If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov.

'':,.. \ -.' .....

This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.

Ii~ i~lI1ll, 2 5 1.0 Ii,£ m,=", 11111 . ~ 13.2 ,. ~ .2 .....""3 Il:; Ii& I!. • I L. e~ 2.0 1.1 ...... '- " -

1I111!1? 1.6 ""'1.4

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART NATIONAL BUREAU or STANDARDS·1953·A

Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U. S. Department of Justice. Date Filmed National Institute of Justice United States Department of Justice 3/13/81 Washington, D. C. 20531

:' ".', - Countersnipers are the eyes of the com­ LAW mand post. The three-man teams include a team leader, a primary countersniper, and a ENFORCEMENT secondary countersniper who doubles as a BULLETIN photographer. NOVEMBER 1980, VOLUME 49, NUI'4BER 11 Contents Cooperation Spokane's Robbery Education Program 7jl'ILf By John D. Moore. Crime Prevention Officer/Program Coordinator, Police Department, Spokane. Wash.

Invesiigative Nonverbal Communications in Interrogations 7~:l'15 TecluW;[ues By Merlin S. Kuhlman, Special Agent, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Fort Riley, Kans. Facilities 10 Problems of Today-Solutions for Tomorrow: Cities 17»,' VJithin Cities By Sheriff Gene Barksdale and Lt. W. Lee Forbes, Sheriff's Planning Unit, Shelby County, Tenn. \' Forensic Science '\ 16 Obtaining Saliva Samples from Bitemark Evidence l3JII By Roger E. Mittleman, M.D., Office of Medical Examiner, Miami, Fla., t_ Willard Carl Stuver, M.S., Public Safety Department, Dade County, Fla., and Richard Souviron, D.D.S., A.B.F.O., Dade County Medical Examiner's Office, Miami, Fla. \ Terrorism \ 20 Tactical Crisis Management: The Challenge of the 80'S,:,-ns By W. Ronald Olin, Assistant Chief of Police, Police Department. L Lawrence, Kans. The Legal Digest \as Probable Cause to Search: The Use of Inferences ,'3i7={ By Robert L. McGuiness, Special Agent, Legal Counsel Division. Federal \r- Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C. 32 Wanted by the FBI The Challenge of the 80's

The Cover: The Federal Bureau of Investigation Published by the PubliC Affairs Office, Newberg, Oreg., Police By W. RONALD OLIN United States Dep~ent of Justice Roger S. Young Department sends a Assistant Chief of Po/ice S' 4" sergeant to Washington. D.C •. 20535 Inspector In Charge kindergarten to explain Edilor-Thomas J. Deakin Po/ice Department that being a policeman is William H. Webster, Director E. Sulewski a big job. Photograph by ASSistant Editor-Kathryn Lawrence, Kans. Bob Ellis, "Oregonian." Art Olfector-Carl A. Gnam, Jr. POllland, Oreg. The Attorney General has dotermlned that the publication WfllerlEditor-Karen McCarron of thiS pellodical IS necessary in the transaction of the Production Manager-Jeffery L. Summers public business required by law of the Department of Justice. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through December 28, 1983.

