Threat Forecast 2014 www.red24threatforecast.com www.red24.com

Advice - Support - Response About us red24 is a crisis management assistance company delivering a range of products and services to businesses, organisations and individuals around the world. We have an unparalleled reputation for assisting clients in minimising risks to their personnel, operations and profitability and we have our own in-house customer service, analyst and crisis support departments that are available to assist clients around the clock. Our services range from country-based security and travel risk information to fraud and identity theft prevention advice. red24’s global network of multi-disciplinary consultants can also assist clients with setting up crisis management and contingency plans, supplying close protection services, resolving kidnapping and extortion incidents, providing security-focused training and conducting evacuations from countries in turmoil. red24 operates a 24/7 Crisis Response Management (CRM) Centre in Cape Town, South Africa, which coordinates our activities across the globe and is available at all times to assist clients. For further information on the company, please visit our website at www.red24.com.

Advice - Support - Response Contents

Foreword 3

Executive Summary 4 red24 Global Risk Map 2014 5/6 Europe • Introduction 7 • The EU in 2014 - The political hangover of economic recovery 8 • Russia - The calculated gamble of the Winter Olympics in Sochi 9 • Turkey - A difficult year ahead 10 Americas • Introduction 11 • Brazil - Security concerns at the 2014 FIFA World Cup 12 • Mexico - Mexico’s national security policy and persistent violence 13 • United States - The threat of terrorism from within 14 Middle East and North Africa • Introduction 15 • Syria - Long-term political and security challenges 16 • Iraq - Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s resurgence 17 • Egypt - The persistent cycle of political uncertainty and instability 18 Asia • Introduction 19 • Afghanistan - Repercussions of the NATO withdrawal 20 • China - Increasing labour protests in the People’s Republic 21 • India - Will the recent creation of new states galvanise other separatist movements? 22 Africa • Introduction 23 • The Sahel - A new frontier of terrorism? 24 • Mozambique - Concerns over a new civil war as RENAMO ‘returns to the bush’ 25 • Kenya - Was Westgate a sign of things to come? 26

Kidnapping 27

Piracy 32 Calendar • General events 34 • Elections 46

Contributors 47

Contact details 48

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 2 Foreword

red24 is once again proud to deliver our annual Threat Forecast. In our latest edition, we look at a select number of key issues globally, providing thoughtful insight into how these concerns will affect their respective political and security environments in 2014. With the world becoming increasingly interconnected, together with the global expansion of markets and operations, it is essential that businesses are informed of how potential or actual risks may develop across the globe. The expansive growth of companies transnationally has seen operations moving into more uncertain territories where security risks are unfamiliar and where global, regional and sub-regional political and economic crises have affected local and foreign actors alike. In many areas these complex environments have given rise to insecurity and volatility that have exacerbated the operational risk of businesses. ‘red24’s Threat Forecast Since 2001, red24 has assisted its clients in mitigating operational and allows organisations to travel risks so they may focus on their own core business areas. red24’s Threat Forecast allows organisations to understand the upcoming understand the upcoming security climate in order to mitigate the threats that lie ahead. With such knowledge in hand, companies can ensure their continued operation, as well as the safety of their clients and employees, and the security climate in order integrity of their infrastructure and supply chains. Specifically, security managers and company strategists have come to use the forecast to mitigate the threats as a starting point in their focus on developing a clear picture of what security, travel and political risks they, their clients and employees are that lie ahead. likely to experience in their specific areas of interest in the year to ’ come. red24 is also excited to announce that our Threat Forecast 2014 will be available in both an interactive web-based platform as well as a printable PDF document. The website is user-friendly and allows clients to easily navigate between the key regional risks we have assessed, our kidnapping and piracy forecasts for 2014, and our upcoming event calendars. In ad- dition, clients wishing to print a comprehensive hard copy version of all the web content can access and download our PDF version; this also includes a large-scale quick-reference poster of our country risk ratings.

In conclusion, our team of analysts, which occupy various regional desks, have compiled a comprehensive and astute threat forecast for the year ahead and I trust that you, the reader, will find value in it and use it as a base from which to mitigate business and travel risks in 2014, and beyond.

Maldwyn Worsley-Tonks CEO

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 3 Executive summary

The 2014 Threat Forecast sees each of our analyst desks – covering Europe, the Americas, Middle East and North Africa, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa – selecting three main issues on which to focus. While each section’s introduction provides an overview of the primary concerns across the respective regions, the 15 key stories provide a greater in-depth analysis and assessment of issues we believe will have a notable impact on the geopolitical and/or security environment in 2014. The Threat Forecast also contains a global review of kidnapping and piracy trends, as well as a calendar of events that may affect travel or security in 2014. In addition, there is also a calendar of national elections for the year ahead.

In Europe, we look at the persisting political and economic concerns across the EU. While 2013 saw some economic growth, with a decline in social turmoil and unrest, the region still faces numerous trials in 2014. We also focus on the security challenges facing Russia ahead of the Winter Olympics being held in the southern city of Sochi, located only a few hundred kilometres from the volatile North Caucasus region. In addition, we take a look at the various political challenges facing Turkey; with two key elections taking place in 2014, significant unrest remains a concern. Like Russia, Brazil also hosts a high-profile sporting event in 2014, with the FIFA World Cup taking place in 12 cities across the country. Here, protests and high levels of both petty and violent crime will be the key risks. In the Americas, we also review the ongoing security challenges in Mexico, where high levels of violence from transnational criminal organisations (TCOs) have persisted throughout 2013, despite assurances of a new strategy from President Enrique Pena Nieto. Authorities in the US will also face the ongoing challenge of preventing terrorist attacks, particularly from self-radical- ised US nationals.

The conflict in Syria continued unabated throughout 2013, despite ‘Fifteen key stories opposition forces not replicating their successes of years prior; while fighting will continue, 2014 may also see peace talks between the provide an in-depth Assad regime and rebel groups. Meanwhile, neighbouring Iraq has seen a resurgence of attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and like- analysis of issues we minded groups. Egypt remains in the grip of a substantial political crisis following the military overthrow of the democratically elected believe will have a notable government in 2013. Afghanistan will face an uncertain future with the withdrawal of the majority of foreign combat troops in 2014, likely impact on the geopolitical leading to increased instability and internal contentions, but also emboldening Pakistan-based militants in that country’s north western tribal regions. While China remains on a relatively solid political and security environment footing, the growing occurrence of labour-related protests shows a potential concern for business interests. In India, the recent granting in 2014. of the establishment of a new state, Telangana, may prompt other ’ separatist movements to push their own agendas.

In Africa, Islamist militants have expanded their operational presence in the Sahel region. Despite regional and domestic initiatives to limit such elements, the authorities’ effectiveness is hampered by porous borders, poorly policed terrain, political instability and easy arms availability. In Mozambique, 2013 saw a number of conflict incidents between the ruling and opposition parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO respectively. Although concerns of a return to civil war were raised, red24 assesses this risk to be low. Finally, in Kenya, terrorism remains a persistent concern, and was highlighted by the 2013 attack on Westgate shopping mall in the capital, Nairobi.

Kidnapping remains an ongoing concern in many regions. Although there was not a considerable rise in the number of incidents globally from 2012 to 2013, the nature and spread of such incidents did alter. While the Americas region remains a prolific area for abductions, the historically high-risk Colombia saw a decrease in incidents, while Mexico recorded its highest number of kidnappings in 16 years. With the ongoing civil war in Syria, the country also saw a notable rise in kidnapping for various reasons, including personal disputes, revenge, intimidation, sectarian tensions, and ransom. Meanwhile, Nigeria saw substantial levels of kidnapping, accounting for the majority of abductions across the African continent. Piracy patterns also focused on Nigeria with the threat in the Niger Delta region continuing to expand out into the Gulf of Guinea. This area once again remained the pre-eminent region for hijackings, with the threat extending to the territorial waters of countries such as Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Togo.

Jeremy Eastman Intelligence Manager

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 4 Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 5/6 Europe

Stories covered Introduction

EU: Despite Europe’s many economic and political issues, the overall security situation in the region is expected to The EU in 2014 - The political remain stable in all but a few peripheral states. In 2013, hangover of economic recovery the EU appeared no closer to resolving its interminable divisions within the bloc, floundering on matters of foreign policy and the vexing question of how to accomplish economic recovery. Yet, most economies stabilised and unrest steadily declined in both frequency and intensity. The political cost of austerity, however, became increasingly self-evident as erstwhile protesters seized their opportunity to punish mainstream political parties at the ballot box in Bulgaria, Czech J.Louw Nel Republic, Italy and elsewhere. In some of the Chief Analyst, Europe region’s more troubled countries, inconclusive elections produced weak coalition governments consisting of established parties opting for cohabitation rather than defeat to emergent, non- traditional political entities.

Russia: In 2014, the bloc is expected to remain bereft of leadership amid slowing efforts to further integrate EU countries economically and institutionally. Instead, decision- The calculated gamble of the making by constituent member states will increasingly be motivated by domestic Winter Olympics in Sochi considerations and populist clamour as political elites remain preoccupied with self-preservation. However, the EU has seemingly not lost its allure entirely; this is particularly evident in the Balkans, where the union achieved a rare diplomatic victory in April 2013 when it brokered an agreement to normalise relations between Serbia and Kosovo, ostensibly a direct result of the countries’ accession ambitions.

The battle for influence in Europe’s eastern periphery proved to be one of 2013’s most fascinating developments. Former members of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Moldova, committed to concluding association agreements with the EU at the keenly anticipated Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit in late November 2013. In contrast, Armenia eschewed the EU’s overtures by committing to the Russia-led alternative, the Customs Union, in September 2013, whereas Azerbaijan and Belarus continued to display indifference to the EaP. The run up to the event was dominated, however, by Ukraine’s continued pursuit of preferential relations with both blocs without committing to immediate accession to either. As Georgia and Moldova will only finalise their association agreements by September 2014, the battle for primacy Turkey: along the continent’s former dividing line appears deferred rather than concluded. A difficult year ahead In the coming year, the Europe desk will closely monitor the Olympic Winter Games in Russia, which will take place in the southern city of Sochi in February and March. Despite being one of the most expensive and elaborately secured international sporting events yet, the threats of terrorism and civil unrest are set to preoccupy Russia’s security forces and elite alike. Turkey will also be closely watched in 2014. Shaken by popular unrest mid-year, the country will hold direct presidential elections for the first time next August amid a shifting domestic political environment. Turkey is also anticipated to become increasingly emboldened by its growing regional significance as it sits astride continents.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 7 The EU in 2014 - The political hangover of economic recovery

In 2013, the EU experienced economic growth, albeit erode the traditional support base of mainstream parties. incremental, as well as a decrease in the social turmoil, In a bid to retain popular support, some parties may renew protests and labour action which prevailed during the their focus on policies preoccupied with ethnic, religious and initial stages of the economic crisis (2009 to 2012). cultural considerations. Debates regarding immigration, However, as the gradual move towards economic integration, Islamic veil bans and Roma communities will recovery continues in 2014, with a projected growth come to the fore. These may periodically present fringe rate of 1.4 percent, the political price of austerity will elements, particularly those with far-right sympathies, become more apparent. with opportunities to instigate unrest. These include the infiltration of otherwise peaceful demonstrations, in Major political change and upheaval are not anticipated in addition to motivating acts of targeted, low-level violence. 2014. However, political developments, including growing Incidents of this nature are most likely to occur during times nationalist and eurosceptic sentiment, will serve to of elevated political tensions, such as election periods and highlight the challenges the EU and its constituent states commemorative events. In southern Europe, the impact of must address in order to secure political and economic austerity will continue to fuel anti-EU sentiment, particularly stability going forward. In 2014, popular frustration with in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. However, increased austerity measures, high unemployment and political support for political groups that question the value of malaise will persist in fuelling anti-government sentiment European integration won’t be limited to austerity- and disillusionment with traditionally dominant political stricken countries. Euroscepticism will gain support in some groups. As such, cross-spectrum alliances and tenuous central and northern countries which have been less directly governing coalitions will continue to colour the political affected by economic adjustment, such as the UK. landscape. Expedient partnerships will be informed by political necessity rather than ideology as traditional With the European Parliament election scheduled to parties (centre, centre-right/left) attempt to stave off take place in May, nationalist and right-wing parties will challenges from emerging, non-traditional parties (far-right/ seek to project their current, largely domestic, influence far-left). Yet, popular dissatisfaction and apathy may support throughout the region. An increase in political rallies, both the emergence of non-institutional champions of national pre- and post-poll, is possible should this campaign gain identity. traction; the potential for unrest may also be elevated during this period. Some parties, such as France’s National The far-right footprint in the EU Front, are expected to see an increase in representation. However, ideological differences will hamper attempts to form an effective far-right coalition, thus limiting their impact. While drawing attention to far-right agendas, increased representation will likely serve to shock political sensibilities rather than shape policy. Eurosceptic parties, which appear less ideologically fragmented, may seem better suited to co-operation. However, attempts at co-operation will remain relegated to opposing rather than directing policy. As such, a significant increase in nationalist, far-right and eurosceptic party representation in the legislature will likely only serve to sow division; this will further hinder the decision-making process. Reactive rather than proactive politicking, which has decreased the Parliament’s effectiveness and legitimacy in previous years, will continue to dominate in 2014. This may limit its ability to respond to future political and economic crises, and detract from the crafting of an overarching political agenda for the region. This could impact overall EU strategy, the adverse effects of which may continue to be felt in the arenas of foreign policy and economic stabilisation.

Francois Hollande and French Foreign Policy

The challenge of balancing EU goals with domestic France has not hesitated to act unilaterally in pursuing social, political and economic pressures will continue to its foreign policy goals, even when differing with the EU’s pose a threat to political stability in 2014. Support for groups position. Military interventions in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya championing the pursuit of narrower, national goals over during the Sarkozy presidency, and then again in Mali regional aims is expected to grow. This trend is already by the current administration of Francois Hollande has evident in several member states, including Austria, reinforced France’s willingness to act alone in pursuing Finland, France and the UK. Although increased national interests. Yet, these interventions have and will continue to create insecurities domestically in the medium- nationalist sentiment is unlikely to translate into significant term, at least. changes in government composition and/or policy, it may

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 8 Russia - The calculated gamble of the Winter Olympics in Sochi

The XXII Olympic Winter Games, which is set to be creation of a vast electronic surveillance network that will held in Russia’s southern city of Sochi from 7 to 23 involve some 5,500 CCTV cameras, as well as extensive February, followed by the Paralympics from 7 internet and phone monitoring. Restricted access to the to 16 March, will be the first in a series of highly resort city will mean that only locally owned, emergency and politicised international sporting events designed to specially accredited vehicles will be permitted in the special showcase the country’s Black Sea resort city, and by zone. Most individuals present during the event would have extension, an ascending Russia. In October, the site been individually documented and possibly investigated will also be the venue of the first Russian Grand Prix prior to the event; this would be done ostensibly through in a century with the track intended to thread the the Fan’s Passport system, which attendees will be required Olympic Park. The Winter Games, already assumed to to register for. Furthermore, foreign nationals travelling be the most expensive in Olympic history, is set to be visa-free and Russian nationals visiting the city during the safeguarded by an unprecedented security apparatus. Olympic period will be required to personally register their This will effectively render Sochi a special operations presence with authorities within 24 hours and three days, zone for the first three months of 2014. respectively.

