CONDUCT

of the

AMZAC COVERING FORCB - GALLTPOLI 25-26 April, 1915

Captain James J« Coghlan, Infantry (DOL)

GROUP RESEARCH THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1931-1932

MEMORANDUM FOR* The Director, 2d Year Class, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworthf Kansas*

SUBJECTt The Conduct of the Covering Foroes of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, Gallipoli, April 25-26, 1915*

I* PAPERS ACCOMPANYING* 1. A bibliography for this study• 2* 10 Maps. Showing the landing of the Anzao Covering Force, farthest points reached by the Covering Force, 25 April, 1915 • M«dn Turkish counterattack* II* THE STUDY PRESENTED* ~ The conduct of the Covering Forces of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, Gallipoli, April 25-26, 1915* III* HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE STUDY*

GHQ PLANS AND ORDERS ANZAC PLAN* The plan of operations for the Australian and New Zealand Amy Corps, in the attack at Gallipoli, was to land north of Gaoa Tepe, and after securing its left flank, to push east to Maidos, with a view to severing the TURKISH north and south communications* (1) (Sketoh 5 A-6) The Anzao Covering Force was an integral part of the First Australian Division; it consisted of the 3d Australian Brigade, which included the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Battalions, the 1st Field Engineer Company and the 3d Field Ambulance Company* The strength of the Covering Force was four thousand men and officers* Colonel Douglas Sinolair-LJaoLagan com­ manded the Covering Force* He was an officer from the British Regular Army* This force had been given special instructions in landing opera­ tions in Egypt* The serious difficulty in the contemplated operations was the lack of knowledge of the terrain, and maps in the possession of the Australians were inaccurate* (2) (1) (I-I65, 3-220; U-681 5-99) 7-51 to 91) (2) (1-166; 2-7,8 *6-100) -1­ The extracts from General Ian Hamilton's order for the landing of the An*ao Corps, whioh was issued on 15 April, 1915, oalled for a bombard­ ment of the heights oorananding the Gaba Tape—Nibrunesi Point by the Naval Squadron, Tfhioh was to accompany and assist the landing of the Corps. (3) The 3d Australian Brigade was to be moved to a plaoe in their trans­ ports, locality to be announced later, to a rendezvous fixed by the naval forces* (h) Disembarkation of the Ansao Corps was to oommenoe immediately after the Covering Force had landed* (5) Bach infantry soldier of the Covering Force, in addition to his rifle and pack, carried two hundred rounds of assnunition, and three days reserve rations, making a total weight of eighty-eight pounds* (6) Two staff officers from Division and Corps Headquarters were to land with the Covering Foroe, and they were to select and mark out form­ ing up places and rendezvous points, and pending completion of this work, the troops were to be formed up by their commanders in the most convenient localities close to, but clear of the beach* Every effort would be made to prevent confusion on the beaches* (7) Hamilton1 s instructions to General Birdwood (Anzao Corps eomwander) stated that a landing in force would be made on the beach betnreen Gaba Tepe and Fisherman's Hut* The objective of the Ansao Corps was the ridge GALLIPOLI--MAIDOS—BOGHALI—KOJA DERE, and to capture MAL TEPE* (See sketch 5-A, 11, sketch 7) This in order to out the Turkish line of retreat from the Kilid Bahr plateau, and to prevent this plateau from being reinforoed by Turkish troops froxa the north while the 29th British Division was making its attack from Helles* This would prevent Turkish reserves from being moved from Maidos or Gallipoli* (8) The Covering Force was to establish itself on the SARI BAIR range; hill in squares 22J+-237 and 238 (British War Office map) in order t? protect the landing of the remainder of the Axuao Corps* From the ridge

(3) (2-7, 8 ;3-220) h) (2-7, 8| 3-228) 5) (2-7, 8, 3-229) 6) (1-172, 2-7, 9> 3-21*5) 7) (2-9) 3-228) (8) (2-16, 3-220, i|^68, 6-98) between 237 and 22i4-F, the spurs running northwest and southwest to the sea* These serai-ciroular ridges seem to lend themselves to the establish­ ment of a strong oovering position. (9) (See sketohes 6 and 7) (See Map No. 7) The Covering Foroe would protect the northern flank of the landing place, and the Anrao line of communication. A strong effort would be made by the Ansao Corps to capture Mai Tepe, whioh is the center and key to the ridge over which the road runs that connects GALLIPOLI—MAID0S-­ BOGHALI--KOJA DERE. (10) The landing of the Covering Force was to be made in three stages; 1st stage to consist of 1500 men, to be landed from the battleships and to be sent ashore in tows; the 2d stage—esribarkation of the remainder of \ the Covering Force into Seven Destroyers, these destroyers would follow into shore immediately after the dispatch of the first battleship tows; the 3d stage—landing of the remainder of the Covering Force from destroy­ ers in suoo.essive tows, three* tows being allotted to each destroyer. Twelve tows were available to the seven destroyers, with a total capacity of 1500 men. (ll) The British Naval Squadron No. 2 (Admiral Thursby) would support the Anxao Corps by naval gunfire during disembarkation and the operations on sho-3. (12) (See Map 10) Hamilton left the detailed plan of landing to Birdwood and Admiral Thursby, Commander of Naval Squadron No. 2. Birdwood and Thursby reoon­ noitered the shore, while on board the Battleship Queen, on 13 April 1915. Birdwood noted wire entanglements along the beach in the vicinity of Gaba Tepe. The terrain and beach between Gaba Tepe and Ari Burnu was favorable for a landing and advanoe, with the exception of the wire obstacles at Gaba Tepe. MaoLagan, during the reoonnaissanoe, was pessimistic and did not believe his troops could get through the wire; Birdwood reassured MaoLagan on this point. For several days after 13 April 1915, Admiral

(9) (2-l6| 3-221, 226, 227, 228) (10) (2-18; 3-220, 226, 227) (11) (2-16; 3-228, 229; 4-68) (12) (2-18; 3-228-229) -3­ Thursby, Generals Birdwood and Bridgea (Commander 1st Australian Division) reoonnoitered the ooast for good landing plaoes and studied ship to shore movement plans* (1?)

TOPOGRAPHY ANALYSIS OF THE TERRAIN* (See sketches 6, 7# 11 & 15) The Gallipoli peninsula is about four or five miles wide at its base, narrowing to about three miles at the isthmus of Bulair, then -widening westward to a width of twelve miles at its widest place, twenty-three miles south of Bulair, again narrowing from there to the toe of the peninsula which is about one and a half miles across* Coast and landing places* In general the ooast is rugged and good landing places are few* South of Suvla and around the toe of the penin­ sula are small crescent shaped beaches from fifty to two hundred yards in length, and from ten to fifty yards in depth, generally backed by cliffs and dominated by hills* INTERIOR* The interior of the peninsula is rough, hilly and cut by many gullies and ravines* The SARI BAIR range of hills comnands the beaoh north of Gab a Tepe and Suvla Bay* (ill) ROADS AND WATER* Roads were few and poor* Water courses shown on map are intermittent streams, and dry in the summer months* There is not a sufficient water supply to maintain a large body of troops in a cam­ paign* (15) The main SARI BAIR range extends southwestwards, in an unbroken chain from the ANAFARTA villages to a point about three fourths of a mile northeast of Ari Burnu; there it divides into three spurs, which are in turn split up by countless gullies and depressions, and eventually reach the coast between Ari Burnu and Gaba Tepe. About its center the range is crowned by three hills of nearly identical height, from the north to the south, KOJA CHEMEN TEPE--EIU. Q~and CHUNUK BAIR, all three of these hills command a view of the narrows to the east. On the western side, these

13 3-221, 222, 223) (Ik) (Sketches 6, 7, 11 & 15) (15) (8-7i Sketohes 6, 7, U, 12 & 15) heights are guarded by difficult terrain* On the eastern side, toward the narrows, the slopes are more gradual, and fewer obstacles to the movement of troops| the two hills at the southern end of the main ridge were named by the Anzaos, Battlesliip Hill and Baby 700, both are oommanded and overlooked **• CHUNUK BAIR* The three long ridges whioh extend from Battleship Hill to GABA TEPE were referred to as the FIRST, SECOND, THIRD (GUN) Ridges by the Ansao Corps. These ridges are generally parallel to the landing beaches and the advance must be made perpendicular to these ridges* FIRST RIDGE* It extends southwest from Baby 700* It consists of the NEK, continuing southwest the ground rises to a commanding plateau known as RUSSELL1 S TOP, on the western side of which there are two steep tortuous valleys.which give aooess to the seashore between FISHERMAN'S HUT and ARI BURNU* South of WALKERS RIDGE the southernmost of these two spurs, the seaward space of RUSSELL'S TOP is unolimable, and here is the graced face oliff some three hundred feet high, known us the SPHINX, at the southern end of RUSSELL'S TOP, the ridge for two hundred yards is a razor edge, and is impassable for infantry troops; it has a deep chasm on either side; it opens out again on PLUGGES PLATEAU, with an under- feature known as ARI BURNU jutting out to the sea, thence the ridge turns south, and its steep scrub covered slopes fringe the coast of ANZAC COVE, the southern arm of whioh is formed by another and smaller underfeature, subsequently known as HELL'S SPIT* This southern portion of the FIRST RIDGE which ends at the mouth of a deep run, is called SHRAPNEL GULLY; it was named MACLAGAN RIDGE* The original British map showed that troops could advance up FIRST RIDGE to BABY 700; this was in error, as the RAZOR

