion Pakistan became nuclear threshold state in 1981.204 In the early 1983, US alleged Pakistan of procuring weapon grade Uranium from China205 sufficient for developing two nuclear bombs. On March 11, 1983, the US allegations were proved correct as Pakistan conducted cold tests.206 CIA claims Zia feared President Reagan‟s administration in the US would cancel six years economic assistance to Pakistan he therefore refused to authorize nuclear tests.207 Shyam Saran alleges that in 1983, China contributed to horizontal proliferation, infringed the NPT and provisioned designs of tested nuclear device208 to Pakistan. In the mid 1980s, India and Pakistan exercised nuclear deterrence as both matured expertise to assemble nuclear weapons. They adopted existential deterrent posture. Dramatic existence of nuclear weapons in the guise of opaque proliferation model was aimed to deter the aggressor.209 US commissioned the growth of missile inventories and proliferation alliance to contain red revolution with Pakistan‟s support.
Pakistan nuclear behavior manifests that it considers nuclear weapon program is India specific and nuclear weapon is weapon of last resort. The succeeding section attempts to explain that Pakistan‟s weaponless deterrent posture, in the 1980s, deterred India. Pakistan believes that robust nuclear deterrent prevent wars and restores strategic stability over a period of time.
204 Farzana Shaikh, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime,” International Affairs, 78, No. 1, (2002): 31. 205 Gary Milhollin and Gerard White,, “Bombs from Beijing,” Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, (May 1991), http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/bombs-beijing.html, (accessed on November 16, 2014). 206 Carey Sublette, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons Program Development,” (January 2, 2002), http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakDevelop.html, (accessed on November 16, 2014). 207 “Case Studies in Sanction and Terrorism,” Peterson Institute of International Economics,http://www.iie.com/research/topic/sanctions/pakistan3.cfm, (accessed on November 16, 2014). 208 Shyam Saran, “Is India‟s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” Delivered at India Habitat Centre, (April 24, 2013): 5. 209 Tom Sauer, “A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32, No. 5, (October, 2009): 749.
106 Contrarily, India surmises nuclear arsenals are political weapons it is of no use210 and China centric. India hypothesized nuclear weapons as a feature of scientific progress, symbol of prestige in global community, national pride and power projection.211 It planned development and testing rather than the deployment of nuclear weapons. Hence, the nuclear perspectives of both India and Pakistan are different. This section attempts to probe the following questions; How Pakistan‟s weaponless nuclear deterrence posture played its role in crisis situations? How overt nuclearisation restored South Asian strategic stability? How international community reacted to May, 1998, tests? How South Asian phenomenon of stability-instability paradox is different than the Cold War era paradox?
4.2 Role of Non- Weaponised Deterrence in Crisis Situations Nuclear deterrence theory advocates bandwagons intimidation and substantial employment of nuclear weapons as a last resort for self-defense. It presupposes equal dispersion of power among adversaries is a prerequisite for stability and perpetual peace. Power is precisely imperative source of survival. Logic of stability is derived from realist philosophy of self-help rooted in anarchy. Islamabad relied on non-weaponised deterrent posture in the 1980s, in reaction to the possibility of Indian decapitating strikes against Pakistan‟s counterforce nuclear assets. Rawalpindi‟s incorporation of India centric deterrence since opaque era in security policy was aimed at war avoidance. Islamabad‟s weaponless nuclear deterrent posture induced fear of unprecedented punishment in the minds of Indian policymakers. Strategic advantages of conventional imbalance, limited or surprise attacks and first strike were thus denied to India. Yet, Pakistan proposed arms control agreements and offered to join the NPT if New Delhi would sign it. However, nuclear deterrent was developed and Pakistan was successfully transformed into an inviolable state at the cost of undermining the treaty.212
210 Mika Kerttunen, A Responsible Nuclear Weapons Power- Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy (Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 2009): 180. 211Frey, India‟s Nuclear Bomb, 18. 212 Subhajit Naskar, Skype interview by Ashfaq Ahmed, (October 14, 2018).
107 4.2.1 The First 1980s Crisis
In the early 1980s, the apprehension of India-Israel concerted preemptive onslaughts against Kahutta nuclear apparatus 213 increased the pace of vertical nuclear proliferation in Pakistan. Military leadership‟s aim in the light of realist philosophy remained to subdue security problems, preserve sovereign status and balance adversarial relations with India by budding nuclear deterrent and posing similar threat to Indian nuclear facilities. In 1983, Pakistan started to procure special equipment to raise Burzil Force to operate in snow. India interpreted Pakistani designs negatively and interpreted them as maneuver to secure control of Siachen Glacier.214 Operation Meghdoot launched by India on April 13, 1984, enabled India to successfully engross high posts in Siachen.215 It ingrained sense of insecurity that India is using coercive measures to gradually annex Pakistani territories. Crisis caused phobia of Indian preemptive strikes against Pakistani nuclear facilities. Nuclear deterrent was surmised essential to deny strategic advantages to India. In March, 1984, and 1985,216 Pakistan carried out cold tests to exhibit definite nuclear warning sign that Indian surgical strikes would exasperate inevitable punitive nuclear strikes against Indian nuclear facilities as well.
Pakistan intrinsically communicated rigid will and resolve by associating nuclear strings with the crisis to deter Indian adventurism. Nuclear deterrence outlawed the outbreak of armed conflict and stabilized Indo-Pakistan relations. Nuclear signaling helped India and Pakistan to set aside international community‟s demands to reinforce the NPT by signing it as NNWS. South Asian proliferants ignored calls for nuclear disarmament as treaty consistently proved its failure to usher conventional and nuclear disarmament. Conversely, Islamabad employed the dictates of nuclear deterrence theory to restore the BOP, address security dilemma and thwart Indian aggression. Nuclear deterrent is considered as prerequisite for peace preservation and to preserve regional strategic stability. However, application of theory in letter and spirit bars the NPT and relevance of the treaty in international security order. In addition, balance of terror and residual
213 Dinesh Kumar, “India and Israel: Dawn of New Era,” Western Defence Organisation Bulletins, (August 11, 2009): 6. 214 Pradeep P Barua, The State at War in South Asia (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005):256. 215 Bruce Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back (Washington, D.C: Brooking Institute Press, 2013): 100. 216Sublette, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons Program Development.”
108 capacity of nuclear forces raise the cost of hostilities it encourages caution, demand rationality and augment the credibility of deterrence. Further, nuclear weapons create fear of irreversible destruction raises nuclear threshold and deter wars.
Contrarily, instability breeds insecurity, fuels war preparedness, lowers nuclear threshold and increases prospects of mutual suicide. Pakistan‟s trust in nuclear deterrence for self preservation is the application of realist precept that state security is an indispensable national interest. Statesmen reexamine security risks considering the logic of self-help to ensure state security. Further, national interest is circumscribed in terms of relative power as anarchy rejects ethics it fosters revisionist policies and aggressive military maneuvers. It is paraphrased that Pakistan evolved its nuclear posture in response to Indian massive arms imports, arms buildup in pursuit to ensure escalation dominance, Islamabad centric hostility and perpetual threat posed to its existence. The US was aware of Pakistan‟s pilgrimage in the direction of nuclear weapons development but failed to conceptualize the essential features behind Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program. Nevertheless, US purposely neglected Pakistan nuclear proliferation due to fighting proxy war in Afghanistan against Soviet Union and later the War on Terror (WoT). Considerable nuclear proliferation, weapon grade fissile material production, and rejection of the NPT by South Asian opaque proliferants, nonetheless badly damaged and weakened the NPT.
4.2.2 The Brasstacks Crisis
In the 1985, Rajiv Gandhi claimed that India can build atomic bomb overnight.217 Indian resourcefulness to manufacture weapon grade plutonium exacerbated the anxiety and heightened Pakistan‟s security fears. In 1986, India instituted innovative military strategy Brasstacks in the name of military exercise. It was programmed to assess the influence, organization, qualitative advances of the munitions and positioning of corps near Pakistani border. It instantaneously nested a distinct security dilemma in the back drop of New Delhi‟s pre-emptive strike abilities. The assumption of taking it a mere adversary‟s conduct clearly contradicted with the decision of devising countermeasures. Pakistan decided to counterbalance Indian maneuvers. Contrarily,
217Albright and Tom Zamora, “India, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons: All the Pieces in Place,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 45, No. 5, (June, 1989): 24.
109 with India‟s incommensurable pursuit and psychical hostility India likewise moved its military nearby Pakistani frontiers and put air force on alert.218
Aforementioned measures and countermeasures however, unquestionably manifest a well known conflicting security interests of India and Pakistan that provoked reciprocal security dilemmas. They contribute to crisis escalation, trigger military build-ups and war probability. Pakistan determined to disperse its counterforce assets. Pakistan necessarily adopted indicated strategy considering Indian conventional superiority. Dispersed counterforce conventional and strategic forces embedded fear of punishment. Considering, India-Pakistan nuclear parity, C2 problems and invulnerability of short range missile forces deployed near border further heightened fear of punishment in aggressor‟s mind. Mutual threat of use of force reflects severity of situation. Indubitably possession of assured second strike forces results in deterrence stability, it prevents outbreak of war and preserve peace.
In the midst of the crisis Dr. A.Q. Khan during an interview to Nayar219 on January 28, 1987, deliberately disclosed that Pakistan manufactures weapon grade plutonium. Conversely, Pakistan can develop nuclear weapon. 220 Perspicuous stance to use force is intrinsically an application of deterrence theory. It was contrived to exonerate ambiguities about Pakistan‟s nuclear capability, to transmit Pakistan‟s intentions and preference to use nuclear weapons if war was imposed. It was deduced by India that balance of irreversible terror is restored consequently cost of war would surpass hypothetical benefits. Pakistan switched conventional war fighting strategy and policy of nuclear opacity with plausible nuclear war fighting doctrine to coagulate the credibility of deterrent forces. Fear of nuclear exchange led to the US involvement to defuse South Asian crisis. On January 31, 1987, Indo-Pakistan representatives declared that a search was being made for the solution of the problem. On February 4, 1987, both India and Pakistan decided to disengage armed forces deployed on international border. Crisis was conciliating
218“Pakistan Nuclear Timeline,” The Nation, (May 28, 2013), http://nation.com.pk/national/28-May-2013/pakistan- nuclear-timeline, (accessed on November 16, 2014). 219 P.R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia,” Simson Centre, Working Paper Version 1.0, (August, 2003): 15. 220 Ibid, 15.
110 subdued with the US encouragement. Later, India-Pakistan instituted hotlines and also signed an “Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities.”221
Crux of the matter is that conventional capability became redundant and traditional war fighting doctrine was termed obsolete in deterring Indian adventurism. Nuclear signals played twofold role for instance, it increased the likelihood of war hence, paved way for foreign intervention to defuse crisis. Nuclear weapons proved to be as an instrument of peace. They became the trademark of Pakistan‟s nuclear behaviour. Conclusively, the crisis laid foundations of Pakistan‟s unwritten nuclear doctrine. Followings are some of the important features: i. Indian preemptive or surgical strikes were declared Islamabad‟s nuclear threshold line. ii. Violation of the Line of Control (LOC) by Indian forces was also termed nuclear threshold resulting in the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against aggressor. iii. Nuclear weapons provide absolute security against Indian aggression. iv. The declaration of armed conflict was not imperative to unleash punitive strikes in the wake of Indian first strike or surprise attack. v. Pakistan indicated the use of TNWs222 against Indian aggression. vi. Overt nuclear capability was deemed necessary to deter India. Pakistan resolve confirms that the punitive measures the West proportionately enforced failed first, to convince Pakistan to sign the NPT as NNWS or second, to coerce it to halt nuclear weapons development. Sino-Pakistan proliferation alliance successfully enabled Islamabad to secretly develop and test nuclear device in 1987, at Lop Nor test site.223 It challenged the NPT‟s central objective to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation, weapon development and halt spread of nuclear technology. The goal of nuclear disarmament became distant. Cold test also exposed treaty‟s failure in halting further nuclear weapons proliferation.
4.2.3 The Kashmir Crisis: 1989
Incidentally, the 1989, Pakistan military‟s war game “Zarb-e-Momin” and uprising in Kashmir coincided. Indicated incidents were interpreted by India as a conspiracy to institute
221Sannia Abdullah, “Cold Start in Strategic Calculus,” IPRI Journal, XII, No. 1, (Winter, 2012): 7. 222 Ibid. 223 Dixit, India-Pakistan in War & Peace, 333.
111 proxy war against India in Kashmir.224 In tit-for-tat reaction India correspondingly positioned armed forces on India-Pakistan border. Pakistani policymakers preconceived conviction and the image of India as an archenemy repined vicious cycle of security dilemma. Further, it resulted in nuclear weapons deployment on India-Pakistan circumferences.225 Crisis escalated it created fear of nuclear exchange. Nevertheless, the US emissary and the CIA station chief in Pakistan226 latter rejected the information of nuclear weapons positioning by the South Asian states.
On March 13, 1990, Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto‟s statement that “Pakistan would fight for a thousand years, to free Kashmir” led to the US involvement in crisis. Deputy Security Advisor Robert Gates and Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs defused India-Pakistan crisis. 227 Nonetheless, Kashmir Crisis proved to be different than Brasstacks Crisis. For instance, during the threat from Brasstacks crisis, only Pakistan expressed its determination to deploy nuclear weapons. In Kashmir crisis, both states reportedly deployed nuclear weapons. Crisis accredited Pakistan to experimentalize effectiveness and credibility of freshly orchestrated nuclear threshold consequently testifying the recently introduced doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) in South Asia. Fear of mutual suicide induced caution, resultantly South Asian adversaries reached to the conclusion that armed conflict is not a feasible alternative. Both empowered third party to conciliatingly disengage crisis. Disappointingly fear of mutual annihilation could not encourage both the adversaries to resolve their differences fully and the Kashmir issue remains the core of differences.
4.3 Nuclear Weapons Developments in 1990s and the NPT
Despite non-signatory to the NPT, Pakistan in June, 1991, endeavored to strengthen the NPT by proposing effective application of Article VII, to establish NWFZ228 in South Asia. Pakistan called US, Russia, China and India to collaborate for elimination of nuclear weapons
224 Stephanie Flamenbaum and Megan Neville, “Optimism and Obstacles in India-Pakistan Peace Talks,” Peace Brief 98, (July 15, 2011): 1. 225Quoted in T. V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Quebec City: McGill- Queen‟s University Press, 2000): 135. 226RizwanaAbbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2012): 151. 227 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon, 111. 228“India-Pakistan Relations: The Heightened Confrontation After the Military Coup in Pakistan,” http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Spot/pdf/19/19_ch4.pdf, (accessed on December 20, 2014).
112 from the region. Aforesaid approach to avoid probable nuclear apocalypse in addition ascertain that liberal philosophy of cooperation is practicable regardless of anarchy and highlights Pakistan‟s responsible nuclear behavior. Favorable outcome of non-proliferation nevertheless is based on mutual cooperation of antagonists. India rejected Pakistan‟s proposal, assuming that great powers undeniably aspired to undercut Indian research and development progress in nuclear realm. Pakistan‟s tabled proposal to sign and seal the NPT and enabled the treaty to get universal status thus never got materialized. India refused to relinquish its right to nuclear weapons development because it wanted to be recognized as de-jure NWS. Instead of penalizing India for damaging the spirit of the NPT, the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan, refused to deliver F-16s and the money Pakistan paid for their delivery.229 Washington pressurized Pakistan to open its nuclear facilities for inspections and become signatory to the NPT. US tactics and biased approach exacerbated Islamabad‟s concerns hence, later refused to open nuclear facilities for inspections and rejected the NPT. To keep manufacturing option open of nuclear weapons Pakistan made signing of the NPT conditional with the Indian entry into the treaty.
The realist credence for global system determines state behaviour230 provide conceptual basis for Pakistan‟s nuclear conduct. Genesis of India-Pakistan rivalry lies in clash of interests. New Delhi wants to achieve the following objectives; i. India wants to dominate and control the region. ii. It wants to maintain the status quo, preserve its central position and deter Pakistan from interfering in its sphere of influence.
Indian offensive military capabilities, bellicose intentions, lust for power and steps to ensure regional hegemony poses security dilemma for Pakistan. Fear of archenemy compelled Pakistan to counterbalance Indian military capabilities and reject Indian quest to dominate the region by relying on nuclear deterrent. The BOP and credible nuclear deterrent induces fear of punishment in the mind of Indian military planners consequently defuse New Delhi‟s hostile behavior and thwart wars. Islamabad‟s reliance on nuclear deterrent is natural as it restores BOP,
229 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon, 46. 230Robert Jackson and Georg Sorenson, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 84.
113 provides absolute security guarantees, deter military aggression, preserve sovereign status and addresses security dilemma. Expansion in Pakistan nuclear apparatus in 1993, in opposition to the US efforts to disrupt Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program was rational decision to guarantee state survival in hostile strategic milieu. In 1993, President Clinton enacted comprehensive non-proliferation policy (CNP) to obstruct progress on India-Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons programs and nuclear tests. 231 Clinton aimed to sequentially dismantle India-Pakistan nuclear weapons program. Initially CNP required halting progress on missile stockpiles and nuclear capabilities followed by dismantling of nuclear warheads and missiles. The US coercive policy failed as India-Pakistan rejected the NPT. Global community responded by initiating deliberations on the FMCT.232 Pakistan feared the FMCT would obstruct fissile material production, nuclear weapons development program consequently restrict Pakistan from creating parity with India in fissile material stocks. One of the dangerous interpretations of the FMCT was that it would create nuclear asymmetry in Indian favor. In 1994, the US offered conditional incentives to Pakistan including military assistance, delivery and overhauling of old F-16s. In return it demanded from Pakistan to allow the IAEA inspectors, 233 halt uranium enrichment and sign the FMCT. However, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto turned down Clinton administration‟s offer fearing the US demands would disturb strategic stability. In 1995, Pakistan started a national debate to discuss whether to sign the NPT or stay out of it. Despite Pakistan strict compliance with the IAEA safeguards and consistent support for the NPT it refused to sign the treaty.234 Contrarily, India received preferential treatment from US, Indian image as potential proliferant was replaced with the US future strategic partner.235 Consequently, the US stopped pressurizing India236 on matters pertaining to nuclear proliferation.
231 Bharat Wariavwalla, “US Efforts Can Cap India-Pakistan Nuclear-Arms Buildup,” The Christian Science Monitor, (June 15, 1994). 232 Ronald E. Powaski, Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981- 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000): 212. 233B. Raman, “Pakistan‟s Post- Chaghi Nuclear Diplomacy,” South Asian Analysis Group, Paper No. 29, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper29, (December 28, 2014). 234 Zafar Khan, interview. 235 Feroz Hassan Khan, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed Islamabad, (September 18, 2018) 236“Bhutto‟s Visit to Washington a Success in Every Way But One.”
114 4.4 The Road to May, 1998, India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests
In March, 1998, India signal to manufacture short range liquid fuel propelled Agni-II237 missile. On April 6, 1998,238 Pakistan tested Ghauri-V, 1500 kilometers239 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). Indian cities i.e. Agra, Lucknow, Jaipur, Nagpur, Amritsar, Ludhiana, Patna, New Delhi and Mumbai could be targeted with Ghauri-V. 240 Secondly, Ghauri-V missile‟s longer range enabled Pakistan to deploy missile forces away from border, to dispel fear of enemy surprise attack, at invulnerable places. The sense of invulnerableness reinstated sense of security therefore it provoked Indian countermeasures to develop advance nuclear capable missile force structure. New Delhi discarded its own decades‟ old policy to attain nuclear zero. Second, it rejected calls for nuclear rollback and; third, India increased production of weapons grade plutonium consequently it undermined the spirit of the NPT by.
Cost for disregarding external security threat is synonymous with compromise on state security. Pakistan perceived the high cost involved in compromise on state security and decided to take deterrent steps. Considering short range of Pakistani missile inventories and insufficiency to cover entire India, Pakistan likewise was dissatisfied with country‟s deterrent force structure. Conversely, it decided to manufacture qualitatively advance nuclear capable missiles. Liquid fuel propelled missiles force structure takes hours for refueling and accompanies burdensome logistic train so it can be tracked and destroyed. Pakistan‟s security dilemma exacerbated. It struggled to narrow the conventional asymmetry by manufacturing state-of-the-art weapon system, achieve precision strike rate, overcome C2 problems and raise cost of war by building credible deterrent force. Crux of the matter is the region was faced with arms race instability.
The BJP government announced241 that Indian sovereignty will not be compromised. The presupposed Sino-Pak threats both inseparably and separable, power politics and regional animosity prescribed India to manufacture and incorporate nuclear weapons in country‟s military
237“India Tests Agni-2 Ballistic Missile,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/node/2902, (accessed on December 24, 2014). 238 Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” 8. 239 Dhruba Kumar, “South Asia After the Nuclear Tests: Securing Insecurity,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation, 6, No. 1, (2000): 39. 240 Zafar Khan, Interview. 241 Krishna M. Bhatta and Mahesh Mehta, “Policy on Major Issues: Nuclear Issue,” The Baharatiya Janata Party ,http://nuclearweaponsarchive.org/India/BJPPolicy.txt, (accessed on August 14, 2013).
115 strategy. Ghauri was contemplated as an overwhelming threat. To deter Ghauri, India relied on nuclear deterrent and India preferred to depart from Gandhi‟s philosophy of peaceful coexistence with a remarkable change. India lifted self-imposed constraints on its nuclear behavior. On May 11, 1998, India conducted its nuclear tests while challenging the NPT,242 disturbing the regional peace and stability. It wrecked the nuclear equilibrium. Nuclear tests exposed dichotomy between India‟s secret nuclear weapons development and call for nuclear weapons free world. It endeavored to augment the regional dominance with spectacular support of nuclear deterrent. Consequently, the spirit of the NPT was undermined.
Indian leaders since Nehru made efforts to make nuclear weapons under opacity. Nehru laid foundations of the Indian nuclear weapons program under opacity. His descendants neither discarded opacity nor openly criticized or opposed or condemned nuclear weapons development and possession. New Delhi discarded the NPT as treaty permanently closed the doors of nuclear weapons development for India. The NPT rejected New Delhi‟s claim that India is an emerging power. Inferior status started to haunt Indian leadership so they opposed and severely criticized the NPT. It tried to change the enduring status of have-nots notwithstanding to emerge as global nuclear power.243 India continued to covertly make nuclear weapons. It was against the spirit of the NPT which aims to halt horizontal proliferation. Nuclear tests proved the anomaly between India‟s actual nuclear strategy and declared goals. It exposed contradiction in Indian declared policies and practice. President Clinton condemned May, tests, rejected Indian self- proclaimed NWS status in the light of Article IX of the NPT. Clinton termed nuclear tests as “worst events of the 20th Century.”244 It was a major blow to Indian aspiration to gain major power status. Contrarily, at regional level, tests altered strategic equation of the region tilted the BOP in Indian favor. India concluded that its stature has been transformed. South Asia was now regarded in its sphere of influence. It surmised possibility of compelling Pakistan to respect India. Coercive policy was adopted to ascertain its hegemony in the region. Regional dynamics were extraordinarily changed by the induction of nuclear weapons. India was convinced that the strategic revolution was in its favor so it tried to exploit the conventional asymmetry. Indian
242 Benjamin Kienzle, Skype interview by Ashfaq Ahmed, (September 19, 2018). 243 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002): 166. 244Dan Blaz and William Drozdiak, “U.S. Responds With Penalties, Persuasion,” Washington Post Foreign Service, (May 14, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/southasia/stories/penalties051498.htm, (accessed on December 2, 2014).
116 aggressive behavior started to destabilize the South Asian strategic stability as well. Indian Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani while foreseeing the change in the strategic environment due to its nuclear superiority and undermining Pakistan‟s defence capabilities threatened Pakistan to back off from its stance on Kashmir.245
Pakistan, contrarily, was posed with security dilemma considering India‟s sinister designs, aggressive military posture, dangerous behavior and coercive diplomacy. Pakistan had to choose from the dictum of might is right. Previously, militarily insubstantial status of Pakistan empowered India to dismember Pakistan. Lessons of the turbulent past coerced Pakistan to adopt tit-for-tat strategy and prevent fear of decapitating strikes by building robust military. India- Pakistan rivalry is based on mutual hostility, struggle for resources and power. To uncover threats and devise countervailing strategies became a continuous feature in the strategic milieu of South Asia. As a result, India-Pakistan affair remained tense and exacerbated the security dilemma. Persistent enmity drew inferences of self-help and the BOP which determine state‟s existence. Though, the world community pressurized the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to avoid the authorization of nuclear tests. Fear of Indian preventive attack against counterforce targets, attack against nuclear facilities246 and public pressure forced Pakistan to carry nuclear tests. On May 28 and 30, 1998,247 Pakistan tested nuclear devices to challenge Indian military might and restore regional BOP. Pakistan response to Indian nuclear tests thus challenged the normative strength of the NPT.248 To conclude Indian belligerent posture, offensive strategy, military readiness and ability to inflict damage coerced Islamabad to develop nuclear weapons. Credible nuclear deterrent overcame strategic gap, created mutual sense of vulnerability, induced caution and prevented the outbreak of violence at massive scale. The armed conflicts remained at limited scale.
245Kumar, “South Asia After the Nuclear Tests,” 42. 246Ibid. 247 Major General Mahmud Ali Durani, Retired, Pakistan‟s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2004): 15. 248 Kienzle, Interview.
117 4.5 International Reaction to India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests
The US sanctions followed by comprehensive plan249 for instance fiscal aid, military hardware suspension and the UNSC Resolution 1172, 250 were all a reaction to May tests. Pakistan was invariably been coerced to dismantle nuclear weapons program. US conditioned to lift sanctions if South Asian rivals would avoid arms race, halt further tests and sign the CTBT, finalize the FMCT, adhere to the NPT as NNWS. Washington feared that lack of efficient C2 system may result in deterrence failure/breakdown, accidental or deliberate nuclear war. The US demanded of India-Pakistan to avoid qualitative and quantitative transformation in nuclear arsenals.
Contrary to US demands New Delhi and Islamabad introduced qualitative improvements i.e. to increase precision strike rate of missiles to express their resolve, send nuclear signals and make enhance efficacy of deterrence. It definitely underpinned the non-proliferation norms based on the NPT, arms control and disarmament efforts and laid down the basis for hazardous nuclear arms race. Second, South Asian nuclear rivals set the trajectory to steadily adopt dangerous force posture and; third develop extremely dangerous nuclear force structure. Substance of the matter is, the NPT was perpetually rejected, dangerous trajectory deviated South Asia‟s nascent nuclear rivals from applying non-proliferation and disarmament agenda.
India favored conventional asymmetry, rising deterrent force structure and pursuits for escalation dominance breeds Pakistan‟s security dilemma. It explains Pakistan‟s raison d‟être for relying on nuclear deterrent. The rejection of No First Use (NFU) policy by Rawalpindi endeavors to preserve the sanctity of state sovereignty. Nuclear deterrent endowed Pakistan to counterbalance rising conventional and nuclear asymmetry and deny strategic gains to India. Conversely, more Indian military would attempt to expand the more severe would be Pakistan‟s threat of nuclear weapons use to augment strategic stability.251 Doubtless to say Pakistan will use TNWs against Indian occupation forces on its own soil, if required. Proposition of nuclear
249Izuyama Marie and Ogawa Shinichi, “The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan,” NIDS Security Reports, No. 4, (March, 2003): 66. 250Shaikh, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Bomb,” 30. 251 Moonis Ahmar, (Former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Karachi) Emailed interview, (September 18, 2018).
118 weapons use ascertains Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold status which is low and aims at deterring India through irrational act only.
In October, 1998, India-Pakistan Relief Act, 252 the Brown Back Amendment was introduced to persuade India-Pakistan to sign the CTBT. US demanded of Pakistan to cease weapons grade fissile material production, development as well as deployment of missiles. Islamabad petitioned for lifting of sanctions and military assistance ahead of signing the CTBT. The US failed to apprehend considerably Kashmir dispute keep the Indo-Pak antagonism alive. Unless Indian aggressive objectives in Kashmir are resolved Pakistan‟s dependence on nuclear deterrent cannot be overcome. Security dilemma fosters nuclear and missile arms race hence, cannot be stopped. Pakistan therefore communicated the conditional readiness to sign the FMCT if US would address formers security concerns. Three years later Washington lifted all sanctions it imposed on India-Pakistan in the wake of May, 1998 tests. Nevertheless the US refused to provision military hardware.
In the late 1998, UN passed a condemnation resolution and demanded from India and Pakistan to stop nuclear tests in future. Nuclear tests were condemned on various other significant forums including at G-8, plus task force and the 47, states in Conference on Disarmament. US, China and Japan as sovereign states condemned these tests. Latin American states condemned the tests due to the treaty of Tlateloco.253 Small South Asian states however, did not exhibit any resentment perhaps due to Indian fear. Global community condemned India on two accounts first, India was held responsible for dragging Pakistan in the nuclear arms race. Second, India was condemned for disrupting the non-proliferation mechanism which gained strength in mid 1990s. May tests prompted lethal nuclear arms race in South Asia. Tests also unleashed an unending debate between nuclear optimists and pessimists.
4.6 Nuclear Optimists and Pessimists: The Debate
Nuclear pessimists‟ associate dangers with nuclear weapons proliferation for instance, theft, insider threats, nuclear terrorism, nuclear anarchy, nuclear weapon proliferation and use by
252 Raman,“Pakistan‟s Post- Chaghi Nuclear Diplomacy.” 253“The Implications of South Asia‟s Nuclear Tests for the Non- Proliferation and Disarmament Regimes,” A Report of the UNIDIR Conference held on 7-8 September 1998, Palais de Nations, Geneva (Geneva: United Nations, 1999): 3.
119 pariah state, accidental or deliberate nuclear weapons use amid crisis and deterrence breakdown or failure.254 Pessimist believes proliferation first undercut the efficiency of the NPT. Second, proliferation damages disarmament efforts, the NPT statutes, calls for nuclear zero and; third, change of course from peaceful nuclear activities towards covert nuclear weapons development challenges the efficacy of the IAEA safeguards.255 Further, nuclear arsenals pose threat to world peace and security whereas they endeavor to halt nuclear proliferation and pursue the goal of nuclear disarmament. Optimists reject the pessimists‟ perspective, the menace associated with nuclear arsenals. Nuclear optimists presuppose that nuclear weapons mere presence encourages caution, rivals handle crisis carefully to avert war.256 The residual capacity of nuclear forces create fear of punishment so potential aggressor is deterred from executing bellicose designs,257 surprise, preemptive and preventive attacks.258 Consequentially, strategic stability is preserved.
The Cold War contributed to aforementioned extreme schools of thoughts. South Asia replaced superpowers rivalry. South Asian laboratory enables nuclear strategists, analysts and experts to expand arguments construct hypothetical scenarios and hold debates on related issues. Optimists contends May tests restored the BOP, stabilized South Asia‟s strategic temperature hence not go to war as both belligerents are vulnerable to mutual nuclear strikes.259 Optimists quote successful diffusion of (un)conventional crises despite of India-Pakistan bellicose postures, hostility, nuclear signaling, reported nuclear weapons deployments to prove their argument.260 War avoidance proves states are rational actors states take steps for self-preservation. Prospects of deliberate and inadvertent war in South Asia lowered as India-Pakistan keep their nuclear arsenals unassembled during peacetime and crises. However, both discern that the adversary can promptly assemble position and launch nuclear arsenals. Pakistan is aware of the irreversible catastrophes of nuclear weapons use. Conversely, nuclear weapon is considered as an instrument of last resort and peace. Nuclear deterrent has its political utility for state security.
254 Saima Kausar, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed (September 27, 2018). 255 Ibid. 256 Joseph M. Grieco, “Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Behavior in East Asia,” Policy Brief, No. 3, (August, 2012): 2. 257 Mathew Kroenig, “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism; The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Managing the Atom Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2009-14, (November, 2009): 8. 258 Chris Gagne, “Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia: Building on Common Ground,” http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NRRMGagne.pdf, (accessed on September 27, 2013). 259SumitGanguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010): 19. 260Verghese Koithara, “Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia,” CISAC Working Paper, (March, 2003): 3.
120 Rising nuclear and conventional asymmetry is perpetual source of concern for pessimist. First, South Asian contestants have worked hard to improve features and lethality of nuclear arsenals. The tit-for-tat reaction resulted in arms race and accelerated qualitative breakthroughs. Pakistan endeavors include the incorporation of nuclear warheads with conventional weapon system the development of solid fuel propelled nuclear capable missiles. In April, 1999, Pakistan test fired Shaheen-I, 750 KMs range. India perceived solid fuel propelled Shaheen-I test as nuclear signaling so strategic heat increased and New Delhi‟s security dilemma exacerbated. The pace of strategic developments alarmed pessimist for instance Andrew Bast,261 phrased trends in Pakistan military posture and armed venture in Kargil as dangerous enterprise. Rodney Jones, considers Kargil as an irrational operation and threat to bombard India with nuclear weapon was irresponsible gestures. 262 Jones believes nuclear weapon possession emboldened Pakistan so deterrence breakdown is inevitable in South Asia. Jones put the onus of probable deterrence breakdown on Pakistan. The ongoing Arms race can increase the scenarios leading towards nuclear detonation. Secondly, Indian and Pakistan nuclear competition raise strategic worth of nuclear weapons for the NNWS signatories to the NPT. NNWS may secretly start developing nuclear weapons and challenge the treaty. South Asia is cracking the NPT from outside and stimulating the treaty‟s signatories to pose internal challenges.
Optimists like Eric Arnett, Moeed Yousaf and Ashley Pandya rejects aforesaid fears and concerns as expense characterized by war exceeds the prospective outcome. Nuclear deterrence realizes antagonists‟ nuclear war is a futile act so, should be circumvented. Preferentially anxiety of recompensed annihilation restrained India-Pakistan offensive behavior and decade long peace. Ganguly asserts, responsible India-Pakistan conduct inhibits long scale conventional war, thwarts nuclear war263 and preserved long peace. Eric Arnett believes264 Pakistan reliance on weaponless deterrent stopped Indian military adventurism.
In conclusion, Pakistan sent nuclear signals during Kargil war, Operation Parakram and in post Mumbai attacks. India though have large conventional forces was deterred from imposing
261Bast, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Calculus,” 83. 262 Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Posture: Quest for Assured Nuclear Deterrence - A Conjecture,” IPRI, XIX, No. 1, (January, 2001). 263Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan and the Bomb, 19. 264 Eric Arnett, et al., Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban: SIPRI Research Report No. 14 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998): 16.
121 war265 on Pakistan. Optimists believe nuclear deterrent endowed Islamabad to knockdown and neutralize India hostile designs. Second, robust nuclear deterrence guarantee crisis stability, restore strategic equation in South Asia and; third continue to deter war and thwart deterrent breakdown in future. Nuclear weapons are viewed certified great equalizer, absolute weapon and weapon of peace.
4.7 The Kargil War and India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis May- June, 1999
Optimists are convinced that India-Pakistan would exercise nuclear restraint eventually strategic and crisis stability would be instituted. This optimism is deep-rooted in the superpowers behavior for instance superpowers had deployed nuclear and conventional forces on alert to raise the cost of adventurism for the opponent. However, both never unleashed nuclear forces because nuclear war cannot be won. Ironclad law was evolved it determine that nuclear rivals do not fight. Nevertheless, in May-June, 1999, India-Pakistan confrontation in Kargil led to dramatic breach of aforementioned ironclad law. On March 28, 1999, 266 Mujahideens captured huge landmass in the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) including single supply line connecting India with Siachin. Kargil is located on LoC. It is 75 miles away from Srinagar. Zoji La is the lone mountain pass connecting Kargil to Kashmir valley.267 Pakistan‟s intentions were to capture high posts to disrupt Indian supply line, Srinagar-Leh National Highway 1A. Further, Pakistan endeavored to get strategically important areas across LoC under its control.268 Intrusion was amid to redraw the LoC.
The stakes were consequential for India considering compromise would have meant compromise on Kargil and Siachin.269 India started using artillery and air force to restore status quo. Limited war in Kargil was fought against the philosophy of nuclear deterrence theory. War pushed India-Pakistan to the verge of nuclear exchange. Neil Joeck opined, circumstances could
265Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan‟s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security, 34, No. 3, (Winter, 2009/10): 64. 266“Pervez Musharraf „Crossed LoC Before Kargil War;‟ V. K. Singh Praises Ex-Army Chief‟s Courage,” The Times of India, (February 1, 2013). 267“1999 Kargil Conflict,” Global security,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm, (accessed June 25, 2017). 268Ibid. 269 Musarat Javaid Cheema, “International Community on Kargil Conflict,” South Asian Studies, 28, No. 1, (January-June, 2013): 90.
122 have drag war beyond LoC.270 Pessimists place confidence in premise that deterrence cannot function in South Asia. Escalation ladder could have increased resulting in nuclear catastrophe. Nuclear strings were hence attached to conflict. Pessimists were perhaps fearful as Kargil war was a violation of the norms of limited objectives in fighting limited war. John M. Collins mentioned the “selection of goals require” care “if rival possesses nuclear weapons.”271
Care refers to avoiding direct confrontation with nuclear adversary. Pace of pessimistic contingency amidst crisis including inherent danger of nuclear exchange, military asymmetry, absence of nuclear doctrines, transitional phase of C2 system, 272 border proximity, fears of preemptive strikes exacerbated the fear of deliberate and inadvertent nuclear weapons use. Aforesaid thoughts forced Clinton administration to get involved and find mutually agreeable solution of Kargil crisis.
However, strategic architects and optimists rejected the fears of nuclear exchange.273 India-Pakistan tacit agreement to keep the war limited to avoid nuclear exchange provided has strengthened the optimists conviction that threat of nuclear weapons use results in prudent crisis management. Nuclear adversaries endeavor to amicably defuse catastrophe, inhibit escalation and keep conflict underneath nuclear threshold line. Optimists avow that as nuclear weapons scrapped direct military confrontation and conflict escalation between the US and the Soviets it would likewise stabilize South Asia and nip in the bud the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan war. Mutual vulnerability would stabilize the strategic affairs of South Asian bellicose. Nonetheless the US neither encouraged the optimist‟s notion nor was ready to take the risk. Conversely, US intervened in Kargil crisis wherein India-Pakistan agreed to defuse limited war in July 1999.
Kargil war helped India to deduce that mutual restraint deterred India-Pakistani advances in Kargil. Pakistan exercised nuclear restraint and enabled India to gain confidence that traditional war below nuclear threshold with Pakistan is possible. India claimed here escalated
270 Neil Joeck, “The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Confrontation: Lessons from the Past, Contingencies for the Future,” NPEC, (September, 2008): 4. 271 John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973): 41. 272 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Spring, 2003): 60. 273 Pravin Sawhney, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad, (September 15, 2018).
123 the intensity of crisis due to conjecture that Pakistan military plot Kargil operation because of its confidence in the nuclear deterrent.
Indian strategic faction reached to the conclusion that overconfident Pakistan‟s future adventures can be deterred by aggressive response. Consequently, India officially announced to fight limited war with Pakistan below nuclear threshold in future. 274 It is fair to state that Pakistan practically sidestepped the non-use of nuclear taboo while India announced to ignore the ironclad law.
Indian strategic planner‟s conviction that limited war underneath nuclear threshold line can be fought with Pakistan. Second, Pakistan can be deterred by coercive means inherits the potential to torment crisis and regional stability. Peter R. Lavoy preconizes the notion that regardless NWS are disgruntled with the territorial distribution they do not go to war. It is designated as a “nuclear revolution.”275 Undoubtedly, this philosophy is deep-rooted in the US- Soviet crises over Berlin, which Lavoy applied to South Asia ascribed to Kargil war. The lessons of Berlin-Kargil overlap. For instance, first, paradoxically NWS cannot swear absolute armed triumph. Second, nuclear weapons neither underpin far-reaching nor rudimentary geographical changes to address the apprehensions of resented state against nuclear adversary. Dissatisfied Soviets ventured to remodel the territorial position of the Berlin, but failed to achieve its objective. Similarly, aggrieved Pakistan yearned to redraw the territorial status of Kashmir militarily however, failed. Thirdly, the Kargil war besides accentuated that NWS do not mire in crisis that may lead the belligerents to direct military competition and violence.
Above discussion helps the readers to deduce that the strategic fraternity conjectured neither Indian regular nor nuclear forces could deter Pakistan from launching proxy war. Pakistan likewise could neither redraw international borders nor could its nuclear deterrent deter India from launching limited war in Kargil. Circumspection and pragmatic struggle to deescalate
274Caranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order, 4. 275 Peter R. Lavoy, “Introduction: The Importance of the Kargil Conflict,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 30.
124 crisis between nuclear adversaries originated the concept that nuclear adversaries can fight underneath nuclear threshold, illustrated as stability-instability paradox.276
4.15 The Stability-Instability Paradox
Superpowers enmity throughout Cold War inbred the philosophy of stability-instability paradox. The possession of nuclear weapons resulted in strategic stability as nuclear rivals discerned that nuclear weapons use would result in reciprocal suicide. Fear of annihilation stabilizes strategic affairs and if crisis develop nuclear power would force the adversaries to keep the conflict below nuclear threshold.277 However, “lower the stability of the overall balance at lower levels of violence.”278 A disgruntled NWS can possibly endeavor to change the status quo and redraw the boundaries. Feeble NWS conjecture that strong adversary would worry premature use of nuclear weapons by revisionist state. Further revisionist state contemplates that lower the resistance capacity of weak state, the lower would be its nuclear threshold. Conversely, adversary aspires to eschew anal-out war to avoid nuclear disaster.
In 1999, Kapur claims, nuclear arsenals integrated with conventional forces buttressed Pakistan‟s confidence wherein it challenged India in Kargil to redraw the border in Kashmir.279 Kapur, prescribes India to pose threat of unrestrained warfare. Further, keep breathtaking prerogative concerning crossing nuclear threshold against Pakistan to reject trade-off and deter future crises.
Pakistan exercised the revisionist policy due to conviction that India will not open second front. India-Pakistan explored the rationale of stability-instability paradox as both managed to circumvent the escalation of Kargil catastrophe from restricted to exhaustive vendetta to nuclear
276 Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia,” http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ESCCONTROLCHAPTER1.pdf, (accessed on December 12, 2013): 1. 277 S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan‟s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is not Like Cold War Europe,” International Security, 32, No. 2, (Fall, 2005): 127, 128. 278 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury ed., The Balance of Power (Scranton: Chndler, 1965); 199. 279Kapur, “India and Pakistan‟s Unstable Peace,” 129.
125 exchange. Eventually fright of mutual suicide coerced India-Pakistan to allow US280 amid Kargil and throughout succeeding crises. India-Pakistan achieved twofold objectives first to climb down the escalation ladder and; second to forestall the flare-up of violence leading to nuclear weapons use. Whether India-Pakistan will eschew nuclear exchange in future is a matter of test. The stability-instability paradox, Krepon opines, could only be applicable to the region if India- Pakistan build assured second strike capability.281 Institutionalization of powerful second strike capability is the prerequisite for the application of aforesaid paradox. South Asian adversaries however, were in transitional phase. They did not possess assured second strike capabilities. Failure to fulfill Krepon‟s criterion proves the paradox was not applicable to Kargil conflict. It is fair to mention that without fulfilling the prerequisites of the paradox it would be dangerous to indulge in a low level conventional conflict. Future conflict or crisis would certainly endanger regional peace if aforementioned precondition of the paradox is not fulfilled. India-Pakistan realized that without retaining survivable nuclear forces both will be subjected to constant fear of enemy preemptive strike. Further strategic stability will be jeopardized and region will inexorably remain unstable. Conversely, India and Pakistan matured and administer survivable nuclear arsenals adequate to effectuate the anxiety of punishment in strategic nerve centre of aggressor. Substance of the matter is assured second strike forces license stability-instability paradox to function.
To sum-up, one may say that Pakistan waged the Kargil war. Fear of nuclear weapons use culminated in US participation in Kargil war to amicably defuse the crisis situation. Contentious Kashmir dispute was though highlighted internationally nevertheless Pakistan failed to correctly present its case on diplomatic front. Pakistan failed to convince global community to settle the protracted conflict in its favor. Conversely, China and Saudi Arabia did not support Pakistan to strengthen its case. The US pressurized Islamabad to withdraw armed forces from Kargil. Intimidating India‟s hegemonic agenda, control over Kashmir and nuclear forces will continue to fuel Pakistan‟s threat perception. In addition succeeding scenarios subscribe to Pakistan‟s threat perception. India can conceivably exercise the pretext of proxy war as well to
280 T.V. Paul, ed. The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 117. 281Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox,” 2.
126 vent out the frustration faced due to the determination of the Kashmiri people for their freedom. Pakistan fully understands the inherent nature of the problems of proxy war as well. India may also try to enter into Pakistani territory in hot pursuits. The launch of surgical strikes inside Pakistan against suspected training centers, which they have claimed to have done in early 2017, is highly possible. In either scenarios India will obviously cross Pakistan‟s defined threshold. This may result in the outbreak of war. It is therefore Pakistan has abandoned abovementioned fragile policy. However, Pakistan will inevitably rely on nuclear weapons to deter Indian imperialism. Further, Islamabad‟s pursuit to resolve Kashmir issue through military means in future may lead to India-Pakistan uncontrollable crisis leading to nuclear weapons use. South Asia cannot be stabilized unless Kashmir dispute remains unresolved.
This study concludes that South Asian stability-instability paradox consists of two distinct phases; firstly, the opaque era: both adversaries were aware that the corrival is manufacturing a nuclear bomb secretly. During this phase, India endeavored to impose war underneath nuclear threshold against Pakistan. Aforementioned paradox admirably functioned in opaque era as stability at opaque level maintained conventional stability. Indian coercive strategy resulted in conflict escalation while war avoidance remained byproduct of Pakistan‟s reliance on WMDs. Secondly, South Asian version of stability-instability paradox is opposed to superpowers model. Soviet Union wanted to engross Western Europe therefore wanted to execute imperial policy. Soviets thus designed the revisionist plans. Soviets had strategic depth hence, could have fought limited war below nuclear threshold.
Pakistan‟s armed forces are poor. The geographical explanation of Pakistan lacks strategic depth. The Kashmir is considered as a lifeline of Pakistan. Its agricultural output largely depends upon the rivers flowing from Kashmir currently occupied by India. However, from defensive realists‟ perspective, Pakistan is likely to remain stick to the policy of status quo. It maintains defensive policy to preserve its existence. Prevalent strategic settings secure Indian strategic interests. Yet, India will continue to back its conventional forces with nuclear deterrent. It can possibly divorce traditional policy to adapt revisionist approach in the light of offensive realist values. The existing strategic settings for the resolution of Kashmir issue can thereby alter. Similarly, Pakistan lacks strategic depth it cannot fight long drawn full scale war. South Asian
127 stability-instability paradox cannot work without superpower‟s interference. It inhibits following problems,
a. Superpowers interest in South Asia may be reduced in future; b. Secondly, superpowers may delay their response resulting in deterrence breakdown in future crisis. c. India-Pakistan policymakers know that conventional asymmetry can result in crisis and strategic instability.
South Asian adversaries discern the inherent complications of stability-instability paradox. Their confidence in superpower‟s interference led them to discount dangers associated with atomic weapon, pushing the enemy to the brink of nuclear war and leaving their survival at the mercy of others.
Conclusion Sumit Ganguly,282 Gene Gerzhy,283 Lodgaard284 and Barry O‟Neill285 assert that the PNE, and May, 1998 tests by India were prestige driven to impress the world about its technological advancements and scientific breakthrough. Indian military modernization, strategic partnership with the US, increasing stockpiles of fissile material and nuclear warheads is an attempt to raise its stature worldwide. Second, it wants to be recognized as rising power. The realist defines pursuit to acquire prestige is a national interest. India has attributed prestige with the development of nuclear bomb as bomb making requires scientific knowledge, advanced technology and constant flow of resources. Policymakers in New Delhi feared that without nuclear weapons Indian entry into the great powers club would not be possible. However, in Pakistan case PNE tests, continued rejection of the NPT, Indian designs to dominate South Asia and conventional superiority posed security dilemma for Pakistan. Islamabad therefore rejected the NPT. Key features of South Asian strategic milieu incorporates political differences, military
282Sumit Ganguly, “India‟s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi‟s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” International Security, 23, No. 4, (Spring, 1999): 148. 283 Gene Gerzhy, “Why Do States Abandon Nuclear Weapons Activities: Understanding the Role of Alliance Coercion,” in Project on Nuclear Issues: A Collection of Papers from the 2011 Conference Series, by Stephanie Spies and Mark Jansson, eds., (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2012): 33. 284Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 54. 285 Barry O‟Neill, Nuclear Weapons and the Pursuit of Prestige,” (May, 2002), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/boneill/prestap5.pdf, (accessed on July 29, 2013): 6.
128 rivalry, missile race, fissile material production, expansion in nuclear complexes, border clashes, vertical nuclear proliferation, reliance on nuclear deterrent, rejection of the NPT,286 efforts to enhance the credibility of nuclear deterrent. Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrent generates sense of vulnerability and distress of holocaust in the minds Indian policymakers. It strengthens balance of terror, buttress Pakistan‟s confidence and thwarts Indian adventurism. India-Pakistan rivalry, in Herman Kahn words, is rivalry of “resolve against resolve.”287
South Asians are emotionally attached with the strategic and political affairs including Kashmir issue and missile tests. Emotionally charged public has made it difficult for India and Pakistan leaders to grant concessions leading towards gradual disarmament. Concession would have disastrous consequences for their political career rather it would be a political suicide. Nuclear program thus complicates the resolution of outstanding problems. Second, policymakers send nuclear signals for political point scoring on both sides of the border since xenophobic politics is deeply ingrained in South Asia.
South Asian arms race has regional and extra regional implications. It prevents the NPT from acquiring universal status, undermines regional arms control and prevents restraint regime. Qualitative and quantitative developments prevent disarmament efforts and systemically linked with nuclear haves. Indian measures require countermeasures from China. Chinese countermeasures add to the vulnerability of US. Qualitative improvements introduced by the US to address the sense of insecurity cause vice versa impact. It fuels arm race spiral both regionally and globally. The South Asian states are prevented from signing the NPT and hampers implementation of Article VI of the NPT by NWS.
286 Basrur, interview. 287 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2010): 172.
129 Chapter Five India-Pakistan Nuclear Doctrines
5.1 Introduction
India and Pakistan views global nuclear order based on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) is discriminatory. Covenant empowers selective states to possess nuclear weapons. The treaty interdicts all other constituents1 and non-signatories to the treaty such as New Delhi and Islamabad from acquiring nuclear weapons. South Asian arch nuclear rivals instead of signing the NPT preferred to develop nuclear weapons under the opacity. India-Pakistan May, 1998, nuclear tests, vertical proliferation and fissile fabric production corroborates coercive measures or rewards cannot stop resolute states from budding nuclear weapons. Proliferators succeed in acquiring necessary technology, fissile material and basic knowledge to develop nuclear bomb. On June 6, 1998, the United Nation (UN) passed Resolution 1172,2 to denounce South Asian nuclearization. It expressed seriousness of the issue and tried to stop the horizontal proliferation.
International society endeavored to influence India-Pakistan to annex to the NPT absolutely NNWS, halt ballistic missiles development and refrain from deploying WMDs. However, both states shunned global society‟s demand through explicit non-compliance in an act of action reaction. India contrary to the NPT statutes, declared itself a NWS. This was a blatant denial of efforts focused on the containment of nuclear proliferation based on the NPT and gave birth to a new set of challenges posed to the treaty. Nuclear analysts were aware that an outside challenge was evolving to damage the norms of non-proliferation and undermined the spirit of the NPT to a great extent. Indian self-declared NWS status weakened the NPT objectives including halting proliferation of, nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. It languish the NPT from attaining absolute status. India nuclear posture consequently is in direct opposition to NPT‟s declared goals. 3 The May, 1998, tests macadamized development of New Delhi- Islamabad C2 System, nuclear force posture and nuclear doctrine. Nuclear doctrines suffice the
1Jonathan L.Black-Branch and Dieter Fleck eds., Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law (Hague: Asser Press, 2014): 34. 2 UN Security Council Resolution 1172, (June 6, 1998), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/naruhodo/data/pdf/data6-1.pdf (accessed on January 31, 2014). 3 Wade L. Huntley and karthika Sasikumar, eds., Nuclear Cooperation with India: New Challenges, New Opportunities (Vancouver: Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, 2006): 5.
130 two-fold objectives. First, it sets criterion for nuclear posture, spotlight scenarios of nuclear attack and chaperon nuclear enterprise. Second, doctrines transmit nuclear signals to thwart adversary‟s aggression. India-Pakistan is stockpiling nuclear forces. However, both should apprehend deliberate or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. Consequently, stabilizing balance of terror leading to war avoidance should be the chief purpose of India- Pakistan nuclear doctrines. This segment addresses the following questions:
Is Pakistan a reliable de-facto NWS? Is India replacing NFU policy with first use policy? Is it appropriate for Islamabad to lower its nuclear threshold to deny advantages to India at battlefield level? Why C2 System bears significance for NWS? Is nuclear war inevitable in South Asia?
In order to grasp swinging nuclear posture it is desirable to tactfully analyse the rationale for developing nuclear weapons and rejection of the NPT by India-Pakistan. The second, section tracks inception of Indian nuclear doctrine. It encapsulates the calls made by nuclear rightists to back the notion of No First Use (NFU) backed by massive retaliation and calls made by nuclear leftists to prepare grounds for nuclear first use. It attempts to summarize how India non-signatory to the NPT opposes the accord from outside? Pakistan‟s nuclear posture aims at deterring Indian aggression/to prevent deterrence breakdown. Pakistan‟s ability to target Indian counterforce assets from land, air, sea and deterrent posture based on first use generates fear of punishment in the minds of Indian policymakers. Islamabad relies on asymmetric escalation posture for war avoidance rather than war fighting. Third, segment trace the sources, origin, analyse the rationale, it highlights key features and objectives of Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrine. It also attempts to explain doctrinal shifts for instance nuclear opacity, minimum nuclear deterrence, credible minimum deterrence and full spectrum credible minimum deterrence capability.4 Theoretical
4 Lt. Gen Zubair Mahmood Hayat coined the term Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrence Capability. Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR248/2014-ISPR, (November 13, 2014), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2014/11/13, (accessed on February 1, 2018); Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Muhammad Zakaullah, also used the term Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrence Capability. Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR254/2015-ISPR, (November 17, 2014), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2014/11/13, (accessed on February 1, 2018); National Command Authority reiterated to maintain Full Spectrum Deterrence in line with Credible Minimum Deterrence, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2707, (accessed on February 1, 2018).
131 frameworks mainly realist paradigm and off-shoots of realism i.e. rational deterrence theory, is applied to understand Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrent posture and doctrine. Attempt is made to provide explanation for Pakistan continued reliance on nuclear deterrent which resulted in ensuring virtual victory in the minds of Pakistani policymakers. Finally, Pakistan‟s nuclear command and control system responsible for administering Pakistan‟s nuclear forces is explained.
5.2 The Impact of South Asian Nuclearization on the NPT
The military nature of the nuclear potential strategically motivated nuclear tests by India. The Indian self-proclaimed NWS status is considered against the NPT. Anti-bomb lobby consisted on T.V. Paul, Thomas Graham Jr., Douglas B. Shaw, Mario Esteban Caranza, Satu Limaye, Don Berlin and Lawrence Scheinman, believed South Asian nuclearization brought the NPT under stress with dangerous consequences. Paul, actually believes that India-Pakistan nuclear tests were carried out in contempt of the NPT. They actually jolted the spirit and damaged the treaty.5 New Delhi based policymakers rejected anti-bomb lobby‟s anxiety and alternately underlined innate tectonic faults of the treaty. The NPT will succumb, Rajiv Nayan profess, because of invariable division of treaty members in nuclear haves and have nots. 6 Classical nuclear order halts nuclear weapons spread, preserves the status-quo, restricts and frustrates dissatisfied NNWS. Indian nuclear tests derision the NPT and traditional BOP- term refers to equal distribution of power among states.7
India, Rajiv Nayan asserts, cannot be held liable for NPT‟s failure.8 Let‟s not forget that India developed WMDs program in pretense of right to obtain nuclear stock for peaceful purposes. Indian disobedience escalates apprehensions concerning transfer of nuclear technology for the evolution of thermonuclear bomb. Constraint on transfer of nuclear technology presumably is an available option to prevent nuclear weapons development. It erodes mutual trust among NNWS and harms the spirit of the NPT. NNWS would question the benefits of
5 Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” 5. 6 Rajiv Nayan, “Is NPT Membership as a Nuclear Weapon State an Option for India?” Strategic Analysis, 31, No. 6, (November, 2007): 872. 7 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (Longman, 1999): 69. 8Nayan, “Is NPT Membership as a Nuclear Weapon State an Option for India?”