Sochi and its proximity to the North Caucasus Conflict- and terrorism-related fatalities in the North Caucasus (per region)

It could be suggested that this vast surveillance operation betrays another of Russia’s major concerns vis-à-vis the Games: the threat of dissidents or activists undermining the carefully stage-managed event. Negative international publicity generated by the country’s law on ‘homosexual propaganda’, which became federal law in mid- 2013, would not have gone unnoticed in the Kremlin. Indeed, demonstrations and rallies in Sochi have been banned by presidential decree from 7 January to 21 March. As such, large-scale disruptive protest action at the event is not anticipated. In this stifling security environment, activists Source: Map data ©2013 Basarsoft, Google may be forced to resort to unconventional forms of protest, possibly with the co-operation of participants themselves, Yet the most pertinent threat to the Olympics is ironically to avoid detection and swift containment. The run up to the situated only a few hundred kilometres away in the event may also feature increasing calls for the politically North Caucasus, a volatile separatist region beset by motivated boycott of the Games; neighbouring Georgia has Islamist extremism and rampant criminality. Efforts to already mooted such a possibility in protest over Russia’s contain the region’s conflict and instability have ranged ‘creeping occupation’ in its breakaway enclaves of South from full-scale military intervention to state largesse, all Ossetia and Abkhazia. without success. Indeed, the unrelenting brutality of Russia’s counterinsurgency efforts in the region, not to mention Despite every effort being expended to prevent a terrorist the well-entrenched and recently legalised practise of incident in Sochi, militants have likely recognised that a strike collective punishment, has only succeeded to fuel the on the city is not necessary for the event to be tarnished. violence. Militants in the region are additionally As demonstrated by the 21 October suicide bombing of a motivated to target the Olympics as the Caucasus’s bus in Volgograd, which left six people dead, a successful indigenous inhabitants were historically displaced from the terrorist strike in any major Russian city prior to or during the Krasnodar region, where Sochi is located. Games will succeed in unnerving international participants and spectators alike. As such, Moscow or prominent cities It is primarily this terrorist threat which inspired Sochi’s elsewhere in the country may be targeted in a significant security arrangements. These include the deployment terrorist incursion as militants seek to maximise the of tens of thousands of security personnel to the city, the exposure generated by the Olympic period.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 9 Turkey – A difficult year ahead

The coming year promises to be a defining one for new constitution since October 2011, appeared no Turkey as two key elections are set to be closer to finding a replacement for the country’s current contested amid an unsettled domestic political charter,; this was introduced after the military coup of 1980. environment. The most significant of these will take place Hopes that the presidential election will coincide with a in August 2014 when the country will directly elect a referendum on a new constitution appears to be fading. The president for the first time. Yet, the scope and extent of failure also proved damaging to Turkey’s rapprochement the intended shift to a presidential system remains with its Kurdish minority and the prospect of an end to the unclear. Accordingly, the future of Recep Tayyip separatist conflict in the country’s south east. Erdogan, currently in his second and final term as prime minister, is mired in uncertainty as the question of his Beyond domestic considerations, Turkey’s burgeoning intentions to contest the presidential elections remains significance in the region is set to continue in2014 unanswered. as the country promotes its vision of being the natural interlocutor in Europe-Asia integration. In November, Main locations of ‘Gezi Park’ protests in 2013 the country’s embattled EU accession process resumed following a three-year hiatus over the territorial dispute in Cyprus. Despite this, accession to the bloc holds diminishing economic allure to the rapidly developing and export-oriented Turkey. Instead, the country is increasingly invested in projecting its influence into its periphery, notably the South Caucasus, parts of the Balkans and the Middle East. In 2013, the country found itself at odds with the EU amid widespread condemnation of Turkey’s Source: Map data ©2013 Basarsoft, Google, Mapa GISrael, ORION-ME heavy-handed response to anti-government protesters, However, it is precisely this carefully orchestrated shift precisely as the Erdogan administration’s outrage over to a presidential system which was the main casualty of democratic reversals in Egypt was not reciprocated in the large-scale anti-government protests which erupted Brussels. Indeed, Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions are throughout Turkey in mid-2013. Widespread hostility to the not anticipated to align with those of the EU imminently, Gezi Park reconstruction project in Istanbul swiftly united particularly with respect to the conflict in Syria, which disparate segments of Turkish society who had grown uneasy continues to fuel insecurity along the shared border. with the Erdogan administration, perceived as increasingly authoritarian, and exposed previously disregarded Election years are rarely uneventful in Turkey and 2014 opposition to his Justice and Development party (AKP). should prove no exception. Unnerved and tarnished This unexpected challenge to the popularity of the ruling by the unrest in 2013, the AKP is unlikely to abandon its party has raised the stakes in Turkey’s other key election familiar blend of Islamic populism and robust nationalism as in 2014, namely the local and municipal polls in March. it seeks to consolidate the support of its conservative core Local elections are increasingly being regarded as a constituency. However, the potential for unrest, prompted barometer of the support the AKP commands. Accordingly, an by a range of domestic and regional concerns, will remain indication of whether or not Erdogan will succeed in elevated throughout the year as opposition groups and orchestrating a seamless transition to president. Defeat in activists alike may feel confident in their ability to challenge key constituencies, such as Ankara and Istanbul, may shake the ruling party, both at the polls and in the streets. the AKP’s resolve in trying to invest more executive power in the presidency; this is particularly evident should the The Kurdish Rapprochement: Towards a Resolution? party feel insecure in its ability to retain the office, currently occupied by key Erdogan ally, Abdullah Gul. Fear A historic opportunity to resolve the decades-long Kurdish mongering over Erdogan/Gul emulating the Putin/ separatist conflict in south eastern Turkey presented itself in Medvedev model by swapping roles may bolster the late 2012 with state actors and Kurdish leaders both carrying prospect of opposition parties making electoral gains. the process forward in 2013. A ceasefire, declared in March, resulted in a sustained and continuing cessation of hostilities. Yet stalling progress in finding a resolution, not to mention Constitutional development was the other casualty questionable political commitment, continues to bedevil the of Turkey’s tumultuous 2013. The parliamentary process which remains vulnerable to collapse. Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, labouring on a

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 10 Americas

Stories covered Introduction Brazil: The political landscape in the Americas has the potential to change in 2014, with elections scheduled to Security concerns at the 2014 be held in at least ten countries. The presidential poll in FIFA World Cup Colombia in May will be a litmus test for the national security policies of President Juan Manuel Santos, who has successfully engineered peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country’s largest militant group. Regardless of the outcome of the vote (or indeed the peace talks), FARC’s influence will unlikely abate in 2014; however, the Nick Piper group will need to vie for control of illicit activities with Chief Analyst, Americas National Liberation Army (ELN) militants and the burgeoning bacrim organised crime groups.

In Brazil, Dilma Rousseff is expected to win a second presidential term in October, Mexico: only a few months after the conclusion of the FIFA World Cup. There is speculation about the extent to which the high-risk security environment in Brazil will affect those Mexico’s national security attending the tournament. policy and persistent violence Civil unrest, whether related to political developments or other issues, will again characterise state-civil interactions in the Americas in the year ahead. Indications are that major student demonstrations in Chile, significant teacher-led protests in Mexico and a well-supported socio-economic unrest campaign in Brazil could continue in 2014. There may be an increase in anti-government agitation in the next 12 months in Venezuela, where President Nicolas Maduro is struggling to portray the impression that his government has a firm hold on domestic economic and security affairs. Haiti, meanwhile, is the likeliest contender for significant violent unrest; this is largely due to the inability of the Michel Martelly-led regime to deliver the services demanded by most of the population.

United States: Non-state armed groups will again define the security environment in parts of some The threat of terrorism from countries. The exception to this is Mexico, where transnational criminal organisations within (TCOs) pose a challenge to security forces in almost all areas of the country. The election of a new administration at the end of 2013 promised some positive change in addressing violence associated with the so-called drug war in that country; whether there has been any change is something we assess as one of our three main stories for the year ahead.

Although there will continue to be a threat of small-scale terrorism posed by ideological militant groups, and in Mexico in particular by larger TCOs, the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings have also refocused attention towards the threat of terrorism emanating from within the United States.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 11 Brazil - Security concerns at the 2014 FIFA World Cup

A great deal of global media attention has focused government will attempt to reduce this risk through on the impact that civil unrest could have on the increased surveillance and an overall heightened police 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, which will take place presence; however, official efforts are likely to fall short of between 12 June and 13 July. Although these reports significantly reducing the risk of crime in host cities. are based on credible concerns, it should be noted that disruptions caused by potential protests are A further concern is that of express kidnapping. In recent anticipated to be largely minimised by government years, there have been a number of instances of this security operations in the 12 host cities of Belo short-term form of abduction affecting foreign nationals in Horizonte, Brasilia, Cuiaba, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and other cities that are set to Manaus, Natal, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, host World Cup matches. This form of kidnapping involves Salvador and Sao Paulo. Rather, the threat from crime victims being held temporarily while they are forced to is expected to be the most prevalent security concern withdraw money or hand over PIN details so that money facing visitors to the country during the World Cup. can be withdrawn from ATMs. Although the use of bogus taxis or rogue taxi drivers is a primary modus operandi of Protest hotspots in Rio de Janeiro express kidnappers, incidents are also perpetrated near outdoor and isolated indoor ATMs. Although somewhat mitigated by an increased security force presence, there is still a credible concern of express kidnapping facing those visiting host cities.

It should also be noted that there is a risk of terrorism at the World Cup that is associated with all international events. Lastly, those visiting host cities are not immune from the prevailing kidnapping for ransom risk. Source: Map data ©2013 Google, MapLink Brazil has experienced a period of sporadic protests since Share of total risk, per category, for host cities June 2013; these have been triggered by various socio- economic and labour concerns. The largest of these events corresponded with the FIFA Confederations Cup (FCC) period (15 to 30 June), when significant disruptions were reported in host cities. Although protests lost significant momentum following the FCC, it has been surmised that larger gatherings will emerge during the World Cup, given the increased international exposure provided by the event. It is red24’s position, however, that protests will not reach the magnitude of those witnessed during the FCC period. This is due, in roughly equal measures, to the large-scale increase in security aimed at limiting disruptions caused by potential protests (the government has invested over US$2.2 billion into World Cup security in 2013 alone) and the placating options that are available to President Dilma Rousseff so as to counter any burgeoning protest After the tournament movement. The general investment climate in Brazil has been unstable Despite the media focus on protests, the most apparent in recent years and will likely remain in this state in 2014 despite the World Cup. At present, it is unlikely that Brazil will risk during the World Cup is the high threat from crime in face an economic crisis; however, President Dilma Rousseff’s Brazil, particularly in major urban centres. Already-high government has made countless promises of progress and petty crime rates will likely be elevated, particularly near upliftment to Brazil’s citizens, and with the lack of economic stadiums, popular tourist areas and transport hubs; growth the road to further substantial civil unrest and other violent crime will remain an ever-present concern, mainly in forms of discord in 2014 is paved. lower-income areas and within cities at night. The

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 12 Mexico - Mexico’s national security policy and persistent violence

When Enrique Pena Nieto assumed office as Firstly, the nature of Nieto’s policy change is such that Mexico’s president on 1 December 2012, there was the anticipated results are only likely to be accrued in the speculative hope that the year ahead would be marked longer-term and not in the first year of its by a decrease in the number of homicides. implementation. Secondly, and perhaps more Unfortunately, but as predicted by red24 in our 2013 importantly, there hasn’t actually been as much of a change Threat Forecast, there has been no reduction in the in strategy as was proclaimed or even anticipated. During level of pervasive violence; there has been over 1,500 Nieto’s presidency to date, there have been several homicides per month during Nieto’s presidency, which significant arrests of high-ranking TCO figures. These is only marginally less than the average during his show that Nieto has not abandoned the kingpin strategy predecessor’s term. As much as 60 percent of murders entirely. In addition, his proposed gendarmerie is no closer to remain directly related to conflict involving TCOs. establishment and the 40,000 members that were planned to comprise the force have been reduced to 5,000. He Homicides by month (2013) has continued to deploy the military to violent areas of the country and evidence suggests that the United States still plays a major part in influencing Mexico’s national security policy.

As such, Nieto’s longer-term strategy to violence alleviation will likely have little effect in 2014; as mentioned, the time frame since implementation in early 2013 is too short. Meanwhile, the continuation of any meaningful semblance of the militant anti-TCO strategy adopted by Calderon will not serve to reduce violence in 2014; precedent has, to some extent, proved that the kingpin strategy serves only to splinter TCOs, thus creating opportunities for inter- and intra-group conflict. Nieto is likely to maintain his longer-term policy goals in 2014; however, he lacks the political capital and support from key role- Average number of homicides per state, per month players, such as the military and United States government, (2013) to attempt a different approach to targeting TCOs in the short-term.

The year ahead will therefore see a continuation in high levels of countrywide violence. As in previous years, areas in the north that border the United States will be worst affected, despite a reduction in the relative homicide numbers in this zone in 2013. Those states located south of border states, as well as central states and southern states, will see levels of violence consistent with 2013.

How cartel-related violence can affect you

Drug cartel-related violence in Mexico is almost solely Nieto’s approach to national security, which he proclaimed confined to those connected in some way to the narcotics trade (drug cartels themselves, police officers, would result in a 50 percent reduction in homicides by the criminal justice officials or journalists). The risks to others are end of his six-year term, is supposed to mark a departure incidental – finding yourself in the cross-fire of a shootout or from the ‘kingpin’ strategy that his predecessor, Felipe at the scene of a grenade blast, for example – and auxiliary Calderon, adopted in 2006. This involved targeting – becoming a victim of extortion or another form crime that is high-ranking cartel members in an effort to reduce the prevalent in drug conflict-affected areas. influence of TCOs. As opposed to Calderon’s approach, Nieto declared that his tenure would see a focus on addressing the socio-economic roots of TCO-related conflict. This includes efforts to improve education systems and employment opportunities. In addition, he proposed the creation of a gendarmerie that would have the dual focus of combating TCOs in high-violence areas and addressing institutional weaknesses in these parts. Why has this not yet resulted in meaningful change?

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 13 United States – The threat of terrorism from within

The Boston Marathon bombings, which took place at Although the self-radicalised terrorist may support an the finish line of the race on 15 April 2013, refocused international terrorist organisation, the individual does attention towards domestic terrorism in the United not generally form part of an extremist group and States. The perpetrators were self-radicalised and rather acts in a ‘lone wolf’ capacity. The lack of formal ties to identified with Islamist extremism. They were also international terrorist networks may serve to limit self- naturalised US citizens. radicalised perpetrators’ capacities to carry out large-scale sophisticated attacks. Indeed, most attacks and foiled There is a credible concern that 2014, like 2013, will plots since 9/11 have lacked complexity. Planned assaults be marked by incidents of attempted and possibly have had various targets, including government buildings, successful domestic terrorism. The risk will continue to public transport infrastructure and symbolic events; actual or be posed partly by extremist groups, whether left-wing, thwarted incidents have geographically taken place across right-wing or Islamist in nature. However, the main threat the country. will come from self-radicalised individuals, including US nationals and naturalised citizens. These individuals, who have no formal affiliation with a radical group but may be When are public mass shootings considered influenced by various terrorist groups’ messages and terrorist acts? ideologies, have been responsible for 90 percent of the 16 successful and 32 thwarted terrorist attacks on US soil since While some public shootings are clearly politically 9/11. In terms of ideological motivation, Islamist extremism motivated acts of terrorism, others seem to be driven more by has been the driver for 75 percent of successful or foiled personal grievances and are often the manifestation of attacks by self-radicalised individuals. untreated mental health problems. Each incident has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and the task is not easy. One indicator is whether the perpetrator sought to influence Characteristics of domestic terrorism in the US 2001- government policy in some way. If this is not the case – 2013 and the motives are short-term or non-political – then mass murder may be a more appropriate classification.