EDGE prevented it, and to get from PLUGGES P%LATEAU to RUSSELL'S TOP, it was necessary to olimb down in the gully and up the steep slopes to the other side*

SECOND RIDGEt The Ridge forms the eastern wall of MONASH GULLY, aid then continues south to a point one mile northeast of GABA TEPE--QUINN— STEELE and COURTNEYS POST and LONE PINE. From Baby 700, itc starting point, to one thousand yards south it consists of a narrow orest line, with a stiff and precipitous fall toward MONASH VALLEY and a less abrupt -5­ descent to MULE VALLEY on its eastern flank. It then widens into an important and oonspiouous plateau some four hundred feet high, known as ifiO Plateau, with an extreme length and breadth of about a half milej on the southern end of the plateau there are five minor spurs extending southwest to the sea* TKIRD RIDGEt It was known as GUN KIDGE and was the longest and largest of the three ridges • It starts due sorth of CHUNUK BAIR, and merges into the MAIDOS plain a little to the east of GABA TEPE, to whioh it is joined by a low and narrow spur which conceals the plain from the sea* Two important localities to be noted on GUN RIDGE are SCRUBBY KNOLL on the north and ANDERSON1 S KNOLL on the southern end* The scrub on SARI BAIR was thick and thornyj it was difficult for men to move through* One thousand yards south of ANZAC CCVE, the high ground recedes from the shore and troops landing between that point and GABA TEPE would find a stretch of mor* or less level ground between themselves and the nearest hill* Troops advancing on MAIDOS from the beaoh north of GABA TEPE, the nearer they landed at the promonotory, the fewer and less abrupt would be the obstacles blocking their way* A few well placed machine guns at GABA TEPE could seriously interfere with a landing in the vicinity of that point* The locality finally selected for the COVERING FORCE to land, was the sandy beaoh between GABA TEPE and ANZAC COVE* (16) (See sketoh 6 and 7) The GABA TEPE promontory and immediate vicinity had been wired, but to the north of it, there were only a few open trenohes, and a few artillery gun emplacements* The Ansaos expected strong resistance far­ ther inland* Naval seaplanes had been used for reoonnaissanoe purposes, to locate gun emplacements, trenches, and Turkish troops* Photographs had been made by the seaplanes of the terrain* Staff officers from Birdwood's headquarters had gone crer in planes to study the terrain* (17)

(16) (1-166, 167,168,1691 3-601) (17) (1-166 to I75i 3-220 to 226) ANZAC CORPS PLANS AND ORDER8

GENERAL BIRDWOOD'S PLANt It was finally decided that the Covering Force would land on a front of 1600 yards, its right resting on a point one mile north of GABA TEPE* (See sketch 6) and its left near the southern extremity of FIRST RIDGE* (18) Birdwood decided that the landing would be made just before daylight, and he desired surprise for the Covering Force, without any preliminary bombardment by the Naval Guns* Hamilton agreed to this decision* British Arnjy officers generally objected to night, operations, due to units losing direction. The Navy preferred to land the troops in the daylight hours* (19) The general plan for the Covering Force and the Ansac Corps was to attack suddenly at dawn, with the Covering Force rushing the three Turkish artillery batteries, putting them out of action; Birdwood would be able with the troops that followed the Covering Force, they would extend up the main ridge to the north* The Covering Force was to seise and ocoupy the ridge from Gaba Tepe toward Chunuk Bair* The remainder of the First Australian Division following the Covering Force would secure the main ridge to the north of it and attend to the left flank* (20) The operations order of the First Australian Division was issued on 18 April, extracts in part from the order, wThe Australian and New Zealand Army Corps will force a landing between Gaba Tepe and Fisherman*s Hut, the first objective, the occupation of the Third Ridge (Gun Ridge) with the left on Hill 971* The Covering Force, the 3d Australian Infantry Brigade, 1st Engineer Field Company, and 3d Field Ambulance Company, less all horses and ve­ hicles, will occupy the Ridge between squares 212 and 238, GUN RIDGE with left; on HILL 971 • The Covering Force will land in 1st Stage, 1500 men to be sent in tows from the Battleships QUEEN, PRINCE OF WALES and LONDON; remainder of Covering Force to be landed by the Destroyers•" (21)

19) (1-169) 19) ?-22U, 225} 20) (3-225, 226) 21) (2-J4U 3-225, ,226) -7­ MaoLagan was instructed by Bridges to push the Covering Foroe aoross Seoond Ridge as quickly as possible and to take the Third Ridge• The troops to advance on a broad front, so if parts of the line were held up, other portions wuld advanoe and outflank points of resistance* The left of the Covering Force to establish itself on CHUNUK BAIR, while on the right a party to be detached to clear GABA TEPE of Turks, and to disable the Turkish battery at Gaba Tepe« The Covering Force to disable Turkish artillery pieces on I4DO plateau. (See Map 7) (22) MacLagan was informed, the 2d Australian Brigade, which would land immediately after his Covering Force, would extend the front to Hill 971# and would protect the left flank by holding a line from that point to

FISHERMAN'S HUT# The 1st Australian Brigade would be held in reserve just clear of the beaoh. The 7th Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade would be landed as early as possible in the morning of 25 April and would be attached to the covering foroe on arrival• (See Map 7) (23) MaoLagan1 s orders to the Jd Brigade designated that the 9^h Battalion would land on the right, the 10th Battalion to land in the oenter, and the 11th Battalion on the left, the 12th Battalion to be in reserve* The two right flank companies of the 9th Battalion were to clear Gaba Tep# of the Turks as soon as they landed, while the other two companies of the 9th Battalion were to make for Anderson's Knoll on GUN RIDGE a mile from the landing plaoe (See Map 7 and sketch 6), the 10th Battalion, after cap­ turing the Turkish guns on 1+D0 Platoau was to occupy SCRUBBY KNOLL on GUN RIDGE, while the 11th Battalion was to seise the northern end of GUN RIDGE and CHUNUK BAIR. The 12th Battalion forming the reserve in rear of the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions. The Indian Mountain Artillery on its ar­ rival to proceed to J4OO Plateau* (21+)

The time of landing was governed by the setting of the moon, as Birdwood wanted the covering forces to gain the first objective before daylight* The moon set before daylight the 25th of April* (25)

(22) (I-I69* 3-226) (23) (1-169, 170| 3-288) (2U) (1-170) 3-226, 2?7, 228) (25) (1-170 ,3-22b 5-108) -8­ With the Covering Force landing in three eohelons, from the three battleships and seven destroyers, the first eohelon of I5OO men would be taken to -within two miles of the shore by the three battleships, whence they would be landed simultaneously in twelve tows; the second and third eohelons would land immediately from the Seven Destroyers$ whioh were carrying 1250 \nen for each eohelon* (26) The main body of the First Australian Division was to follow close on the heels of the Covering Force* It was calculated to land all three brigades and the Indian mountain artillery batteries ashore by 9*00 AM, 25 April 1915. (27)

THE APPROACH

On the morning of 2I4. April 1915* 150° m6nf constituting one half of the force of the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions, and the 1st Field Engi­ neer Company, these being the first eohelon to land, were transferred to the battleships* 500 men of eaoh battalion, from the 9th Battalion to the Battleship QUEEN; 10th Battalion to the PRINCE OF WALES; 11th Battalion to the London; a detachment of the 1st Eng* Field Company on eaoh battleship* The remainder of the Covering Force were to sail in their transports to a rendezvous off the peninsula and there be trans­ ferred to the destroyers* The destroyers would then sail in toward the land and would find the three battleships already ahead of them* Each battleship would have four tows, each tow consisting of a small steamboat and three rowing boats* The troops in eaoh battleship would disembark in these tows, and the three battleships would tow them slowly along at their sides to a point as near to the shore as the big ships could reach without being seen; they would then cast them off, and the twelve tows would move in line abreast to the beach* Following closely the twelve tows, the Seven Destroyers would move in between the battleships and as near the shore as was safe; they would have a string of row boats on each side of them, the troops would get into these, and when the destroyers had

(26) (1-171j 3-228) (27) (1-171J 3-228; ln-68) -9­ reached the limit, the boats would oaet off and row separately to shore. The destroyers and tows would immediately begin landing the other two brigades of the 1st Australian Division; these two brigades to follow closely the landing of the Covering Foroe« When the whole 1st Division was ashore, the New Zealand and Australian Division would ooranenoe to land, (See Maps 9# 10 * 11) (28) At 2$00 PM, 2k April, the battleships Queen, Prinoe of Wales, and the London, carrying the first eohelon of the Covering Foroe, accompanied Dy the battleships Queen Elisabeth, Triumph and Majestic, and the cruiser, Baochante, the seven destroyers and the four transports of the 3d Brigade, steamed out of Mudros harbor, when outside of the harbor, the group separated, the Battleship Queen Elisabeth headed for the Dardanelles, the transports and destroyers headed for Imbros, The five battleships and one cruiser moved around west of Lemnos, proceeding to a rendezvous five miles west of Gaba Tepej at that point the 1500 men in the first eohelon were to be transferred to the tows in whioh they were to land* The trans­ fer of the remainder of the Covering Foroe into the Seven Destroyers was to be made at IMBHOS, and shortly after the battleships sailed, the four transports of the Covering Foroe left Mudros for Imbroe, (29) Steering on a light shown by the battleship Tr? ^h, whioh had pro­ oeeded forward to make the rendezvous,'- the ships of Admiral Thursby1* Squadron steamed silently into position at It00 AM, night 2I4.-25 April, Dead fcstern the moon was sinking in the western horizon, tows were formed, and at lt30 AM troops of the first echelou began to climb down the sides of the battleships and fill the boats, The second and third eohelons at lit00 PM, night 2i|^25 April, in the transports off Kephalos at the eastern end of Imbros, the transfer of the remainder of the 3d Brigade was made into the destroyers, (For the dis­ position of troops into che destroyers, see Map No, 9) At 2t35 AM all the battleghip tows -were ready. As the moon set be­ hind Imbros, the three battleships followed by the twelve tows, and further astern by the seven destroyers, whioh at 2t35 AM had arrived from Inbros