132 adhering to the NPT. Conversely, NNWS may practice withdrawal clause spark rise of new NWS, new nuclear arms races, global strategic instability and increase in the chances of nuclear warfare.
Neo-realism paraphrase Pakistan WMDs program was indispensible to augment balance of terror. In May, 1998, it was imperative for strategic circles in Rawalpindi and Islamabad to authorize nuclear tests. Nonetheless, it was weighed as an opposition of disarmament and a challenge to established nuclear order based on the NPT. Pakistan chose to go nuclear in search to preserve its existence. Nuclear tests neutralized Indian hawkish military posture. Hence, deterrent force proved Pakistan‟s credence that nuclear weapons alone pledge flawless security against India. Pakistan laid down new blueprints that even small NWS can stop hegemon‟s aggression in the region. This change in the traditional pattern of interactions between India and Pakistan can help weak states to infer that the possession of nuclear weapons ensure state autonomy and sovereignty. Continued application of neo-realist philosophy augmented Pakistan defence layer but hinders the universality of the NPT. Neo-realist framework for state security produces fears that weak states may exercise Article X, to develop nuclear deterrent to ensure self-preservation.
India and Pakistan‟s incorporation of nuclear weapons in their nuclear doctrine is also weakening the established non-proliferation norms. The succeeding debate therefore highlights the significance, nature and role of nuclear doctrine in general and particularly in South Asia.
5.3 Nuclear Doctrines and Policies in South Asia
Doctrines, Henry Kissinger believes, are decisive rules accentuating rightful connection between strategies and tactics. It translates power into policy and decides requisite degree of force required for achieving national cause.9 Doctrines arrange help to policymakers in routine affairs during peacetime, in crisis management and if requisite achieve national ambitions during war. It aid policymakers to take measures in pursuit to accrue or protect national interests. Military leadership begin or wind-up fatal missions in the light of military doctrines.10 Sovereign states weigh strategic environment threat perception, economic disparity, geographical size,
9 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957): 7, 8. 10 Bert Chapman, Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara: Pager Security International, 2009): 1.
133 military preparedness and belief systems to develop and perpetuate national security strategy and doctrine.11 In post 9/11 era, ideological wars12 waged by non-state actors also cannot be ignored. Inter-services competition, civil-military affairs, the rise of non-state actors, quantitative and qualitative improvements in technology influences military doctrines.
Nuclear doctrine stimulates nuclear behavior, expedite policies, prompt future course, specify force structure i.e. type and range of missile inventories. It holds the reins of nuclear forces in peacetime and specifies conditions for WMDs use. List of prerequisites for decision making procedure in NWS entail care, foresight and effectiveness. 13 However, evolution, progression and perfection of nuclear doctrines, vertical proliferation and nuclear commerce are weakening the NPT.
During the crisis, the nuclear doctrine, nuclear weapons deterrent role and the gauge of nuclear signals increases. Paramount aim of nuclear signaling is to avoid outbreak of violence. Or keep its pace as low as possible. However, residual capacity of defending state‟s nuclear forces instills fear of punishment and deters aggression. New NWS work in three dimensions; they determine nuclear force structure, practical and declaratory policies. 14 Force structure guides NWS to regulate size, range and future requirements. Practicable tenets justify resolve and prospects for nuclear weapons positioning.15 Descriptive blueprints define aim of WMDs budding, possession and broadcasts nuclear gestures to subdue and deter adversary.16 Nascent NWS preserve murkiness to construct and preserve WMDs warehouse, nuclear laboratories and complexes. Opacity subdues fear of enemy‟s decapitating strike and ascertains nuclear lifeline of NWS.
Genesis of India-Pakistan nuclear doctrines are traced back to the times of the Cold War. Nuclear doctrines are developed to deter aggression or deal with circumstances involving
11Manpreet Sethi, “Devaluing Nuclear Weapons: Difficult, But Desirable,” in Nuclear Deterrence and Diplomacy, eds. Jasjit Singh and Manpreet Sethi (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004): 175. 12National Security Strategy (May, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed on February 4, 2014): 1. 13 Hilary Synnott, “Nuclear Capabilities, Nuclear Doctrines,” The Adelphi Papers, 39, No. 332, (1999): 53. 14 Tom Sauer, “A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32, No. 5, (October, 2009): 746. 15Bhumitra Chakma, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine, and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age,” Security Challenges, 2, No. 2, (July, 2006): 115. 16Karsten Frey, India‟s Nuclear Bomb and National Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2006): 140.
134 probable nuclear warfare.17 Superpowers knew nuclear war cannot be won therefore both treated WMDs as weapon of last resort. Mutual annihilation is consequently averted. Since atom bomb has its deterrent role, it has been politically and psychologically used to accrue financial, political and strategic objectives. Pakistan relies on nuclear deterrent to maintain its sovereignty. It does realize that nuclear weapons should be used only as a last resort. Pakistan‟s nuclear ability has deterred Indian military from any aggression. Despite having entrenched political differences, the two republics have not aspired for any large-scale military adventure ever since the acquisition of nuclear capability. Sverre Lodgaard framed the term “political advantage,” for exultant deterrent role of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons.18 It is asserted hither efficacious practice of nuclear deterrent to preserve strategic objectives embedded sense of “virtual victory” in the psyche of Islamabad stationed bureaucrats. This doctrine also stems from Pakistan‟s opposition to Indian declaration that South Asia falls in Indian sphere of influence;19Indian armed forces bankruptcy to attack Pakistan in various crises. Pakistan opposed Indian coercive policy because Islamabad based bureaucrats firmly regards radical perspective that tyrant must be resisted by the oppressed. It is considered as a rational policy. Pakistan firm resolve to resist India with nuclear deterrent prevent Islamabad from signing the NPT as NNWS. India-Pakistan nuclear policies, arms race and vertical proliferation undermine universalisation of the NPT.
5.4.1 The Development of Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Vajpayee Era
States exercise defensive or offensive strategies, asserts Scott D. Sagan,20depending upon its military muscles. In August, 1998, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee became the architect of Indian nuclear doctrine. His doctrine was based on three pillars having a moderate nuclear posture.
I. Nuclear deterrent is imperative to certify Indian sovereignty and liberation. II. India adheres to NFU.
17Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free- World? (New York: Routledge, 2011): 55. 18Ibid. 19 Quoted in C. Raja Mohan, “Beyond India‟s Monroe Doctrine,” Ministry of External Affairs, (January 2, 2003), http://mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm?dtl/15281/Beyond+India+s+Monroe+Doctrine (accessed April 24, 2017). 20 Scott D. Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistan and Indian Nuclear Doctrines,” in Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009): 222.
135 III. India will neither threat nor resort to use atomic weapons against NNWS.21
Vajpayee‟s doctrine this academic-work claims classified Indian neighbors into three zones. Vajpayee broadcasted nuclear signals to visualize Beijing that strategic changes taking place in South Asian strategic sphere by saying that “deterrence… ensures Indian liberty… sovereignty.”22 It was an attempt to caution China. Second, realism bestows acumen for the Indian adherence to NFU designed for nuclear Pakistan.23 Conventionally, strong NWS avouch to mimic NFU policy against competing weak NWS.24 Other explanations include major Indian continental, air and naval forces are deployed against Pakistan. It provides the leverage to India to wage limited or full scale war against Pakistan below nuclear threshold. However, first use notion will oblige Pakistan to unleash nuclear weapons against India. Since, Indian conventional military is capable of delivering nuclear warheads hence, it will respond with punitive nuclear strikes. Policymakers in Islamabad understand that Indian doctrine facilitates it to deploy large scale dual use conventional forces near Pakistani border. The DND though adhered to Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence (CMD). It emphasized the development of survivable nuclear and conventional forces. However, the level of forces was not specified. Consequentially, the CMD is considered as a dynamic concept used to continue vertical proliferation under ambiguity and neutralize international pressure. Second, New Delhi‟s NFU notion hence, cannot be trusted. Further, India aches to put the onus of the outbreak of possible atomic war on Pakistan. Islamabad believes deterrence stability therefore can be preserved by signing conventional arms control agreements and proposed signing a mutually agreed ratio of forces to India. 25 Unfortunately, New Delhi rejected Pakistan‟s proposals in pursuits to sketch Pakistan nuclear weapons program as a threat to global peace and regional security. It aspires to notify Pakistan as an irresponsible NWS26 and bring it under pressure from international community. On grounds, New Delhi increased defence budget and procuring technologically advanced Pakistan centric modern weaponry. In 2004, Pakistan, in its pursuit to send a message of goodwill to India,
21Ranjit Singh, “Nuclear Weapons as a Deterrent in South Asia: An Analysis,” Asia Pacific Journal of Social Science, II, No. 2, (July-December, 2010): 38. 22 Ibid, 38. 23 Feroz Hassan Khan, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 18, 2018). 24Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistan and Indian Nuclear Doctrines,” 222. 25 Maleeha Lodhi, “Security Challenges in India,” The Nonproliferation Review (Summer, 2001):122. 26Amit Baruab, Dateline Islamabad (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2007): 254.
136 voluntarily reduced the size of its army by 50,000 soldiers.27 Contrarily, India responded with an announcement to additionally recruit 80,000 servicemen in Indian army. 28 The then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes stated that “all that Pakistan has done is that it has kept the combat forces intact, and cut off only the tail. As far as the combat forces of Pakistan are concerned, the same old balance remains.”29 Third, pillar NSA is created to transmit high moral values to the world civilization to receive admiration from the world community that India is a responsible NWS. It does not pose threat to NNWS.
5.4.2 Draft on Indian Nuclear Doctrine
Indian government established Strategic Advisory Board (SAB). It for the first time ever annexed troika of services chiefs,30 to facilitate Indian National Security Advisory Board to compile Draft Nuclear Doctrine.31 In August, 1999, First Draft on Nuclear Doctrine (DND) was announced it was agreed that,32
a. India would not use nuclear weapons to exploit its adversaries. b. India would not indulge in arms race with its nuclear rivals China and Pakistan or any other state. c. Possession of Indian nuclear weapons is meant to keep India intact, secure its borders from foreign aggression. India would also repe l nuclear threats or coercive “political- strategic policy” backed by nuclear weapons of any state. d. India is committed to the policy of nuclear disarmament therefore, India will unilaterally suspend future nuclear tests of all types. e. India would abide by the principle of no first use. India would neither use its strategic weapons against Pakistan or any other nuclear or non-nuclear weapon state. f. Indian nuclear program is amid to achieve the minimum credible deterrence. g. Indian Prime Minister will take the decision to use nuclear weapons in self-defense.
27 “Pakistan Announces First Troop Cut,” BBC News, (April 28, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3665857.stm, (accessed January 2, 2018). 28 Sandeep Dikshit, “Time to Trim Indian Army,” The Hindu, (April 30, 2004). 29 “Fernandes Rules Out Downsizing Army,” The Hindu, (April 29, 2004). 30 Frey, India‟s Nuclear Bomb, 49. 31Izuyama Marie and Ogawa Shinichi, “The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan,” NIDS Security Report, No. 4, (March, 2003): 67. 32J. N. Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace (New York: Routledge, 2002):.340.
137 h. Indian armed forces would be empowered with operational command and control system of nuclear program.
India, as a non signatory to the NPT yet, violated the considerable norms and clauses of the NPT by announcing DND. The Draft aimed at winning global appreciation owing to rhetoric India would not indulge in arms race with regional adversaries. Indian credentials ascertain Indian policymakers propagated similar statements for political motives i.e. to gain concessions from the West. Indian leaders Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi supported efforts to see nuclear weapons free world. However, Indian history certifies Nehru authorized the Indian scientific community to deliberately divert nuclear material and technology acquired for peaceful purposes to build atomic weapons hence, contaminated Article IV, of the NPT. Indira Gandhi approved nuclear tests and tried to legalize them under Article V, of the NPT, by declaring them PNE. Rajiv issued directives to accelerate the pace of nuclear weapons development program and made preparations for Hydrogen bomb.33 The substance of the matter is above claim was confined to paper only. Indian vertical proliferation sabotaged Article VI, (disarmament clause) of the NPT. Future policy fixed by the DND meant Indian refusal to comply with Article VI, of the NPT. It posed security threats for Pakistan‟s survival and affixed route for qualitative nuclear arms race.
India perpetually prevented the establishment of the NWFZ proposed by Pakistan, as discussed in Chapter three, in the light of Article VII, of the NPT. New Delhi first, obstructed the establishment of the NWFZ in South Asia. Secondly, it damaged the spirit of Article VII, of the NPT. India shares disputed boundary with China in Ladakh, mainly Kashmir with Pakistan, Rajahstan, Sylhet District, Garo Khasi, Jaintia Hills and Murshidabad with Bangladesh. 34 Nuclear arsenals in Indian hands constitute existential threat for Pakistan. Significantly, India undermined the essence of the Article IX, of the NPT. The Article asserts that, states which has
33 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhry, “Under Rajiv Gandhi, India Was Ready with H-Bomb to Counter Pakistan‟s Nukes,” The Times of India, (January 24, 2017); Andrew B. Kennedy, “India‟s Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb,” International Security, 36, No. 2, (Fall, 2011); Balazs Szalontai, The Elephant in the Room: The Soviet Union and India‟s Nuclear Program, 1967-1989 (Washington D.C.: Nuclear Proliferation International History Project and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011). 34 DK Sinha, “Leading Disputes of India With Its Neighbouring Countries,” http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/essay/leading-disputes-of-india-with-its-neighboring-countries/42447/, (accessed May 1, 2017).
138 manufactured and tested atom bomb prior to January 1, 1967, is NWS. India‟s self proclaimed NWS status undermined the aforeknown clause.
Indian political system warrants Indian premier to oversee country‟s affairs with an authority to decide on strategic policy decisions. Hence even the strategic decisions are politically motivated. DND was also authored on the recommendations of political leaders.‟ Though, Prime Minister controls the authority to sanction nuclear attack if essential, however, DND reiterated that India would not be the first to carryout nuclear strikes against adversary. Indian nuclear doctrine is based on “deterrence by punishment.”35
5.4.3 Indian Official Nuclear Doctrine
On January 4, 2003 Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approved Indian official nuclear doctrine36 (IOND). It consists of the following,37
a. “Protecting the Indian state, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity, is the raison d‟être of India‟s nuclear deterrent.” b. “India will not resort to the use or threat of use of WMDs against NNWS but such states shall be deemed NWS if they ally with or assist NWS against India, and or assist them during hostilities.” c. “India‟s nuclear deterrent is a manifestation of its right to self-defense as provided in Article 51 of the UN Charter.” d. “The Prime Minister (and his designated successors) shall exercise C2 over India‟s nuclear forces.” e. “Survival of the chain of command shall be ensured to provide leadership continuity in all eventualities.” f. “India will continue research on developing both delivery systems and warheads in the light of global technological advancements.”
35A. Vinod Kumar, “A Cold Start: India‟s Response to Pakistan-Aided Low-Intensity Conflict,” Strategic Analysis, 33, No. 3, (May, 2009): 325;Ali Ahmed, “Reviewing India‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, www.idsa.in/policybrief/reviewingindiasnucleardoctrine_aahmed_240409, (accessed May 2, 2017). 36 Shyam Saran, “Is India‟s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” Delivered at Habitat Centre New Delhi, (April 24, 2013): 12. 37India‟s Nuclear Doctrine: An Alternative Blueprint, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (2012): 4, 5.
139 g. “India will be prepared to meet new challenges in ballistic missile defence, chemical, biological and radiological weapons that may have a bearing on its nuclear doctrine.”
Indian reliance on nuclear deterrent to protect India is a common attribute of DND and IOND. Nuclear doctrine endeavors to deter regional nuclear adversaries; as it is caught with two- front nuclear dilemma i.e. Pakistan and China. Indian rationale for developing nuclear program is embedded in the Article 51, of the UN Charter. It grants states the right to self-defense. India legitimizes the development and subsequent possession of nuclear weapons under Article 51. India in its pursuit, to legitimize diversion of peaceful nuclear technology for nuclear weapons development in the guise of Article 51, of the UN Charter is polluting and undermining the UN Charter. It can provide basis for the NNWS signatories to the NPT to divert peaceful nuclear technology in violation of the Article II, and Article IV, of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards.
There is an obvious dichotomy in the Indian application of the UN Resolutions to legitimize nuclear weapons development. The interpretation is more align with its hegemon designs. For example, India refused to hold plebiscite in the Indian Held Kashmir (IHK),38 under the UN Resolution 47, passed on April 21, 1948, and the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) of January 5, 1949. 39 India, instead wants to maintain status quo in Kashmir. Unfortunately, India started violating international treaties for instance. India has threatened to scrap the Indus Water Treaty signed between India and Pakistan in 1960.40 India wants to divert the course of rivers originating from Kashmir to permanently set its control. Indian designs defy Pakistan‟s expectations as Indian control over river waters can cause drought or floods in Pakistan. Intensions to solidify control over Kashmir may result in nuclear war in South Asia.
38 “Resolution Adopted at the Meeting of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on January 5, 1949,” Document No. 5/1196 para. 15, (January 10, 1949), www.mofa.gov.pk/unsc/Resolution%20adopted%20at%20the%20meeting%20of%20the%20united%20nations%20 Commission%20for%20India%20and%20Pakistan%20on5%20January%201949.pdf (accessed May 1, 2017); “United Nations Documents on MOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan,http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/documents.shtml, (accessed on January 26, 2014) also see “Resolutions Adopted and Decisions Taken by the Security Council in 1951,” http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/91(1951). (accessed on January 26, 2014). 39“UNICP Resolution of January 5, 1949- S/1196,” (January 5, 1949), www.humsafar.info/jkun490105.php, (accessed May 1, 2017). 40 “Indo-Pak Talks on Indus Water Treaty Likely this Month,” The Times of India, (March 3, 2017); Prabhjit Singh, “Water That Belongs to India Will be Stopped From Going Waste in Pak: PM Modi,” Hindustan Times, (November 25, 2016).
140 History proves desire to take control over piece of land remained the driving force for states to go to wars. Case in point is Monroe Doctrine wherein the Western nations were precisely cautioned that the US would confront colonization of the Western Hampshire.41 The US desires to expand across the North American continent to the Pacific Ocean led to outbreak of wars between US-Mexico and other neighbors.42 German invasion of Poland43 and Iraq forced annexation of Kuwait44 led to outbreak of violence.
India-Pakistan adversative relationship and unsettled border dispute breeds regional instability. India is mounting its conventional military strength to strengthen its regional status. It has surpassed Pakistan. Yet, it is expanding the size of its nuclear forces in collaboration with the West and particularly with the US approval to become regional hegemon. Proponents of the NPT and arms control have also turned blind eye to Indian military developments rather they have enabled New Delhi to modernize deterrent forces by providing it nuclear technology and fissile material. Islamabad is forced to balance the strategic equation by developing assured second strike nuclear forces. New Delhi‟s hegemonic designs, conventional imbalance, hostile military posture, missile developments, rising nuclear asymmetry and introduction of anti ballistic missile (ABM) fuels arms race and destabilize regional strategic stability. New Delhi introduced theater missile defence (TMD) to protect Indian forces from tactical missiles.45 The ABM system and TMD can undercut Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrent leading to New Delhi favored deterrent force asymmetry. It can encourage surprise attack against Pakistan‟s counterforce targets. New Delhi announced the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces 2017.” This doctrine requires India to enhance capabilities in space and cyberspace. It also calls for surgical strikes against potential terrorists hideouts. 46 Yet, India seems dissatisfied with prevailing conventional asymmetry. Indian conventional superiority, the ABM system and nuclear weapons fuels abhorrence,
41 “Westward Expansion,” History Net, www.historynet.com/westward-expansion, (accessed May 1, 2017). 42 “History Guy: The U.S.-Mexican War (1846-1848),” The History Guy,www.historyguy.com/Mexican- American_War.html, (accessed May 1, 2017). 43 Bradley Lightbody, “Invasion of Poland,” BBC, (March 30, 2011), www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/invasion_poland_01.html, (May 1, 2017); “The War in Europe, 1939- 41: The Campaign in Poland, 1939,” Encyclopedia Britannica, (www.britannica.com/event/world-war-II/The-war- in-Europe-1939-41#ref511786, (accessed May 1,, 2017). 44 W. Raymond Duccan, Barbara Jancar-Webster, Bob Switkey, eds., World Politics in 21st Century: Student Choice Edition (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009): 246. 45 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Arms Control: Risk Reduction Measures Between India and Pakistan,” SASU Research Paper, No. 1, (June, 2005): 18. 46 Nishant Rajeev, “A Holistic Approach to India‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” The Diplomat, (May 24, 2017).
141 reciprocal hostility and regional arms race. Lebow and Stein rightly argued that, “too much deterrence… can fuel arms race rather that make both sides less rather than more secure and provoke aggression that it is designed to prevent.”47 Indian military modernization is thus a perpetual source of horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation in South Asia. It provoked Islamabad to modernize nuclear forces, reject the NPT, NFU and proposed no war pact.48 Likewise, India blocks signing of the bilateral conventional arms control agreement, joint renunciation of acquisition or the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, mutual inspection of nuclear facilities, Low Force Zone, Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR)49prevent Pakistan from signing the NPT particularly and implementation of the Article VI, of the NPT globally. It eternally challenges the fate of the NPT.
Indian nuclear doctrine reassures political leadership‟s domination as authority to fire thermonuclear weapon enshrines in the Prime Ministers‟ Office. The NSA is slightly revised in Indian nuclear doctrine. The revised version is a replica50 of NSA given by US, France, UK and Russia to the NNWS signatories to the NPT. New Delhi‟s adherence to NFU is a core principal of the Indian nuclear doctrine.51 India would not be the first to resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in pursuit of political or strategic goals. India endeavors to guarantee Indian adversaries that India during crisis will not resort to the threat or use of WMDs to impose its demands. Indian nuclear establishment categorically clarify that India reserves the right of the use of nuclear weapons if India or Indian armed forces are attacked with chemical, biological or radiological weapons.
Indian nuclear doctrine without determining minimum account of nuclear forces has affirmed to amass a CMD to shield India. Minimum deterrent posture means deterrer garners survivable adequate forces to offset adversary‟s aggressive posture. Enemy is deterred regardless of the magnitude and nature of his armed forces. Development and maintenance of assured
47 Richard N. Lebow and J.G. Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 368. 48 Rifaat Hussain, “Thinking About Nuclear Use and No First Use,” National Development and Security, x, No. 2, (Winter, 2001/02): 1. 49 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Race,” in The Next Arms Race, ed., Henry D. Sokolski (Calisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012): 358, 375, 384. 50Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (Solona: SIPRI, 2003): 110. 51 SIPRI Year Book 2012: Armaments Disarmament and International Security (Solana: SIPRI, 2012): 15.
142 second strike forces, Buzan prescribes, is a prerequisite for deterrent forces.52 India contrary to the CMD is expanding nuclear complexes, producing weapons grade fissile material, increased production of delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads to complete nuclear triad. Indian quest to acquire second strike capability is driving Indian nuclear weapons program.53 The practical steps of the Indian government affirm the dichotomy between rhetoric and substantial policy. It creates an impression that New Delhi is keeping its nuclear arsenals open-ended to ensure survivability of its nuclear forces. Consequentially, India is developing massive missile forces hence it has dropped the idea of the CMD posture. It is also enhancing the precision strike rate of missile forces to achieve the ability to carry out decapitating strike or at least inflict unacceptable damage against the enemy. The qualitative and quantitative changes indicate a shift in Indian nuclear doctrine. Yet, it is making efforts to create an impression that it adheres to the CMD posture and has not deviated from declared non-proliferation norms. Indian expanding deterrent forces and doctrinal shift cannot be viewed in isolation. These developments can be labeled as tactics to pressure Islamabad and tilt escalation dominance in its favor. Nevertheless, it disturbs regional peace and undermines Pakistan‟s conventional capabilities. It is matter of great concern and worry for Pakistan. New Delhi‟s offensive posture such as claim on September 26, 2016, that it carried out surgical strikes in Azad Kashmir54 manifests irresponsible strategic behavior of the Indian top brass. It disturbs strategic equilibrium, fuels regional animosity and intensifies nuclear and missile arms race. Since nuclear arms race has no end in sight both non-NPT signatories are moving towards acquiring overkill capacities. It coerced Islamabad to introduce qualitative changes such as reduce nuclear threshold by introducing low yield Nasar, in South Asian strategic environment. The Ababeel, surface to surface ballistic missile is yet another response by Islamabad to New Delhi‟s provocative behavior.
Indian official nuclear doctrine echoes NATO‟s nuclear weapons use strategy and the strategic concept of massive retaliation. Massive retaliation is dangerous strategy as it requires New Delhi to enhance conventional military capabilities and ensure readiness of its forces. The increased defence budget allows India to procure conventional arms, nuclear material and
52 Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (Hampshire: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987): 193. 53 Maleeha Lodhi, “Security Challenges in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, 8, No. 2, (Summer, 2001): 119. 54 “Return Was the Most Difficult Part: Major Who Led Surgical Strikes,” The Times of India (September 11, 2017).
143 technology. These developments create fear that India is gradually effectuating preemptive doctrine. It enables India to increase the size and numbers of nuclear warheads. Consequentially, nuclear restraint regime is discarded and the NPT is undermined. It weakens Pakistan‟s sense of security and requires Islamabad to rely on asymmetric deterrence,55 adhere to First Use Policy (FUP). First use of nuclear bomb is neither time-bound nor by the type of war. It is developing and may presumably use TNWs to express resolve and pledge in an attempt to transmit message. Probable use of TNWs at minor level by Pakistan is known as graduated response in literature available on nuclear war fighting and strategy. If, Indian forces did not stop its maneuver intensity of nuclear weapons use would be gradually intensified. But Indian nuclear doctrine would force India to respond to graduated response with massive retaliation. Fear of massive retaliation may thereupon force Pakistani policymakers to authorize decapitating first strike against India instead of graduated response. However, Indian ability to gather leftover nuclear forces would surely result in massive retaliation. Fear of reciprocative massive retaliation in the minds of Indian and Pakistani policymakers would continue to persist therefore both sides cannot leave something to chance.56 IND based on massive retaliation strategy generates uncertainty, disturbs strategic and crisis stability and scrap philosophy of limited nuclear war.
5.4.4 Calls for Review: Indian Nuclear Leftists and Rightists
Reassessment of a nuclear doctrine is imperative to address modern-day challenges. BJP 2014 election manifesto, P.R. Chari, former Strategic Forces Commander Lt. Gen B.S. Nagal57 Indian analysts Ali Ahmed, 58 Bharat Karnad, 59 former Defence Minister Manohar Parikar 60
55 Tom Sauer, (Senior Lecturer University of Antwerpen) Emailed interview, (September 16, 2018). 56Ali Ahmed, “Rethinking India‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” http://fsss.in/agni-volume/2nd/rethinking-india's-nuclear- doctrine.pdf (accessed on February 18, 2014). 57Quoted in Manoj Joshi, “Weighing the Benefits of Recalibrating India‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” The Wire, (November 11, 2016), https://thewire.in/79461/weighing-the-benefits-of-recalibrating-indias-nuclear-doctrine/. 58Ali Ahmed, “India‟s Nuclear Doctrine: Coming Out of the Closet,” Foreign Policy Journal, (December 13, 2016), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/12/13/indias-nuclear-doctrine-coming-out-of-the-closet/, (accessed on January 1, 2017) . 59Quoted in Gurmeet Kanwal, “India‟s Nuclear Doctrine: Need for a Review,” CSIS, (December 5, 2014). 60“Why Bind Ourselves to „No First Use Policy,‟ Says Defence Minister Parikar on India‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” Times of India, (November 10, 2016).
144 Satish Chandra61 and criticized the NFU and demanded of the government to review DND on grounds that;
a. NFU posture binds India to adopt defensive posture vis-à-vis the adversary. b. Notion of massive retaliation in response to Pakistan‟s probable use of TNWs is considered inappropriate. c. Advocates of change are skeptic of Indian willingness to use nuclear bomb on massive scale against TNWs.
Commentators assert that the NFU may encourage the adversary to launch first strike against India. Critics believe India can deter Pakistan from launching proxies and exercising TNWs against India by discarding the NFU. Indian cardinal society‟s criticism over IND echo anxiety of Indian strategic hawks. Conversely, nuclear hawks demands revolutionary changes for instance NFU policy should be relinquished. This camp is named here as nuclear leftist (revisionists or revolutionaries). However, Indian walkout from the NFU will ripen ambiguous and erratic nuclear posture. It will have dire implications such as, it would lead to create crisis instability. Indian walkout from the NFU raises considerable questions. For instance, in what circumstances India will resort to the first use after discarding the NFU? Will India carryout preemptive first strike? Or India will resort to WMDs use owing to launch on warning? Whether Indian nuclear forces will target enemy‟s counter value or counterforce targets? By rejecting the NFU the prerogative to launch nuclear strikes will be delegated to India‟s junior military officers.
Indian viewpoint on IND likewise consist of the nuclear rightists. They adhere to the strategy of massive retaliation, resist novelty, advocate preexistent nuclear doctrine and call for developing assured second strike nuclear armory to lash adversary. The alarming facet of the adherence to massive retaliation conception is that it embeds fear of obsolescence so encourage the adversary to carryout massive first strike instead of launching graduated response. Massive retaliation is inappropriate against the use of TNWs as it creates crisis instability and destabilizes the region. In conclusion of this section, Pakistanis i.e. Zafar Khan, Muhammad Munir, Moonis Ahmar, Rifaat Hussain, Feroz Hassan Khan, Tughral Yamin, Indian i.e. Pravin Sawhney,
61Satish Chandra, “Revisiting India‟s Nuclear Doctrine: Is It Necessary?” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Issue Brief, (April 30, 2014): 3.
145 Western experts including Micahel Krepon, Tom Sauer, Benjamin Kienzle and others including Rajesh M. Basrur during interviews (schedule is mentioned as Annex-II) with the author expressed that India is not replacing NFU with nuclear FU.
5.4.5 Nuclear Command and Control (C2) System
Overt nuclearization of South Asia nursed the struggle of India and Pakistan to develop sophisticated C2 System62 with a view to guarantee that nuclear weapons will be controlled and launched in conformity with the nuclear doctrine. C2 modus operandi thus erodes the hazards of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.63 Above all, it assists the triggering authority to overcome crisis without resorting to violence, prevent theft of fissile material, ensure security of warheads and associated delivery system. Deterrence stability depends upon the development of C2 System and survivable second strike nuclear forces. Deterrence stability is a prerequisite for strategic stability. Fear of punishment induced preserved deterrence and strategic stability in South Asia. It induced caution and resulted in the decade long peace in South Asia. Strategic stability is therefore the byproduct of South Asian nuclearisation.
5.4.6 The Genesis of the Indian C2 System
In October, 2001, India decided to gradually mature C2 system. On the counsel of Kargil Review Committee, Indian Defence Ministry annunciated a letter no MoD/IC/1027/32/IDS/5843/2001, to set-up Integrated Defence Staff (IDS)64 to administer the state security better. It aimed to liaison among armed forces during crisis. In 2003, India instituted national command authority (NCA) to oversee the nuclear affairs.65 On January 4, 2003, Political Council (PC) and Executive Council (EC) were enacted to administer C2 system and take responsibility for operational decisions. NCA, headed by the Prime Minister hold meetings twice a year. Members of PC include Defence Minister, Home Minister and Minister for External Affairs. National Security Advisor professorates the EC. Council also comprises of
62Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Proliferation Motivations,” The Nonproliferation Review, 13, No. 3, (November, 2006): 506. 63 Parag KullKarni, The Peacemakers: Can You Prevent the Nuclear Inevitability?(Quills Ink Publishing, 2015): 285. 64“Integrated Defence Staff,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/ids.htm, (accessed on December 29, 2014). 65Saran, “Is India‟s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” 12.
146 armed services Chiefs.66 EC provides recommendations to PC, headed by Indian premier about nuclear weapons use to erode the prospects of inadvertent use. Indian nuclear program thusly outlasts underneath rigid civilian authority. In January, 2003, Indian statecraft revealed the creation of SFC known as Strategic Nuclear Command (SNC) headed in rotation by the Chiefs of Staff Committee equal to the rank of Air Marshall. SFC is responsible for protection, supervision, management of nuclear forces, execution of NCA instructions, target selection and delivering tactical and strategic weapons.67
5.4.7 Contingency Planning
The NCA, SFC and delivery mechanism turn into high value target for the opponent during crisis or after the outbreak of war. Crucifixion of NCA during crisis or war minimizes the dangers posed to adversary‟s forces and civilian population. 68 Fear of decapitating strike accordingly resulted in the development of substitute the NCA. If the genuine the NCA headed by Premier is perished or becomes dysfunctional, 69 substitute the NCA would perform operations. Contingency plan known as “negative control,” or “partial delegation,”70 highlights the significance and challenges posed to C2. Indian scientists at DAE keeps the nuclear warheads separate from delivery vehicles controlled by DRDO71 during peacetime. Nevertheless, Indian Premier enjoys the prerogative to authorize the assembling, deployment and launch of nuclear armory. SFC is responsible to execute PCs‟ orders.
Indian SFC proposed to the government to arrange two squadrons of fighter jets72 and raise mini-air force to deliver nuclear warheads against the targets. In 2012, Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) empowered SFC to build mini-air force. It preferred Su- 30MKIs with a range of 3000 KMs to strike the adversary with atom bomb via BrahMos missiles. In March, 2015,
66 Ibid. 67 “Bharat: An Untold Story,” http://bharatuntoldstory.tumblr.com/post/31644028656/nca-the-nuclear-command- authority-nca-of-india#, (accessed June 22, 2015). 68 Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Posture: Arms Race Instabilities in South Asia,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 25, No. 2, (1998): 78. 69 Saran, “Is India‟s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” 12. 70Khan, “Nuclear Command-and-Control,” 168. 71Gurmeet Kanwal, “Safety and Security of India‟s Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Analysis, 25, (April, 2001), http://www.cianet.org/olj/sa/sa_apr01kag01.html (accessed February 9, 2017). 72“Why the BrahMos Armed Sukhoi is Bad News for India‟s Enemies?” IBC World News, (April 20, 2015), https://www.ibcworldnews.com/2015/04/20/why-the-brahmos-armed-sukhoi-is-bad-news-for-indias-enemies/, (accessed June 22, 2015).
147 SFC acquired 42, SU-30MKIs73 equipped with air launched BrahMos, with 300 KMs range. Fighter jet can be refueled in the air. It tilts asymmetry in Indian favor. Mini-air force produces sense of escalation dominance in the minds of Indian strategists as they prescribed Indian leaders to launch offensive combat operations.74 Dams, power generation complexes, industrial units, missile production facilities, depots, nuclear facilities, complexes, depots including Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot, ballistic missile bases in Gujranwala, Okara, Multan, Jhang and Dera Nawab Shah, ordinance factories and army headquarters Rawalpindi75 are on the hit list of India.
5.5 Assessment of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
Military top brass stationed in Rawalpindi, believes that the atomic weapons deter India from engrossing Pakistani territories. Pakistan concealed nuclear strategy, principle and C2 spectrum for the sake of advancing opaque nuclear posture as it believes that opacity wields deterrent posture.
5.5.1 Significant Features of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
First, Pakistan‟s nuclear doctrine is though unwritten/customary yet it is based on various handouts issued by the NCA and the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR). Statements and interviews of civilian strategists, senior serving and retired government armed forces officials serve the purpose of providing policy guidelines for customary nuclear doctrine. Second, it is associated with personalities for example Dr. Samar Mubarikmand, Naeem Ahmed Salik, 76 Khalid Kidwai,77 and Mahmud Ali Durani.78 Third, CMD posture of Pakistan is India specific. It is reactive rather than proactive. Fourth, Pakistan WMDs deterred India conversely, WMDs are
73Ibid. 74 Rakesh Krishnan Simha, “How the Su-30 MKI is Changing the IAF‟s Combat Strategy,” Russia and India Report, (January 5, 2014), http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2014/01/05/how_the_su- 30_mki_is_changing_the_iafs_combat_strategy_32099.html , (accessed June 22, 2015); “Why the BrahMos Armed Sukhoi is Bad News for India‟s Enemies?” 75 Ibid. 76 Bhumitra Chakma, Pakisstan: Whither Minimum Deterrence? (S. Raja Ratnam School of international Studies, 2013): 1. 77 Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: AConcise Report of a Visit by Landau Network Centro Volto,” http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan- nuclear.htm (accessed on July 21, 2013). 78 Muhammad Ali Durranni, Pakistan‟s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons (Sandia National Laboratories, 2004).
148 viewed both strategic and political weapons. Fifth, despite nuclear first use Pakistan keeps de- mated nuclear forces during peacetime simultaneously, it emphasizes graduated response. Sixth, doctrine denies advantages to India in crises situations and in case deterrence breakdown.
Pakistan, arguably, in contrast to its own earlier proposed regional arms control and disarmament proposals is maturing nuclear weapons and doctrine. Nuclear restraint regime or disarmament agreement in South Asia though appears straightforward, nevertheless it is complex phenomenon. Preceding proposals endorses the fact that, Pakistani policymakers acknowledge strategic significance and positive impact of bilateral arms control agreements on South Asian strategic environment.
5.5.2 Objectives
Pakistan‟s nuclear policy focuses on achieving the following objectives,79 a. Deter all forms of “external threats” posed to the national frontiers of the mainland. b. Development of conventional and strategic forces is prerequisite for enhancing credibility of nuclear deterrence. c. Deterring India from launching (pre-emptive) attacks, against country‟s strategic forces, with retaliation of nuclear strike. d. Preserving strategic parity within the South Asian belt.
5.5.3 Nuclear First Use
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Military Committee in December, 1956, approved MC-14/2 Document, to authorize nuclear first use strategy against the Soviet Union.80 Islamabad‟s nuclear first use of asymmetric posture81 is conceivably based on the MC-14/2, for three motives. First, WMDs possession by Islamabad knocks down Indian military superiority; second, residual capacity of nuclear forces creates fear of punishment in Indian policymakers conversely, it deters India and maintains the South Asian strategic stability. Third, India-Pakistan
79Ibid. 80 J. Mendelsohn, “NATO‟s Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for 'No First Use,” 3, (July/August, 1999). 81 Vinnie Liebl, “India and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines,” Comparative Strategy, 28, No. 2, (2009): 156.
149 troubled relations, Indian gigantic military, revisionist policy, border proximity and the fact that traditional deterrence is prone to breakdown requires Pakistan to rely on first use. Fourth, rising deterrent force asymmetry in Indian favor requires Pakistan to deny the strategic advantages and convince India that war is not an option by adopting deliberate nuclear first use posture. Islamabad therefore rejected New Delhi‟s proposals to sign no-first use agreement. It helps Pakistan to;82 a. rely on nuclear deterrent during crisis and accrue its interests, b. thwart existential threat India poses to Pakistan‟s sovereignty; c. Maintain strategic stability and results in war prevention. d. Prevents the adversary from imposing demands during crisis.
Islamabad‟s policy of deliberate firs-use is rooted in realist teachings of self-preservation, to repel the Indian aggression and guarantee Pakistan‟s existence. It does not aim at carrying out decapitating first strike conversely it is therefore far from nuclear primacy- ability to eliminate enemy‟s nuclear forces with first strike.83 The realist philosophy also asserts that conventionally weak states adhere to deliberate first use to deter external threats. Pakistan is situated in strategically volatile region for instance East Pakistan dismembered, Afghanistan is unstable since 1970s and India continues to threaten Pakistan‟s existence. In post 9/11 era India and Afghanistan joined hands against Pakistan to destabilize it. It is claimed here, Pakistan‟s threat perception therefore stems from Hobbes‟ state of nature. Conversely, deliberate nuclear first use evolved as basis of Pakistan‟s customary nuclear doctrine. In post 9/11 era, Indian offensive Cold Start Doctrine and rising conventional military imbalance provides imputes to Islamabad to rely on asymmetric escalation posture.84
Islamabad‟s countermeasures fractures New Delhi‟s sense of security and creates security dilemma for India. New Delhi‟s therefore relies on conventional and nuclear military forces to deal with Pakistan. India in association with the Western scholars has launched propaganda to declare Pakistan as an irresponsible NWS.85 It is asserted that Islamabad relies on pre-delegated
82Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 83 Sauer, “A Second Nuclear Revolution,” 747. 84 Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan‟s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” 39. 85 Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015); Shashank Joshi, “Pakistan‟s Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà vu?”The Washington Quarterly, 36, No. 3,
150 control of nuclear weapons. It keeps nuclear forces in ready status particularly in time of crisis. Thus Pakistan‟s nuclear posture complicates C2, apparatus. Deliberate first use also increases the prospects of accidental and deliberate nuclear war. It creates ambiguity. Further, it lowers Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold hence, NCA can authorize the use of nuclear capable tactical missiles against Indian troops on Pakistani soil.86 Or NCA can authorize first use in country defence as a last resort. The asymmetric escalation posture is therefore an offensive strategy. Pakistan‟s lack of strategic depth and conventionally weak armed forces strengthen these fears. It paves the way for allegations that Pakistan‟s deterrent posture inherits risks, vulnerabilities, fosters fear of accidental use of nuclear weapons and deliberate use due to use it or lose it phenomenon in midst of crisis. It aims to target Pakistan‟s nuclear assets, bring Islamabad under pressure from international community and roll back its nuclear weapons program. Secondly, it aspires to divert global community‟s attention from the Indian hostile preemptive war-fighting strategy.
First use posture is also criticized on grounds that it is in contrast to Pakistan‟s proposal to India to jointly renounce the acquisition or manufacturing of nuclear weapons. It discards Islamabad‟s earlier calls for establishing Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia.87 Strategy requires large scale missiles. On the basis of the development of solid fuel short range missiles, Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program is labeled as fastest growing.
Pakistan‟s deterrent posture contrary to aforementioned allegations attempts to deter Indian decapitating strikes. Fear of Indian preemptive strikes occupies Pakistan threat perception. Islamabad, A. H. Nayyer claims, therefore keep its nuclear forces de-mated and away from missiles.88 Contrary to Indian propaganda Pakistan exercises assertive control during crisis and peacetime to avoid inadvertent, emotional or deliberate use of nuclear weapons. Assertive
(Summer, 2013); Bhumitra Chakma, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age,” Security Challenges, 2, No. 2, (July, 2006); Timothy D. Hoyt, “Strategic Myopia: Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine and Crisis Stability in South Asia,” in South Asia‟s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China ed., Lowell Dittmer (New York: Routledge, 2015). 86 Ali Ahmed, “Pakistan‟s „First Use‟ in Perspective,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, (May 12, 2011), https://idsa.in/idsacomments/PakistansFirstUseinPerspective_aahmed_120511, (accessed January 21, 2018). 87 A. H. Nayyar, “A Pakistani Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, FES Briefing Paper 9, (August, 2008): 4. 88 Nayyar, “A Pakistani Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation,” 4.
151 control ensures launch codes are not shared with operators or handlers of nuclear arsenals.89 Deployment of TNWs thus should not be cause of concern as prerogative to launch rests with the NCA chief, Pakistani premier. Development of TNWs can be part of deception and ambiguous nuclear doctrine to embed doubts in the minds of the adversary. Hype of TNWs development enables Pakistan to keep intermediate range nuclear forces de-mated from delivery vehicles at storage depots to prevent detection from Indian satellites, thwarts fear of theft during transportation, neutralize use it or lose it phenomenon, enable NCA to maintain tight control over nuclear assets and pacify threat of deliberate or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Deterrent force and resolve to use atomic arsenals enables Islamabad to deny escalation dominance and checkmate India. Consequentially, status quo is preserved. The substance of the matter is nuclear dilemma India poses to Pakistan‟s security discards Islamabad‟s belief in disarmament efforts and particularly in the NPT. Pakistan‟s nuclear policy is based on nuclear restraint and responsibility.90 Islamabad desires status quo, deterrence stability. It believes, nuclear weapons are weapons of last resort. Islamabad therefore, has repeatedly proposed India to sign an agreement to avoid deployment of ballistic missiles. Second, to keep nuclear weapons de- mated. 91 It reflects strategic maturity of Pakistani decision makers and aspirations to avoid deliberate or accidental nuclear war.
5.5.4 Minimum Nuclear Deterrence
May, 1998, Indian nuclear tests formally laid Pakistan‟s opaque nuclear posture to rest. Islamabad raised voice against the damage caused by the Indian nuclear tests to the regional nuclear restraint regime, the non-proliferation efforts and the South Asian strategic stability. Pokhran-II also deposited Pakistan‟s belief that regional solution to non-proliferation is possible into the morgue. Further, India cannot be tied down to regional arms control agreement.92 Under pressure from the deterrent force asymmetry created by the Indian nuclear tests Islamabad in tit- for-tat response changed its deterrent posture from opacity to minimum nuclear deterrence. The
89 Mario Esteban Carranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating A Robust Indo- Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime (London: Routledge, 2016). 90 Naeem Salik, “The Evolution of Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” http://www.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/6+Nuclear+Learning_Salik.pdf/3457bf32-507c-4120-8c74- 45d71d4340b7, (accessed January 2, 2018). 91 Inam Ul Haq, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Statement in the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, (January 25, 2001). 92 Farah Zahra, “Pakistan‟s Road to A Minimum Nuclear Deterrent,” Arms Control Today, (July 1, 1999), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/fzja99, (accessed January 2, 2018).
152 doctrine was referred to quantified survivable nuclear forces sufficient to punish the aggressor for carrying out nuclear first strike. 93 Yet, Pakistan adhered to minimum nuclear deterrent posture owing to;
a. Avoid nuclear arms race with India. b. Belief, fear of punishment would deter the adversary. c. Reduce maintenance/overhaul cost. d. Administer less complex command and control (C2) system and; e. Counterbalance Indian conventional arms superiority.
Government officials for instance in June 1998 Dr. Samar Mubarakmand94 and later Brig (retired) Dr. Naeem Salik95 asserted Pakistan requires, sixty to seventy nuclear warheads to deter India from waging war against Pakistan. Islamabad agreed to keep its nuclear forces quantified to contribute directly to regional strategic stability and stabilize bilateral strategic relations with India. It was aimed to strengthen preexistent agreements such as to avoid attacks on nuclear installations. Islamabad aspired to pave the way for nuclear risk reduction measures through negotiations and signing an arms control agreement, to overcome trust deficit, reduce political and military tensions and coexist peacefully. Islamabad was offering an alternative to future wars in its quest to peacefully resolve protracted conflicts. It was application of P. Terrence Hopmann recipe aimed at addressing conventional force asymmetry. Hopmann suggests implementation of arms control agreement to address military imbalance. Once conventional asymmetry is balanced nuclear rivals will implement NFU in letter and spirit.96 Keeping in view that India is constantly modernizing its military it results in rising deterrent force asymmetry. India does not adhere to meaningful arms control agreement and the Indian favored rising conventional force disparity undermined Islamabad‟s voluntary arms control efforts. Pakistan soon realized that either to rely on catalytic nuclear posture or to adopt asymmetric escalation posture hence, it requires credible deterrent forces vis-à-vis India. Consequentially, it adopted asymmetric escalation posture.
93 Kristensen, Hans M., Robert Stan Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, eds.,From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons (Federation of American Scientists, 2009). 94 The Dawn News, (June 3, 1998). 95 Naeem Ahmed Salik, "Minimum Deterrence and India Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue: Case Study on Pakistan." Landau Network Centro Volta South Asia Security Project Case Study, January (2006). 96 P. Terrence Hoppman, “Negotiating Security in Europe,” in Nuclear Weapons and the Threat of Nuclear War, eds., John B. Harris and Eric Markusen (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986): 213.
153 Political and strategic pressures coerced Islamabad to abandon its policy of quantifying nuclear forces.
5.5.5 Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD)
Nawaz Sharif‟s administration introduced the CMD posture. 97 It was departure from minimum deterrence. The CMD continued to preserve ambiguity in Pakistan‟s nuclear policy; second, it avoided limits on the extent of Pakistan‟s nuclear force structure.98 Third, this dynamic approach enabled Islamabad to address country‟s security concerns emanating from the Indian qualitative changes resulting in New Delhi‟s favored deterrent force asymmetry. India justifies the increase and deterrent force modernization by terming it Beijing specific. Pakistan cannot neglect these developments hence respond with countermeasures. The CMD posture was adopted to avoid nuclear arms race with India.99 It is prudent approach, as it allows and emphasizes changes in the deterrent posture keeping in view Indian national security policy. Line of the argument is changes in the CMD posture are directly proportional to Indian (conventional/ nuclear) military modernization, increase in the size of Indian nuclear forces and war fighting doctrine. It was a reactive rather than proactive approach. Conversely, Islamabad‟s efforts to address security concerns cannot be labeled as arms competition or quest for nuclear parity. The CMD enabled Pakistan to cut economic expenditure required for the maintenance of large scale nuclear forces; secondly, minimum stocks evaded fear of inadvertent and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Third, the CMD posture highlighted India poses existential threat to Pakistan‟s security. Yet, Pakistan endeavors to avoid nuclear signaling and missile arms race. Fourth, by maintaining the CMD posture Pakistani decision makers tried to convince the world that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear weapon state (NWS). Islamabad though relies on first use policy yet it keeps nuclear forces de mated. It is known as recessed deterrent posture. Country set up comprehensive Command and Control (C2) mechanism. Pakistan actively participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Resolution 1540. Further, Pakistan‟s deterrent forces are India centric alone.
97 Bruno Tertrais, Pakistan's Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks (EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, 2012): 2. 98 Andrew Bast, “Pakistan's Nuclear Calculus,” The Washington Quarterly, 34, No. 4, (2011): 78. 99Chakma, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine, and Command and Control System,” 122.
154 5.5.6 Credible Minimum Full Spectrum Deterrence
On September 5, 2013 NCA, the supreme body to administer nuclear affairs decided to adhere to Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) to deter all kinds of external threats.100 It comprises of first, full spectrum of nuclear weapons. Second, it covers huge Indian landmass. Third, aspires to bring India‟s outlaying territories101 such as Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The FSD is in line with CMD. It was introduced in reaction to offensive Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). India wants to impose limited conventional war against Pakistan under nuclear umbrella. Islamabad believes that the CSD enables India to enjoy advantages at tactical and operational level.102 The CSD therefore poses existential threat to Pakistan‟s sovereignty. Pakistan plugged the gap by introducing TNWs Hatf IX sixty kilometers short range ballistic missile Nasar. The CMFSD posture is based on Hatf IX. TNWs are introduced because Pakistani deployed its armed forces in Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA) to fight terrorists. Policymakers in Islamabad feared Indian surprise attack. TNWs were therefore introduced to deter India from executing the CSD.103 It empowers Pakistan to use mini-nukes at tactical level rather than using the strategic weapons. The CMFSD advocates limited nuclear-war or gradual escalation of nuclear-war. It essentially lowered nuclear threshold level. Shaheen-III missile is capable of destroying its targets within the range of 2750 kilometers. It prevents India to gain assured second strike capability from Andaman and Nicobar Islands.104
Pakistan military leadership reiterated the existence of the CMFSD on September 9, 2015, in a press release.105 It was asserted that Islamabad would maintain FSD in line with CMD to thwart aggression and avoid (nuclear) arms race with India. Indian military amalgamation near Pakistani border embeds fear of preemptive strike in the minds of policymakers in Islamabad. Pakistan‟s threat perception heightened it fears that delayed response towards the CSD can result in devastating enemy surprise attack. Secondly, inaction would endanger Pakistan‟s existence. Provocative nature of the CSD requires likewise countermeasures such as preemptive strikes to
100 Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR133/2013-ISPR, (September 13, 2013), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2361, (accessed on July 11, 2014). 101 Hasan Ehtisham, “Pakistan‟s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” The Express Tribune (January 9, 2018). 102 Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, “A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai,” Carnegie Endoment for International Peace,(P. Lavoy, Interviewer):8. 103 Jawad Hashmi, interviewed by Ashfaq Amed, Gujrat (January 14, 2018). 104 Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Sargodha (January 13, 2018). 105 Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR280/2015-ISPR, (September 9, 2015), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=3026, (accessed April 10, 2017).
155 disrupt enemy war plans and to enjoy the benefit of first-strike. Preemptive strategy can possibly gain thrust in South Asia. Pakistan however as responsible NWS keeps it nuclear forces de- mated and unassembled to reduce chances of nuclear Armageddon. Tit-for-tar strategy yet undoubtedly increases chances of deliberate and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.
5.5.7 Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control System
India centric nuclear weapons program requires Pakistan to develop C2 system. Credibility of C2 system can be best tested during crisis. Misperception, distrust, mistakes and emotions may escalate low level crisis resulting in general warfare. In South Asian case, it may result in WMDs use.106 Crisis thence requires sensible handling and amicable resolution of the situation. C2 System was therefore conceptualized and developed by India and Pakistan to avoid deliberate or accidental use of the WMDs. Nuclear weapons possession facilitates Islamabad to resist Indian dictation, preserve Pakistan‟s existence and restore strategic stability. Policymakers in Islamabad believe had Pakistan not developed nuclear weapons India would have undone the partition. Credible deterrence facilitated Pakistan military in wiping out terrorism from Pakistan. Strategic stability is gradually strengthening democracy107 in Pakistan. WMDs stabilized the region, are source of national harmony cohesion. Nuclear weapons are viewed political weapons a source to acquire emerging power status globally. Indian leadership believes South Asia is Indian sphere of influence. India considers Pakistan as a basic hurdle and an obstacle in Indian rise to accrue regional supremacy and great power status.
In the 1999, General Musharraf established National Security Council (NSC) including civilian and military leaders.108 NSC comprised of first NCA; second, developmental control by a government body; Strategic Force Command (SFC) and; fourth Secretariat.109 NSC served as comprehensive mechanism to handle nuclear affairs. In the year 2000, Musharraf overwhelmed NCA by bring nuclear establishment, missile development complex KRL, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM), and
106Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Command-and-Control in South Asia During Peace, Crisis and War,” Contemporary South Asia, 14, No. 2, (June, 2005): 164. 107Andrei Kokoshin, Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theories and Applied Questions (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2011): 5. 108Tertrais, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear and WMD Programmes,” 7. 109“National Command Authority.”