The high number of self-radicalised attacks, in relation to incidents perpetrated by foreign nationals and foreign- based groups, has much to do with the challenges faced by US authorities in anticipating the source of the ‘home- grown’ threat. Instead of formal training, self-motivated individuals have exhibited the capacity to make use of internet sources to gain knowledge of the construction of explosive devices and how to overcome superficial barriers to an attack. Internet ‘chatter’, however, is often not significant enough to rouse the attention of authorities. In cases where self-radicalised persons do actually travel abroad to receive training from radical Successful and foiled attacks from domestic terrorist Islamist organisations, US nationals and naturalised sources citizens may easily move in and out of the US without raising suspicion. These perpetrators are also difficult to profile; a number of studies have presented inconclusive or conflicting findings in terms of perpetrators’ likely level of education, socio-economic background and marital status.

Given these challenges, and despite the success US authorities have had in thwarting most planned incursions in the country in recent years, there is a credible threat of an attack on US soil in 2014. The US remains a desirable target for numerous radical groupings and individuals and for various ideological and alternate reasons. Should another incident take place, it will more than likely be perpetrated by a self- radicalised US national or naturalised Source: Map data ©2013 Google, INEGI individual.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 14 Middle East and North Africa

Stories covered Introduction Syria: The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains a dynamic region. The post-Arab Spring environment Long-term political and security has created and added to various complex political and challenges security environments that pose an increasing risk to locals and foreign nationals alike. The conflict in Syria will remain a critical area of focus in 2014.

The fighting has exacerbated sectarian tensions and negatively influenced security and political environments in a number of neighbouring states, Andre Colling particularly Lebanon. In addition, the conflict has, Chief Analyst, MENA like the Libyan conflict in 2011, fuelled Islamist extremism in the Levant region and given new impetus to militant groups in Iraq. The fallout of this conflict is likely to continue to evolve over the course of 2014 and the Iraq: regionalisation or internationalisation of the Syrian conflict remains a pressing Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s resurgence concern. In addition, political transitions and resultant instability and uncertainty remain key issues in the MENA region and are likely to remain so through 2014.Although Morocco, Algeria and Jordan have largely sidestepped concerns over violent and dramatic regime change, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain remain susceptible to further instability in 2014; this is due to the fact that the political systems remain largely unsettled in the post-Arab Spring environment. Competition over the character of the political systems in each state will drive further unrest. This in turn will be exacerbated by high levels of youth unemployment and poverty, religious differences, sectarian violence and separatist sentiment in places. Egypt: Political machinations will also continue, albeit in a different guise, in Israel and The persistent cycle of the Palestinian Territories. Further Western efforts at Palestinian/Israeli unity will political uncertainty and occur; however, this will be complicated by intra-Palestinian competition and Israeli instability settlement construction in the West Bank.

Iran/US détente, a feature in the second half of 2013, may also develop further but will not dissuade the Israeli state from its confrontational position regarding Iran’s nuclear development programme. Apart from Bahrain, the stability of the Gulf States of Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, will continue in 2014 and no major upheavals are anticipated.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 15 Syria - Long-term political and security challenges

Bashar al-Assad maintains a grip on power in Syria. His Despite the rebel failures, Assad’s position remains elite, regular and militia forces, supported by a largely endangered, largely due to the threat of foreign unified minority Alawite community and international intervention. The threat of a US military strike in backers (Russia, Iran and China), have successfully September 2013 in response to the government’s resisted a determined but divided predominantly Sunni chemical weapons use in Damascus shook the confidence rebel ‘movement’ since 2011. of the regime. Indeed, it responded unusually swiftly following a Russian proposal to declare its Ethno religious breakdown of Syria chemical weapons stockpiles to the international community, averting an apparent imminent US air and naval strike. Despite this successful sidestep, the potential for foreign military intervention in 2014 is a highly probable scenario. In the interim there are credible indications that the regime and part of the rebellion (likely NCSROF) will meet towards the end of December or early 2014. The momentum towards talks has largely been a result of the international reaction to the August chemical attack in Damascus. However, it is still not clear if the two sides will meet or if all rebel fighting groups will participate. In addition, should either side begin to make advances on the battlefield, negotiations are likely to be delayed. Should The rebels, beset by internal dissent, an unclear common negotiations occur, they will not, however, affect one post-conflict goal and conflicting ideological positions, inevitable outcome of the civil war - Syria will remain split have failed to make further inroads into regime-dominated for many years to come. The rebels have taken control of territory since their largely surprising early successes in peripheral territory in the north and north east, and 2011 and 2012. This state of affairs has largely been a result Sunni central regions remain as restive as ever, which will of its lack of armour and air assets and a clear and unified require a large allocation of regime resources to subdue and military command. The Free Syrian Army (FSA), aligned contain. From strongholds in the north, Islamist extremists to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and will also continue to place massive pressure on the regime Opposition Forces (NCSROF), numerous local militias and to further their goals of creating an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq Islamist ‘extremists’ all have their own command and control and Syria; Kurds are also unlikely to step back from their systems and rarely coordinate operations. push towards greater autonomy in the far north and north east. Control of governorates by group Syria will face ongoing conflict in 2014 regardless of whether negotiations occur. The intensity andspread of the fighting will depend on a number of factors, including the extent of foreign support for local armed groups, developments on the battlefield and the relationship between competing rebel organisations. In addition to the possible internationalisation of the conflict, the spectre of a regionalisationof the conflict is a potential new hotspot of confrontation. Israel is believed to have conducted at least three attacks in Syria in 2013 and Turkey remains highly agitated by repeated cross-border conflict spillover. Either of these forces may enter the fray in 2014 in response to Syrian conflict developments or to protect their own national interests. Spillover will continue and increasingly impact on the security environments in Lebanon, Iraq and, to a lesser extent, southern and south eastern Turkey. Should neighbouring forces get involved more directly in the conflict Source: Map data ©2013 Basarsoft, Google, Mapa GISrael, ORION-ME in Syria, this could have significant ramifications on regional stability.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 16 Iraq – al-Qaeda in Iraq’s resurgence

Iraq’s insurgency reached new heights in 2012 and 2013 Casualties of the Breaking the Walls campaign July as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) reorganised and established 2012 to July 2013 a highly competent and structured command and control network capable of projecting its presence across much of the country and in neighbouring Syria. This increased influence is expected to continue through 2014.

Under the umbrella of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the group has established a presence in northern Syria and benefited greatly from a flow of fighters and expertise from the Syrian conflict theatre to Iraq through existing trafficking and smuggling routes. In December 2012, AQI also profited from a spike in anti-government protests in Sunni areas in Iraq. In addition, a government crackdown on Sunni communities in mid-2013 will continue. This may well increase in frequency as the further heightened anti-government sentiment and bolstered group aims to extend its influence and control of territory support for ISIL/AQI operations in the country’s Sunni belt, in Iraq to further its ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic located between Baghdad, Anbar and Ninewa governorates caliphate in central and northern Iraq and northern Syria. in the north. AQI/ISIL area of operation Sunni Muslim discontent and civil unrest

A raid on the home of Sunni Finance Minister Rafi al- Issawi sparked countrywide anti-government protests in Sunni communities in December 2012. Demonstrations were largely peaceful until a security force raid in Hawja in April, which left over 50 people dead. The violence gave new impetus to the action and stoked sectarian tensions and anti- government sentiment, two key elements to AQI/ISIL’s broader strategy.

From this strong base, AQI launched a major year-long campaign, ‘Breaking the Walls’. This culminated in a complex multi-phase operation against a fortified prison complex in Abu Ghraib in July 2013, which resulted in Source: Map data ©2013 Basarsoft, Google, Mapa GISrael, ORION-ME the escape of 500 prisoners, including dozens of hardline Islamist militants. The campaign primarily focused on It is red24’s position that AQI/ISIL will succeed in stoking sectarian tension and reconstituting AQI’s capturing and holding territory in leadership structures through jail breaks, goals it is assessed central and northern Iraq, should the to have achieved. Following the completion of Breaking government not act immediately to reform and equip its the Walls, AQI announced the start of its next phase, ‘The security sector to deal with the insurgency. AQI/ISIL will Harvest of the Soldiers’ campaign; this is aimed at also continue to pursue alliances with ideologically aligned establishing control of territory, specifically in the Ninewa groupings such as the Syria-based al-Nusra Front and governorate, and targeting government-aligned Sunni northern Iraq-based Naqshbandi Army and Ansar al- personalities and the security forces. In the latter part Islam; however, its increasing bravado and growing of 2013, AQI mass casualty bombings resulted in dominance may bring it into direct conflict with other hundreds of security force and civilian casualties, and early Islamist extremist groups. It may also result in periods of indications are that AQI is making steady progress towards intense in-fighting, particularly in Syria, where there are the fulfillment of its new goals. numerous and competing Islamist militant organisations. The AQI campaigns, which have had a significant impact AQI/ISIL is expected to continue its offensive against the on the majority Shiite population in Iraq, will also serve to state of Iraq in 2014 and into 2015. It will continue to use escalate sectarian tensions; as such, sectarian conflict is vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), expected to spike in 2014. Hardline Shiite militia groups, suicide attacks (SVEST) and suicide VBIED’s in both once- such as the Mahdi Army, Badr organization, Asai’b ahl off and coordinated attacks (sometimes countrywide); al-Haq (AAH), and Katai’b Hezbollah (KH), and popular these techniques resulted in a tremendous and horrific self-defence militias, such as the Baghdad-based League casualty count in 2012 and 2013. Its targeting of both hard of the Righteous, will respond with further mobilisation in and soft targets, including police, military and government some areas, including retaliatory attacks against Sunni interests, Shiite communities and ethnic/religious minorities, communities.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 17 Egypt – The persistent cycle of political uncertainty and instability

Egypt has been in the grip of a debilitating political This position has allowed it to challenge parties that are crisis since the overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak- and not aligned with its interests, particularly Islamist parties. National Democratic Party (NDP)-led regime in 2011. The military maintains strong fears that Islamist control of The oppressive yet stabilising influence of the NDP the state will challenge its national authority and economic regime is yet to be replicated and the political interests, forge alliances with its traditional regional vacuum yet to be filled by a government that has the opponents and threaten the Egyptian state’s vital economic political capital to manage the interests of the powerful investment from its Gulf allies. Egypt’s core problem then military establishment and unify the country’s disparate is how it will manage to satisfy the military’s interests while political and religious groupings. also fostering democracy, a key demand of its Western partners and numerous domestic political groups. In the Civil unrest and extremist hotspots current context, it is red24’s position that this problem cannot be solved, at least not in 2014. Islamist parties maintain, arguably, the most significant support. Should new elections be held, as the military and interim government have promised, these groups will likely re-win the vote. This will, in all likelihood, set Egypt up for another confrontation akin to the one experienced in mid-2013. Likewise, if the military and interim government moves to stifle the Islamists participation and create conditions for liberals, Copts and secularists to emerge as the dominant civilian political force, an Islamist protest backlash and Islamist militant response are anticipated.

The extremist threat from the Sinai Peninsula

Insecurity in the northern Sinai Peninsula has allowed a number of Islamist militant groups to emerge and challenge the authority of the state. Groups such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis have claimed numerous bombings in and outside of the North Sinai governorate. red24 anticipates that these groups will continue to grow and at least one mass casualty attack Source: Map data ©2013 Basarsoft, Google, ORION-ME, basado en BCN outside of the Sinai is anticipated in 2014. IGN España, Mapa GISrael Egypt is the most populous state in the Middle East and In the unlikely event that a government forms an important bridge between Asia and Africa. Given representative of and acceptable to the people is formed, the country’s geopolitical significance, its stability remains the state will also need to overcome an ongoing economic critical for both the political and security concerns of the crisis. Unemployment and poverty are widespread, region. At present, the stability of the state is being particularly among the youth. Although key resort areas artificially upheld by the military. Following the 2011 in the country have not been affected significantly by civil revolution, it was the Supreme Council of the Armed unrest since 2011, the instability has nonetheless served Forces (SCAF) that assumed power in an interim to deter foreign nationals from visiting the country (tourism capacity before allowing national elections in late 2011 being a notable income earner) and dissuade investors. and 2012. These elections led to the emergence of the Such issues have fuelled anti-government sentiment and Muslim Brotherhood (MB)’s Freedom and Justice Party recent political crises. This has also stoked the labour (FJP) as the most prominent party and an MB president, sector’s ill-will towards the state. Labour and other Mohammed Mursi. The secular military’s traditional economically motivated civil unrest and disruption will unease with Islamist-leaning parties led it to intervene in yet remain a key domestic challenge for a generation at least. another political crisis in mid-2013 when the army, led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, overthrew the popularly elected Islamist- Key economic indicators and trends dominated government and installed an unelected interim government composed of technocrats, liberals, secularists Unemployment rate: 9.4% (2010) to 13.3% (2013) and members of the judiciary. Youth unemployment: Estimates of 50 to 75% (18 to 30 year olds) The military remains the most powerful force in Egypt. It Population: 79 (2010) to 83 million people (2013) maintains significant control of the economy with some New job seekers annually: Estimates at 500,000 estimating its share of control of the economy at between Current account balance (Exports less imports): Surplus 15 and 40 percent. It also has a historical and unwritten of 693 million US (2008) to deficit of 1.7 billion US (2013) mandate from the ‘people’ to ‘protect’ the Egyptian state.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 18 Asia

Stories covered Introduction Afghanistan: Several security and political dynamics will serve to shape events in the Asia-Pacific region in 2014. Repercussions of the NATO Separatist conflicts simmering in southern withdrawal Thailand, north east India, the southern Philippines and Indonesia’s eastern Papua region will continue as the respective governments and separatist groups appear unwilling to find common ground over which to end hostilities. Terrorism, stemming from numerous quarters, including such separatist conflicts, will continue to pose a threat in Asia in the upcoming year. Jonathan Vincent In Indonesia, where there has been a number of mass Chief Analyst, Asia casualty attacks against soft targets in recent years, the risk has diminished somewhat; nevertheless, regular arrests of suspected militants and skirmishes between the security forces and Islamist extremists demonstrate that non-state armed groups maintain a presence and a threat in the country.

Bangladesh’s elections, set to take place on 5 January 2014, are expected to be highly contentious. The opposition and incumbent parties have adopted decidedly China: confrontational stances. There are concerns of a repeat of the 2007/8 elections, which were subject to months of widespread violence and a state of emergency. Increasing labour protests in Pakistan also continues to experience severe political and security challenges. It held the People’s Republic relatively successful elections in May 2013; however, the government’s influence and authority and its ability to manage crises remains threatened by a domestic Islamist insurgency, pervasive corruption, a chronic electricity shortage and a legacy of economic mismanagement. Elsewhere, Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will likely remain relatively politically stable. Despite this, there are concerns over inevitable transitions of power from their respective ageing and long-standing leaders to a new guard. These leaders’ unwillingness to embrace political reform has increased the threat of demands for democracy, either through a secular or Islamist prism; however, this is not expected to pose a serious threat to stability across Central Asia in 2014.

In the Kashmir region, despite isolated firing incidents across the Line of Control (LOC) between India and Pakistan, the situation will likely continue to stabilise as relations between the nuclear-armed states slowly improve. Further east, tensions between the two Koreas continue to de-escalate following a high point in confrontational rhetoric India: in March 2013. However, the coming year may again see bellicose (albeit symbolic) actions and statements from the north - particularly if it once again uses the tactic to Will the recent creation of gain economic concessions or aid - in the face of mounting domestic pressures. China new states galvanise other and India will also face domestic challenges through the year. The former faces an separatist movements? increase in labour-related issues while dealing with separatist ambitions in the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region; the latter is forced to deal with multiple ethno-linguistic groups calling for greater regional autonomy, in addition to organising the largest democratic elections in the world by the end of May.