(1-172* 3-228, 229, 2U3» 7-92) (1-172,; 3-21*3 i 2I4U, 2U5i 7-92, 93) -10­ with the rest of the Covering Foroe, the ships steamed slowly toward the peninsula* It was noticeable that there was excellent oooperation and good feeling between the Army and Navy. The Australian soldiers had shown excellent discipline throughout the day* (30)

THE LANDING

At 2s 35 AM the moon was very low, the battleships were moving very slowly, towing the tows behind them; at 3t00 AM the moon sank and it be­

oame very dark* Sunrise on 25 April 1915 was at 5tl5 AMf dawn at U1O5 AM* The sea was smooth; at 3i3O AM the three battleships oame to a stop when two end a half miles from shore* The signal "land armed parties" was given, the twelve tows moved slowly forward in line abreast, towed by small steamboats with one half of the 9th Battalion on the right, one half of the 10th Battalion in the center and one half of the 11th Battalion on the left. (See Map 10 and lla) It is interesting to note that the troops had been sitting in the boats since It30 AM, they were very cramped and uncomfortable, personal discipline was excellent* Men kept quiet* The Seven Destroyers followed the tows* There was some difficulty in getting the tows originally into line and they became intermixed* The Naval officer responsible for guiding the line of tows, was in Tow No* 1, the starboard steamboat, at the extreme southernmost end of the tows* Night was now so dark it was impossible to see at all times the tows on either side* The starboard tow was steered by oompass bearing which was intended to land it on the extreme right of the seleoted beach* To main­ tain their direotion, and to cover the whole frontage oorrectly, the re­ maining eleven steamboats with their boats were to keop a lateral interval of one hundred and fifty yards from eaoh other and to steer their oourse by the tow on the right* Commander Dix, Royal Navy, was in charge of the Tow flotilla; he was on the extreme left in steamboat No* 12* A midship­ man was on eaoh tow, and each boat oarried five seamen, to row it ashore when the ropes were cut off* A commissioned naval officer was in steam­

(30) (1-172| 3-2U5, 21*6, 2iff, 2I48)

-11­ boats 3, 5 and 9* In the darkness it was difficult for tows to see each other, and they bunohed together, some of them got into wrong positions in the line, and there now occurred the error that had caused the Navy to favor a dayligjtt landing* The current along Gallipoli Coast was stronger than the Navy oalou­ lated* Shortly after IpOO AM, the shore became visible. Lieut, Waterlow, catching sight of ARI BURNU, mistook it for Gaba Tepej jumping to the er­ roneous conclusion that he was a mile south of his course, he at once swung his steamboat to the north, and made for a point actually north of Antac Cove* Commander Dix in No* 12 tvteamboat, at the same moment realised the error had been made; he turned his tow south, passing close under the stern of the tows that were crossing his bow* He placed his steamboat on the extreme starboard (right) flank and headed for ARI BURNU* Seeing this maneuver, the rerrcdning boats started on a roughly parallel course, and all twelve tows made for the shore at a point approximately one mile north of the intended landing place* (See sketch 6, Maps 10 & lla) (31)

COMMENTSt Ship to shore operations* The failure to land the troops at the proper place, illustrates the difficulty that is to be found in landing on a small beach, maneuvering in the dark, and misjudging the current* The Navy had failed to place the troops at the proper place* There is some argument in their favor, as operations carried on in the dark will always be subject to more or less confusion* However, the decision of General Birdwood to land his troops when the light was poor and his troops invisible to the enemy troops, is believed sound; it saved his force casualties and he completely surprised the Turkish troops* The responsibility was the Navyfs and they failed to put the troops at the proper place* This error dislocated the whole plan of operations for the Covering Force* The terrain that they were to soon operate over, was difficult, and the type that would oause troops to lose direction, and with inexperienced troops, it added only to the oonfusion that was soon to come about during the day* The important

(31) (1-1731 3-2l|Bf lesson, it is believed, any Nation oonteTnplating an overseae expedition that involves landing on a hostile shore, or in any war plan or maneuver, accurate knowledge should be had of the currents• This error on the part of the Navy saved the Covering Force casualties as only a few Turks were in this vicinity. The error was not entirely fatal to the plan of opera­ tions as a whole* The advance for the troops was difficult. A study of the British Official Histories stress the difficult terrain as causing the failure of the operation; this cannot be concurred in, as the facts that are unoovered in the operations do not justify any such conclusion.

THE ADVANCE

£t U*25 AM, while fifty yard* from the shora, the tows were cut off, no sign of life had appeared on the shore. A flare was shot up from the Turkish position, and scattered rifle fire came from Ari Burmu Tho twelve tows were very close together, running into the foot of Ari Burnu. (See Map 10 and lla) The 9th and 10th Battalions struck the point of Ari Burnu; they were the first to reach land. Some of the men from the 10th Battalion landed south of Ari Burmu The three left tows of the 11th Battalion landed two hundred yards north of Ari Burnu. Commander Dixfs tow of the 11th Bet tali on landed near Ari Burnu on the right mixed with the other nine tows. There was little thought of maintaining the relative positions, each boat landed where it could. The result was a serious intermixing of units from the very beginning; added to this was the very small frontage on which the landing had taken place whioh was a great disadvantage. Some of the boats grounded in three feet of water, the men jumping out became wet to their waists. In a few minute's every boat was emptied, and the first echelon was ashore with very little loss. (32)

Surprise had been complete, the battleships had not been seen, the tows were not discovered until fifty yards from shore. At the wrong place, and anyone who depended upon a set plan for the next move was com­ pletely bewildered. There had I aen no time for the Turkish Outpost Compaq

(32) (1-174,1751 3-252,253i 6-105* 7-92,93,95) 86 the Australian Covering Force at this time was one rifle company he 27th Turkish Regiment of Infantry, which had posted a strong sentry p on Ari Burnu, and a fe* small posts overlooking the beach• ^None he positions were wired, no wire was seen by the Australians on 25 !• In the vioinity of Gaba Tepe as previously stated there were wire obstacles*, The beach where the Covering Force had landed had . considered so unlikely a landing place, for operations in the interior ; the Turks did not make very extensive defensive preparations on this ; of the ooast* At the time of landing, the Australians ha)d a ten to < superiority* The Turks had conoealment, knew the' terrain, and above used their rifles effectively* (33) The unfortunate swing of the tows upset the carefully prepared plans« terrain the oovering force had to advance over, was steep and diffi­ , the gullies would cause men to lose direotion* Had the landing n place as originally intended, the task of landing initially would been more difficult, due to the wire, but once the Covering Force disposed of this Turkish force, the terrain to advance over would been mioh easier* The defense at Gaba Tepe with the exception of was no stronger than at Ari' Burnuj it consisted of a rifle oompany the 27th Turkish Infantry. (See sketch 5 A) The places where the ralians landed gave them a suitable landing place; it was defiladed almost screened from direot observation of the Turks• (3^) * On landing, the right oompanies of the 9th Battalion, which should formed the right flank oompanies of the Covering Force, were mixed Lth the right of the 10th Battalion* The 11th Battalion that landed to left, was reoeiving fire from a Turkish mchine gun five hundred I to the left of the battalion* Someone asked a superior officer do vr* do next* his reply, "I do not know, everything is in a muddle*1* r authority from General Hamilton on down had dinned into the troops, «ust go forward, you must advanoe whatever the opposition, you are the

5:, 186) 3-255i 7-95) (1*1751 hrteV ' Coloring Force and muoh depends on you* The men, on landing had dumped their paoksj they had been told they would find a low «andy bank skirting the beaoh which they were to form by couqpanies, before rushing two hun­ dred yards of level ground to the first hill* The mistake in landing and intermixing of units had caused considerable confusion, but to push on were the orders* In a short time eager groups of all la-btalions, without waiting to act ac a unit, or reorganize, rushed to the top of PIJJGCES PLATEAU, in time to see thirty or forty Turks disappear dowa the slopes on the further side of PLUGGES PLATEAU* Up to this time casualties had been negligible among the troops on the plateau* The morale of -fcha nsn was high; they thought the campaign was half over* The ease la landing was a disadvantage, as it caused a false sense of seourtty* (See Map

12) (35) The First Field ftigineer Company with the Covering Foroe, on Land­ ing forgot its role and dashed forward with the infantry* It w*s some tine before the company oould be reformed on the beaoh**. ID order -bo perform its proper functions* Midshipmen and naval enlisted men left their boats, forgetting their roles, and dashed forward to get In the fight, but they were finally gotten back to their boat*, in order that they oould transport the remainder of the troops ashor«% The beaoh head personnel did not land till lOtOO AM in the morning 25 April• (36)