156 the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO)110 under its control. In April, 2004, Pervez Musharraf approved NSC from the parliament.111 Pakistan People‟s Party- Parliamentarian (PPP-P) opposed NSC. Replacing NSC with Defence Cabinet Committee was one of the defined interests of PPP-P, in the 2008, election manifesto.112 In February, 2009113 NSC was abandoned. Nevertheless Musharraf is architect of Pakistan‟s current Nuclear C2 System known as Strategic Command Organisation114 based on the SPD; secondly, the NCA and; third, SFC. 115 SPD situated in Joint Services Headquarters is Secretariat of NCA. 116 Lieutenant General or Director General (DG) 117 leads SPD. Secretariat is responsible for personnel reliability, material management, special security emphasis, counterintelligence and control physical security on sites.118 The SPD is responsible to protect nuclear facilities and complexes. Former DG SPD Khalid Kidwai raised special security wing of 8,000 armed forces personnel to protect nuclear assets. It was SPD‟s internal security wing (ISW) answerable to DG SPD. The ISW coordinates with other intelligence agencies to thwart threats. 119 Four sub- directorates of SPD includes, first, Operational and Planning Directorate; second, the Computarized, Command, Control, Communications, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate (CCCCIISR); third, Strategic Weapons Development Directorate and; fourth, the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate.120
Members of the NCA include Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), services chiefs, key cabinet ministers and the Prime Minister. The NCA participants review
110Rehman, “Nuclear Command and Control Systems: Pakistan and India.” 111Riaz Ahmed Sheikh, “A State of Transition: Authoritarianism and Democratization in Pakistan,” Asia Journal of Global Studies, 3, No. 1, (2009): 18. 112“Manifesto 2008,” http://www.ppp.org.pk/manifestos/2008.pdf, (accessed on July 13, 2014): 16. 113Anas Malik, Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology (London: Routledge, 2011): 196. 114Tertrais, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear and WMD Programmes,” 7. 115Shalini Chawla, “Challenges for Securing Pakistan‟s Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Centre for Air Power Studies, (February 14, 2013): 1. 116Chakma, ed., The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, 47. 117Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (New York: Free Press, 2006). 118 Tariq Osman Haider, “Concerns Over Pakistan‟s Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality,” Policy Perspectives, 9, No. 2, (2012): 36. 119Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, (January 21, 2007), http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=291&rid=6, (accessed on July 13, 2014). 120Kenneth N Luongo and NaeemSalik, “Building Confidence in Pakistan‟s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, (December, 2007), http://spearheadresearch.org/Pages/Documents/Building_Confidence.pdf, (accessed on July 13, 2014): 13.
157 developments in nuclear field. 121 It controls nuclear weapons development, deployment and use.122 Prime Minister of Pakistan is the chairman of the NCA. During its meetings members of the NCA review Indian developments and threats posed to Pakistan‟s security. The NCA proposes future course of action. It reviews global developments that could have implications for Pakistan‟s national security i.e. the FMCT, the IAEA, the NSG, the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). The Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC) are two significant bodies of the NCA. The ECC provides policy directions recommend guidelines for WMDs deployment, making nuclear doctrine and policy for authorizing WMDs use.123 The CJCS is deputy chairman of the DCC it attempts to implement the ECC goals. Constitutionally, Islamabad‟s political leadership enjoys upper hand over military bureaucracy. Possibly nuclear affairs may completely get out of control of military. Political leadership maturity and stable political culture are prerequisites of aforementioned forecast. The SFC enjoys prerogative to exercise control nuclear weapons, delivery system, exercise training, technical and administrative control.124 In 2012, Islamabad started developing Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) 125 to expand country‟s strategic forces. Development of the NSFC could be outcome of the decision to administer developed naval nuclear forces; prerequisite for effective deterrent and assured second strike capability. Qualitative development was indication that surrender was out of question. Significantly India was denied escalation dominance. From crisis control perspective residual capacity of nuclear forces ensures credibility of deterrent and prevents enemy from imposing demands. Global society‟s failure to take substantial steps in addressing Pakistan‟s genuine concerns. It also lacks interest in resolving Indo-Pakistan contentious issues the upshot is arms race spiral. Disarmament activist consequently cannot convince Pakistan to join the NPT as NNWS. NSFC echo Pakistan‟s security dilemma a response to India as New Delhi by raising blue-water navy126 is nuclearizing Indian Ocean with
121Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR133/2013-ISPR, (September 13, 2013), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2361, (accessed on July 11, 2014). 122Michael E. Clarke, “Pakistan and the „Four Faces‟ of Nuclear Terrorism: A Preliminary Assessment,” in Pakistan‟s Stability Paradox: Domestic Regional and Regional Dimensions, et al., edrs. Ashutosh Misra and Michael E. Clarke (London: Routledge, 2012): 200. 123Ian Bremmer and Maria Kuusisto, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters,” SASSI Research Report 15, (London: SASSI, 2008): 10. 124Luongo and Salik, “Building Confidence in Pakistan‟s Nuclear Security,” 13. 125Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR122/2012-ISPR, (May 19, 2012), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2012/5/19, (accessed on March 14, 2015). 126 Thughral Yamin, Telephone Interview, (September 15, 2018).
158 Russian support. Superpowers knew nuclear war cannot be won therefore both treated nuclear weapons as weapon of last resort. Mutual annihilation was consequently averted. Nuclear weapons were used politically to achieve strategic interests. Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons for self-preservation. However, Pakistan realizes that nuclear weapons are weapon of last resort and should not be used. Nuclear weapons are politically used against India to resolve crises and deter Indian military aggression. Sverre Lodgaard coined the term “political advantage,” for successful deterrent role of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons. It is claimed successful implementation of nuclear deterrent to preserve strategic objectives embedded sense of “virtual victory” in the minds of Islamabad based policymakers. This conviction also stems from opposition to Indian claim that South Asia falls in Indian sphere of influence; Indian hegemony; failure of conventionally powerful and nuclear equipped Indian forces to cross into Pakistani territory. Pakistan believes in radical perspective that oppressor must be resisted by the oppressed.
Conclusion
India-Pakistan dismissal of the NPT, vertical proliferation nuclear weapons incorporation with conventional weapons, war fighting doctrines enhances significance of nuclear weapons for the NNWS members to the NPT. Development and deployment of tactical, submarine launched nuclear missiles and nuclear signaling in crisis raise likelihood of deterrence breakdown. Second, India-Pakistan prevents the NPT from acquiring universal recognition. Third, South Asia‟s outlier states critique of the NPT to legalize past horizontal and current vertical proliferation is marginalizing Articles I, II, III, IV, VI, VII and IX of the NPT and cracking the nutshell of the treaty. Fourth, India-Pakistan rejection of the treaty poses external threats to the treaty. Consequently, NNWS members to the NPT may warn to withdraw from the treaty if they are not offered rewards127 for their decision to relinquish nuclear weapons.
Pakistan nuclear policy is replica of the US‟s Cold War era nuclear strategy known as MC 70. The US deployed nuclear arsenals in Western Europe to deter Soviets from annexing/ taking control of tactically important areas. Proportionately, Pakistan resorts to threat of use of nuclear weapons to thwart the outbreak of war and ensure its survival. War avoidance is the
127Jayantha Dhanapala, “The NPT Regime: External and Internal Challenges,” Seventh Carnegie International Non- Proliferation Conference, (January 11, 1999), http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/HR/docs/1999/1999Jan11_Washington.pdf, (accessed July 4, 2015).
159 basic theme of Pakistan‟s nuclear policy. India-Pakistan decade long peace certifies optimist‟s belief nuclear weapons neutralize fear of adversary‟s disarming strike.128 Pakistan‟s nuclear First Use posture is also based on Glenn Synder‟s deterrence by denial model. Likewise, India borrowed the philosophy of massive retaliatory nuclear attack from Albert Wohlstetter‟s writings. South Asian strategic stability requires both states to avoid escalation dominance likewise crisis stability can be ensured by keeping unassembled missiles at storage facilities. Mutual vulnerability and mutual fear that enemy cities are held hostage deters preemptive strikes so it will ensure crisis stability.
It speaks of the notion of existential deterrence as slight prospects of nuclear retaliation outweigh ostensible ascendency of preemptive attack. However, the vertical extended deterrence, ready, super-ready status and short time for nuclear reaction creates fear of inadvertent and accidental nuclear war in South Asia. West disregard the fact that struggle to rollback Pakistan nuclear weapons program is contrary to the realist teachings that “nuclear weapons are anti-war vaccine.”129 It would destabilize South Asian strategic stability and increase asymmetry in Indian favor. The denial of the West for advanced military technology impedes Pakistan‟s ability to rise countervailing conventional force (similar to declared by the West in 1952 Lisbon Conference). 130 The failure of the West to understand the provision of military hardware increases asymmetry in Indian favor. It prevents Islamabad from introducing changes in the nuclear policy for instance to adopt flexible response. The substance of the matter is global community‟s failure to address Pakistan‟s security concerns undermines non-proliferation apparatus based on the NPT. Pakistan as per realist teachings, from deterrence perspective and according to the concept of security dilemma relies on nuclear deterrent for its security. The incorporation of nuclear weapons with the conventional weapons and first use policy would continue to dominate Pakistan‟s security policy. Consequently, Islamabad would not rollback nuclear weapons program and remain an outlier state. The guardians of the NPT are neither
128Elbridge Colby, “Defining Strategic Stability: Reconciling Stability and Deterrence,” in Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations, eds. Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013): 48. 129 Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy (Lahore: National Book Foundation, 1972): 97. 130Stan Windass, “Problems of NATO Defence,” in Avoiding Nuclear War: Common Security as a Strategy for the Defence of the West Europe, et al., eds. Stan Windass (London: Brassey‟s Defence Publishers Ltd., 1985): 7.
160 ready to accept Pakistan as NWS nor addresses Pakistan‟s security concerns. The universalisation of the NPT would therefore remain a distant goal.
Indian NFU posture enables New Delhi to receive tribute from international community. In contrast, it nuclearized the Indian Ocean, evolved CSD, hostile conventional war fighting strategy to increase Islamabad‟s reliance on nuclear weapons. India is dragging Islamabad in nuclear and conventional arms race to isolating and declare Pakistan as an irresponsible de-facto NWS. Pakistan considers nuclear deterrent deters aggression, thwarts coercive diplomacy, stop nuclear blackmail and stabilizes crisis. It offsets conventional and deterrent force asymmetry. Nuclear deterrent denies escalation dominance and prevents existential threats. It preserves state sovereignty. Pakistan‟s fissile material production, expansion in nuclear facilities, war heads production, doctrine shifts and development of battlefield missile is reply to revolution in Indian military affairs.
161 Chapter Six Fissile Material Production: Implications for the NPT
6.1 Introduction
Efforts to halt the production of fissile material commenced in 1953.1 United States (US) President Eisenhower requested the world to get rid of weapon grade fissile material amid fear of nuclear weapons proliferation to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Second, possibility that fissile material will fall into the wrong hands resulting in nuclear terrorism. In September, 1993, the US President Bill Clinton fearing nuclear terrorism urged the world to cease fissile material production. 2 In December, 1993, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution 48/ 75L calling for international forum to consult and author an accord to cease fissile material production.3 The underlying aim of the UN resolution remained to ink Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Chapter two of resolution led to the creation of Shanon Mandate through the Conference on Disarmament (CD) forum. India-Pakistan nuclear establishments are conscientiously aware that powerful nations are carrying out arrangements to cease fissile material production. India and Pakistan are making efforts to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium. Participants representing India and Pakistan attend CD sessions first to annul global accusation and isolation in nuclear realm. Secondly, Pakistan desires to warrant in general outcome on FMCT is not drawn contrary to Pakistani expectations and interdict Indian upper hand in the realm of fissile material production.4
India-Pakistan investment in fissile material production, HEU and plutonium for military purposes continues. 5 It is essential feature for nuclear weapons development. India-Pakistan hides statistics concerning existing fissile material stockpiles. Opacity is preserved to hide actual capacity of weapons grade fissile material production. Consequentially, real potentials of nuclear warheads production remain unknown. This section endeavors to explore drivers behind India-
1“Negotiations of a Ban on the Production of Fissile Material,” UNIDIR, (2013), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/understanding-disarmament-no-1-en-509.pdf, (accessed on July 13, 2014): 6. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Gaurav Rajen and Michael Vannoni, Fissile Material Controls in South Asia: Regional Analyses and Potential Confidence Building Measures(Livermore: SAND, 2006): 9. 5“Fissile Material Stocks,”International Panel on Fissile Material, (June 13, 2016), http://fissilematerials.org/, (accessed June 18, 2016).
162
Pakistan energies devoted to boost fissile material stockpiles. It attempts to answer following questions;
How international think tanks project Pakistan‟s nuclear program in their reports? How non- NPT signatory India‟s nuclear agreements with various NPT signatories endanger the fate of the NPT?
A state‟s autonomy in HEU and Plutonium stocks is a prerequisite for making credible nuclear deterrent. The ceaseless struggle of India and Pakistan to manufacture weapons grade fissile material is vertical proliferation. It is against the spirit of the NPT. It harms the treaty and disarmament efforts. It undermines Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) adherence to the NPT. Certainly, vertical proliferation in South Asia challenges non-proliferation norms, strategic stability and increase prospects of nuclear war regionally and at global level. Probability that non-state actors will get hold of fissile material or assemble weapon increases. It threatens global peace and world security.
The predisposition of India and Pakistan makes perfectly transparent inevitable nuclear behavior and proliferation model. For instance, by preserving the fissile material India and Pakistan will have innate capacity to engineer qualitatively advanced generation of nuclear weapons. Further, fissile material stockpile will likewise warrant South Asian belligerents to succeed in dealing with the future shortcomings. Self-reliance will endow both states to increase the number of nuclear warheads to ensure the survivability of nuclear forces. The residual capacity of nuclear forces following the preemptive strike of the enemy is a prerequisite for attaining second strike capability. Indisputably, India and Pakistan introduced qualitative and quantitative changes in the nuclear force structure. The worrisome aspects of India and Pakistan rivalry are;
a. No defined criterion or specified limit is set to how much fissile material is needed. b. No limit is set to how many nuclear weapons are needed due to the fear that BOP would shift in adversary‟s favor. It augments the prospects of adversary‟s preemptive military strikes against nuclear depots and complexes. c. Protracted vertical proliferation elucidates active missile race, rejects the NPT. Likewise, it discards the regional arms control measures and nuclear restraint regime. General
163
understanding that WMDs are weapons of peace rather than war fighting increases the possibility of inadvertent or deliberate use of nuclear weapons. d. India and Pakistan aims to prevent the IAEA to determine exact figure of existing weapons grade fissile material stockpiles.
Pretext for the indicated bizarre nuclear behavior lies in the quest of the South Asian belligerents‟ to buildup assured second strike forces. The accomplishment of prerequisite will enhance the efficacy of deterrence and ingrain sense of vulnerability in the mind of the adversary.
Indian military procurement in pursuit to become regional hegemon intensifies Pakistan‟s security dilemma. Pakistan reliance on nuclear deterrent and countermeasures results in mutual nuclear and missile arms race. Nuclear weapons role is increasing in war fighting doctrines with strategic implication. Qualitative progress increases the cost of war incase deterrence breakdown. The worrisome aspect is the asymmetry is increasing in Indian favor. Advanced aircraft, airborne early warning system, nuclear powered submarines, Command and Control (C2) System and anti ballistic missile defense provides false sense of security and escalation dominance to New Delhi. Undeniably, conventional superiority will result in crisis and strategic instability. It will lower nuclear threshold and result in deterrence breakdown. Islamabad is left with no option but to first, increase conventional capability including the development of Multiple Independent Re- entry Vehicle (MIRVs) Ababeel Missile, stealth aircrafts, anti-aircraft missiles, predator drones and advance radar system. Second reject arms control proposals. Third, increase fissile material production. Fourth, increase nuclear weapons development and; fifth rely on nuclear weapons use- passive/primary deterrence. Islamabad‟s countermeasures to increase size of nuclear capable missiles raise force structure to penetrate Indian defense layers and increase survivability of its forces raises the cost of war and increase pace of arms race.
Pakistan is condemned and alleged of adopting full spectrum deterrence with a pursuit to seek parity with India. Ironically, global community has turned blind eye to India‟s top secret
164 nuclear city,6 abuse of non-proliferation norms, vertical proliferation, massive military spending, acquisition of sophisticated military hardware and weapon grade fissile material production.
Mutual suspicion, distrust and enemy images demand India and Pakistan to take substantial steps if non-proliferation norms rooted in the NPT have to succeed. Cooperation through institutional development in the light of liberalism can facilitate India and Pakistan to eradicate mutual hostility, cease vertical proliferation and nuclear arms race. Correspondingly, mutual cooperation through institutional platform can pave the way for India and Pakistan to sign and seal the NPT. In opposition, consistent vertical proliferation and missile and nuclear arms race will exclusively escalate prospects of nuclear war.7 The development of Prahar missile and increased Plutonium production tilts the balance of terror in Indian favor. It intensifies Pakistan‟s security concerns and bars Pakistan from disarming its nuclear weapons. Overriding security concerns deters Islamabad to affix considerable significance to non-proliferation objectives particularly the NPT. Tacit Plutonium production in Chellakere nuclear city, the development of miniaturized missiles force and increasing number of nuclear arsenals justifies the premise that India is in pursuit to first complete nuclear triad. Secondly, to prepare for fighting two-front war and; third guarantee escalation dominance in South Asia. Growing asymmetry in nuclear and conventional realms makes it imperative for Pakistan to rely on nuclear weapons. It demands the manufacturing of indispensable missile force to deliver nuclear warheads. Further, policymakers in Pakistan views the implementation of the NPT requires disarmament, verification and opening up of nuclear complexes for IAEA inspections. The NPT implementation thus far conflict with Pakistan‟s security paradigm.
6.2 Post 9/11 Era Fissile Material Production Projects and Facilities in Pakistan
The nuclear facilities in Pakistan are in Golra Sharief, Rawalpindi, Kahutta, Sihala, Wah, Khushab, Lahore, Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Chaghi hills, Kundian, Chashma, Laki and Isa Khel8 quarters. HEU is the backbone of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program. Pakistan‟s first Uranium site at Bagalchore ceased production in 2000. Presently, Pakistan is procuring Uranium
6Adrian Levy, “India is Building a Top Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons, Expert Say,” Foreign Affairs, (December 16, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/INDIA_NUCLEAR_CITY_TOP_SECRET_CHINA_PAKISTAN_BARC/, (accessed December 19, 2015). 7 Muhammad Munir, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 24, 2018). 8 J. N. Dixit, India-Pakistan in War & Peace (New York: Routledge, 2002): 326.
165 from deposits at Nanganai and Taunsa near DG Khan yet Pakistan, according to the IAEA claims was producing 23 tons in 2000 per annum and 40 tons per annum in 2002.9 Khushab allegedly is a military-site for plutonium production to reduce Pakistan‟s dependence on HEU. Plutonium is used in compact short range solid fuel propelled missiles10 known as (tactical nuclear weapons) TNWs to neutralize Indian proactive Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). Indo-Pakistan stern relationship and border standoff led to the transformation by the replacement of liquid with qualitatively advanced and reliable solid fuel missile system. Liquid fuel missile remains strenuous to handle during transportation so fuel has to be carried on tankers. It demands long time-span for refueling. Enemy can easily detect and destroy such missile force. Uranium used as fuel in nuclear reactors produces plutonium. Spent uranium enhances Islamabad‟s capacity to produce additional stock of plutonium. Currently, Pakistan has introduced qualitative changes in nuclear weapons program. For instance Pakistan is producing miniaturized/TNWs. Indian developments coerce Pakistan to discard the credible minimum deterrence (CMD) posture.11Second, Islamabad is replacing liquid with solid fuel nuclear capable missiles. Direction of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program aims at denying battlefield advantages to India. Contrarily baseless allegations are leveled that;
a. Pakistan has increased weapons grade fissile material particularly plutonium production. b. Pakistan‟s involvement in vertical proliferation weakens the efforts to enforce the NPT in South Asia. It accelerates the ongoing nuclear arms race. c. Pakistan after introducing TNWs has lowered the nuclear threshold. Introduction of TNWs increases the likelihood of nuclear weapons use. d. Qualitative changes i.e. TNWs and strategic arsenals poses security dilemma for India. e. Pakistan aspires at triggering huge explosions by building thermonuclear bomb.12
On May 4, 2004, China signed a nuclear accord for the construction of Chashma-II. It was intrinsically designed to express confidence in Pakistan‟s nuclear program while accepting
9 Quoted in Rajaram Nagappa, Arun Vishwanathan and Aditi Malhotra, HATF-IX/ NASR- Pakistan‟s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Implications for Indo-Pak Deterrence (Bangalore: National Institute of Advance Studies Indian Institute of Science Campus, July 2013): 22. 10 Richard Weitz, “South Asia‟s Nuclear Arms Racing,” The Diplomat, (Octber 1, 2010), http://thediplomat.com/2011/10/south-asias-nuclear-arms-racing/ (accessed on February 4, 2014). 11 Moonis Ahmar, (Former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Karachi) Emailed interview, (September 18, 2018). 12Gregory S. Jones, “From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000): 10.
166
Dr. Qadeers‟ involvement in nuclear proliferation as an act of an individual. In January, 2006, it was reported that China and Pakistan are negotiating the sale of eight nuclear reactors. Chinese media confirmed that Pakistan wants to buy six nuclear reactors.13 Signing of nuclear accords expanded the civilian nuclear program and enabled Pakistan to overcome energy shortages. Contrarily in July, 2006, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) highlighted strategic shift in Pakistan‟s nuclear policy. The report of ISIS alleged14 that the expansion in Khushab (I-HEU fueled reactor), heavy water production would capacitate Pakistan to manufacture 200 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium per annum. Consequently Pakistan would accelerate pace of nuclear weapons production to reduce growing nuclear asymmetry vis- à-vis India. Pakistan endeavors to execute realists‟ philosophy of self-help to balance against India and hedge against uncertainty. ISIS ignored the fact that the rigorous struggle of the world to devise FMCT; Indian capacity to use domestically produced fissile material for nuclear weapons development and the perpetual blindness of the world towards Pakistan‟s security concerns explain the alleged accelerated pace of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons production. It advocates Pakistan‟s dissatisfaction with the present stocks of fissile material needed to bridge the gap vis-à-vis India. Essentially credible deterrence and war avoidance depends upon survivable nuclear forces. Pakistan aspires to mature second strike nuclear force structure to deter India from imposing war on Pakistan. It is claimed here that Pakistan‟s nuclear strategy is defensive, reactive to ensure self-preservation rather than arms racing. It does not endeavor to ensure escalation dominance.
In October, 2008, Sino-Pakistan nuclear accord was signed to build Chashma-III and IV nuclear reactors.15 In 2009, Khushab-II became operational and Chashma-III and IV designs were finalized. The world has associated risks with Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program. Further, concerns regarding vertical proliferation are expressed in literature available on country‟s WMDs program. In 2010, SIPRI 16 warned on Pakistan‟s heightened reliance on nuclear deterrence. The report also cautioned Pakistan can manufacture WMDs utilizing its
13Weitz, “South Asia‟s Nuclear Arms Racing.” 14David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Commercial Satellite Imagery Suggests Pakistan is Building a Second, Much Larger Plutonium Production Reactor: Is South Asia Headed for a Dramatic Buildup in Nuclear Arsenals?” ISIS, (July 24, 2006), http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/newkhushab.pdf (accessed on January 31, 2014): 1. 15“Nuclear Power in Pakistan,” World Nuclear Association, (November, 2014), http://www.world- nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Pakistan/, (accessed on December 31, 2014). 16SIPRI Year Book 2010: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security (Solana: SIPRI, 2010): 16.
167 fissile material stocks at short notice. Pakistan nuclear weapons program alone is alleged of weakening the NPT, proposed regional nuclear restraint regime, disarmament and arms control efforts. Further, Chashma power plants would pyramid Pakistan‟s resourcefulness to manufacture additional weapons grade fissile material and nuclear warheads. Nonetheless Sino- Pak nuclear accord is an answer to Indo-US Nuclear Deal. The agile engagement of the US and China in South Asia basically links regional developments with extra regional actors. It fuels and complicates India-Pakistan arms race and prevents the application of Article VI of the NPT globally. The report bears importance because Pakistan changed its stance on the NPT.
i. The NTI in April, 2012, claimed that Pakistan is producing 330 pounds of HEU per year; ii. it has produced 6060 pounds of HEU and; iii. 309 pounds of plutonium.17
Pakistan absolutely relies on nuclear deterrence to deter and deny escalation dominance to India. The NCA on record issued statement that “despite the government‟s continued opposition to a nuclear or conventional arms race in South Asia, Pakistan may need to increase its nuclear arsenal in response to Indian conventional and nuclear arms expansion.”18 Plutonium production determines the fact that Pakistan is changing course of nuclear program from Uranium to Plutonium and liquid to solid fuel propelled delivery vehicles. Islamabad prefers missiles as delivery vehicles over fighter jets.
The appraisals indicate that Pakistan‟s nuclear posture is sequentially transforming CMD posture. This study opines that execution of MAD by Islamabad is difficult task as it requires massive financial resources to perfect and overhaul nuclear forces. Inherited risks of inadvertent nuclear weapons use and scarce resources stop Pakistan from operationalizing MAD. In addition to that additional stock would require deployment of additional security personnel to guard nuclear complexes, installations and depots. In reality Pakistan as a responsible NWS voluntarily adheres to the NPT statutes including Article-I, III, IV and VI. Discarding CMD would only result in global condemnation, pressure, cause turmoil and isolate Pakistan globally. Pakistan while relying on CMD has repeatedly deterred India from waging war against the former.
17“Pakistan is Spending $2.5 B Annually on Nuclear Arsenal, Report Says,” NTI, (April 11, 2012), http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/new-report-offers-higher-estimate-pakistani-nuke-arsenal-spending/, (accessed on January 3, 2015). 18“Pakistan Command Meeting Voices Concern Over Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” Pakistan TV, (April 12, 2006).
168
Conversely Pakistan adheres to CMD strategy. However, CMD strategy is not static rather it is proportional to adversary‟s strategic forces. The CMD strategy warrants opacity and gradual increase in country‟s strategic forces. Flexible CMD posture is thus prerequisite to overcome strategic requirements and imbed fear of punishment in opponent‟s mind.
China views Indo-US nuclear cooperation as US policy to contain the former. In October, 2013, Pak-China nuclear accord was signed. The deal endows Pakistan to acquire two nuclear reactors from China.19 First a pressurized water nuclear reactor will be delivered to Pakistan in late 2019, followed by the second in 2020. Each will generate 1000 megawatt electricity outside Karachi. The accord is meant to counterweight Indo-US strategic cooperation. It also reflects Chinese concerns over growing US-India strategic collaboration and cooperation in the nuclear realm. The US aware of strategic significance of the deal criticized the deal on the basis that this treaty would weaken the NPT.20 The US brought China under pressure from NSG members to rollback Pak-China nuclear accords.21 Further, US would never sign a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan. Boucher‟s concerns regarding Dr. Khan‟s activities and rejection to address Pakistan‟s concerns regarding Indo-US nuclear deal initially22 supports the claim. Boucher named Dr. Khan as “Pakistan‟s rouge nuclear scientist” and demanded that the US should be provided access to question Dr. Khan. A year later, Boucher while responding to a question whether US would sign a nuclear deal with Pakistan similar to India said that, “…Pakistan should not expect similar arrangements to those the US had made with India.” On the issue of sharing civilian nuclear technology Boucher‟s replied “now in 10 years, 20 years or 50 years. No. I don‟t see anything like that on the cards for Pakistan.”23 Former US President George Bush categorical rejection of signing nuclear accord with Pakistan24 further provides strength to above claim. In fact, there is
19Saeed Shah, “China Agrees to Sell Pakistan Two More Nuclear Reactors,” The Wall Street Journal, (October 15, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304561004579137420511807840, (accessed on January 31, 2015). 20Ibid. 21Sharad Joshi, “The China-Pakistan Nuclear Deal: A Realpolitique Fait Accompli,” NTI, (December 11, 2011), http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/china-pakistan-nuclear-deal-realpolitique-fait-accompli-1/#, (accessed June 23, 2015). 22Quoted in Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan‟s Rocky Relationship with US,” BBC, (May 5, 2006). 23Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, “Roundtable with Indian and Pakistani Journalists,” U.S. Department of State Archive, (March 9, 2006), https://2001- 2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/62995.htm, (accessed August 12, 2017). 24Elisabeth Bumiller and Carlotta Gall, “Bush Says Pakistan Cannot Expect Nuclear Deal Like One With India,” The New York Times, (March 4, 2006); “Pakistani Atomic Trade Talks Off the Table, U.S. Says,” Global Security Newswire, (October 20, 2010).
169 more possibility that the US would create hurdles in Pakistan‟s way and try and prevent states from signing accords with Pakistan. Islamabad needs to convince the US and the world that Pakistan is a responsible NWS. Pakistan recognizes the strategic consequences of the nuclear proliferation. It therefore terminated Dr. Khan‟s network. Pakistan is IAEA member. 25 It voluntarily implemented Article I, II, III and IV of the NPT. Pakistan has always cooperated with the world in halting vertical and horizontal proliferation. Pakistan‟s claim is verifiable for instance; four of nuclear reactors earlier provided by China are under IAEA safeguards. Similarly, new reactors are also open to IAEA inspections safeguards. It thus prevents the diversion of civilian nuclear technology for military purposes. It should be included in prevalent international nuclear order.
6.3 Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Challenges to NPT
On July 18, 2005 the US President George W. Bush announced to carry nuclear trade with India after declaring it as a “responsible state.”26 The covenant enabled India to acquire nuclear fuel and technology. Prior to the signing the accord India ensured that nuclear suppliers in return of nuclear technology would not demand from India to rollback its WMDs program or halt nuclear operations.27 The US is violating Article-I of the NPT by enhancing Indian capacity to produce weapons grade fissile material and build additional nuclear reactors. Indo-US nuclear deal though stops India from conducting future nuclear tests nevertheless; it fractures the NPT both from within and outside the treaty. It encourages horizontal and vertical proliferation thus is a double edge sword.
India as non-signatory to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 28 may carryout thermonuclear tests in violation of Indo-US Nuclear Deal. Under the statute of the Deal, the US can terminate/ suspend the supply of nuclear fuel to Indian reactors. Indo-US growing strategic partnership advocates that the US would ignore Indian absurd nuclear behavior. The US Congress, Ved Parkash asserts, may undo the clause restricting India from carrying out nuclear
25“Pakistan, Islamic Republic of,” IAEA Office of Legal Affairs,https://ola.iaea.org/ola/FactSheets/CountryDetails.asp?country=PK, (accessed August 12, 2017). 26Oliver Meier, “The US-India Nuclear Deal: The End of Universal Non-Proliferation Efforts?” (2006), http://www.fes.de/ipg/inhalt_d/pdf/Meier_GB.pdf (accessed on February 15, 2014): 31. 27C. Raja Mohan, “India‟s Nuclear Exceptionalism,” in Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, ed. Morten Bremer Maerli and Sverre Lodgaard (New York: Routledge, 2007): 153. 28George Perkovich, Principles for Reforming the Nuclear Order (Paris: IFRI, 2008): 11.
170 tests.29 Indian non-compliance with the CTBT, violation of Indo-US nuclear deal and special treatment received from the US would raise apprehensions in NNWS resulting in first fading NNWS belief in the efficacy of the NPT; second NNWS would start reviewing the efficacy of their decision for adhering to the NPT; third, several NNWS may decide to withdraw from the NPT to record protest; fourth walk away states may decide to develop indigenous WMDs due to revitalized significance of strategic weapons. The derivative conclusion is that the Indo-US Nuclear Deal is weakening the NPT. Security dilemma, 30 deterrence by denial model and rational deterrence theory would stimulate thermonuclear tests by Pakistan. India is not only working on the procurement of plutonium and uranium it is also concentrating its efforts to gain tritium. Following paragraph is an attempt to take an overview of fissile material production facilities of India and Pakistan.
The US is taking substantial steps to make India as a major power. Analysts, such as, VR Raghavan, argue that the US assistance to raise India to the status of major power will capacitate it to play a responsible role.31 The potential proliferators would assume that nuclear proliferation inherits strategic and political benefits. Bush‟s decision thus undermined efforts focused on combating nuclear proliferation. For instance, South Africa and Ukraine expressed resentment in reaction to Indo-US nuclear accord.32 Further Indian rise as a major power would destabilize the BOP in the region. Southeast Asia would be destabilized due to Sino-India competition for controlling the energy rich area.33 The Sino-Indian enmity would foster weapons grade fissile material production. Indian reliance on nuclear weapons for its security vis-à-vis China would enhance. China would thus be posed with security dilemma. Chinese countermeasures would obstruct disarmament process and prevent the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. The Chinese countermeasures would provide India an excuse to increase precision strike rate of missiles. It would fracture Pakistan‟s sense of security. Further, Indian rise would revive Indira
29Ved Parkash, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” in Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal, eds., Rahul Bhonsle, Ved Parkash and K.R. Gupta (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2007): 80. 30S. Paul Kapur, “More Posture than Review: Indian Reactions to the US Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review, 18, No. 1, (March, 2011): 70. 31VR Raghavan, “India‟s Quest for Nuclear Legitimacy,” Asia-Pacific Review, 13, No. 1, (2006): 65. 32Mohan, “India‟s Nuclear Exceptionalism.” 33Walter Anderson, “Recent Trends in Indian Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey, 41, No. 5, (September/October, 2001): 768.
171 doctrine34 and policy of intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states similar to Indian intervention in East Pakistan, Maldives and Sri Lanka. Consequently, the Indian rise would endanger both the global peace and fate of the NPT.
6.4 India and the NSG
The US government amended domestic laws to cooperate with India in the nuclear sector.35 India specific NSG special wavier is yet another feature of the Indo-US nuclear deal.36 Under the authority of the agreement US demanded of India to first differentiate the civilian and military nuclear plants. It requires India to open civilian nuclear facilities for IAEA inspections. The US demanded the separation of nuclear facilities to limit weapon grade fissile material production by India. In return, India will acquire nuclear fuel and sophisticated nuclear technology from the US.37 The US assured India that the US and its allies will amend NSG regulations to carryout uninterrupted nuclear commerce with India. Washington is also gradually and systemically paving the way to legitimize Indian de-fact nuclear weapon status.38 Indian possible entry in the NPT as a NWS would open Pandora-box and resent NNWS signatories to the treaty.39
A massive nuclear program is being run in India it does not connote that entire uranium and plutonium would be used for military purposes. Indian domestic fissile material resources have already proved to be insufficient for the existing 20 atomic reactors. It is perhaps in this background an Indian official stated that “the truth is we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end of 2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear program.”40 It is because of the low quality of uranium and plutonium that India is prevented from weaponizing its missile forces. Nonetheless, NSG wavier opened the doors for India to get hand on advanced nuclear
34Christian Wagner, “Promotion of Democracy and Foreign Policy in India,” SWP Research Paper, (October, 2009): 9. 35Zahid Ali Khan, “Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal: The Gainer and the Loser,” South Asian Studies, 28, No. 1, (January-June, 2013): 242. 36Zia Mian et al., eds. “Fissile Material in South Asia: The Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, Research Report No. 1, (September, 2006): 5. 37Khan, “Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal,” 242. 38 Mansoor Ahmed, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 30, 2018). 39 Zafar Khan, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 24, 2018). 40Sanjeev Srivastava, “Indian PM Feels Political Heat,” BBC, (July 25, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4715797.stm (accessed on September 6, 2014).
172 reactors, to enrich Uranium and produce huge cache of weapons grade Plutonium.41 Hence, huge stocks of weapons grade fissile material enable India to increase the number of nuclear forces. It accredits India to surpass an accumulative stock of fissile material of Pakistan. NSG waiver endangers nuclear disarmament cause and undermines the non-proliferation objectives in South Asia. Other implications include; i) South Asian strategic stability which will be disturbed in Indian favor. Change in the prevailing status quo would heighten Pakistan‟s security dilemma. Naturally Pakistan‟s reliance on nuclear deterrence would increase. Rawalpindi will have to amalgamate nuclear forces in country‟s military and war fighting doctrine. ii) The NSG wavier has the potential to further complicate the old dream of the universality of the NPT. The NSG members while adopting new guidelines in 2011 declared that NSG states should “not authorize the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities and equipment and technology,” to non-NPT states42 thus defy its own guidelines. Pakistan has its own unresolved territorial issues with India. On the other hand, India has a desire to be recognized as a major power in international arena and considers the possession of nuclear weapons necessary for seeking the UNSC‟s permanent seat. To legitimize its possession of nuclear weapons program, India has declared China as a threat to the Indian security.
Pakistan foresees in addition raised voice to express concerns that India would divert civilian nuclear fabric for military purposes. Islamabad criticized Indo-US strategic cooperation.43 In April, 2006, an official from NCA asserted that the future agreement can tilt the strategic balance of South Asia in India‟s favor.44 Nevertheless, Pakistani concerns are genuine since in September, 2008, it was reported that Indian nuclear reactors are operating at forty percent capacity or below. 45 The Indo-US nuclear accord vanquished Indian fissile material shortages. In July, 2008, an India-Specific IAEA safeguards agreement was signed. India without
41 Zafar Khan, Interview. 42Reaching Critical Will 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Monitoring Report September 29, 2011 (Geneve: Women‟s International League for Peace and Freedom, 2011): 10. 43 Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (August 28, 2018). 44Kerr and Nikitin, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons, 6. 45Kranti Kumara and Deepal Jayasekera, “Nuclear Supplier Group Gives India Unique “Wavier.” But Only After Row between Delhi and Beijing,” International Committee of the Fourth International, (September 17, 2008), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/09/nucl-s17.html, (accessed on August 28, 2014).
173 adopting full-scope IAEA safeguards46 signed an Additional Protocol (AP) in return to IAEA assured continuous supply of nuclear fuel to India. India has so far promised to refrain from diverting peaceful nuclear technology for military purposes.
The Indo-US nuclear accord inherited Achilles heel includes the accord‟s failure to open Indian military nuclear facilities/complexes for IAEA inspections. The accord can neither restrict India from producing weapons grade fissile material nor can stop India from manufacturing nuclear weapons. The Indo-US accord cannot prohibit India from actualizing a strategy of nuclear armament.47 It is intransigent reality that India diverted peaceful nuclear technology to carryout Pokhran-I tests. It is surmised that India will redirect its nuclear fabric acquired under Indo-US accord for manufacturing nuclear bombs. NSG wavier and the Indo-US accord poses threat to the nonproliferation norms based on the NPT. Though, the US is a signatory to NPT, it still is providing a nuclear fabric to India in violation of Article I of the NPT. The Article I of the NPT binds NWS to abstain from providing assistance or encouraging any NNWS to achieve or develop WMDs. The NPT statutes regard India as a NNWS.48 Instead of persuading India to practice piecemeal steps for nuclear disarmament, the US is encouraging and shielding NNWS to be recognized as a de-jure NWS. The Indo-US nuclear cooperation is a promotion of horizontal proliferation and is in direct violation of the NPT. It violates Article I, III, IV and VI of the NPT by the US. Article VI requires the NWS to systemically dismantle the WMDs. The US instead of invoking the Article VI of the NPT bestowed substantial assistance to India to mature Indian nuclear complexes. The NNWS relinquished the development of the WMDs in a hope that NWS would gradually dismantle WMDs. The Indo-US accord would embed frustration amongst the NNWS. The NNWS may question the implementation of the Article VI and the efficacy of the NPT. The US increased the tilt towards India. In conclusion one may say that the US is setting a wrong example. The NNWS may draw a wrong inference that noncompliance of the NPT inherits political, economic and strategic benefits. The Indo-US strategic cooperation would encourage the NNWS signatories to the NPT to pursue a clandestine development of the WMDs. It would inspire the weak NNWS to discard the NPT and develop WMDs to deter external threats. The withdrawal of the NNWS would be a huge setback for the NPT.
46Rajiv Nayan, “The NPT and India: Accommodating the Exception,” Strategic Analysis, 34, No. 2, (March, 2010): 312. 47Meier, “The US-India Nuclear Deal,” 32. 48Nayan, “Is NPT Membership as a Nuclear Weapon State an Option for India?” 869.
174
6.5 Post 9/11 Era: Indian Fissile Material Production Facilities
India begun construction on first prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) in 2004 but refused to place it under IAEA safeguards.49 About 140 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium is annually extracted from PFBR which would be used for making 28 WMDs if five kilogram is used in each weapon. Further, India can manufacture 56 TNWs if 2.5 kilogram is used in each weapon. In 2006, it was disclosed that nearly one third of thorium resources are in India.50 In 2006, Arms Control Association also claimed that India can produce 300 tons uranium annually.51 The nuclear programs of India and Pakistan reveal that India enjoys ascendancy over Pakistan in plutonium and tritium production. Despite maintaining predominance vis-a-vis Pakistan, India is continuously procuring fissile material from domestic and foreign sources. The Indian shift from Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) to Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWRs) reaffirms the stance. India has enormous potential to produce weapon grade plutonium (WGP). India used fuel-grade Plutonium in developing and manufacturing nuclear device in the past.52 It set an example for threshold states to divert peaceful nuclear technology for military purposes thus challenges the NPT. A critical analysis of Indian nuclear program reveals that India has two different types of nuclear reactors for the production of WGP for example; i) PHWRs, based on uranium, are also known to be the first phase reactors. PHWRs are based on uranium. Furthermore, according to IAEA report, eighteen out of twenty operational and another four out of seven under construction reactors are PHWRs.53 ii) AHWR, second phase reactor, consumes thorium to produce plutonium.54 Indian shift from PHWRs to AHWR is a strategic step because Indian depleting uranium reserves are low quality. Thorium on the other hand, is available in bulk and it will cater for Indian energy needs and WGP for its nuclear inventory. India is one of the twelve countries in the
49Alexander Glaser and M. V. Ramana, “Weapon- Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor,” Science and Global Security, 15, No. 85, (2007): 86. 50Raghavan, “India‟s Quest for Nuclear Legitimacy,” 66. 51“Impact of the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal on India‟s Fissile Production Capacity for Weapons,” Arms Control Association, (November 15, 2006), http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2549, (accessed on September 6, 2014). 52 Mansoor Ahmed, Interview. 53Quoted in “Advance Heavy Water Reactor (AHWRs) BARC (India),” https://aris.iaea.org/sites/..%5CPDF%5CAHWR.pdf, (January 3, 2015). 54Ibid.
175
world that has Uranium enrichment facilities. Details regarding Indian development of new nuclear reactors are mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs.
It is ironical to see that in post 9/11 era, Western states, instead of declaring Indian nuclear military program as an illicit program, have imperceptibly accepted it.55 Hence, the NPT depository states themselves have entertained India to continue to challenge the NPT. They have intentionally or unintentionally challenged the NPT from within by violating Articles I, II, III, IV and VI of the NPT. The international community is also not taking effective counter measures to question Indian nuclear program while not taking the NPT seriously. It reflects West‟s double standards by declaring two parallel nuclear programs as acceptable and unacceptable proliferators.56 As a result, India has gained self sufficiency. It can recycle spent fuel, enrich uranium, and manage nuclear waste. It can produce heavy water, design and construct nuclear reactors. India in conjunction is also developing delivery vehicles for WMDs. Indian officials have conjointly rejected any possibility to halt the production of fissile material. In 2009, Nirupama Rao, an Indian permanent representative to the CD categorically asserted that the Indian authorities would not accept any obligations which would in any way either halts or gradually slowdown Indian nuclear activities in the realm of research or military field.57 The IAEA, the NSG and the MTCR turned a blind eye towards these developments because they are controlled by the major powers. Major Powers abnormally, comprehend a step-by-step procedure to first recognize the Indian WMDs program. It was endowed a special wavier to deal in the nuclear commerce. In second phase, Major Powers will dispose discussions regarding dismantling Indian nuclear weapons program. The question arises that why India needs a huge cache of fissile material if its nuclear doctrine is based on CMD? Can this question be answered in the prism of India‟s hegemonic design? Or is it because of Indian decades old aspirations to become a Major Power? Does India want to drag Pakistan in a nuclear arms race to overburden it? Indian rise would have disastrous consequences for the regional strategic stability.
Contemporary Indian nuclear policy reflects that Indian policymakers are obsessed with the Cold War era‟s strategic choices. Further, India is developing nuclear weapon to;
55 Feroz Hassan Khan, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 18, 2018). 56 Ibid. 57Walter Pincus, “U.N. Hopes to Ban New Fissionable Material, Space-Based Weapons,” The Washington Post, (June 2, 2009).
176 i) Enjoy escalation dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan in case of crisis. ii) In case of war, it would target and destroy Pakistani cities through massive retaliation. iii) The perpetual novelty and progression in India defence sector is linked with the security perceptions/relations of Pakistan and China. It therefore, cannot be viewed in isolation. It is taken as an attempt by the India to ensure escalation dominance. Pakistan will therefore respond by countermoves to increase its own nuclear capability in reaction. Indian pursuit is nourishing distinct nuclear arms race in South Asia while involving China. The most worrisome aspect of the Indian breakthrough includes an introduction of qualitative changes in Indian nuclear force structure and the development of nuclear asymmetry in Indian favor. Consequently, an edge of India over Pakistan will disturb the regional stability as India may resort to coercive measures in future crisis to exploit Pakistan‟s weaknesses. A series of blames may be unleashed by India, such as, Mumbai like attacks in future as well. Use of force by launching surgical strikes to allegedly destroy terrorists training camps or operationalise CSD could be yet another cause of destabilizing the peace posture between the two. This would eventually lower the nuclear threshold and can augment chances of deterrence breakdown and; iv) India is steadily moving away from defensive posture. It is sequentially replacing CMD posture with a more assertive war fighting military doctrine and offensive posture/ strategic deterrence. However, such scenario requires an operational nuclear city, with uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel and assured second strike forces to enable India in achieving goals.
In early 2012, India started developing a top-secret nuclear city in Challakere and Maysore to build South Asia‟s largest unsafeguarded military nuclear complex. Operational facility will be used as an aircraft testing facility enable India to enrich Uranium at fast pace than any existing version.58 Mysore complex, after the completion and with the help of 1050 new hyper efficient machines and 700 old centrifuges will produce approximately 200 kilograms of weapon grade Uranium.59 If 7.5 kilograms is used in a single nuclear bomb it is sufficient to develop roughly 26 warheads annually. Indian authorities can decide to manufacture forty nuclear warheads by using five kilograms in each nuclear warhead. India is believed to have
58Levy, “India is Building a Top Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons.” 59Ibid.
177 dedicated its energies towards the production of HEU to use it in uranium propelled nuclear submarines. India, according to IPFM report published on April 22, 2012, is one of the six nations using HEU in two of its submarines.60 Nuclear city will supply fuel to nuclear submarine fleet and produce weapons grade fissile material to make hydrogen bombs.
The positioning of nuclear submarines would require India to keep nuclear warheads assembled and pre mate them with delivery vehicles. Fully assembled deployed nuclear forces on submarines and the provision of launch code may result in a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear weapons use in crisis situations combined with C3 problems. India is deviating from its earlier NFU policy to use nuclear weapons if required. Innovations in nuclear armory indicate that along held notion that nuclear weapons are political weapons is obsolete hence, incrementally becoming a symbol of military strength and weapons of war. The gradual adoption of ready nuclear status or weaponised deterrence by India in contemporary South Asian strategic environment is not a plausible option. Indian national security cannot be viewed in isolation from Chinese and Pakistan‟s national security. Security measures taken by the former poses new form of challenge to the securities of the later hence cannot be ignored. The deployment of nuclear weapons on nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean to gain a second strike capability foster animosity and compels Pakistan to follow the suit. Indian doctrinal changes are dangerous hence breeds strategic instability proactively. Energies and resources diverted in this direction explain India wants to complete the third leg of assured nuclear deterrence. India has focused its energies in different realms to buy fissile material for peaceful purposes and procure weapon grade plutonium from the spent fuel. It is working on a strategy to build a chain of nuclear reactors. Bulk of fissile material stock will be available for developing nuclear warheads tipped on air and land based missile forces. Huge nuclear forces available to India would create a wrong sense in the minds of Indian military planners that it can carry out nuclear disarming strike against Pakistan.
Pakistan‟s cautious defence planners are cognizant of the advances Indian nuclear establishment authority made in collaboration with foreign assistance. It results in Indian favored nuclear asymmetry between India and Pakistan. The international assistance empowers India to
60“Facilities: Naval Reactors,” IPFM, (April 22, 2012), http://fissilematerials.org/facilities/naval_reactors.html, (accessed on January 3, 2015).
178 boost the production of the nuclear weapons and increase nuclear weapons stockpile. The nuclear asymmetry in Indian favor erodes Islamabad‟s sense of security. Indian nuclear developments pose existential threat to Pakistan‟s security. Preferential treatment of India is therefore viewed at the expense of Pakistan in Rawalpindi. Despite India-Pakistan emerging nuclear asymmetry, Pakistan respects the established nuclear non-proliferation norms and continue to behave as a responsible de-facto NWS. Various instances include Pakistan‟s active participation in the nuclear security summit (NSS). A global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism (GICNT) advocates nuclear missile restraint regime in South Asia. It cooperates with IAEA since agency‟s inception, adheres to agency‟s safeguards protocols, voluntarily pledge to abstain from testing nuclear devices and collaborating with the UN in implementing Resolution 1540. It established NCA soon after testing nuclear devices, amended domestic laws to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking, heavily guard nuclear facilities and to thwart terrorists‟ penetration in country‟s nuclear program and introduced personnel reliability program.
India is currently operating twenty two atomic reactors including Kudankulam-I nuclear power plant, situated in Tamil Nadu. Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS) located in Kalpakkam, in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Kalpakkam has two nuclear reactors MAPS I or Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) and II. Kakrapar atomic power station (KAPS) pressurized heavy water reactor I and II which is functioning in Gujarat. Tarapur I, II, III and IV, both are functioning in Maharashtra. Rajasthan I, II, III, IV, V and VI (PHWR) are functioning in Indian state of Rajasthan. KaigaI, II, III and IVare (PHWR) are functioning in Karnataka. Narora I and II (PHWR) constructed in Uttar Pardesh.61 Rattehalli is a uranium enrichment facility. It caters Indian military needs of weapon grade fissile material. India, as of October 4, 2012, has four more facilities to separate plutonium for its military. Military facilities identified by IPFM include Trombay, Tarapur-I, Tarapur-II and Kalpakkam,62 (MAPS I and II). The Indian missile development ratio and its ability to produce wide array of plutonium makes it world accelerated nuclear weapons program. Indian nuclear establishment has proposed or planned construction of another thirty five nuclear reactors across India in future. Russia will help India in order to build twenty nuclear reactors. France is constructing six reactors in
61“Nuclear Power in India,” World Nuclear Association, (December 16, 2014), http://www.world- nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/India/, (accessed on January 4, 2015). 62“Facilities: Plutonium Separation,” IPFM, (October 4, 2012), http://fissilematerials.org/facilities/plutonium_separation.html, (accessed on January 4, 2015).
179
Maharashtra and US is also planning to build eight reactors in India. 63 India, after the construction of these reactors, would get legal cover to procure and also gain the ability to produce huge stocks of fissile material necessary for nuclear bombs.
Currently India is working on the construction of five out of six large nuclear reactors including Kudankulam- II, in Tamil Nadu. Kalpakkam,fast breeder reactor, Kakrapar III and IV nuclear reactors, Rajasthan VII and VIII (PHWR) in Rajasthan. According to the estimates of International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) in January, 2013, India had an estimated stock of 0.8 tons of HEU, 5.2 tons of non-civilian plutonium and 0.24 tons of plutonium for civilian usages.64 In another report published, in 2013, by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimating nuclear arsenals claimed that Pakistan maintains 100-120 nuclear warheads and its competitor India holds 90- 110 nuclear warheads. 65 Neither India nor Pakistan has announced the actual numbers of their nuclear warheads. But it is evident that Pakistan wants to reduce Indian favored rising asymmetry in nuclear field. Pakistan wants to thwart India‟s adventurist designs. Keeping in mind the current pace of the production of fissile material and additional developing facilities, experts on Pakistani nuclear weapons program alleges that Pakistan fissile rate production is at the top in the world. 66 Most of the reports regarding Pakistan‟s nuclear program have raised concerns but these reports have neglected two important issues including Pakistan‟s threat perceptions and substantial security threats posed to its national security. Unfortunately, Indian nuclear and military modernization program have also been neglected, which provide justification to Pakistan‟s nuclear program. In June 2014, Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) started functioning at Kalpakkam, near Madras. India has now the facility to reprocess the Uranium and develop “plutonium- rich mixed carbide fuel.” India is also developing a Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility to recycle the fuel from PFBR.67 Indian PFBR would enable India to convert thorium-in India which can be used for 600 years- into Uranium.68 India has already refused to include its fast breeder in the civilian list. Indian
63Soutik Biswas, “Will the India-US Nuclear Deal Work?”BBC News, January 26, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-30978152, (accessed April 11, 2015). 64“Fissile Material Stock,” IPFM, (31 July, 2013), http://fissilematerials.org/, (accessed on January 3, 2015). 65Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945- 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69, No. 5, (2013): 80. 66Weitz, “South Asia‟s Nuclear Arms Racing.” 67C Shivakumar, “500 MW Kalpakkam Reactor to Reach Criticality,” The New Indian Express, (June 28, 2014). 68“First Fast Breeder Reactor Almost Ready,” The Hindu, (July 26, 2013).
180 nuclear establishment authority is believed to use the acquired plutonium in future nuclear warheads. India is also working on a plan to construct six additional fast breeder reactors.
6.6 Indo-France Nuclear Deal: 2009
In September, 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited France. During his visit Singh also signed an Indo-French civil nuclear cooperation deal.69 In the aftermaths of this nuclear cooperation deal, which was primitively condoned as an essential teamwork in nuclear research and energy sectors, France agreed to develop six nuclear reactors in Jaitapur, Maharashtra. In February, 2009, the governments of India and France decided to sign a memorandum on civil nuclear cooperation.70 France thus became the first country after Indo-US nuclear deal to built nuclear reactors in India. However, the final agreement involving Indo- France nuclear cooperation was signed in 2010 and paved the way for the construction of six nuclear reactors. Under the agreement France acknowledged to transfer nuclear technology to capacitate India to manufacture large parts of reactors. It is a huge achievement for India and brings an end to its reliance on foreign sources. France as signatory to the NPT is fostering horizontal proliferation. It is simultaneously violating Articles I, III, IV and VI of the NPT. France is contravening NSG “non-proliferation principle.”71 NSG member state cannot transfer nuclear material and technology to the non-NPT signatories. Further, the NSG signatory is bound to commence nuclear commerce to the recipient signatory to the NPT when it is satisfied that the recipient will not use it for the proliferation of WMDs. Principle in general applies to the non NPT member states and areas that are not NWFZs. India is neither the NPT member state nor situated in NWFZ. India is using domestically produced fissile material for WMDs production and nuclear submarines. Indian involvement in the vertical proliferation is not possible without foreign supplies.
From perspective of the theory of institutionalism, bilateral cooperation between India and French government is a healthy sign. However, this cooperation escalated fears in the minds of Pakistani strategic circles. On December 7, 2010, Pakistan‟s security concerns echoed in a
69“France-India Nuclear Cooperation Deal,” World Nuclear News, (September 30, 2015), http://www.world-nuclear- news.org/IT_NP_No_nuclear_deal_from_Singhs_Paris_trip_3009081.html, (accessed April 14, 2015). 70Meena Menon, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal Can Apply to other Countries,” The Hindu,(February 6, 2015). 71“Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),” NTI, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-suppliers-group- nsg/, (accessed March 11, 2016).
181 statement issued by foreign office‟s spokesman Abdul Basit. 72 Abdul Basit contrived two significant points; first the exclusive wavier to India was called as discriminatory to Pakistan and a “step backward,” a blow to discipline focused to bottle up nuclear proliferation. Secondly, nuclear deal would enable India to produce weapon grade fissile material in bulk and thus disturb the strategic balance prevailing between India and Pakistan. Abdul Basit‟s statement is a clear manifestation of the fact that signing of the NPT as NNWS is out of question for Islamabad. Moreover, Pakistan is indubitably in disagreement with the Western scheme of conceding special status to India. This unparalleled policy would exclusively elicit in depriving the NPT from becoming a universal treaty. It additionally highlights the inevitable threatening trends of vertical proliferation, qualitative and quantitative changes and possible accidental nuclear war due to intensified nuclear arms race.