The country which is likely to remain the most unstable in the region, and could possibly deteriorate further, is Afghanistan. This includes the wider Afghanistan- Pakistan (AfPak) border region where local security forces will struggle to maintain a semblance of stability in the wake of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troop withdrawal.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 19 Afghanistan – Repercussions of the NATO withdrawal

The upcoming year sees important political and elections. Moreover, as the NATO-led ISAF departs the security transitions in Afghanistan with developments country during 2014, it will leave an air cover, intelligence, there likely to have a direct effect on neighbouring and logistics vacuum that the under-equipped Afghan Pakistan. National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) will be unable to fill; this will further provide more room within A key development will be the anticipated total withdrawal of which the Taleban can expand its influence. foreign combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. This has raised significant concerns of a deterioration in In addition, opium production is expected to increase the security environment in the country as Taleban-aligned in 2014 as efforts by the ISAF to eliminate narcotics Islamist extremists will likely seek to increase the scope of production will be curtailed, given its anticipated withdrawal. areas under their control in the post-withdrawal era. There The potential for conflict over control of the trade (which are also concerns that as Islamist militias consolidate their accounts for approximately 90 percent of the world’s bases of operation in eastern Afghanistan, they will be heroin supply) between local militias/warlords and other able to launch incursions across the border into Pakistan, criminal syndicates is likely to escalate sharply. Given that a as well as provide support to their Pakistani counterparts, significant proportion of opium is transported north into the Tehreek-i-Taleban Pakistan (TTP); the TTP, like the Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours, an upsurge in Taleban, is a Pashtun-dominated organisation. This will inter-crime/militant group competition and associated serve to exacerbate existing insecurity in Pakistan’s north conflict/criminal activity is likely in the southern border western tribal areas where the Pakistani military is battling regions of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. to contain the Islamist insurgency that has resulted in near- daily attacks across that country. Opium production in Afghanistan (tonnes-per-year) Major ethnic groups in Afghanistan/Pakistan

In a worst-case scenario, the country may enter into a period of elevated civil conflict in 2014 with the Taleban and various conflict figures controlling most of the country - and the government, as has persistently been the case, unable to exert any notable jurisdiction outside of the capital, Kabul. Such a situation may precipitate a return to the anarchy of the post-Soviet era in which former warlords, including Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Gul Agha Sherzai (both presidential candidates), and Rashid Dostum, Source: Map data ©2013 AutoNavi, Google Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan and Mohammed Fahim, who enjoy considerable levels of local support, One small mitigating factor is the consensus, in principle, create alliances of necessity with each other in order to among the US, Afghan and Pakistani governments, as well protect their own interests against the Taleban. as among the Taleban, TTP and the Pakistani military, that Nonetheless, violence and insecurity are likely to peace negotiations should take place. Given the numerous continue to plague Afghanistan, with potential for spillover obstacles to any eventual talks, including disagreements into Pakistan in terms of direct militant activity, and into on the structure of the future Afghan state (Islamic or civil), Central Asia in terms of increased criminality, in 2014. multiple competing armed ethnic groups and disunity among the many factions that make up the TTP, it remains unlikely that any meaningful dialogue will occur. In the meantime, the Taleban will likely continue to expand its operations in order to gain leverage over the Afghan state during any potential negotiation process. A second aim of the anticipated increase in Taleban-related activity will likely include the attempted disruption of the 5 April 2014

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 20 China - Increasing labour protests in the People’s Republic

Since the late 20th century, China has experienced rapid escalated into demonstrations numbering thousands economic growth and expansion; however, with growth through the use of Sina Weibo; this ultimately led the gov- rates slowing, endemic corruption, limited legislation ernment to halt construction. and rights for workers, as well as increasing income inequality, there are growing occurrences of The growth of protests is a pressing concern for Chinese disruptive labour-related protests. This has, in authorities, who do not wish to highlight any instability. This turn, raised concerns over the ability of the central is a particular concern as the economic recession in the government to manage the issue and ensure that West and increased labour costs in China have left many productivity, in addition to the appeal of the country to Chinese companies struggling to attract investment, in foreign investors, remains strong. comparison to a few years ago. In seeking to limit the protests, the government will likely employ a multi-pronged Due to the strict media and internet censorship imposed strategy in 2014. Locally, authorities will deploy the by the government, only a few hundred protests are paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP) in an reported each year. While these reported figures are attempt to quell any dissent before it escalates into wider seemingly low, the actual number is estimated to be violence in heavily monitored cities such as Kunming, significantly higher. Some data indicates that Shanghai, Shenzhen, Jinan, Nanjing and Guangzhou. there are approximately 180,000 mass-protests Efforts will be redoubled on tightening media control, annually, an average of almost 500 per day, in specifically that of the internet (new defamation laws explicitly response to issues such as corruption, environmental targeting the ‘spreading of rumours’ on social media have been concerns, human rights violations and service delivery introduced). More generally, authorities will use China’s complaints. The number of labour-related events in the ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea with country’s industrial heartland, on the eastern seaboard, is its neighbours to divert attention away from economic of particular concern. Although there has been an increase woes. The government will also likely use the threat of of almost 300 percent in the number of reported annual ‘separatist terrorism’ emanating from the far western Xinjiang labour gatherings in mainland China between 2011 and Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Tibet Autonomous 2013, many of these occur in industrial cities in China’s Region (TAR) as a means of rallying its majority ethnic Han eastern and southern provinces, namely Guangdong, population around a common cause in the more densely Fujian, Shandong, Jilin, Jiangsu, Hebei and Yunnan, where populated eastern and southern regions. many Western companies base their operations. Given the constraints outlined above, this upward trend in labour protests is anticipated to increase in these areas in 2014. The terrorist threat from Uighur separatism

Growth in GDP versus number of protests in China In 2014 the threat of terrorism in China will stem predominantly from separatist elements in the western Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The majority of incidents occur within the XUAR; however, the apparent attacks in Beijing and Taiyuan late in 2013 which left several people dead and more injured illustrates their desire to strike targets outside of the XUAR. Contrary to government statements, these militants are driven by a nationalist agenda, not a religious one.

Despite these moves, the government has yet to tack- le the structural issues that are causing the protests; these include slowed economic growth, increasing income disparity and poorly demarcated rights for workers, among others. Until these underlying factors are addressed, Another indirect but formidable driver of the labour China looks set to see further growth in labour-related unrest has been the widespread use of social media and protest actions. communication channels. The growth of instant messaging tool, QQ, and social microblogging site Sina Weibo (which has 500 million users) has presented Chinese authorities with a new problem. Akin to a Chinese version of Twitter, Sina Weibo has allowed those participating in protest action to draw attention to their activities and grievances in real-time. Flagging and deleting posts on specific protest- related issues have proved challenging for censors, given the near-instantaneous transfer of information among Sina Weibo users. For example, in July 2013, in Shifang, Sichuan province, small-scale protests over a copper plant quickly

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 21 India – Will the recent creation of new states galvanise other separatist movements?

On 30 July 2013, the Indian government announced its following the Telangana announcement, the group plan to move forward with the bifurcation of Andhra initiated a series of disruptive protests, strikes and transport Pradesh state, and the subsequent creation of a new blockades in the state’s Darjeeling district. Indeed, since Telangana state. The bifurcation announcement the government’s decision on Telangana, it has received prompted months of protests and severe strike bids for the creation of approximately 20 states. Elsewhere action across Andhra Pradesh and motivated across the country, other groups vying for the creation of separatist groups across the country to increase their new states have been agitating with renewed vigour. These own agitation for separate autonomous regions. areas are likely to continue to experience elevated levels of Despite this development, the overall integrity of the agitation in 2014. Indian state will remain sound in 2014. At the very least, further political posturing, either for or Telangana is one of three distinct cultural regions in against the issue of bifurcation, in the lead up to the general Andhra Pradesh state, together with Coastal Andhra and election (which has to be held by May 2014) will increase Rayalaseema. The Telangana state creation marks the the frequency of politically motivated rallies, disruptive first time that a state will be divided without the consent of protests and strike action. Local bifurcation-leaning the state legislature, including heavy opposition from the candidates will harness these agitations among their public. Following the announcement of the regional constituents by prioritising the issue of statehood aspirations split other movements have intensified their own in their campaign agendas as a means to garner votes. This agendas. Such aspirations include the demand for the may in turn precipitate counteraction by supporters of rival creation of new administrative districts or greater regional candidates and political parties. Furthermore, statehood autonomy for the areas of Awadh Pradesh, Poorvanchal, ambitions that would otherwise have been disregarded Bundelkhand and Harit Pradesh in Uttar Pradesh; Vidarbha in may experience a surge in political exposure, albeit only Maharashtra, and Gorkhaland in West Bengal. In addition, temporarily. Banned militant groups such as the United secessionist groups calling for new nation-states completely Liberation Front of Assam, People’s Liberation Army of independent of India, such as in the Kashmir region, Assam, Manipur and the National Liberation Front of Tripura, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura, have including others that are vying for some form of regional also been buoyed. autonomy or complete independence from India, may also seek to take advantage of the government’s perceived Areas prone to spike pro- or anti-statehood agitation in willingness to concede to territorial demands. These groups may intensify their insurgencies with renewed confidence in 2014 2014. An escalation in shootings, sabotage, assassinations and low-level bombings against state and security interests is possible. Overall, a long-term deterioration in India’s security environment is not anticipated. The effects of statehood agitation in the form of protests, strikes and blockades will likely be localised and unlikely to continue in a sustained fashion beyond the general elections. Likewise, any upsurge in violent militant separatism will be tempered by resource constraints and somewhat successful counterinsurgency operations by security forces in recent years. Moreover, with regard to statehood agitation as well as violent separatist militarism, both are likely to be confined to states where they currently exist and not necessarily spread across the country. Thus any statehood, regional autonomy or independence agitation or violence will likely be a short-term affair and accompanied only by localised deteriorations in the security environment. Sexual violence against women in India

Gender-based violence is an ongoing concern in India, with rape among the fastest growing crime in the country. The capital, Delhi, accounted for 19.3 percent of countrywide rape Source: Map data ©2013 AutoNavi, Google, MapIT cases during 2012, making it the worst affected urban centre An example of the intensification of efforts can be seen in in India. Although locals are predominantly targeted, cases of the campaign by Gorkha Janmukti Morcha, a prominent sexual assault and harassment against foreign travellers are regional political party in West Bengal state that has on the increase. Although efforts have been made towards been agitating for the creation of an ethnic Nepali female empowerment and institutional reform, the issue of Gorkhaland state for a number of years. Immediately sexual violence is likely to persist.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 22 Africa

Stories covered Introduction The Sahel: As was the case in 2012, a number of countries in Sub- Saharan Africa were subject to, at times, moderate to A new frontier of terrorism? severe insecurity in 2013. Of particular note, Islamist extremism, fuelled by political instability, a proliferation of arms and limited policing structures, was a key security concern in a number of northern and western Sub-Saharan African states. The situation remained particularly precarious in north eastern Nigeria where, as outlined in red24’s 2013 forecast, the Boko Haram extremist sect continued to escalate its Ryan Cummings insurgent operations against the Nigerian government. Chief Analyst, Africa Outside of that country, transnationalist Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) expanded its operational presence within the Sahel region of West Africa and gained in strength despite being ousted from major northern urban centres in northern Mali in 2012 and 2013.

Although terrorism remained the key feature of North and West Africa’s security environment, Central Africa continued to serve as a hotbed for conflict between government forces and non-state groups. The most significant development within Mozambique: the region was the Seleka rebel offensive in early 2013, which ultimately toppled the Concerns over a new civil war regime of the Central African Republic (CAR)’s long-serving leader, Francois Bozize. Although political control of the country has since been transferred to an interim civilian as RENAMO ‘returns to the administration, Bozize’s ousting catalysed an outbreak of ethno-religious bush’ violence which has precipitated a dire humanitarian crisis across much of the CAR. Moreover, the resultant instability has also threatened neighbouring countries, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC has not only seen an influx of refugees, but has also faced increased activity by CAR-based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgents in its Orientale province. Elsewhere in the DRC, a UN intervention force defeated the Tutsi-dominated M23 rebel group in November 2013. The success is notable but will not serve to improve the security situation in the eastern DRC, which continues to be undermined by the presence of numerous armed groups, particularly in the North and South Kivu provinces.

In Kenya’s northern Turkana County, which has already experienced agitation by local communities that claim they are being marginalised by oil firms and the government, oil extraction and production are set to commence in 2014; hence, there are concerns that protracted and possibly violent agitation by Turkana residents may increase if their grievances are not quickly addressed. In addition to security concerns centring on the region’s hydrocarbon industry, Kenya will also face an ongoing terrorism threat Kenya: in 2014. The primary risk in this regard stems from Somalia-based al-Shabaab. This group may seek to target Kenya, in addition to neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Was Westgate a sign of Uganda and Tanzania, in reprisals for their respective involvement in military things to come? operations against the group in Somalia. However, it should also be noted that the aforementioned countries face secondary terrorist threats posed by separatist and/or other radicalised groupings.

Developments in southern Africa in 2014 will be focused on general elections being held in both South Africa and Mozambique. Although security concerns regarding the former are likely to be minimal, Mozambique is positioned to go to the polls amid heightened tensions between the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government and its wartime-turned-political adversary, the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO).

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 23 The Sahel – A new frontier of terrorism?

The Sahel region of Africa is no stranger to their ongoing support and involvement in Malian-centric to insecurity. For decades, its desert terrain has counterterrorism operations. A more latent terrorist threat been subject to the de facto control of illicit groups may also permeate countries such as Senegal and which smuggle narcotics and other contraband along Burkina Faso. These countries, in addition to being clandestine trafficking routes. Although there has not signatories to the US-backed Trans-Saharan Counter been much change in this regard, the Sahel’s tenuous terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), are also facing increased security environment was worsened by the Arab Spring domestic Islamist radicalism. State-aligned interests will and its geopolitical consequences. Indeed, the toppling remain the most likely targets; however, a high-profile of strongman regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt led to attack against a major foreign-linked commercial and/or the removal of intricate political and security nexuses diplomatic interest remains a possibility. Sahel and Sahara- which had long curtailed a more ominous and wide- based mining sector interests will undoubtedly be viewed reaching regional threat of Islamist militancy. as high-value targets. While less of a threat at this time, anecdotal reports of jihadist groups obtaining man-portable Since 2012, Islamist extremist groups, particularly the air-defense systems (MANPADS) may also pose a threat to transnationalist al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb trans-Sahel civil aviation in 2014. (AQIM), have increasingly expanded their operational capabilities across the Sahel. In early 2012, AQIM and Insecurity within the Sahel in 2013 its alleged offshoot, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), seized control of northern Mali amid a security vacuum which followed the country’s March 2012 military coup. For nearly a year, Islamist militants exerted control over the region and used its vast terrain as a hosting point for training camps and to cache stores of weaponry acquired from Libya following the Libyan Civil War. Although Islamist militants eventually retreated from the main towns of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu amid France-led military operations in January 2013, their withdrawal could best be described as strategic. Militants have taken up clandestine positions across many parts of northern Mali, while evidence suggests that insurgent bands may have also been regrouping in neighbouring Mauritania, Niger and southern Algeria.

