DOCSLIB.ORG

Stephen Harper and Election Spending in a Spendthrift Age Richard Haigh Osgoode Hall Law School of York University [email protected]

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Stephen Harper and Election Spending in a Spendthrift Age Richard Haigh Osgoode Hall Law School of York University Rhaigh@Osgoode.Yorku.Ca The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference Volume 29 (2005) Article 15 He Hath a Heart For Harping: Stephen Harper and Election Spending in a Spendthrift Age Richard Haigh Osgoode Hall Law School of York University [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Citation Information Haigh, Richard and . "He Hath a Heart For Harping: Stephen Harper and Election Spending in a Spendthrift Age." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 29. (2005). https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol29/iss1/15 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The uS preme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. He Hath a Heart for Harping: Stephen Harper and Election Spending in a Spendthrift Age Richard Haigh Prior to the actual decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Harper v. Canada,1 the plaintiff, Mr. Stephen Harper, had every reason to feel confident that he would be victorious. He had a good track rec- ord, after all. Previous attempts by him and his organization, the Nation- al Citizen’s Coalition (NCC), challenging earlier federal gag laws on election spending, had proven successful.2 In the case itself, both lower court levels had ruled in his favour.3 And to top it all off, he had recently been crowned leader of a newly united Conservative Party of Canada.4 The Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) finding, therefore, must have struck a big blow to Mr. Harper. In a split decision, the Court held that the latest version of an ever-refined series of spending limits enact- ed by Parliament were acceptable. The timing could not have been more propitious: the decision was rendered on May 18, 2004, mere weeks prior to the June 28 federal election in which Harper challenged Paul Martin for the position of Prime Minister of Canada. This short paper examines the recent history of election financing laws in Canada, and then looks briefly at three distinct aspects of the Harper decision: the irony of Stephen Harper’s position in the case, evi- dential and conceptual problems associated with equating commercial Associate Director, Graduate Program, Osgoode Hall Law School Professional Devel- opment. Thanks to Chaim Sapirman for initial research assistance and help with this paper, Sara Wharton for performing most of the reference checks, Tiffany Coelho for assistance with the commercial advertising section and Michael Sobkin for reviewing and commenting on an earlier draft. Apologies to Ezra Pound, whose poem The Seafarer contains the line: “He hath not heart for harping.” 1 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827. 2 Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] A.J. No. 515, 136 D.L.R. (4th) 205 (C.A.); affg [1993] A.J. No. 504 (Q.B.). 3 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] A.J. No. 1542, 2002 ABCA 301 (C.A.), affg [2001] A.J. No. 808 (Q.B.). 4 Harper was elected leader on March 20, 2004 at the Conservative Party of Canada Con- vention in Toronto, Ontario. 306 Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) speech with political speech, and an examination of whether financial restraints are of declining importance in an era where political influence is more subtly obtained. I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ELECTION FINANCE REFORM AND THE HARPER DECISION Election finance regulation became a serious concern in Canada in the mid-1960s. The Barbeau Committee report in 1966 recommended to Parliament that candidates and their political parties should be subjected to spending limits during an election campaign.5 Some of these recom- mendations were adopted, resulting in amendments to the Elections Act in 1974 banning anyone other than parties or candidates from incurring any election expenses during a campaign. The crucial exception to this rigid rule allowed expenses to be incurred by third parties only for the purpose of advancing an issue of public policy ― the so-called “good faith” exception.6 This exception was short-lived. In 1983, the Chief Election Officer Jean-Marc Hamel agreed with critics who argued that the good faith exception was full of loopholes. Evidence showed that third parties were spending large sums of unaccounted for money during election cam- paigns. New regulations were adopted prohibiting anyone but a regis- tered agent of a party or a candidate from spending any money on the promotion of a candidate or a party.7 At this point, the NCC entered the fray. It began systematically challenging the federal position through strategic use of the courts and 5 Canada, Report of the Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) (Chair: Alphonse Barbeau). 6 Election Expenses Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 51, s. 12. This amendment created a new s. 70.1 to be inserted after s. 70 of the Canada Elections Act. The relevant s. 70.1(4) is as follows: Notwithstanding anything in this section, it is a defence to any prosecution of a person for an offence against this Act… if that person establishes that he incurred election expenses… (a) for the purpose of gaining support for views held by him on an issue of public policy, or for the purpose of advancing the aims of any organization or association, other than a political party or an organization or association of a partisan political character, of which he was a member and on whose behalf the expenses were incurred; and (b) in good faith and not for any purpose related to the provisions of this Act limiting the amount of election expenses that may be incurred by any other peson on account of or in respect of the conduct or management of an election. 