6.7 Indo-Australian Nuclear Deal: 2014
In 2007, Australian Prime Minister John Howard, prescribed to sign a uranium accord with India nevertheless it was put to the backburner by Kevin Rudd, after securing his victory in the elections. 73 In 2011, new Australian prime minster Julia Gillard paved the way for the agreement. On September 5, 2014, Tony Abbott, Australian prime minister‟s visit to India signed a nuclear deal with India.74 Initially, Australia refused to sign nuclear accord with India for the reason that it is not a signatory to the NPT. One of the problems associated with this deal is safeguards issue. This inherited problem was also highlighted by John Carlson, former Chief of Australian nuclear safeguards organization.75 Under this deal Australia has agreed to provide a long-term uranium supplies to India. The agreement was signed under the cover of civilian nuclear energy cooperation. Yet Australia according to the statutes of the agreement cannot question India regarding the use of the reprocessed Uranium. Furthermore, India is not bound to return the procured uranium incase the agreement is broken or violated or if the agreement does
72Kamran Yousaf, “France-India Nuclear Deal: Pakistan Sees Serious Strategic Implications,” The Express Tribune, (December 7, 2010). 73Jenna Gibbons, “Uranium Trade Off: What Are Australia‟s Obligations,” Right Now, (September 2, 2012), http://rightnow.org.au/writing-cat/feature/uranium-trade-off-what-are-australias-obligations/, (accessed on January 25, 2015). 74Mark Hibbs, “India‟s Bilateral Obligations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (February 7, 2015), http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/07/india-s-bilateral-obligations/i201, (accessed on March 21, 2015). 75 “Regulatory Issues- Australia,”Wise Uranium Project, (December 8, 2014), http://www.wise- uranium.org/uregaus.html, (accessed on January 25, 2015).
182 not remain standing due to any reason. India would juridically buy uranium while its usages cannot be traced nor it would be provide details about reprocessed uranium.
It is a well known fact that Indian government has not placed all of its nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, India enjoys leverages under the Article VI of the agreement76 which empowers India to use Australian uranium and reprocessed plutonium for multi purposes. India enjoys the prerogative to use reprocessed uranium for military purposes for example, to mount the Indian nuclear ballistic missiles, develop TNWs and fuel nuclear submarines. Australia capacitated India a non-NPT member state to double the size of its nuclear forces and simultaneously indulge in qualitative and quantitative vertical proliferation. India as mentioned above has not signed the CTBT. It has not yet tested a hydrogen bomb. This deal provides it an impetus to test a hydrogen device in future. Australian supplies of uranium to India will also be in violation of the Protocol II, of the Rarotonga treaty. Former state wants to free South Pacific from use or threat of use of nuclear weapons but on the other hand it is providing abundant resources of uranium with provision of free hand to utilize both the enrich uranium and reprocessed plutonium in the nuclear bombs. Australia is thus fueling the ongoing nuclear arms race in South Asia.
India is acquiring uranium, as per rhetoric for peaceful purposes. However, there is every possibility that India will divert not only domestic but foreign supplied uranium also for military purposes to acquire escalation dominance against Pakistan. This observation got reaffirmed when Jaideep A Prabhu claimed that India refused to provide details of the usage of uranium stock it acquired from Australia.77 India also rebuffed the claims that in case of the violation of the treaty it will return the nuclear material on the basis that India opposed this clause during negotiations. Furthermore, India will return the nuclear material but it will first arrange its substitute from another source. The report also increases the worries in the minds of the Pakistan‟s strategic community. It accelerates Pakistan‟s feelings of insecurity and security dilemma. Pakistan is thus compelled to make countermeasures, a natural response as per realist‟s teachings, to restore the strategic balance in the region. Pakistan would obviously opt for uranium enrichment, reprocess
76Michael Safi, “Australia‟s Uranium Deal With India Risks Weakening Safeguards,” The Guardian, (October 3, 2014). 77Jaideep A Prabhu, “India‟s Nuclear Deal with Australia Running into Turbulence Over Fuel Safeguards,” First Report, (March 31, 2015), http://www.firstpost.com/world/indias-nuclear-deal-australia-running-turbulence-fuel- safeguards-2180599.html#, (accessed June 25, 2015).
183 it to acquire plutonium. It would utilize its energies to increase the size of its nuclear forces and enhance the credibility of its nuclear deterrence.
Conclusively Indian nuclear establishment authority‟s decision of the nuclear weapons modernization program is creating a security dilemma for China as well. The Chinese countermeasures in return create a security dilemma and require countermeasures from rival India, US and Russian policymakers. This vicious cycle is thus weakening Article VI of the NPT, which requires NWS to pursue negotiations for the disarmament. Australia is a NPT signatory. It is in violation of Article III.2, IV and VI of the NPT and weakens the core of the treaty. The agreement is thus a dual blow (to the NPT and NSG).
Conclusion
States cannot neglect threats posed to their national security they are responsible for safeguarding their own borders. Effective defence policies therefore require states to maximize their power to pursue the goal of self sufficiency. US acknowledge that rising China is a threat to its global hegemony. The US therefore wants to constitute complications to obstruct, slow down the pace of Chinese modernization and latter‟s rise to major power status. US wish to use India as a counterweight against China. US for this reason providing military hardware, transferring modern technology, economically and supporting India in its bid to get the NSG membership and join the NPT as a NWS.78 US is trying to create barriers to delay China‟s rise at the cost of the NPT.
Pakistan believes that Indian membership of the NSG would permanently block the doors of the club for it. The decisions in NSG are consensus based India after becoming member of the NSG would oppose Pakistan‟s membership. Pakistani government expressed its resentment,79 through Sartaj Aziz advisor to prime minister on national security and foreign policy, over President Obama‟s announcement. Sartaj Aziz called it a policy of selectivity and favoritism. US policy of favoritism has several flaws it seems that US has hatched this policy to address future national security issues- rise of China. It would further intensify nuclear arms race between India
78 Tughral Yamin, Telephone interview, (September 15, 2018). 79“Indo-US Nuclear Deal to Impact Deterrence Stability in South Asia: Pakistan,” The Economy Times, (January 27, 2015), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-01-27/news/58508451_1_nsg-membership-unsc-pakistan- prime-minister, (accessed March 31, 2015).
184 and Pakistan on one hand and India-China on the other hand. Indian membership, backed and supported by US, would further accelerate the prevailing asymmetry between India-Pakistan. US policy has thus implications for South Asian strategic stability it pushes Pakistan against the wall and further intensifies its opposition to joining the NPT as NNWS. Since, US is not addressing Pakistan‟s security concerns it perturbs latter‟s policymaking circles and ensures their long held belief that only nuclear weapons certify Pakistan‟s security.
South Asian strategic landscape and hostile environment is best explained by the realist school paradigm. It asserts that in the presence of noteworthy differences between the states, possibility of the outbreak of war remains high. India and Pakistan because of their unresolved problems will not abandon their nuclear weapons program. Evaluation of available information on the nuclear weapon programs of India and Pakistan determines that the production of the fissile material by India and Pakistan confronts the NPT norms. India-Pakistan‟s nuclear posture result in regionally more bloodthirsty strategic rivalry obstructs implementation of the NPT and weakens disarmament efforts.
The growing stocks of the fissile material result in the vertical proliferation and pose security dilemma to the opponent. India and Pakistan is thus discarding CMD and rejects the arms control measures. Absence of institutional mechanism to eradicate the contentious issues of India and Pakistan accelerates nuclear arms race and enhances the possibility of inadvertent or deliberate nuclear warfare. India aims at developing assured second strike nuclear forces and efforts to ensure Indian dominance in conventional and nuclear realms further deteriorate the regional strategic stability. Pakistan‟s countermeasures, development of the TNWs, solid fuel propelled missiles inventories and their extended range aims at denying escalation dominance to India and obstructs the implementation of the NPT. In addition, conventionally weak Pakistan is forced to rely upon FUP to deter the Indian aggression. However, the US opposition to Pakistan‟s WMDs program is a matter of grave concern because the US; i. Refused to sign a nuclear agreement with Pakistan; ii. Used pressure on other states from signing nuclear accord with Pakistan; iii. The US-India strategic collaboration increases the conventional and nuclear asymmetry in the Indian favor; iv. The US wants Pakistan to rollback its nuclear weapons program and;
185 v. The Indo-US collaboration fuels the ongoing India-Pakistan rivalry. The US provision of nuclear fabric to India is violating Article I, III, IV and VI of the NPT.
Pakistan‟s WMDs program could not get US‟s recognition because Dr. A. Q. Khan confessed involvement in illicit nuclear commerce and urged the nation to forgive him.80 US inferred Pakistan‟s involvement in nuclear weapons proliferation and related technology may result in nuclear terrorism.81 Al Qaeda‟s aspirations to acquire WMDs, its presence in South Asia and terrorists attacks against Pakistan military assets ring alarms in US about safety and security of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons.
Surprisingly, Pakistan is criticized for future stockpiles of WMDs while West ignores Indian actual bomb making capacity and fissile material production. The Indo-US signing of Defence Framework Agreement82 raises asymmetry in Indian favor. The accord binds both states to jointly conduct military exercises, operations, collaborate in the field of missile development, enables India to purchase arms and co-produce weapons. Logistic Support Agreement and maritime security cooperation further increases the strategic cooperation between Indo-US navies. 83 The creators and self proclaimed guardians of the NPT complicates the Indo-Pak ongoing rivalry as Access to fissile material enables India to introduce changes in the nuclear posture, military planning and war fighting doctrine. West ignores that nuclear agreements enabled India to drag nuclear arms race into the Indian Ocean, produce new generation of WMDs and India poses existential threat to Pakistan. India developed SRBMs, ICBM, SLBMs, BMD System with West‟s support. Pariah nuclear behavior of the West thus endangers the future of the NPT, fuels nuclear arms race, crisis instability and increases the possibility of deterrence breakdown in South Asia for the sake of monetary benefits.
80Rajesh Kumar Mishra, “Dynamics of China‟s Supply of Nuclear Reactors to Pakistan,” IDSA, (November 23, 2006), http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/DynamicsofChinasSupplyofNuclearReactorstoPakistan_RKMishra_2311 06.html, (accessed on January 31, 2015). 81George Perkovich, “The Non-Unitary Model and Deterrence Stability in South Asia,” STIMSON, (November 13, 2012): 3. 82 Sunil Kumar Jangir, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal and 123 Agreements,” International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 2, Issue. 10, (October, 2010): 2. 83Ibdi.
186
Chapter Seven Rising Asymmetry in South Asia and the Emerging Challenge to the NPT
7.1 Introduction The qualitative improvements introduced by the South Asian nuclear rivals include the Indian Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDs) and Pakistan‟s battlefield missiles, Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MARVs) and cruise missiles. Qualitative changes increased the regional strategic temperature. 1 India aspires to be recognized as rising major power in evolving multi polar world and gain prestige in global community. India receives preferential treatment from US i.e. designated as It is designated as a major defense partner. Indo-US strategic accords Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-I), Communications, Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) tilt conventional asymmetry in Indian favor. It will enable New Delhi to import high tech products from US. Second, it wants to acquire sophisticated military hardware including Predator-B, MQ-9 Reaper Drones/ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for precision attacks, to start production of F.16 fighter jets, naval multi role rotorcraft, stealth submarines, Future Infantry Combat Vehicle, the Future Ready Combat Vehicles, Light Utility Helicopters, Light Combat Helicopters and also acquire robust missile and radar systems.2 Third, carryout joint military, naval exercise with US, expand and strengthen its conventional military. Fourth, it wants to play bigger role in the region including Afghanistan, Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific Ocean.3
New Delhi is also expanding the size of its nuclear forces to project its military strength and ensure escalation dominance in the region. However, the efficacy of nuclear deterrence theory raises the strategic significance of nuclear weapons for the non nuclear weapons states (NNWS). The uninterrupted nuclear and missiles arms race prevent India and Pakistan from signing the NPT as NNWS.4 It thus prevents the treaty from acquiring universal recognition. Attempt is made in this section to probe the following questions;
1 Zafar Khan, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 24, 2018). 2Ibid. 3 Rashid Ahmad Khan, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 5, 2018). 4 Muhammad Munir, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September, 24 2018).
187
Why there is unending crisis situation in South Asia? How rising asymmetry in South Asia challenges the NPT?
This segment endeavors to discuss India-Pakistan antagonist relations in post nuclearised South Asia. It explains the role of nuclear deterrence in thwarting deterrence breakdown in crisis. The study assesses 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military stand-off that provided justification to India to introduce the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The origins of the CSD have been traced to Clausewitz‟s indirect approach. It aims to overstretch, engage the enemy forces at unnecessary places, create ambiguity, demoralize enemy, carryout surprise attack and exploit vulnerabilities. General V.P. Malik merely named Clausewitz‟s indirect approach as the CSD. Gurmeet Kanwal idea to operationalize the CSD, capture narrow strip inside Pakistan and declare ceasefire was originally evolved by Hermman Kahn, in 1960. Rawalpindi based military top brass understands it. It has therefore rightly applied Kenneth N. Waltz notion to counterbalance Indian offensive military posture.
7.2 2001-2002 India-Pakistan Military Stand Off
India alleged Pakistan for December 13, 2001,5 terrorists attack on the Indian Parliament and launched Operation Parakaram.6 India burnt its bridges and directly challenged Pakistan to trial it‟s will and resolve. Non-use of nuclear forces during Kargil war encouraged India to chalk- out plan for fighting a limited war7 against Pakistan below nuclear threshold. New Delhi aspired to exhibit the prerequisites of credible deterrence including capability, credibility and resolve. However, the idea of limited war originally evolved during the Cold War era. It encompasses differing politico-military conduct lower than conventional war. A limited endeavor, Lauren B. Thompson asserts, requires neither nationwide deployments nor extensive commitment.8 Limited war below nuclear threshold is considerable. Idea of limited war, concept of stability-instability
5Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, eds., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb (Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 163. 6 “The Dogs of War,” Tribune India, (May 25, 2002). 7Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army‟s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security, 32, No. 3, (Winter, 2007): 158. 8Asif Haroon Raja, “Genesis of Limited War and Emerging Threat,” 5, http://asiantribune.com/sites/asiantribune.com/files/asian_tribune_epaper_page5.pdf, (accessed on December 22, 2013).
188 paradox and the Indian Nuclear Doctrine all are strategic concepts that India basically borrowed from strategic thought nurtured during the Cold War era.
Immediate threat of war, enemy‟s aggressive designs, existential threat and quest for self- help intensified Pakistan‟s threat perceptions. It fortified Pakistan‟s belief in realist teachings. Nuclear weapons integrated in military and war fighting doctrine guarantees security. The crisis escalated as Pakistan in response to Indian coercive bargaining strategy tried to checkmate India by conveying categorical messages to intentionally use nuclear bomb if New Delhi endangers Islamabad‟s existence. Pakistan‟s reliance on nuclear deterrent is on purpose. Bilateral exchange of intimidating statements to induce caution and convince opponent that commitment to use force is genuine intensified crisis. It was, Kahn‟s, “sub-crisis maneuvering,”9 initiation of the lower bottom of the “escalation ladder.”
Pakistan‟s reliance on nuclear deterrent was the byproduct of attempt to extricate armed forces, boost their morale, and address public concerns. It was meant to guarantee masses idea of war avoidance by replacing traditional notion of war fighting. Nevertheless, the entry of nuclear armory escalated the crisis ladder so that nuclear signaling replaces the conventional military strategy. As a result, risk of nuclear war replaced the danger of conventional warfare. It was the beginning of the “brinksmanship crisis.” Pakistan‟s blatant threats to deliberately use nuclear weapons indented to escalate crisis; enhance the credibility of nuclear deterrent. It was an application of offensive defense posture because conventionally weak NWS relies on first use policy. It is a natural tendency for realists as endangered state tends to balance against potential threat keeping in view of border proximity, hostile intentions and offensive capabilities of the adversary.10 On December 25, 2001, India responded to Pakistan‟s deployment of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) with the deployment of missiles and nuclear capable aircrafts.11 The deployments served the purpose to convince the adversary that opponent possess sufficient nuclear forces, delivery vehicles and willingness to deliver them in enemy‟s heartland. However, there is no substantial proof whether deployed missiles were tipped with nuclear warheads or
9Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Originally Published by Transaction Publishers, 1965, Republished by Transcition Publishers, New Brunswick, 2010): 52. 10Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987): 21-26. 11Rahul Bedi, “India Sends Missile to Pakistani Frontier,” The Telegraph, (December 27, 2001).
189 not. On January 2, 2002, In order to increase credibility of Indian nuclear deterrent Indian Army Chief General Padmanabhan reemphasized that India would resort to massive retaliation if it comes under nuclear attack. 12 New Delhi and Islamabad issued irrevocable statements to communicate resolve, transmit threats, determine the credibility of threats and coerce the opponent to back down. Pakistan‟s lone aim during the crisis remained to deter war.
The breaking up of the diplomatic relations, firing exchange, reports that unmanned aerial vehicle was shot down, missile tests, suspension of military trainings, cancelation of leaves of armed forces personnel and threats of use of nuclear weapons were conveyed to harass and gain concessions or compel opponent to back-down. Border proximity, short flight time for missiles, lack of early warning systems and immature C2 system in Pakistan while C2 system was completely missing in India increased the chances of inadvertent and deliberate nuclear war. Military tactics, coercive diplomacy and escalation rules for example Kahn‟s “traditional and intense crises,”13 were jumbled up to achieve national interest without going to war. The crisis manifest that the leaders of India and Pakistan have put millions of lives at risk, proved immaturity and lacked the ability to handle military crisis. A single wrong move could have resulted in nuclear holocaust.
The crisis and Pakistan‟s “catalytic deterrent posture,” attracted the attention of the US, President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald H, Rumsfeld. British Prime Minister Tony Blair arrived in South Asia on six days visit.14Crisis attracted Russian, President Vladimir V. Putin, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev and European Union‟s15 attention. This global involvement in the defuse situation changed the course of crisis. Due to this involvement India also surrendered the initial objective to impose limited war and punish Pakistan. Since Pakistan‟s allies could not prevent creation of Bangladesh
12Rahul Bedi, “India Gives Musharraf Nuclear War Warning,” The Telegraph, (January 2, 2002). 13Kahn, On Escalation, 62, 83. 14Andrew Sparrow and Rahul Bedi, “Blair‟s Visit Fails to Calm Indian Rage at Pakistan,” The Telegraph, (January 7, 2002). 15Gaurav Kampani, “India‟s Compellance Strategy: Calling Pakistan‟s Nuclear Bluff Over Kashmir,” MIIS, (June 10, 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020610.htm#, (accessed June 26, 2015); Michael Wines, “India Rejects Putin‟s Effort on Kashmir,” New York Times, (June 5, 2002); Gerry J. Gilmore, “Rumsfeld Discusses India-Pakistan Situation, Pending Visit,” U.S. Department of Defense, (June 4, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43787, (accessed June 27, 2015).
190 in the past so foreign involvement could neither ease pressure nor reduce Pakistan‟s threat perceptions. India could only be deterred by relying on nuclear weapons and by issuing irrevocable statements of first-strike. On March 23, 2002, General Musharraf warned that India would be taught an unforgettable lesson if war will be imposed on Pakistan.16 On April 6, 2002, Musharraf warned to use WMDs against India if Pakistan‟s survival is endangered.17 Threat of the use of nuclear weapons deterred India from crossing Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold.
Indian aggression could have provided justification for first-strike, benefits of time and target selection to Pakistan. Fear of mutual annihilation raised significant questions as to how India and Pakistan would use WMDs if deterrence fails. Fear of mutual annihilation stopped India from crossing Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold thus crisis stability prevailed. Nevertheless, fear of war hovered over South Asia. In May, 2002, insurgents attack against Indian occupying forces in IHK was used as a pretext by the Indian Premier to launch limited war against Pakistan.18 On May 22, 2002, the then Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief General Javaid Ashraf Qazi warned that if Pakistan‟s existence is ever endangered “then what is this damned nuclear option for,”19 Islamabad will use nuclear weapons. General Musharraf reiterated ferocious Pakistani response.20 Islamabad ignorance towards inherited flaws of nuclear deterrence during crises for self-preservation is crude deterrence.21 Deterrence theory demands the vertical proliferation as the rejection of nuclear disarmament and signing of the NPT as NNWS. Imperfect Indian Nuclear Doctrine based on massive retaliation leaves no room for graduated response so damage limitation requires Pakistan to rely on massive first-strike strategy targeted against counterforce and counter-value targets inside India. Flawed Indian Nuclear Doctrine hence increases crisis instability.
16Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control,” STIMSON, (April 27, 2004), http://www.stimson.org/essays/nuclear-doctrine-declaratory-policy-and-escalation-control/#, (accessed June 26, 2015). 17“Musharraf Aims to Reassure on Nuclear Danger,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 64, (May-June, 2002). 18Kampani, “India‟s Compellance Strategy.” 19Chaudhury, “Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control.” 20Kampani, “India‟s Compellance Strategy.”. 21Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament (New York: Interlink Publishing Group, 2000): 164.
191
Nuclear signals though constituted fright of the outbreak of unwinnable nuclear war however, irrevocable statements protracted breathtaking standoff as both antagonists wanted face saving and termination of the situation by declaring it victory. Rational deterrence theory believes that states are rational actors and make rational decisions. The acceptance of India and Pakistan to allow the involvement of the US was a rational decision considering the threat of nuclear war was thwarted, crisis was amicably defused, forces were withdrawn from the border and both claimed victory. Operational requirements of stable nuclear deterrence from rational deterrence theory perspective include22first the absence of preventive war during transitional phase. Second, the NWS must possess second strike nuclear forces.
The NWS must not be caught with the problem of the threat of use of nuclear weapons unintentionally or unofficially. Nuclear deterrent successfully worked in case of India and Pakistan because both fulfilled the requirements of the above nuclear deterrence theory. The presence of nuclear weapons helped India and Pakistan to meet the first requirement, stabilized the region and to avoid general and limited war. India was deterred from carrying out conventional attack because of the fear of punishment. The potential cost of the Indian attack on Pakistan thus, outweighed potential benefits, due to the threat of the use of nuclear weapons leading to full scale nuclear war. Both states thus fulfilled the second requirement of stable nuclear deterrent.
7.3 The Development of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)
Operation Parakaram failed to achieve its objectives due to the delayed mobilization of entire Indian army in pursuit of limited objectives.23 Other reasons include Pakistan‟s speedy counter mobilization to deter Indian adventurism and the involvement of foreign community to defuse the situation. The US required Pakistan‟s assistance because of its front state role on war on terror (WoT) in Afghanistan. The US consequently pressurized India-Pakistan to de- escalate.24 General V.P. Malik revealed arisky and offensive strategy of limited war known as
22Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2013): 45. 23Iram Khalid, “Nuclear Security Dilemma of Pakistan,” Journal of Political Studies, 20, Issue, 1, (2013): 158. 24Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 161.
192 the CSD in April, 2004, to overcome the chance of losing the advantage of first-strike, the consumption of enormous economic resources, long time span and requirement of mass manpower from deployment and withdrawal of the military. Indian CSD, according to pessimistic view, inherited the possibility of full scale war,25 possibility of deterrence failure and the use of nuclear weapons.
The CSD is designed to punish Pakistan through swift penetration of Indian forces inside Pakistan. The basic feature of this doctrine is the speedy mobilization, within 72-96 hours,26 of the Indian forces once deployment orders are received. Its force structure is composed of three strike corps, divided into eight division sizes, “Integrated Battle Groups,” (IBGs) equipped with artillery, armor, infantry27 and supported by air force stationed near Pak-India border28. They are predestined to capacitate them to bring to successful conclusion their objectives. Additional features will be composed of robust C2, Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Electronic Warfare (EW) employed by aerial and land forces. Malik borrowed CSD from Clausewitz‟s teachings for instance, Clausewitz asserted that “select … one point of the enemy‟s position and attack it… leaving the rest of his army in uncertainty but keeping it occupied.”29 Clausewitz‟s strategy was based on (three) offensive and (two) defensive or reserve corps,30 the defensive corps played two-fold role essentially to defend the motherland and if indispensable initiate an offensive operation in coordination or independently against the enemy. Clausewitz advocated greater autonomy for corps commander, physical disruption and wearing down enemy‟s morale through attacks on areas where he is less prepared. The CSD is designed on similar lines it also focuses on adopting Indian military formation in a way to overstretch Pakistani forces by deploying Indian forces at unnecessary points. Secondly, it aims at launching surprise strikes to wear down morale of Pakistani forces.
25 Khalid, “Nuclear Security Dilemma of Pakistan,” 14. 26 Omar Qasim, “Too Cold to Start,” Spearhead Research,(December 27, 2010), idsa.in/system/files/jds_4_4_aahmed.pdf, (accessed on December 21, 2013). 27 Shashank Joshi, “India‟s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 36, No. 4, (2013): 516. 28 Ali Ahmed, “Cold Start and the Sehjra Option,” Journal of Defence Studies, 4, No. 4, (October, 2010): 23. 29Carl Von Clausewitz, Principles of War, trans. Hans W. Gatzke (Harrisburg: Military Service Pub. Co., 1942): 9. 30Ibid.
193
The CSD is thus claimed only here that a replica of Clausewitz‟s military strategy, with few modifications due to advances in military technology. It endows Indian armed forces to quickly mobilize and enjoy advantages of surprise and first strike/ decapitating attack against Pakistan to wear down its morale. This approach is based on Clausewitz‟s strategy of indirect approach. IBGs commanders, similar to Clausewitz‟s corps commanders have the prerogative to freely maneuver and formulate autonomous decisions. The CSD aims at penetrating and occupying 30 KMs to 80 KMs of Pakistani territories to ensure that Pakistan can be forced to fulfill Indian demands during coercive bargaining. The CSD also aims at destroying Pakistan‟s C2 network and defence lines. Indian objectives erode Pakistan‟s sense of security hence, engage Pakistan‟s security hawks to search for appropriate countermeasures to maintain the BOP. Kenneth N. Waltz‟s assertion is applicable to Pakistan‟s countermeasures. Waltz asserts, “in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only of survival is assured can state seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and power.” 31 Security is defined as devoid of foreign antagonistic involvement in a country‟s domestic affairs and sovereignty to set up overseas contacts. The qualitative technological advances in the conventional and nuclear realms echo the Indian sophisticated war plans. They are a manifestation of New Delhi‟s Pakistan centric hostile policy. Pakistan rightfully views Indian war planning as an existential threat. Policymakers in Rawalpindi believe only nuclear weapons can ensure Pakistan‟s sovereignty, determine outcome of the crises and can enable Pakistan vis-à-vis India to live with dignity. India equates Pakistan‟s countermeasures as a challenge to Indian regional hegemony. The moves and countermoves of the South Asian rivals thus ripe conditions for permanent rivalry and results into dangerous arms race. Furthermore, assured survival in such an environment cannot be achieved.
Indian military ushered thirteen exercises, from 2004 to 2011 in Indian Punjab and Rajasthan to test efficacy of latest military hardware, armed services coordination32 and CSD. Intra services coordination an important feature was also tested by bringing three strike corps including 1 Corps Mathura, 2 Corps Ambala and 21 Corps Bhopal under single command.33 In
31Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979): 126. 32 “Indian Army War Game to Strategies Battle Concepts,” http://www.defencenow.com/news/928/indian-army- war-game-to-strategise-battle-concepts.html, (accessed on December 25, 2013). 33 “Indian Army and Air Force Conduct Joint Exercise in Rajasthan,” http://www.defencenow.com/news/170/indian-army-and-air-force-conduct-joint-exercise-in-rajasthan.html, (accessed on December 25, 2013).
194
May, 2006, Indian military conducted Sanghe Shakti exercise under General Daulat Shekhawat‟s command. On the occasion General Shekhawat asserted that “we firmly believe that there is room for a swift strike even in case of a nuclear attack, and it is to validate this doctrine that we conducted this operation.”34The CSD is a notorious doctrine. General Shekhawat issued a cynical statement it confirms deliberate maneuvering of the Indian forces to pave the way for nuclear warfare. The offensive nature of the CSD aims at demoralizing the echelons of Pakistan army by means of surprise attacks on C2 systems. Further, exploit Pakistan‟s vulnerabilities and shield Indian troop formations and Indian territory through effective coordination of Indian forces. The primary aim of the CSD is to accomplish strategic and diplomatic objectives rapidly. The Indian military expeditious thrust into Pakistan prevents major powers from defusing the crisis. Circumstances push Pakistan to rely entirely on nuclear weapons for its security and adopt hard line stance of nuclear optimism.35 Consequently, Pakistan integrates nuclear weapons with its conventional weapons. This feature augments the likelihood of the use of WMDs in future crisis.
Prelude of the CSD is an integral part of Indian coercive policy, a scheme deriving out of a position of strength. Contrary to adopting a policy of conflict avoidance the offensive nature of the CSD restricts India and Pakistan from exercising caution. It escalates the crisis instability, bud trepidation of Indian aggression and increases the possibility of deterrence breakdown.
Indian political leadership controls Indian military. Perhaps General V. P. Malik designed the CSD to bankrupt powerful intervention of politicians in Indian military affairs. Consequently, military will reap the benefits of autonomy if the CSD is operationalised. Political leaders lack expertise to understand the operational, tactical, or the battlefield requirements. The suspenseful short response time further complicates the situation. Fear of losing the battle followed by dire consequences for example, international humiliation, losing public support and demand of the emotionally charged masses may compel the government to resign. It is in this background politicians would not interfere in the military affairs during crises hence the IBGs commanders will perform a dominant role and enjoy autonomy during crisis. Operationalisation of the CSD will however result in the crossing of Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold. It would oblige Pakistan to
34 “Indian Army Tests its New Cold Start Doctrine,” Hindustan Times, May 19, 2006. 35Michael R. Kraig, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Developing World: A Game-Theoretical Treatment,” Journal of Peace Research, 36, No. 2, (March, 1999): 165.
195 keep the advantage of time and target selection for carrying out first use against the advance of the Indians or occupant forces. In return, India would respond with similar weapons execution of the CSD seems to be suicidal.
Fear of the first use in response to the CSD compels the Indian defence planners to explore possibilities and eschew nuclear weapons use by Pakistan. Ali Ahmed suggests IBGs should penetrate Pakistan‟s cities to use them as an umbrella as Pakistan will not use TNWs against its own population.36 TNWs are low yield nuclear weapons manufactured and designed for the battlefield usage. TNWs can be unleashed against enemy‟s counterforce targets, headquarters, communication centers, air bases, logistic support areas, and aircraft careers.37 Indian military should raise mountain taskforce to occupy Kashmir, suggests Ahmed, to use itas bargaining tool and extract concessions from Pakistan. Omar Qasim suggests the establishment of the Indian intelligence network in insurgent hit areas of Pakistan as precondition for operationalizing the CSD. Qasim emphasizes to galvanize the protracted war and destabilize Pakistan through insurgency. 38 Propaganda warfare against Pakistan should be launched to declare it as a terrorist state, nuclear program a source of regional instability and grave threat to international peace. Qasim maintains that upon achieving the preconditions India can operationalise the CSD without a fear of first use.
Ground realities reveal operational requirements, Pakistan military successful counterinsurgency operation and erstwhile Indian political leadership‟s lack of interest prevents the implementation of the CSD. In 2009, Pakistan finalized its offensive conventional military response to preempt39 the CSD through Azm-e-Nau IV military exercise.40 It demanded speedy deployment of military hardware, personnel and low penetration in enemy territory. The coherence and the time of the mobilization of the troops while responding to IBGs was tested through four years long Azm-e-Nau exercises. Pakistan‟s response to CSD is the by-product of Pakistan‟s constant threat perception, devoir to mount country‟s military power base, to reduce
36 Ahmed, “Cold Start,” 26. 37 Ibid. 38 Qasim, “Too Cold to Start,” 3, 4. 39 “Pakistan Army to Preempt India‟s Cold Start Doctrine,” The Express Tribune, (June 16, 2013). 40 “Pakistan‟s Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities,” Intelligence Quarterly, May 25, 2010, http://www.intelligencequarterly.com/2010/05/pakistan%E2%80%99s-ongoing-azm-e-nau-3-military- exercises-define-strategic-priorities/, (accessed on December 25, 2013).
196 insecurity and ensure state sovereignty. It capacitates Pakistan to use unparalleled military might against enemy forces. Concurrently Azm-e-Nau publically warns India to withdraw its forces or get ready for nuclear attack. It is a flexible response, based on rational decision making approach aimed at stopping the enemy with conventional means and if necessary later carryout nuclear strikes. India-Pakistan moves and countermoves demonstrate mutual distrust, uncertainty, inescapable security competition, arms race and security dilemma. In the light of optimists teachings Pakistan‟s India centric strategy is a good omen. However, in the presence of nuclear weapons and conventional asymmetry in Indian favor, the possibility of nuclear exchange cannot be ruled out.41 Additional problems include lack of interest by the Indian political leadership. This was highlighted on February 16, 2010, by former US ambassador to Indian Tim Roemer in his diplomatic cable to the US State Department.42 Cable mentioned that Indian government did not operationalise CSD in the wake of Mumbai attacks when overall environment was conducive for implementing it. In September, 2010, General V.K. Singh rejected,43and detached Indian military from CSD. He asserted that it is one of the contingency plans.44
Pakistan is taking proactive steps in terms of conventional and nuclear strategy. Succeeding paragraph discusses Pakistan‟s countermeasures and nuclear preparedness to thwart the CSD.
7.4 Operationalizing the CSD Road to Nuclear Apocalypse
Due to the fear of Pakistan‟s resort to TNWs Indian IBGs may enter, as postulated by Gurmeet Kanwal, 1 to 5 kilometers inside Pakistan at different points. After taking control of “narrow strip” Indian forces would stop their advance, to dodge crossing Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold. India would use this narrow strip in bargaining.45 A strategist must be aware of the
41Ali Ahmed, “India and Pakistan: Azm-e-Nau as a Response to the Cold Start,” IPCS, (July 28, 2013), http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/india-and-pakistan-azm-e-nau-as-a-response-to-4056.html (accessed on February 3, 2014). 42 “WikiLeaks: US on Indian Army‟s Cold Start Doctrine,” WikiLeaks India Cable (December 2, 2010), http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-india-cables/wikileaks-us-on-indian-army-s-cold-start-doctrine-69859, (accessed on December 22, 2013). 43 “No Cold Start Doctrine, India Tells US,´ Indian Express, (September 9, 2010). 44 P.R. Chari, “Defining India‟s Security: Looking Beyond Limited War and Cold Start Strategies,” IPCS Issue Brief, 169, (July, 2011): 1. 45Gurmeet Kanwal, “Does India Need Tactical Nuclear Weapons? ” http://www.idsa-india.org/an-may-03.html, (accessed on May 22, 2014).
197 strategic environment in order to devise a holistic strategy. However, analysis of Gurmeet Kanwal‟s prescribed strategy reveals that he has completely failed to understand South Asian strategic culture and environment. Furthermore, critical analysis of Gurmeet Kanwal reveals that he has either failed to understand Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold or completely sidelined it. The fundamental flaw of his strategy is that as soon as Indian forces will reach and cross India- Pakistan border, Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold will be crossed. Indian advances would be interpreted as an Indian attempt to seize control of Pakistani territory or the destruction of Pakistani defence mechanism. Indian execution of the CSD will therefore compel Pakistan to resort to the use of TNWs against Indian occupying forces.
The idea to capture narrow strip inside Pakistan is not a new concept, in fact, Herman Kahn has already discussed it in 1960, in the context of the Soviet‟s possible moves to occupy a small portion of allies administered Germany and then declare ceasefire.46 Pakistan will not accept a ceasefire on the Indian terms and conditions because it would affect morale, as Gurmeet Kanwal has highlighted in his article while referring to the Indian situation of Pakistani forces and nation.47 In this likely scenario, possible situation may be that Pakistan would resort to the measures to negate Indian nuclear blackmailing and the advantage achieved by India. Pakistan would therefore be “running greater risk” of resorting to nuclear weapons. In India-Pakistan conflict US has always played an active role and successfully defused various crisis. It is clear that the US officials would again use their good offices to deescalate the situation. Pakistan would be anxious to continue fighting. Overall situation would be grave if possible outcome would not address Pakistani concerns and Indian initial advantage is not negated.48 Indian refusal to withdraw its forces might therefore, cause strains in India and the US. Moreover, fear of Pakistani first use may also cause internal rifts in the Indian leadership.49
In case India may authorize operationalisation of IBGs, while sidelining Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold, it would be a suicidal mission as Pakistan may resort to declared first use in self defence. A possible use of the nuclear weapons on Indian counterforce targets would pave
46Kahn, On Escalation, 114. 47Kanwal, “Does India Need Tactical Nuclear Weapons?” 48Kahn, On Escalation, 114. 49Ibid.
198 the way for India to retaliate with massive retaliation. In these circumstances, yet another possible option for India could be to retaliate against Pakistani TNWs with similar non-strategic weapons. Since India-Pakistan strategies are inspired and are based on Cold War doctrines, India may equip its IBGs with tactical nuclear weapons, a decoy of Soviet strategy, to get the advantage of launching surprise tactical nuclear attack directed against Pakistan. It would adopt this strategy because of at least three reasons. Interestingly all these scenarios have been borrowed from the US-Soviet Cold War days of rivalry. These plots would include first subsidiary reinforcement in the middle of crisis, however, would mean “losing an element of surprise.”50 Indian defence planners may consequently, authorize a bare minimum use of nuclear war.51 In second scenario, Indian forces may use nuclear weapons because of fear. For instance, Pakistan is conventionally a weak state. It therefore relies on first use option, in any crisis or actual war it may resort to the deliberate use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan‟s declared first use policy generates the feelings of insecurity and fear in the Indian defence community. Pakistan‟s actual reliance on “First Use” would, as observed by Herman Kahn, possibly result in cheating by Indian policy makers to secure the advantages of decapitating attack/ first strike. William M. Arkin, asserts that, “first strike is a massive and preemptive blow against enemy nuclear forces.”52 Decision to authorize nuclear first use against Pakistan would also stem from the fear that Pakistani security establishment is about to issue such orders. Third, Indian military strike corps can purposely use nuclear weapons against Pakistani counter-value targets. New Delhi‟s potential designs may be to inflict purposeful harm to Pakistan‟s key military installations. Occasional use of nuclear weapons would then be justified, as Kahn noted, in the guise of accidental use of nuclear weapons. 53 Key purpose during previously mentioned justification insists to rescind international condemnation. Secondly, it would like wise transmit emotional message to Pakistani planners that India would punish the individuals responsible for the accidental WMDs use. Pakistan is compelled to renounce deliberate use of nuclear weapons against India as New Delhi is also ready for reprisal for the consequences of the use of nuclear bomb. Fear of unconsumed Pakistani nuclear weapons, according to optimistic realists, would
50Michael Krepon, Ziad Haider and Charles Thornton, “Are Tactical Nuclear Weapons Needed in South Asia?” in Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones and Ziad Haider (Washington, D.C: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004): 133. 51Term was originally used by Max Singer. It has been quoted by Herman Kahn in On Escalation, 88, 89. 52 William M. Arkin, “The Drift Toward First Strike,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 41, No. 1, (January, 19885): 5. 53Kahn, On Escalation, 88, 89..
199 ascend Pakistan‟s positions against any possibility (Threat of leftover Pakistani nuclear weapons would therefore, restore importance of Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrence).54
In such a scenario, Pakistani security establishment should incorporate the concept of massive retaliation in its nuclear doctrine. The enemy should be sent a clear message that Pakistan would not tolerate accidental use of nuclear weapons targeted against counterforce or counter value centers. Furthermore, no justification would be bought and enemy will be punished on massive scale. The centerpiece of nuclear war fighting strategy is that Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrence may breakdown in future.55 Nuclear war fighting strategy is thus designed to deal with a likely failure of nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India. It is the application of strategic objective defined by Andre Beaufre, “force the enemy to accept the terms we wish to impose on him.”56 In this background, Pakistan test fired Hatf-IX NASR, with an effective range of sixty kilometers, surface to surface short range missile on February 11, 2013. 57 The missile tests exhibit substantial progress made by Pakistan in the field of missiles. Pakistan‟s military liaison wing, ISPR revealed that Pakistani engineers have mastered the technology to defeat anti tactical missile defence systems. The Pakistan military was equipped with multi tube mobile missile launchers capable of firing TNWs. The development of Hatf-IX missile is categorical indication that Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold has lowered. On October 20, 2015, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry categorically asserted that Pakistan will use low yield nuclear weapons in response to operationalisation of the Indian CSD.58 The preparation to meet the enemy with nuclear weapons at every level is in the adoption of full- spectrum deterrence.
The strategic pundits refer to Manmohan Singh‟s administration as it did not own the CSD, and public rejection of the CSD by General V.K. Singh. Despite these past rejections of the CSD, the development of TNWs by Pakistan was seen rational approach. One can understand that the Indian government and security analysts consolidated their efforts to assure the world
54 Halloran, “Protracted Nuclear War,”57. 55 Ibid. 56 Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, trans. R. H. Barry (Rawalpindi: The National Book Foundation, 1972): 23. 57Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR17/2013-ISPR, (February 11, 2013), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2240, (accessed July 4, 2015). 58Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan has Built Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons to Counter Indian Aggression,” The Dawn News, (October 20, 2015).
200 that India is a responsible NWS. Likewise, the Indian rhetoric is that it has centered its energies and employing its efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the actual situation is different than the Indian rhetoric particularly from Pakistan‟s point of view. During the Cold War, India signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for the “coproduction of Mig-21 aircraft in India,” it created conventional military asymmetry in New Delhi‟s favor against Islamabad. In the post-Cold War era, India has signed similar agreements for the production of arms, with US, France and Britain.59 Indian Army Chief Bipin Rawat recently owned the CSD.60 India is thus primary reason of the conventional and nuclear arms race in the region. The Indian policies to procure sophisticated conventional military hardware and modernize its nuclear force structure are fueling the ongoing arms race. 61 Pakistan is caught with the security dilemma because of the lack of strategic depth, Indian favored conventional military imbalance and low defense budget in comparison to India increasingly rely on nuclear deterrence for its defense. The rising asymmetry in South Asia in the Indian favor is marginalizing the strength, value and importance of the NPT. It is because of this reason that the universality of the NPT is becoming a distant goal.
7.5 Introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs)
TNWs known as non-strategic nuclear weapons62 have roots in the US-Soviet Cold War era rivalry. NATO deployed TNWs as Quick Reaction Alert Force (QRAF). 63 The NATO military planners believed that these weapons can play an effective role against large scale advancing military forces. NWS consider the development of TNWs necessary for enhancing the credibility of their nuclear deterrent. The US deployed 500 TNWs mostly in Western Europe-64 480, B61 or mini nukes were deployed in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey.
59 Raju G. C. Thomas, “The South Asian Balance in a Western Dominant World,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2004): 312. 60“What is India‟s Cold Start Doctrine?,” The Indian Express,(September 21, 2017). 61 Muhammad Adnan Nayar, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (December 17, 2017). 62 Zulfqar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi, “Regional Centric Deterrence: Reassessing its Efficacy for South Asia,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 25, No. 4, (December, 2013): 495. 63 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for India and Pakistan,” Vivekananda International Foundation, June 4, 2013, http://www.vifindia.org/article/2013/june/04/tactical-nuclear-weapons-lessons-for-india- and-pakistan, (accessed on December 23, 2013). 64 Michel Chossudovsky, “First Strike” Pre-Emptive Nuclear War Directed against Iran. The Alliance‟s Nine Nuclear Weapons‟ States,” Global Research, April 15, 2013, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-us-nato-first-strike- nuclear-war-plans-directed-against-iran-who-are-the-main-players/5331216, (access on January 26, 2014).
201
According to estimates 350 TNWs were pointed against Russia in 2007, while in 2013, another 180, were targeted against Iran. In early 2013, 180, were directed against Iran. Russia is believed to have developed 2000 TNWs. How many TNWs have been exactly deployed is not known.65
7.5.1 Pakistan Introduces TNWs in the Backdrop of CSD
In the post-9/11 era, TNW gained significance in the eyes of Pakistani strategic community. It started developing TNWs in the backdrop of Indian announcement of proactive military strategy today known as the CSD. The introduction of TNWs exhibits that Pakistan on purpose adopted rationally- irrational deterrent strategy (the term was originally used as rationality-of- irrationality, by Herman Kahn).66 Islamabad based policymakers understand that “threat of retaliation, in order to be believable, must depend upon the potential irrationality of the retaliator.”67 The logic of deterrence by denial strategy also explains Pakistan‟s nuclear posture. TNWs were introduced in South Asia on April 19, 2011, when Pakistan test fired short range, 60 KMs, nuclear capable Nasr cruise missile also known as Hatf-IX.68 After the successful test, Pakistan military through its liaison Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a press release stating that the Nasr is “part of country‟s new “full-spectrum” deterrent posture.69 It had been a warning for India that Indian proactive military strategy under the banner of the CSD or limited war would be handled rigorously. The significance of Pakistan‟s first strike thus increased after the Indian announcement of the CSD and New Delhi‟s intentions to fight a limited war.
Pakistan transmitted nuclear signals to India by introducing the TNWs. First use of nuclear weapons can be authorized against India if it crosses Islamabad‟s nuclear threshold. Decision to operationalise the CSD would definitely result in the potential mutual use of nuclear weapons in future crisis.70 Pakistani analysts Khan and Abbasi have termed Nasr missile as
65 “Implications of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in India‟s Neighbourhood,” https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=htt p%3A%2F%2Fwww.cenjows.in%2Fdownload.php%3Fdownload_file%3Dpublication_files%2F1326258324Main. pdf&ei=WXe4Uu_XCOXoywPV6YHgBw&usg=AFQjCNHgO49saYFRC1K86vPJTZnCAuyy5g&sig2=qPEGayL LF5XlZHX9THv4-A&bvm=bv.58187178,d.Yms, (accessed on December 23, 2013): 1. 66Kahn, On Escalation, 57. 67 Ibid. 68 “Implications of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in India‟s Neighborhood,” 1. 69 Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR94/2011-ISPR, (April 19, 2011), http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721&search=1, (accessed on April 24, 2013). 70 “Implications of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in India‟s Neighbourhood,” 1.
202 valuable apparatus to deliver nuclear warhead against advancing IBGs. 71 TNWs though solidified Pakistan‟s offensive defence policy however; in the absence of imminent threat it would not be the first to initiate wars. The notion, mentioned here, is in partial contradiction to S. Paul Kapur‟s argument he has narrated in his article “The Effects on South Asia of Deep US Nuclear Reductions.” Kapur views that despite Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons there are minimal chances that Pakistan would launch strategic or conventional offensive strike to capture Indian territory. Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons, Kapur‟s second argument, have eroded India‟s second strike capability.72 However, this scenario has yet to be tested due to an available list of options, to India. Such scenario has been discussed in succeeding paragraph.
Nasr is not the only short range cruise missile Islamabad developed. Pakistan developed and tested Abdali, Hatf-II short range cruise missile on March 2, 2012. It can destroy its targets within the range of 180 KMs. Islamabad has introduced qualitative changes. It is manufacturing solid fuel propelled more advanced nuclear capable tactical missiles to augments Pakistan‟s deterrent posture against India.73 Pakistan‟s reactive nuclear deterrent posture is both offensive and defensive. In peace time, Pakistan deterrent posture remains “defensive.” It endeavors to deter India from waging war of which Pakistan is afraid. Covering Indian IBGs or the CSD under Pakistani strategic or low yield weapons may be termed as reactive “offensive deterrent posture.” The goal of Pakistani offensive posture is to breakdown Indian resistance of launching offensive against Pakistan to which Pakistan is opposed.74 Changing postures from defensive to offensive is the collapse of defensive deterrent posture. The defensive posture is aimed at preserving normal relations to prevent India-Pakistan from climbing the escalation ladder. However, once the primary objective of applied strategy to deter India from escalating the crisis ladder is undermined, both states would step up to the next level of offensive deterrent. It is a dangerous situation. It can prompt nuclear exchange therefore invites third party intervention. In Indo-Pakistan case it is the US intervention.
71 Khan and Abbasi, “Regional Centric Deterrence,” 495. 72S. Paul Kapur, “The Effects on South Asia of Deep US Nuclear Reductions,” The Nonproliferation Review, 20, No. 2, (2013): 282. 73 Khan and Abbasi, “Regional Centric Deterrence,” 495. 74 Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, trans. R. H. Barry (Lahore: National Book Foundation, 1972): 35.
203
7.5.2 Intrinsic Flaws Associated with TNWs
The development of TNWs is subsequently followed by the deployment of TNWs during peacetime, known as adoption of ready status. It is considered hostile posture vis-à-vis the enemy. Herman Kahn coined the termed “retortions” for it.75 It requires delegation of operational authority to junior ranking officers or field commanders. The ready status posture can result in the likely adoption of “positive command,”76 the decision to launch nuclear strikes is made by the junior ranking field commander at the discretion of military or political leadership without any interruption. It generates fears of use it or lose it, deliberate and accidental nuclear war in the minds of nuclear pessimists. Second likely posture is negative command i.e. field commander is empowered to deploy and launch nuclear forces unless cancelled by the top leadership. Negative command ensure assertive control of top leadership on nuclear forces it eradicate chances of deliberate or accidental nuclear war. Nuclear optimists believes that negative command preserves status quo, thwarts war, ensure deterrence and strategic stability. Consequentially, nuclear weapons are weapon of peace.
Nuclear pessimists have also associated preceding risks with Pakistan‟s strategic and battlefield weapons. In addition propaganda is also launched that terrorists might steal, pose insider threat or takeover Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons. However, it is worth mentioning that Pakistan has never deployed tactical or strategic nuclear weapons during crises or peacetime. Further, according to Tanzila Khalil 77 Pakistan has never claimed that its short range or battlefield missile inventory serves the purpose of TNWs. Zulfiqar Hussain during interview asserted78 that NCA headed by the Prime Minister controls Pakistani nuclear forces. Launch codes and authority to launch nuclear strike reside in chairman of the NCA. Conversely, Hussain rejected the notion of deliberate or inadvertent nuclear weapons use. He stressed that fears including use it or lose it associated with Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons is mere propaganda. Introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asian region has resulted in debate and raised questions such as TNWs has lowered Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold while other argue that
75 Kahn, On Escalation, 55. 76 Alexander L. George “Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 26, No. 5, (1984): 227. 77 Private Conversation: Tanzila Khalil, Expert on India-Pakistan Missiles Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division (SPD), (December 3, 2017). 78 Zulfiqar Hussain, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Cabinet Division Islamabad (January 14, 2018).
204
Pakistan nuclear threshold has increased. In fact introduction of TNWs in my opinion asserts Hussain stabilized India-Pakistan relations.79 Musarat Jabeen believes Pakistan nuclear weapons are centralized weapons. NCA has neither authorized deployment of TNWs nor delegated the authority to launch nuclear weapons to junior ranking field commanders.80 Pakistan developed TNWs because these are cost effective weapon. It maintains recessed nuclear posture. Further, TNWs are integral part of the FSCMD posture.81 Pakistan heavily relies on nuclear forces to deter Indian military aggression emanating from CSD, Pragati and Prahar missiles and preserve regional peace.82 However, nuclear weapon is weapon of last resort.
7.5.3 Pakistan’s Strategic Objective and Rationale
The strategic objective of Pakistan‟s FSCMD, unlike the undoubted old policy, is to preserve peace in the region by preventing war with India.83 Pakistan‟s strategy is based on the likely idea that surrender is out of question. Further, Pakistan is perhaps planning strategy of protracted nuclear war (PNW)84developed by the US Undersecretary of Defence Fred C. Ikle, “fighting and wining nuclear war.”85 The second strategic objective of Pakistan is to uphold regional strategic stability in South Asia. Since Kashmir dispute remains unresolved, the region remains unstable. The UN on the other hand, also failed to resolve the issue between India and Pakistan as the UN resolutions on Kashmir, discussed in the succeeding paragraph, could not be implemented even after seven decades. The nuclear optimists, therefore, argue that for strategic stability, as roots of instability still exist. The policy of nuclear disarmament or arms control would turn to be dangerous.86 For them, policy of nuclear deterrence is an effective strategy to maintain stability in the region. The development of TNWs by Pakistan and their subsequent induction in Pakistan‟s nuclear forces would stabilize the region. The integration of TNWs restored BOP and equalized Pakistan against India. Despite overcoming military asymmetry
79 Ibid. 80 Musarat Jabeen, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Sargodha, (January 13, 2018). 81 Ibid. 82 Moonis Ahmar, (Former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Karachi) Emailed interview, (September 18, 2018). 83 George “Crisis Management, 157. 84 Richard Halloran, “Protracted Nuclear War: The Reagan Pentagon Wanted to Plan for It. Then, All Hell Broke Loose,” Air Force Magazine, (March, 2008): 56. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid.
205 misperception dominates India-Pakistan relations. Further, nuclear pessimists fears that the situation is ripe for future crisis due to unresolved Kashmir dispute. Prior to operationalizing the CSD India will have to calculate the outcome of waging the CSD.
7.6 Missile Developments, New Arms Race and Delivery Means Capabilities in the Post Nuclearised South Asia
India and Pakistan‟s missile programs, their names and tit for tat tests particularly during crisis exhibits their relentless rivalry. It attracts third party intervention to interfere in ongoing crisis and resolve it or to protect the political objectives. The strategic objective of India-Pakistan missile race and vertical extended deterrence is to ensure that nuclear weapons will be delivered to targets inside enemy territory with pin-point accuracy. Extended range of the missiles enhances the deterrent role87 of nuclear weapons and restores the faith of the masses in country‟s defence mechanism. India-Pakistan has not signed arms control agreements. Missile tests are transparent. It exhibits developments, pace and the future trajectory. Publicly conducted missile tests exhibit range, payloads, type i.e. cruise, ballistic, fuel type and reflect nature of the arms race. South Asian missile tests suggest that it is rooted in action-reaction phenomenon. Second, South Asian missile tests motivate opponent‟s behavior to invest in missiles armory. It increases adversary‟s security dilemma. Pace of tests suggest that missile tests are used as a tool to send signals and coerce the adversary. Inference can be drawn that regional strategic temperature is increasing. It escalates prevailing bitter rivalry, mutual threat perception and fears of accidental and deliberate nuclear war. Continued missile developments are meant to develop different platforms, complete nuclear triad and to ensure survival of deterrent forces. New Delhi and Islamabad is introducing qualitative improvements. Both are sensitive to adversary‟s missile developments and responsive to embryonic threats. In the following section the study brings into limelight post 1998 era India-Pakistan missile developments.
87Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia,”http://www.stimson.org/images/upload/research-pdfs/ESCONTROLCHAPTER4.pdf(accessed on February 9, 2014): 75.
206
7.6.1 Indian Missile Developments
India accelerated the pace of its missile program in post 1998, era. It suggests first, missiles role significantly increased in strengthening New Delhi‟s deterrent posture. Second, intensified tests exhibits Indian scientific community‟s endeavor to perfect missile‟s precision strike rate, to extend effective range of its missile stocks as 1500 kilometers was the longest range of Agni missile. Despite this limited range, India could hit the counterforce and counter value targets anywhere in Pakistan. Nevertheless, this required the positioning of Indian missiles near Pakistani border exposing Indian missiles to enemy attacks. Third, New Delhi was therefore not satisfied with the status quo. It aspired to deploy Indian counterforce targets out of the range of Pakistani missile and to counterbalance China, was the substratal motives for modernizing Indian missile force structure. Fourth, India aspired to demonstrate to the world that its scientists have actualized technological breakthrough, by budding liquid and solid fuel propelled missile forces. Conclusively, it possesses real capabilities and gradually achieving major power status in the international community.
7.6.1.1 Continental Missile Inventory
The Indian continental missile force is operational and it comprises of four types the Prithvi and Agni-I (short-range), Agni-II (medium range), Agni- III (intermediate range). New Delhi justifies modernization and qualitative changes in its missile force structure on grounds to deter China. Nevertheless, Indian secretive agenda behind these developments is to alter strategic balance in its favor, become regional hegemon and achieve recognition as an emerging global power. South Asian strategic equilibrium is complex as it is triangular rather than bilateral in nature. Indian missile developments thus fuels regional and extra regional missile race. India and Pakistan are active participants they carryout missile tests due reciprocal missile arms race, security dilemma, and competitive relations. In addition to authenticate technical features such as quality, range or payloads of newly developed missile inventories.