In addition to expanding their presence, Islamist groups are also seemingly evolving their operational capabilities. The past year saw militant groups launching highly coordinated and sophisticated attacks against foreign-operated mining interests which, up until now, were generally spared from direct terrorist incursions. On 16 January 2013, at least 40 foreign nationals were killed when al-Qaeda-linked insurgents targeted the BP-operated Tigantourine gas complex in Algeria’s southern town of In Amenas. Less than Source: Map data ©2013 Google, ORION-ME, basado en BCN IGN España three months later, militants similarly attacked a French- owned uranium plant near the Nigerien town of Arlit. Both attacks were seemingly orchestrated with dual purposes of Fact or fiction: Africa’s arc of terror disabling vital sites of foreign investment and maximising foreign casualties. There are increasing concerns that an arc of terrorism may be developing across North, East and West Africa due to Although Western-backed and regionally coordinated suggestions that terrorism groups such as Boko initiatives are being implemented to curtail Sahel-based Haram, al-Shabaab and AQIM may be forging logistical jihadist operations, factors such as porous borders, and operational linkages. However, indications delineating poorly policed terrain, political instability and easy arms the existence of such collaboration are currently limited. availability continue to hamper the effectiveness of such While there is evidence to suggest that the aforementioned undertakings. As a consequence, 2014 will likely see much groups operatives have previously engaged in joint-training of the Sahel remain a hotbed for Islamist militancy. In terms exercises, suggestions of a cross-pollination of weaponry, tactics, funding and tactical expertise remain anecdotal at this of high-risk areas, northern Mali will continue to serve as stage. a focal point for insurgent attacks. However, neighbouring countries such as Algeria, Niger, Mauritania and Chad are also assessed to carry a heightened terrorism threat due

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 24 Mozambique – Concerns over a new civil war as RENAMO ‘returns to the bush’

In 2013, Mozambique experienced the worst outbreak Further mitigating the risk of civil war is political of political violence since the country’s civil war, which expediency. Ultimately a return to conflict favours occurred between 1977 and 1992. Akin to the 15-year- neither party. From FRELIMO’s perspective, eradicating a long conflict, hostilities were a result of strained movement that poses a minimal political threat may relations between the ruling Front for the Liberation of actually reinforce RENAMO’s ‘power-hungry’ narrative Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique National of the ruling party. With general elections taking place in Resistance (RENAMO) party. October 2014, FRELIMO will be hesitant to undertake any actions that could see the party losing popular support at The recent cycle of violence stems from allegations made the ballot. Moreover, conflict or even the threat thereof will by RENAMO’s long-serving leader, Afonso Dhlakama, that undoubtedly also pose a risk to foreign direct investment the ruling party was undermining Mozambique’s post-war which, up until now, has been central to the consolidation of pluralist democracy and was seeking to centralise political stability in the post-civil war era. From RENAMO’s control over economic revenues garnered via the country’s perspective, the party is aware that it does not possess the burgeoning hydrocarbon industry. Although capacity to challenge FRELIMO militarily. It is also mindful Dhlakama’s rhetoric was by no means a new development, of the fact that any attempts to do so may well catalyse the his October 2012 decision to disengage from electoral demise of the party. These factors suggest that a politically politics, and subsequently return to the party’s former achieved resolution to the impasse will remain the primary rebel encampment within the Gorongosa Mountain Range, goal for both parties. delineated the extent to which relations between RENAMO and FRELIMO had worsened. Moreover, Dhlakama’s so-called ‘return to the bush’, which was Assessed military capabilities of the Armed Forces initially thought to be nothing more than a symbolic of Mozambique (FADM) and RENAMO gesture, has precipitated a spiral of violent encounters between RENAMO and government forces. This has FADM: Currently it is assessed that the FADM has a subsequently raised concerns of a resumption of civil war in 13000-strong military, in addition to a fully functional Mozambique. naval and air force. Furthermore, the Mozambican army has access to offensive air, ground and maritime military But do such concerns have any merit? Current evidence vehicles, including tanks, attack helicopters and patrol boats. suggests not. Unlike what was experienced during the Mozambican civil war, RENAMO no longer enjoys the RENAMO: The armed forces are estimated to include patronage of foreign governments upon which much of between 800 and 1000 personnel. The group does not the movement’s operational and logistical structures were possess any naval or aerial capabilities. RENAMO’s weaponry is limited to stockpiles of dated artillery which the dependent. Although the group continues to have access to group failed to decommission as part of the 1992 peace arms which were not decommissioned in the aftermath of accord. Nonetheless, unverified claims made by RENAMO the 1992 peace accord, RENAMO’s fighting force has also spokesman, Fernando Mazunga, suggest that the group has dwindled considerably. The group is now dependent on a access to ak-47’s, mortar rounds, anti-personnel landmines few hundred ageing guerrilla fighters who, while well-trained and bazookas. and experienced, are incapable of waging a full-scale armed campaign. Attempts to recruit new fighters will also be stymied by RENAMO’s lack of political relevance among Nevertheless, should RENAMO become increasingly many Mozambicans due to the party’s inability to make frustrated in its campaign, and should the diplomatic and the transition from a guerrilla movement to an effective political avenues to achieve its objectives remain limited, political party with a resonating ideological agenda. there is a possibility the group could increasingly resort to Although the Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM) remains violence as a means of pressing FRELIMO into concessions. relatively small and weak, it is assessed to have the requisite To date, much of RENAMO’s rhetoric has been focused on prowess to nullify any attempted armed campaign launched disrupting strategic rail and road infrastructure, specifically by RENAMO. the EN1 highway and SENA railway line, which are key in transporting coal supplies from Tete province to the port Key dates in Renamo’s recent insurrection of Beira. Given that such transport corridors run through RENAMO strongholds in Sofala province, the possibility of these interests being targeted in insurgent assaults will remain a credible threat in 2014.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 25 Kenya - Was Westgate a sign of things to come?

Kenya will enter 2014 with fresh memories of the three- al-Shabaab had extensive funding, recruiting and training day siege at the Westgate shopping complex in Nairobi networks within Kenya; it also highlighted that the group was in September 2013, which resulted in the deaths of at planning to execute attacks against various targets in Nairobi, least 67 locals and foreign nationals. Many questions specifically high-rise buildings. In the aftermath of the on how members of the Somalia-based al-Shabaab Westgate incident, a classified report compiled by a Kenyan Islamist extremist group were able to execute such intelligence agency also highlighted that it had disrupted at a brutal attack in one of Kenya’s wealthiest and least seven planned large-scale offensives by al-Shabaab most prominent neighbourhoods have still been left in Kenya since 2011, the most recent of which was aimed at unanswered. Moreover, it has raised concerns that disrupting the country’s May 2013 elections. the attack may indicate the start of a more sustained and coordinated armed campaign by al-Shabaab in the The al-Shabaab attack at the Westgate country. shopping centre is not, however, indicative of a tactical evolution in thegroup’s capabilities, nor does it indicate that Kenya‘s Significant terrorist attacks in Nairobi claimed and/or attributed to al-Shabaab major commercial centres are since 2011 at risk of a sustained armed campaign by the extremist group. On the contrary, the Westgate attack was more likely a result of a combination of complacency by Kenyan security authorities and growing desperation by al- Shabaab to garner relevance amid a spate of infighting and territorial losses the group has been experiencing in neighbouring Somalia. However, what the incident does highlight is that Kenya will be at risk of further al- Shabaab incursions as long as the country continues to conduct military operations in southern Somalia - and if its domestic security forces become complacent. With the Kenyan government stating it would not withdraw from Somalia despite the Westgate attack, the threat of terrorism in Kenya Source: Map data ©2013 Google will remain a feature of the country’s security environment in 2014. Although the three-day siege of the Westgate shopping However, as was witnessed prior to the siege, complex caught many by surprise, red24 had highlighted al-Shabaab’s Kenya-based operations will in both its 2012 and 2013 threat forecasts that Kenya, likely remain relatively unsophisticated and particularly its major urban centres of Nairobi and opportunistic in nature. The threat posed by the Mombasa, were susceptible to significant terrorist group will remain most elevated in areas incursions by al-Shabaab. Indeed, since Kenya first bordering Somalia, specifically the urban centres of conducted cross-border military operations in southern Wajir, Mandera, Dadaab and Garissa. In Nairobi, the city’s Somalia in October 2011, al-Shabaab has threatened to predominantly Somali Eastleigh neighbourhood is also execute reprisals in Kenya. While such warnings were assessed as being susceptible to further low-impact subsequently supported by a number of actual incidents, terrorist attacks. However, another mass casualty al-Shabaab’s operations prior to the Westgate siege attack cannot be completely discounted in 2014. If such an were generally limited to small-scale gun and/or grenade incident does occur, the city of Mombasa could also be attacks against isolated state interests. Nonetheless, signs susceptible, given indications that al-Shabaab has that the group had the capability and intent to launch mass increasing support and assets in that city. Shopping malls, casualty attacks against high-value targets in Kenya were hotels, restaurants and other public venues will continue to evident. A UN report released in 2012 warned that serve as high-value targets.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 26 Kidnapping

Estimates suggest that more than 70 percent of kidnappings Introduction are not reported due to inadequate law enforcement and judicial systems, coupled with the fear of retaliation by the Kidnapping poses a perpetrators or police collusion. As a result, official statistics direct threat to business have also failed to fully represent the scale of the kidnapping and leisure travellers threat globally. red24 estimates that approximately 33,000 globally. Kidnapping, in its kidnappings for ransom took place in 2013, while thousands variant forms, continued to be of abductions in response to various other motivations also recorded at high incident occurred. Although this number remained relatively steady rates in numerous regions from 2012, the scope, spread and motivation of abductions of the world in 2013. As have fluctuated. However, a trend towards an increase in outlined in red24’s 2013 express kidnappings globally has been identified. Threat Forecast, high- and Frances Nobes Global Risk Analyst extreme-risk destinations, such as Mexico, Venezuela, Definitions Nigeria, Iraq, Pakistan and the Sahel/Sahara region Economic kidnapping: Economic kidnapping or (specifically in Mauritania, Mali, southern Algeria, extortion involves the demanding of a monetary ransom southern Libya and Niger) had elevated threat levels (or ransom in the form of valuable property or goods) for both local and foreign nationals. The ongoing civil to obtain a financial advantage or influence business war in Syria also contributed to an elevated threat and decisions. number of kidnap incidents, including nationals of regional and Western states. In some bordering states, Political or ideological kidnapping: The objective particularly Lebanon, conflict and insecurity spillover may be to highlight a particular grievance, to create or translated into a heightened kidnap threat level and reinforce an atmosphere of insecurity, to seek associated increase in incidents. publicity or to influence decisions by governments or other official or large organisations and entities. In the Americas, Mexico recorded its highest number of Such kidnappings are usually carried out by militant/ kidnappings in 16 years in 2013; Venezuela also continued separatist groups with a political or religious agenda. to experience an incline in the number of reported events. Central and Southern America also experienced an upward Custodial kidnapping: These are kidnappings trend in the number of express kidnappings in particular. where the hostage and/or offenders are connected by In Europe, the threat of kidnapping generally remains low domestic or family arrangements. overall; however, socio-economic pressures are anticipated to result in further abductions in certain areas in Tiger kidnapping: This type of kidnapping takes place 2014. Conflict-affected regions, such as south east Turkey to facilitate another criminal act, typically to enable and the North Caucasus, will continue to pose an ongoing the acquisition of particular goods in the course of a direct risk to foreign nationals and locals alike. Kidnapping robbery. They tend to be fast-moving, lasting no more in general in Asia remained largely confined to traditional than 24 to 48 hours. hotspot countries, including India, Pakistan, Philippines and Afghanistan; China continues to experience a growing Express kidnapping: The hostage is seized for a number of incidents motivated by various reasons from relatively short period of time, just long enough to ransom demands to labour disputes. obtain some concession or financial gain. This form of kidnapping usually involves victims being held 2013 kidnappings by region temporarily while they are forced to withdraw money or hand over PIN details so that money can be withdrawn from ATMs.

Virtual kidnapping: In a virtual kidnapping, a demand is made but there is no actual hostage-taking. The demand is made on the pretext of a person (often a relative) having been abducted. Success depends on the victim being unable to prove or disprove the well- being of the purported hostage until the ransom has been paid.

Extortion: The obtaining of property, including goods, money and favours/privileges from another induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or As continues to be the case, a persistent challenge fear, or under the pretence of official right. within the field of kidnap analysis is the poor reporting rate.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 27 Global kidnapping hotspots Philippines: The elevated kidnap risk stemming from militant and criminal groups will likely remain unchanged Areas considered by red24 to be the primary kidnapping in 2014. The western half of the southern Mindanao hotspots around the globe. The list includes states where region and the Sulu Archipelago are expected to remain the the risks are particularly elevated for foreign nationals. primary kidnapping hotspots.

Mexico: Recorded highest kidnapping rate for 16 years in Europe 2013. Extortion, as well as kidnapping, is a considerable threat, with Tamaulipas, Michoacan, Guerrero, Tabasco and The threat of kidnapping remains low in most Morelos states recording the highest number of incidents. European countries, particularly across Western Europe, with comparatively few incidents being reported compared to Nigeria: Some estimates suggest that in the first half of other regions across the globe. However, the low rating does 2013, Nigeria accounted for more than 25 percent of all not imply the absence of abductions and increased threat kidnappings globally and 70 percent of all incidents in levels are present in some key areas, including Greece, Africa. red24 anticipates that Nigeria will experience an Turkey and the Balkans. escalation of incidents in 2014, with criminal and Islamist groups using kidnapping as a form of finance and means of The ongoing economic difficulties being faced across applying political pressure. Europe are considered a credible motive for kidnappings and have translated into a number of incidents, The Sahel: The vast Sahel region will continue to pose particularly of high-net-worth persons in areas such as Greece, an elevated kidnap threat and experience numerous a country which is facing a severe economic crisis. Continued incidents in 2014. This is particularly prevalent in Mauritania, socio-economic tensions will continue to place pressure on Mali, southern Algeria, southern Libya and Niger. Islamist criminals and crime groups who may increasingly turn to extremists will pose the greatest threat and the overall risk kidnapping to meet financial ends in 2014. will be exacerbated by economic and social difficulties across the region. Established kidnap criminal groups and militant organisations will continue to account for the Pakistan: The kidnap threat to foreign nationals from majority of reported incidents. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Islamist militant and organised criminal groups will remain People’s Party (PKK) poses an ongoing direct threat in the elevated, particularly in certain high-risk areas. These south east of the country. The group has carried out numerous include Karachi, the north west tribal areas, western kidnappings recently despite ongoing peace initiatives parts of Balochistan province and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with the government. The primary targets of these groups are province. However, the vast majority of incidents will continue contractors and engineers of predominantly local extraction to involve locals. who work in the areas bordering Iraq and Syria. The PKK has desisted from abducting foreign nationals for fear of Afghanistan: 2013 witnessed a continuation of the negative international response to its wider political goals. kidnapping of foreign nationals, particularly those The PKK, and other Kurdish separatist militants, is likely engaging in projects linked to Western NGOs and to continue using kidnapping as a political tool in 2014. local and foreign military interests. The potential security Elsewhere in Turkey, estimates place the number of vacuum, which could be created in Afghanistan after the kidnappings per day at 25. The majority of these are withdrawal of international forces, could lead to an increased motivated by family feuds, custodial kidnappings and kidnapping risk in the country. personal disputes. Yemen: Yemen is expected to remain insecure and politically unstable in 2014, allowing non-state armed Europe’s distribution of incidents relative to the rest of groups (tribes and Islamist militants) a space within which to the world coordinate abductions of foreign nationals and locals.

Syria: The civil war has resulted in a proliferation of armed groups of various ideologies and motivations. The kidnapping risk to both locals and foreign nationals motivated by political, religious and financial concerns will remain extreme in 2014.

Somalia: Somalia continues to experience high kidnapping incident rates. However, the decreasing number of piracy incidents off the coast has led to a slight decrease in overall figures. The country will remain a hotspot for kidnappings in 2014.