The day was dawning rapidly* Australians were now realising their error in landing, the objective of the center and left battalions was a thousand yards to the right (south)* Mixed groups of ail three battalions flushed with success and thinking only of closing with the Turks, had al­ ready oharged down the face of SHRAPNEL GULLY. A halt was now called, in an endeavor to colleot units under their leaders, and to wait for the man still coining up from the beaoh, before making a further advance* This reorganisation caused a delay, but the dislocation of units on landing made it necessary; even a slightly longer delay would have been probably better* (37 >

35 1-176* 3-255,256,262) (3636 ) (1-195,196,184) (37) (1-176, 3-262,263) -15* COMMENTS• The first eohelon that landed had no centralized oontrol and was under no one commander* The initial disposition of the battalions of the 3d Brigade by splitting them, part on the battleship tows and the remainder in the destroyers, was faulty, with half of a battalion on the tows and half on the destroyers, and the error in landing caused confusion* Disorganisation was the inevitable result* Units should not be split; it would have been better to have landed battalions as a whole, and not piecemeal) desiring that a front of 1600 yards to have been covered, it would have been better for MaoLagan to have had say one battalion, the 9th Battalion, and half of the 10th Battalion attached to the 9th Bat­ talion to initisdly have landed in his first wave ashore, under one com­ mander, instead of having three commanders with parts of their units intermixed* His aeoond wave could have consisted of the 10th Battalion, less two companies and the 11th Battalion; his third wave the 12th Bat­ talion* The disposition of this battalion was faulty; it was disposed on the destroyers behind the 9bh, 10th and 11th Battilions and it was supposed to be in brigade reserve and assemble at a central point* This did not materialise as it was absorbed into the other battalions* This type of disposition would have been better on a narrow beaoh* "Where the front is wide, there must be boundaries between battalions, otherwise con­ fusion will result when two or more battalions are landed simultaneously* The first wave under present day teachings, on landing must push rapidly in and secure a small arms bridgehead* It is to be expected that this wave will be more or less disorganised from, combat, due to defeating the hostile covering detaohments* Centralised control will be difficult; it is far better to have one ooramander for this wave, than to have several, in order to ooordinate the aotion* The second wave on landing assumed the first wave has pushed forward two thousand yards, would be in somewhat better organisation, and the commander oould push this organiiation on the part of the line where the going was easier* UaoLagan's seoond wave landed too close in the time interval behind the first wave; it should have landed at least thirty to forty-fire minute* later; what happened

-16­ it was absorbed into the first wave and all idea of coordinating its aotion was lost* similar to reinforcing a disorganized skirmish line* In event of landing on the wrong beaoh, where they are small, there should have been an alternate plan, as Birdwood had considered landing on this beach, in event that he was unsuccessful on the intended beaoh* The following grave errors were committed: no centralized oontrol over the various waves, units initially disposed wrong for landing, inter­ mixing of units and landing on the wrong beaoh through errors of the Naval personnel* General Birdwood should have landed with the second echelon, or he should have had one of his staff offioers with it, to keep him in touch with the situation* Birdwood alone, could fcake the change in the original plan, after a wrong la ruling had been made, he left to his subordinates to carry out a changed plan by piecemeal fotion* General Bridges should have landed with the second echelon. Even with difficult country, the size of the defending Turkish force, the Covering Force could have pushed rapidly to its objective, if aggressive leaders had been lit. command of the Australian troops* The outstanding lesson is faulty command and leadership, on the part of MacLagan, Bridges and Birdwood*

Shortly after 5*°0 AM both companies of the 10th Battalion were moved into SHRAPNEL GULLY, heading for the steep path at the northern end of I4OO Plateau, up which the Turks had scattered* Men of the 9fch Battalion were widely soattered, and one small party, regardless of its allotted role, had dashed off to the left in pursuit of a handful of Turks* Major Salisbury collected about a hundred men on the right of PLUGGES PLATEAU, and these he now led across the gully in the direction of LONE PINE* The 11th Battalion contingent that reaohed PLUGGES PLATEAU, they were directed by Major Brookman to the shelter of REST GULLY to re­ organize, another party advancing from the north of ARI BURNU reaohed REST GULLY by olimbing over the cliff like sides of the RAZOR EDGE* In addition to the 11th Battalion, numbers of other men belonging to the other three battalions continued to assemble in REST GULLY about this time, and were organized into a oomposite company* A drastio reorganiza­ tion should now have been in order, before any serious fighting had taken

-17­ place; other troops ware still on the northern beaoh pinned to a position on the ground by a Turkish machine gun at Fisherman's Hut* It would have been in order for a force to have endeavored to outflank this gun from the high ground instead of trying to take it frontally* Stray men of all three battalions were collecting in considerable numbers in ANZAC COVE, and in the small gullies which run down to it from the top of the ridge above. (See Map 12) (38) The seven destroyers carrying the second eohelon of the Covering Force, with Colonel Sinclair MaoLagan, commander of the Covering Force and his staff, had followed the battleship tows to Ansac Cove, and by k*hP AM had begun to disembark them on a broader front than that of the leading troops* The two right destroyers, one was lying off Hell1 a Spit and the other five hundred yards south of it, carried two companies of the 9th Battalion and one company of the 12th Battalion* The three oenter destroyers opposite Ansac Cove carried two companies of the 10th Battalion and two companies of the 12th Battalion* The two left destroyers carried two companies of the 11th Battalion and one oompany of the 12th Battalion, and the 3d Field Ambulanoe Company; they lay to the north of Ari Burnu* The 12th Battalion was to concentrate after landing and remain in brigade reserve on the western slopes of i|D0 Plateau, but its dispersion amongst all seven destroyers proved fatal to that plan, landing under scattered fir*,, amid great confusion on shora and the excitement that was going on, spread out over a front of a mile, its scattered companies were caught up in the advance of the units nearest them and the 12th Battalion was never able to fulfill its proper function or to fight as a unit, throughout the 25th of April, 1915* The destroyers landed the troops on a front three quarters of a mile south of Ari Burnu along the beach to a point five hun­ dred yards north of Ari Burnu* The destroyers had placed the battalions in their proper order, the 9th Battalion on the right, the 10th Battalion in the oenter and the 11th Battalion on the left* (See Maps 10 & lla) (39)

(38) (1-176,177* 3-2&,263) (39) (1-177; 3-263,26U,265,266; 1+-68)

-18­ COMMENTS• The destroyers landed the seoond eohelon in better order than the battleship tows, however the time interval of being right behind the first wave was too close, as previously commented on* The 12th Battalion which was to be in Brigade reserve was scattered throughout the whole front* A commander should have his reserve at a central point in the formation or at a place in the formation where it oan be assembled intact upon landing; the result was that elements of the 12th Battalion were ab­ sorbed piecemeal into the 2d wave which merged into the first wave* MacLagan had now lost complete control of his reserve force* It would have been better to have landed the reserve after the three waves had landed* Then the commander has it under control, and oan so use it when the situation demands that it be employed in action* The important lesson is the faulty disposition of the reserve in the ship to shore movement, in the Australian plan* The troops from the Starboard destroyers Colne and Beagle were ashore by 5*00 AM, and heading straight up the easy slopes in front of them, they rushed a Turkish post guarding this part of the coast, and reached the J4OO Plateau in front of the battleship detachments* One small group rushed across IJOO Plateau and captured three Turkish mountain guns on the eastern part of the plateau* Another detachment pushed down Pine Ridge and across LEGGE VALLEY toward its final objective* The two oon*­ panies on the right were to capture Gaba Tepej these two companies of the 9th Battalion were a mile further north than intended* The Turks from Gaba Tepe were firing in this direction with rifles and machine guns* On reaching the i^OO Plateau, these companies turned to the south to capture Gaba Tepej they found a group of Turks entrenohed on Boltonfs Ridge, the two companies rushed the trench and captured it, the assault was made frontally, the men became scattered* The two company commanders were wounded and put out of action, the companies occupied the trenoh on this part of Bolton's Ridge and failed to advanoe farther* (See Map 12) (140)

(I4D) (1-178; 3-266) -19­ In the center the 10th Battalion landing at Ansac Cove was shelled from Gaba Tepe* The leading troops pressed forward and one small party of the 10th Buttalion under Lieutenant Loutit advanced over the southern end of MacLaganfs ridge, outdistanced the first eohelon and reached 0wenf§ Gully in front of the party that captured the Turkish mountain guns* (l|l) North of Ari Burnu, the troops landing on the left of the line, were less fortunate and it was here that the heaviest casualties oeourred* By the time the first destroyers landed, more Turks had assembled at Fisher­ man^ Hut, The incoming troops were met by accurate rifle and machine gun fire; a large number of Australians were killed and wounded bofore reach­ ing shore• A few yards from the waters edge, a stretch of ground afforded cover from the flanking fire, and here were assembled a few of the 11th Battalion who had landed twenty minutes earlier* But fifty yards beyond the broken ground the troops were confronted by a wall of cliff three hundred feet high, later called the Sphinx* Colonel Clarke commanding the 12th Battalion, detached a small force to knock out the Turkish machine guns at Fisherman's Hut* The force never reached it* He now issued an order for the other troops near him to advance to the top of the ridge* Clarke, accompanied by fifty men succeeded in climbing the steep side of the cliff on the north of the Sphinx* For a few minutes a Turkish de­ taohinent on-Russellfs Top continued to fire on the advancing troops; several casualties were incurred by the troops* The Turks seeing their line of retreat threatened by another body of Australians advancing up Walkerfs Ridge, led by Captain Tullooh of the 11th Battalion—hd was now commanding a mixed foroe of the 11th and 12th Battalion* The Turks re­ tired north across the NEK to Baby 700, between 5tJ0 and 6t3O AM; the whole of First Ridge was oleared of Turkish troops* Colonel Clarke, who was the nominal commander of the 12th Battalion at this time, was killed on this advanoe near the NEK* (Ij2) MaoLagan arriving off Hellfs Spit at l|ti*0 AM, now realited that hit first eohelon was too far north, and none of his force between Gaba Tepe and Ancao Cove$ when he arrived on shore at 5t00 AM, he sent his Brigade