207
7.6.1.2 Short Range
The Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) can neutralize its targets within 800 kilometers range.88 Agni- I, is a short range nuclear capable ballistic missile. The evolution of Agni-I commenced in 1999. It was first triumphantly tested in January, 2002.89 The missile is in service since 2004. It can destroy its targets within 700 kilometers radius. Agni-I was test fired from a rail-mobile launcher. The efficiency and technology has been remodeled as it has new guidance, reentry kit and control system.90 The stationing of Agni-I near India-Pakistan border warrants it to butcher noticeable targets inside Pakistani territory. In 2011, India test fired solid fuel propellant Prahar, with a range of 50 to 150 kilometers. 91 The short range, easy transportation, target accuracy, the ability to work in all weathers conditions and the ability to launch from road mobile launchers makes it suitable for operationalizing the CSD. The dual use of missile can cripple Pakistan‟s counterforce targets, roads, bridges, airbases, nuclear storage facilities and forward deployments. It is apocalyptic menace particularly for a small force structure and will be sufficient for Pakistan considering Pakistan lacks strategic depth and resources. Prahar once comprehensively inducted will replace the short range Prithvi missiles. Moreover, Prithvi missiles‟ range will be enhanced. The Prahar‟s development is an Indian reaction to Pakistan‟s Nasr missile. It is action-reaction syndrome and manifestation of gradual escalation of regional arms race spiral. Adil Iqbal views that India is importing huge stocks of Uranium. It endows New Delhi to rapidly expand nuclear missile inventories. Yet, it endeavors to harden defensive self-images.92 These developments reveal breathtaking objective concerning India‟s reassertion to adhere to striking policy denoting power maximization. Further, New Delhi is using the perception of insecurity based on suspicion and dangerous interpretation of Islamabad‟s intentions and motives. The overriding result is military competition and continued hostility. Hence, there will be no sense of security. It is a thorny progress. Consequentially, arms race spiral can get out of control. It escalates crisis instability, mounts arms race and enhances the chances of accidental nuclear warfare.
88International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1985-1986 (London: IISS, 1985): 165. 89“Agni- 1,” Missile Threat, (September 20, 2012), http://missilethreat.com/missiles/agni-1/, (accessed February 26, 2016). 90S. Paul Kapur, “More Posture than Review: Indian Reactions to the US Nuclear Posture Review,” Monterey Institute of International Studies, 18, No. 1, (March, 2011): 70. 91Hemant Kumar Rout, “Tactical Missile Pragati Readied for Export,” The New Indian Express, (November 5, 2014). 92 Adil Iqbal, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (January 20, 2018).
208
7.6.1.3 Medium Range
The Agni-II, solid fuel propellant missile force was test fired on April 11, 1999.93 It has an effective range of 2000 kilometers. The missile range can be extended to 3,500 kilometers by reducing its payload. The then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajayee asserted that Indian missile is exclusively for defence purposes.94 Practically the higher precision strike rate enables the missile developing state to hold enemy cities hostage. India thus climbed on the escalation ladder. It naturally heightened Pakistan‟s anxiety and mounted pressure on it. Missile test had seriously negative implications for Islamabad. Important aspects of the test encompass for example, first, Indian government envisage arming Agni-II with nuclear warheads. Vajayee claimed that India indigenously developed and tested Agni-II. It indicated to satisfy Indian voyage to attain prominence in global society. Thirdly, India rejected the global community‟s calls to show restraint and avoid weaponisation of its missile forces. It motivated policymakers in Islamabad to follow the suit. New Delhi‟s authorized missile test thus seriously undermined the NPT and other regional arms control efforts. The Pakistani foreign minister Sartaj Aziz while condemning Indian missile tests,95 warned that India is driving Pakistan into missile race. India achieved this breakthrough with the foreign assistance. Fourth, the deployment of Agni-II during kargil crisis, in the absence of command and control (C2) system and pre-delegation of authority could have resulted in major catastrophe. Fifth, the range of the Agni-II, missile enabled India to deploy it far away from the reach of Pakistani bombers and missiles. Hence, in 1999, New Delhi acquired assured second strike capability against Pakistan.
The Agni-II, was re-launched on April 7, 2013.96 In response Pakistan test fired Shaheen- I (Hatf-IV) missile.97 The Agni-II was again test fired in July 2013. India-Pakistan missile tests
93“India Tests Agni-2 Ballistic Missile,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/node/2902, (accessed on December 24, 2014). 94“Agni II & Ghauri II,” Paper No. 47, South Asian Analysis Group, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper47, (accessed on December 24, 2014). 95“World: South Asia Analysis: Neighbours May Stay Friends,” BBC, (April 14, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/319532.stm, (accessed on December 24, 2014). 96 “India Successfully Test Fires Nuclear Capable Agni-II Missile,” India Strategic, (April, 2013), http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1988_India_tests_nuclear_capable_Agni-II_missile.htm, (accessed December 11, 2017). 97 Jonathan McLaughlin, “Pakistan Prioritize Short-Range, Nuclear Capable Missile,” Wisconsin Project on Arms Control, February 1, 2016) http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pakistan-missile-update-february-2016/, (accessed September 24, 2017).
209 seem tit-for-tat policy. The South Asian strategic rivalry and arms competition can be defined in terms of escalation rules described by Herman Kahn in his landmark book On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios.98 The prevalent distrust and enemy image would continue to drive this rivalry.99 The mutual suspicion would prevent the normalization of the military hostility and competition. The mutual mistrust is a constant element of India-Pakistan relationship. Both sides remain skeptical of the steps taken by the other to normalize the situation due to the fear of cheating. The fear of being caught by surprise compels Pakistan to continue to reckon on nuclear weapons. It is, as per realist account, a normal state of affair. It can only be dealt by relying on the notion of self-help to ensure the existence of the state. Prevailing situation, according to nuclear pessimists or anti bomb lobby, prevents the universalisation of the NPT. The worrisome aspect is any future war between India-Pakistan can turn into the first regional nuclear war. The missile competition, Suresh Dhanda views, is a challenge to the NPT. 100 The bilateral competition to gain the ability to infiltrate the opponents‟ defence mechanism increases the security dilemma and threat perception. An unending conflict results in an unending arms race rather than the adoption of the arms control and Confidence and Security Building Measure (CSBM). The fear of nuclear exchange is a viable reason for both states to pursue arms control measures and CSBMs. The dominant reasons which prevent both states from pursuing the policy of arms control is defensive and the self image ingrained in the minds of leadership on both sides. The decision makers do not sign arms control policies due to the fear of cheating by the opponent. In addition to that, the willingness to sign such arms control agreements can be considered as a sign of weakness vindicating coercive policy.
7.6.1.4 Intermediate Range
The Indian missile forces though, could already hit targets anywhere in Pakistan, yet, in February, 2001, India developed Agni-III nuclear capable solid-fuel propellant. The rail-mobile is capable of hitting its targets within 3,500 kilometers range. 101 It was weighed significant
98Kahn, On Escalation. 99 Muhammad Munir, Interview. 100Suresh Dhanda, “Dangers of Missile Race in South Asia: an India-Pakistan Perspective,” International Affairs and Global Strategy, 2, (2011): 20. 101“India Missile Milestones: 1947- 2012,” The Risk Report, 18, No. 6, (November- December, 2012), http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/MissileMiles2005.html, (accessed on December 25, 2014).
210 because of the missile ability to permeate and exterminate counter value and counterforce targets on the Chinese mainland. Further, it could be positioned beyond the range of Pakistani missile forces. Mansoor Akbar asserts that it is safe to claim that India acquired second strike capability against Pakistan.102 It conjointly aspire Indian scientists to strive for budding Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), finally, to join powerful society characterized by practically advanced nations of the world. Innovation introduced by New Delhi tilted regional strategic balance and escalated Indian favored conventional asymmetry. Islamabad reliance resultantly increased on nuclear deterrent to restore strategic equilibrium.
However, in May, 2006, the Indian scientists faced a disappointment as the schedule test launch of Agni-III missile resulted in failure.103 The Indian physicists did not renounce their efforts which resulted in the successful test firing of the same missile system in May, 2007. Developments in nuclear and conventional realm substantiate that New Delhi was not satisfied with the desired range, type, features and maximum number of its missile forces. Continued missile tests point that it desires to produce additional stocks of delivery mechanism and nuclear warheads. It indicates India is incorporating nuclear capable missiles in its war fighting doctrine. Eventually, New Delhi will divorce No-First Use Policy thus the strategic temperature of South Asia will raise. It is sufficient to claim that the Indian grand strategy is not confined to histrionic regional dominance. It is relatively in pursuit of advancing enhanced missile force with global reach. The budding and test launch of nuclear capable Agni-V on April 6, 2012, authenticate preceding speculations. The Agni-V can extinguish targets within 5,000 kilometers.104 Currently, the extended range of Agni, surface to surface missile, is from 8,000 to 10,000 kilometer. This enables the Agni-V to carry multiple warheads.
The DRDO top brass desires to extend the range of Agni-V up to 6000 kilometers and integrate it with Indian submarines. The DRDO futuristic design is rejection of the Indian pledge to maintain the CMD made under nuclear doctrine. It is inevitably introducing changes in the official Indian nuclear doctrine. The current trajectory of the Indian missile program i.e. the
102 Mansoor Akbar, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (December 6, 2017). 103Bharat Karnad, India‟s Nuclear Policy (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008): 81. 104“Agni-V to be Ready By Mid 2014,” IBNLive, (May 23, 2012), http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india/agni-vi-to-be- ready-by-mid-2014-476884.html, (accessed July 22, 2015).
211 maturation of multiple independently re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and to integrate Agni-V with submarines intends to encourage regional states (particularly China) to compete in the arms race thus destabilizes the regional strategic stability. Second, increase in the production of weapons grade fissile material and imported fissile material enables India to increase the production of nuclear warheads. It is gradually moving it towards raising and maintaining overkill capacity. Hence, New Delhi in near future will be forced to introduce changes in its nuclear doctrine such as delegate authority to use nuclear weapons to junior ranking naval officers and replace No-First Use probably with First Use. Ever-growing missiles and Indian military modernization program prevents Islamabad from taking unilateral measures to desist from arms competition or to adhere to NFU.105 The production of weapons grade fissile material and the ingress of advance nuclear capable missile would undermine efforts to develop FMCT. Further, unilateral arms control measures or disarmament by Pakistan will only be a strategy of self destruction.
The spokesman of the DRDO, Ravi Kumar Gupta on September 15, 2013, announced that India successfully test fired solid fuel surface to surface nuclear capable three stage Agni-V ballistic missile with a range of 5000 kilometers.106 Pakistan is already in the range of Indian missiles including Agni-I, II and III107 therefore Agni-V does not have immediate or grave implications for Pakistan. Agni-V capacitated India to target China and the Middle East. It was asserted that Agni-V is China specific. However, the Chinese military experts and foreign ministry response to Agni-V test was worth noting. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei made an account that both India and China should subdue the prevalent skepticism for the political and regional stability. 108 Further, Chinese military experts did not give it significance noticeably Agni-V was designated as an old technology.109 Perhaps, Chinese did not
105 Tom Sauer, (Senior Lecturer University of Antwerpen), Emailed interview, (September 16, 2018). 106Kelsey Davenport, “Pakistan to Focus on Short-Range Missiles,” Arms Control Association, (October, 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_10/Pakistan-to-Focus-on-Short-Range-Missiles (accessed on January 31, 2014). 107Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India‟s Nuclear Policy,” in Major Power‟s Nuclear Policies and International Order in the 21st Century, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2009/e_06.pdf, (accessed on January 31, 2014): 104. 108Ibid. 109“Chinese Reactions to India‟s Agni-V Test Firing,” ICS, No. 4, (May, 2012).
212 take notice of this development because the missile has to go through the necessary tests.110 It will be soon commissioned. India wants to reduce the conventional military asymmetry between India and China. New Delhi believes that the military modernization will help it to be acknowledged as a major power, enjoy respect and autonomy globally. Furthermore, Agni-V will besides escalate India-Pakistan military asymmetry and drag Pakistan into more costly arms competition. The president of the Indian ruling party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Nitin Gadkari also expressed these ambitions in the wake of missile test.111 Gadkari claimed that India entered the privileged society of the nations. In another statement issued from BJP platform, India was regarded as a “missile power.” In April, 2015, Pakistan test fired MRBM Ghauri Hatf-V, nuclear capable ballistic missile. It has range of 1300 kilometers112 India backfired with a test launch of Agni-III. However, it could not change the strategic equation in India‟s favor.
7.6.1.5 Cruise Missile Continental Inventory
The Indian continental cruise missile legion encompasses Nirbhay nuclear capable cruise missile. It is surface to surface missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers. The Indian DRDO carried out a successful trial of Nirbay in October, 2014.113 The stealth technology enables it to fly at low altitude, maneuver and disallow the adversary to detect it. Due to its qualitative significance and precision strike rate it is speculated that Nirbhay will remain the most reliable nuclear delivery vehicle for India. Keeping in view the short range of the missile it is safe to claim that Nirbhay is Pakistan specific. Counterforce targets including runways, military depots and other military installations in Pakistan will be on the list of the missile. It is clear indication that India is implementing counterforce targeting strategy. It is speculated that India will increase fissile material production to develop additional stocks of missile inventories. New Delhi thus wants to ignite and deliberately drag Islamabad in costly arms race. India claims that it fulfills
110Jaideep Parabhu, “Agni-V and the South Asian Balance of Power,” Z News, (September 17, 2013), http://zeenews.india.com/exclusive/agni-v-and-the-south-asian-balance-of-power_6643.html, (accessed on February 2, 2014). 111“India‟s 5,000 KM Agni-V Missile A Game Changer,” The Weekly Voice, http://www.weeklyvoice.com/headlines/indias-5000-km-agni-v-missile-a-game-changer/, (accessed on August 12, 2014). 112“India Successfully Test Fires Nuclear- Capable Agni III Ballistic Missile,” Missile Threat, (April 16, 2015), http://missilethreat.com/india-successfully-test-fires-nuclear-capable-agni-iii-ballistic-missile/, (April 26, 2015) 113Ankit Panda, “Meet India‟s New Nuclear Cruise Missile,” The Diplomat, (October 18, 2014).
213 the criteria of a responsible nuclear weapon state. However, development of the BMD, MIRVs and the MARVs are sources of strategic instability. It damages efforts focused on achieving non- proliferation, the disarmament objectives and aimed at establishing strategic stability in the region. The offensive military capabilities encourage India to adopt offensive military force posture such as aim at destroying counter value targets. Consequentially, the development of tactical and short range missiles will definitely fuel India-Pakistan hostility. It can bring these states at the cusp of nuclear war.
India and Pakistan therefore should resume composite dialogue process and sign the nuclear restraint regime. It is dire need of the hour to initiate Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and institutionalize efforts focused on reducing dangers of deterrence breakdown. New Delhi and Islamabad necessarily should discuss the negative implications of vertical proliferation and qualitative changes introduced by both the adversaries.
7.6.1.6 Maritime Missile Forces
The Indian maritime modernization programme can be divided into three categories; Include equipment of surface vessels with modern missiles. The cruise missiles inventory. The submarine launched missile system.
Pakistan‟s continuous attempts to compete with India in the missile race could not dissuade New Delhi from stopping the missile modernization programme. In early 2,000,in fact, India dragged missile race to the Indian Ocean in its quest for regional dominance and to accomplish the goal prescribed in Indian nuclear draft to acquire assured second strike capability. The nuclear forces without second strike capabilities are meaningless. On April 11, 2000, India test fired 250 to 300 kilometers short range surface to surface Dhanush missile.114 Pakistan‟s quest to compete with India in maritime missile force means additional burden on its weak economy. However, neglecting it had far grave security consequences for conventionally weak
114“Sagarika/Dhanush,” FAS,http://fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/sagarika.htm, (accessed on December 24, 2014).
214
Pakistan. In navy for instance, the enemy would acquire disarming strike capabilities and ensure quick victory.
7.6.1.7 Cruise Missile
Indo-Russian strategic partnership and persistent endeavors capacitated India to successfully bud Brahmos cruise missile.115 The short range, submarine launched 250 to 300 kilometers missile was tested in June, 2001. New Delhi and Islamabad are embarked on the path to achieve higher precision strike rate. Enhanced capabilities and continued technological assistance by the extra regional powers to India are no doubt a matter of concern for Pakistan. Further Russian expertise enabled India to manufacture missiles while US turned a blind eye to regional instability and heightened missile race. The US later realizing the grave consequences only made a lip-service by issuing a handout on July 12, 2001,116 stating that US urges both India-Pakistan to express restraint and avoid missile race to maintain regional peace.
In October, 2007, India announced the development of short range Barahmos supersonic cruise missile,117 with the Russian assistance. Missile was tested on October 6, 2012, presumably in reaction to Pakistan‟s Hatf-VII.118 The short range of missile indicates that India is preparing to fight publically denied limited war. The successful test firing of Barahmos within five years after the announcement manifest the dedication of the Indian scientists, engineers and policymakers to complete nuclear triad, a goal set in Indian nuclear doctrine. It however is a departure from the policy of minimum credible deterrence. Indian military modernization program verifies that India rely on nuclear forces for its security.
115Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Missile Issues in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Summer, 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92salik.pdf, (accessed on December 21, 2014). 116“Pentagon Clarifies South Asia Nuclear Policy,” Arms Control Association,https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_09/sasiasept01, (accessed on December 28, 2014). 117Sharad Joshi, “India and Pakistan Missile Race Surges On,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (October, 2007), http://cns.miis.edu/other/wmdi071008d.htm (accessed on February 9, 2014). 118Debak Das, “India and Pakistan Missile Flexing: Cursing Toward Regional Stability,” IPCS, 30, No. 1, (January- March, 2013): 8.
215
7.7 Nuclear Capable Submarine Program
Entire India is on the list of Pakistani missiles. India is therefore developing submarines which are difficult to detect and to accomplish assured second strike capability. In July, 2009, India inaugurated the INS Arihant, nuclear propelled submarine development project. India plans to manufacture four additional submarines by the end of 2020.119 INS Arihant started sea trails on December 16, 2014. 120 On May 5, 2015, DRDO announced to mate intermediate range nuclear capable K-4 missile with INS Aridhaman, under construction nuclear capable submarine.
The K-4 missile can destroy its targets within the range of 3,500 kilometers.121 INS Arihant completed its diving tests in November, 2015, and missile tests in 2016. Initially, it was planned to equip INS Arihant with twelve nuclear capable short range K-15 ballistic missiles122 with a range of 800 kilometers.123 The short range of missile makes INS Arihant vulnerable to enemy attack. India therefore, requires submarine launched intermediate range missiles to accomplish assured second strike capability. The extended range enables the submarine force to hit any target on Pakistani soil, sail in the Bay of Bengal without fear of enemy detection and enemy‟s disarming strikes. Indian policymakers have therefore ordered the development, testing and fitting of intermediate range missiles on its submarines to ensure the completion of nuclear triad. The necessity to complete nuclear triad stems from Indian policymakers fear that first India‟s major urban centers; second military basis can be held hostage by Pakistani missiles or destroyed during war. Third, Indian policymakers fears that the Indian NCA can be wiped out by Pakistan in case of war.124The evolution of submarine endows Indian military first, to hold Pakistani counter value and counterforce targets captive in the midst of crises. Second, it creates the fear of massive punitive attacks in the minds of the enemy.
119Yogesh Joshi, “India‟s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent Poses Proliferation Challenges,” World Politics Review, (September 18, 2013), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13222/india-s-undersea-nuclear-deterrent- poses-proliferation-challenges#close (accessed on February 1, 2014). 120Franz-Stefan Gady, “Sea Trials of Indian Navy‟s Deadliest Sub Going Very Well,” The Diplomat, (May 5, 2015). 121Ibid. 122Timothy McDonnell, “Nuclear Pursuits; Non-P-5 Nuclear-Armed States, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69, No. 1, (January 7, 2013): 63. 123Iskander Rehman, Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015): 13. 124Iskander Rehman, “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinksmanship in the Indian Ocean,” Naval College Review, 65, No. 4, (Autumn, 2012): 66.
216
The deployment of nuclear submarine would require New Delhi to maintain its punitive nuclear forces assembled or to adopt super ready status (ready to launch condition) to ingrain feelings of extinction in enemy‟s mind. The intermediate and long range missile will remain prerequisite to substantiate the invulnerability of the deployed nuclear forces to ensure the cost effectiveness, precession and from deterrence perspective to strike fear into the hearts and minds of the enemy. However, the deployment would require the delegation of authority to submarine commander. These developments would therefore, disturb crisis stability due to the fear of deliberate or accidental launch. The use of WMDs can become a reality if communication system for submarines is destroyed by the enemy. It would additionally disturb the strategic or regional stability. Feelings of invulnerability can heighten the Indian statecraft morale resulting in the adoption of Indian hostile military posture during peacetime. The introduction of India-Pakistan qualitative changes and nuclear submarine programs to accomplish nuclear triad and augment nuclear deterrent poses new type of challenge to the NPT. Apparent challenges stem from the NPT‟s failure to address HEU use for naval nuclear reactors.125 India‟s Rattehali Uranium enrichment facility exclusively used for nuclear propelled submarine126 generates fears of increase in the production of weapons grade Uranium. The Indian nuclear submarine program can inspire and become a role model for unsatisfied NNWS. The latter category of states will require U-235 enrich Uranium below or close to 20 percent to run submarine reactors.127 It is an alarming situation as naval nuclear reactor produces Pu-239, plutonium isotope is useful for developing WMDs. Indian nuclear submarine project helped NNWS in discovering the loophole in the NPT and enables the NNWS to pose a new challenge to the entire non-proliferation mechanism.
7.8 Indian Air Force Modernisation
Indian defence architects are pursuing stratagem directed toward modernizing the Indian air force. In 2007, Indian Defence Ministry, after approaching different fighter jets makers concluded an agreement with French firm to purchase 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
125Greg Thielmann and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “The Naval Nuclear Reactor Threat to the NPT,” The Arms Control Association, (July 24, 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/files/TAB_Naval_Nuclear_Reactor_Threat_to_the_NPT_2013.pdf (accessed on February 1, 2014): 1. 126Joshi, “India‟s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent Poses Proliferation Challenges.” 127Thielmann and Vergantini, “The Naval Nuclear Reactor Threat to the NPT,” 2.
217
(MMRCA)128 to address the country‟s air force requirements. This modern air force equipped with sophisticated technology would further enhance the existing asymmetry in Indian favor. Indian government allocated Rs 481.9 million to Indian air force in 2012-13 constituting 24.9 percent of the total defence budget.129 New Delhi is also taking substantial steps to enhance the deterrent role of the nuclear weapons by modernizing the country‟s aerial force. Indian nuclear capable aircrafts include Mig-27 with an approximate range of 350 miles, Jaguar 700 miles range, SU-30K with 1600 miles range and the Mirage-2000 H ranging from 750 to 1300 miles. Mirage can also cover such a distance while depending upon the external fuel tanks.130The Indian fighter jets can easily cover entire Pakistan in their offensive operations. The military buildup and their deployments near Pakistan‟s border will only fuel the ongoing arms competition. A joint collaboration between IAF and DRDO enabled India to integrate Astra missile with Su-30 fighter jet and Tejas. On May 24, 2014, it successfully test fired solid fuel propellant Astra air to air missile. 131 Astra is difficult to be tracked. It can jam enemy communication system particularly, radar signals. It can also work in all weathers.
7.9 Pakistani Missile Developments
Pakistan pursued India specific missile modernization program132 in late 1990s due to the short range of its missile inventories and failure to target significant targets deep inside India. Furthermore, Indian missile developments required a prompt response from Pakistan to reduce the growing asymmetry. Pakistan missile inventory can be broadly divided into three categories the continental, maritime and air force missile inventory. It is developing low-to-medium altitude air defence system, solid fuel propelled ballistic missiles, short range, MARVs and MIRVs. Pakistan‟s missile development program is a reaction to Indian CSD, steady and gradual implementation of counterforce targeting strategy, missile developments and BMD system.
128“France Sells Nuclear-Capable Aircraft to India,” Global Security Newswire, (February 7, 2012), http://www.nti.org/gsn, (accessed on March 13, 2012). 129S D Muni and Vivek Chadha, eds., Asian Strategic Review (New Delhi: PENTAGON Press, 2013): 18. 130 Vernie Liebl, “Indian and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines,” Comparative Strategy, 28, No. 2, (2009): 157. 131Memant Kumar Rout, “Astra Missile Test Fired Successfully From Su-30 MKI,” The New Indian Express, (June 20, 2014), http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Astra-Missile-Test-Fired-Successfully-From-Su- 30MKI/2014/06/20/article2290747.ece, (accessed on August 12, 2014). 132 Rajesh M. Basrur, Emailed Interview (September 17, 2018).
218
Indian military modernization program undermines UNSC resolution 1172. New Delhi has brought Islamabad under immense pressure. Pakistan therefore takes keen interest in missile development, aimed at defending country‟s national frontiers. Keeping in view the efficacy of BMD it is speculated that Islamabad may start developing indigenous BMD system.
7.9.1 Continental Missile Force
Pakistan‟s continental missile widely known as land based missile force can be divided into six categories (the short range) Abdali Hatf-II, Ghaznavi Hatf-III, Shaheen Hatf- IV, Nasr Hatf- XI, (the medium range) Ghauri Hatf- V and Shaheen Hatf- VI. Pakistan is also working on (cruise missile) Babur (continental) and Raa‟d (aerial inventory). Continental missiles are launched from surface e.g. land or sea to destroy its targets on land or at sea. Pakistani missiles are capable of destroying urban centers and counterforce targets deep inside India. Consequentially, Pakistan‟s missile tests attract Indian leadership‟s attention. New Delhi based bureaucracy therefore views Pakistani missile system as a grave threat to Indian security.
7.9.2 The Short Range
In response to Indian Agni-II missile test Pakistan tried to balance the score with the test launch of solid-fuel, Hatf-IV Shaheen-I missile on April 14, 1999. The short-range missile is capable of hitting the targets within the range of 750 kilometers.133 This missile test was a blatant move and transparent message that Pakistan cannot brush-off tense changes taking place in its immediate neighborhood; first as such negligence would result in the policy of self-destruction. Or to accept Indian dictations and Indian military on Pakistani territory in worst case scenario. The well-timed reaction of Pakistani policymakers ensured their vigilance. Instead of relying on the foreign help to rescue or restore the strategic balance in Pakistan‟s favor Pakistan is relying on self-help, raising, modernizing and overhauls missile forces to deter the Indian aggression. Islamabad‟s tit-for-tat response ensures sanctity of Pakistan‟s national security vis-à-vis India.
133“World: South Asia India Fires New Missile,” BBC, (April 16, 2014), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/321397.stm, (accessed on December 24, 2014).
219
Pakistan maintained the pace of its missile development program. In May, 2002, Pakistan achieved another milestone by test firing solid-fuel 290 kilometers short range Hatf-III Ghaznavi,134 followed by 180 kilometers135 Hatf-II Abdali. These series of missile tests bear significance if viewed from the prism of escalation rules. However, the salient feature of Ghaznavi and Abdali is their short range which means they are effective against counterforce targets (advancing Indian forces) however, at the same time they are vulnerable to the enemy attacks because of their close deployment near the international border. Furthermore, Pakistan requires a missile force with longer range and higher accuracy to target valuable urban centers and counterforce targets in North and West of India. The fear of the enemy‟s decapitating strikes compels the South Asian adversaries particularly, Pakistan to rely on the policy to easily disperse missile forces mainly because of lack of strategic depth. The peculiar nature of missile apparatus raises questions in the minds of Indian strategic planners. For instance, Arvind Kumar while highlighting the Indian concerns, questions the Indian requirement for strong intelligence mechanism to trace the exact location and determine the nature of Pakistan‟s missile deployments. It also needs to characterize defensive or offensive purposes of the missiles. Under prevalent scenario missile deployments would fuel the hostility and increase the risk of accidental war.
7.9.3 The Medium Range
Ghauri-II a medium range missile was first test fired on April 13, 1999, in a tit-for-tat response to India‟s Agni-II test launch. The missile is capable of neutralizing its targets within the range of 2,300 kilometers.136 It was a distinct attempt by Pakistan to narrow the growing conventional gap between India and Pakistan through domestic sources. Pakistan cannot depend on the outside help to deter India. In March, 2000, Pakistan test fired solid-fuel propellant Hatf- VI Shaheen-II with a range of 2,500 kilometers.137 In May, 2002, Pakistan successfully test fired
134“Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Ghauri (Hatf-5),” Global Security,http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/hatf-5.htm, (accessed on December 25, 2014). 135“Pakistan Missile Milestones- 1961- 2014,” The Risk Report, 20, No. 5, (Septmber-October 2014), http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/miss-miles2005.htm, (accessed on December 24, 2014).
136“World: South Asia India Fires New Missile,” BBC, (April 16, 2014), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/321397.stm, (accessed on December 24, 2014). 137“Pakistan Missile Milestones- 1961- 2014.”
220 liquid fuel propelled138 surface to surface nuclear capable Ghauri missile Hatf-V with a range of 1500 kilometers during military standoff with India. It was a demonstration of an aggressive gesture and an expression of Pakistan‟s commitment that it will not back down.
On November 17, 2014, Pakistan successfully test fired Shaheen 1A Hatf-IV nuclear capable ballistic missile with a range of 900 kilometers. 139 Shaheen 1A can consolidate Pakistan‟s second strike nuclear capability if Pakistan develops and deploys submarine version of Hatf-IV. It will be deployed beyond Indian decapitating strikes thus ensuring the strategic stability in South Asia. A successful test firing of solid fuel surface to surface Shaheen-III conventional and nuclear capable missile with a range of 2,750 kilometers enabled Pakistan to hit North-Eastern parts of India and Nicobar Islands.140 Earlier, these areas were beyond the reach of Pakistani missiles thus India enjoyed second strike capability against Pakistan. Latest development was a response to Indian naval modernization program. India put in place revolution in naval affairs e.g. nuclearization of the Indian Ocean to accomplish nuclear triad. Shaheen-III missile aspires to target India‟s faraway deployed missiles. The missile can be fitted and launched from mobile launchers. Consequentially it can easily be transported anywhere on the grounds it would be difficult to detect. Keeping in view Indian BMDS it is proposed to use Shaheen-III for carrying multiple warheads into enemy heartland. This ambitious agenda would require more complex qualitative changes to enhance missile range and accuracy. The development of Shaheen-III is a departure from Pakistan‟s previous policy to manufacture miniaturized and medium range missiles.
7.9.4 Cruise Missile On August 11, 2005, Pakistani engineers successfully test fired nuclear capable surface to surface Babur Hatf VII cruise missile.141 The missile cannot be detected by the enemy due to stealth technology. Its pin point accuracy enables it to destroy targets within 700 kilometers range. Its extended range and an ability to penetrate enemy territory enabled Pakistan to hit
138“Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD.” 139“Pakistan Successfully Test-Fires Hatf-IV Ballistic Missile,” The Express Tribune, (November 17, 2014). 140Tim Craig, “Pakistan Tests Missile that Could Carry Nuclear Warhead to Every Part of India,” The Washington Post, (March 9, 2015). 141Dennis M. Gormley, “Winning on Ballistic Missile but Losing on Cruise: The Missile Proliferation Battle,” Arms Control Association,https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_12/Gormley, (accessed on December 21, 2014).
221 important Indian urban centers and counterforce targets. The missile test validates the fact that India successfully dragged Pakistan into more costly missile race. From Islamabad‟s point of view, it successfully cracked Indian defence nutshell. The dual use of missile neither disturbs the regional stability nor crisis or arms race stability. It rather ensured it. The missile was re- launched on September 17, 2012142 to ensure maneuverability, stealth technology and its range. The stealth technology enables Babur to effectively dodge Indian BMDS. It is also effective against Indian air defence system.143 Important Indian cities including Chandigarh, Delhi, Jaipur, Gandhinagar, Bhopal, Mambai, Pune, Nagpur and outskirts of Lucknow, 144 can be easily targeted with Babur Hatf-VII. The qualitative superiority enjoyed by Pakistan thus caught India with a sense of insecurity. Pakistan‟s blatant manifestation of qualitative edge over India ensures deterrence stability and prevents India from imposing limited war against Pakistan. A potent weapon in the hands of Pakistani security officials is a weapon of peace.
Pakistan within its limited capacity is making every possible effort to supplement its deterrent capability. Further, in case deterrence breakdown, the technological ascendancy commission Pakistan to inflict maximum damage against India. Hatf-VII can easily be transported to desired locations. One can therefore associate prospective benefits and dangers with it. Easy dispersal of the missile during crisis complicates enemy‟s disarming strike. The residual capacity of Hatf-VII imbeds fear of punitive attack in the minds of the enemy. This feature will deter the enemy from launching preemptive strikes or attacking counterforce targets.145 The destabilizing effect of the missile inventory is dispersal of the missile in crisis like situations which will confuse the enemy in determining whether the deployment is for offensive or defensive purposes?146 Other risks associated with positioning of Hatf-VII encompass pre- delegated authority of nuclear weapons use to junior ranking commander. It can result in nuclear first strike. Moreover, the missiles may come under enemy (invulnerability-vulnerability paradox) or terrorists attack at the time of transportation. Above mentioned doubts are merely apprehensions. Fears that junior ranking officers will use WMDs are baseless because such
142Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR204/2012-ISPR, (September 17, 2012), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2150, (accessed July 22, 2015). 143Das, “India and Pakistan Missile Flexing,” 8. 144S. Chandrashekar, Arvind Kumar and Rajaram Nagappa, An Assessment of Pakistan‟s Ballistic Missile Programme: Technical and Strategic Capability (Bangalore: National Institute of Advance Studies, 2006): 26. 145Kumar and Vonnoni, Ballistic Missile Proliferation in Southern Asia,17. 146Ibid.
222 authority lies with the chairman of NCA. The codes will only be provided when decision in this regard will be made. The doubts that terrorists may attack these weapons are groundless because these are heavily guarded. The security officials deployed for missile security are hired after tough selection process. It is claimed that the missile was indigenously developed. However, it is viewed that Babur Hatf-VII is a decoy of US Tomahawk cruise missile. 147 The Obama administration accused Pakistan of transforming Harpoon anti- ship missiles. US provided these missiles to Pakistan during the Cold War.148
7.10 Pakistan Air Force Modernisation and Missile Force
Pakistan‟s national security policy, missile system, nuclear and military program is rooted in the philosophy of opposition to India. Hostility, turbulent history and enemy images augment suspicions and mutual threat perceptions. Defensive measures by one are considered potential threat, an attempt to ensure escalation dominance and threat to national security by the opponent. Indian decision to procure state of the art MMRC aircrafts resulted in Pakistan‟s March, 2009 initiative to produce JF-17 Thunder fighter jets in collaboration with China.149
7.10.1 Cruise Missile Aerial Inventory
The manufacturing and successful test firing of cruise missile is a multifaceted task. However, Pakistan is one of the few countries to develop and successfully test cruise missiles. In August, 2007, Pakistan test fired aerial version of cruise missile Raa‟d Hatf-VIII. Later, on April 29, 2010, and February 2, 2015,150 Pakistan successfully retest fired nuclear capable Raa‟d,151 with a range of 350 kilometers. The stealth technology endows the cruise missile to remain undetected by the enemy, fly at low altitude, change its course, dodge enemy defence mechanism and enter into enemy territory. However, Raa‟d‟s aerial plat forms are deployed near India-
147“Missile Race in South Asia Enters Space,” Vantage Point Analysis, (April 29, 2012): 2. 148“Pakistan‟s Threat Perception,” CSIS, (August 13, 2014), http://csis.org/blog/pakistans-threat-perceptions, (accessed on August 13, 2014). 149Muni and Chadha, Asian Strategic Review, 25. 150Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR29/2015-ISPR, (February 2, 2015), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2772#pr_link2772, (accessed April 25, 2015). 151“Pakistan Missile Chronology,” NTI, (May, 2011), http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_missile.pdf?_=1316466791, (accessed on August 6, 2014).
223
Pakistan border. It is speculated that the launching pads are vulnerable to detection hence can be destroyed by the Indian BMDS before it is launched.
7.11 Nuclear Submarine Program
In April, 2011, Pakistan responded to the Indian naval expansion program with the signing of contract with China State Shipbuilding Industrial Corp (CSIC).152 China will help Pakistan to accomplish project S-26 and Project S-30. CSIC will provide six type 032 Qing-class submarines,153 to deliver three CJ-10 K cruise missiles with maximum range of 1,500 kilometers, conventional land attack cruise missile (LACM). Later, CJ-10 K cruise missile 154 will be equipped with single tactical warheads to complete nuclear triad. Islamabad‟s response to Indian maritime expansion is based on security dilemma in addition to the dilemma of interpretation and response.155 The view that India has hostile motives compels Pakistan to maximize its military capabilities, avoid weakness and lack of resolve. However, India believes revolution in Indian military affairs (RIMAs) is defensive in nature and a prerequisite for Indian sovereignty. Contrarily India interprets Pakistan‟s maritime developments intimidating and a threat to Indian existence. This action-reaction phenomenon escalates the preexisting rivalry.
The innovations in Pakistan‟s strategic milieu and Indian efforts to reap the benefits of escalation dominance coerced Islamabad to harbinger novelty in intrinsic nuclear force structure. In May, 2012, Pakistan communicated sudden inception of Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC)156as a basic requirement of a credible and effective second strike capability. NSFC will enable naval and NCA leadership to transmit messages to submarines in the bottom or at mid level in sea. The security apparatus in Islamabad thus, simultaneously pursued the program to perfect country‟s naval force structure and C2 system. Pakistan substantially embarked on the path to first develop nuclear propelled submarine. Secondly, Islamabad introduced qualitative
152“Pakistan Naval Modernization,” Global Security,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/navy- modernization.htm, (accessed July 16, 2015). 153Ibid. 154Ibid. 155Ken Booth and Nicolas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 230. 156Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR122/2012-ISPR, (May 19, 2012), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2012/5/19, (accessed on March 14, 2015).
224 changes to furnish its conventional submarines with nuclear warheads. The qualitative changes would require Pakistan to develop Light Water Reactor for its nuclear submarine force.
In December, 2014,there surfaced reports that Pakistan urged China to provide it with three nuclear capable submarines157 and transfer of its technology. Neither Islamabad nor Beijing commented on these reports. In April, 2015, both Germany and France under pressure from India refused to sell submarines to Pakistan. Perhaps Islamabad consequently decided to purchase six Qing Class diesel run submarines from Beijing to accomplish basic national security needs.158
Each submarine is having an innate efficiency to carry three nuclear warheads. The nuclear arms race involving India-Pakistan in blue waters is a dangerous manifestation of vertical extended deterrence. India and Pakistan are impuissant to comprehend powerful fear of the opponent and consider their steps as defensive. Pakistan‟s strategic objectives behind raising and sustaining strong navy include denying any gain to the Indian navy. It would prevent India from blockading Pakistani ports, gain strategic depth and most importantly achieve assured second strike capability. Pakistan is mastering technology to mate Babur Hatf-VII cruise missile,159 with newly ordered submarines. However, the medium range of 700 kilometers will constrain Pakistan to deploy these submarines around adversary sea shores whereas making it susceptible to adversary counterstrikes. The remedy to avoid detection and counterstrikes is to increase the range of Hatf-VII and acquire nuclear propelled submarines.
In pursuance to conclude the above dissertation it is claimed that the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean, nuclear and missile race exhibits that India and Pakistan is not ready to accept opponent‟s escalation dominance. Nuclear deterrent is treated as a potent force to repel foreign aggression. India-Pakistan nuclear weapons will therefore continue to play dominant role in the military doctrines and national security strategies. India will possibly discard NFU policy because of the addition of BMDS, unfolding nuclear arms race in addition to nuclearization of
157Tom Hussain, “India‟s Weapons Plans Raise Specter of Nuclear Arms Race in Asia,” McClatchy, (December 8, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/12/08/249370/indias-weapons-plans-raise-specter.html, (accessed April 26, 2015). 158“Pakistan Nuclear Submarine Development Analysis,” Asian Defence News,http://www.asian- defence.net/2014/02/pakistans-nuclear-submarine-development.html, (accessed April 24, 2015). 159Tim Craig and Karen DeYoung, “Pakistan is Eyeing Sea-Based and Short-Range Nuclear Weapons, Analysts Say,” The Washington Post, (September 21, 2014).
225
Indian Ocean. The BMDS constitutes superstition characterized by invulnerability and nuclearization of Indian Ocean is viewed as accomplishment of assured second strike capability. It inescapably prepares grounds for operaationalistion of CSD to avail the benefits of surprise first and disarming strike. Consequently, Indian rejection of the NFU will escalate instability in the region. Indian adoption of the FU will be opposite to the escalation rule known as rationality of irrationality therefore, may result in breaking the taboo of non-use of the nuclear weapons. Conclusively current pace of nuclear arms race will prevent the NPT from acquiring the status of universality.
7.12 Indian Ballistic Missile Defence System
India started working on its BMDS in early 1990s. It was inspired by the US ballistic missile system. The BMDS is manufactured to counter emerging threats emanating from nuclear capable missiles. 160 It additionally possesses striking ability to influence tense authoritative decision making procedures of the foreign states.161 Budding of BMD does not necessarily mean application of defensive mechanism as offensive war fighting strategy can be well employed. Indian military developments thus exacerbate prevalent conventional and nuclear asymmetry in Indian favor. Consequentially India can launch preemptive strikes or can impose limited war on Pakistan without fear of punishment. BMD system poses existential threats to Pakistan‟s security. Consequentially, Pakistan‟s whole conventional defence apparatus is aimed at repelling Indian conventional and nuclear threats. Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons are weighed inevitable determinative deterrent force against Indian conventional and nuclear forces. Pakistan attempts to upgrade robustness of its missiles to accomplish “accuracy, range and reliability”162 in pursuit to deter Indian pre-emptive strikes and preserve country‟s sovereignty have in return caught India with the sense of vulnerability. The vulnerability of the Indian urban centers in addition the counterforce targets are to Pakistan‟s advantage. It strengthens Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrent posture. India, to maintain its superiority and shift BOP in its favor, is thus left with the only option to escape from this balance of terror. This academic
160Andrew Feickert, “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries,” CRS Report for Congress, (March 5, 2004), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31999.pdf, (accessed on February 9, 2014):1. 161Ibid. 162T. Chand, “Emerging Trends in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System Development,” Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, V, No. 1, (January 8, 2013).
226 work is an attempt to analyze imperative political and strategic rationale behind Indian decision to introduce the BMD in the South Asian strategic milieu. First section will briefly review probable Indian rationale for introducing the BMD in South Asian strategic milieu. Second section will focus on India‟s acquisition of more advanced technology from the Israel and the West. The third section focuses on the positioning of the BMD. The fourth section analyzes the ramifications of Indian positioning of the BMD for South Asian strategic stability. 163 Fifth section reviews the Indian BMD implications for Pakistan‟s deterrent posture. It subsequently analyzes revolution coerced by the BMD in Pakistani military affairs. Sixth section aspires to highlight ramifications of India and Pakistan‟s strategic competition for the NPT. The seventh segment discusses impact of Indian the BMD on South Asian crisis stability. Final section concludes this segment.
7.12.1 The Rationale for Introducing the BMD System in South Asia
India is advancing the BMD program regardless of meaningful negative impact of this weapon system on South Asian security. This study claims that India is discarding Pakistan‟s arms control efforts aspiring to achieve nuclear disarmament and establish nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. Further, India is replacing Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) posture with overkill capacity.
India is acquiring the BMD system by rejecting Pakistani proposal to adhere to nuclear restraint regime. Islamabad proposed nuclear restraint regime in pursuit to peacefully coexist. Second realistically exercise confidence building measures perforce to undermine India-Pakistan security dilemma. Further, to preserve strategic stability and minimize the lethality and cost of India-Pakistan war in case deterrence breakdown. However, India rejected Pakistani proposal perhaps owing to two reasons. First, New Delhi wants to engage Pakistan in costly arms race. Second, India is not prepared to concede equivalence to Pakistan. US is facilitating India in budding the BMD to counterweight China.
163Private conversation: Brigadier General Zahir kazmi Director Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division (SPD) believes BMDS is Indian right however it disturbs South Asian strategic stability, (December 3, 2017).
227
The accessible literature on topic suggests diverse inferences for Indian interest in acquiring and deploying the BMD. India wants to complicate Chinese and Pakistani military strategies.164 Maria Sultan views that India desires to counterbalance deterrent value of Pakistani missiles. Second India wants to augment deterrent value of Indian second strike punitive forces and third engage Pakistan in expansive missile race.165 Several analysts advocate India wants to acquire advanced military technology from US to introduce revolution in Indian military affairs.166 Other drivers include, India political motives to deploy BMD include acquiring United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat. 167 India wants to be entitled to great power status globally. BMD is an aim possibly set by the political elite of the country. Similar attempts were made by the Indian political leadership during 1974, by testing nuclear devices under the cover of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE). In 1998, the Indian scientists made that dream a reality. However, in 21st century they were tasked to develop or acquire the BMD to exalt Indian political stature, to spectacular level of great power in the global community. The rationale behind the manufacturing of nuclear weapons and BMD by India is similar i.e. in the 20th century India wanted to bud nuclear weapons and their delivery system to prove and express that despite sanctions to import sophisticated technology, the Indian scientists have achieved technological milestone. In the 21st century, India is engineering BMD to consistently demonstrate to the world that its scientific community is capable of developing a sophisticated defence shield. It has the potential and therefore, it should be recognized as an emerging power. The development of BMD is a consensus based decision. The stakeholders include Indian political bureaucracy, military top brass and the scientific community. The Indian political leaders aspires to stand next to the world leaders/ developed countries, on international forums i.e. UNSC. The stakes in the development of BMD for military leaders are that they want to give confidence to the Indian leaders and provide sense of security to the Indian nation from foreign threats. Indian scientists want to impress the domestic and international audience by achieving the set goal.
164Khalid Banuri, “Missile Defences in South Asia: The Next Challenge,” South Asian Survey, 11, No. 2, (2004): 195. 165Maria Sultan, “Emerging NMD Technologies and the South Asian Context,” Caspian Brief, No. 26, (August, 2002), available at http://www.cornellcaspian.com, (accessed December 18, 2017). 166Rajesh M. Basrur, “Missile Defence: An Indian Perspective,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia (New Delhi: Vision Books, 2003): 3, 9; Achin Vanaik, The Hindu (May 25, 2001); Mutahir Ahmed, “Missile Defence and South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective,” in krepon and Gagne eds., 259. 167Atul Aneja, “Defence Ministry Debating Deal with the US Over NMD,” The Hindu, (May 13, 2001).
228
7.12.2 BMD System Enabled India to Acquire Next Generation Technology
The development of BMD System required and enabled India to get its hold on long range radars and the anti-missile platforms. The Indian defence planners be acquainted that credible development of such technology remained paradoxical enterprise consequently, it had to receive foreign assistance. India first acquired Russian S-300 anti-missile platforms. Later India manufactured long range (Arrow) radars with the Israeli cooperation. India team up with France to develop guidance radars. 168 The Indian BMD are based on Prithvi Air Defence (PAD), designed to counter high altitude, exo-atmospheric, threats above 50 kilometers and the Advance Air Defence (AAD), above 15 kilometers.169AAD is designed to thwart the low altitude, endo- atmospheric threats.170 AAD is essentially formed on surface to air missile system (SAMS) Akash.171 India is continuously working to increase the reliability of its missile defence shield. The exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric features attributed to the defence shield exhibits that provided that an incoming enemy missile cannot be destroyed at high altitude then it will still have the time, space and chances to destroy it at low altitude. DRDO has already announced the future course of PAD which will be replaced with Advance Software Systems (ADSS). ADSS will be “developed to achieve a high hit-to-kill the probability.”172 It is claimed that PAD, using Swordfish long range tracking radar encompass impressive expertise to track 200 gadgets appearing within a range of 600 kilometers.173 Despite indicated quality PAD will be replaced as its first stage is liquid propellant which reduces efficacy of the PAD. From 2006 to November, 2012, Indian DRDO carried out eight trial tests. In the aftermath of the successful November test the then DRDO Chief VK Saraswat announced that a missile defence system for New Delhi will
168Frank O‟ Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, “India‟s Missile Defense: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” The Diplomat, (August 2, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/indias-missile-defense-is-the-game-worth-the-candle/, (accessed on August 17, 2014). 169“Indian Ballistic Missile Defence- and Its Consequences,” Defence and Security of India,http://defencesecurityindia.com/indian-ballistic-missile-defence-and-its-consequences/, (accessed on July 30, 2014). 170“The Challenges and Opportunities in Developing an Indian Ballistic Missile Defence System,” http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_2013_Patel.pdf, (accessed on February 9, 2014): 73. 171Donnell and Joshi, “India‟s Missile Defense.” 172Debalina Ghoshal, “India Conducts Successful Missile Interceptor Test: Although its Capabilities are Improving, Planned Implementation is Questionable,” The Diplomat, (May 8, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/india- conducts-successful-missile-interceptor-test/, (accessed on July 28, 2014). 173Narayan Menon, “Defence System for India: Ballistic Missile,” Indian Defence Review, 27, No. 3, (July- September, 2012), http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/ballistic-missile-defence-system-for-india/, (accessed on August 17, 2012).
229 be operationalised by the end of 2014. AAD shield would be able to offset incoming missile up to 2000 kilometers. India is working on the agenda to increase its range up to 5000 kilometers.174 According to the reports by RUSI journal, India is also planning to start developing third layer of its missile defence system. The third layer is inspired by the effectiveness of Israel‟s Iron Dome System.175The Iron Dome System effectively functioned against “low-cost missiles” fired from Gaza, with a “range of up to 70 kilometers.” India is working on developing a system, similar to Israel‟s Iron Dome, to be deployed against “artillery shells and low- flying- short- range rockets” which can possibly be fired by neighboring states.176 India is working on a program to develop and deploy “laser based interception.” The Indian researchers claim that the laser based system would be even more effective then US‟s PAC 3 system in terms of “interception range and operation altitude.”177
India is also possessing Israeli Elta Green Pine early warning system and Russian airborne early warning system. If India comes under attack from Pakistan New Delhi will only have two to three minutes to launch counter-strike.178 Less time for response create fears and confusion. Indian decision making authorities in the state of confusion may authorize first strike against Pakistan while damaging major area of the region especially in Pakistan. It is feared that the early warning system may result in breaking the nuclear taboo in any future conflict between India and Pakistan.179
In achieving its ambitious goals, India has also developed solid fuel propelled, surface to air missile system (SAMS) Akash. It has the range of 25 kilometers. India is devising a framework as it is planning to export it to the friendly countries. 180 India is working in collaboration with France to achieve high level of accuracy of Akash SAMS. Askash can be used in all types of conditions and weathers. The Indian Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has
174Guastav Lindstrom, “Development and Implications of Missile Defence,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, (2012): 15. 175“The Challenges and Opportunities.” 176Ibid. 177“Emerging Trends in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System Development,” 178Mohd Aminul Karim, “Is Nuclear Deterrence Workable at the Brink Time in South Asia and Beyond?” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 26, No. 1, (March, 2014): 38. 179Ibid, 42. 180“India Can Export Fighter Planes, Misiles: DRDO Chief,” (June 22, 2014), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-can-export-fighter-planes-missiles-drdo-chief/, (accessed on August 12, 2014).
230 ordered to acquire it for the Indian land forces.181 There are several reasons for ordering this system which includes for instance, its launching pads have been made very flexible as it can also be launched from tanks. The Akash‟s targets include the “cruise missiles, helicopters, fighter planes and unmanned air vehicles (UAV).” Furthermore, its accuracy has been claimed 96 percent. The additional features of this defence shield include the ability to track sixty four targets simultaneously. It can neutralize twelve targets by launching twelve missiles simultaneously.182 Advance weapon system enables India to improve its Command and Control (C2) system. The robust C2 system will endow India to overcome operational problems.
7.12.3 Positioning of the BMD System
India started developing particular BMD in 2006, with an objective to safeguard Indian military installations and urban centers within its frontiers deriving out of foreign threats. China and Pakistan falls in the Indian catalogue of foreign threats with which India administers unsettled borders. The Indian sense of insecurity has been increased due to the advances made by Pakistan (and China).Pakistani fighter jets though cannot cover entire India accordingly Pakistan relies on missiles to destroy targets deep inside the Indian territory. Indian security managers are determined and perfecting war schemes directed to meet eyeball-to-eyeball and to fight two front war. 183 The incorporation and positioning of credible BMD was a decisive step taken with obsession that it will license India to deter Pak-China threats.
Initially, Indian authorities decided to deploy BMD in two Indian cities. “New Delhi is a perfect site,” asserted Gustav Lindstrom, because the BMD deployment would provide protection shield to the Indian National Command Authority (NCA).184However, a decision was recently reached to deploy BMD in two Indian villages of Rajasthan including Alwar and Pali.185 Both Indian villages are less than 800 kilometers from Islamabad. BMD System is known to be a system of systems because its powerful sensors detect missiles initially at boost phase. In the aftermath, the integrated system in BMD starts functioning to identify and track the enemy
181“Akash Surface- to- Air Missile System, India,” (May 24, 2012), http://www.army- technology.com/projects/akashsurfacetoairmis/, (accessed on August 12, 2014). 182Ibid. 183 Muhamamd Irfan Qaisrani, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (August 28, 2018). 184Lindstrom, “Development and Implications of Missile Defence.” 185“India to Deploy Two Ballistic Missile Defence Systems Near Pakistan Border,” Sputnik, (August 7, 2017), https://sputniknews.com/asia/201708071056252187-india-missile-defense-systems/, (accessed November 12, 2017).
231 missile for the interceptor missile186 with an ultimate goal to destroy it. The BMD can intercept the enemy missiles at three stages i) the boost phase, ii) the cruise phase and iii) the reentry (into earth‟s atmosphere) phase.187
7.12.4 BMD Positioning and Ramifications for South Asian Strategic Stability
The BMD positioning by New Delhi exhibits Islamabad bankruptcy to favorably engage India in arms control apparatus. Indian aspirations to mature BMD discards classical notion of credible deterrence based on the concept of punishment. BMD possession and subsequent deployment by India undermines Pakistan‟s first strike policy. BMD endows New Delhi to prevent Pakistani missiles from entering and destroying targets inside India. Consequentially, efficient BMD buttress Indian conventional superiority. Keeping in view efficacy of defence shield India can launch surprise disarming attacks against Pakistan‟s counterforce targets. It thus shifts the balance of power in Indian favors and hampers strategic stability. The BMD institutes false sense of security in the minds of Indian public, political leadership, civil bureaucracy, NCA and military directorate. New Delhi is implementing Cold War era superpowers strategies to ensure escalation dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Indian policymakers should realize the fact that both superpowers survived the long persisting threat of conventional and nuclear war because of the mutual vulnerability of counter value and counterforce targets. The nuclear deterrence in South Asia is effectively functioning because of the fear of mutual vulnerability. In South Asia deterrence is functional because first credibility of deterrence based on nuclear weapons has not been tested. Second, fear of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and third deterrence stability resulted in solidifying strategic stability.
The BMD system would transform Indian military deployments and nuclear posture from relaxed to super ready status. India is therefore replacing liquid fuel propelled missiles with solid fuel missile inventories.188 It will endow India to keep its missile forces ready for longer period of time. New Delhi can issue orders to launch these forces within minutes particularly in crisis like situations. The BMD deployment and super ready status would in addition require India to delegate the authority to launch missiles to junior ranking military officers resulting in deliberate
186PA Patil, “Indo-Israel Collaboration for Integrated Anti-Missile System,” In Focus, (February 24, 2014), http://capsindia.org/files/documents/CAPS_Infocus_PP_1.pdf, (accessed on August 12, 2014). 187Ibid. 188 Khalil, (December 3, 2017).
232 or accidental use of nuclear weapons. Indian BMD forasmuch adds destabilizing variables and forestall regional stability. Pakistan maintains de-mated nuclear forces however Indian hair- trigger alert would bring Pakistani NCA under pressure particularly in crisis situation. Changes in Indian nuclear posture, war fighting strategy and military preparedness can coerce Pakistan to espouse likewise nuclear posture.
