Immunity from Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment: an Analysis of Constitutional Standards
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Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity "From Below"
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by ValpoScholar Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 53 Number 1 pp.47-84 Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity "From Below" Lawrence G. Albrecht Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr Part of the Law and Society Commons Recommended Citation Lawrence G. Albrecht, Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity "From Below", 53 Val. U. L. Rev. 47 (). Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at [email protected]. Albrecht: Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity "From Below" CONFRONTING GOVERNMENTAL IMPUNITY AND IMMUNITY “FROM BELOW” Lawrence G. Albrecht* I. INTRODUCTION The hierarchy of judicial doctrines advancing governmental immunity has created a legal thicket of obstacles for civil and international human rights victims to overcome.1 Powerful policy pronouncements often accompany judicial decisions dismissing or limiting such litigation—policy that reinforces and often expands judicial absolution of alleged civil and human rights abuses. Impunity or qualified immunity may triumph regardless of the egregiousness of governmental conduct. Missing from this immunity architecture is fulsome judicial consideration of the legal interests of victims of injustice and public policy factors supporting a more balanced and inclusive legal framework. This missing law circumscribes consideration of unsettled or novel constitutional and statutory interpretation and embedded policy assessed from the plaintiff’s perspective and impedes the development of law responsive to new realities. -
Informal Immunity: Don't You Let That Deal Go Down
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Volume 21 Number 1 Article 1 11-1-1987 Informal Immunity: Don't You Let That Deal Go Down Marc L. Sherman Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Marc L. Sherman, Informal Immunity: Don't You Let That Deal Go Down, 21 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1987). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol21/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INFORMAL IMMUNITY: DON'T YOU LET THAT DEAL GO DOWN Marc L. Sherman* I. INTRODUCTION When a person has knowledge of criminal activity, the government is entitled to the evidence unless the informant would be implicated in the crime.1 If the police or prosecuting attorneys need the evidence for an investigation, they may force an informant to be a witness against his own interests promising the witness that what he says will not be used against him. When this immunity is given pursuant to federal statute,2 the obtained testimony can only be used against the witness as a basis for perjury or another similar charge. Often, however, the police or prose- cuting attorneys promise immunity to a witness, either orally or in writ- ing, thus ignoring the statute. -
Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: the Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation
Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation Stephanie E. Balcerzak In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,' the Supreme Court fundamentally altered the qualified immunity defense available to a government official charged with a constitutional violation in a civil rights action for damages. Under Harlow, an official is entitled to immunity unless his conduct violates a "clearly established" constitutional right.' This purely objective standard of qualified immunity is a radical departure from prior law, which per- mitted a plaintiff to rebut an official's immunity defense by introducing facts to show that the official had acted with malicious intent to cause a constitutional deprivation or other injury.3 The Harlow Court believed that such a drastic revision was necessary to shield officials from the bur- den of defending against insubstantial lawsuits based solely on conclusory allegations of malice.4 By focusing exclusively on the "clearly established" requirement and foreclosing factual inquiry into an official's state of mind, Harlow transformed the issue of qualified immunity from a mixed question of fact and law into a pure question of law to be resolved by the court on a motion for summary judgment.5 1. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 2. Id. at 818. 3. See infra text accompanying notes 21-29. 4. 457 U.S. at 816-18. 5. A number of case notes have commented upon Harlow and its reformulation of the qualified immunity test. See Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. -
Introduction Definition of Key Terms
Forum: General Assembly 6 (Legal Committee) Issue: Strengthening the cooperation with the International Criminal Court in its efforts to end impunity Student Officer: Amadea Hofmann Position: President of the Legal Committee Introduction The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been the subject of great debate in its aim to prevent and punish crimes which “threaten the peace, security, and well-being of the world”. Its main principles and goals can be summarized in the treaty that simultaneously establishes it: the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Its primary goal is “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators (...) of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”. While it is certainly a noble goal, the biggest obstacle the ICC faces in its ambitious pursuit of justice is the concept of impunity. In the past, impunity was integral part of past governmental structures. The Treaty of Westphalia (1649) was based on the sovereignty of states and the sovereign immunity of heads of state. Naturally, this inviolability was also transferred to their ambassadors and diplomats, resulting in “untouchable” heads of state with, essentially, no limitations on their power. Eventually, head of state immunity was not permitted to prevail, although some still regarded it as a “necessary evil”. The dominant idea was that impunity must be sacrificed to ensure a transition to democracy, the return of the “soldiers to their bunkers” or the way to overcome internal armed conflicts. In this day and age, the concept of impunity is a contentious issue, although the international community generally recognizes its faults outweighing its benefits. -
Must Courts Raise the Eleventh Amendment Sua Sponte?: the Urj Isdictional Difficulty of State Sovereign Immunity F
Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 56 | Issue 3 Article 16 Summer 6-1-1999 Must Courts Raise the Eleventh Amendment Sua Sponte?: The urJ isdictional Difficulty of State Sovereign Immunity F. Ryan Keith Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons Recommended Citation F. Ryan Keith, Must Courts Raise the Eleventh Amendment Sua Sponte?: The Jurisdictional Difficulty of State Sovereign Immunity, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1037 (1999), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol56/iss3/16 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Must Courts Raise the Eleventh Amendment Sua Sponte?: The Jurisdictional Difficulty of State Sovereign Immunity F. Ryan Keith* Table of Contents I. Introduction ...................................... 1038 II. The Love-Hate Relationship of the Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity ........................ 1040 A. The Love .................................... 1040 B. The Hate .................................... 1041 Im. How Sovereign Immunity Looks Like Jurisdiction ......... 1044 IV. Can a State Waive Its Sovereign Immunity by Omission?: A Split inthe Circuits .............................. 1048 A. Patsy's Permissive Standard: A Way to Reach the Merits 1051 B. Pennhurst'sMandatory Standard: Acknowledging a Constitutional Limitation When a State Is a Federal Defendant .................................... 1054 1. Raising the Eleventh Amendment Sua Sponte and Yet Deciding the Merits ........................ -
Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania
Volume 82 Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 82, 1977-1978 1-1-1978 Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation: Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania Jerome S. Sloan Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra Recommended Citation Jerome S. Sloan, Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation: Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. REV. 209 (1978). Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol82/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation: Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania Jerome S. Sloan* Table of Contents I. Introduction .......................................................... 2 10 II. Good Cases Make Bad Law ....................................... 211 A. Absolute Immunity-High Officials and Their Agencies Always Win ....................................... 213 B. ConditionalImmunity-Low Officials and Their Agencies Always Win ........................................ 214 C. Employees of PoliticalSubdivisions ....................... 214 D . Jurisdiction.................................................... 215 E . Equity Suits .................................................... 216 III. The Rules of Constitutional Interpretation ....................... 218 IV . H istorical Truth ....................................................