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310 20 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin The Central Intelligence Agency The State of the Art recently predicted that "terrorists will Tactical response groups were or­ try to adapt their tactics to neutralize ganized to cope with an increasing the countermeasures adopted by gov­ problem of hostage and barricaded­ ernment and private security services. suspect incidents. As usual, the police They pl{)bably will change target selec­ response to this phenomenon devel­ tion, improve planning and trade craft, oped after the widespread use of these and, possibly, increase their technolog" tactics by criminals. The resulting so­ ical sophistication." 1 This prediction phistication of the police response was has ominous implications for law en­ enhanced when if: was proven thaI "in forcement agencies in the United those instances where the police used States. There appears to be a resur­ specially trained and equipped person­ gence of terrorist-type attacks, wheth­ nel, they were abl6\ to successfully iso­ er politically or criminally motivated, late and contain the suspects and which require sophisticated law en­ thereby prevented the loss of life of forcement response. Unfortunately, innocent bystanders." ~ Perhaps the American police agencies seem to be most famous tactical team is the Los locked into a "mind set" when dealing Ar>geles Police Department Special with tactical police operations. Most Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team. tactical police response is defined by Los Angeles pioneered the develop­ parameters developed in the early ment and training of SWAT. The result­ 1970's. Unless we carefully evaluate ing model of tactical response was recent innovations in handling crises, copied by many law enforcement law enforcement may not be prepared agencies throughout the country/. to deal effectively with the challenge of Some law enforcement ag,encies tried the decade ahead. to obscure ties with the concept of How prepared are most law en­ SWAT because of adverse publicity R. Richard Stanwlx forcement agencies to handle a com­ caused by a popular television show of Chief of Police plex tactical police response? Many that name. In those cases, teams were agencies are only marginally prepared created and the titles changed to "Tac­ or not prepared at all. While some tical Operations Unit" 3 or "Emergency agencies have tactical units, special­ Services Unit." 4 However, the basic ized training has focused on the coun­ tactics remained the same. tersniper option. Response is American tactical police response complicated by some field command­ has been locked into the mold as de­ ers who rely on the spontaneous use fined in the early 1970's by the LAPD of any officer arriving upon the scene. concept of SWAT. LAPD specifies: These arbitrarily dispensed assign­ "A SWAT team is composed of ments suggest that many administra­ five permanent team members tors are quite assured that their (team leader, mc:rksman, ob­ enlightened leadership is more impor­ server, scout and fear guard). tant than any preplan ned response. SWAT teams operate separate­ A great deal of literature is availa­ ly or combined with other SWAT ble to police officers and administra­ teams as squads or platoons, to tors on the various components of perform special tactical mis­ response. Many articles are available sions ...." 5 which describe the equipment or train­ Each SWAT team member was cross­ trained in the duties of every man. ing of Special Weapons and Tactics Assistant Chief Olin (SWAT) personnel. Others describe Some police agencies changed the the ne-:ds of hostagG negotiation and number of men assigned to a team or weaponry. This article will review some the name of the team. But, the evi­ of the historical developments relevant dence indicates that law enforce­ to police tactics and provide a con­ ment's view of tactical response has crete framework for planning and ex­ been clouded by the automatic accept­ ecuting a sophisticated emergency ance of the SWAT team model with response. little significant change. Some law en­ forcement agencies have integrated

