Torah Journal 5781 Ohr Torah Stone Midreshet Lindenbaum Matmidot Scholars Torah Journal 5781 Introduction The Matmidot Scholars Program is an innovative Ohr Torah Stone initiative aimed at enhancing the learning, writing, and leadership skills of a carefully selected group of students. Every Monday night, the Matmidot meet a different figure who has made an impact in some significant manner. The Matmidot of 5781 had the privilege to learn and meet in a personal way with a wide variety of scholars and leaders, including Rabbi Dr. Kenneth Brander, Dr. Yael Ziegler, Rav Yosef Tzvi Rimon, Rav David Stav, Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, Rabbi Josh Fass, and many more. In addition, a key feature of the program is training this exceptional group of students to research and produce high-quality Torah articles. Each Matmida is paired with a faculty mentor who aids and guides her throughout her research and writing. A tremendous thank you goes to each of the Mentors: Rav Yitzie Blau, Rav David Brofsky, Rav Alex Israel, Rabbanit Rivky Krest, Rabbanit Rachel Leshaw, and Rabbanit Dena Rock. The Matmidot cohort of 5781 invested an extraordinary amount of work into the essays that comprise this Journal. From solidifying their chosen topics to submitting outlines, thesis statements, and rough drafts, these young women have been on a journey all year long learning how to research, write, and edit serious Torah articles. Please enjoy and learn from the fruit of their labor. With gratitude to Hashem, Rabbanit Sally Mayer Rabbanit Nomi Berman Rabbanit Dena Rock Rosh Midrasha Rosh Beit Midrash Matmidot Coordinator 1 Contents FREE WILL IN JUDAISM .................................................................................... 5 Bruria Spraragen CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A TYPE-SCENE .................................................... 26 Elisheva Hermann HOW TRAGEDY AFFECTS TEFILLA .................................................................. 51 Lauren Stiefel ROBIN HOODS OF TANACH ............................................................................ 73 Meirav Grajower THE TORAH – BOTH OF AND TRANSCENDING TIME ...................................... 99 Mia Parry EXAMINING LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE FRAMEWORK OF KOHELET ......... 143 Miri Granik AVODA ZARA THROUGH THE LENS OF THE JEWISH-HINDU ENCOUNTER ... 164 Rebecca Babitz DAVID’S LIFE IN TEHILLIM ............................................................................ 183 Rivkah Wyner HOW SHOULD WE TEACH? .......................................................................... 206 Tari Sztokman 3 FREE WILL IN JUDAISM Bruria Spraragen The issue of free will, how much autonomy a person has over his or her choices, is one of the most perplexing questions in both Jewish and secular philosophy and has been so throughout history. Many philosophers, psychologists, and halachists have pondered the issue, yet the question of free will remains unresolved. A tension exists between the belief that Hashem knows and anticipates our every action and personal autonomy, and a reconciliation of the two is complicated. Sources throughout Tanach, philosophy, Talmud, and Rabbinic literature give insight into this complex topic. This paper aims to present the major approaches that have been proposed throughout history and to analyze their strengths and weaknesses. The question of whether a person has free will does not have a definitive answer, but by exploring various sources and approaches, this paper will provide a deeper understanding of the issue and its possible solutions. The question of how much free will a person has has been a long- standing debate not only as a religious matter, but in secular philosophy and psychology as well. Beginning in the fourth century BCE with Greek philosopher Aristotle (Greek, 384-322 BCE), philosophers began to offer opinions about how much autonomy a person has over his actions. Before exploring Jewish approaches to free will, it is helpful to first understand free will within the larger philosophical world. Looking at secular philosophy helps to categorize types of belief in, or against, free will, and those categories can then be applied to Jewish thinkers. Exploring secular approaches to this age-old question can also give a broader picture of the free will 5 Lindenbaum Matmidot Journal conversation, which parts conform with Jewish philosophy, and where they conflict. Over time, a range of perspectives on free will has been developed - ranging from libertarianism, the belief that people have choice over their actions, to hard determinism, the belief that external factors are the sole determinants of one’s actions. Determinists believe that a person’s actions are governed by biological, psychological, environmental, and/or metaphysical factors; though we do not realize it, our “decisions” are the inevitable product of outside factors in our lives without us having any real choice. Determinists argue that everything in a physical world can be traced back to its causes and people are just another physical element of a physical world. In contrast, absolute freedom, or libertarianism, claims that each decision a person makes is his own independent choice, devoid of any outside factors. According to libertarians, people “feel” free to make their own choices, and there must be truth behind this feeling. Some believe that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive, while others argue that the two can both exist simultaneously. The phrase “compatibilist free will” has been used to refer to Aristotle’s belief that determinism is compatible with free will. In his book Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes that each person has the ability to act or not to act, as proven by a person’s ability to weigh various outcomes of a given situation, and therefore a person’s actions are voluntary.1 Since the time of Aristotle, the idea of compatibilist free will has remained a strong argument for many philosophers, regardless of where or when they lived. 1 Timothy O'Connor and Christopher Franklin, “Free Will” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 21 Aug. 2018. 6 Bruria Spraragen Many generations later, Thomas Hobbes (English, 1588-1679), known as a “classic compatibilist,” claimed that since a person can choose to act in one way, but could have decided to take the alternative route, that ability to make a decision alone is proof that free will exists. Hobbes claims that freedom is, “the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent.”2 As long as a person is capable of acting in a certain manner, claims Hobbes, he is free. For classic compatibilists, the existence of determinism does not mean that agents are deprived of the ability to do as they choose. They claim that determinism is compatible with the ability to choose otherwise.3 The argument for free will as a lack of physical restraints is shared by other philosophers. David Hume (Scotland, 1711-1776) writes, “This hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.”4 Similarly, Voltaire (France, 1694- 1778) writes, “liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one wills.”5 For Voltaire, free will is merely the power of acting. For these philosophers, the matter of free will is almost simple - if one is not physically prevented from doing something, he has freedom of choice that can exist simultaneously with determined motives. This idea is further developed in the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), a theory later established by Harry Frankfurt in 1969, which says that an action is free and warrants moral responsibility only if the person performing it could have chosen otherwise. 2 Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, (1966). 3 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ 4 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford University Press, 1967). 5 Voltaire, Dictionnaire Philosophique (1764). 7 Lindenbaum Matmidot Journal Alternatively, “incompatibilists,” are those who think that free will and determinism cannot be reconciled and that one must choose either end of the spectrum. Incompatibilism does not take a position on whether or not free will exists; its position is simply to contradict compatibilism and argue that free will and determinism cannot coexist. This idea, articulated by modern philosopher Peter van Inwagen (America, 1942 - ), argues that a determinist world is devoid of free will and vice versa.6 Under the category of incompatibilism, libertarians and hard determinists are grouped together; extreme beliefs for or against free will lead both libertarians and hard determinists to agree that free will and determinism cannot be reconciled. Libertarians follow a theory known as agent causation, which argues that an agent (person performing an action) is controlled by a mind which can start a chain of causality unrelated to prior events. This idea exists in contrast to event causation, the belief that no event exists without influence from previous events. Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, takes the approach that prior decisions, personality traits, and values have no bearing on present decisions. Determinists, the other group of incompatibilists, say that the whole world is predetermined and therefore people cannot be free. One of the most notable groups of determinists are psychologists, many of whom have proven through studies that actions are based on external factors. In the world of psychology and science,