7 An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act (No. 3), S.C. 1983, c. 164, s. 14. (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) He Hath a Heart for Harping 307 the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.8 It took the position that the very idea of spending limits is anathema to a free and liberal society, gaining the backing of the Alberta courts in a number of separate judgments. The first in this line of decisions was National Citizens’ Coalition Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) handed down by the Alberta Queen’s Bench.9 The Court held that the prohibition was an unjustifiable viola- tion to the right to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Char- ter. Unexpectedly, the decision was never appealed; as a result the next two federal elections, in 1984 and 1988, took place without any third party spending limits. Following the 1988 election, the Lortie Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing recommended to Parliament a new strategy for controlling third party spending. The Commission maintained that broad-based spending limits represented the best way to ensure that all voters received an equal amount of information; this would allow the election process itself to be conducted on as level a playing field as possible.10 As a result, Parliament amended the Elections Act in 1993 to include third party spending limits of $1,000, a prohibition on pooling resources (as a measure to prevent circumventing this limit), and adver- tising blackout periods during a start-up period after a writ is issued and again in the final two days of an election campaign. The NCC also suc- cessfully challenged these provisions in Alberta in Somerville v. Cana- da. An appeal by the Crown was dismissed.11 Up to this stage, the Supreme Court of Canada had not participated meaningfully in the debate. Its chance came in the case of Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), a case involving campaign financing rules, albeit in the context of a referendum, not an election.12 In the decision, however, the Court expressed its disapproval of the Somerville decision. A unanimous SCC stated in obiter that In Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General)…the Alberta Court of Appeal declared [election spending] provisions to be unconstitutional. 8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sch. B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 9 (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (Alta. Q.B.). 10 Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Final Report: Re- forming Electoral Democracy (1991) (Chair: Pierre Lortie). 11 Supra, note 2. 12 [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569. 308 Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) With respect, we have already mentioned that we cannot accept the Alberta Court of Appeal’s point of view because we disagree with its conclusion regarding the legitimacy of the objective of the provisions.13 as it had noted in an earlier passage that: the objective of Quebec’s referendum legislation is highly laudable, as is that of the Canada Elections Act. We agree in this respect with the analysis of the Lortie Commission and of the expert witness P. Aucoin regarding the need to limit spending both by the principal parties (the national committees in the case of a referendum) and by independent individuals and groups in order to preserve the fairness of elections.14 As a result, and with the implicit support of the Court, Parliament revised its strategy yet again by enacting Bill C-2.15 This latest reform initiative received royal assent on May 31, 2000 and reflects an evolv- ing trend towards further tightening of the purse strings.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Rebalanced and Revitalized: a Canada Strong
    Rebalanced and Revitalized A Canada Strong and Free Mike Harris & Preston Manning THE FRASER INSTITUTE 2006 Copyright ©2006 by The Fraser Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. The authors have worked independently and opinions expressed by them are, therefore, their own, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters or the trustees of The Fraser Institute. The opinions expressed in this document do not necessary represent those of the Montreal Economic Institute or the members of its board of directors. This publication in no way implies that the Montreal Economic Institute or the members of its board of directors are in favour of, or oppose the passage of, any bill. Series editor: Fred McMahon Director of Publication Production: Kristin McCahon Coordination of French publication: Martin Masse Design and typesetting: Lindsey Thomas Martin Cover design by Brian Creswick @ GoggleBox Editorial assistance provided by White Dog Creative Inc. Date of issue: June 2006 Printed and bound in Canada Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Data Harris, Mike, 945- Rebalanced and revitalized : a Canada strong and free / Mike Harris & Preston Manning Co-published by Institut économique de Montréal. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0–88975–232–X . Canada--Politics and government--2006-. 2. Government information-- Canada. 3. Political participation--Canada. 4. Federal-provincial relations-- Canada. 5. Federal government--Canada. I. Manning, Preston, 942- II. Fraser Institute (Vancouver, B.C.) III. Institut économique de Montréal IV.
    [Show full text]
  • Do the Homeless Have a Constitutional Right to Camp in Edmonton?