Due to the heightened alert status and false sense of security developed by BMD, Indian military would start believing that Pakistani cities have been held hostage by the Indian nuclear and conventional missile forces. Consequentially New Delhi will adopt aggressive posture towards Islamabad. There is grave possibility that Indian military top brass, thereafter taking the political leaders into confidence, may operationalize the CSD against Pakistan. The BMD apparatus is increasing Pakistan‟s threat perception and security dilemma. The future possibility to launch CSD (limited conventional attack) would mean crossing Pakistan‟s demarcated nuclear redlines and threshold. The Indian defence planners are thus developing defence layer to provide the sense of security to its masses at the cost of regional instability. Further, Indian BMDS is also systemically linked with global peace and security due to the Chinese presence in the region and global arena. Possession of Indian BMD has already accelerated the ongoing missile race between India and Pakistan. Indian policymakers should understand that the deployment of BMD system will result in quantitative and qualitative vertical proliferation. Second it will heighten Sino-Pak dependency on nuclear weapons. It will proportionately weaken regional arms control measures, disarmament clause Article VI of NPT and; third possible operationalization of CSD would result in lowering the nuclear threshold leading to deterrence failure. The non- use of nuclear weapons taboo may consequently crumble.
Indian deployment of the BMDS will thus result in the violation of Bernard Brodie‟s philosophy that “thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose.”189The Indian violation of the rule established by Brodie resulted in devising war wining offensive strategies i.e. CSD. Indian offensive posture poses existential threat to Pakistan. New Delhi coerces Islamabad to concentrate on war fighting strategies rather than deterrent strategies.
189Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946). 76.
233
7.12.5 Indian BMD Implications for Pakistan Deterrent Posture
South Asia is one of the regions where an active arms race is underway between nuclear rivals. Pakistani security establishment visualizes that although India has not matured BMD yet the BOP will be shifted in Indian favor. Indian deployment of BMD necessitates changes in Pakistan‟s external strategic environment. Preexistent ominous factors in Pakistan‟s strategic environment include revolution in Indian Military Affairs (RIMAs), Indian arms procurement and bellicose war fighting strategy. Powerful incorporation consisting of the indicated factors resulted in the conventional military asymmetry in Indian favor. The BMD further capacitates India to intercept and destroy bulk of Pakistani missiles. In this situation, India can execute disarming strikes against Pakistan‟s counterforce targets to exterminate major chunk of Pakistan‟s defensive capabilities. After absorbing Indian attack, Pakistan would have two options; either realizes that Pakistan‟s residual forces are insufficient and incapable to inflict damage to the Indian forces. Furthermore, in India-Pakistan war, Indian BMD would enable India to block majority of missile attacks. In retaliation, a strong conventional Indian military would destroy the remaining Pakistani forces. After this realization, Pakistan may not retaliate and may demand for the compensation either by filing plea in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or approaching major powers. Secondly, Pakistan may reorganize its remaining forces and retaliate against India with an objective to punish and inflict maximum damage to India. It is possible that Pakistani attack would be based on the nuclear forces to deprive New Delhi of potential incentives of disarming strike. Irrespective of the potential effectiveness of the Indian BMD, lack of strategic depth and Indian massive retaliation doctrine, Pakistan‟s nuclear Command and Control (C2) authority should therefore publically adhere to policy of Maximum Damage Doctrine (MDD). However, MDD would be conditional it can only be launched in case of the Indian limited surgical strikes or accidental launch of missiles against Pakistani counterforce and counter value targets. This defensive retaliatory strategy can serve twofold purposes. First it dissuades India from military adventurism against Pakistan. Second MDD justifies vertical nuclear proliferation and missile modernization program.
Indian BMD and rejection of nuclear restraint regime proposal increases Pakistan‟s preexistent security dilemma. It widens India-Pakistan prevailing trust deficit. It required Pakistani defense planners to conscientiously notice changes in strategic environment and alter
234 preexistent strategy of CMD. Changes in Pakistan‟s external strategic environment despite economic constraints require Islamabad to revise nuclear posture and upgrade its conventional military mussels. Pakistan‟s primary motive would be to thwart Indian bellicose designs and preserve sanctity of its borders. The CMD posture therefore was considered redundant due to the novelty in Indian military posture. Pakistan‟s up-to-date nuclear posture today is based on CMFD to preserve the sanctity of Pakistan‟s sovereignty. Comprehensive strategy thus enables Pakistan to repel Indian dictations and oppose Indian regional hegemony.
7.12.6 Indian BMD Actualize Revolution in Pakistan’s Military Affairs
The strategic hawks in Pakistan believe that nuclear weapons possession is considered as countervailing power by India. Nuclear weapons thus reduce Islamabad‟s dependence on allies and neutralize Indian conventional military superiority. It deters Indian military adventurism mainly preemptive strikes and maintains regional strategic stability. Pakistan therefore adheres to first use policy and considers nuclear weapons as weapon of peace. Pakistan knows that credible nuclear deterrent in South Asia can only function if the Indian counterforce and counter value assets would remain vulnerable to Pakistani missiles.
The BMD enhances in dealing with the BMD threat Pakistan introduced qualitative change in its missile inventory to overwhelm Indian BMD with considerable number of missiles. Islamabad therefore decided to replace one missile with “Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).Islamabad is producing Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MARVs) Chaffs, decoys, trajectories and the cruise missiles”190 essentially to dodge the Indian BMD. Development of MARVs Chaffs, decoys and trajectory is an expensive task however, once it is achieved India would again feel vulnerable. Shaheen-II missile is capable of delivering 700 kilograms up to 1136 kilometers and 1000 kilograms can hit target within the range of 851 kilometers. The extension in the missile range enabled Pakistan to target Indian cities of Raipur and Hyderabad. 191 In 2008, Shaheen-II, solid fuel missile reach was extended up to 2000 kilometers.192 Shaheen-II enabled Pakistan to hold important Indian cities including Bangalore,
190Ghoshal, “India Conducts Successful Missile Interceptor Test.” 191Chandrashekar, Kumar and Nagappa, An Assessment of Pakistan‟s Ballistic Missile Programme, 29. 192“ Pakistan Launches Longest-Range Nuclear-Capable Missile During Exercise,” Associated Press, (April 22, 2008).
235
Trivandrum, Chennai, Bhubanesh war, Kolkata, Gangtok and Shiong193 as hostage during crisis or in the event of actual war. It was believed that the Shaheen-II developed by the National Defence Complex (NDC) would become the main striking force against India. One of the features of Shaheen- II is that it can be fired from road- mobile launchers making it difficult for the enemy to locate and destroy it. Pakistan is also developing a more sophisticated battlefield cruise and ballistic nuclear capable missiles. Islamabad‟s countermoves or war winning strategies are the outcomes of first security dilemma and; second Indian supremacy in the conventional and nuclear realms. India-Pakistan efforts to strengthen their security hampers the efforts to put restraint on advances in the field of nuclear tipped “ballistic missile proliferation.”194
Pakistan‟s missile forces and fighter jets with medium range could not target Indian counterforce assets. Further, the deployment of Pakistan‟s military assets near enemy border to destroy targets deep inside enemy‟s territory made them vulnerable to enemy attacks and destruction. The fears of enemy‟s preemptive strikes resulted in further extension of the missile range that can be deployed close to Afghan and Iranian border. In dealing with BMD, Pakistan may work on the development of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to disrupt C2 and communication system in enemy‟s heartland. In order to deliver EMP, Pakistan will rely on cruise missiles which are difficult to intercept. Pakistan in view of the above cannot join the NPT as a NNWS195 or abandon its efforts to produce fissile material to strengthen the NPT at the cost of the entire Pakistani state. Pakistan‟s CMD posture became redundant it could not function following the introduction of BMD in South Asia. Only large number of missile forces would provide and ensure the sense of security to Pakistan. Decision to deploy BMDs ceased Islamabad‟s endeavors to control nuclear and conventional arms race. If Pakistan will not increase the number of its missiles, small missile force will be either shot down by BMD or destroyed in the Indian attack on Pakistani missile installations. In the aftermath of such a scenario, Pakistan will be left at the mercy of the Indian forces. Pakistan‟s nuclear deterrent ability repeatedly deterred Indian military adventurism. Pakistan‟s countermeasures against BMD include the development of anti-
193Chandrashekar, Kumar and Nagappa, An Assessment of Pakistan‟s Ballistic Missile Programme 30. 194Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic- Missile Defence and Strategic Stability (London: Oxford University Press, 2004): 5. 195 Sauer, interview.
236 missile interceptor or BMD System known as FM-90 Missile System.196The Pakistani engineers have mastered the technology to shoot down unmanned aerial vehicle, cruise missiles and against electronic control measures (ECM). The additional features of surface to air missile system include its ability to operate in all types of weather. The FM-90 Missile System recently inducted, can engage numerous targets. The induction of missile system confirms that Pakistan is working on the idea of deterrence by denial.
In knee-jerk reaction to Pakistan, India will either manufacture TNWs or realize intrinsic dangers of the escalation ladder. Nevertheless, in arms races and in the escalation situation, adversaries continue to climb tense escalation ladder. However, South Asian arch rivals cannot adhere to this typical escalation situation. It is a hazardous game of action reaction which might finally cause a nuclear confrontation. The missiles modernization program increased the defence budgets of India and Pakistan and their dependence on foreign suppliers. Pakistan has a weak economy. To bear the burden of an arms race is difficult to sustain. Pakistan‟s nuclear program is essential in its security-centric relations with India. Besides, their maintenance is easy, cost effective and efficient in deterring Indian adventurism. Despite Pakistan‟s technological achievements, India desires to drag Pakistan in the conventional and nuclear arms race. On February 1, 2017 Indian finance ministry allocated US $ 53.3 billion to Indian Ministry of Defence.197 India was listed as fifth largest military spender by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.198 Pakistan‟s military budget in contrast is $ 7.6 billion to Indian defence budget. Indian huge military budget to procure technologically advanced military hardware and bud BMDS exacerbates Pakistan‟s insecurity. It compels Islamabad to raise its military budget in pursuit to decrease rising military asymmetry between India and Pakistan. Apparently Indian strategy is to indulge Pakistan in arms race aimed to bankrupt Islamabad. Indian desire has its roots in the US President Ronald Regan‟s strategic defence initiative (SDI) program. SDI led to the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. However, Indian military deployments near Pakistani borders and war plans hatched against Pakistan enabled Islamabad to master the technology to
196 Inter Services Public Relations, ISPR, Release No. PR136/2015-ISPR, (May 11, 2015), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2879, (accessed July 26, 2015). 197Laxman K Behera, “India‟s Defence Budget 2017-18: An Analysis,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, (February 3, 2017), https://idsa.in/issuebrief/india-defence-budget-2017-18_lkbehera_030217, (accessed December 19, 2019). 198Rezaul H Laskar, “India is Fifth Largest Military Spender with Outlay of $ 55.9 bn: SIPRI,” Hindustan Times, (April 24, 2017).
237 develop WMDs. The existential threat posed to Pakistan‟s survival enabled it to develop and deploy the battlefield or tactical missiles, intermediate and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles and SLBMs. These qualitative changes enabled Pakistan to develop solid fuel missile propellant. Islamabad is now embarked on the way to develop MIRVs. The development and the integration of short range missiles in the military doctrine to hit the counterforce targets depicts Pakistan is focusing on offensive-defence war winning strategies. Improvements in Pakistan‟s missile force structure and changes in the military doctrine further aggravate the situation for India. For example, enhanced features of Pakistani missile leave little room for the Indian BMDS to respond to former‟s incoming conventional or nuclear missiles.
7.12.7 India-Pakistan Strategic Competition is Undermining the NPT
India and Pakistan have not signed CTBT, they are increasing warhead numbers/stockpile and fissile material.199 South Asian arms race and emerging nuclear posture is weakening the spirit of the NPT in South Asia. It is also weakening the international community‟s efforts focused on the global nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. From the perspective of nuclear pessimists, overall situation is worsening and undermining the NPT. Indian BMD compels Pakistan to adopt nearly nuclear ready status and deploy unassembled short and long range nuclear weapons. This deployment will result in, as several time asserted to delegate powers, to launch battlefield missiles to junior ranking officers. The maturing of the Indian BMD will thus further complicate the situation200 and clouds of nuclear war will continue to hover over South Asia. The matured BMD System deployed by India can force Pakistan to adopt a super nuclear ready status for instance, to increase production of fissile material, missiles, nuclear warheads, test and deploy assembled battlefield or TNWs and nuclear weapons to guard against India. The necessity to increase the production and the deployment of missiles stems from the positioning and possibility of Indian BMD to destroy the incoming Pakistani missiles before reaching their targets. The multiplication in statistics of missiles will thus in return reinforce Pakistan‟s capacity to ravage Indian cities and counterforce assets. Conclusively, the Indian BMD exhausts Article IV, Article VI and Article IX of the NPT. The Indian BMD likely frustrates regional and beyond the region‟s arms control and disarmament efforts.
199 Michael Krepon, (Co-Founder, Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.) emailed interview, (September 17, 2018). 200 Feroz Hassan Khan, interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 18, 2018).
238
7.12.8 Implications for Crisis Stability
Indian BMDs posed challenges and hampered South Asian crisis stability, based on mutual fear and threat of retaliation by the opponent. The crisis stability functions because neither of the opponents is in possession of weapons system to shift the BOP in his favor. The crisis stability thus depends on arms race stability. If arms race stability, from Indian perspective, is eroded with the help of BMD, it would erode mutual threat perception and the crisis stability would be placed in Indian favor. The Indian political and military elite believe that the BMD maintain higher level of accuracy. The BOP is shifting in Indian favor. India believes that BMD endow it to enjoy strategic advantages vis-a-vis Pakistan. It is therefore feared that due to New Delhi‟s strategic depth, sense of protection and future assured second strike capability, the Indian leadership may authorize surgical strikes, limited or full scale conventional war against Pakistan.
Indian aggressive military posture poses existential threat and compels Pakistan to restore crisis stability, nullify the sense of superiority and protection enjoyed by the Indian military. Pakistan fears that the Indian quest for BMD has roots to ensure “escalation dominance.” Sumit Ganguly asserts that India is gradually advancing on the path to prevail over Pakistan during all levels of crisis and conflict. India through steady modernization of military technology wants to achieve the ability to launch pre-emptive strikes and ensure self defence against Islamabad. 201 The Indian military dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan bears political, military and socio-economic consequences for Islamabad. Military consequences include existential threat, threat of pre-emptive strikes202 against counter value and counterforce targets. The list also includes the possibility of the Indian blackmailing or to carry actual decapitating strikes against Pakistan‟s nuclear facilities and depots. Islamabad‟s countermeasures based on escalation rules203 are focused on maintaining regional BOP. Islamabad‟s negligence in maintaining parity with New Delhi would bring Pakistan under pressure during crisis. Hence, Pakistan will have to hold negotiations on Indian terms and conditions during crisis. Owing to these fears, Pakistan despite its scarce resources is solidifying its deterrent force with an aim to ensure if deterrence fails, it can inflict maximum damage to India.
201 Sumit Ganguly, “Diverging Nuclear Pathways in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, 20, No. 2, (2013): 385, 386. 202Kahn, On Escalation, 174. 203Ibid, 4.
239
The spiral of South Asian arms race is a matter of political life and death for New Delhi based politicians and the military top brass based in Rawalpindi. The politicization of conflicting issues helps the ruling elite on both sides of the borders of India and Pakistan to enjoy the support of masses. Emotionally overcharged masses support helps the ruling elite to enjoy perks and privileges, extend their rule or suppress political opponents. It is in this background claimed here that different ruling elites in India-Pakistan were involved in military competition to gain parity, took risk of crisis and experienced typical escalation situations, as Herman Kahn asserted, because of the “fear of overreaction” 204 of the society and enemy. Detrimental political ramifications of the opponent‟s victory did not allow both sides to abandon their efforts. Pakistan‟s anxiety of enemy‟s overreaction, in case enemy wins, has roots in the occupation of Kashmir by the Indian military in 1947, the dismemberment of East Pakistan by the Indian military in 1971, Indian army‟s occupation of Siachin glacier, the crisis of Brass tacks, 1990s crisis, Kargil war and the military stand-off 2001-2. The series of such turbulent activities reaffirms the belief of policy making circles that India has not accepted the partition of the sub- continent. It wants to undo the 1947 partition of the sub-continent. The indicated crises always remained unpredictable. It is possible that India may hold Pakistan responsible for terror incident inside India and decide to punish the Pakistan. BMD capacitates India to destroy Pakistani satellite and makes this eventuality possible. The retaliatory policy is based on Herman Kahn‟s “reprisal policy” which best explains likewise scenario discussed in Rung 28 under the heading exemplary attacks against property.205 Islamabad lacks expertise in satellite technology. It would require huge financial resources and efforts to launch or hire another satellite. In case of hiring satellite, the owner would transfer data based on his liking and disliking. If implemented, it would thus an effective policy. India would achieve twofold objectives by destroying Pakistani satellite. First, India would remain below Pakistan‟s nuclear threshold. Conversely, inhibit Islamabad from launching first strike against India. Second, India would whip Pakistan yet avoid outbreak of nuclear war and international condemnation.
To conclude this section Indian aspiration to maintain conventional asymmetry vis-à-vis Pakistan, become regional hegemon and attain major power status accelerated Indian vertical proliferation. The deployment of BMDs provides fictitious sense of security to India (BMD
204Ibid. 205 Ibid,144.
240 cannot intercept and destroy all incoming missiles) yet it erodes mutual sense of insecurity. In this background India can operationalise offensive CSD. Indian aggressive military posture poses existential threat to Pakistan‟s sovereignty. Consequently the introduction of Indian BMD requires India to acquire advance military technology. Introduce offensive war fighting doctrines directed towards Pakistan. Indian developments thus pose serious threats to crisis and deterrence stability. Further BMD System is thus a matter of grave concern for Pakistan. Indian BMD System revitalizes domino effect theory i.e. it provides imputes to neighboring Pakistan to take countermeasures and consolidating a nuclear and conventional missile arms race.
Conclusion
India-Pakistan geographical size, economies, populations and militaries proves that both were born asymmetrical. Islamabad signed Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in search of security.206 India is a huge market for the West hence it enjoys twofold advantages i.e. first, the West turns deaf ear to Pakistani narrative vis-à-vis India. Second, New Delhi receives preferential treatment, the next generation technological hardware and incorporating qualitative changes in conventional and nuclear force structure.207 The foreign investment, economic stability and huge size of the Indian economy make it impossible for Pakistan to compete. The available options for Pakistan is, first to avoid arms race with India. Second, rely on Full Spectrum Credible Minimum Deterrent (FSCMD) for its security. It deters India from operationalising CSD despite robust military forces. 208 Introduction of the CSD increased the escalation ladder and disturbs the regional stability. Possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by India further increased by the coming of the Hindu orthodox, Bharitya Janata Party, under the leadership of Narendra Modi, into power, who were responsible for demolishing Babri Masjid, Samjhota Express Carnage and killings of Muslims and Christians in India. Presumably Orthodox Hindus would attempt to solidify their grip on country‟s nuclear weapon program and later justify the use of WMDs in the guise of accidental use against Pakistan.
206 Muhammad Khan, Interviewed by Asfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 24, 2018). 207 Ishtiaq Ahmed, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 23, 2018). 208 Khan, interview.
241
Indian favored vicious conventional asymmetry based on i.e. size, the lethality, range, types of missiles, MIRVs, MARVs, satellites, nuclear submarines, predator drones, tanks, long range aircrafts and F.16 production worsen Pakistan‟s security dilemma. 209 India-Pakistan asymmetry can be measured by comparing the overall strength of three branches- army, navy air force- of the two sides.210 New Delhi has termed them defensive capabilities. However, their offensive nature requires Islamabad to expand its nuclear forces. 211 Hence, cooperation is impossible instead Indian signaling generates crisis like situation.212 In short, Indian vertical proliferation, large conventional forces and strategic accords significantly increased deterrent role of nuclear weapons. Indian vision to modernize Indian nuclear forces, the development and deployment of the BMD are the driving forces of nuclear arms race in the South Asian region. It provides justification to Pakistan to discard the NPT, develop and rely on WMDs for its security. 213 Expecting Islamabad to dismantle nuclear weapons program without credible security guarantees would inevitably damage its national security. Indian negative security assurances cannot be trusted214 it defied Canada and US by changing the course of civil nuclear program for nuclear weapons development. The recorded history validates that Napoleon violated signed convention. Later, in 1904 and 1941 Japanese launched attacks without declaring wars. In 1914 Germans violated Belgian neutrality. 215The succeeding examples validate the teachings of offensive realism that a state may be benign today tomorrow it can be aggressor. South Asia‟s active arms race is therefore an outcome of India-Pakistan opposed views. For instance, Indian arms buildup is a result of the Indian aims to be recognized as global power and to neutralize threats posed by China and Pakistan.216 Efforts to maintain the status quo, desire to reduce the prevailing asymmetry217 and enhancing the credibility of nuclear deterrent explains Pakistan‟s arms buildup.
209 Syed Rifaat Hussain, Emailed interview (September 19, 2018). 210 Ibid. 211 Rajesh M. Basrur, Emailed interview (September 17, 2018). 212 Zafar Khan, Interview. 213 Muhammad Khan, Interview. 214Kahn, On Escalation, 123. 215Ibid, 123, 127. 216 Ashok Sharma, “The Enduring Conflict and the Hidden Risk of India-Pakistan War,” SAIS Review, XXXII, No. 1, (Winter-Spring, 2012): 132. 217 Ibid.
242
The introduction of TNWs by Pakistan echo a strategy of flexible response as it aims to punish aggressor on a limited scale for endangering Pakistan‟s existence. The WMDs will be used against India for crossing the nuclear thresholds. It is thus deterrence by denial model. However, it gave birth to the debate between Pakistan‟s critics and sympathizers. Critics ignore Pakistan reason deter‟ for introducing the TNWs and their deterrent role rather view them dangerous because of the fear of delegation of authority to junior ranking officers and the adoption of nuclear ready status. Khan views that TNWs should not be deployed near Indian border. First, proximity to border will make them vulnerable to enemy attack. Second, India may deliberately invade to test the credibility of nuclear deterrent. Failure to launch TNWs will erode credibility of FSCMD. On contrary, if TNWs are unleashed India will prove Pakistan as an irresponsible state demanding the world to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. 218 Khan prescribes that Pakistan should modernize its conventional forces and use TNWs as a last resort.
Sympathetic circles views super ready status and delegation of authority empowers guardians of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons. Yet decision to launch nuclear weapons is the prerogative of NCA headed by the Prime Minister. Operational codes will remain with the NCA. Launch codes will only be shared with the field commanders if NCA decides to carryout nuclear strike against India. NCA will ensure to maintain the negative command, as mentioned in Chapter four, to avert inadvertent or unauthorized nuclear attack and ensure strict control on nuclear forces. The requirement of peacetime deployments stem from the fear of enemy‟s pre- emptive strikes against Pakistan‟s nuclear assets. Adherence to nuclear war fighting strategy would create fear of punishment in the hearts and minds and deter enemy from operationalising the CSD. TNWs thus play a deterrent role and maintain status quo in a strategically volatile South Asian region.
218 Hassan Khan, Interview.
243
Chapter Eight Emerging International Nuclear Order and the Efficacy of the NPT
8.1 Introduction
The NPT is unique accord. It legally allows only five states to retain nuclear weapons. The NPT is a diverse treaty by its nature as it nips the bud of proliferation of nuclear technology, illicit nuclear commerce, fissile material, transfer of nuclear weapons to NNWS. It essentially involves the entire international community- except India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan. The NPT signatories in spite of all the efforts failed to persuade the non-signatory states to annex the treaty as NNWS. The outliers‟ states have imperceptibly posed challenge to the survival of the NPT because of the treaty‟s non-universal status. Outliers‟ states with the exception of South Sudan while living outside the NPT manufactured their respective nuclear weapons. These de-facto NWS prohibited the NPT from making changes in their security policies. Yet, NPT is a powerful mechanism and prevented majority of states from acquiring nuclear weapons.1 The NPT in few cases unearthed course or slowed the procedure of nuclear bomb making. The treaty has successfully established a taboo- on the use of nuclear weapons.2 Furthermore, according to Article VI of the NPT, NWS are indebted to convene discussions on complete nuclear disarmament. It is therefore an established fact that nuclear order is based on the NPT.
This section highlights daunting troubles of the NPT that accommodate basis as favorable to the articulation of powerful neoteric global nuclear order. It recalls the readership that the NPT inherits consequential complications such as possibility of cheating by the NPT signatories. This segment attempts to search answers of;
Can nuclear order based on the NPT be revised to align the non-NPT states? What are the possible consequences of extension in the NPT‟s cut-off date? How can stable NPT align non-NPT states? How different measures are stabilizing the NPT?
1 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “Nuclear Proliferation,” in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. William (Oxon: Routledge, 2008): 362. 2 T.V. Paul, “Taboo or Tradition? The Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons in World Politics,” Review of International Studies, 36, No. 4, (October, 2010): 853.
244
8.2 Preexistent Nuclear Order and the NPT
Indisputably international system is becoming multi-polar. Classical belief that states are primary actors is replaced. Present-day international system consists of the states, international organizations i.e. United Nations (UN) and nuclear watchdog agencies including the IAEA, the MTCR and the NSG. Likewise nuclear order consists of considerable groups including NWS, NNWS members to the NPT, nuclear watchdog agencies and covenants i.e. the NPT, the PSI, the MTCR and the UN Security Council (SC) Resolution 1540. UNSCR 1540 looks at the measures taken by states to proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors.3
The use of the diplomacy to settle controversies of non-compliance encompassing the NPT signatories is an essential feature of the established nuclear order. In 1990s, the treaty accomplished large-scale breakthroughs (discussed in details in chapter two) yet it is faced with daunting problems. Inherited problems of the NPT necessitate significant changes to overcome the treaty‟s challenges and survive. The succeeding section highlights thesaurus of challenges confronting the NPT including; a. Non-compliance by the NPT signatories to divert course of peaceful nuclear activities in violation of the Article I, pillar I non-proliferation and Article IV, pillar III of the NPT to manufacture nuclear weapons. b. The NWS have deliberately ignored pillar II nuclear disarmament by putting Article VI of the NPT in the back burner. Further, the NWS are enjoying a distinguished position in the NPT. Preexistent nuclear order was evolved on the basis of the benefits promised to NNWS under Articles III and IV of the NPT. However, a variety of cases of non-compliance manifests tendency and possibility that NNWS can cheat. Consequentially, the pillar I and pillar III of the NPT is faced with grave threat. Problems including nuclear proliferation, non-compliance and cheating persists. Fault-finding analysis about the controversy of non-compliance exhibits that; i. The NPT NNWS signatories on purpose double-crossed and disobeyed their juridical and principled obligations. ii. Proliferating states accomplished the initial phase of proliferation, for military purposes.
3 Richard T. Cupitt, (Senior Associate Stimson Centre, Washington DC) emailed Interview (September 17, 2018).
245 iii. The NPT aims at ceasing horizontal proliferation. However, the treaty is an inadequate tool to cope with modern-day challenges and restrict NNWS from diverting peaceful nuclear technology towards nuclear bomb making. Consequently, NPT was empowered with additional tools including the NPT review conferences, the NSG, the IAEA machinery, the Additional Safeguards Protocol, 4 the MTCR, UNSCR 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The verification clause was deemed indispensable to prevent the NPT signatories from cheating and developing atom bomb. iv. Technologically progressive states including NWS signatories to the NPT aims at halting proliferation by restricting supply of nuclear technology and fissile material.5 The NNWS have neither threatened nor have exercised withdrawal clause- except North Korea- Article X of the NPT. However, NWS failure to implement disarmament agenda under Article VI and departure from Article IV creates feelings of resentment among NNWS. The list of challenges confronting the NPT also includes the following; c. Policymakers in various NNWS can analyze the cost they had to pay to remain NNWS. d. India-Pakistan, South Sudan and Israel did not accede to the NPT as NNWS. e. South Asia‟s outlier states are frustrated as both envisage the NPT as a discriminatory treaty. Both want amendments in the NPT to be recognized as NWS. f. India signed nuclear accords for peaceful purposes but it developed nuclear weapons in violation of morally and legally binding covenants. Yet, it enjoys a distinguished position in an established nuclear order for example, it was granted the MTCR membership and backdoor NSG wavier.6 g. Nuclear reactors in submarines facilitate states to produce fissile material including HEU and plutonium. This loophole needs to be fixed. However, the NPT is silent and state like India is exploiting it. h. Nuclear disarmament appears to be a distant and difficult task fundamentally due to US selective non-proliferation policy to accommodate selective states for instance India.US adopted iron-fisted standard aligning coercive non-proliferation policy in several cases policy of regime change. This academic work concludes that US divide proliferating
4 George Bunn, “The World‟s Non-Proliferation Regime in Time,” IAEA Bulletin 46/2, (March, 2005): 8. 5 Camille Grand, “The Non-Proliferation Treaty in an Era of Proliferation Crises,” in Nuclear Weapons After the 2010 NPT Review Conference, ed. Jean Pascal Zanders (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2010): 19. 6 Benjamin Kienzle, Skype interview by Ashfaq Ahmed, (September 19, 2018).
246
states into responsible for example India and unreliable (rogues) states. US non- proliferation policy results in feelings of resentment in NNWS hence can lead to internal challenges for the NPT. US preferential nuclear policy towards India is widening the gulf between the NPT and Pakistan. The US is essentially exacerbating external challenges for the NPT. i. The established nuclear order based on the NPT constitutes global hierarchy and asymmetrical distribution of nuclear perks and privileges among constituents of the treaty. The haves legally inherit the right to bud position, preserve and modernize nuclear forces. The NSG, a select group of states regulate nuclear commerce. The have-nots are seemingly the most oppressed states as they carry the burden to abide by non- proliferation commitments prescribed in the NPT, assure the haves and nuclear watchdog agencies that have-nots are neither making nor aspiring to acquire nuclear bomb. The outliers states (India, Pakistan and Israel), and the withdrawing state (so far North Korea is the only example). Since the haves and NSG states are enjoying benefits of the prevailing nuclear order they have aligned their interest in pursuit to preserve the status quo. The haves and NSG states are creating “physical and legal” obstacles to thwart any challenge from emerging. South Asian outlier‟s states have revisionist designs as they want to become de-jure NWS.
8.3 The Revised Nuclear Order Based on the NPT
The NNWS have highlighted disparities in the prevalent nuclear order based on the NPT. The policymakers in NNWS signatories to the NPT may one day question about the compulsion of complying with the NPT statutes. The wide array of interest groups, disparities identified above and T.V. Paul assertion that the NPT inherits fault such as the treaty does not house new NWS7 is against the established rules of “modern international system.”8 It also manifests that established nuclear order is under significant stress. Enduringly neglected disparities will aggravate the ongoing crisis of the NPT. Change from the perspective of power transition theory is inevitable. However, the development of novel nuclear order is strenuous assignment as participants involved in the process would be representing opposed views and endeavor to accrue
7 T.V. Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Fall, 1998):10. 8 Ibid.
247 divergent interests. Succeeding paragraphs endeavors to analyse potentiality of the evolution of revised nuclear order. The proposals to revise established nuclear order will first of all have to address disparities and tacit hierarchy among NPT signatories. Likewise, this academic work will examine to what degree South Asian outliers‟ states are merged in the prevailing nuclear order?
Different proposals can be tabled to revise the NPT such as to adopt a global zero approach and force the NWS to dismantle nuclear weapons. Secondly, accept the NPT non- signatories states as de-jure NWS by extending the cut-off date and; third possibly accommodate India alone as de-jure NWS in the NPT.
8.3.1 Global Zero Approach
The quest for nuclear weapons free world (NWFW) is not recent. Calls for worldwide nuclear disarmament are part of the great bargain which resulted in the evolution of the NPT. The intrinsic aim behind the development of the NPT is the fulfillment of the Article VI to completely dismantle nuclear weapons. Founding fathers of the NPT though designed a thorough disarmament process but it is strenuous, protracted, and requires patience.
8.3.2 Extending the Cut-off Date
The indicated proposition is based on the hypothesis that US is in favor of regulating contrary to rolling back the “Israel, India and Pakistan‟s nuclear realism.” It is therefore proposed to extend the NPT‟s cut-off date and imperceptibly sector India and Pakistan as NWS in the existing nuclear order as NWS.
The already stated recommendation is formed on the past proliferation behavior of South Asia‟s non-signatory states to the NPT. In past, India and Pakistan had to face backbreaking penalties for budding nuclear weapons. Yet, embargos could not dissuade Islamabad and New Delhi from perfecting nuclear weapons program. India and Pakistan would continue to vigorously oppose demands of international community to sign the NPT as NNWS. 9 The proposals to integrate the holdout states would remain ineffective until non-NPT members are officially offered “nuclear supper.” India and Pakistan for that reason will never have a capacity for dialogues with the world if the agenda of the negotiations would be to rollback their nuclear
9 Syed Rifaat Hussain, Emailed interview (September 19, 2018).
248 weapons programs. India and Pakistan therefore rejected UN resolution 1887, demanding of the South Asian outlier states to join the NPT as NNWS. 10 However, in response to UNSC‟s resolution 1887, Indian Permanent Counselor to the UN in an exclusive note to the UNSC intimated that “India cannot accept calls for the universalization of the NPT… there is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.”11 It is a perfect rejection of the UNSC resolution by India. During an interview with Fareed Zakaria, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh symmetrically rejected the international community‟s optimism that India would annex to the NPT as NNWS.12 India dismissed to join the NPT as NNWS on the basis that NWS have not yet made efforts to dismantle their WMDs. Further, India would decide to disarm if NWS, including China would simultaneously adhere to the policy of nuclear weapons disarmament.13 Considering that NWS have not taken measures that can result in NWFW in foreseeable future, the scenario provides reason to India to frustrate international efforts that may cause steady nuclear disarmament of India. Indian stance capacitates it to complete nuclear triad and achieve second strike capability. The prevalent position of the Indian government vis-a-vis the NPT is based on the Nehruvian principles (already discussed in details in chapter two);
i. To condemn nuclear proliferation at domestic stage and international forums. ii. Gain the confidence and brainwash humanity that India is a mature NWS. Consequently, India should get license for nuclear trade and get access to world nuclear market to acquire fissile material, technology, training, and that; iii. India should be recognized as a responsible NWS according to the statutes of the NPT.
Indian vertical nuclear proliferation and conventional military modernization programme stimulates chain reaction in Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan‟s security policies are formed in opposition to India. In early 2010, Pakistan‟s Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit in a strong worded statement brought an end to Pakistan‟s decades old stance vis-à-vis the NPT that
10 UN Security Council Resolution 1887, (September 24, 2009), http://www.pnnd.org/archives/1887.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on January 31, 2014): 3. 11 A. Vinod Kumar, “Reforming the NPT to Include India,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May 1, 2010), http://thebulletin.org/reforming-npt-include-india (accessed on February 2, 2014). 12 A. Vinod Kumar, “A Doctrine at Work: Obama‟s Evolving Nuclear Policy and What it Bodes for India,” Strategic Analysis, 35, No. 2, (March, 2011): 216. 13 Ch. Viyyanna Sastry, “Pakistan Against Signing the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State,” IDSA, (March 8, 2010), http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/PakistanagainstsigningtheNPTasanon- nuclearweaponsstate_cvsastry_080310.html, (accessed on January 31, 2015).
249
Islamabad would sign the NPT as NNWS if India would accede to the treaty as NNWS.14 Pakistan‟s newly adopted policy towards the NPT categorically asserts that Islamabad would consider the option of joining the NPT if it would be recognized as a NWS. Conceivably, Pakistan altered its inherent posture vis-à-vis the NPT because of the persistent achievements of India to procure fissile material. It commissions New Delhi to expand its nuclear weapons stock. The fear that the BOP in nuclear realm will tilt in Indian favour played a significant role in the development of Pakistan‟s revived policy with respect to the NPT.
India and Pakistan‟s obsession with nuclear weapons increases strategic significance and their dependence on nuclear weapons. Presence of nuclear weapons, nuclear arms race, border skirmishes and continuous tension enhances the prospects of accidental or deliberate nuclear war between India and Pakistan.
The substitute point of view (advocated by Harsh V. Pant in addition to Mario Esteban Caranza) is international community or US‟s proposition to incorporate outlier states into the NPT as NWS can damage the regime.15 It is viewed that the incorporation of India and Pakistan into the NPT as de-jure NWS would undermine the conclusive fervor of the universality of the NPT.16 NNWS would consider aforesaid scheme as a betrayal of trust because they relinquished their inherent right to develop atom bombs.17 It is thereupon argued that the recognition of India and Pakistan nuclear weapons would be an inadvisable sentence as it would anchor an iniquitous precedence. India and Pakistan nuclearization, differing views, proposals and proposed solutions regarding how to deal with their nuclear weapons is clear manifestation that the NPT was not ready to deal with the problem of de-facto nuclear weapons states. Preceding arrangement annex the potential to conflictingly disturb international endeavor to restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the NPT. India and Pakistan specific wavier to extend the NPT‟s cut-off date can result in dangerous consequences including;
14 Ibid. 15 Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, “Israel, India and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Association, (December, 2003), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman (accessed on February 1, 2014). 16 Krepon, interview. 17 Rajiv Nayan, “The NPT and India: Accommodating the Exception,” Strategic Analysis, 34, No. 2, (March, 2010): 311.
250 i. The NNWS can draw inference from the South Asian nuclearisation that instead of facing tough sanctions, international isolation and condemnation, both fully enjoyed political and military benefits.18 The dire consequences of South Asia specific NPT wavier can be that few of the NNWS can arrive at a conclusion to withdraw from the NPT.19 j. The extreme course of action can be a horizontal proliferation, gradual collapse of the international safeguards leading to the collapse of the NPT. The threshold states can decide to withdraw, test nuclear devices and demand to be recognized as de-jure NWS. k. Nuclear anarchy or “nuclear spring,” can result in the rise of a group of NWS. The particular group can be labeled as “nuclear rebels,” for out rightly discarding the NPT and budding nuclear weapons. Nuclear anarchy can cause nuclear blackmail, destabilize global peace and threaten strategic stability. Conversely, prevailing BOP20 will collapse and it may lead to an inadvertent or deliberate nuclear weapons use. l. Nuclear anarchy would cement the determination of would be proliferating states additionally push them towards the development of nuclear weapons. m. Considering the negative implications of the nuclear proliferation the NSG members can toughen the criteria for the transfer of nuclear material and technology to NNWS.
Preceding paragraphs substantiate the view of the nuclear pessimists‟ that the South Asian nuclearistaion encompass the ability to revise the existing nonproliferation order based on the NPT.21 The South Asian proliferators, Caranza views, are struggling to replace the first generation nuclear order based on the NPT with a new covenant to be recognized as de-jure NWS.22 The world community is consequently very apprehensive of the possible breakdown of the NPT as it was developed after continuous efforts of two decades. Yet, critical analysis concerning the prevalent nuclear order delineates a divergent picture. The US is taking substantial measures to accommodate India alone in the NPT. It is an objectionable evolving scenario from Pakistan‟s perspective. US President Obama, in November, 2010 announced to
18 Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev, eds., Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan in Nuclear Arms Limitations (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2012): 13. 19 Ibid. 20 Bharat Karnad, India‟s Nuclear Policy (London: PRAEGER Security International, 2008): 36. 21 Harsh V. Pant, “Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South Asia: The Debate Continues …,” India Review, 9, No. 3, (July-September, 2010): 386. 22 Mario Esteban Caranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009): 2.
251 support India for its struggle to become a permanent member of UNSC.23 President Obama in his January, 2015, visit to India reiterated that India is ready to join the NSG.24 Conclusively revised nuclear order should be comprehensive. It should address the issues that the NPT has failed to address i.e. the additional protocol, introduce new protocols, the UNSCR 1540, and the PSI. New nuclear order should also establish an internal mechanism to verify the activities of the states and ensure compliance of the member states to the treaty. An easy task would be to incorporate IAEA for the said purpose.
8.4 The US- IAEA Additional Protocol Capacitating the NPT
President Bush, in his address at National Defence University Washington D.C., on February 11, 2004, reiterated the US interest in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Bush asserted that, “I propose that by next year, only states that have signed Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civil nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about fighting proliferation will approve Additional Protocol.” 25 There could be three significant conclusions which can be drawn from Bush‟s address; First, Bush personal resolve to stop illicit nuclear commerce. Second, the US declared an uninterrupted future strategy to prevent the illicit nuclear commerce activities. Concerning this, Bush in personal capacity requested international community to work in alliance by approving the Additional Protocol (AP) to halt proliferation of world‟s deadliest weapons. Third, Bush urged the US allies to prepare a comprehensive scheme in furtherance of efforts to prevent the rise of new NWS. The Additional Protocol subdivides states into three categories i) the haves, ii) technologically advanced states and iii) states aspiring nuclear technology for civilian purposes.
The essence of implementing the Additional Protocol lies in the very fact that the IAEA has categorically declared its inability to halt proliferation or unearth clandestine nuclear activities in the NNWS through Comprehensive Safeguards agreement alone. The “haves” individually US in view of this case reacted with the Additional Protocol to strengthen the NPT. However, the US alone cannot execute these rules it requires support from developed countries
23 J. Lamont and E. Luce, “Obama Calls for Top Indian Role at UN,” Financial Times, (November 8, 2010), 24 “Indo-US Nuclear Deal to Impact Deterrence Stability in South Asia: Pakistan,” The Economy Times, (January 27, 2015). 25 Theodore Hirsch, “The Additional Protocol: What It Is and Why It Matters?” Non-Proliferation Review, (Fall- Winter, 2004): 140.
252 and watchdog agencies for instance the IAEA and the NSG. The US collaboration with the IAEA is known as the US-IAEA Additional Protocol.26 The Bush administration aligned the Additional Protocol with the NPT by denying right of the NNWS to nuclear technology, equipment and material required for up-gradation if they would not sign the protocol. The NPT signatories involved in nuclear commerce will have to give the details of their import and export to the agency‟s inspectors. The Additional Protocol capacitates the NSG either to accept or discard the NPT member states requests for signing the nuclear agreement. The NPT NNWS signatories aspiring to indulge in the nuclear commerce with the NSG states will have to provide assurances under the statutes of the Additional Protocol that they will acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The Additional Protocol authorizes the NSG states to probe nuclear activities and future course of action of the NPT member states. Conclusively, Additional Protocol is an evolving mechanism to halt horizontal nuclear proliferation. It intends to assure that the NNWS have not diverted the course of peaceful nuclear activities or technology towards nuclear bomb making. The US zeal to implement the Additional Protocol manifest that US considers the NNWS as potential risk. Washington is passionate to reinforce the existent safeguards apparatus to stop the NPT members from distracting the peaceful course of nuclear program towards nuclear weapons development.
8.4.1 India and the Additional Protocol
In 2006, India decided to discuss probabilities of signing Additional Protocol with the IAEA as part of Indo-US nuclear accord. In July, 2008, the IAEA started holding deliberations with India to finalize text of India specific Additional Protocol.27 In February India signed the protocol28 while in March, 2009, the IAEA approved India specific Additional Protocol.29 Indian government ratified it in June, 2014.30 The Protocol entered into force on July 25, 2015.31
26 Rizwana Abbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012): 221. 27 “Nuclear Verification: The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and of Additional Protocols,” IAEA, GOV/2009/11, (February 25, 2009), https://armscontrollaw.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/indias-iaea-ap.pdf, (accessed January 8, 2018): 3. 28 Mark Heinrich, “IAEA Approves Extra Nuclear Inspection Pact for India,” Reuters, (March 4, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-india-iaea/iaea-approves-extra-nuclear-inspection-pact-for-india- idUSTRE52260L20090303, (accessed January 8, 2018). 29 “Decision on Additional Protocol Sign of Commitment: Government,” The Economic Times, (June 23, 2014). 30 Ibid. 31 Aabha Dixit, “India‟s Additional Protocol Enters into Force,” IAEA, (Julu 25, 2014), https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/indias-additional-protocol-enters-force, (accessed January 8m 2018).
253
However, India under the Protocol has accepted fewer responsibilities such as India under Article II of the Additional Protocol will share details of exports to NNWS with the IAEA if volume of exported nuclear material uranium and thorium will exceed ten tons and twenty tons per annum.32 Further, Protocol endows New Delhi to avoid the IAEA‟s requests regarding how exported fissile material was produced. It enables India to shun submission of reports concerning Indian nuclear equipment, enrichment facilities, reprocessed fuel and mining. The document empowers India to deny the right of IAEA inspectors in order to seek access to oversee activities in declared civilian nuclear reactors.33 It limits IAEA inspector‟s right to carryout inspections on short notices. Further, the document also discards IAEA inspectors‟ tools including “visual observations, collection of environmental samples, utilization of radiation, detection and measurement devices and …information described in the Model AP.”34 New Delhi under the statutes of the Additional Protocol limits the IAEA access to declared civilian nuclear reactors using imported fissile material. Undoubtedly Indian military including the Pressurized Heavy Water nuclear reactors (PHWRs) will remain outside the IAEA inspector‟s purview. Instead of strengthening the NPT the IAEA India specific Additional Protocol prevents the IAEA and the NPT from discussing unsafeguarded nuclear activities in eight nuclear reactors taking place in India. Indian military reactors have the capacity to produce twelve hundred and twenty five kilograms of plutonium per annum.35 Prototype Fast Breeder Reactors (PRBRs) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactors (FBTR) with an ability to produce approximately hundred and forty kilograms of weapons grade plutonium will not be subject to the IAEA inspections.36 Ironically the IAEA can neither question Indian nuclear facilities dedicatedly producing fissile material for nuclear submarines nor under construction military nuclear reactors as proliferation concern.37 The protocol facilitates India to drag Pakistan into Indian Ocean and sunk its financial resources. Completion of Indian nuclear triad would however require deployment of nuclear weapons on Indian submarines. Consequentially, probability of nuclear war would hover over India and
32 “Nuclear Verification,” 8. 33 Robert Kelley, “Unconditional Surrender-India‟s Exceptional Protocol,” Atomic Reporters,http://www.atomicreporters.com/2014/06/unconditional-surrender-indias-exceptional-protocol/, (accessed January 8, 2018). 34 Ibid. 35 “India Ratifies an Additional Protocol and Will Safeguard Two More Nuclear Power Reactors,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, (July 1, 2014), http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2014/07/india_ratifies_an_additio.html, (accessed January 8, 2018). 36 Ibid. 37 Siddharth Varadarajan, “India and the Additional Protocol,” The Hindu, (March 7, 2009).
254
Pakistan. It is fair to state that India fulfill its promise to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol. This Additional Protocol is worst in kind and being termed as Mickey Mouse Additional Protocol by the assistant director general of IAEA.38 The Additional Protocol aims at preventing illicit nuclear weapons development. However, India specific protocol license India to produce weapons grade fissile material beyond its requirements. Second, free India‟s domestically produced fissile material for nuclear bomb making. Third, India has successfully achieved its goal to be accepted as a responsible NWS outside NPT‟s framework. However, Indian achieved these objectives at the price of regional strategic stability. India is undermining the NPT and the IAEA. Yet, Indian Additional Protocol is considered as comprehensive.
8.4.2 Pakistan and the Additional Protocol
Pakistan is non-signatory to the NPT owing to the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Yet Islamabad submits reports and signed various agreements with the IAEA.39 Pakistan therefore believes it fulfills essential credentials hence it should be aligned in the existing nuclear order. Pakistan‟s aspirations to be mainstreamed intensified after US brokered NSG special wavier was granted to India. Pakistan has not signed Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan since, 2006, was ready to sign the Additional Protocol on condition if India would also sign it.40 Experts including Abbasi,41 Khan, Mehmood,42 Sultan43 and Cheema44 suggests that Pakistan should separate civilian and military nuclear reactors and sign country specific Additional Protocol with the IAEA. However, Indian signing of the Mickey Mouse Additional Protocol transformed rules of engagement. Islamabad would sign alike India specific Mickey Mouse Additional Protocol or concerning Pakistan‟s civilian nuclear reactors. It will not be sufficient to get NSG membership. Yet, it will aid Islamabad to fulfill the requisite in the way
38 Kelley, “Unconditional Surrender-India‟s Exceptional Protocol.” 39 “Signing of a Safeguard Agreement with Pakistan,” IAEA, (May 3, 2017), https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/signing-of-a-safeguards-agreement-with-pakistan, (accessed January 8, 2018). 40 “Pakistan to Sign IAEA‟s Additional Protocol if India Signs,” Kuwait News Agency, (December 1, 2016), https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=1692593&language=en, (accessed January 1, 2018). 41 Rizwana Abbasi, “Pakistan and the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” E-International Relations, (January 11, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/11/pakistan-and-the-nuclear-suppliers-group-nsg/#_edn6, (accessed January 8, 2018). 42 Hajira Asif Khan and Majid Mehmood, “IAEA Additional Protocol: Prospects and Challenges for Pakistan,” CISS Insight: Quarterly News & Views,http://ciss.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2-Article-Majid-Hajira-1.pdf, (accessed January 8, 2018). 43 “Process for NSG Membership Politicised: Pakistan,” The Dawn News, (December 31, 2016). 44 Ibid.
255 to be acknowledged as a responsible NWS. It will enable Islamabad to overcome an obstacle created by Rafael Mariano Grossi,45 former chairman of the NSG to stop Pakistan from acquiring the NSG membership.
8.5 The UNSC Resolution 1540
The UNSC Resolution 1540, was passed by the UN member states on April 28, 2004,46 to prevent non-state actors from budding and acquiring nuclear technology, nuclear weapons and interconnected delivery mechanism. The resolution manifests that world leaders acknowledge the essence, character and severity of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism orchestrated by terrorists. It directs the states to guard the nuclear assets in pursuit of ensuring global peace, non- proliferation of the WMDs and the delivery system. It aspires to halt nuclear proliferation and prevent fissile material from falling into the wrong hands such as terrorists by directing the states to set up domestic changes and revolutionize domestic laws to halt illegal trade in the field. Changes in domestic laws require states to toughen organizational grip on nuclear complexes and carryout stringent security measures. Further, carryout personnel reliability program to single out rough elements within the nuclear organization. It will help to prevent the possible infiltration of terrorists or members of nuclear black market in a country‟s nuclear organization. The resolution categorically demands from states to declare possession of NBC materials as a criminal activity.
The resolution regards the NBC terrorist attacks as a grave threat to humanity yet it inherits several weaknesses. For instance a permanent body to implement this resolution is lacking. The resolution is its life line based on ad-hocism and requires extension from the UNSC. It could not bud an adequate internal verification system to verify whether members of the UN have taken satisfactory steps to implement the resolution or not. It rather is dependent on the reports submitted by the parties with regard to performance and implementation of the resolution. It is silent and does not discuss what type of penalty will be imposed on states that will fail to comply with the resolution. The resolution does not talk about the penalty the states have to pay in case they fail to submit reports. Furthermore, it is voluntary and not binding. The
45 Daryl G. Kimball, “NSG Membership Proposal would Undermine Nonproliferation,” Arms Control Today, (December 21, 2016), https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControlNow/2016-12-21/NSG-Membership- Proposal-Would-Undermine-Nonproliferation, (accessed January 8, 2018). 46 “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,” United Nations, (2004), http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/, (accessed on February 8, 2015)
256 voluntary feature of the resolution projects its inability to effectively implement and its limited capacity to avert possibility of nuclear terrorism. It raises apprehensions in states that resolution may be used, to impose sanctions,47 as a tool against states that does not enjoy cordial relations with the West (US and its allies).
8.5.1 Pakistan Compliance with UNSCR 1540
In compliance with the resolution 1540, Pakistan submitted its first report to the Committee on October 27, 2004.48 The second report was submitted on September 27, 2005,49 on August 3, 2016 submitted compliance report.50 Compliance reports submitted by Pakistan to the Committee on UNSCR 1540 determines that Pakistan took important steps prior to the UNSCR 1540 including: Adoption of National Control List; Establishment of the Strategic Export Control Division; Nuclear Security Action Plan; National Command Authority Ordinance, 2007; Participation in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database; Participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and Participation in Container Security Initiative.51 It demonstrates Pakistan‟s responsible behavior and resolve to thwart nuclear terrorism.
8.5.1.1 Adoption of National Control List
It comprises of the lists maintained by the NSG, the MTCR and the Australia Group. The list includes material, technology and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery vehicles.
47 Kathleen E. Masteron, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540 at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, (October 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/1540, (accessed on February 9, 2015). 48 “Pakistan‟s National Report on National Measures on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004),” United Nations Security Council, S/AC.44/2004(02)22, (November 5, 2004), https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/597/46/PDF/N0459746.pdf?OpenElement, (accessed August 26, 2016). 49 “Annex to the Note Verbale Dated 19 September 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee,” UNSC, S/AC. 44/2004(02)/22/Add.1, (September 27, 2005), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/542/40/IMG/N0554240.pdf?OpenElement, (accessed August 26, 2016). 50 “Update on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) in Pakistan,” United Nations Security Council, S/AC.44/2007/19, (August 3, 2010), 51 Ibid.
257
8.5.1.2 Establishment of the Strategic Export Control Division (SECD)
In the 2000, Pakistan orchestrated Export Control Legislation. However, it was put in force in 2004. 52 The SECD established in Ministry of Foreign Affairs functions in various capacities. Delivery Systems Act 2004 passed by the parliament provide basis to the SECD and restricts exports.53 The SECD serves the role of issuing licenses. The SECD in collaboration with SPD formulates rules and regulations on export controlled items. It provides basis for the functioning of institutionalized inter-Agency apparatus to ensure implementation of export control policy keeping in view the legal requirements. It prevents nuclear proliferation by restricting the export, re-export, transit, transshipment of nuclear material, goods, and necessary delivery vehicles.54
8.5.1.3 Nuclear Security Action Plan It was devised to ensure safety and security of nuclear technology, facility complexes storage facilities; stop illegal trafficking of nuclear objects and function in emergency situation involving nuclear incidents. Pakistan‟s Nuclear Regulating Authority (PNRA) works in collaboration with the IAEA to implement it.55 It manifests Islamabad‟s resolve to preserve global peace by securing nuclear assets and thwart menace of nuclear terrorism.
8.5.1.4 National Command Authority (NCA) Ordinance, 2007
President Pervez Musharraf publicized the institutionalization of the NCA in pursuit to raise robust C2 network.56 It is the apex office to oversee country‟s nuclear program. It also devises policies related to country‟s nuclear and missile affairs. It looks after entire nuclear
52 Muhammad Saleem, “Export Control: Pakistan‟s Measures Globally Recognised,” Business Recorder, (July 27, 2016). 53 “Export Control Regime, at par with World Standards, MTCR Team Told,” The Nation, (January 12, 2017). 54 Ibid. 55Jonathan Medalia, Dirty Bombs: Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress (DIANE Publishing, 2011): 35. 56 “National Command Authority Ordinance Promulgated,” Pak Tribune, (December 14, 2007).
258 program including delivery vehicles.57 The NCA ensures to avoid accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
8.5.1.5 IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) It is a voluntary mechanism which operates under the IAEA. The basic purpose for its establishment is to prevent nuclear terrorism in the world. Pakistan participates in ITDB‟s proceedings. 58 The stringent measures applied by PNRA to prevent unlawful trafficking of nuclear material were endorsed by the IAEA.59 PNRA also ensure safety measures at power reactors.
8.5.1.6 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)
In July, 2007, Pakistan through its foreign office expressed determination and resolve to work in collaboration with the global community under the banner of GICNT to prevent nuclear Terrorism. 60 Keeping in view insider threat Pakistan introduced and implementing personnel reliability program to prevent nuclear terrorism.61
8.5.1.7 Container Security Initiative (CSI) The initiative was taken by US wherein containers bound for US are scanned before leaving for the US. Pakistani authorities have deployed scanners at Port Qasim, Karachi to scan containers bound to USA.
8.5.1.8 IAEA Acknowledges Pakistani Measures to Safeguard Nuclear Installations Despite numerous attacks on military installations in country‟s fight against war on terror nuclear establishment authority is in full control of nuclear apparatus. Country‟s security forces have neither allowed individuals nor terrorist organizations or rough elements to take control of nuclear base or infrastructure. Personnel reliability program has proved to be
57Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks- A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007): 109. 58 “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB),” Fact Sheet 2016,https://www- ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/itdb-fact-sheet.pdf, (accessed January 9, 2018): 7. 59 “Pakistan not on IAEA N-trafficking Database,” The Dawn News, (September 8, 2006). 60 “Pakistan Joins Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Establishes Strategic Export Control Division,” International Export Control Observer, (11 June/July, 2007): 2. 61 Paul K. Kerr and Merry Beth Nikitin, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (DIANE Publishing, 2010): 17.