(la) (l-178i 3-266) (I|2) (1-178,179; 3-267,268,269,270,271,272,273,2710 -20­ Major to look after his right flank. He climbed MaoLagan ridge to get a view of the situation* His anxiety was for his right flank* It was east of Gaba Tepe, that reports showed large Turkish oonoentrations of troops; he feared a counterattack from that direotion. He viewed the diffioult terrain, the tactical situation was obscure, he saw deep ravines in front of him which swallowed up his troops• He learned from a member of his com­ mand that part of the 11th Battalion and a composite company of all units were reorganising in Rest Gully, but with this exoeption the only rein­ forcements were a company of the 12th Battalion that had just reached the Plateau* The whole covering force was at least ashore) some of the advance elements were on the Second Ridge* The Turks had been surprised, they. were in no great numbers, the enewy fire was negligible, ho signs of enemy reinforcements* (2;3) MacLagan now thought that the role of the 2d Brigade had to be re­ versed, instead of prolonging the left, it must go in on his right, to carry out the task originally allotted to the Covering Force* (Uh)

MACUGAN'S DECISION TO DEFEND

MaoLagan now set himself to strengthen his position on Second Ridge and particularly on his right* He now made his first important decision; he directed the troops to dig in on the Seoond Ridge* This decision cost him his objective* He wished to reorganize his forces, and he feared a Turkish counterattack* He believed that the advance would be resumed on arrival of the 2d Brigade. He sent the company of the 12th Battalion to Seoond Ridge aad ordered a detachment up Monash Gully to oocupy Indenta­ tions on its eastern slopes, known later as Quinn's, Courtney1 s and Steele's postj the remainder of the detachment he sent to Baby 700. (I4.5) When MaoLagan had reached l|00 Plateau, he found a number of his troops on its western edge in disconnected detaohments and a few posts on the eastern edge* The thiok and steep slopes disrupted the organization of his battalions. He was unaware at this time that any of his troops were on the Third (gun) RIDGE. His decision was that in view of the dis-

U-179,18O| 3-275,280)

-21­ location of his battalions, it would be unsafe to make any attempt to occupy Gun Ridge with the frontage allotted to him, and that the line of the Second Ridge must for the time being be held by the Covering Force• His order called for intrenohments on the western edge of I4OO Plateau/Jourtn McLaurinfs Hill, Steele and Court Neysj a wide gap existed between Court­ neys and Baby 700• The detachments on the eastern edge of i|00 Plateau were to remain as covering detachments till the trenches in rear were completed* (146) By 7100 AM only a few Turkish snipers were on Second Ridge, scattered Australian detachments were in possession of it, including the eastern slopes of 1400 Plateau and the long pine covered spur called Pine Ridge at its southeastern extremity. A few small detachments had reached Gun Ridge, the final objective of the Covering Foroe* Lieut* Loutit of the 10th Battalion with a force of about thirty men had penetrated with this foroe to Gun Ridge, and three and a half miles away he could see the narrows* This was the nearest any Allied soldiers reached the straits during the campaign^ (itf) The advance detachments of the Covering Force at other points were held up by Turkish rifle fire and would not advance unless the line ad­ vanced as a whole* The hours which Third (Gun) Ridge was almost undefended by the Turks were slipping away during MacLaganfs delay* This was working to Turks advantage* (J48) COMMENTS t MaoLagan1a decision to the Covering Force to dig in on the Second Ridge was unsound* The only Turkish troops that had opposed his landing was a rifle company of the 27th Turkish Infantry, a couple of maohine guns and a battery of mountain guns* The artillery had been oaptured, the oom­ pany of riflemen had been dispersed, they were still annoying* MaoLagan's forcee at this time could have moved forward and oooupied the Third Ridge whioh was his objective, with very little opposition* He let looal oondi­ tions influenoe him too muoh* The diffioult terrain will always cause

h$) (1-181,182, 3-276,3Wtf359 37, Itf) (1-181,181822, 3513-51*5 ) ) I8) ( ^i6)

-22­ troops to get out of hand somewhat and «o will rifle fire, but this is to be expected in an advanoe* MaeLagan1 s foroe, from the time they landed until he made his decision, were out of oontrol, for reasons pre­ viously stated, in the improper disposition of his forces• His troubles at this time were largely imaginary. It is to be expeoted that the first wave or echelon on landing will be somewhat disorganised; it should push on and seoure a small arms bridgehead to protect the landing of the second wave, but duo to faulty dispositions, and improper timing of units coming ashore, these foroes had all merged and become intermixed, central oontrol was lost. While communication was most difficult, MaeLagan could have influenced his men by having them push forward on to the Third Ridge* He was worried about Turkish reserves. He expected a counterattack on his right, while the main counterattack actually came on his left flank. A commander should be apprehensive about the eneny reserves, because they will influence his future action. The British naval seaplanes had the mission of finding targets for the naval guns, and adjusting their fire, they had previously been used for reconnaissance purposes, they failed to use them on reconnaissanoe missions to locate the Turkish forces (reserves). Keep them constantly under observation and inform the commander, where are the enemy reserves, what is the direction of march, when will it arrive and where will it strike ray force, are some of the questions that MaoLagan oould have answered if the British Force had properly used the Aviation. A captive balloon was on one of the British Naval ships) it also had the mission of adjusting fire and pick­ ing up target for the Naval Guns, at an altitude of thirty-five hundred feet ••—these Turkish oolumns could have been picked up. Birdwoodfs Headquarters knew that these Reserves were in the vioinity of Boghali. The British cannot be exoused for not using the planes on the ground that they were a new part of warfare, as the faots show they were used on prior reconnaissances.- The Turks oould only use rifle and maohine gun fire for antiaircraft against the planes, and it would have been inef­ fective. Mustafa Kemal1 a main counterattack did notoome until UtOO PM on the afternoon of 25'Apkl I915. MaoLagan1s decision was made at 7t00 AM to dig in. His troubles outside of some disorganieation were -23­ imaginary until Kemal oame back and attacked at J+tOO PM and then he had real problems. It is a reasonable assumption that had the Covering Foroe had an aggressive oommander, they would have reached Third Ridge and would have held it against the Turkish counterattack, as the Australians held the poor position on Second Ridge with the Turks having better ob­ servation, against Turkish counterattacks* By nightfall Kemal only had 3000 men against the Australians! the Australians that day l&nded 15,000 men* The attack came on the left flank instead of the right; this sur­ prised MaoLagan* The outstanding lesson is faulty leadership, such a force, should have an aggressive leader, the desire to attain his objec­ tive* Other important lessons, failure to use the Naval Aviation properly, and the high command (Birdwood) not being ashore at this time* Sending troops in to action piecemeal* On the extreme left the situation was confused, and the delay in reinforcing these troops was disastrous* Troops on Russellfs Top and at the NEK, still consisted of all four battalions of the 3<* Brigade* Cas­ ualties among men and officers had been heavy* Captain Tullooh had crossed the NEK and reaohed the lower edge of Baby 700* So much confusion and uncertainty, supports long in reaching them, vital hours to Australians were slipping away, this attack was flowed and held up by concealed Turkish riflemen* (J4.9) General Hamilton had arrived off Anzao Cove on the battleship Queen Elisabeth; news reached him that the Covering Foroe was a mile inland, and only scattered Turkish rifle fire, with some slight shrapnel coming from Gaba/Tepe, there soen»d to be no other hostile artillery* Hamilton viewed the situation as satisfactory; he left at 6t00 AM for the toe of the peninsula* (50)

Baby 700 commanded Monash Gully throughout its length* Monash Gully formed the only line of communication between the upper portion of Second Ridge and the ooaet. It was plain that unless the head of First Ridge

(1)9) (l-181,182j 3-276) (50) (1-180j 7-128-129 [Hamilton* Diary]) was firmly held, a Turkish foroe moving units south from Baby 700 to Ru68ellfs Top oould outflank a position on Second Ridge and take it in rear. (51) Colonel J.W. McCay, commanding the 2d Australian Brigade landed at 6100 AM; he joined MaoLagan on the First Ridge. He agreed to place the 2d Brigade on MacLagan1s right, when MacLagan told him the left flank -was secure. MoCay ordered his troops on arrival to reinforce Boltonfs Ridge, as this would guard the right of the landing plaoe. MaoLagan and McCay now agreed on a boundary between brigades, which was a line running through east and west across the center of 1*00 Plateau and through Owen's Gully. (See Map 12) (52) Military and naval beaoh personnel did not oome ashore until lOt00 AM, 25 April 1915. The failure to have beaoh personnel on the beach earlier caused confusion, as wounded and dead were sent back in boats that were intended to transport the remainder of the brigades end the Indian Mountain Artillery. This prevented the Covering Force from getting any appreciable artillery support throughout the day. (53) MacLagan18 change of plan, many of his officers were ignorant of it, there was no such a thing as a system of communications, except by mes­ senger and some attempts at signalling• Unauthorized oalls for help at all points of the line, for reinforcements to fill gaps. Individual groups of high spirited men would dash away on their own initiative. Companies and battalions moved independently. The units of the entire 3d Brigade were now so entirely intermixed, and other troops arriving ashore being £ed into the line piecemeal, was contributing to the defeat of the Covering Force's mission. (5!+) On the extreme left Captain Tullooh with sixty men had reached the southeast slopes of Battleship Hill. This was between 9*00 and 10:00 AM. He sent a small detaohment to the seaward slope of the hill to proteot his left flank, hit advance up to this time had been slow, the Turkish riflemen were few, but their fire was effective. In his rear were small detachments of the 12th Battalion on Baby 700. (55) (51) (1-180) (52) (1-181! 3-362,363,365,368,369) (53) (l-18l« U-70, 83a) 5W (I-I8I41 3-3U3-3W;) (55) (1-187) .25­ MaoLagan had hie headquarters established on MaoLaurin's Hill* He deemed it important to hold this hill, and he wanted to stay in this exposed position to encourage his men by his presence. (56)

