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Stock Market Indicators: Margin Debt Yardeni Research, Inc. September 24, 2021 Dr. Edward Yardeni 516-972-7683 [email protected] Mali Quintana 480-664-1333 [email protected] Please visit our sites at www.yardeni.com blog.yardeni.com thinking outside the box Table Of Contents TableTable OfOf ContentsContents Margin Debt 3-6 September 24, 2021 / Stock Market Indicators: Margin Debt Yardeni Research, Inc. www.yardeni.com Margin Debt Figure 1. 900 Aug 50 MARGIN DEBT & WILSHIRE 5000 840 9/23 780 720 Margin Debt* 40 660 (billion dollars) (911.5) 600 Wilshire 5000 540 Market Cap 30 (trillions) (46.3) 480 420 360 20 300 240 180 10 120 60 yardeni.com 0 0 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 * Debit balances in margin accounts at broker/dealers. Beginning in 1997 data are debit balances in customers’ securities margin accounts. Note: Shaded red areas are S&P 500 bear market declines of 20% or more. Yellow areas show bull markets. Source: New York Stock Exchange through December 1996, FINRA thereafter, and Haver Analytics. Figure 2. 3.0 3.0 MARGIN DEBT* (as a percent of Wilshire 5000) 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.0 Aug 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 yardeni.com 1.0 1.0 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 * Debit balances in margin accounts at broker/dealers. Source: New York Stock Exchange through December 1996, FINRA thereafter, and Haver Analytics. Page 3 / September 24, 2021 / Stock Market Indicators: Margin Debt Yardeni Research, Inc. www.yardeni.com Margin Debt Figure 3. 400 400 MARGIN DEBT* 350 (yearly change, billion dollars) 350 300 300 Aug 250 250 200 200 150 150 100 100 50 50 0 0 -50 -50 -100 -100 -150 -150 yardeni.com -200 -200 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 * Debit balances in margin accounts at broker/dealers. Note: Shaded red areas are S&P 500 bear market declines of 20% or more. Yellow areas show bull markets. Source: New York Stock Exchange through December 1996, FINRA thereafter, and Haver Analytics. Figure 4. 100 100 MARGIN DEBT* (yearly percent change) 50 50 Aug 0 0 yardeni.com -50 -50 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 * Debit balances in margin accounts at broker/dealers. Note: Shaded red areas are S&P 500 bear market declines of 20% or more. Yellow areas show bull markets. Source: New York Stock Exchange through December 1996, FINRA thereafter, and Haver Analytics. Page 4 / September 24, 2021 / Stock Market Indicators: Margin Debt Yardeni Research, Inc. www.yardeni.com Margin Debt Figure 5. 1000 40 MARGIN DEBT & S&P 500 9/22 Aug 800 Margin Debt* (billion dollars) (911.5) 30 S&P 500 Market Cap (37.3) 600 20 400 10 200 yardeni.com 0 0 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 * Debit balances in margin accounts at broker/dealers. Source: New York Stock Exchange through December 1996, FINRA thereafter, and Standard & Poor’s. Figure 6. 4 4 MARGIN DEBT (as a percent of S&P 500 market cap) 3 3 Aug 2 2 yardeni.com 1 1 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 * Debit balances in margin accounts at broker/dealers. Source: New York Stock Exchange through December 1996, FINRA thereafter, and Standard & Poor’s. Page 5 / September 24, 2021 / Stock Market Indicators: Margin Debt Yardeni Research, Inc. www.yardeni.com Margin Debt Figure 7. 900 Aug 3000 MARGIN DEBT & RUSSELL 3000 850 800 9/24 750 Margin Debt* 700 (billion dollars) 650 2000 600 Russell 3000 Index 550 500 450 400 350 1000 300 250 200 150 100 yardeni.com 50 0 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 * Debit balances in margin accounts at broker/dealers. Beginning in 1997 data are debit Balances in customers’ securities margin accounts. Source: New York Stock Exchange through December 1996, FINRA thereafter, and Wall Street Journal. Figure 8. 9/24 1000 1000 950 MARGIN DEBT & S&P 1500 950 900 Aug 900 850 850 800 800 S&P 1500 Composite Index 750 750 700 Margin Debt* 700 650 (billion dollars) 650 600 600 550 550 500 500 450 450 400 400 350 350 300 300 250 250 200 200 150 150 100 100 yardeni.com 50 50 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 * Debit balances in margin accounts at broker/dealers. Source: New York Stock Exchange through December 1996, FINRA thereafter, and Haver Analytics. Page 6 / September 24, 2021 / Stock Market Indicators: Margin Debt Yardeni Research, Inc. www.yardeni.com Copyright (c) Yardeni Research, Inc. 2021. All rights reserved. The information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not necessarily complete and its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. 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