November 1980 I 21 - ---- .------~------.------

Group Two-Assault (7 or more hostage nGgotliltl0n techniques Into Perhaps one of the most sobering is A Model Police Response men) The assault group is respon:;ible ttw rospons() concept. Howover, there the Munich massacre on September 5, The resulting police response 19n, in Munich, West Germany at the for inner perimeter control, entry, and has lJ()oll a lack of a concrete model to mode, taken from the Bavarian State armed assault. This group requires a Incorporate a total systems approach 20th Olympiad. Black September ter­ Polic<. and incorporates a total ap­ minimum of seven men, one for each for dealing with police tactical emer­ rorists killed two and seized nine Israeli proach for dealing with tactical emer­ athletes in the OlympIC village and held side of the target and tilree or more for gellCI()S M,'mbL'rs of t.~e assaul/ group practice baSIC gencies. The model corrects the any actual assault. The separation of llw development of SWA T and han(lIo·/lanU combat F,lty percent 01 al/ assaul/ them for an anticipated trade with im­ deficiencies outlined above. The Ir31/l/"gls pl1 yslcallftness ?nd deft'nslve tacltcs. this team from thEl countersnipers ttw aura of clitlqm Inbred Into the prisoned terrorists in Israel. After strength of the model lies in the sys­ /lIt" lemamder 01 the trammg IS de"oted 10 lengthy nego:iations were unsuccess­ enables the assault group to practice t(!ams rosuitccl 111 many articles In po­ classroom :;mcl scena(lo work tematic identification of the elements ful, the terrorists were transported to and perfect entry methods into various Ilcc profcsSlor al Jourlrals, newspapers, necessary to resolve an incident of this FiJrstenfeldbruck airfield outside of Mu­ structures, short range selective fire and magazines, each accompanied by nature. The strict division of labor and nidI, where a gun battle resulted in the techniques, hand-to-hand combat, a pllOto of ttlC parbcular team complc"t­ specialization is a further refinement of protective assignments, and other Ing some excttlng maneUV"lr while death of the remaining athletes, one existing response models using four specialized tasks. brandishing the exotic weapons of thel. police officer, and five' of the eight groups-countersniper group, assault trade. T110 natural reaction of the pub­ terrorists. The Munich incident was group, negotiation group, and intelli­ Group Three-Negotiations (2 or lic was to view SWAT as a "killer complicated by many police problems, gence group. (See fig. 2.) This model more men) The negotiations group team." This cllizen perception created including inadequate intelligence gath­ may not vary significantly from the way requires a minimum of one two-man ering, no police assault capability, a team to conduct negotiations in the pressure Jrl police administrators to some agancies actually handle tactical demonstrate that tactical police re­ total reliance on countersnipers for emergencies. However, it does careful­ case of a barricaded suspect. The sponse can be deployed With a mini­ resolution of the problem, high ranking ly delineate the necessary criteria for negotiators should be selected and mum of force. Hence, hostage police administrators rather than mid­ an organized respf)nse. trained in psychfJlogical communica­ negollallon rapidly evolved Into an ac­ level personnel as negotiators, a lan­ Group One-Countersniper (3 or tion techniques. Whenever possible, ceptable practice. Some law enforce­ guage barfler, and a command post more men) This group requires a mini­ the negotiator should speak a foreign ment agencies merged their too close to the incident to remain mum of one three-man team com­ langut:.