ACTION'OF TURKISH REINFORCEMENTS •

The remainder of the Turkish outpost battalion of the 27th Turkish Infantry that was defending the seotor where the Covering Force had landed, was extended over a front of five miles; this included the rifle oompany at Gaba Tepe and the company at Ari Burnu (See Sketch 5 A)* The remainder of this battalion that was not engaged up to this time was withdrawn and proceeded to the assistance of the outpost company that was resisting the Covering Force* The delaying power of concealed rifleman with aocurate fire is very great; however, there is no excuse for the Australians1 failure to reach their objective, as at 5tOO AM they had landed four thousand troops, and four thousand more Australians landed between 6t00 AM and 8100 AM* The Covering Force oould have es­ tablished themselves on Gun Ridge and Chunuk Bair before Turkish rein­ forcements arrived* (57) Colonel Sami Bey, commanding officer of the 27th Turkic* Infantry, with his headquarters at Uaidos, learned from his outpost battalion of the Australian landing at 5*3° AM« He thought this landing was a feint, and that the main attack would come at Bulair* He sent his two reserve battalions of the 27th Infantry and Machine Gun Company to waroh on Gaba Tepe* The force proceeded at onoe, and it was 9*00 AM before this force was seen by the Australian advance detachments* The Turkish troops came marching \xp Gun Ridge from the south. General Liman vori Sanders learned of the landing by the Arisaes at 6100 AM; he still thought it a feint and believed the main attaok would oome at Bulair* Von Sanders remained at Bulair* (58) Mustafa Kemal, commanding the 19th Turkish Division whioh was in reserve near Boghali, on being informed by Sami Bey of the Australian landing, near Chunuk Bair, Sand Bey had requested him to send some troops

(56) (1-187J 3-292.293,291+) (57) (I-I861 3-W+5) (58) (1-185) 3-Wtf) -26* to assist the 27th Infantry, as he would probably have to use the re­ mainder of his force (Sami Bey) to assist in the attack at Hellee. Kemal deoided if the Australians were seeking to capture Chunuk Bair it was no feint, it was the critical terrain, and if the Australians succeeded in obtaining it, the Turks would suffer for its loss, so on his own initiative, he started the 57th Turkish Regiment of the 19th Division, and a mountain battery to march on Chunuk Bair« Kemal accom­ panied the advance guard of the regiment • Shortly after 10*00 AM the advance elements of the 57th Infantry (Turkish) came in contact with Tullooh's force on Battleship Hill* (59) The regimental eanmiander of the 57th Turkish Infantry, having be­ come separated from the head of his column, Kemal gave orders to the 57th Infantry for the attaok against the Australians, to drive them from Battleship Hill and Baby 700* He gave instructions to the mountain battery where it would go into position^ He now considered the situation to be well in hand} he then left for Mai do 8, as he desired permission from Essad Pasha, Corps Commander, to use the whole of the 19th Division in counterattacking the Australians and driving them into the sea; Kemalfs division was in reserve and it could not be used without Essad Pasha's authority. He arrived at Mai doe at noon, explained the situation, Essad approved of his action and gfrve him permission to use his entire 19th Division. (60) At 9*30 AM, the reserve battalions of the 27th Infantry (Turkish) which had been sent forward by Sand Bey, began to advance westward from the oenter of Gun Ridge* The scattered detaohments of Australians on this ridge were now foroed to retire; the Turks now opened up effeotive

! rifle fire on 1*00 Plc&eau and MoLaurin s Hill# (61) MaoLagan now feared aH attack on the eastern slope of Lone Pine; he ordered the companies of the 9th Battalion who were digging in, toward the looality Lone Pine. He wanted-tham to hurry forward and meet the attaok* Seotidn after section of Australians rushed through, but the Turkish Rifle fire was very accurate on ijOO Plateau and only a few 59' 1-166; 3­ ;6f UI861 1-187; 3­

-27­ Australians succeeded in getting through it* A gap was now formed in this part of the line that caused anxiety throughout the day. (6S) Shortly after lOtOO AM, the leading troops of the 57th Turkish Infantry went into action on the seaward slopes of Battleship Hill; Tullooh** force was driven from Battleship Hill, the force on Baby 700 was driven of* the hill, a company of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Australian Brigade, which had landed at Jtlfi AM, and at 9t00 AM it was ordered to reinforce 1400 Plateau, became mixed with other units, lost direction, and at 10tl5 AM found itself at the NEK* Seeing Tulloch's defeat th?y went to his assistance, and recaptured Baby. 700 from the Turks. (63) General Bridges, commanding the First Australian Division had landed at Jtlfi AM, and established his headquarters in a gully at Plugges. He saw that the whole operations was badly mixed up, 3d Brigade at the wrong place, 2d Brigade on the right, the 1st Brigade that was to be division reserve, eight companies had been absorbed pieoemeal into the 3d Brigade. He had two companies on the beach; these were sent to the NEK to support the left. He had six oompanies of the 1st Brigade to land from the transports, two companies remained of the 8th Battalion, and the ijth Battalion for reserves, all else had been absorbed, little progress had been made. The Turks were beginning to arrive in force to oppose his forces. (6I4.) MacLagan now viewed with alarm the withdrawal of his troops from Battleship Hill and Baby 700. He had thought this flank secure. He sent a message to General Bridges at 10*35 AM that if he were not rein­ foro.ed on his left, he could not hold the position on Second Ridge. (65) Birdwood modified the original orders and authorised the employment of another brigade to assist the C&vering Force by extending its left. At 10tU5 Birdwood signalled from his headquarters on board the Queen, that he was landing one and a half battalions of the New Zealand Brigade.

(6S) l-187i 3-357,358) 63) (1-167,188, 3-295,296, (6k) (1-188,189; 3-3O3OOO | & 6 ) (65) (1-188! 3-292,293,29^,200) -26­ Australians succeeded in getting through it, A gap was now formed in this part of the line that caused anxiety throughout the day* (62)

Shortly after IOIOO AM, the leading troops of the 57th Turkish Infantry went into aotion on the seaward slopes of Battleship Hill* Tulloohfs foroe was driven from Battleship Hill, the force on Baby 700 uas driven of* the hill, a company of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Australian Brigade, which had ltnded at 7ti|0 AM, and at 9*00 AM it was ordered to reinforce I4OO Plateau, became mixed with other units, lost direction, and at 10s 15 AM found itself at the NEK. Seeing Tullochvs defeat they went to his assistance, and reoapturedBaby,700 from the Turks• (63 > General Bridges, commanding the First Australian Division had landed at Jtlfi AM, and established his headquarters in a gully at Plugges* He saw that the whole operations was badly mixed up, 3d Brigade at the wrong plaoe, 2d Brigade on the right, the 1st Brigade that was to be division reserve, eight companies had been absorbed piecemeal into the Jd Brigade* He had two companies on the beach; these were sent to the NEK to support the left. He had six companies of the 1st Brigade to land from the transports, two oompanies remained of the 8th Battalion, and the Ijth Battalion for reserves, all else had been absorbed, little progress had been made* The Turks were beginning to arrive in force to oppose his foroes* (6J4.) MaoLagan now viewed with alarm the withdrawal of his troops from Battleship Hill and Baby 700. He had thought this flank seoure* He sent a message to General Bridges at 10*35 AM that if he were not rein­ forc.ed on his left, he could not hold the position on Second Ridge* (65) Birdwood modified the original orders and authorized the employment of another brigade to assist the Covering Force by extending its left* At 10*^5 Birdwood signalled from his headquarters on board the Queen, that he was landing one and a half battalions of the New Zealand Brigade*