Venezuela: An increasing kidnap incident rate speaks to Organised criminal groupings remain strong across Europe. a deteriorating security environment that is likely to remain These groups have utilised kidnap for ransom in the past; unchanged in 2014. red24 estimates as many as 2,000 however, the current trend is thought to be more towards incidents may have taken place in 2013.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 28 extortion. This state of affairs is particularly apparent in A positive development in 2013, however, was the Eastern Europe, where there is a palpable culture of reported decrease in kidnappings in Colombia; this organised crime within systems with weak law marked the continuation of a general downward trend in enforcement. Extortion and racketeering continue to be kidnappings in that country in recent years. The Colombian common in countries with a significant organised crime Ministry of Defense has claimed that in 2013, the number of element such as Russia and other former Soviet Union kidnappings reduced by 8 percent, with 219 incidents countries, as well as in Italy and the Balkans, including being reported. However, the actual figure is likely to be Greece. considerably higher due to the significant underreporting of incidents in the country. Much of the decrease can be explained by the continued reduction on the part of the militant Hotspot - Russia Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to engage in kidnapping activity. It is unlikely that FARC, which is in In 2013, Russia experienced a number of kidnappings; peace talks with the government, will renege on a 2012 however, these largely occurred in larger cities such as commitment to stop abducting civilians; however, one or two St Petersburg and Moscow. The main perpetrators were isolated cases are expected. A more credible concern that criminal syndicates. Their main targets included Russian could reverse the downward kidnapping trend is the activity nationals (businesspeople) for financial reward. Foreign of the bacrim organised crime groups. These groups have nationals that were targeted also tended to be business personnel rather than tourists or other visitors. Business shown the motivation and capability to use kidnapping as personnel targeted in kidnappings were also generally a revenue-generating mechanism. The increasing role of already subject to other threats, such as demands for the militant National Liberation Army (ELN) in abductions of protection money from syndicates; this trend is likely to both locals and foreign nationals will also affect the overall continue through 2014. kidnap risk profile of Colombia.

The North Caucasus, specifically areas outside of main The Central and South America region will most likely see cities in the Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and a continued high risk of kidnapping in 2014, with express Kabardino-Balkaria regions, is considered an area with kidnapping remaining a prominent threat to both local and an elevated kidnap risk. Militant groups and organised criminal organisations pose a direct threat to locals and foreign foreign nationals. Apart from Mexico, North America and nationals. The majority of militant-related recent incidents parts of the Caribbean remain low- to medium-risk kidnap have affected locals, particularly prominent persons, and were environments; the threat to foreign visitors is considered politically motivated. Concerns also persist that kidnap activity largely negligible. by crime or militant groups may increase ahead of and during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, located near the North Distribution of incidents in the Americas relative to the Caucasus; however, pervasive security will likely mitigate the threat towards foreign nationals in the city during the Games. rest of the world

Americas

Large parts of South and Central America continued to experience high kidnapping rates in 2013. The crime was particularly prevalent in Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico. Incidents of the growingly pervasive threat of express kidnapping were once again commonplace throughout the region. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the cities of Buenos Aires (Argentina), Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo (Brazil), La Paz (Bolivia), Quito (Ecuador), Mexico City (Mexico), Caracas (Venezuela) and Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula (Honduras) were again some of the worst affected by this form of short-term Hotspot - Mexico abduction. Kidnapping in Venezuela remained a prominent concern. The majority of cases in the first ten The number of kidnappings reported from January to June months of 2013 (approximately one-third) continued to take 2013 was the highest recorded since statistics began place in the capital, Caracas; the state of Miranda was ranked tracking the crime in 1997. Over 750 kidnappings were second, accounting for approximately 22 percent of reported, indicating an 8 percent increase on 2012 figures for the same period. These numbers are assumed to be grossly cases. The remainder took place in rural areas, mainly under representative (some agencies attest to a 99 percent near the country’s border with Colombia, as well as in other non-reporting rate), but the trend is indicative of prevailing urban centres. The recording of kidnappings in Venezuela is insecurity, which allows for kidnappings to proliferate. inconsistent and absolute numbers may be misleading; however, red24 estimates that as many as 2,000 incidents took place in 2013.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 29 Middle East and North Africa operations over the near-term. The low number of incidents affecting foreign nationals is mostly due to elevated security measures around foreign interests and should not be This region has witnessed a considerable increase in the viewed as a decrease in the threat, which remains high in number of kidnappings affecting locals and foreign nationals most areas of the country. in 2013. The increase in numbers and spread of the threat have been, in part, due to ongoing conflict and political Although locals will continue to be targeted for instability that have affected key parts of the region since abduction more frequently, incidents affecting foreign 2011, specifically North Africa and the Levant. The high nationals in some key hotspot areas are extremely incident numbers and growing threat are expected to be likely, given the larger ransom payments that can be replicated in existing kidnap hotspots and newly emerging demanded when compared to locals. In some areas high- and extreme-risk areas through 2014. ransom demands as high as US$10 million per hostage are made. Nevertheless, political instability, general In 2013, kidnappings were widely reported in the North insecurity and poor law enforcement will fuel criminality African states of Algeria, Libya and Egypt, in the and kidnapping for both financial, personal, sectarian and southern Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, in the Levant states of political motivation in 2014. Lebanon and Syria, and in Iraq. Key trends can be assessed within each of these specific regions. In Algeria, the In Amenas crisis in the southern desert region on 16 MENA’s distribution of incidents relative to the rest of January 2013, which led to a hostage-taking involving the world dozens of foreign nationals and hundreds of locals, vividly highlighted the underlying threat at strategic oil and gas facilities in North Africa from Islamist militants. Militants also persisted with the abduction for ransom of locals across the north and north east of the country. The threat from these militants continued to reverberate elsewhere in the region, including in Libya and in Tunisia to a lesser extent, where Islamist extremist groups grew in prominence. The majority of cases outside of Algeria in North Africa occurred in Libya and affected local officials or prominent locals. The identity of the perpetrators remained unclear in many cases; however, some incidents were carried out by political opponents and militia groups. The rising insecurity in Libya and Tunisia may translate into a number of abductions involving foreign nationals in 2014. A repeat of the In Amenas siege is also a persistent concern for persons involved in the oil and gas industry across North Africa. Hotspot - Syria

The correlation between insecurity (conflict and civil Although exact figures are difficult to ascertain, it is estimated unrest) and an increase in kidnapping rates was starkly that thousands of people have been kidnapped in Syria since the start of the civil war in 2011. Kidnappings are undertaken evident in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Egypt’s for various reasons including personal disputes, revenge, restive Sinai Peninsula emerged as a primary kidnap intimidation, sectarian tensions, ransom to fund activities hotspot in the first half of 2013 with disaffected tribesmen in and in response to abduction of kin or colleagues (tit-for-tat the area implicated in a number of short-term abductions of kidnappings). Locals have predominantly fallen victim to tourists and local officials. In Syria, elevated conflict levels kidnapping in Syria; however, nationals of nearby regional and the abundance of non-state armed groups resulted in a states, including Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and Iran, have been noticeable spike in kidnappings for ransom of foreign targeted by non-state armed groups. Non-regional foreign nationals and locals alike. This insecurity also nationals, particularly journalists, have been specifically negatively impacted its neighbour Lebanon, where a spate targeted in Syria due to their high ransom worth. Some estimates place final settlements as high as US$600,000. of conflict-related abductions were reported throughout These hostages have also been used as a means to garner 2013 in the country’s eastern Bekaa Valley. Elsewhere, political concessions. Yemen remained a high-risk kidnapping destination with at least 20 foreign nationals being abducted in 2013. Kidnapping groups have increasingly targeted the These kidnappings were largely conducted by tribal wealthy Syrian business class and ordinary civilians. groups to gain local concessions and, to a lesser but Estimates place average ransom values of locals between increasing extent, by militants aligned to US$2,000 and US$20,000. Finally, the threat of kidnapping al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to permeate neighbouring countries, specifically in and Ansar al-Sharia for political and financial eastern Lebanon. This threat is likely to remain extreme in Syria for the medium-term, with the ongoing conflict providing motivations. In Iraq, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the an environment of insecurity in which a kidnapping group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other militant can thrive. Furthermore, due to the sectarian motivations of organisations persisted with kidnapping locals for some kidnappings, even the removal of President Bashar al- ransom to finance their respective insurgencies against the Assad and negotiations may not lead to a direct cessation of state. Mosul and Kirkuk emerged as key kidnap hotspots kidnappings in the country. and are likely to remain so as AQI attempts to expand its

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 30 Asia threat of unlawful detention and extortion, particularly those dealing with Chinese companies in which government officials have considerable interests. Due to the lack of India, Pakistan, Philippines, Afghanistan and China effective oversight or access to legal recourse, aggrieved continued to experience a high number of kidnapping parties, such as factory workers, may also detain business incidents in 2013. India had one of the highest personnel if they feel their interests are threatened. numbers of recorded incidents with 45,000 cases reported; however, these figures almost exclusively included locals The vast majority of kidnappings and highest threats in and were primarily motivated by tribal/ethnic disputes, 2014 will exist in the above-mentioned countries. Foreign forced marriages and labour, rape, financial incentives nationals face low- to medium-risk kidnapping environments and prostitution. However, the kidnapping of two British in other states such as Japan, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, nationals of Sri Lankan descent in the relatively secure Thailand and the Central Asian and Oceania states; city of Chennai in May 2013 indicated and continues to kidnapping in such areas will remain a nominal concern. highlight that a threat (albeit limited) to foreign nationals exists. In Pakistan, a large number of political, ideological and financially motivated incidents were Asia Pacific’s distribution of incidents relative to the also reported; however, like India, these mainly affected rest of the world locals. Unlike India, however, the overall threat to foreign nationals in Pakistan is assessed to be higher.

The threat of kidnapping for ransom facing locals and foreign nationals in the Philippines remained elevated in 2013, with most incidents perpetrated by militant organisations, specifically in the western half of the southern Mindanao region and the Sulu Archipelago. Isolated incidents were also attributed to criminal groupings elsewhere in the country, including in Manila. The most prominent militant grouping conducting kidnappings was Abu Sayyaf. The group is responsible for numerous abductions of tourists, foreign workers and locals with estimates placing its earnings from kidnapping, since the group’s inception in 1991, at more than US$35 million. A secondary threat stems from splinter groups with loose affiliations to the New People’s Army (NPA), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). These Hotspot - Pakistan splinter groups have largely been implicated in incidents targeting locals. The kidnap threat to foreign nationals in Pakistan continues to be assessed as elevated due to the presence of The presence of numerous militant and criminal groupings numerous and well-resourced Islamist/anti-Western non-state armed groups and criminal organisations. Islamist groups in and local militias, as well as a weak central government, particular specifically targeted Westerners. The threat in continue to translate into an elevated kidnap threat to Pakistan from Islamists is particularly acute in the north west foreign nationals in Afghanistan. Foreign nationals tribal areas (where abductors are able to hold victims for continue to be perceived as high-value (political and financial) lengthy periods of time with relative impunity), western parts targets. In 2013, the trend of targeting these individuals, of Balochistan province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and particularly those engaged in projects linked to Western Karachi. non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or foreign and local military interests, persisted. A number of wealthy locals Officials in the city of Karachi reported that there were148 were also targeted by kidnapping groups, although these cases of kidnapping for ransom in the first nine months of 2013, the highest number reported in the city in two incidents were less widely reported. Kabul remains a decades. Average initial ransom demands ranged kidnapping hotspot due to the concentration of wealth and from US$940 to US$2,820. Statistics provided by the foreign personnel in the city. A key development to monitor Citizen Police Liaison Committee also show that 630 in 2014 will be the anticipated withdrawal of international extortion attempts were reported between January military forces and the potential that this could lead to wider and mid-June of 2013, in comparison to 589 reported insecurity and an increased kidnap risk to foreign nationals cases during 2012. In both cases, these are likely to be in the country over the medium-term. underestimations of the true crime rates within the city, but do offer anecdotal evidence regarding the ongoing threat of China continues to witness a number of kidnap for both kidnap and extortion. ransom incidents annually, according to anecdotal sources (the country does not retain official statistics on this crime). It is known, however, that the main targets are usually wealthy Chinese nationals, who are largely targeted for ransom. Foreign nationals face a more credible

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 31 Africa

Kidnapping remained a credible security Africa’s distribution of incidents relative to the rest of concern across many parts of Africa in 2013 and will the world continue to pose a threat in 2014. The Sahel-Sahara region continued to serve as a high-risk area for both politically and financially motivated abductions. Akin to the proliferation of terrorism within the region, assailants exploited factors such as political instability, porous borders and limited law enforcement structures, as a means of perpetrating abductions. Although the number of foreign nationals targeted in such operations was lower compared to 2012, the past year saw some foreign governments increasingly resorting to ransom payments to secure the release of hostages. Following the abduction of a French family by suspected Boko Haram operatives in northern Cameroon in February 2013, authorities secured their release within a matter of weeks by purportedly paying a ransom of approximately US$3 million. On 30 October, French authorities allegedly paid US$27 million to al- Hotspot - Nigeria Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for the release of four French hostages who were seized from a According to some estimates, in the first half of 2013, Nigeria uranium mining site in Arlit, Niger, in 2010. France’s had the most kidnappings globally, accounting for 25 percent decision to make ransom payments has raised concerns that of recorded incidents and 70 percent of all kidnappings in kidnapping could proliferate across the region. Africa. While the Niger Delta, particularly the states of Rivers, Anambra, Edo and Delta, remains the highest risk for In East Africa, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and kidnapping in the country, incidents are increasingly being Sudan have also continued to experience a high number of reported outside the oil-rich region; these are particularly kidnappings; this is a trend which will most likely prevalent within Nigeria’s largest commercial hub of Lagos, where a number of foreign nationals were abducted in 2013. continue into 2014. Both locals and foreign nationals are Furthermore, concerns that Nigeria-based jihadist groups targeted by kidnapping groups. Indeed, there are concerns would increasingly resort to kidnapping as both a political that groups such as al-Shabaab may increasingly seek to and financing tool were also reinforced in 2013, when Boko target such entities, given that the group’s primary Haram and its affiliates abducted foreign nationals in-country, revenue streams are increasingly being curtailed including in northern regions, and in neighbouring Cameroon. by regionally coordinated anti-crime initiatives. The kidnapping risk in Nigeria will remain significant in 2014. Elsewhere on the continent, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic face a generally medium risk of kidnapping overall, with higher risks in certain areas; these largely stem from non-state armed groups. The threat is exacerbated by weak government authority Piracy and law enforcement, as well as ongoing conflicts. For- eign nationals remain the minority in reported incidents; The overall number of reported piracy incidents at sea however, this state of affairs is predominantly due to the declined in 2013, with some official figures reporting a low presence of foreign nationals. drop of up to 40 percent. Official figures indicate 206 piracy incidents worldwide in 2013; however, these In Southern Africa, Mozambique is increasingly emerging figures may not disclose the full extent of the piracy threat. A as a potential kidnapping hotspot. The capital, Maputo, significant element of this reduction is due to the dramatic and the city of Beira have been experiencing a series of drop in hijackings off the Somali coastline; namely the kidnappings which are primarily targeting resident southern Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and western parts of the business personnel of south Asian and Portuguese Arabian Sea, where only two successful hijackings had descent. Although the threat to short-term visitors is been reported up until December 2013, in comparison to limited at this stage, particularly those visiting resort areas, 14 in 2012. This has largely been attributed to the use of the threat of such a trend developing in 2014 cannot be on-board armed security, international naval operations in discounted. Express kidnapping in other parts of the the area and the disruption of pirate bases in the semi- Southern African Development Community (SADC), autonomous Puntland region by the privately funded particularly South Africa and Zimbabwe, emerged as a paramilitary organisation, Puntland Maritime Police Force. developing new trend. In addition, in South Africa, Indeed, hijackings, both actual and attempted off the Horn recent statistics (April 2012 to March 2013) indicated that of Africa, have dropped to such an extent that in terms of hundreds of kidnappings in the country were mainly incident numbers, it has been overtaken by the Gulf of concentrated around major urban centres in the Western Guinea, whose waters have been the most dangerous for Cape, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal; the majority of cases seafarers in 2013. involved locals and were likely motivated by familial and other personal disputes.