259 indispensable as it prevents inside support to non-state actors. It ensures that nuclear material is used for peaceful purposes only. In December, 2010, Pakistani officials signed an agreement with the IAEA officials on safeguards without holding deliberations.62 The agreement enabled the Agency to monitor Pakistan‟s nuclear activities at Chashma Nuclear Power Plant III & IV, through its inspectors. In January, 2015, TeroVarjoranta, the IAEA Deputy Director General (DDG) expressed Agency‟s satisfaction over Pakistan‟s compliance with Agency‟s safeguards.63 Eight months later IAEA Director General Yukia Amano verified Varjoranta‟s claim. IAEA chief expressed satisfaction over Pakistan‟s nuclear activities in September, 2015, at the sidelines of UNGA‟s 70th Session.64 The certificate issued by the nuclear watchdog Agency endorses that nuclear material gained for peaceful purposes is not diverted to accomplish military objectives. It approves the fact that nuclear material has not been provisioned to third party (state or non-state actors). Concreted measures employed by Pakistan are sufficient to prove that protection of nuclear assets is regarded as a highest priority by Pakistani security managers. Collaboration with global community to achieve the objectives of non-proliferation, prevent illicit trafficking and nuclear terrorism guarantee Pakistan‟s seriousness. It is fair to state that Pakistan is a rational responsible NWS.65 Pakistan understands seriousness of the threat of nuclear terrorism. Essential steps taken to safeguard nuclear material domestically ensure world peace and security. Steps taken by Pakistan strengthens country‟s bid to acquire nuclear carrot and sophisticated nuclear technology for peaceful purposes being a responsible NWS. Regrettably, Pakistani authorities could neither project the IAEA satisfaction nor could convince international community that civilian nuclear facilities in Pakistan are under IAEA safeguards and working entirely up to higher satisfaction of the watchdog Agency.
62“IAEA Board Sets Plan for Monitoring New Pakistani Nuclear Reactors,” NTI, (March 9, 2011), http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iaea-board-sets-plan-for-monitoring-new-pakistani-nuclear-reactors/, (accessed September 11, 2016). 63 “N-Safeguards Steps Implemented: IAEA,” The Daily Dawn News, (January 20, 2015). 64 “Mr. Yukia Amano, Director General IAEA, Calls on Foreign Secretary on the UNGA Sidelines,” Embassy of Pakistan Santiago, Chile, (September 27, 2015), http://www.mofa.gov.pk/chile/pr-details.php?prID=3103, (accessed September 16, 2016). 65 Muhammad Munir, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 24, 2018).
260
8.5.2 India and the UNSCR 1540
India prior to the adoption of the resolution was skeptical and joined non aligned movement (NAM) countries to oppose the resolution. Later, India supported the resolution.66 In its support India introduced the weapons of mass destruction and their delivery system (prohibition of unlawful activities) in the Indian parliament. It is known as the WMD Act and aims at preventing non-state actors from acquiring NCB material and weapons. It provided basis to the Indian government to empower Indian customs department, organize training in collaboration with IAEA on physical protection of nuclear installations.67Indian officials project measures India took on various international forums such as creation off “Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership,” 68 “Open Consultations of the Comprehensive Review of the UNSCR 1540,”69 “1540 Committee: National Reports,”70 to project India as a responsible NWS. Indian civilian experts i.e. Rajiv Nayan,71 Reshmi Kazi,72 in their writing to showcase changes India introduced in conformity with the resolution to thwart nuclear terrorism and receiving international appreciation. On the basis of New Delhi‟s public stance on non-proliferation and disarmament issues US lobbied for India and persuaded other responsible states to grant special wavier (discussed in detail in chapter five) to India.
In conclusion of this section, it is claimed that Islamabad failure to efficiently project Pakistan‟s aforementioned efforts resulted in international criticism, failure to get the NSG membership and denial of nuclear technology. Among other consequences failure to acquire nuclear material, technology, reactors and other components without getting entry into the NSG club. Pakistan is penalized because of its diplomatic failure to appropriately project its case and prove with credible proofs that India is responsible for nuclear proliferation in South Asia as it
66 Rajiv Nayan, “UNSCR 1540: A Decade of Existence,” IDSA Comment, (April 28, 2014), https://idsa.in/idsacomments/UNSCR1540_rnayan_280414, (accessed January 9, 2018). 67 Ibid. 68 Lisa Curtis, “Enhancing India‟s Role in the Global Nonproliferation Regime,” CSIS and NTI Report , (Washington, D.C, 2010): 1. 69 Statement by Abhishek Singh,“Open Consultations of the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540,” (June 20, 2016), https://www.pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/68880cas_20june.pdf, (accessed January 9, 2018). 70 “1540 Committee: National Reports,” United Nations,http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national- implementation/national-reports.shtml, (accessed January 9, 2018). 71 Nayan, “UNSCR 1540: A Decade of Existence.” 72 Dr Reshmi Kazi, “Nuclear Terrorism and UN Resolution 1540: A South Asian Perspective,” http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/working_papers/KaziSouthAsianPerspective.pdf, (accessed January 9, 2018).
261 diverted nuclear technology acquired for peaceful purposes to develop nuclear bomb. Pakistan developed WMDs program to deter Indian aggression. However, following the discovery of A.Q Khan Network, Indian officials made rhetoric that New Delhi‟s nuclear track record is different than Pakistan. The discovery of A.Q. Khan Network has become an excuse for regard Pakistan as an irresponsible NWS.73 It endowed US to deny the signing of civilian nuclear deal, similar to Indo-US Nuclear Deal, with Pakistan. Contrarily India has been successful in portraying itself as a responsible NWS. India adopted NFU posture, as noted by Abbasi, to show it to the world that India is a cultured and an enlightened country74 of the international community.
8.6 How to Address Regional Security Concerns Aligning the Non-NPT States (India and Pakistan)
The regional security dynamics helped this author to comprehend South Asian regional rivalry. Barry Buzan calls it a “security complex.”75 It is based on amity and enmity. However, antagonism determines the very course of relations between or among states. The very concept of regional security is that it is a “relational phenomenon.”76 It involves mutual threat perception, military strength, readiness and military planning, of the states situated in the same region and having border proximity. The national security policies of these geographically locked states are interdependent involving action-reaction process. If these states would share common history of wars, betrayal and animosity, it would further complicate their relations. Decision makers with this background and predetermined mindset would fail to interpret adversary‟s intentions. The clouds of mistrust and uncertainty would ultimately result in an active arms race because both antagonists would try to dominate the other. The continuous struggle and uncertainty in the security realm would further result in arms race and security dilemma. Perspective represented by the regional security is seemingly an offshoot of neo- realism, as both schools agree that states responsible for their own security are operating in an anarchic world however, there is a hierarchy in this system. According to the security complex, the only point of difference between the two is that regional mechanism, dominated by regional power is fragile as it is prone to great
73 Kienzle, Interview. 74 Rizwana Abbasi, “Strategic Stability in South Asia?” Hilal, (2014): 44. 75 Ibid, 8. 76 Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, (Hong Kong: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1986): 4.
262 powers interference.77 Another negative connotation of “regional security” is militarily dominant state in the region may adopt a bullying attitude and may start interfering in the internal affairs of the regional states. The bullying attitude and meddling in the internal affairs of the small regional states is seen as a normal behavior from the perspective of the offensive realists.‟ Counterbalancing by small regional states, in the hope to deter regional hegemon, preserve sovereign status, regional peace and stability, is the antidote that prescribes BOP theory. Counterbalancing can take various forms for instance; small states may decide to form regional alliance or individually seek foreign assistance or utilize internal resources to counterweight regional hegemon. Counterbalancing however, will result in regional arms race. The regional hegemon will take measures to preserve the status quo and ensure the escalation dominance. Small regional states take countermeasures in the hope to preserve their sovereignty in an anarchic system. Apparently the notion of security complex and the BOP theory seems two different sides of the same coin. But it is not the case because the participants in the security complex are aware of the moves made by the enemy. However, they do not know that how enemy interprets their own moves. In the BOP case, the participants are aware of one another‟s moves, countermoves and how opponent interprets its own moves.
8.6.1 How to Address Proliferation Problem?
The regional security in the aftermath of the Cold War has transformed drastically. This change is twofold. First, the Cold War era block system collapsed. Russia lost its sphere of influence or client states. Second, 9/11 attacks revived the feature of Cold War. The 9/11 attacks provided justification to US to intervene in the regions abroad 78 in pursuit to eradicate Al Qaeda‟s safe heavens and contain nuclear proliferation. Al Qaeda and its leaders were targeted first for claiming the responsibility of 9/11 attacks. Second Al Qaeda expressed its resolve to acquire the WMDs and use them against US or its allies. In post 9/11 era, terrorists‟ pursuit to carryout nuclear terrorism has emerged as gravest threat to international peace and security. The trend or problems associated with involvement of states and non-state actors in nuclear proliferation are twofold for instance, the possession of nuclear bomb by non- state actors may result in nuclear terrorism. Secondly, the pursuit of (NPT member) NNWS to develop their own
77 Ibid, 7. 78 Barry Buzan and Ole Waver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 3.
263 nuclear bomb would result in the outbreak of uncontrollable horizontal proliferation leading to nuclear anarchy. The proliferation problem can be explained and understood, as asserted by Ian Clark, from the perspective of the conflict resolution. In international system, states endeavor to resolve the conflict by carrying out foreign policy and other diplomatic techniques to attract the attention of major powers. However, this technique would help the weak party to temporarily resolve the problem. Second method involves the conflict resolution through the application of proxy wars by the weak state to change the status quo. Third technique is “for the conflict to be resolved in the interest of stronger party.”79 It is thence easy to understand that statesmen and policymakers develop nuclear weapons to resolve the conflict in their best interest. (Nuclear proliferation can be halted, Ian Clark suggests, by rejecting the special status attached to nuclear weapons).80 But if it is not possible to alter the situation in ones interest than the strategy, to maintain the status quo and avoid future wars is adopted. During the Cold War nuclear weapons played the role of equalizers and prudent handling of nuclear weapons by superpowers avoided nuclear war.
8.6.2 The Role of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia
Waltz and T.V. Paul both have weighed the importance and highlighted role of nuclear weapons in South Asian context. Waltz claims that nuclear weapons have maintained status quo. Paul asserts that nuclear deterrent enable Pakistan to deny Indian military dominance. India and Pakistan, as noted by Vipin Narang, adopted three different approaches in dealing with one another.81 Narang termed these approaches as nuclear postures these include catalytic approach involving superpower on its behalf, on occasions both India and Pakistan has welcomed the US involvement in resolving conflict like situations, such as, the Kargil war and 2001-02, stand-off. Pakistan has adopted an asymmetric escalation approach to deter Indian military adventurism. An assured retaliation strategy: India has announced to reply with nuclear attack after surviving the first salvo. It underlines development of second strike nuclear forces to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies. India officially announced this policy in response to Pakistan‟s nuclear first use option. It is nuclear posture, actual deployment of nuclear weapons, rather than the mere
79 Clark, The Hierarchy of States, 16. 80 Ibid, 21. 81 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014): 4.
264 existence that deterred the conflicts from out breaking. Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski feared breakdown of nuclear deterrence and therefore cautioned that South Asia poses threat to international peace and security.82
8.6.3 Aligning the Non-NPT States into the NPT
The NPT provides legal basis to successfully contain horizontal nuclear proliferation. Treaty is known for inherited weaknesses for instance the NNWS can in violation of Article IV of the NPT achieve military objectives. The NPT does not allow entry and recognize new NWS. John Arquilla asserts that India and Pakistan rivalry can promote inspiration that “more is better” as credible nuclear deterrent forces enable states to thwart foreign aggression. 83 This view harbors the potential to seriously damage the NPT. George Perkovich therefore recommends aligning India and Pakistan with the NPT. Perkovich asserts as long as outlier states would remain outside of the NPT they would undermine the efficacy of the treaty.84
Unbiased, serious negotiations considering liberalism are required to eradicate mutual suspicion, encourage cooperation and align South Asia‟s outlier states directly or indirectly with the NPT. For example The NPT secretariat serving as guarantor can convince New Delhi and Islamabad to hold confidence and nuclear security building measures (CNSBM), as a primary rung to slow the pace of regional nuclear, missile arms race and stop outbreak of nuclear war. Correspondingly, additional institutional platform would be required i.e. to identify mutual problems Comprehensive Security Mechanism (CSM)85 framework serves the purpose. Secondly Cooperative Security Framework (CSF) encourages collaboration, consultation, interdependence, confidence building measures (CBMs),86 security assistance, strategic dialogues and intelligence
82 Meena Singh Roy, ed., International and Regional Security Dynamics: Indian and Iranian Perspectives (New Delhi: IDSA, 2009): 28. 83 John Arquilla, “Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: More May Be Manageable,” Comparative Strategy, 16, No. 1, (1997): 13. 84 George Perkovich, “Strengthening Non-Proliferation Rules and Norms-The Three State Problem,” Disarmament Forum, (December 2, 2004), https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCcQFjAA&url=http %3A%2F%2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F48076%2Fichaptersection_singledocument %2F99b3ae59-2bc4-4c60-8fa1-40ceb8e46815%2Fen%2F04_Non- proliferation%2BRules%2Band%2BNorms.pdf&ei=eMntUo7gCefd7QaK- oHQBQ&usg=AFQjCNHRsU3V7cTMamNViFI3zxPE5n0nWQ&sig2=2fehAWR-V3vayU0qkFL- Kw&bvm=bv.60444564,d.Yms (accessed on February 2, 2014): 1. 85Nihar Nayak, ed., Cooperative Security Framework for South Asia (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2013): XVI. 86 Ibid, XV.
265 cooperation. Third signing of nuclear restraint regime based on Abbasi‟s NSG Model to address the NPT‟s bankruptcy. Abbasi model offer incentives such as it accommodates India and Pakistan into the NSG. In return South Asian outlier states will have to sign and ratify the CTBT to judiciously outlaw nuclear testing. New Delhi and Islamabad‟s participation in negotiations on the FMCT and signing of the treaty will slow the pace of nuclear and missile arms race. Consequentially, it will lower the probability of deliberate or accidental nuclear war in South Asia. In return it will stabilize nuclear deterrence and strategic stability preserved. Abbasi‟s NSG Model will be directly attached to the NPT. It is discussed in detail in conclusion of this thesis.
8.7 The Prague Speech and National Security Summit
President Obama, during speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, clarified that the US and the US allies would implement the PSI in their fight against halting the challenge of nuclear proliferation.87 The disarmament is viewed as a process.88 An effective disarmament process requires a momentum, effective verifiable practices and an international cooperation. President Obama‟s administration was leading the non-proliferation initiative. President Osama‟s initiative needed an international recognition, voluntary actions and consistent support base. Hence, it decreased the role of nuclear weapons in the US war fighting doctrine. The minimal role of nuclear arsenals in US military doctrines endorses the fact that the US is increasing its reliance on conventional weapons to convince the world that security can be achieved without WMDs. Other initiatives include reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles. He also suggested the creation of nuclear fuel bank to keep check on the supplies of fissile material. It was aimed to restrict states from acquiring fissile materials and prevent its usage in the nuclear bomb making. The ultimate objective behind the idea had been to achieve the goal of world free of nuclear weapons. The Prague summit also revealed the worries of the US that terrorists are trying to achieve nuclear weapons or fissile material. In order to deal with the potential threat of nuclear terrorism Obama expressed his resolve that his administration is determined to protect the fissile material and break the chains of nuclear black markets across the globe, with an international support, to prevent nuclear material from falling into the wrong hands. International community therefore should help his efforts to halt proliferation and strengthen the NPT.
87 “Proliferation Security Initiative,” U.S. Department of State,http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm, (accessed on September 21, 2014). 88 Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 170.
266
The first ever Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was convened on April 12-13, 2010.89 The NSS has genesis in President Obama‟s Prague speech. In Prague expressed his determination to bulwark unsafeguarded nuclear material across the globe. In 2012, the second NSS was hosted in Seoul. The third NSS was held two years later in 2014, in Hague, Netherlands. The state leaders meet at NSS forum bi-annually. NSS had four broader objectives i.e. it emphasizes the efficacy of WMDs free world. Consequently the NSS helped the NPT in implementing Article VI. Secondly, the NSS affixed paramount significance to sensational risk of nuclear terrorism posed to world peace and security. In this background NSS demands from the participating states to heavily guard unsafeguarded complexes, nuclear material, warheads and their delivery vehicles. It is an international forum to assemble across the board world leaders to merely highlight and discuss the hazards of proliferation and use of WMDs.
The NSS assisted world community to converse genuine steps in addition to discuss the benefits of first dismantling WMDs or secure unsafeguarded nuclear material. The NSS required participating states to present progress reports on steps taken to accomplish summit‟s objectives. The objective initiated by President Obama could have helped states to overcome the prevailing trust deficit among states. This platform had the potential to develop an understanding among antagonist NWS states to repair their adversarial relations by overcoming their differences. NWS could have used NSS platform to provide the negative assurances to NNWS. Further it could have encouraged states to abandon clandestine nuclear activities pursued towards budding of nuclear weapons, and rely on conventional weapons without fear of punishment. The NSS performed a significant task at three different levels including national level, second, regional level and third, at the international level. The NSS endeavored to encourage states to secure nuclear material or bring an end to bitter relations.
8.7.1 Pakistan and the Nuclear Security Summit
Pakistan regularly participated and took measures in compliance with NSS directions. In March, 2014, IAEA Director General Yukia Amano during his visit to Pakistan expressed his satisfaction90 over security measures adopted by Pakistan to secure nuclear complexes. Pakistani
89Bong-Geung Jun, “Road to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit,” (US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2012): 1. 90 Malik Qasim Mustafa, “Nuclear Security Summit 2014 and Pakistan,” ISSI, (March 28, 2014), http://issi.org.pk/?p=1702, (accessed April 2, 2015).
267 security measures were also applauded by US President Obama during 2014 NSS.91 On March 20, 2014, the ambassador of Netherlands in Islamabad while addressing a press briefing lauded Pakistan‟s efforts to secure its nuclear complexes.92 The NSS participants shared experiences, as how to safeguard nuclear material, research laboratories, depots and complexes. Pakistan is closely analyzing these lessons through the experiences shared and information provided by the NSS participants. Pakistan used information provided by the NSS participants to build Nuclear Security Training Center (NSTC). It illustrates seriousness of Pakistan‟s nuclear establishment authority that nuclear security is an issue of esteem importance. SPD the custodian of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons believes that the protection of radioactive material, nuclear complexes and delivery vehicles is its national responsibility. SPD consistently review and update security plans to ensure unauthorized access to country‟s nuclear assets. SPD has setup a training academy to deliver lectures on nuclear security.93 Pakistan‟s responsible nuclear behavior is well illustrated through its aptitude to sweat conjointly with the world community and organizations including IAEA, UN, Interpol- NSS participant organizations and regular submission of reports to UNSC 1540 Committee. Pakistan aspires to thwart illicit nuclear trafficking. Yet, Pakistani representative could neither improve country‟s image using the NSS forum nor convince the world that Pakistan is a responsible NWS. Various measures including establishment of the nuclear C2 system, export control regime, volunteer adherence no CTBT, NSG guidelines, implementation of Article IV of the NPT, establishment of NSTC and safety and security measures were sufficient to project Pakistan‟s responsible nuclear behavior. However, Pakistan should continue to cooperate with international community and learn to highlight its efforts to be recognized as a responsible member of international community.94
91 Ibid. 92 “19th March, 2014: 3rd Nuclear Security Summit, The Hague 24-25 March 2014,” Netherlands Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, (March 20, 2014), http://pakistan.nlembassy.org/news/2014/03/press-statement-19th-march- 2014-3rd-nuclear-security-summit.html, (accessed April 2, 2015). 93Rizwana Abbasi, “Pakistan and the Nuclear Security Summit,” Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad,http://www.issi.org.pk/pakistan-and-the-nuclear-security-summit/, (accessed January 12, 2018). 94 Private Conversation: Tanzila Khalil, Expert on India-Pakistan Missiles Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division (SPD), (December 3, 2017).
268
8.1.2 India and the Nuclear Security Summit
Indian exploited the NSC to project steps taken by India such as Indian collaboration with international community to thwart illicit nuclear trafficking. Second bring into limelight Indian participation in Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,95 creation of Center for Nuclear Security Training and Research,96 Global Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Energy Partnership.97 Indian voluntary contributions to the nuclear security fund. Indians in their analysis of NSS tried to project aforestated steps to establish that India is a responsible NWS. Simultaneously India has launched propaganda to establish that Pakistan poses twofold nuclear threats to India. 98 First, Jihadis can infiltrate in Pakistan army and directly launch nuclear weapons against India. Second India alleges that Pakistan can use terrorists99 including Al Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) to carryout nuclear terrorism against India. India is using international forums and publications in its pursuit to prove Pakistan as a terror sponsoring state, bring Islamabad under pressure from international community and disarm Pakistan. India poured its energies to establish that Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program is the world‟s fastest growing program.100
8.8 Global Dynamics & NSG Debate: Indo-Pak Concerns
This segment is focused on changing global dynamics in nuclear arena such as whether India should be granted admission into the NSG. The debate strengthened in the wake of President Obama‟s proposal to grant India entry into the NSG during his November, 2010 visit to India.101Australia, Germany, France, Russia, US and UK are the leading proponents while China is leading opponent of the Indian entry into the NSG. China demands an impartial NSG ruling for states 102 (in the Indian region). Indian entry into the NSG was discussed in the annual
95Aparna Pande, “India & Nuclear Security,” 96 “Nuclear Security in the Digital Age,” Brookings India, (March 21, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/events/nuclear-security-in-the-digital-age/, (accessed January 12, 2018). 97Sushant Singh, “Nuclear Security Summit: How to Understand What it Does,” The Indian Express, (March 31, 2016). 98 “Nuclear Security in the Digital Age.” 99Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India and the Nuclear Security Summit,” Observer Research Foundation, (April 27, 2016), http://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-the-nuclear-security-summit/, (January 12, 2018). 100Ankit Panda, “Why India‟s Upset About Obama‟s Post Nuclear Security Summit Remarks,” The Diplomat, (April 5, 2016). 101 “US to Support India‟s Full Membership in NSG,” The Times of India, (November 6, 2010). 102
269 meetings since 2012. However, rifts among NSG member states prevented Indian entry into the NSG. Stiff resistance determines that staunch non-proliferation conditions including signing of the CTBT, reduction in weapon grade fissile material production, halt production of short and long range missiles may be demanded. Indian admission despite being non NPT member state would only weaken the non-proliferation efforts and particularly the NPT. Pakistan is also opposed to the idea of Indian entry into NSG.
Pakistan believes Indian membership of NSG would raise Indian stature internationally. It would augment the credibility and narrow the gap in recognizing Indian nuclear weapons program. However, India specific policy would disturb strategic stability in the region. Indian probable entry alone into the NSG by the West is regarded as discriminatory treatment of Pakistan. Islamabad considers it as a policy based on nuclear apartheid. Pakistani policymakers fears if India becomes NSG member it will permanently block Pakistan‟s entry into nuclear mainstream. Pakistan will thus have to permanently live with the stigma of second class citizen. Conversely, Pakistan is demanding of the NSG to adopt a non-discriminatory and unbiased multilateral approach able to address strategic interests of all the stakeholders.
Pakistan‟s non-proliferation record has improved. It submits details to UNSC‟s 1540 Committee on transfer of sensitive material and technologies, 103 works in coordination with IAEA and party on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). Lack of consensus prevents Indian entry into the nuclear club. Criteria for entry into the NSG require that the applicant state must be member to the NPT and abide by strict NSG guidelines or signed NWFZ treaty, able to supply NSG listed (nuclear material) technology and able to implement nuclear export control regime. Proponents of the proposal will have to articulate a refine policy to get India specific wavier from the NSG as India only fulfills the “second condition.” India voluntarily adheres to the NSG guidelines thus it fulfills the NSG membership criteria. Indian probable entry into the NPT would coerce Pakistan to strictly rely on nuclear weapons for its security and remain outside the NPT. Indian membership alone into the NSG would thus cause a major blow to the NPT. NSG members cannot ignore issues like India favored rising asymmetry, South Asian strategic stability, missiles and nuclear arms race.
103 Muhammad Umer Hayat, Personal Interview, Lahore (September 5, 2018).
270
Conclusion
The NPT notwithstanding has not acquired universal status. Yet, it is a significant treaty as it provides basis for containing global nuclear anarchy for that reason, the international community cannot afford the NPT‟s collapse. It is in this background suggested to introduce slight changes to enable the treaty to cope with modern day challenges. US is gradually revising the traditional nuclear order to accommodate India in the mainstream. Islamabad has criticized the US and European states for their preferential treatment of India. Pakistani policymakers believe that Washington has adopted a biased approach, a policy based on discrimination vis-à- vis Pakistan and neglected Pakistan‟s legitimate security concerns.
This study opines that the West led by US failed to understand that Pakistan developed nuclear weapons to deter Indian aggression. Second the West wants South Asian outliers states to sign the NPT as NNWS. However, it could neither devise nor table formula to address their security concerns, particularly that of Pakistan. International community‟s demand from India and Pakistan to join the NPT without offering any incentive reflects lack of seriousness and political will of the world leaders. The international negotiators should realize that in order to bring these states on the negotiations table, it would require the negotiators to offer attractive deal. Both states have already laid conditions and determined the price of signing the NPT “to be recognized as no less than de-jure NWS.” India has not only determined the criteria to enter into the negotiations it has also involved, US, Russia, Australia, Japan and several other NSG member states. 104 It has also ensured to maintain an effective control on the course of the deliberations with an objective to ease pressure on its nuclear weapons program, get recognition from international community and join the NPT as NWS.
This section emphasizes that the West and US in particular failure to address India and Pakistan‟s security concerns prevents New Delhi and Islamabad from signing the NPT as NNWS. Consequentially, South Asia‟s outlier states reliance on nuclear weapons to incorporate nuclear weapons in their national security strategies to thwart foreign aggression has increased the political and strategic significance of nuclear deterrent for NNWS. It attracts NNWS with possible outcome to follow the suit. India and Pakistan‟s decision to remain outside the NPT is
104 Khan, interview.
271 posing twofold challenges to the treaty first both are depriving the NPT from acquiring the status of universality. Second India and Pakistan are undermining the NPT from outside. Yet, South Asian nuclear rivals cannot be held responsible for undermining the NPT due to the treaty‟s inability to address India-Pakistan legitimate security concerns.
272
Conclusion
The prime objective of this study was to understand India-Pakistan‟s behavior of nuclear proliferation, the nature of rising asymmetry in South Asia and challenges to the NPT. Realism, nuclear deterrence theory and liberalism appeared the appropriate rudiments enabling this researcher to understand India-Pakistan‟s strategic competition and its daunting impact on the NPT. The realist school of thought elucidated the role of nuclear weapons in India-Pakistan‟s national security policies and the transformation of military doctrines. The second task was to describe and relate the case of South Asia to the NPT. The target was to underline the essential deliberations that how the vertical proliferation outside the NPT undermines the strength, sustainability and the future relevance of the treaty. Realism and liberalism helped assess this aspect of the study carefully. Final task was to determine that how deterrence can be stabilized and most warranted peace can be maintained in South Asia. Liberalism and deterrence theory offered lessons towards crafting a fresh mechanism for the maintenance of peace and stability between India and Pakistan.
India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation Behavior Discards the NPT
The study concludes that India-Pakistan‟s bilateral relations are based on misperception, enmity, abhorrence and vendetta due to disputed borders, water issue and terrorism. The realist framework was accordingly selected and exercised to comprehend India-Pakistan‟s strategic competition and nuclear weapons buildup. Though, India and Pakistan are distinct states, their conventional, nuclear weapons modernization programs, national security policies, military and nuclear doctrines are intertwined. Endeavors by one to reinforce its national security intensify sense of insecurity, raises anxiety, worsens opponent‟s security dilemma and intimidates the antagonist to take countermeasures.
This academic research while tracing the origins of Indian nuclear weapons program applied Scott D. Sagan‟s nuclear proliferation models. 1 It is an undeniable fact that Nehru wanted India to be recognized as great power in the international community. Likewise, Dr. Homi Bhaba intended to manufacture nuclear weapons by changing the course of peaceful
1 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-1997).
273
nuclear technology and join the nuclear club and anticipated to ratify the competence of Indian nuclear scientists by obtaining nuclear weapons technology. To sum-up this argument, Indian strategic enterprise envisages nuclear weapons as political tool. Nuclear weapons will help India to secure higher status and prestige at the global level. Consequentially, Indian nuclear proliferation model is the offshoot of first violation of peaceful nuclear technology. Second, Indian nuclear weapons development is prestige driven case. Significant feature of the Indian nuclear proliferation behavior prescribes that Indian approach to the NPT is dissimilar than Pakistani perception. India raised voice against inequality, injustice and denied to accept secondary status globally. Likewise, Scott D. Sagan‟s domestic model elaborates that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi authorized PNEs because of the domestic turmoil. PNE helped India to appease infuriated masses demonstrating against the government. In short, Indira authorized nuclear tests to prolong her rule.
Indian approach to the NPT has two fundamental features; first, it remained consistent. India rejected the NPT because the treaty encouraged aristocracy; allowing it to possess nuclear weapons. India believes the NPT has discriminatory posture that did not permit the remaining states to procure nuclear weapons. Considering that the NPT that cannot allow India to acquire the prestigious status at the global level New Delhi voiced against the dual standard of the NPT. Sagan who is a liberal, but his realists guided Security Model guided the author to understand India and Pakistan proliferation behavior in a fair and rational way. While looking at perspective, it is transpired that Dr. Homi Bhaba under Nehru laid basic infrastructure of Indian nuclear weapons program. Bhaba also determined Plutonium route for nuclear weapons development program. However, security concerns played nominal role in Indian nuclear weapons development program.
The study eventually originates that Pakistan from the outset believed in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was inclined towards non-proliferation norms and traditions during its initial phases rather rejected the idea of nuclear weapons development. However, Indian involvement in the disintegration of East Pakistan forced Z.A. Bhutto to change the course of Pakistan‟s peaceful nuclear program towards nuclear weapons development. The existential threat, quest to mitigate Indian favor conventional asymmetry and aspiration to ensure self-preservation forced Pakistan to place confidence in nuclear deterrence, proceed for and develop India centric nuclear
274
weapons. Pakistan‟s decision to bud India centric nuclear weapons was a strategic compulsion to ensure self- preservations, sovereignty and independence.
The neo-realist John J, Mearsheimer 2 asserts that dominant state prefers to overrun weaker state that intensified Pakistan‟s security dilemma. Preceding factors intimidated Pakistan to test nuclear devices to reinstate balance of power (BOP). Pakistan‟s nuclear tests in 1998 were therefore a rational act, and contributed to the accomplishment of nuclear deterrence theory. It can be elucidated in the light of nuclear domino theory that nuclear weapon stabilizes strategic stability. India and Pakistan established their nuclear deterrent after May, 1998 nuclear tests. Nuclear postures of both the states prevented full scale wars and preserved peace. Nonetheless, nuclear postures confirmed Measheimer‟s belief that in Post-Cold War era, the increased nuclear proliferation will pose challenge to the NPT.
India and Pakistan have steadily finalized their nuclear doctrines to regulate peacetime nuclear posture, define the role of nuclear forces during crisis and find out prerequisite for the use of nuclear weapons during crisis. The utmost aim of nuclear doctrine is twofold as first to transmit the nuclear signals during crisis or in peacetime to avoid the outbreak of violence, and second, to keep pace during crisis or to preserve the violence at the minimum level. However, it could not stop asymmetry between India and Pakistan, incorporated nuclear weapons in their conventional weapon system, national security policies, nuclear doctrines and military strategies with divergent goals in minds. India aspires to acquire prestige globally while Pakistan intends to augment passive deterrence. Dawn of nuclear weapons thus enabled South Asian nuclear rivals to acquire overkill capacity. It has ripened mistrust leading to disruption of composite dialogues, discards Confidence and Security Building Measure (CSBMs) to resolve bilateral disputes and enhances fear of mutual annihilation in the minds of policymakers of both the states. South Asian strategic environment based on mutual trust deficit, bilateral suspicions and aversion that compels military modernization. Although India and Pakistan are non-signatories to the NPT, their military developments undermine the efficacy of the NPT, treaty‟s future relevance and intensify likelihood of accidental nuclear war.
2 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).
275
Fear induces caution. Statesmen are rational actors and indeed they tend to avoid the outbreak of war. Mutual vulnerability and fear of mutual extinction is therefore, essential for deterrence stability and prerequisite peace. Nuclear optimists have rightly professed that nuclear weapons retained BoP, reduced chances of war, preserved peace and stabilized South Asian strategic phenomenon. Precept that victory in nuclear age is dreadful resulted in war avoidance and decade long peace. On that account nuclear weapons are viewed as weapons of peace and stability. Waltz has emphasized that the possession of nuclear weapons have made statesmen careful (during crisis and war) because nuclear weapons usage produces irreparable catastrophe. 3 Indeed state‟s dependence on nuclear weapons is a rational behavior because nuclear weapon thwarts the prospects of deterrence disruption and the outbreak of war. In case of nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, their adversarial relations and efficient deterrent postures enable NNWS members of the NPT to extract the essential inferences that first nuclear weapons provide absolute security guarantees and ensure state existence as a central theme in the realist philosophy. Secondly, the incentives for NNWS to develop nuclear weapons remain high and; third conventionally strong and NWS can only be deterred with nuclear weapons.
Indo-Pak rivalry compelled Pakistan to draw inferences such as; first, nuclear weapons offset conventional and nuclear military superiority in addition in denying escalation dominance of India. Second, it rejects nuclear blackmailing, during crisis, in battlefield and strategic advantages in India‟s favor, third, Pakistan nuclear weapons cautioned India to pursue policy of restraint as India-Pakistan peace is outcome of nuclear weapons. Fourth, crisis and strategic stability is subject to credible deterrent posture; fifth, Nuclear weapons deter India from engrossing Pakistan‟s territories and; sixth nuclear weapon provides absolute security. Thus, nuclear weapons are conclusively declared as weapons of peace.
Conversely, genesis, steady progression and perfection of nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan are abating the NPT while becoming non signatory of the treaty. In post nuclear era, confrontational relations have driven India and Pakistan into enduring nuclear arms race. New Delhi and Islamabad has recently focused their endeavors to establish advanced nuclear facilities. Both the states have intensified production of weapon grade fissile material and are
3Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers, No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).
276
expanding the size of deterrent forces, extending the range in addition to accomplished precision strike capability. India and Pakistan have also introduced new technologies such as low-yield weapons that create additional risks of nuclear war fighting. They are developing solid fuel propelled short range, medium range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MARVs), electromagnetic pulse, and sea based sub-marine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in pursuit to compete nuclear triad thus, accelerating the pace of nuclearization to acquire assured second strike capability.
The Indian deployment of nuclear submarine means positioning of Indian nuclear missiles and nuclearization of the Indian Ocean. It disrupts the region by upsetting the regional balance. India validates its move in pretext to accomplish basic prerequisite of the credible nuclear deterrence. Besides, credible deterrence would ensure India‟s sovereign stature at inexpensive cheaper cost. Indian aspirations to accomplish nuclear triad nonetheless, inherit the faults in conjunction with shortcomings. Due to the deployment of nuclear weapons on Indian submarines, the Indian Prime Minister will have to absolutely empower the junior ranking naval commanders to use nuclear weapons. The deployment of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean can thus result in unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons leading to full scale nuclear war. Indian endeavors to complete nuclear triad has already augmented Pakistan‟s security dilemma. Pakistan was coerced to counterbalance India with the development of NSFC. New Delhi and Islamabad‟s counterbalancing techniques aim at achieving escalation dominance vis-à-vis the adversary. Counter containment strategies provoke unremitting nuclear arms race and intensify dangerous and vicious cycle of mutual security dilemma.
India though vindicated policy of CMD in reality it has accumulated substantial quantities of weapon grade fissile material and advanced weapon system. On January 13, 2010, Pakistan declared Indian military‟s intimidating strategies4 as destabilizing for regional peace and strategic stability. Indian policy denies nuclear restraint regime and discards the policy of the CMD.
4Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR11/2010-ISPR, (January 13, 2010), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1110, (accessed August 12, 2015).
277
The interest of India and Pakistan to build advance nuclear forces stems from the reasons such as; the worrisome cycle of security dilemma. Second, aspirations of India and Pakistan to accomplish the prerequisites of credible nuclear deterrence based on second strike forces. The rudiments for credible nuclear deterrence comprises of residual capacity of nuclear forces to survive enemy‟s first strike and if necessary carryout punitive strikes against the aggressor. Third, to constitute efficient C3 system as it prevents the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan are in formative phase, therefore, both inferred to justify the prerequisites of credible nuclear deterrence. Both are developing additional nuclear forces to ensure second strike capability (ability to retaliate with nuclear forces after absorbing first nuclear attack/ strike).
Convincingly, India and Pakistan believe that the developments made by the opponent in nuclear realm destabilizes its security hence, response should be with countermoves. New doctrines have been incorporated by both the states into their military war fighting doctrines particularly, by Pakistan. The deadly combination of WMDs with conventional weapons and the policy of first strike reduced the nuclear threshold and increased the likelihood of the outbreak of either deliberate or accidental nuclear war in crisis or crisis like scenario. The blame-game, enemy images, mutual sinister designs escalated animosity, mutual abhorrence, and preexisting security dilemma inevitably accelerates the pace of conventional and nuclear arms race. General public in India and Pakistan is obsessed and emotionally attached with their nuclear weapons programs. Leadership in both countries recognizes that any attempt to convince general public to rollback nuclear program can result in political suicide. Consequentially, the leadership in India and Pakistan sidesteps the norms of non-proliferation and the forceful demands to sign the NPT as NNWS. Hence, the NPT is rejected by the South Asian de-facto NWS. In nutshell, nuclear disarmament of India and Pakistan will remain a distant goal due to the inability of the NPT depository states to comprehend the determinants the nuclear weapons programs of India and Pakistan.
Apparently, the India- Pakistan‟s nuclear behavior is unsupportive about NPT. Their nuclear postures endanger the future of the NPT generally in the world and particularly in the South Asian region. This validates the anti-bomb lobby, encompassing of well-known scholars
278
such as T.V. Paul,5Thomas Graham Jr.,6 Douglas B. Shaw,7 Mario Esteban Caranza,8Satu P. Limaye, 9 Don Berlin 10 and Lawrence Scheinma 11 having conviction that the South Asian nuclearization brought the NPT under stress with dangerous impending ramifications.
Vertical Proliferation outside the NPT in South Asia Challenges the Treaty
The study asserts that the denial of NPT by India and Pakistan undermines its efficacy and sustainability. It threatens the significance of the treaty in future as well. The characteristics of the nuclear weapons program of India and Pakistan remained discernible and diverse. India refused to sign the NPT due to the discriminatory nature of the treaty. India believes that the NPT is in conflict with its democratic provisions and practices. Further, the treaty infringes Indian sovereignty. 12 India retained the right of nuclear weapons development open. It intermittently highlighted the intrinsic tectonic flaws of the treaty. Indian policymakers and security analysts believe that the NPT will fail due to consistent division amongst the NPT signatories depicting themselves into nuclear haves and nuclear have nots. Indian political leadership rejects the anxiety of anti-bomb. Consequently, India believes that it cannot be held responsible for the treaty‟s failure.
Pakistan disproved the NPT due to Indian rejection of the treaty. Despite the fact that India and Pakistan are non-signatories to the NPT their nuclear weapon modernization program and qualitative developments are challenging the treaty from outside. The continued reliance and obsession of India and Pakistan with nuclear weapons poses twofold challenges. On the one hand, it is dwindling the established non-proliferation norms. On the other, following the tests
5 T.V. Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Fall, 1998). 6Anver `Cohen and Thomas Graham Jr., “An NPT for Non-members,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 60, No. 3, (May/ June, 2004): 6. 7Douglas B. Shaw, “Sovereignty in a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” in The Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, ed. David Krieger (London: Transaction Publishers, 2009). 8 Mario Esteban Carranza, South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009). 9Satu P. Limaye, “India,” in Asian Security Handbook 2000 eds., William M. Carpenter and David Q. Wiencek (New York: An East Gate Book, 2000); Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik and Robert G. Wirsing, eds., Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004). 10Satu P. Limaye and Don Berlin, “ Nuclear Weapons in Asia,” A Report of a Conference of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, (April, 2000), available at http://www.apcss.org (accessed September 2015). 11 Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, “Israel, India and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Association, (December, 2003), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman (accessed on February 1, 2014). 12“Sign NPT, UNSC Tells States,” The Tribune, (September 25, 2009), http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090925/main1.htm, (accessed August 31, 2017).
279
conducted by India and Pakistan, the demand by the global society to halt the development of the ballistic missiles and to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons is also avoided. The nuclear posture of India and Pakistan is undermining the efforts of the global community focused on achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament enshrined in Article VI of the NPT. India and Pakistan‟s denial to join the NPT as NNWS is obstructing the universality of the treaty.
Though, India and Pakistan are non-signatories to the NPT yet, they are NNWS in the light of the treaty. It is an undeniable fact that South Asian nuclearization was in violation of the established norms of the NPT. Nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia is in violation of the Article II of the NPT. However, the two states did not break any law. Article II prohibits the NNWS from acquiring nuclear weapons. Indian decision to test nuclear devices was also a major setback to regional stability and Pakistan‟s efforts to achieve the objectives of nuclear disarmament. In 1974 and 1991, Pakistan had proposed to sign nuclear restraint regime (NRR) and establish NWFZ in South Asia. Indian nuclear tests undoubtedly, posed existential threat to Pakistan. It provoked Pakistan to break the established non-proliferation norms based on the NPT and to test nuclear devices. India is thus responsible for discarding the NRR and obstructing the cause of the establishment of NWFZ in the light of Article VII of the NPT in South Asia.
The May, 1998, nuclear tests portray the security competition between India and Pakistan. The relations between India and Pakistan are undoubtedly based on mutual suspicions and mistrust. Indian offensive military CSD, the development of Prahar missile,13 establishment of secret nuclear city, 14 the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean and Plutonium production intensify Pakistan‟s security concerns genuinely. Overriding security concerns deters Islamabad to affix considerable significance to the objectives of non-proliferation particularly, the NPT. India aspires to guarantee the escalation dominance in South Asia. Growing asymmetry in Indian favor makes it imperative for Pakistan to build nuclear weapons and modernize the associate platforms. It demands manufacturing of indispensable missile force to deliver nuclear warheads.
13 Hemant Kumar Rout, “Tactical Missile Pragati Readied for Export,” The New Indian Express, (November 5, 2014). 14 Adrian Levy, “India is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons, Experts Say,” Foreign Policy, (December 16, 2015), available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barc/, (accessed December 16, 2015).
280
Pakistan believes that nuclear deterrent is an absolute defence to deter impending Indian conventional and nuclear threats.
The rejuvenated strategic and political role of nuclear deterrence in South Asia gave birth to fears that opportunist states may follow India-Pakistan nuclear weapons development route. It is claimed that South Asian nuclear rivals have contaminated Article IV of the NPT. For instance, potential nuclear proliferate state can lawfully stockade dual use of nuclear technology under Article IV of the NPT and later can change the course of peaceful nuclear program to manufacture nuclear weapons. It is feared that threshold states such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Western European and NNWS may adjudicate to transcend the route of peaceful nuclear program to build a nuclear hammer. Self-preservation is a paramount antecedence and is an indispensable national interest of every state. From the perspective of neo-realist theory of alliance, power transition theory and rational decision making theory, national interest is solemn and cardinal for far-sighted statesmen. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Western European NNWS states albeit enjoy US protracted deterrence status. Conventional deterrence does not induce fear of punishment, so it cannot promise state security. Efficiency of Pakistan‟s nuclear weapon vis-à-vis India may encourage nuclear threshold states to produce atomic weapons in pursuit of achieving absolute security. Perchance threshold states may accordingly decide to benefit from withdrawal clause of Article X of the NPT- Each party… have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events,… have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.15 Enforcement of Article X by NNWS member to the NPT would automatically result into the rejection of the NPT.
India and Pakistan have become NWS. It is yet another challenge to Article X, since the claim of the status of NWS is a blatant denial of the efforts focused on the containment of the nuclear proliferation based on the NPT. The self-proclaimed NWS status and the demands to be adjusted in the NPT as NWS followed by the announcement of nuclear doctrines undermined the spirit of the NPT and particularly, weakened the Article IX of the NPT. It asserts that a NWS is one which developed and tested nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967.16 In line with this
15“The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) NPT),”United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, http:www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/ (accessed April 23, 2017). 16Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (Wiltshire: The Cromwell Press Ltd, 2002): 101.
281
particular definition, India and Pakistan cannot become de-jure NWS. The global community while realizing the critical fact has condemned the nuclear tests and refused to accept both India and Pakistan as NWS. South Asian nuclear tests have a definite potential to test the strength of NPT.
Nonetheless, India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry is weighed as an opposition of disarmament and a challenge to the established nuclear order based on the NPT. Pakistan laid down new blueprints that even small NWS can stop hegemon‟s aggression in the region. This change in the traditional pattern of interactions between India and Pakistan can help weak states to infer that the possession of WMDs ensure state autonomy and sovereignty. The continued application of the neo-realist philosophy augmented Pakistan‟s defence layer but hinders the universality of the NPT. The neo-realist‟s framework for state security produces fears that weak states may exercise Article X to develop nuclear deterrent to ensure self-preservation.
Global anarchy systemically relates South Asian conflict with NWS and obstructs the implementation of the Article VI of the NPT. For example, Indian reliance on nuclear weapons to deter China poses security dilemma for the latter. The sense of vulnerability stops China from applying Article VI of the NPT even to abandon nuclear weapons. Chinese nuclear weapons poses security dilemma for US. The US conversely integrates the nuclear weapons with the conventional forces, in national security policy and modernizes nuclear weaponry. The US nuclear posture simultaneously threatens China and Russia. Hence, nuclear proliferation begets nuclear proliferation. Further, nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons NWS are continuously involved in vertical proliferation. It authenticates the neo-realist philosophy that the modus- operandi to safeguard state is nothing but a self-help and power accumulation. It however, damages the spirit of the NPT.
A critical examination of the behavior of the international community towards India indicates that to satisfy Indian desire, a gradual process including out of the box solution is in progression. India is going to be accepted as a NWS outside the NPT. India specific NSG wavier17 has provided a unique opportunity for the international community to be indulged in nuclear commerce with New Delhi. However, this wavier and preferential treatment of India is
17 Zia Mian et al., eds. “Fissile Material in South Asia: The Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, Research Report No. 1, (September, 2006): 5.
282
undermining the NPT.18 For instance, Indo-US nuclear covenant failed to open Indian military nuclear complexes for IAEA inspections. The covenant can neither halt the production of weapons grade fissile material nor can stop India from manufacturing nuclear weapons. India diverted its peaceful nuclear technology to carryout Pokhran-I tests. It is feared that India will undeniably change the direction of nuclear material and technology acquired under Indo-US, Indo-France, 19 Indo-Australia 20 and Indo-Japan 21 accords for developing additional stocks of nuclear bombs.US and its allies are aware of the preceding fears. Yet, they bestowed India with substantial assistance to perfect Indian nuclear weapons program. In the wake of these agreements, India gained self-sufficiency to produce heavy water, design and construct nuclear reactors, recycle spent fuel and produce weapons grade fissile material. The US, NSG members, the MTCR, the IAEA and the NPT depository states have turned a blind eye to these developments. Further, the US is encouraging and shielding non-NPTNWS India to be recognized as a de-jure NWS.
The Indo-US and the nuclear agreement of the NSG member states with India is promoting vertical and horizontal proliferation. These nuclear agreements are therefore in direct violation of the Articles I, II, III.2, IV, VI and XI of the NPT. It is ironical that the NPT depository states and the NSG members instead of outlawing Indian nuclear weapons program have accepted it.
The NNWS relinquished their right of developing nuclear weapons under Article II of the NPT in a hope that NWS would gradually dismantle WMDs. However, the US and nuclear agreements of the NSG member states with India can embed frustration amongst the NNWS. The NNWS may question the implementation of the Article VI and the efficacy of the NPT. The US is setting a wrong example. The NSG wavier and Indo-US nuclear agreement is posing internal challenge to the NPT while threatening the future and the survivability of the treaty.
Further, the US is leaving no stone unturned in helping India to become member of the NSG and the UNSC. On the other hand, these steps have been weakening the NPT as Indian
18 Tughral Yamin, Telephone interview, (September 15, 2018). 19Meena Menon, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal Can Apply to other Countries,” The Hindu, (February 6, 2015). 20 Mark Hibbs, “India‟s Bilateral Obligations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (February 7, 2015), http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/07/india-s-bilateral-obligations/i201, (accessed on March 21, 2015). 21 “India, Japan Civil Nuclear Deal Comes into Force,” The Hindu, (July 21, 2017).
283
access to international market to acquire fissile material enabled it to divert domestically produced material for the production of the WMDs without any practical hurdle. NSG member states are using Article IV of the NPT- allowing states to carryout peaceful activities in the nuclear realm- enabling India to get involved into vertical proliferation. NWS are in violation of the Article I and NNWS in violation of the Article II of the NPT are carrying out nuclear commerce with India. Additionally, the future of non- proliferation mechanism based on the NPT is endangered.
Any attempt to accommodate India or even to Pakistan into the NPT requires amendment under Article VIII of the NPT. However, it is a lengthy and difficult process. The procedure includes the submission of the proposed amendment to the depository governments, responsible for the circulation among all member states. The convening of a particular conference to discuss the fate of the proposed amendments requires the consent of one third or majority parties for particular alterations. The amendment needs majority votes including “depository governments” and vote from IAEA‟s Board of Governors as well. The entry of India alone or Pakistan together, after proposed amendments in NPT would contradict the single cause to limit the number of NWS to five. NNWS and technologically advanced threshold states may start questioning the utility of acceding to the NPT and ultimately relinquishing development option of the WMDs. It may also be possible that the threshold states would decide exercising Article X of the Treaty and quit the NPT to develop the nuclear weapons and join the nuclear club. On the basis of such fears, worst case scenario would be chain reaction leading towards the spread of nuclear anarchy. The NPT neither alone nor directly bring India and Pakistan into the nuclear mainstream the treaty has evolved over the years.
Historically, both South Asian rivals have refused to join NPT as NNWS on several occasions e.g. Indian Minister for External Affairs in 2000 asserted that the NPT member states must understand India cannot join the NPT as a NNWS.22 Nine years later the Indian permanent representative to UN in response to UNSCR 1887 categorically refused to sign the NPT as a NNWS.23 Pakistan, on the other hand insists that it would only join the NPT if India joins. A candid change has also been reported in Pakistan‟s stance in February, 2010 as Pakistan Foreign
22 Leonard Weiss, “India and the NPT,” Strategic Analysis, 34, No. 2, (March, 2010): 266. 23 A. Vinod Kumar, “Reforming the NPT to Include India,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May 1, 2010), http://thebulletin.org/reforming-npt-include-india (accessed on February 2, 2014).
284
Office Spokesman Abdul Basit asserted that “we cannot sign the treaty. We cannot give up nuclear weapons.”24 He emphasized that “if you have conventional imbalance between Pakistan and India, then obviously our reliance on nuclear weapons increases correspondingly.” Basit further stated that Pakistan will only join the NPT if it is recognized as NWS.25 Nevertheless, on June 3, 2015, Pakistan‟s former Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry, during deliberations with the US officials reiterated that the treaty is discriminatory in nature and Islamabad cannot accede to it.26 It would be safe to predict that South Asia‟s hold-out states will not join the NPT27 in the near future because the Treaty does not offer any incentive; it neither provides security guarantee to Pakistan nor does it support the prestige rhetoric of India.
To conclude India and Pakistan developed nuclear deterrent in violation of the Article II of the NPT. Since they diverted the nuclear technology acquired for peaceful purposes, it was a violation of the Article IV. India and Pakistan nuclear tests were in violation of Article V, which initially allowed PNEs. The strategic competition of India and Pakistan is undermining the disarmament efforts globally since nuclear proliferation begets nuclear proliferation. South Asian nuclear weapons poses security dilemma to the de-jure NWS. India and Pakistan nuclear rivalry is preventing the region from becoming NWFZ in the light of the Article VII of the NPT. India and Pakistan demands to amend the Article IX the cut-off date can pave the way for NNWS to exercise Article X of the treaty. It can in worst case scenario result in global nuclear anarchy. The non-proliferation mechanism based on the treaty is thus under great stress.
Creating Nuclear Stability through Cooperative Mechanism
This study promotes the precept that liberalism encourages states to sideline troubled history, develop working relationship in addition to the search for common political, financial and strategic objectives. Liberalism believes that regardless of anarchy, cooperation among states is practicable. Further, states cooperate to peacefully determine the rules of engagement, compete without going to war, ascertain and reach a goal by establishing institutions. An institutional framework is set to regulate the code of conduct, reduce trust deficit, tie states
24 Kamran Yousaf, “France-India Nuclear Deal: Pakistan Sees Serious Strategic Implications,” The Express Tribune, (December 7, 2010). 25Ibid. 26 Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan will Not Sign NPT, Says Foreign Secretary,” The Dawn, (June 3, 2015). 27 Mansoor Ahmed, Interviewed by Ashfaq Ahmed, Islamabad (September 28, 2018).
285
lawfully and avoid cheating. Liberalism was thus exercised to explain the development of the NPT.
Cooperation through institutional development in the light of liberalism can facilitate India and Pakistan to eradicate mutual suspicion, hostility, cease vertical proliferation and nuclear arms race. Correspondingly, mutual cooperation through institutional platform can pave the way for India and Pakistan to sign and seal the NPT. In opposition, protracted vertical proliferation, missile and nuclear arms race will result in military competition, nuclearization of Indian Ocean, and Indian favored asymmetry. It can escalate the prospects of nuclear war. South Asia‟s nuclear rivals while applying comprehensive security mechanism (CSM)28 framework have identified preceding list of mutual problems. The CSM helped South Asian nuclear rivals to acknowledge that the traditional thinking based on suspicions and mutual threat perception results into impending crises. It bars India and Pakistan from resolving their core issues through cherished dialogue and through peaceful methodologies. Further, both states have already paid high price due to non-cooperative behavior based on realism. India and Pakistan strategic community after identifying mutual disputes in the light of CSM predicted that prospects of accidental or inadvertent nuclear weapons launch hover over South Asia.
Correspondingly, strategic community suggests that India and Pakistan should initially evolve institutional framework based on the following three models
a. the Cooperative Security Framework (CSF); b India-Pakistan and the Future of the NPT in the Light of Abbasi‟s NSG Model and; c. The NPT actualizing India and Pakistan CNSBMs. It would first thwart potential nuclear war in South Asia. Institutional framework would curb the nuclear proliferation and reinforce the NPT. It would streamline India-Pakistan into the established nuclear order based on the NPT. a. The Cooperative Security Framework (CSF)
The South Asian region has peculiar characteristics. The region is known as a nuclear flash point and it is a hub of different insurgent movements. In security literature, these issues are known as
28NiharNayak, ed., Cooperative Security Framework for South Asia (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2013): XVI.