62) I-I871 3-357,358) 63) 1-187,188, 3-295,206, (6k) (1-188,189, 3-3OO| £-68) (65) (1-188, 3-29e,S93t29U,j -28­ Bridges decided to put these troops in on his left flank, with orders to reinforce the line of Baby 700, by way of Walkers Ridge* The bat­ talion, after landing started in this direotion, but after going some distance, the slopes were so difficult and exposed that General Walker, who was with the battalion, unaware of the existence of the Razor Edge, issued orders to retire, and to proceed to Russell's Top by way of Plugges Plateau. The change of plan was oonfusing, many of the men could not be reached or recalled, the remainder like the earlier arrivals lost their way, companies and platoons became intermixed and soattered, some of the men found themselves on I4DO Plateau, others on McLaurinfs Hill, others at the head of Monash Gully, and not more than one company reached the NEK before lt30 PM in the afternoon* By 3*00 PM in the afternoon, the Australian and New Zealand troops on the left consisted of parts of seven battalions, all very intermixed and all worn out by a series of spasmodic and disjointed attacks by the 57th Turkish Infantry* There was no senior commander on this part of the front* The soattered com­ panies had no knowledge of what was required of them* For several hours the line had moved backward and forward over Baby 700* Each reinforcing detachment in turn succeeding in making a little headway* Only to be stopped by Turkish rifle fire* Since It00 PM, from the vicinity of Chunuk Bair, Turkish mountain guns shelled this part of the line with shrapnel; ths Australians had no artillery to oounterbattery it* (66)

MAIN TURKISH COUNTERATTACK

Mustafa Kemal launohed the main counterattack at i|*00 PM* The Australians were driv.en from Baby 700, the Australians falling back on Popefs and MoLaurinfs Hill where they formed the garrison known as Quints post* A few men remained at the southern end of the NEK* The road lay open to the heart of the An&ao position, but the Turks were too exhausted and disorganised to take advantage of the situation* (67)

(66) (1-188,189,190; 3-300,301; i*-68) (67) (1-190,191; 3-313#3U*,315#318I U-70)

-29­ The Australians lying out in the thick scrub, ignorant of the situation, man separated from their leaders and each other, under ar­ tillery firef and unsupported by artillery, not knowing what was expected of them, the breaking point for many had passed* This was the oondition when Ken»l launched his counterattack at 1**00 PM* (68)

COMMENTS* The battleships failed to interdict the Turkish reserves when they formed for the attack, firing on them would have delayed the columns, but the ooranunioations from shore to ship was faulty. Bridges and MaoLagan did not seem to grasp the situations they answered calls for reinforcements and sent them forward piecemeal into the line; units be­ came separated. (lost and intermixed* \ Birdwopd could know little of the

\ : > ' ' ' * '• •' / ' I * ••',"• '/••'' • • - ' • \ • / ; * real situation by being aboard i battleship*' Failure in the plan to have beaoh head personnel landed early, was the oause of failure to get the artillery ashore; artillery should have followed the 3d echelon of the Covering Foroe, when sick, wounded and dead were placed on the boats to carry them back to the ships, it interfered with all combat troops that were to come ashore, the combat troops should have had first priority, sick and wounded should have been oared for by the medical de­ tachment that was ashore, evacuation to the ships after the combat troops were adhore* MaoLagan failed to estimate what was the critical terrain, namely the dominating ground at Chunuk Bair* His fear was for a oounter­ attaok on his right; it came on his left from the dominating terrain Chunuk Bair and Hill 971* Sami Beyfs two reserve battalions of the 27th Regiment of Inf aiitry were sent into aotion as early as he could get them there; they stopped the Australian advance from i+00 Plateau* The outpost battalion of the 27th Infantry did 'commendable work; the group that was unopposed moved to assist the oompany that the Australians were forcing baok* The result shows what with a few riflemen on difficult terrain oan accomplish against a large number of troops who are untrained* The Turkish artillery had its effect on the Australians; what the Turks possessed rendered excellent support to their infantry* Mustafa Kemal analysed the » (68) (I-19O1 3-307,308,3110 -30­ situation properly; he knew the critical terrain ftnd want after it to deny it to the Australians• He sent his best regiment, the 57th Infantry, into action early, and the commendable part was that he went forward to see for himself what should be done. In many cases throughout the World War, too iaany leaders of the higher command were content to sit baok too far to the rear and let subordinate leaders solve problems that required the higher command to solve* Fortunately for the Turks and unfortunately for the Anzaos, Mustafa Keraal was an aggressive leader; he possessed the offensive spirit that too often was laoking in the higher command* When the 57th Infantry arrived at 10:00 AM in the vicinity of Battleship Hill, the objective for the Covering Force was gone forever, and the Ansac Corps was stopped* Keraal in bringing his 19th Division into action put the Anxao Corps on the defensive* Bridges and MaoLagan were the defen­ sive type of leaders* Their whole leadership throughout the day, is a monument to unfitness and gross stupidity* If Loutit, with thirty men could reaoh Gun Ridge early in the morning, the Covering Force could have reached it* In summing up, MacLagan lacked the offensive spirit; he failed to push vigorously forward when his orders called for that action* He let local conditions influenoe him too muoh in making his decisions* The Australians were untrained for such an operation; it takes something besides individual bravery and enthusiasm to win suocess in such a type of operation* Bridges, on landing should have ordered MacLagan to push forward instead of acquiescing in his actions, he should have held his reserves out* A reorganization on the Third Ridge would have been proper* Even with untrained troops with aggressive leaders in oommand the operation would have been a suocess instead of a failure*

Captain Salmonson with thirty-three men of five different battalions, stopped the advance of the Turks on the seaward side of Walkers Ridge* He realized the importance of holding the left flank of the Australian position he held out until relieved* (69) At 6t00 PM the situation at the NEK was obscure, a dangerous gap existed between Second Ridge and Braunds troops on Walkers Ridge* MaoLagan thinking that tho Turks would attack in his rear any moment, asked for

(69) (1-191; 3­ the i|th Australian Brigade to be sent up to fill the gap* Colonel Pope took two companies of the l6th Battalion and one oompany of the 15th Battalion, and two platoons of New Zealanders* Pope oocupied the wedge- shaped hill that bore his name. Some of Pope's men in the rear lost direction and were used to reinforce the garrisons of Steele and Courtney posts* At dark there was a gap between Pope and Braund, and between Popefs right and the troops on Second Ridge* The Turks were too tired and disorganized to profit by the situation* (70) On Second Ridge and particularly on 1*00 Plateau, portions of no less than 12 battalions of the 1st Australian Division, were engaged and fought all afternoon; on this part of the front the Australians had a somewhat better position than on the left, the Turks had superior observation* A Turkish mountain battery had',gone into action on this . ' ) ' \ . . . .. part of the front at lit00 AM, later in the afternoon three Turkish batteries covered this position with accurate shrapnel fire* The Aus­ tralians were out in the open, lacked artillery support, the advance de­ taohments ofi I4OO Plateau held their positions throughout the day* In rear where the 9^h Battalion had advanced in the morning, there was a wide gap in the line on the western edge of the plateau; this gap was filled by the Ijth Battalion* This line consisted of irregular shallow trenches from Boltonfs Ridge seaward to a point on l\O0 Plateau northeast of McKays Hill, a total frontage of twelve hundred yards* (71) At dark the Australian advance detachments fell back to the main position* The Turks were too disorganized to follow* On this part of the front, at 10*00 PM, a detaohment of the 27th Turkish Infantry ad­ vanced on the front of the ifth and 8th Battalions but were driven back* (72) Absence of artillery support during a greater part of the day was a severe handicap to the Australians* One mountain battery was ashore by 9*00 AM, and went into position on I4OO Plateau; it was en­ filaded by Turkish guns from Chunuk Bair, and went out of aotion at (70 (71 (72 1-192,1931 3-U52)

-32­ 2t30 PM* This battery and one 18-pounder was the only Australian artillery available for use until 6tOO PM* Additional artillery had been sent ashore, but through error was sent baok to the ships* A handicap as previously commented on was the lack of organisation at the beaches, which handicapped what was to come ashore• Naval gunfire was inadequate» Due to faulty communications from shore to ship, very little support came from the Naval Squadron on 25 April 1915* So*e oounterbattery against a Turkish battery by the cruiser Baocahante had been fired, but results were negligible * (73) The result of the days fighting, 15,000 men were ashore, a favorable beach had been secured, A position occupied and held against counter­ attack, a dangerous gap existed on the loft of the line* Casualties for the Australian foroe on 25 April was approximately 2000; only half the objective of the covering foroe had been gained* Covering Force had failed. All units ashore were widely scattered and intermixed* A number of leaderless men had been straggling back to the beach since It00 FM* Many stated they came back, as there were rumors going the rounds, the foroe was to retire* Some stated they were hungry, some stated they were in search of orders* Hundreds were colleoted and sent to reinforce the left flank* First Division Headquarters was ntuoh alarmed over the oondi­ tions on the beaoh* (7l+) Bridges expected the Turks to renew the attack at daylight, 26 April, and that it would bring disaster to his forces* The true pioture the Turks were more disorganized than the Australians, they had suffered 2000 casualties. From daybreak until 9*30 AM, not more than 500 Turks oppos« ed the Australians, and from 9*30 AM until dark, a gradually increasing number at no time exceeded six Turkish battalions* (75) Mustafa Kemal's troops at dark, 25 April, the 2d Battalion of the 57th Turkish Infantry had practioally oeased to exist as an organisation, due to excessive casualties in their attaoks. The First Battalion of the same regiment suffered heavily, the 3d Battalion of the 57th Infantry was