\,je or have translators available negotiators and tacllcal teams, while emotionally detached. The resulting prised of one leader-communications on an immeciiate basis. Two men are others Inslsled on separation of ttle lesson, which has led to changes by man and two marksmen. The advan­ necessary in most instances to support two for optimum resuits. both the Bavarian State Police and the tage of separating the' countersnipers each other physically and psychologi­ Additional Innovations accompa­ Federal Republic of Germany, is that to from the traditional SWAT composition r.ally during the incident. nied these developments, including the be successful a police tactical oper­ is tWo-fold. First, most SWAT deploy­ Group Four-Intelligence (8 or ation must have intelligence, counter­ more men) The intelligence group use of scenarios to test the emergency ment is made on a team-by-team requires a minimum of one three-man response capability of an agency. sniper, assault, and negotiation basis. In some instances, entire teams team speciiically designated prior to Some scenarios plJinted out difficuilies capabilities. are used to set up countersniper posi­ Figure 1 any tactical emergency. This team is In proper deployment. In a complex These conclusions have been tions when only three of the men are responsible for developing background scenario run in Norman, Okla., the substantiated in other incidents and required to complete the task. If team information on the offenders involved. merger of tactical response and nego­ Command Post scenarios throughout the world. The deployment is not used, then the team The group leader would be responsible tiation demonstrated an "obVIOUS evidence suggests that proper tactical must be split to accomplish total cover­ for team coordination and evaluation of (need) to study further training pro­ response is too complex to cross train ag0. Secondly, the department's best all personnel in ali elements of any the information acquired from all grams."" The scenario also demon­ Negotlattons Tactical Unit rifle shots are not necessarily those sources. The group leader would then strated that "the police sometimes operation. This is especially true when who are young or in the best physical provide the command post with the stressed tactical considerations at the the personnel train only. part-time. condition. While it is desirable to have Such a conclusion challenges one of information. In some cases, technolog­ expense of sacrificing intelligence op­ Target combat-ready snipers, the only require­ the basic assumptions of SWAT. It is ical expertise is recommended to allow portunities." 7 Perhaps the problem truly ments for a countersniper are the tal­ for electronic surveillance when legally lies in the multiplicity of responsibilities also obvious that to improve the tacti­ ent to provide preCise, controlled permissl .Ie. required to resolve f')rofessionally a cal response of any law enforcement gunfire on command and the psycho­ There are several advantages to tactical emergency. While many prob­ agency, it is necessary to define pre­ logical ability to pull the trigger. A sepa­ the four-group concept of tactical re­ lems were exemplified in scenarios Figure 2 cisely the division of labor, the specific ration of the countersnipers from the sponse. Many tactical situations are and actual cases, no documentation job tasks, and the training goals and assault team accomplishes these objectives of each man. A simple alter­ successfully resolved or catastroph­ can be found suggesting that the baSic Command Post needs. Refresher training is also sim· ically bungled by local agencies before organization f)f lhe respon\o,' was chal­ ation of the traditional concept of plified for countersniperc;, since daily or SWAT can solve the problems speci­ a more specialized alternate agency lenged. The tradillonal tacllcal re­ weekly practice can be completed with fied above. This model has been in use a minimum expenditure of time and arrives. The four-group concept out­ sponse could be described as a simple Ccuntersnlpers Assault Group i Negotiation Group Intc:J;gtJr~ce by our German police colleagues for lined above uses a department's per­ four-pOint concept. (See fig. 1.) Howev­ to' money. sonnel in the most advantageous way. er, it IS necessary to depart from thiS some time. However, few American ad­ The model clearly defines the tasks of myopic view and examine a new ministrators have so precisely inter­ Targel each member and should result in less framework for police tactical response. preted the lessons of history to mold confusion· and more control by the Many lessons can be learned by an improved polir.e response. examining past historical Incidents.