286
non-traditional sources (NTS) of concerns. International community fears that NTS can lead to an outbreak of war between the two nuclear powers which may result in a deliberate or accidental nuclear war in South Asia. The strategic community of both India and Pakistan lack in mutual trust due to historical reasons. It results in missile and arms race, nuclear signaling (during crisis), alleged deployment of conventional and (TNWs, medium and intermediate range) and deployment of nuclear forces at or near international border. Due to active arms race, border skirmishes and concentration or the alleged deployment of nuclear forces on the borders of India and Pakistan, both share “active nuclear borders.” In post nuclearised era, Pakistan has sent nuclear signals to deter its enemy during Kargil war and 2001- 2002 stand-off. However, since India and Pakistan have secret nuclear programs, it is not sure whether they actually deployed nuclear weapons on their borders during the stand-off or not. It is fair to assert that due to the introduction of nuclear weapons, South Asian regional anarchy could not be altered. The possible use of nuclear weapons aggravates the intensity and dangers of the crisis. The outbreak of crisis between these states requires an efficient handling of the situation. The international community particularly, the US realizes that the mismanagement can lead to the outbreak of violence resulting in catastrophe beyond imagination. The US involvement has peacefully defused India-Pakistan crises in the past.
The CSF encourages bilateral, mutual and multilateral cooperation, negotiations, confidence building measures, interdependence,29defence cooperation, strategic dialogues and intelligence cooperation. The CSF provides platform to statesmen. It encourages policymakers to build mutually agreed institutional mechanism to unfold and understand mutual concerns, overcome trust deficit, to coup emerging threats and resolve prevailing common security problems. The CSF can work at regional and global levels to foster dependency among states through agreements and compromises for war avoidance. The CSF encourages and accepts non- state actors‟ role globally thus, it negatives neo-realist philosophy. It is reasonable to mention that liberalism and the CSF ignores the possibility of war stemming from global anarchy, security dilemma, threat perception and states tendency to cheat after signing the agreements.
Despite the efficacy of liberalism and CSF, much should not be expected due to the pronounced feelings of Hindutva for the reunification of the sub-continent dominated by India. A
29Nayak, ed., Cooperative Security Framework for South Asia, XV.
287
common external threat is the essential characteristic for the smooth functioning of the CSF. However, this feature is missing in India- and Pakistan. Instead both have difference of opinion. India believes that Beijing supports Islamabad militarily against New Delhi and Pak-China nexus is detrimental for its security. Pakistan considers India as a major security threat to its sovereignty. The security competition between India and Pakistan has led to the evolution of two schools of thoughts including the traditional school or the status quoits and the revisionists.30The traditional school believes that it holds through knowledge of the India and Pakistan‟s protracted bilateral conflicts, hence, it holds the key to resolve these issues. It conversely rejects the change. However, the revisionist rejects traditional approach and hold traditional school responsible for its inefficacy and the protracted conflicts between the two.
This academic research also does not agree with the traditional approach. It proposes that India and Pakistan should work in collaboration while applying the CSF to eradicate terrorism and thwart accidental or deliberate nuclear war in South Asia. It is claimed that signing of nuclear restraint regime based on Abbasi‟s Model that can bridge the gap between New Delhi and Islamabad to stabilize the deterrence and maintain peace in South Asia. b. India-Pakistan and the Future of the NPT in the Light of Abbasi’s the NSG Model
The chronicles of events certify that mere presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia revolutionized the military affairs of India and Pakistan. War avoidance rather than war fighting evolved as a primary objective. Consequentially, India-Pakistan managed conflict and full scale wars were avoided. However, nuclear deterrence alone was not the determining factor that thwarted major wars in South Asia. In fact, US‟ active involvement regulated states behavior. US efficient crises management deterred the breakdown of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. Yet, concerns regarding the failure of deterrence breakdown hover over South Asia. Fear of deliberate or inadvertent nuclear war requires a perpetual framework to stabilize deterrence and maintain peace in South Asia.
India and Pakistan while applying the teachings of nuclear liberalism and Abbasi‟s Model can preserve strategic stability of deterrence and deter deterrence breakdown. According to this particular model, the NPT in its pursuit to ensure the implementation of Article II and IV of the
30Ibid, XVIII.
288
NPT will have to introduce changes in the NSG. This particular Model31 highlights the NPT‟s bankruptcy to address outlier states demands. Abbasi Model advocates that in the absence of incentive, an attractive-package South Asia‟s outlier states will not join the NPT. Abbasi recommends that the NPT, in order to convince India-Pakistan to join the NPT will have to introduce changes in the NSG. She asserts that India and Pakistan will have to become the signatories to the CTBT. It facilitates the CD process to finalize the FMCT and sign it. In return, the NPT will pave the way for India and Pakistan to get the NSG membership thereby attaching it to the NPT (the NPT + NSG and India-Pakistan formula).
Abbasi proposes that „it is high time that the group members readjust the NSG guidelines by setting up a new formula on the principle of energy security for all. For her „this will make the NSG more relevant and the NPT more resilient in the 21st century.‟ She proposes;
that “through the NSG, the group members can help integrate and recognize the status of India and Pakistan. It would allow them to retain their nuclear deterrence to maintain peace and abstain from a dangerous nuclear arms race. For her, through revised– universally acceptable guidelines, the NSG can be made a permanent group by offering membership to both India and Pakistan that may indirectly universalize the status of the NPT.”32
The signing of CTBT by India and Pakistan will outlaw nuclear testing. In addition, signing of the FMCT will limit the production of weapons grade fissile material and slow the pace of nuclear and missile arms race. Preexistent security dilemma haunting New Delhi and Islamabad based policymakers will be overcome. Further, the probability of deliberate or accidental nuclear war will also be reduced. Hence, this particular model is a key to maintain peace and stabilize deterrence in South Asia. India-Pakistan NSG seat will be conditional and automatically be revoked if both or either one is found involved in treachery i.e. diverting nuclear technology for nuclear weapons development. Secondly, India-Pakistan under the agreement will have to provide account of spent fuel to the IAEA, the UNSC, the NSG and the NPT. India and Pakistan will have to inevitably allow the IAEA inspectors to verify their claims. The nuclear establishments will have to assure the NPT that India and Pakistan is not expanding
31Rizwana Abbasi, “Pakistan and the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” E-International Relations, (January 11, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/11/pakistan-and-the-nuclear-suppliers-group-nsg/, (accessed September 9, 2017). 32 Ibid.
289
the size of the WMDs program. Further, both are using nuclear technology in the light of the Article IV of the NPT.
However, prior to signing of the CTBT and FMCT the NPT depository states through the use of good-offices will have to first persuade India-Pakistan to sign and seal nuclear restraint regime (NRR). The NPT through its secretariat would devise mutually agreed upon rules enacted in NRR to ensure cooperation between India and Pakistan in pursuit to overcome the prevailing trust deficit, mutual suspicion, threat perception, security dilemma and to regulate India and Pakistan nuclear behavior. Signing of the NRR would ceremoniously declare cheating as an illegal act hence embeds sense of shared victory. The NPT secretariat serving as a guardian of the NRR can ensure regime‟s success and endow India and Pakistan to stabilize the nuclear deterrence and breathe peacefully. The NPT can provide basis for actualizing India and Pakistan proposed NRR. The particular regime‟s prominent feature will be Confidence and Nuclear Security Building Measures (CNSBMs) to ease mutual suspicions, trust deficit, overcome existent security dilemma and stabilize regional deterrence. c. The NPT actualizing India and Pakistan CNSBMs
The renewed role of nuclear weapons; escalating significance of nuclear deterrent, the clash involving non-proliferation objectives of the NPT and deterrent role of WMDs requires the treaty to play a leading role in stabilizing South Asia‟s regional deterrence. The NPT depository states can convince India and Pakistan to employ CNSBMs in the light of nuclear liberalism through the NPT‟s platform. The treaty‟s depository states would evolve permanent secretariat to lead an uninterrupted peace process, provide directions, verify and conclude negotiated peace concerning South Asia‟s non-signatories to the treaty.
The NPT would highlight the importance of using pre-existing hotlines connecting the India-Pakistan Director General Military Operations (DGMOs) to relieve tensions and avoid exchange of fire on borders. The NPT would also compel and provide good offices to New Delhi and Islamabad for the resumption of stalled composite dialogues process. It would also reiterate the preexisting understanding to avoid major military exercises and deployment of technologically advanced military hardware in close proximity. The treaty‟s secretariat would be responsible to confirm the claims of India and Pakistan e.g. through on-site inspections and
290
satellite imageries that both states are abiding by the NRR statutes. The NPT secretariat would restrict India and Pakistan to share the calendar pertaining to aerobics, missile tests and military exercises to avoid crises like situations and accidental warfare. Both New Delhi and Islamabad would be convinced from nuclear signaling via ballistic missile tests, military deployments on borders and avoid issuing harsh statements during crises. It would mutually avoid nuclear tests. It would restrict media on both sides from depicting the opponent as an arch rival. Finally, it would encourage bilateral trade and opening up of additional transit routes between the two countries.
The NPT can help South Asia‟s non-NPT signatories to reduce the prevalent security dilemma and regulate the size of conventional and nuclear force structure. The NPT can thus normalize the nuclear proliferation behavior of India and Pakistan, increase the nuclear threshold level and maintain strategic and crises stability. It would thus overcome the fear of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and bestow India and Pakistan to guard their borders devoid of nuclear deterrent. The NPT led peace process contemplates security through cooperation. It encourages cooperation under anarchy. Conclusively, CNSBMs from the secretariat of the NPT confronts and rejects Hobbes philosophy of the state of war. Further, to sabotage nuclear deterrence theory particularly in South Asia, the treaty requires replacing the strategic significance of nuclear deterrent with the notion of peace and security through cooperation.
However, much should not be expected due to the prevailing hatred, exchange of firing on border and rise of Hindutiva in India. It can also be said that the above expectations can be labeled as wishful thinking. Further, the fate of the proposed regime depends upon internal and external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders include military bureaucracy and political leadership. In South Asia, Rawalpindi based military bureaucracy and Islamabad based political leaders support the signing of strategic restraint regime. However, geographically huge, militarily powerful and economically strong India declined Pakistan‟s proposal. Had West persuaded India it would have signed the NRR but the West notably US uses India as a counterweight against rising China. US therefore supplied sophisticated military hardware, nuclear technology and radioactive fuel to India. US helped India to get the membership of the MTCR to raise Indian stature globally. Further, Washington is pursuing a provocative strategy to help New Delhi in its quest to seek permanent membership of the UNSC, NSG and WA. US strategy is undermining the NPT and global non-proliferation efforts. It infuriates Indo-China rivalry hence, India relies
291
upon nuclear weapons vis-à-vis China. Indian measures are viewed hostile by Pakistan and China it results in employment of nuclear weapon deter nuclear weapons policy. The substance of the matter is the Chinese nuclear deterrent embroils US hence; South Asian nuclear policies have global consequences.
India and Pakistan killer instinct originated Kargil war, 2001-02 standoff and anxiety of Indian preemptive attack against Pakistan following Mumbai massacre. Sino-US lucrative involvement nevertheless defused aforesaid crises. Contemporary South Asian strategic circumstances require strategic restraint regime. The role of major powers would remain meaningful in maintaining a balanced atmosphere. Their innate skills to tabulate plans and enforce policy guidelines can even help alter institutional policies. A common platform can be set to encourage cooperation between India and Pakistan. Major Powers continued pressure on India and Pakistan would sustain cooperation and marginalize fear of cheating because in case of non-compliance major powers can impose embargo on cheating state.
In conclusion, it is suggested that nuclear restraint regime can constitute and preserve deterrence stability in South Asia. However, it appears to be a distant goal. The succeeding lines highlight the challenges that hinder the execution of the proposed regime. First big-powers neglect hinders enforcement of the regime. Second, longstanding unresolved border problems i.e. Kashmir dispute, Sia-Chin and Sir Creek issues exacerbate trust-deficit and fuel ongoing rivalry. The continued vertical proliferation and arms race also breeds‟ hostility and increases mutual suspicion. Competitive strategic enterprise prevents South Asian states from pursuing nuclear disarmament process. Unfortunately, India alleges Pakistan of its involvement in cross border terrorist attacks and suspends dialogues process. Indian coercive policy further complicates the situation and increase possibility of full-scale conflict in South Asia.
292
Appendix-I Interview questions
Followings are the interview questions.
1. Define the nature,/character of rising asymmetry in South Asia. 2. What is the nature of India-Pakistan asymmetry? 3. What is the nature of India-Pakistan deterrent force asymmetry? 4. How rising asymmetry is increasing Pakistan‟s security dilemma? 5. What is the impact of Indian force build up on Pakistan nuclear force structure? 6. How India and Pakistan pose challenge to the NPT? 7. What is the future status of India and Pakistan‟s membership in the context of the NPT? 8. Why Pakistan would prefer to strengthen its nuclear forces rather than joining the NPT as NNWS. 9. Is Pakistan a reliable de-facto NWS? 10. Pakistan Tactical Nuclear Weapons is cause of stability or instability? 11. Is India replacing NFU policy with first use policy? 12. How South Asia's non-signatories nuclear commerce with NPT signatories is undermining the treaty? 13. What is the impact of India-Pakistan asymmetry on the efficacy of the NPT? 14. How South Asia's non-signatories nuclear commerce with NPT signatories is undermining the treaty? 15. What is the impact of India-Pakistan arms race on South Asian strategic Stability?
293
Appendix-II
Interview Schedule Guide
S.NO. Name Designation Mode of Interview Date & Place
1. Zulfiqar Hussain Director General Law, Personal Interview December 17, Cabinet Division (45 Minutes) 2017, Islamabad.
2. Mansoor Akbar Senior Research Fellow Personal Interview December 6, Ministry of Defence, (30 Minutes) 2017, Islamabad.
3. Adil Iqbal Research Fellow Personal Interview January 20, Ministry of Defence, (40 Minutes) 2018, Islamabad.
4. Michael Krepon Co-Founder Emailed Interview September 17, The Stimson Center 2018. Washington D.C.
5. Dr. Tom Sauer Senior Lecturer Emailed Interview September 16, University of Antwerpen 2018.
6. Mr. Muhammad Lecturer, Dept of Pol. Science Personal Interview January 14, 2018 Jawad Hashmi & International Relations (25 Minutes) Gujrat. University of Gujrat.
7. Mr. Muhammad Associate Professor Personal Interview January 13, 2018. Nawaz Bhatti Dept of Politics & International (20 Minutes) Sargodha. Relations (DPIR), University of Sargodha.
8. Mr. Muhammad Research Officer Personal Interview December 17, Adnan Nayar, Ministry of Defence (20 Minutes) 2017. Islamabad.
9. Mr. Zulfiqar Hussain Director General Law, Personal Interview January 14, Cabinet Division (20 Minutes) 2018, Islamabad.
10. Dr. Musarat Jabeen, Director City Campus Personal Interview January 13, & Chairperson Dept of ((20 Minutes) 2018, Sargodha International Relations University of Lahore City Campus Sargodha.
11. Brig. Zahir Kazmi Director Arms Control & Private Conversation December 3, 2017 Disarmament (ACDA), (10 Minutes) SPD, Chaklala. Strategic Plans Division (SPD).
294
12. Ms. Tanzila Khalil Research Officer, ACDA Private Conversation December 3, 2017 SPD, (30 Minutes) SPD, Chaklala.
13. Dr. Rajesh M. Professor, S. Rajaratnam Emailed Interview September 17, 2018 Basrur School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University Singapore.
14. Dr. Richard Cupitt Senior Associate, Emailed Interview September 17, Stimson Center, 2018. Washington, D.C.
15. Dr. Moonis Ahmar Dean Faculty of Social Emailed Interview September 18, University of Karachi, 2018.
16. Dr. Syed Rifaat Former Chairman Dept of Personal Interview September 19, Hussain Strategic Studies (25 Minutes) 2018. Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad.
17. Dr. Tughral Yamin Professor/Associate Dean Telephone Interview September 15, Dept of Peace & Conflict (16 Minutes) (2018) Studies National University of Science & Technology (NUST), Islamabad.
18. Dr. Benjamin kienzle Senior Lecturer Skype Interview September 19, Defence Studies Dept, (43 Minutes) 2018. Kings College London (KCL).
19. Mr. Pravin Sawhney Editor FORCE & Writer of Personal Interview September 15, Dragon on Our Doorstep: (20 Minutes) 2018. Islamabad. Managing China Through Military Power.
20. Dr. Rasheed Ahmad Professor/ Former Dean Personal Interview September 5, Khan Faculty of Arts & Law (35 Minutes) 2018. Lahore University of Sargodha.
21. Brig (R) Feroz Writer/ Naval Postgraduate Personal Interview September 18, Hassan Khan School Monterey, (50 Minutes) 2018. Islamabad
22. Dr. Zafar Khan Assistant Professor Personal Interview September 24, NDU Islamabad (30 Minutes) 2018. Islamabad
295
23. Dr. Muhammad Assistant Professor Personal Interview September 24, Munir NDU Islamabad (30 Minutes) 2018, Islamabad.
24. Iftikhar Ahmed Commander (retd), Private Conversation December 3, 2017 ACDA, SPD, (30 Minutes) SPD, Chaklala.
25. Dr. Muhammad Khan Professor, Int‟l Personal Interview September 24, Islamic University (25 Minutes) 2018, NDU Islamabad. Islamabad (IIUI).
26. Dr. Syed Shahid Assistant Professor Personal Interview August 28, 2018. Hussain Bukhari Bahauddin Zakariya (20 Minutes) NDU, Islamabad. University Multan.
27. Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad Former Head of Dept Personal Interview September 23, 2018 Choudhry of Peace & Conflict (20 Minutes) Islamabad. Studies, NDU Islamabad.
28. Dr. Mansoor Ahmed Lecturer, Dept of Personal Interview September 30, 2018 Defence & Strategic (30 Minutes) Islamabad. Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
29. Dr. Muhammad Irfan Assistant Professor Personal Interview August 28, 2018 Qaisrani Dept of International (25 Minutes) Islamabad. Relations, Bahria University.
30. Dr. Muhammad Assistant Professor Personal Interview September 5, 2018 Umar Hayat Dept of Pol. Science (15 Minutes) Lahore LEADS University, Lahore. 31. Mr. Tauqeer Hussain Assistant Professor Personal Interview September 24, 2018 Sargana Dept of International (15 Minutes) Islamabad Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad.
32. Mr. Subhajit Naskar Assistant Professor Skype Interview October 14, 2018 Dept of International (15 Minutes) Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.
33. Ms. Saima Kausar Visiting Lecturer Personal Interview September 24, 2018 Dept of History (15 Minutes) Sargodha. University of Sargodha
296
34. Dr. Zafar Iqbal President Strategic Personal Interview November 22, 2018 Cheema Vision Institute (35 Minutes) Islamabad. Islamabad
297
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
A. Kan, Shirley, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues (DIANE Publishing: 2011).
Abbasi, Rizwana, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011).
Abraham, Itty, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).
Ahmed, Mahmood, History of Indo-Pak War 1965(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006).
Ahmed, Samina, and David Cortright,Pakistan and the Bomb(Norte Dame: The University of Norte Dame Press, 1998).
Alagappa, Muthiah, edr., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge, 1995).
Arbatov, Alexei, "Prospects of Engaging India and Pakistan," in Nuclear Arms Limitations, by Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev(Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2012).
Arnett, Eric, et al., Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban: SIPRI Research Report No. 14 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Aron, Raymond, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, tr. R. Howard. A. Baker Fox(Garden City: Doubleday, 1966).
Bajpai, Kanti P., P. R. Chari, P. I. Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia(New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1995).
Balogun, M. J.,Hegemony and Sovereign Equality: The Interest Contiguity Theory in International Relations(Ontario: Springer, 2011).
Barnett, Roger W., Asymmetric Warfare: Today‟s Challenge to the U.S. Military Power (Washington, DC: Brassey‟s Inc, 2003).
Barua, Pradeep P., The State at War in South Asia (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005):256.
Baruab, Amit, Dateline Islamabad (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2007).
298
Basrur, Rajesh M., "Missile Defence: An Indian Perspective," in Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia, by Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (New Delhi: Vision Books, 2003).
Basrur, Rajesh M.,South Asia‟s Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective(London: Routledge, 2009).
Baylis, John, James J. Wirtz, Eliot A. Cohen and Colin S. Gray, eds., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (USA: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Beaufre, André, Introduction to Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965 [Introduction à la stratégie, Paris, 1963]) and Deterrence and Strategy (London: Faber, 1965[Dissuasion et stratégie Paris, Armand Colin, 1964]), NATO and Europe (1966 [L'O.T.A.N. et l'Europe ]).
Beaufre,Andre, Deterrence and Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1965).
Bert Chapman, Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara: Pager Security International, 2009).
Bhatia, Vandana, The US-India Nuclear Agreement: Accommodating the Anomaly (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017).
Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, The Myth of Independence (Karachi: 1967).
Bidwai, Praful, Achin Vanaik and Arundhati Roy,New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament(New York: Olive Branche Press, 2000).
Black, Samuel,The Changing Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Threats from 1970 to 2010(Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Centre, 2010).
Blix, Hans, "Introduction: The Present Nuclear Order, How It Came About, Why It May Not Last," in Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non- Proliferation Treaty, by Olav Njolstad (New York: Routledge, 2011).
Boon, Kristen E., Huq, Aziz, and Lovelace, Jr., Douglas C. Catastrophic Possibilities Threatening US Security. Vol. 119. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
Bratt, Duane, The Politics of CANDU Exports (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).
Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. 1959).
Brodie, Bernard, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1946).
299
Buzan, Barry, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (Hampshire: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987). Buzan, Barry,An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military technology and International Relations(London: The Macmillan Press, 1989).
Caldwell, Dan, and Williams Jr., Robert E., Seeking Security in An Insecure World (Rowman & Little Field, 2016).
Caranza, Mario Esteban. South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime(Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009).
Chakma, Bhumitra, South Asia‟s Nuclear Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2015).
Chakma, Bhumitra, ed., The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (Faranham: Ashgate, 2011 ).
Chakma, Bhumitra, Pakisstan: Whither Minimum Deterrence? (S. Raja Ratnam School of international Studies, 2013).
Chakma, Bhumitra, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons(London: Routledge, 2009).
Chakma, Bhumitra, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia: A Historical Analysis (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2004).
Chandrashekar, S., Arvind Kumar, and Rajaram Nagappa,An Assessment of Pakistan‟s Ballistic Missile Programme: Technical and Strategic Capability (Bangalore: National Institute of Advance Studies, 2006).
Chari, P. R., P. I. Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics and Security (London: Routledge, 2003).
Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002).
Cheema, Z. I., Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security (Karachi: Oxford University press, 2010).
Chomsky, Noam, Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs. (Cambridge: South End Press, 2000).
Cimbala, Stephen J., The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence (Praeger Publishers, 1998).
300
Clary, Christopher, “The Safety and Security of the Pakistani Nuclear Arsenal,” in Pakistan Enduring Challenges, eds., C. Christine Fair and Sarah J. Watson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
Cohen, Avner, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
Cohen, Stephen P., The Idea of Pakistan (Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
Collins, John M., Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973).
Corera, Gordon, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (London: Hurst & Company, 2006).
Dixit, J. N., Indian-Pakistan in War and Peace (New York: Routledge, 2002).
Duccan, W. Raymond, Jancar-Webster, Barbara, Switkey, Bob, eds.,World Politics in 21st Century: Student Choice Edition (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2009).
Durranni, Muhammad Ali, Pakistan‟s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons (Sandia National Laboratories, 2004).
Engagement in South Asia (Washington D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 2007).
Fair, C. Christine, et al., Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010).
Farooq, Nasra Talat, US-Pakistan Relations Pakistan‟s Strategic Choices in 1990s (London: Routledge, 2016).
Freedman, Lawrence, Deterrence(Malden: Polity Press, 2004).
Frey, Karsten, Elite Perception and Biased Strategic Policy Making (Hochschulschrift: Heidelberg, Univ., Diss., (Publikationsdatum 2005).
Frey, Karsten, India‟s Nuclear Bomb and National Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2006): 140.
Ganguly, Sumit and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crisis in the Shadow of Nuclear weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Ganguly, Sumit and Kapur, S. Paul, India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2010).
301
Ganguly, Sumit and Kapur, Paul, eds., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).
Ganguly, Sumit, and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia(Columbia University Press, 2010).
Gerzhy, Gene, “Why Do States Abandon Nuclear Weapons Activities: Understanding the Role of Alliance Coercion,” in Project on Nuclear Issues: A Collection of Papers from the 2011 Conference Series, by Stephanie Spies and Mark Jansson, eds., (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2012).
Gritzner, Charles F., ed., Pakistan (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2007).
Hagerty, Devin T, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: Massachusetts, 1998).
Hans M., Kristensen, Norris, Robert Stan, and Oelrich, Ivan, eds., From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons (Federation of American Scientists, 2009).
Hass, Richard N., Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes (Durhan: yale University Press, 1988).
Henry Shue, ed.,Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott(Oxford: Blackwell, 1948).
Hoffman, Steven A., India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
Hoyt, Timothy D., “Strategic Myopia: Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine and Crisis Stability in South Asia,” in South Asia‟s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China ed., Lowell Dittmer (New York: Routledge, 2015).
Hussain, Mushahid, and Akmal Hussain, Pakistan Problems of Governance (New Delhi: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1993).
Hymans, Jacques E. C., “Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons? Comparing the Cases of India and France,” in Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century, eds. D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
302
Hymans, Jacques E. C., “Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons? Comparing the Cases of India and France,” in Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century, eds. D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)
Jackson, Robert and Sorenson, Georg, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Jalalzai, Musa Khan, The Prospects of Nuclear Jihad in South Asia: Pakistan‟s Army Extra Judicial Killings, and the Forceful Disappearances of Pashtuns and Balochs (Algora Publishing, 2015).
Jervis, Robert, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
Jhonson, Jeannie L., Kerry M. Kartchner, and Jeffrey A. Jhonson.,Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insight into Comparative National Security Policy Making(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
Jones, Gregory S.,From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 2000).
Jones, Rodney W., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1998 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998).
Jordan, Amos A., et al., American National Security (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2011).
Josephson, Paul R., Red Atom: Russia‟s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005)
Kahn, Herman, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2010). Kapur, Ashok, India - from Regional to World Power (London: Routledge, 1edition 2006).
Kapur, Ashok, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Development (New York: Croom Helm in association with Methuen, 1987). Kapur, Ashok, Pokhran and Beyond: India‟s Nuclear Weapons Capability (OUP India: 2003)
Kapur, S. Paul, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford University Press, 2008).
Karnad, Bharat, India‟s Nuclear Policy(Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008).
Kartchner, Kerry M., “Strategic Culture and WMD Decision Making,” in Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National
303
Security Policymaking, eds., Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
Kaufmann, William W.,Military Policy and National Security(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).
Keohane, Robert O, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Politics Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).
Keohaneed, Robert O., Neorealism and its Critics(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
Kerttunen, Mika, A Responsible Nuclear Weapons Power- Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy (Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 2009).
Khan, Feroz, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).
Khan, Saira, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan (New York: Routledge, 2010).
Khan, Zafar, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
Khan, Zulfqar, Nuclear Pakistan: Strategic Dimensions (Oxford University Press, 2011).
Kissinger, Henry, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).
Krause, Keith, "Rationality and Deterrence in Theory and Practice," in Contemporary Security and Strategy, by ed., Craig A Snyder(London: Deakin University, 1997).
Krosney, Weissman, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York: Times Books: 1981).
KullKarni, Parag, The Peacemakers: Can You Prevent the Nuclear Inevitability?(Quills Ink Publishing, 2015).
Lavoy, Peter R., “Introduction: The Importance of the Kargil Conflict,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
304
Lindstrom, Guastav, Development and Implications of Missile Defence (Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2012).
Lodgaard, Sverre, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon- Free- World? (New York: Routledge, 2011).
Maerli, Morten Bremer, and Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear Proliferation and International Security (New York: Routledge, 2007).
Mahmood, Safdar, International Affairs (Lahore: Feroz Sons, 1969).
Marie, Izuyama and Shinichi, Ogawa, “The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan,” NIDS Security Reports, No. 4, (March, 2003).
Martin Griffiths, ed., International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2007).
Mingst, Karen A., and Ivan M Arreguin-Toft., Essentials of International Relations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011).
Mirchandani, G.G., India‟s Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968).
Mistry, Dinshaw, “Missile Proliferation and Deterrence Stability in South Asia,” in Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, eds. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (Washington, D.C.: The Stimson Center, 2013).
Alam, Mohammed B., ed., Essays on Nuclear Proliferation (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1995).
Morgan, Forrest E., et al., Dangerous Threshold: Meaning Escalation in 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008)
Morgan, Patrick M., Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1985).
Muni, S D, and Vivek Chadha, Asian Strategic Review (New Delhi: PENTAGON Press, 2013).
Musharraf, Pervez, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008).
Nagappa, Rajaram, An Assessment of Ballistic Missile Production Capacity in Pakistan, (Bangalore: NIAS, 2007).
305
Narang, Vipin, “Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia,” in Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Njolstad, Olav, et al., Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non- Proliferation Treaty (New York: Routledge, 2011).
Nolan, Janne E., “The INF Treaty,” in The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification, et al., Michael Krepon (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1991).
Nye, Jr., Joseph S., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (Longman, 1999).
Pakistan Nuclear Programs and Projects Handbook Strategic Information and Regulations (Washingon D.C.: International Business Publications, 2009)
Pakistan: Intelligence, Security Activities and Operations Handbook (Washington, D.C.: International Business Publication).
Paul, T. V., ed., The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Paul, T. V., Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Quebec City: McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 2000).
Perkovich, George, “Faulty Promises: The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Policy Outlook Carnegie Nonproliferation South Asia, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September, 2005).
Perkovich, George, India‟s Nuclear Bomb, the Impact on global proliferation (London: University of California Press, 2001).
Pervez, Muhammad Shoaib, Security Community in South Asia: India-Pakistan (Oxon: Routledge, 2013)
Powaski, Ronald E., Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981- 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Powell, Robert, Nuclear Deterrence Theory The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
306
Rajagopalan, Rajesh,and Mishra, Atul, Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts (London: Routledge, 2014).
Rao, P.V. Narasimha, ed., India and Disarmament: An Anthology of Selected Writings and Speeches (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1988).
Rashid, Ahmed, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000).
Riedel, Bruce, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back (Washington, D.C: Brooking Institute Press, 2013). Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz eds., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons with New Sections on India and Pakistan, Terrorism, and Missile Defence (New York: W W Norton and Company, 2002).
Sagan, Scott D., “The Evolution of Pakistan and Indian Nuclear Doctrines,” in Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
Salik, Naeem, Learning to Live with the Bomb (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017).
Salik, Naeem A., The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan‟s Perspective (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Sauer, Tom, Nuclear Inertia: US Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War(New York: I.B. Taurus, 2005).
Schweller, Randall L., Deadly Imbalances Tripolarity and Hitler‟s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
Sethi, Manpreet, "Devaluing Nuclear Weapons: Difficult, But Desirable," in Nuclear Deterrence and Diplomacy, by Jasjit Singh and Manpreet Sethi (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004).
Sidharan, E., The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations(London: Routledge, 2007).
Singh, Garima, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Disorder: Weapons, Proliferation and Safety (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006).
SIPRI Year Book 2012: Armaments Disarmament and International Security (Solana: SIPRI, 2012).
307
Smith, Chris, India‟s AdHoc Arsenal: Direction Or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
Snyder, Glenn H., “The Balance of Power and Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury ed., The Balance of Power (Scranton: Chndler, 1965).
Sokolski, Henry D., ed., Pakistan‟s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (U.S. Army War College, 2008).
Solingen, Etel, "Nuclear Logics: Constraining Paths," in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J., 2007).
Squassoni, Sharon, “India and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons,” CRS report for Congress, (February 17, 2005):
Sreedhar, ed., Pakistan‟s Bomb: A Documentary Study (New Delhi: ABC Publishing 2nd edition, 1987).
Sridharan, E., ed., The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations (New Delhi: Routledge, 2007).
Stein, Arthur A., "Neoliberal Institutionalism," in The Oxford Handbook on International Relations, by Christian Reus- Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Strange, Susan., The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Ganguly, Sumit, and Kapur, S. Paul, India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
Sverre Lodgaard, Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon- Free World (New York: Routledge, 2011).
Szalontai, Balazs, The Elephant in the Room: The Soviet Union and India‟s Nuclear Program, 1967-1989 (Washington D.C.: Nuclear Proliferation International History Project and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011).
Talbot, Strobe., Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
Tang, Shiping, The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis (Routledge, 2009).
308
Tellis, Ashley, India‟s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal(Santa Monica: Rand Corp, 2001).
Venkataramani, M.S., The American Role in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Book Ltd, 1984).
Waltz, Kenneth N. and Scott D. Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debaterenewed (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001).
Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publications, 1979).
Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge, 1995).
Wilkening, Dean A., Ballistic- Missile Defence and Strategic Stability (London: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Willet, Susan, Costs of Disarmament- Monitoring the Future: the South Asian Arms Dynamics (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2003).
William, Phil., "Crises Management," in Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts, by et al., John Baylis (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
Williams, Phil, “Nuclear Deterrence,” in Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts John Baylis et al. (Croom Helm, 1987).
Zagare, Frank C., and D. Marc Kilgou, Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
MAGAZINES/JOURNALS/YEARBOOK
“Indo-Pak Talks on Indus Water Treaty Likely this Month,” The Times of India, (March 3, 2017).
“Vienna Meet Sees Divisions on India‟s Entry into NSG,” The Hindu, (March 23, 2013).
“Why Bind Ourselves to „No First Use Policy,‟ Says Defence Minister Parikar on India‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” Times of India, (November 10, 2016).
Abdullah, Sannia, “Cold Start in Strategic Calculus,” IPRI Journal, XII, No. 1, (Winter, 2012).
Acton, James M., "Chapter One: Central Deterrence," Adelphi Series, (2010).
Albright and Zamora, Tom, “India, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons: All the Pieces in Place,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 45, No. 5, (June, 1989)
309
Aneja, Atul., "Defence Ministry Debating Deal with the US Over NMD," (The Hindu, May 2001).
Banuri, Khalid, "Missile Defences in South Asia: The Next Challenge," South Asian Survey 11, No. 2 (2004).
Bergner, Jonathan D., "Going Nuclear: Does the Non-Proliferation Treaty Matter?" Comparative Strategy, 31, No. 1 (2012).
Bhumitra, Chakma, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine, and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age,” Security Challenges, 2, No. 2, (July, 2006).
Blair, Charles P., Anatomizing Non-State Threats to Pakistan‟s Nuclear Infrastructure: The Pakistani Neo Taliban(Terrorism Analysis Report No. 1, June, 2011).
Brodie, Bernard, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," International Security 2, No. 4 (Spring, 1978).
Brown, Harold, and John Deutch., "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," The Wall Street Journal (November 19, 2007).
Buzan, Barry, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," International Affairs (Blackwell) 67, No. 3 (July 1991).
Chakma, Bhumitra, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age,” Security Challenges, 2, No. 2, (July, 2006).
Chand, T., "Emerging Trends in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System Development," Synodos Paper (Centre for Joint Warfare Studies) 1, No. V (January 2013).
Chandra, Satish, “Revisiting India‟s Nuclear Doctrine: Is It Necessary?” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Issue Brief, (April 30, 2014).
Chari, P.R., “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia,” Simson Centre, Working Paper Version 1.0, (August, 2003).
Chaudhry, Dipanjan Roy, “Under Rajiv Gandhi, India Was Ready with H-Bomb to Counter Pakistan‟s Nukes,” The Times of India, (January 24, 2017).
Cheema, Musarat Javaid, “International Community on Kargil Conflict,” South Asian Studies, 28, No. 1, (January-June, 2013).
310
Chakma, Bhumitra, "Pakistan‟s Nuclear Doctrine, and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age," Security Challenges 2, No. 2 (July 2006).
Cimbala, Stephen J., "East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 18, No. 4 (2005).
Cohen, Avner, and Thomas Graham Jr., "An NPT for Non-members," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60, No. 3 (May/ June 2004).
Dalton, Toby, and Krepon, Michael, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015).
Das, Debak., "India and Pakistan Missile Flexing: Cursing Toward Regional Stability," IPCS 30, No. 1 (January-March 2013).
Deutch, John, "A Nuclear Posture for Today," Foreign Affairs 84, No. 1 (January/February 2005).
Diaz, Linda, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Arsenals: A Threat to U.S Security,” Global Security Studies, 3, No. 4,(Fall, 2012).
Elman, Colin, "Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America‟s Rise to Regional Hegemony," The American Political Science Review 98, No. 4 (November 2004).
Flamenbaum, Stephanie, and Neville, Megan, “Optimism and Obstacles in India-Pakistan Peace Talks,” Peace Brief 98, (July 15, 2011).
Ganguly, Sumit, "Diverging Nuclear Pathways in South Asia," The Nonproliferation Review 20, No. 2 (2013).
Ganguly, Sumit, "India‟s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi‟s Nuclear Weapons Programme." International Security 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999).
Ganguly, Sumit, “India‟s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi‟s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” International Security, 23, No. 4, (Spring, 1999).
George P. Shultz, et al., "How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent: Maintaining Confidence in Our Nuclear Arsenal is Necessary as the Number of Weapons Goes Down," The Wall Street Journal(January 19, 2010).
311
Gerson, Michael S., "Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age." Parameters 39, No. 3 (2009).
Goswam, Namarta, "Power Shifts in East Asia: Balance of Power vs. Liberal Institutionalism." Perceptions XVIII, No. 1 (Spring 2013).
Gregory, Shaun, “The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons,” CTC Sentinel, 2, Issue, 7, (July 15, 2009).
Grieco, Joseph M., "Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Behavior in East Asia," Policy Brief, No. 3 (August 2012).
Grieco, Joseph M., “Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Behavior in East Asia,” Policy Brief, No. 3, (August, 2012).
Hennery A. Kissinger, et al., "Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation," The Wall Street Journal(March 7, 2011).
Herz, John H., "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2, No. 2 (January 1950).
III, Walter C. Ladwig., "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army‟s New Limited War Doctrine," International Security 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007).
Izuyama Marie and Ogawa Shinichi, “The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan,” NIDS Security Report, No. 4, (March, 2003). Jervis, Robert, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," International Organization 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
Joeck, Neil, “The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Confrontation: Lessons from the Past, Contingencies for the Future,” NPEC, (September, 2008).
Jones, Rodney W., "Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia," SASSU Research Paper, No. 1 (March 2005).
Jones, Rodney W., “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Posture: Arms Race Instabilities in South Asia,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 25, No. 2, (1998).
Jones, Rodney W., “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Posture: Quest for Assured Nuclear Deterrence - A Conjecture,” IPRI, XIX, No. 1, (January, 2001).
Joshi, Shashank, “Pakistan‟s Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà vu?”The Washington Quarterly, 36, No. 3, (Summer, 2013).
312
Kanwal, Gurmeet, “India‟s Nuclear Doctrine: Need for a Review,” CSIS, (December 5, 2014).
Kapur, S. Paul, “India and Pakistan‟s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is not Like Cold War Europe,” International Security, 32, No. 2, (Fall, 2005).
Karim, Mohd Aminul, "Is Nuclear Deterrence Workable at the Brink Time in South Asia and Beyond?" The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 26, No. 1 (March 2014).
Keck, Zachary, "India “Cold Start,” and Pakistani Tactical Nukes," The Diplomat(May 8, 2013).
Kennedy, Andrew B., “India‟s Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb,” International Security, 36, No. 2, (Fall, 2011).
Keoane, Robert, and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995).
Khalid, Iram, "Nuclear Security Dilemma of Pakistan," Journal of Political Studies 20, No. 1 (2013).
Khan, Feroz Hassan, “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Spring, 2003).
Khan, Feroz Hassan, “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan, Strategic Insight, IV, No. 10, (October, 2005).
Khan, Feroz Hassan, “Nuclear Proliferation Motivations,” The Nonproliferation Review, 13, No. 3, (November, 2006).
Khan, Zulfqar, and Rizwana Abbasi, "Regional Centric Deterrence: Reassessing its Efficacy for South Asia," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 25, No. 4 (December 2013).
Kroenig, Mathew, "Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects on Nuclear Proliferation," Working Paper No . 2009-14(November, 2009).
Kroenig, Mathew, “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism; The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Managing the Atom Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2009-14, (November, 2009).
Kumar, A. Vinod, "A Cold Start: India‟s Response to Pakistan-Aided Low-Intensity Conflict," Strategic Analysis 33, No. 3 (May 2009).
313
Kumar, Dhruba “South Asia After the Nuclear Tests: Securing Insecurity,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation, 6, No. 1, (2000).
Kumar, Dinesh, “India and Israel: Dawn of New Era,” Western Defence Organisation Bulletins, (August 11, 2009).
Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and the Cold War," Political Science Quarterly 110, No. 2 (Summer 1995).
Liebl, Vernie, "Indian and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines," Comparative Strategy 28, No. 2 (2009).
Lieggi, Stephanie, “From Proliferator to Model Citizen?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, (Summer, 2010).
Lodhi, Maleeha, “Security Challenges in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, 8, No. 2, (Summer, 2001).
Marwah, Onkar, "India and Pakistan: Nuclear Rivals in South Asia." 35, No. 1 (Winter 1981).
Mearsheimer, John J., "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993).
Mearsheimer, John J., "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95).
Mendelsohn, J., “NATO‟s Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for 'No First Use,” 3, (July/August, 1999). Miller, Steven E., and Sagan, Scott D., "Alternative Nuclear Futures," American Academy of Science and Arts, (Winter 2010).
Miller, Steven E., and Sagan, Scott D., "Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?" American Academy of Science and Arts(Fall 2009).
Monteiro, Nuno P., and Alexander Debs, "The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation," International Security 39, No. 2 (Fall 2014).
Nabil, Rahmatullah, “The World Must Secure Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons,” The New York Times, (April 20, 2017).
Narang, Vipin, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan‟s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security, 34, No. 3, (Winter, 2009/10).
314
Nayan, Rajiv, "The NPT and India: Accommodating the Exception." Strategic Analysis 34, No. 2 (March 2010).
Odgaard, Liselotte, “The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: US-China Policies on Regional Order,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 19, No. 1, (2007).
Paul, T.V. "The Systemic Bases of India‟s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order," The Nonproliferation Review(Fall 1998).
Paul, T.V., “Chinese-Pakistan Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power,” The Non Proliferation Review, (Summer, 2003).
Posen, Barry R., "US Security Policy in a Nuclear- Armed World Or: What if Iraq Had Nuclear Weapons?" Security Studies(Spring 1997).
Prabhjit Singh, “Water That Belongs to India Will be Stopped From Going Waste in Pak: PM Modi,” Hindustan Times, (November 25, 2016).
Rahman, Muhammad Shafiq Ur, “The Probabilities of Nuclear War in South Asia,” Margalla Papers, (2010).
Rajaraman, A., "Battlefield Weapons and Missile Defense: Worrisome Developments," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 70, No. 2 (2014).
Rajiv Nayan, “Is NPT Membership as a Nuclear Weapon State an Option for India?” Strategic Analysis, 31, No. 6, (November, 2007).
Ranjit Singh, “Nuclear Weapons as a Deterrent in South Asia: An Analysis,” II, No. 2, Asia Pacific Journal of Social Science(2010).
Rezaul H., Laskar, "India is Fifth Largest Military Spender with Outlay of $ 55.9 bn: SIPRI." Hindustan Times, (April 24, 2017).
Riet, Rob Van, ed., "Moving Beyond Nuclear Deterrence to a Nuclear Weapons Free World," Nculear Abolition Forum, No. 2 (2013).
Rydell, Randy., "International Humanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Humanitarian Approach to Nuclear Disarmament," Nuclear Abolition Forum, No. 1 (2011).
Sagan, Scot D., “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” Asian Survey, 41, No. 6, (November/ December, 2001).
315
Sagan, Scott D, Kenneth N. Waltz, and Richard K. Betts, "A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?" Journal of International Affairs 60, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007).
Sagan, Scott D., "Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament," American Academy of Science and Arts(Fall 2009).
Sagan, Scott D., "The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security," Society for Risk Analysis 24, No. 4 (2004).
Sagan, Scott D., "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-1997).
Saran, Shyam, “Is India‟s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” Delivered at Habitat Centre New Delhi, (April 24, 2013).
Sauer, Tom, "A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence," The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, No. 5 (October 2009).
Sethna, Dr. H. N., "India‟s Atomic Energy Programme-Past and Future," IAEA Bulletin 5, No. 1 (2015).
Shaikh, Farzana, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime,” International Affairs, 78, No. 1, (2002).
Shuja, Sharif, “International Affairs: Pakistan Feels Jilted by US-India Nuclear Deal,” News Weekly, (February 17, 2007).
Sherrill, Clifton W., "Why Iran Wants the Bomb and What It Means for US Policy," Non Proliferation Review (Routledge) 19, No. 1 (March 2012).
Singh, Ranjit, "Nuclear Weapons as a Deterrent in South Asia: An Analysis," Asia Pacific Journal of Social Science II, No. 2 (July-December 2010).
Singh, Ranjit, “Nuclear Weapons as a Deterrent in South Asia: An Analysis,” Asia Pacific Journal of Social Science, II, No. 2, (July-December, 2010).
Synnott, Hilary, “Nuclear Capabilities, Nuclear Doctrines,” The Adelphi Papers, 39, No. 332, (1999).
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., "Security Seeking under Anarchy Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01).
Liebl, Vinnie, “India and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines,” Comparative Strategy, 28, No. 2, (2009).
316
Waltz, Kenneth N., "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review 91, No. 41 (December 1997).
Waltz, Kenneth N., "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review 84, No. 3 (September 1990).
Waltz, Kenneth N., "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000).
Waltz, Kenneth N., "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability," Foreign Affairs 91, No. 4 (July/August 2012).
Waltz, Kenneth N.,“The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” 18. No. 4 (1988).
Wariavwalla, Bharat, “US Efforts Can Cap India-Pakistan Nuclear-Arms Buildup,” The Christian Science Monitor, (June 15, 1994).
Wilson, Ward,"The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence," Nonproliferation Review 15, No. 3 (November 2008).
Yousaf, Moeed, and Ashley Pandya. "The Quest for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia: A Reality Check," United States Institute of Peace(August 6, 2010).
ARTICLES, BLOGS, DOCUMENTS, REPORTS, SPEECHES, MISC WEBSITES
“Bharat: An Untold Story,” http://bharatuntoldstory.tumblr.com/post/31644028656/nca-the- nuclear-command-authority-nca-of-india#, (accessed June 22, 2015).
“Guidelines,” Nuclear Supplier Group,http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/guidelines (accessed June 11, 2015).
“History Guy: The U.S.-Mexican War (1846-1848),” The History Guy,www.historyguy.com/Mexican-American_War.html, (accessed May 1, 2017).
“Integrated Defence Staff,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/ids.htm, (accessed on December 29, 2014).
“Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG),” NTI,http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear- suppliers-group-nsg/, (accessed June 11, 2015).
317
“Pakistan Nuclear Weapons,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke.htm, (accessed June 11, 2015).
“Resolution Adopted at the Meeting of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on January 5, 1949,” Document No. 5/1196 para. 15, (January 10, 1949), www.mofa.gov.pk/unsc/Resolution%20adopted%20at%20the%20meeting%20of%20the %20united%20nations%20Commission%20for%20India%20and%20Pakistan%20on5%2 0January%201949.pdf (accessed May 1, 2017).
“Resolutions Adopted and Decisions Taken by the Security Council in 1951,” http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/91(1951). (accessed on January 26, 2014).
“The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) NPT),”United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, http://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/, (accessed April 23, 2017).
“The War in Europe, 1939-41: The Campaign in Poland, 1939,” Encyclopedia Britannica, (www.britannica.com/event/world-war-II/The-war-in-Europe-1939-41#ref511786, (accessed May 1,, 2017).
“UNICP Resolution of January 5, 1949- S/1196,” (January 5, 1949), www.humsafar.info/jkun490105.php, (accessed May 1, 2017).
“United Nations Documents on MOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan,http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/documents.shtml, (accessed on January 26, 2014).
“Westward Expansion,” History Net, www.historynet.com/westward-expansion, (accessed May 1, 2017).
“Why the BrahMos Armed Sukhoi is Bad News for India‟s Enemies?” IBC World News, (April 20, 2015), https://www.ibcworldnews.com/2015/04/20/why-the-brahmos-armed-sukhoi- is-bad-news-for-indias-enemies/, (accessed June 22, 2015).
Ahmed, Ali, “India‟s Nuclear Doctrine: Coming Out of the Closet,” Foreign Policy Journal, (December 13, 2016), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/12/13/indias-nuclear- doctrine-coming-out-of-the-closet/, (accessed on January 1, 2017).
Ahmed, Ali, “Rethinking India‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” http://fsss.in/agni-volume/2nd/rethinking- india's-nuclear-doctrine.pdf (accessed on February 18, 2014).
318
Ahmed, Ali, “Reviewing India‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, www.idsa.in/policybrief/reviewingindiasnucleardoctrine_aahmed_240409, (accessed May 2, 2017).
Akash Surface- to- Air Missile System, India. May 24, 2012. http://www.army- technology.com/projects/akashsurfacetoairmis/ (accessed August 12, 2014).
Albright, David, O‟Neill, Kevin, and Hinderstein, Corey, “Securing Pakistan‟s Nuclear Arsenal: Principles for Assistance,” ISIS, (October 4, 2001), http://isis-online.org/isis- reports/detail/securing-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-principles-for-assistance/12, (accessed on June 11, 2015).
Behera, Laxman K. India‟s Defence Budget 2017-18: An Analysis. February 03, 2017. https://idsa.in/issuebrief/india-defence-budget-2017-18_lkbehera_030217(accessed December 19, 2018).
Brown, Andrew. Truman‟s Nuclear Policies 1946-1952. March 14, 2009. http://www.atomicheritage.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=391 (accessed March 22, 2012).
Donnell, Frank O‟, and Yogesh Joshi. India‟s Missile Defense: Is the Game Worth the Candle? August 02, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/indias-missile-defense-is-the-game- worth-the-candle/ (accessed August 17, 2017).
Feickert, Andrew. Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries. (March 5, 2004. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31999.pdf, (accessed February 09, 2014).
Ghoshal, Debalina. India Conducts Successful Missile Interceptor Test: Although its Capabilities are Improving, Planned Implementation is Questionable. May 08, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/india-conducts-successful-missile-intercep(accessed July 28, 2014).
Gormley, Dennis M. Winning on Ballistic Missile but Losing on Cruise: The Missile Proliferation Battle.https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_12/Gormley(accessed December 21, 2014).
India Can Export Fighter Planes, Misiles: DRDO Chief. June 22, 2014. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-can-export-fighter-planes- missiles-drdo-chief/ (accessed August 12, 2014).
India Has No Cold Start„ Doctrine: Army Chief. December 2, 2012. http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/india-has-no-cold-start-doctrine-army- chief-70159 (accessed June 13, 2015).
319
India to Deploy Two Ballistic Missile Defence Systems Near Pakistan Border. August 7, 2017. https://sputniknews.com/asia/201708071056252187-india-missile-defense-systems/ (accessed November 12, 2017).
Indian Ballistic Missile Defence- and Its Consequences .http://defencesecurityindia.com/indian- ballistic-missile-defence-and-its-consequences/ (accessed July 30, 2014).
Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR133/2013-ISPR, (September 13, 2013), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2361, (accessed on July 11, 2014).
Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR280/2015-ISPR, (September 9, 2015), https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=3026, (accessed April 10, 2017).
ISPR, Release No. PR136/2015-ISPR. May 11, 2015. https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2879(accessed July 26, 2015).
Joshi, Manoj, “Weighing the Benefits of Recalibrating India‟s Nuclear Doctrine,” The Wire, (November 11, 2016), https://thewire.in/79461/weighing-the-benefits-of-recalibrating- indias-nuclear-doctrine/.
Joshi, Sharad. India and Pakistan Missile Race Surges On. October 2007. http://cns.miis.edu/other/wmdi071008d.htm(accessed February 9, 2014).
Kampani, Gaurav, “Living with the Bomb: In Praise of Indifference,” http://cns.miis.edu/reports/pdfs/indbomb.pdf, (accessed on November 28, 2014).
Kanwal, Gurmeet, “Safety and Security of India‟s Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Analysis, 25, (April, 2001), http://www.cianet.org/olj/sa/sa_apr01kag01.html (accessed February 9, 2017).
Kumar, Hari. Why Has India Become the World‟s Top Arms Buyer? 21 March, 2012. http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/why-has-india-become-the-worlds-top-arms- buyer/?_r=0 (accessed November 13, 2013).
L.Meser, Rober. New Evidence on Truman‟s Decision. http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/readings/messer_newevidence.pdf(accessed March 22, 2012).
Learn About Nuclear Weapons. http://laromkarnvapen.slmk.org/ENG/Dokument/History/Thecoldwar%20ADVANCED. pdf (accessed March 22, 2012).
320
Lee, Ingmar. The Smiling Buddha Blast & Canada‟s CANDU Snafu. November 1, 2006. http://www.ingmarlee.com/news/20-warmongers-cabal/86-the-smiling-buddha-blast-a- canadas-candu-snafu.pdf (accessed May 2, 2012).
Lightbody, Bradley, “Invasion of Poland,” BBC, (March 30, 2011), www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/invasion_poland_01.html, (May 1, 2017).
Mendelsohn, Jack, “NATO‟s Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for „No First Use,” Arms Control Association, (July/August, 1999), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/jmja99, (accessed on January 26, 2014).
Menon, Narayan. "Defence System for India: Ballistic Missile 27, No. 3,." Indian Defence Review. July-September 2012. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/ballistic- missile-defence-system-for-india/ (accessed August 17, 2012).
Miller, Marvin, and Lawrence Scheinman. Israel, India and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime. December 2003. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman(accessed February 1, 2014).
Mohan, C. Raja, “Beyond India‟s Monroe Doctrine,” Ministry of External Affairs, (January 2, 2003), http://mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian- media.htm?dtl/15281/Beyond+India+s+Monroe+Doctrine (accessed April 24, 2017).
National Security Strategy (May, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed on February 4, 2014)
Norris, Robert S., “India and Pakistan, At the Crossroads,” Paper presented at The Sixth ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, (October 28, November 2, 1998), http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_10289801a_039.pdf (accessed on February 10, 2014).
Patil, PA. Indo-Israel Collaboration for Integrated Anti-Missile System. February 12, 2014. http://capsindia.org/files/documents/CAPS_Infocus_PP_1.pdf(accessed August 12, 2014).
Perkovich, George. Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead. October 2008. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons.pdf (accessed November 25, 2012).
Qasim, Omar. Too Cold to Start, Spearhead Researc. December 27, 2010. idsa.in/system/files/jds_4_4_aahmed.pdf, (accessed December 21, 2013).
321
Ramusino, Cotta, and Martellini, Maurizio, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: AConcise Report of a Visit by Landau Network Centro Volto,”http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm (accessed on July 21, 2013).
Riley, James Whitcomb. How Realistic is Realism. March 2, 2008. http://www.e- ir.info/2008/03/02/how-realistic-is-realism/ (accessed September 12, 2012).
Salik, Naeem Ahmad. Missile Issues in South Asia. Summer 2002. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92salik.pdf.
Sankaran, Jaganath. The Enduring Power of Bad Ideas: „Cold Start‟ and Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in South Asia. November 2014. https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/201_11/Features/Cold-Start-and-Battlefield-Nuclear- Weapons-in-Sou (accessed June 13, 2015).
Simha, Rakesh Krishnan, “How the Su-30 MKI is Changing the IAF‟s Combat Strategy,” Russia and India Report, (January 5, 2014), http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2014/01/05/how_the_su- 30_mki_is_changing_the_iafs_combat_strategy_32099.html , (accessed June 22, 2015).
Sinha, DK, “Leading Disputes of India With Its Neighbouring Countries,” http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/essay/leading-disputes-of-india-with-its-neighboring- countries/42447/, (accessed May 1, 2017).
Stuenkel, Oliver, “India‟s National Interests and Diplomatic Activism: Towards Global Leadership?” http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR010/stuenkel.pdf, (accessed January 22, 2016).
Sultan, Maria. Emerging NMD Technologies and the South Asian Context. August 17, 2002. http://www.cornellcaspian.com (accessed December 18, 2017).
The Challenges and Opportunities in Developing an Indian Ballistic Missile Defence System. http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_2013_Patel.pdf(accessed February 09, 2014).
322