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 32 2013 Piracy incidents (by region and type) carry out smaller-scale attacks. In the Caribbean and Latin America, onshore dynamics continue to remain much the same, and thus the offshore risk to seafarers is likely to remain generally unchanged.

Hotspot - Gulf of Guinea

The Gulf of Guinea became the pre-eminent piracy hotspot in the world in 2012, surpassing the Horn of Africa’s coastal waters, which were long regarded as the most dangerous for seafarers. Initially confined to the waterways and estuaries of Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region, maritime attacks by Gulf of Guinea pirates are increasing in both frequency and scope, a trend which is likely to continue in 2014. The groups The South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, responsible for piracy in this region are largely affiliated particularly in the vicinity of lesser policed Indonesian in some form with militant groups such as the Niger Delta islands in the southern approach to the passage, Vigilantes, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and remnants of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger accounted for the majority of piracy incidents in 2013. Delta. While accurate statistics on the piracy phenomenon This is part of an ongoing trend which has seen a rise in within the region remain difficult to ascertain, the International piracy incidents since 2009, and is expected to Maritime Organization (IMO) estimated that as many as 50 continue into 2014. However, the vast majority were low-level attacks are being reported in the region on an annual basis. incidents of theft and armed robbery from vessels and crew rather than full-scale hijacking of vessels and kidnapping of crew as seen in the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Guinea – Hijacking hotspot Horn of Africa. Some evidence suggests that the attacks are becoming better coordinated as a number of organised criminal elements have added piracy to their range of other illegal activities. In addition, two incidents have raised concerns about intelligence-led operations carried out by pirates operating in the region. In October and November, two vessels were temporarily hijacked while pirates transferred the vessels’ cargo of marine gas/ oil to their own tankers, indicating they had knowledge of the vessels’ cargo and itinerary.

A number of piracy incidents were also reported in the Caribbean and Latin America, including off the coasts Source: Map data ©2013 Google of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador. These incidents targeted both leisure and cargo ships, including the Since 2006, piracy has rapidly expanded beyond the holding of at least three foreign-owned oil ships in Niger Delta and increasingly occurred in the territorial disputed waters off the coast of Venezuela in October waters of neighbouring countries such as Benin, 2013. The vast majority of these involved the boarding Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Togo. of vessels rather than their hijacking, although However, maritime attacks in the aforementioned armed robberies have ended in fatalities when crew countries were generally opportunistic and limited to low- members resisted their attackers. Incidents such as level robberies, while vessel hijackings remained limited to these have occurred in popular leisure cruising waters off the coast of Nigeria. Since late 2011, the trend areas which experience considerable levels of changed with vessel seizures reported off the coasts of crime onshore, including on Isla Margarita, off the Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Togo and Cote d’Ivoire. Venezuelan coast. Regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of The coming year is unlikely to see piracy dynamics change Central African States (ECCAS) are in the process of considerably; ongoing efforts to improve the security developing the institutions required to address the situation onshore in the Puntland region will continue to piracy threat. However, concerns pertaining to the funding, have the desired effect off the Horn of Africa. In the Gulf coordination and enforcement of such initiatives have of Guinea, poverty, insecurity in the Niger Delta and a already been raised regarding similar initiatives in the lack of a coordinated approach to tackle this issue among Gulf of Guinea. Furthermore, even in the presence of affected states will see it continue to escalate. In the Strait internationally backed and regionally coordinated anti- of Malacca region, the Changi Command and Control piracy initiatives, a failure to address the key socio- Centre (located in Singapore) has brought together com- economic and political concerns in the Niger Delta will mand and communication efforts of Singapore, Malaysia likely see piracy remain a feature of the Gulf of Guinea’s and Indonesia to create an effective regional anti-piracy security environment in 2014. body. However, the latter’s inability to adequately provide law and order in areas such as the Anambas Islands will provide ample cover from which pirates will continue to

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 33 General events calendar 2014

A list of significant global events that may have an impact on security and travel in 2014.

January

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Elevated threat of Sudan Revolutionary Front 1 Sudan Independence Day (SRF)-led rebel attacks; possibility of anti- government protests in major urban centres

Elevated Islamist terrorist threat against Christian Coptic Christmas (Orthodox Christianity) 7 Egypt/Lebanon interests

9 Philippines Feast of the Black Nazarene (Christianity) Large-scale procession in Manila’s Quiapo district

Large-scale gathering in Tongi, north of Dhaka; 10 Bangladesh Biswa Ijtema (Islam) travel disruptions and increased security amid terrorist threat

Memorial events and possible service delivery Anniversary of 2010 earthquake 12 Haiti protests in Port-au-Prince and elsewhere

Afghanistan/ Increased security amid elevated countrywide 13-14 Eid Milad-un-nabi/ Mawlid (Islam) Pakistan terrorist threat

Political protests anticipated in urban centres, Anniversary of 2011 resignation of Ben Ali 14 Tunisia including Tunis

Elevated threat of rebel attacks in northern regions 20 Mali Armed Forces Day of Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu; possibility of anti-government protests in major urban centres Increased security amid possible terrorist threat 24-31 Ethiopia AU Summit stemming from domestic and transnational extremist groups

Pro- and anti-government protests anticipated in January 25 Revolution Day 25 Egypt main cities and towns

Commemorative events in urban centres Republic Day 26 India countrywide amid heightened security

30 Jan East and South Increased demand for transport and business - Spring festival (Lunar New Year) 5 Feb East Asia disruptions anticipated Commemorative marches in Londonderry and UK (Northern 30 Bloody Sunday Anniversary elsewhere in Northern Ireland amid threat of Ireland) sectarian violence

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 34 February

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Elevated threat of terrorist attacks by FDLR Hutu Heroes Day 1 Rwanda militia, particularly in Kigali

Elevated threat of militant attacks by RENAMO in Heroes Day 3 Mozambique Sofala province amid political tensions

Commemorative events and associated travel Independence Day 4 Sri Lanka disruptions in Colombo and elsewhere

Elevated threat of rebel attacks by separatist Liberation Day 4 Angola groups operating in the Cabinda enclave

Increased security measures countrywide for 7-23 Russia Olympic Winter Games in Sochi duration of the event due to elevated threat of terrorism and protests

Commemorative events and anti-Western Anniversary of 1979 Islamic Revolution 10 Iran protests countrywide

Pro- and anti-government demonstrations Anniversary of 2011 resignation of Ben Ali 11 Egypt anticipated

Commemorative events in Sanaa and other primary Anniversary of start of 2011 uprising 11 Yemen cities; anti-government/separatist events in south

Anniversary of 2008 assassination of Imad Commemorative events in Hezbollah-dominated 12 Lebanon Mughniyah areas in southern Beirut, as well as south and east Lebanon Anniversary of Dresden bombing during Second Far-right demonstrations to take place amid 13 Germany World War increased police deployment and counter- demonstrations by anti-fascist groups

Commemorative rallies expected in Beirut amid Anniversary of 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri 14 Lebanon elevated security

Increase in anti-government political protests Anniversary of start of 2011 uprising 14 Bahrain anticipated in Shiite Muslim areas

Anniversary of the capture of PKK co-founder, Protests and demonstrations by pro-Kurdish 15 Turkey Abdullah Ocalan groups; possibility of low-level violence, particularly in Istanbul and south eastern cities

Commemorative events and rallies, increased Anniversary of start of 2011 uprising 17 Libya security in response to terrorism threat

Commemorative events in Pristina and majority 17 Kosovo Independence Day Albanian areas; protests and low-level violence possible in Serb-dominated northern municipalities

Anniversary of start of 2011 pro-reform Pro-reform demonstrations possible in major 20 Morocco demonstrations cities

Hindu-Muslim tensions elevated; possibility of 27 India Anniversary of Gujarat riots communal violence, particularly in Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh states

Anniversary of 2004 ousting of Jean-Bertrand Politically motivated protests possible in Port-au- 28 Haiti Aristide Prince

Official festivities; likely travel disruptions and Start of various carnivals 28 South America marginal increase in crime threat

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 35 March

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Commemorative events expected countrywide; 2 Ethiopia Victory at Adwa Day likely to be concentrated in the capital, Addis Ababa

Commemorative events likely countrywide; some Anniversary of Chavez’s death 5 Venezuela gatherings may be highly politically charged

Heightened security measures countrywide for 7-16 Russia Paralympic Winter Games in Sochi duration of the event due to elevated threat of terrorism and protests Increased security in Tibet and elevated risk of 10 China Tibetan National Uprising Day clashes between Tibetan protesters and security forces Increase in anti-government political protests Anniversary of 2011 GCC military intervention 14 Bahrain anticipated in Shiite Muslim areas

Commemorative events and protests possible, 15 Hungary Revolution Day particularly in Budapest; travel and business disruptions anticipated Increased security and possible closure of Purim (Judaism) 16 Israel Palestinian territories

19 Iraq Anniversary of 2003 US invasion Elevated threat of terrorist attacks

Commemorative events and increased security 21 Iran/Turkey Nevruz/Norooz (Persian New Year) likely in south east Turkey; transport and business disruptions anticipated in Iran Pro- and anti-government demonstrations 22 Mali Anniversary of coup anticipated; elevated threat of rebel attacks in northern regions

Increased security in urban centres amid elevated Pakistan (Republic) Day 23 Pakistan threat of terrorist incursion

Threat of attacks by pro-Bozize militias, specifically Central African 24 Anniversary of Seleka’s capture of Bangui in Ouham prefecture as well as pro-Bozize areas Republic of Bangui, including the Boy-Rabe area Commemorative events, mainly in Minsk; 25 Belarus Dzen Voli/Freedom Day possible protests against the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko

Commemorative events in urban centres; Independence Day 26 Bangladesh anti-government protests possible

Elevated threat of rebel attacks in northern regions, Martyr’s Day/Democracy day 26 Mali particularly Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu

Protests and general instances of civil Day of the Youth Combatant 29 Chile disturbances anticipated, particularly in Santiago

Anniversary of founding of New People’s Army Increased security expected countrywide amid 29 Philippines (NPA) elevated threat of NPA attacks

30 Israel Land Day Pro-Palestinian protests anticipated

India/Nepal/ 31 Hindi and Telugu (Ugadi) New Year Commemorative events throughout the region Sri Lanka

Increased security and transport disruptions likely Nyepi/Balinese New Year 31 Indonesia on Bali

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 36 April

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Protests possible outside British interests in 2 Argentina Malvinas Day Buenos Aires amid heightened tensions pertaining to the ownership of the Falkland Islands

Elevated threat of terrorist attacks by FDLR Hutu Genocide Memorial Day 7 Rwanda militia, including in Kigali

Elevated threat of armed attacks/protests by 11 Cote d’Ivoire Anniversary of Laurent Gbagbo’s capture Gbagbo sympathisers in Abidjan and western regions

11 Venezuela Anniversary of 2002 coup Commemorative events anticipated countrywide

Anti-government protests anticipated; likely to 12 Swaziland Anniversary of the banning of political parties focus on major urban centres, including Manzini, Mbabane, Nhlangano and Siteki

Increased ethnic tensions expected with possible Anniversary of 2012 Skopje killings 12 Macedonia protests by ethnic Albanians and/or Macedonians

South East 13-15 South East Asian New Year (Water festivals) Commemorative events throughout the region Asia Commemorative events in Sri Lanka and India/ 14 Tamil New Year southern India amid increased security in major Sri Lanka urban centres

Increased security and possible closure of Passover (Judaism) 15-21 Israel Palestinian territories

Bangladesh/ 15 Bengali New Year Commemorative events countrywide India

17 Brazil International Day of Peasant Struggles Increase in political protests anticipated

Elevated Islamist terrorist threat against Christian Easter (Christianity) 18-20 Egypt/Lebanon interests

Anti-government protests anticipated; likely to 19 Swaziland King’s birthday focus on major urban centres, including Manzini, Mbabane, Nhlangano and Siteki

Heightened security expected following 2013 Boston Marathon 21 United States bombing; travel disruptions also anticipated

23 Nepal Second Democracy Day Commemorative events countrywide

Commemorative events in Armenia and protests 24 Armenia Anniversary of 1915 ‘Armenian genocide’ by the Armenian diaspora aimed at Turkish interests worldwide

Elevated threat of terrorist attacks in North Sinai Sinai Liberation Day 25 Egypt region

Tanzania Increased threat of violent unrest by separatist 26 Union Day (Zanzibar) Islamist groups in Zanzibar archipelago

28 Afghanistan Mujahideen Victory Day Elevated threat of terrorism

29 Japan Golden Week Countrywide transport and business disruptions

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 37 May

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Large-scale labour-related rallies and protests May Day/Labour Day 1 Global globally

Increased security throughout the US and at US Anniversary of the killing of Osama bin Laden 2 Global interests worldwide

Increased security amid possible terrorist threat, Patriots Victory Day 5 Ethiopia particularly at security facilities in Addis Ababa

Opposition-led protests likely in Moscow and 6 Russia Anniversary of 2012 Bolotnaya Square unrest possibly elsewhere both on and around the anniversary

Increased security and possible closure of Independence Day 6 Israel Palestinian territories

Belarus/Russia/ Large-scale military parades in Minsk, Moscow 9 Victory Day Ukraine and Kiev Anti-Israel protests anticipated in Hezbollah- 12 Lebanon Resistance and Liberation Day dominated areas in southern Beirut, as well as south and east Lebanon Transport and business disruptions in Thailand, 14* Asia Vesak (Buddha’s ‘birthday’) Cambodia, Myanmar, Bhutan and Sri Lanka, among others

Increase in pro-Palestinian demonstrations and Nakba Day 15 Levant anti-Israel protests anticipated

Elevated threat of rebel attacks and protests SPLA Day 16 South Sudan possible in urban centres

Transport disruptions anticipated amid Sanja Matsuri festival (Shinto) 17-19 Japan commemorative events in Tokyo

Commemorative events and anti-government Anniversary of 2010 UDD clashes 19 Thailand protests possible, particularly in Bangkok

23 China Anniversary of the defeat of the Tibetan army Increase in political protests anticipated

Anti-Israel rallies possible in southern Beirut, as South Liberation Day 25 Lebanon well as south and east Lebanon

Heightened security due to marginally elevated 27 Colombia Anniversary of FARC founding threat of terrorism posed by the group on symbolic anniversary

Increased security and possible closure of Jerusalem Day 28 Israel Palestinian territories

Transport and business disruptions anticipated Republic Day 28 Nepal amid heightened security

Elevated terrorism threat stemming from both National Day 28 Ethiopia domestic and transnational groups

Increased security amid threats of counter- Belgrade Pride parade (provisional) 31 Serbia demonstrations and possibility of targeted violence

*14 May and other dates

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 38 June

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Elevated threat of terrorist attacks and agitation, specifically in Mombasa, stemming primarily 1 Madaraka Day Kenya from the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) separatist group

Hong Kong/ 2 Dragon Boat Festival Transport and business disruptions anticipated Macau/Taiwan