November t 980 I 23 22 I FBI Law Enlorcement Bulletin - ---_.. ------

(,(JflllnitrHJ r'(I',I. 'h" (,onu!pl allows ',(!par a 1(, Ir ilifllfHJ iind It IU r!r;vr>loprrwnt the actual forces Involved :n tactical CriSIS management. It'S necessary to of rn{J[IJ "yp':rtl~,r' fJY r;ac.1i group I rillrllfHJ ,>((,nanos carl tH: (:aslly dfNel· view the overall Impact of a cnsls on society. Figure 3 shows many of the (J[i"rj 10 m,:rq" Itu: [(''>ponsu groups for complicated factors that must be con­ IJrilLlILCd rl,:ployrnunt on a regular Ilk:' m/(J/"yent~U ~IOUp IS cl1r1rqet/ Will, proVldmy bm,I'> tlfne/},. (l'flCI(lnl mlelll{/en~ tl qal/ll>fmg on Sidered dUring a CriSIS of thiS magnI­ /Jamradl'ri Suspecl.s or hostage 51tIJallons Tills tude rII,: rJl~,advantilqe to the iour­ l/fOIJP develops dl'tari{'() personat mformatlOn for There are several historical prece­ qrollfJ rusl)(J(\<'u I'> tllal It requires a u~" l>~ th" of/I"r gfl""PS and tho command post 0 dents. Including the rescues by the ITIlrllllllJili 01 1 , rm:n Because of Figure 3 Israeli commandoes al Entebbe, the tJudqul and manpower limitations. thiS Border Police Group Nine at Magadl­ I nodul may nol be possible except In a shum. and recently by the SpeCial ,\Ir ITWdlllrrl or larqe police department. ,;...... ~.: ServlcPs In London. which prove that a 1 IIf' modr,1 also ruqulws a strong oper­ ational commander to control the .. ~ .• ; Public --'T(.'~ -'-' :...-:-' '-":_"- planned. [Jracll\.:ud tactical response dlv,!(sU lunc;tlons which are slmulta­ can be successful It IS InGrl'laslngly L necessary that law enforcement agen­ nuously oc;eurnng However. these dls­ cies be so well prepared Ifl our advantaqes am far outwelgtwd by the ildvilntages to thiS specific response response that we can rapidly seize the '.llr initiative from a Criminal even when he C;OrlCI)pt ----7i-i*:~"""~t-~~1 has used the element of surprise Tho Conclusion .. I f P~2'2~,?~icallmf'~Lelc .. West German modei demonstrates Taetlcal resronse IS far more com­ I thai police tactical response can be Viewed In ways other thar. the rati1er plicated tllan frequently depicted In Intelligence Unit trallling mociels. Ttlere are. In fact. Simplistic model of the 1970's Law many undlscussed areas of concern 10 Command Post ',' enforcement administrators must con­ any tactical operation. It IS necessary stantly strive to find ways to Improve by Negotiations Unit to Include tl18 news media and the studYing successes. fadures. and the ---l lessons of others .A.bove all. we must public's reaction when conSidering tac­ I tical response. The cltlzcns have a t .. not be locked Into one Vl8W of re­ rlgllt to know about these inCidents. sponse or fear constructive r.:hange It AgenCies must be constantly striving to i I IS espeCially Important that we carefully uptlold profeSSionally the trust given to l.le;:n~ the problem of tactical CIISIS law enforceml nt by tile publiC and rnanagtln •.Qnt and vigorously pursue in­ II1tmpreted by the news media. Cltl­ j novation In that area Such a posture IS wns expoct proper handling of emer­ the only way to meel the challenge of gencies The law enforcement Tactical Perirrreler the 80s FBI Sniper & Assaull Teams profosslon cannot afford to be per­ FOOlnotes cOlved as brutal. VICIOUS. or disorgan­ ."d'd' •. !. -",il'" I /. l~"I, "!, ," .i' '.1 "t"" .... Izod Thp. resulting Impact of an ,t' ':; ':1 A '11'''''.1', I, ;".-Ipt" " II., IJ ~. '>', i, ,.1", ',1f ,",1 ~rJ., ..-1 '"V"df' ,r" I~":" t " ~ Improperly handled tactical Situation t 'lc' 1', l/ ( t' , '11 't' f .J J I,. ~ l' '; f.: .. 1 can be) so overwhelming that the after­ , I)"TIII' H 1',0.. fl. T d~ ll'.d: r "r,"'rl' ,'" '1' • :-.' I..dt1 E ~.'fl'" t'rnr''': tf ;'.t-lin ,,1'::Jd', ' t" i'l • '. InCident publiCity may be more devas­ "..1a""J,I-.1 f A., 1' ,1 ~fil'" '<;II l.f·,I;I··"'. ,f": • I • filL' t'~t>'" ,.'rlo II., f\p~:H!)Ch h ... Ht. ,1"", '.fl' ,t r., tating tllan the actual tactical deploy­ ,·1," ~)r) '.h h{) ment. An dl-concelved tactical plan that 1 ;', t.1'JPII'~ P'.'!I'.!' Lh·Pdrl.r",r! .,~.,., i l." ii'," elri') T d. ~I ... : i'drt' _,/l'.I.'r;! ,.1.... , t .• fads may result In lawslJlts. the forced ~Ii'r!t I" :-'1,'<1" arl;j r1:'.t'~lf J r ",t'l, I /~f t., t ,', L rt,slgnatlons of key police personnel, or , I d '-11"" r,.J!!"j r I'f~. If.,t 'f!, l.l, •• ,1 "I" 11 "', , I., ~t " 1 ~:.. r. '", I uven lIn necessary loss of life to tllose tJII1 r I,r Involved 111 tlk: situatiori. In some SOCial enVIronments. It IS pOSSible that tile . - -- -_.- -- percolved abuses of police authOrity 011(> negollator works on a scenaflo. white bacf.up I j could underrrllne the Citizens' trust In p£'rsonnvl rocord tile mCldent and offer tllC govornment, and the re~ult could suyg,'stlons to handle the enslS more prcclpltate rioting or further attacks on appropriately L~._, law enforcement. The aftershock of News Media terrorist InCidents may be Internalional Iri scope. When trYing to understa:ld

24 I 81 Law t nlUI(:enwnl 8"II .. tlll Nov,,"'bel I \l80 25