    Conacher v. Canada (Prime Minister): Taking the 2008 Federal Election to Court On September 8, 2009 the legality of the 2008 federal election will be debated in the Federal Court, one year and one day after Stephen Harper advised the Governor General to call an election. Duff Conacher and Democracy Watch, a “citizens advocacy” group, contend that the Prime Minister broke not only his own fixed-date election law (section 56.1 of the Canada Elections Act), but also the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[1] The background to this case was outlined in an earlier article. In brief, Canadian law has left the decision to dissolve Parliament – that is, to call a general election – in the hands of the Governor General. In all but very rare circumstances, the Governor General is expected to follow the advice of a prime minister to dissolve Parliament. However, in 2006 Parliament passed Bill C-16, which added section 56.1 to the Canada Elections Act. This new section provided for elections at four-year intervals, beginning in October 2009, but also explicitly preserved the “power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General’s discretion.”[2] Under the new provision, it was generally understood that when a government lost a confidence vote in the House of Commons, the Governor General would still follow advice and grant dissolution. However, it was a surprise to some, including Conacher, to learn in September 2008 that without any vote of confidence, the Prime Minister still could advise dissolution and the Governor General would grant it. Questions immediately arose about the legality and the propriety of Prime Minister Harper’s advice on September 7, 2008.
    [Show full text]
  • Interpreting the Charter with International Law: Pitfalls & Principles
    APPEAL VOLUME 19 n 105 Winner of the 2014 McCarthy Tétrault Law Journal Prize for Exceptional Writing ARTICLE INTERPRETING THE CHARTER WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW: PITFALLS & PRINCIPLES Benjamin Oliphant* CITED: (2014) 19 Appeal 105–129 INTRODUCTION While the use of international human rights law in Canadian courts is not an entirely novel phenomenon,1 there is little doubt that it has become more prevalent in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence.2 Far from being treated “as some exotic branch of the law, to be avoided if at all possible,”3 the courts have come to embrace international law and human rights norms, notably in the course of defining the guarantees found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).4 Indeed, more than simply being considered among various aids to interpretation, it is often said that the Charter must be presumed to provide at least as much protection as international human rights law and norms, particularly those binding treaties that served as its inspiration.5 However, as I aim to show below, the Court has so far used international human rights law inconsistently and imprecisely in the process of Charter interpretation, exhibiting * The author would like to thank the Appeal Editorial Board for their diligent work and helpful suggestions throughout the process, and Judith Oliphant for her editorial assistance and unwavering support. Special thanks are also owed to Professor Brian Langille, who has been a constant source of encouragement and with whom many of these ideas below were initially developed. 1 See e.g. R v Shindler, [1944] AJ No 11, 82 CCC 206; R v Brosig, [1944] 2 DLR 232, 83 CCC 199; and R v Kaehler and Stolski, [1945] 3 DLR 272, 83 CCC 353.
    [Show full text]
  • The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Role: an Historical Institutionalist Account
    THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE: AN HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST ACCOUNT by EMMETT MACFARLANE A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Studies in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada November, 2009 Copyright © Emmett Macfarlane, 2009 i Abstract This dissertation describes and analyzes the work of the Supreme Court of Canada, emphasizing its internal environment and processes, while situating the institution in its broader governmental and societal context. In addition, it offers an assessment of the behavioural and rational choice models of judicial decision making, which tend to portray judges as primarily motivated by their ideologically-based policy preferences. The dissertation adopts a historical institutionalist approach to demonstrate that judicial decision making is far more complex than is depicted by the dominant approaches within the political science literature. Drawing extensively on 28 research interviews with current and former justices, former law clerks and other staff members, the analysis traces the development of the Court into a full-fledged policy-making institution, particularly under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This analysis presents new empirical evidence regarding not only the various stages of the Court’s decision-making process but the justices’ views on a host of considerations ranging from questions of collegiality (how the justices should work together) to their involvement in controversial and complex social policy matters and their relationship with the other branches of government. These insights are important because they increase our understanding of how the Court operates as one of the country’s more important policy-making institutions.
    [Show full text]
  • Reforming Lawyer Mobility—Protecting Turf Or Serving Clients?