Anti-G8 protests in major urban centres G8 Summit 4-5 Russia anticipated, particularly in Moscow

Heightened security expected, particularly in Anniversary of Tiananmen Square massacre 4 China Beijing

5 Levant Naksa Day Pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel protest anticipated

6 India Anniversary of storming of Amritsar Temple Large-scale protests anticipated in Amritsar

Increased security measures countrywide for 12 Brazil Start of FIFA World Cup duration of the event due to numerous security threats

Threat of protests in Antananarivo due to Independence Day 26 Madagascar lingering political tensions

Elevated threat of terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab; 26 Somalia Independence Day Mogadishu and major strategic centres at elevated risk

Large-scale military parade in Baku; Army/Navy Day 26 Azerbaijan opposition-led protests possible

Anti-government protests possible; likely to focus Independence Day 27 Djibouti on the capital, Djibouti

Transport and business disruptions anticipated; Start of Ramadan (Islam) 28 Global elevated threat of terrorism in some countries

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 39 July

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Elevated threat of rebel/terrorist attacks Republic Day 1 Somalia stemming primarily from al-Shabaab

1 Hong Kong Anniversary of 1997 handover Annual large-scale protest rally expected

US (and 4 Independence Day Commemorative events countrywide territories)

Threat of Islamist extremist attacks targeting state Independence Day 5 Algeria interests; opposition protests in places

Increased security and political protests Anniversary of Xinjiang riots 5 China anticipated; unrest possible

Increased security amid threats of counter- 6 Hungary Annual Budapest gay pride parade demonstrations and possibility of targeted violence Elevated threat of rebel attacks, as well as 9 South Sudan Independence Day elevated tensions in the disputed Abyei and Heglig regions

Anniversary of 2010 al-Shabaab bombings in Elevated threat of terrorist incursions by 11 Uganda Kampala al-Shabaab, particularly in Addis Ababa

Peak of the annual marching season in Northern UK (Northern Ireland; marches and counter-demonstrations in 12 The ‘Twelfth’ march Ireland) Belfast and elsewhere amid threat of sectarian violence

14 Iraq Republic Day Elevated threat of terrorism

Afghanistan/ Elevated threat of terrorist attacks against Shiite 19 Imam Ali Martyrdom Iraq/Pakistan Muslims; increased security anticipated

Commemorative events possible; heightened Martyrs’ Day 19 Myanmar security anticipated amid elevated terrorist threat

Increase in pro- and anti-government protests Revolution Day 23 Egypt anticipated

Political protests expected to coincide with Independence Day 26 Maldives commemorative events in major urban centres

27 Global End of Ramadan (Islam) Transport and business disruptions anticipated

28 Jul - India Martyrs week Transport and business disruptions anticipated 3 Aug

Elevated threat of terrorist attacks; transport and Eid al-Fitr (Islam) 28 Global business disruptions anticipated

Commemorative events expected in Juba; Martyrs’ Day 30 South Sudan elevated threat of rebel attacks

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 40 August

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Marches and counter-demonstrations in UK (Northern 11 Relief of Derry parade Londonderry and elsewhere amid threat of Ireland) sectarian violence Threat of attacks by pro-Bozize militias, specifically Central African 13 Independence Day in Ouham prefecture as well as pro-Bozize areas Republic of Bangui, including the Boy-Rabe area

14 Pakistan Independence Day Elevated threat of terrorism

15 Bangladesh National Mourning Day Increased security amid elevated threat of unrest

Pro-Kurdish rallies anticipated amid increased Anniversary of first PKK attacks in 1984 15 Turkey security, particularly in Siirt and Hakkari provinces

15 India Independence Day Elevated threat of terrorist attacks

Commemorative events and possible anti- Independence Day 17 Indonesia government protests

Commemorative events throughout the region; Krishna Janmashtami/Sri Jayanti (Hinduism) 17 South Asia elevated threat of militant attacks

19 Afghanistan Independence Day Elevated threat of militant assaults

Commemorative rallies anticipated amid threat of Anniversary of 2011 Battle of Tripoli 20 Libya violence by supporters of former regime

Large-scale festivities in London; increased threat Notting Hill Festival 24-25 UK of petty crime

Commemorative events and possible anti- Independence Day 24 Ukraine government protests

Commemorative events amid increased security, Independence Day 27 Moldova particularly in Chisinau

28 India/Nepal Ganesh Chaturthi (Hinduism) Commemorative events anticipated countrywide

Commemorative events and possible anti- Independence Day 31 Kyrgyzstan government protests

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 41 September

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Commemorative events amid increased Independence Day 1 Uzbekistan security in major urban centres

National Day of Pedestrians and Cyclists in Significant transport disruptions anticipated due 2 Bolivia Defence of Mother Earth to restrictions on motor vehicle access in main urban centres

Union- and opposition-led protests and Thessaloniki International Fair 6-14 Greece demonstrations in Thessaloniki

8 China/East Asia Mid-Autumn festival (Zhongqiu Festival) Transport and business disruptions anticipated

Afghanistan/ 11 Anniversary of terrorist attacks in the US Increase in anti-US protests anticipated Pakistan

Commemorative events amid elevated threat of 11 Chile Anniversary of Pinochet coup violent unrest

Anniversary of the 2006 ousting of former PM, Protests possible in Bangkok and other urban 19 Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra centres 20 Transport disruptions and increased petty crime Sep Start of Oktoberfest - Germany threat in Munich 5 Oct Elevated threat of attacks by al-Shabaab, Anniversary of Westgate Mall attack 21-24 Kenya particularly in Nairobi

Elevated threat of rebel attacks in northern 22 Mali Independence Day regions; political protests possible in Bamako and elsewhere 25 Large-scale festivities amid elevated threat from Sep Navaratri (Hinduism) - South Asia Islamist extremists 3 Oct Increased security and possible closure of Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year) 25 Israel Palestinian territories

Elevated threat of terrorism and separatist September Revolution Day 26 Yemen protests in the south 30 Large-scale festivities amid elevated threat of Sep Durga Puja (Hinduism) - South Asia attack from Islamist extremists 4 Oct

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 42 October

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Elevated threat of Boko Haram attacks, 1 Nigeria Independence Day particularly in the northern states of Adamawa, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau and Yobe

1-8 China National Day/Golden Week Travel and business disruptions anticipated

Travel disruptions anticipated in Jeddah, Hajj pilgrimage (Islam) 2-6 Saudi Arabia Mecca and Medina

3 Iraq National Iraqi Day Increased threat of terrorist attacks

Travel and business disruptions anticipated; Eid al-Adha (Islam) 4-7 Global elevated threat of attacks in some Muslim states

Elevated security and possible closure of Yom Kippur (Judaism) 4 Israel Palestinian territories

Increase in anti-military political protests Armed Forces Day 6 Egypt anticipated

Elevated threat of terrorist attacks and/or anti-US Anniversary of US invasion of Afghanistan 7 Afghanistan protests

Elevated threat of anti-government protests, 9 Uganda Independence Day particularly in Kampala, as well as heightened terrorism threat stemming from al-Shabaab

Transport and business disruptions; protests National Day (Double Ten Day) 10 Taiwan and demonstrations possible

Protests likely by groups who view the day as 12 Americas Columbus Day/Dia de la Raza a reminder of atrocities committed against the region’s indigenous population

Commemorative events and anti-Morocco protests National Unity Day 12 Western Sahara anticipated

Elevated threat of terrorism and separatist Liberation Day 14 Yemen protests in the south

Demonstrations and road blockades anticipated Anniversary of Black October 17 Bolivia outside the US Embassy in La Paz

Commemorative rallies expected amid elevated Anniversary of the capture of Muammar al-Gaddafi 20 Libya threat of violence by supporters of former regime

Elevated threat of terrorist attacks stemming from Mashujaa (Heroes’) day 23-27 Kenya regional and domestic extremist groups

Large-scale festivities amid elevated threat from Diwali (Hinduism) 23 South Asia Islamist extremists

Commemorative events and counter- 25 Hungary Anniversary of 1956 uprising demonstrations anticipated in major urban centres

25 Global Start of Islamic New Year (Muharram) Elevated threat of terrorist incursions in key areas

25 Thailand Anniversary of Tak Bai incident Commemorative events and protests possible

Commemorative events countrywide; anti- Republic Day 29 Turkey government protests possible in major cities November

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Elevated threat of Sunni extremist attacks Ashura (Islam) 3 Global against Shiite Muslims in key areas

Anniversary of 1979 US Embassy takeover in Anti-US/Western protests expected in Tehran 4 Iran Tehran

Nationalist rallies anticipated in Moscow and Unity Day 4 Russia elsewhere

Large-scale commemorations and travel Commemoration of Guru Nanak Jayanti (Sikhism) 6 India disruptions in Punjab state

Belarus/Russia/ Communist rallies in respective capitals and 7 Anniversary of 1917 Bolshevik Revolution Ukraine possible protests

North America/ 11 Armistice Day Transport and business disruptions likely Western Europe Israel/Occupied Pro-Palestinian demonstrations and anti-Israel Anniversary of Arafat’s death 11 Palestinian protests anticipated in the West Bank Territories Commemorative events in major urban centres; Republic Day 11 Maldives counter-demonstrations likely

Travel disruptions due to increased security in G20 Summit 15-16 Australia central Brisbane; protests possible

Anniversary of the 1973 Athens Polytechnic Increase in political protests amid increased 17 Greece uprising security anticipated in Athens

Morocco/ Commemorative events in major urban centres; 18 Independence Day Western Sahara counter-demonstrations possible

Large-scale commemorations and travel 20 Brazil Day of Black Consciousness disruptions in major cities, particularly Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Salvador

27 United States Thanksgiving Anticipate travel and business disruptions

Commemorative events in Albania; increase in Albania/Kosovo/ 28 Albania Flag Day political protests and possible unrest anticipated in Macedonia the region Commemorative events and counter-demonstrations 28 Mauritania Independence Day amid heightened tensions; likely to be concentrated in urban centres Elevated threat of terrorism and separatist Independence Day 30 Yemen protests in the south

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 44 December

Date Location Event Event description/implication

Anniversary of Papuan declaration of Countrywide protests possible 1 Indonesia independence (1961)

Moldova/ Travel and business disruptions; commemorative 1 Great Union Day Romania events and possible protests in major urban centres

3 India Anniversary of Bhopal gas disaster Countrywide protests possible

Commemorative events, particularly in Bangkok; King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s birthday 5 Thailand protests possible

Anniversary of demolition of Babri Masjid in Heightened communal tensions and possible 6 India Ayodhya by Hindu nationalists violence involving Hindu and Muslim communities

Anniversary of Indonesian occupation of East Demonstrations anticipated in East Timor 7 Indonesia Timor (1975)

7 Iran Student Day Increase in political protests anticipated

Elevated threat of civil unrest in Zanzibar and Republic Day (Independence Day) 9 Tanzania Dar es Salaam

Commemorative events countrywide amid 12 Kenya Jamhuri Day (Independence Day) increased security due to elevated threat of terrorism Anti-Japan protests anticipated in major urban Anniversary of Nanjing Massacre 13 China centres

Iran/Shiite Elevated threat of attacks by Sunni Islamist 13 Arbaeen (Islam) Muslim regions extremists against Shiites in key areas

Commemorative events and increase in Anniversary of Hamas founding 14 Gaza Strip anti-Israel protests anticipated

Bangladesh/ 16 Victory Day Increased security due to elevated terrorist threat India

Commemorative events countrywide; protests Anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s death 17 North Korea possible in South Korea

17 Tunisia Anniversary of start of 2010 uprising Increase in political protests anticipated

Elevated Islamist terrorist threat against Christmas Eve and Christmas Day (Christianity) 24-25 Global Christian interests in certain states

Commemorative events amid increased Anniversary of Benazir Bhutto’s death 27 Pakistan security

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 45 General elections calendar

A diary of national elections in 2014. Note that the list includes confirmed and scheduled elections as of 9 December 2013.

Date Location Event

5 January Bangladesh Legislative (provisional) 8 January Somalia (Puntland) Presidential February Yemen Presidential and Legislative (provisional) February Egypt Legislative (provisional) 2 February Costa Rica Presidential and Legislative 2 February El Salvador Presidential (1st round) March Antigua and Barbuda Legislative (provisional) March Macedonia Presidential (provisional) March Slovakia Presidential (provisional) March Thailand Legislative (provisional) 9 March Colombia Legislative 16 March Guinea-Bissau Presidential and Legislative April Hungary Legislative (provisional) April South Africa Legislative (provisional) April Algeria Presidential (provisional) 5 April Afghanistan Presidential (provisional) 9 April Indonesia Legislative 30 April Iraq Legislative May India Legislative (provisional) 4 May Panama Presidential and Legislative 11 May Lithuania Presidential 16 May Dominican Republic Legislative 20 May Malawi Presidential and Legislative 22 - 25 May EU Legislative 25 May Belgium Legislative 25 May Lithuania Legislative 25 May Colombia Presidential (1st round) June Israel Presidential (provisional) July Mauritania Presidential (provisional) 9 July Indonesia Presidential August Turkey Presidential (provisional) September Fiji Presidential and Legislative (provisional) 14 September Sweden Legislative (provisional) 18 September UK (Scotland) Referendum October Bahrain Legislative (provisional) October Botswana Legislative 5 October Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidential and Legislative 5 October Brazil Presidential and Legislative 15 October Mozambique Presidential and Legislative 26 October Uruguay Presidential (1st round) and Legislative November Namibia Presidential and Legislative (provisional) November Moldova Legislative (provisional) November Romania Presidential (provisional) 4 November US Legislative 25 November Tonga Legislative December Bolivia Presidential and Legislative (provisional)

Threat Forecast 2014 | www.red24.com 46 Contributors

The following people were involved in the compilation of red24’s 2014 Threat Forecast: Analysts • Jeremy Eastman - Intelligence Manager • Andre Colling - Chief Analyst, Middle East and North Africa • J.Louw Nel - Chief Analyst, Europe • Nick Piper - Chief Analyst, Americas • Jonathan Vincent - Chief Analyst, Asia • Ryan Cummings - Chief Analyst, Africa • Frances Nobes - Global Risk Analyst (Kidnapping and Piracy) • Nicole Elliott – Analyst, Europe • Tumi Wallace – Analyst, Europe • Barend Lutz – Analyst, Americas • Lara Sierra-Rubia – Analyst, Americas • Samantha McTigue – Analyst, Asia • Brendan von Essen – Analyst, Asia • Gabrielle Reid – Analyst, Africa • Ziyanda Stuurman – Analyst, Africa • Claire Price – Analyst, Middle East and North Africa Editors • Firdows Omar - Senior Editor • Graham Leverton - Senior Sub-editor • Francis Harrison - Sub-editor • Nicola Jacobs - Sub-editor Design and Marketing • Julia Sproston - IT Project Manager • Alexis Parker - Project Support Coordinator • Christina Rock - Website Manager and Senior Editor • Janizol Adams - Junior Software Developer • Jethro Arenz - Developer • Abdurahim Shariff - Software Developer • Camilla Batteson - Graphic Designer Contact details London Address 3 Minster Court Mincing Lane London EC3R 7DD Phone +44 (0)203 291 2424 Email [email protected] New York Address 111 Broadway 11th Floor New York NY10006 Phone +1 866 316 0317 Email [email protected] Cape Town Address Block A The Terraces Steenberg Office Park Westlake, 7945 Phone +27 (0)21 700 3800 Email [email protected]

Twitter twitter.com/red24 Facebook www.facebook.com/red24assistance Microsite www.red24threatforecast.com Website www.red24.com

Threat Forecast 2014

©copyright all rights reserved red24