    Reforming Lawyer Mobility—Protecting Turf or Serving Clients? JAMES W. JONES,* ANTHONY E. DAVIS,† SIMON CHESTER,‡ AND CAROLINE HART§ ABSTRACT In this Article, we describe in detail the current problems with the regulation of lawyer mobility in the United States and the compelling reasons that a fundamental change in the present approach is required. We contend that the current rules regarding multijurisdictional practice by licensed lawyers impede the ability of clients to achieve more efficient and cost effective legal services, are unnecessary to protect the interests of clients, and undermine the integrity of the overall regulatory structure by articulating requirements that as a practical matter cannot be complied with. Drawing on lessons from Australia and Canada, both common law countries with a long tradition of regulation of the legal profession at the state/provincial levels, we offer a proposal for the recognition of rights of practice of all American lawyers engaged in federal or interstate matters in all American jurisdictions. This proposal, if adopted, would enable clients to use counsel of their choice on a nationwide basis. Such a change is critical if American lawyers are to remain responsive to the legitimate expectations and demands of their clients and true to the highest standards of professionalism. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION.......................................... 128 I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES..................................... 128 II. THE CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH THE REGULATION OF LAWYER MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES ....................... 130 * James W. Jones is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at the Georgetown University Law Center.
    [Show full text]
  • The Mclachlin Court and the Charter in 2012
    The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference Volume 63 (2013) Article 2 The cLM achlin Court and the Charter in 2012 Jamie Cameron 2013 CanLIIDocs 596 Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Citation Information Cameron, Jamie. "The cLM achlin Court and the Charter in 2012." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 63. (2013). https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol63/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The uS preme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. The McLachlin Court and the Charter in 2012 Jamie Cameron* 2013 CanLIIDocs 596 I. INTRODUCTION In 2012 — the year of its 30th anniversary — Canadians learned that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 is now more influential abroad than the U.S. Constitution.2 Despite that boost, last year’s anniversary lacked the celebratory verve of earlier milestones.3 The federal government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper snubbed the occasion, refusing to extend the courtesy of birthday wishes or rehearse the customary platitudes which applaud the virtues of constitutional * Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School. I thank Holden Sumner (J.D. 2013) and Kendall Grant (J.D. 2015) for their valuable research assistance.
    [Show full text]
  • Osgoode Hall Law Journal
    Osgoode Hall Law Journal Volume 55, Issue 1 (Winter 2018) The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress Article 13 Guest editors: Janet Walker, Gerard Kennedy, and Sagi Peari Red, White, and Kind of Blue? The onseC rvatives 2018 CanLIIDocs 10757 and the Americanization of Canadian Constitutional Culture, by David Schneiderman Joseph McDonald Osgoode Hall Law School of York University Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj Part of the Law Commons Book Review This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Citation Information McDonald, Joseph. "Red, White, and Kind of Blue? The onC servatives and the Americanization of Canadian Constitutional Culture, by David Schneiderman." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 55.1 (2018) : 333-340. http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol55/iss1/13 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. Red, White, and Kind of Blue? The onseC rvatives and the Americanization of Canadian Constitutional Culture, by David Schneiderman Abstract In the 2010 case of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, a narrow 5–4 majority of the United States Supreme Court overturned decades of jurisprudence by striking down any limitation on what corporations can spend on indirect electioneering. While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms upholds a similarly robust protection of political speech under its freedom of expression provision, an analogous case at the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) in 2004 resulted in a much different outcome.
    [Show full text]
  • Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights Internationalism in American Courts
    ALLAN-HUSCROFT.DOC 4/20/2006 8:27 AM Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights Internationalism in American Courts JAMES ALLAN* GRANT HUSCROFT** TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 2 II. PART I —THE SPREAD OF RIGHTS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM........................... 14 A. Post WWII Developments .......................................................................... 14 B. How Other Bills of Rights Work ................................................................ 17 1. Canada ............................................................................................... 17 2. New Zealand and the United Kingdom ............................................... 22 3. Summary ............................................................................................. 27 C. Non-American Conceptions of Judicial Review......................................... 28 D. Different Interpretive Theories, Premises, and Conceptions of Rights ................................................................................ 31 III. PART II—TO HAVE DOUBTED ONE’S OWN FIRST PRINCIPLES: REVISITING THE DEFENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ................................................... 37 A. The Sirens Argument.................................................................................. 37 B. The Constitutional Argument..................................................................... 40 C. The “Yes There Are Objectively Right Answers” Argument.....................
    [Show full text]
  • Judicial Freedom Index
    The 2019 Judicial Freedom Index An analysis of Supreme Court of Canada rulings on Charter section 2 fundamental freedoms, 1982-2018 John Carpay, James Kitchen, David Hersey May 2019 JUSTICE CENTRE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS 253-7620 ELBOW DRIVE SW, CALGARY, AB T2V 1K2 www.jccf.ca | [email protected] | 403-475-3622 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION………………………………………………….………………………..1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY………………………………………….………………………2 ATTITUDINAL DECISION-MAKING………………………………….………………. 3 METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………….………… 5 ANALYSIS OF THE 2019 SUPREME COURT JUSTICES……………….…………… 5 OVERVIEW……………………………………………………………………..…5 INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS………………………………………………..…….....6 CURRENT NINE JUDGES - 2019: CHARTS……………………………….……………9 SECTION 2(A) FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION………….…...9 SECTION 2(B) FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION……...…………...…..……..…...10 TOTAL SECTION 2 CASES (Excluding s. 2(d) union cases)………...……........11 SECTION 2(D) FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION – UNION CASES……….…...12 OVERVIEW OF 2018…………………...……………………………….………………..13 SECTION 2(A) FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION……….…….13 SECTION 2(B) FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION…………………..………….…..14 SECTION 2(D) FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION – UNION CASES…………....15 RECENT TREND: 2014-2018…………………………………………………..………...15 OVERVIEW OF TRENDS IN DECISIONS INVOLVING SECTION 2 FREEDOMS………….…………………………………………………………...15 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE JURISPRUDENCE…………………….…………..16 5-YEAR REPORT: 2014-2018 CHARTS…………………………………………..…….17 SECTION 2(A) FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION……….…….17 SECTION 2(B) FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION…………………..………….…..18 TOTAL SECTION
    [Show full text]
  • The Bungling of Justice Nadon's Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada
    The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference Volume 67 (2014) Article 3 The unB gling of Justice Nadon’s Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada Hugo Cyr Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Citation Information Cyr, Hugo. "The unB gling of Justice Nadon’s Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 67. (2014). http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol67/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The uS preme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. The Bungling of Justice Nadon’s Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada Hugo Cyr* I. INTRODUCTION On April 22, 2013, the Honourable Justice Morris Fish wrote to the then Minister of Justice, the Honourable Robert Nicholson, to advise that he would retire from the Supreme Court of Canada and that his retirement would be effective August 31, 2013, a mere three months before he reached the mandatory retirement age.1 Despite four months’ notice, the federal government waited until the last minute to appoint a replacement. Indeed, just a week before the Fall term hearings were to begin at the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister announced on September
    [Show full text]
  • The Canadian Electoral System
    The Canadian Electoral System Publication No. 2013-81-E 15 September 2008 Revised 22 October 2015 Dara Lithwick Sebastian Spano Legal and Social Affairs Division Parliamentary Information and Research Service Library of Parliament Background Papers provide in-depth studies of policy issues. They feature historical background, current information and references, and many anticipate the emergence of the issues they examine. They are prepared by the Parliamentary Information and Research Service, which carries out research for and provides information and analysis to parliamentarians and Senate and House of Commons committees and parliamentary associations in an objective, impartial manner. © Library of Parliament, Ottawa, Canada, 2015 The Canadian Electoral System (Background Paper) Publication No. 2013-81-E Ce document est également publié en français. CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 2 BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 1 3 THE CHIEF ELECTORAL OFFICER ........................................................................ 2 4 CALLING ELECTIONS .............................................................................................. 4 5 THE RIGHT TO VOTE .............................................................................................. 5 6 VOTER REGISTRATION .........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • (Title of the Thesis)*
    THE UNNATURAL LIKENESS OF DEFERENCE: THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS by Kristin Claire Hulme A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Studies In conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen‟s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada (December, 2011) Copyright ©Kristin Claire Hulme, 2011 Abstract This dissertation examines the behaviour of the Supreme Court of Canada in cases involving electoral/referendum laws and the alleged violation of freedom of expression and/or the right to vote. In 2007, it declared that the judiciary should adopt „a natural attitude of deference‟ towards Parliament‟s decisions about the democratic process when determining, under section one of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, whether the infringement is reasonable and justified. This declaration reflected institutional concerns about judicial competence to review legislative choices in this area of public policy and the democratic legitimacy of it doing so. It was made even though the Court had found laws unconstitutional in a majority of the cases that it had heard to date. Deference is often simply equated with government „wins‟ in court. Such an equation ignores the effect that the decision has on judicial reasoning. It sets the standard of review the court uses when applying the Oakes test, the framework within which the section 1 analysis occurs. It also establishes the standard of proof that the Crown must meet to demonstrate that an infringement is justified. The outcome of constitutional disputes can turn on the decision about deference, pointing to a need for structure and coherence in the judiciary‟s approach.
    [Show full text]