(73) (l-193fl*tl95i i*-70) (7U) (1-196,1971 3-2*5^1*66) (75) (l-197f198j 3­ -33* ordered to fill the gap between remnants of the 2d and 1st Battalions, this battalion had between eighty and ninety men for the task* The 27th Infantry that attaoked 1|DO Plateau was oompletely worn out; it had suffered many casualties. Kemal had the 77th Arab Regiment of Infantry* these troops were inferior to the Turkish troops. He ordered them to attack McLaurin's Hill at dark. After launching the attack, they fled in panic from Australian rifle and machine gun fire, back to Gun Ridge* and from that position they fired into the backs of the 27th and 57th Turkish Infantry. The 72d Arab Regiment did not arrive until daylight 26 April 1915# The' Turkish offioial source gives the effective stremgth of the 27th and 57th Infantry as IJOOO men and officers; these two regi­ ments in the days fighting had suffered fifty percent losses. The 77th Arab Regiment suffered only slightly, and the 72d Regiment did not get into action on ?5 April. The 27th and 57th Infantry and a few Turkish artillery batteries had stopped the Australian advance. (76) Kemal1 s only reserve left in his 19th Division was the 72d Ai*ab Regiment and what he could gather of the 77th Regiment. The British official sources state that the Ansacs would have succeeded if they had pushed on, and that they were near a triumph but did not knew it; this same souroe quoting Frederick the Great, "If we all knew before a battle as much as we know after its conclusion, everyone of us would be a great general." Kemal, due to the great disorganization had to wait twonty­ four hours for new troops before renewing the offensive, and it is to be noted that when they arrived Kemal attaoked. (77) The British offioial summary of the operation* The wrong landing had been made, piecemeal landing of organisations. Chain of oommand and communication poor. Individual groups of high spirited men went forward on their own initiative. Intermixture of units caused plan to fail* (78) A small but well disciplined foroe of Mustafa Keraal, exoluding the Arab regiments, with some artillery support, had stopped the Australian advanoe, illustrating the great difficulty that a landing foroe will en­

(76) (1-199) 3-U77) (77) 1-198,199; 3­ (78) (l-200| U-70) counter in front of a small body of troops, with stubborn resistance, they can get the maximum of delay• ' General von Sanders could now move his main reserve; the Antao Covering Foroe had failed; the whole Aus­ tralian Corps had failed. (79) General Bridges, becoming alarmed over the situation, on the advice of his brigade commanders, advised evacuation of the foroes. Birdwood had come ashore; he at first disapproved of it, but later gave it his approval• < He communicated with General Hamilton on board the battleship Queen Elisabeth* Hamilton refused the request of Birdwood, after the Naval Commander of Squadron No. 2 had stated it would take two days to reembark thenu Hamilton1 s decision was to stick and dig in, which they did. (80) The generalMii^e held at Nightfall, by the'(?bverin£ Fofrce a^d the i other troops that had landed, the 2d Australian Brigade was on the right from Bo It onfs Ridge to the middle of i|00 Plateau, next came the 1st and Jd Brigade (Covering Force). These two units were intermixed, extending to the north Quinnfs Post on Second Ridge. From Quinnfs Post the line bent sharply back across the head of Monash Gully to the Center of Russell's Top and was then continued down the spur known as Walker's Ridge. There was a mixed party of the 1+th Australian Brigade under Colonel Pope of the l6th Battalion on Pope's Hill, the spur which juts into the head of Monash Gully from Baby 700, but with this exception the head of the Gully and all the northern portion of Russell's top, lay open to the enemy. The Turks on Baby 700 had an almost uninterrupted view of the Gully bed whioh formad the only means of communication be­ tween Second Ridge and the sea. Located at the head of Walker's Ridge was Lieut.Col. Braund with two depleted companies of the 2d Australian Battalion* while below him were two companies of the Canterbury Bat­ talion. The Australian position at nightfall was one and half miles long and three quarters of a mile deep; this is practically the line as held when the Australians evacuated, it was the line that MaoLagan had

(79) (1-2551 3-2l40,ltf7) J* (80) (1-267,268,269,2711 ordered the Covering Foroe to dig in on, with the exoeption on Battle­ ship Hill and Baby 700 which was now held by the Turks* (81) Colonel McLaurin, commanding the First Australian Brigade, suoceeded MacLagan in oommand of the line held by tho 3d Brigade* The Australians made no attempt to advance on the 26th April 1915* reorganization and consolidation of the position* The 3d Brigade /waswithdrawn under cover of darkness, commencing on the night of 26-27 April 1915» to the beaoh, for reorganization and rest* The Turks did not attempt and advance on 26 April 1915* This concludes the operations and conduot of the Covering Force for 25-26 April 1915^ (82)

IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS OF THE CONDUCT OF THE COVERING FORCE* The initial dispositions of the battalions of the Covering Force on the battleship tows and in the destroyers was faulty, it split the tactical organizations; it would have been better to have battalions landed as a unit* The Reserve Battalion should have been held together as a unit, and landed at a central point* Each wave oh landing should have had one commander, instead of several acting independently. The Australians landed their units too close together; there should have been an interval of thirty to forty minutes between echelons* This improper timing and faulty dispositions is what caused intermixing of units* The first echelon will always be disorganized, the second one following assuming the 1st echelon has made progress, could have been pushed through where the going was good, as we have seen how units beoame absorbed* The Navy's error failed to place them at the proper beaoh, putting them on more difficult terrain to advanoe over, but a defiladed beach was secured* The Navy18 error was a serious one; it should call for oareful reoonnais­ sance of the beaohes and check the points that you will sail on during darkness* The naval commander should have been on the starboard side instead of on the port side of the formation* Good knowledge should be obtained of the ourrents adjaoent to the beaohes in any landing operation

(81) (l-272> 3-5251 (82) (1-272, 7-145) -36­ contemplated* In event of a wrong landing an alternate plan should have been prepared beforehand what aotion the troops were to follow* Gun Ridge was 2500 yards from the beach, just a good small arms bridgehead* The 1st echelon should have pushed on to this, tho 2d and echelons could have secured the ridge, the reserve plaoed at a point or looality where it was expected to be used. 'As we view the operations it was confusion from the beginning until the end, due to bad timing, dis­ positions and lack of aggressive leadership* Failure to use the naval aviation was a serious error* The Turkish reserves moved to their position, and were not discovered until they ad­ vanoed to the attack* Failure of beach head personnel to arrive promptly ashore, to take charge of the situation at the beach, caused trouble in getting the ar­ tillery ashore and other conbat troops* MaoLagan's deoision to dig in caused the failure of the whole opera­ tion; he lacked aggressive leadership, he was hesitant, and did not know what to do* One thing he could have done was to have pushed his troops to their objective and there reorganized* He could have reached his ob­ jective, it was two and a half hours before reserves from Boghali reached the Gun Ridge, after MacLagan made his deoision* Bridges and Birdwood both failed to keep in touch with the situation, and plaoed the troops pieoemeal into action* The Australian and New Zealand troops were brave and enthusiastic, but they were poorly trained, their idea was rushing everything when held up, instead of outflanking it* As individuals they were exoellent, but functioning as an organization was entirely different* They were unsuited and not properly trained for such an operation, and this applies more to the higher command than to the individual soldier* Mustafa Kemal and Sami Bey aoted with initiative; Kemal was an aggressive type of leader, it was refleoted in his troops* The 27th and 57th Turkish Regiments of Infantry gave all that was expeoted of them* and they performed most exoellently against a superior foroe* The Arab troops

-37­ were worthless• The Australians had underestimated the Turks1 fighting ability, and they were surprised at his resistance. Kemal seoured the critical terrain, Chunuk Bair and from there he had all the advantage of observation and superior ground for launching his counterattack. The Australian and New Zealand Corps, through lack of aggressive leadership on the part of the higher command failed to carry out their mission; suoh operations call for the most aggressive leadership, the most carefully prepared plans mean nothing if not carried out with resolution*

LESSONSt Careful and correct planning for a landing operation* Troops to be well trained for this operation* Correot disposition of units; avoid splitting of tactical organizations. Alternate plan to be used in oase of the plan being unworkable. Landing to be made just at dawn* A simple system of communications* Centralized oontrol of command and of eaoh echelon landing* Where battalions land abreast, specify boundaries, etc. Full use to be made of all reconnaissance agencies* Surprise in landing, surprise in oounterattaok. Secrecy in the location of seotor reserves for the defense* The proper timing of echelons arriving on shore* Beaoh head personnel to land at an early hour* Artillery to follow the infantry ashore as soon as practicable. An elastic system of defense preferable to a oordon system. The Turks should have had a stronger force near Gaba Tepe, at least a regiment. The failure of the Australians to push forward after landing was the only thing that prevented their reaching Gun Ridge in the early morning hour. The commander of the Forces should keep in touch with the situation and remember his mission* A small arms bridgehead to be established initially, then a bridge­ head for the artillery* -38­ THE OUTSTANDING LESSON* Is the faulty leadership of the Australian high command, in their failure to push aggressively in* land to secure their objeotive, and the aggressive leadership of Mustafa Kemal in stopping the Australian advance*

Captain; Infantry (DOL)

-39­ BIBLIOGRAPHY

Keyt (1-10, 15) s.No, 1 text (below) pages 10 and

1 # British Official History, Gallipoli, by Brigadier General Aspinall-Oglander, British Army. London: William Heineman, Ltd* 1929.

2 # British Official History, Gallipolij Maps and Appendices, compiled by Major Beoke, British Array. Londoni William Heineman, Ltd*, 1929* 3* Official History of Australia in the World War, Volume I, "Story of the Anzao", by G*E*W* Bean. Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson, Ltd*, l j Dardanelles Expedition - Gallipoli, by Captain W*D* Pules ton, U*S*- Na*vy# Menasha, Wisconsin: Banta Publishing Company, 1926* 5» Hamilton1 s Diary (Gallipoli Diary), by General Ian Hamilton, Volume I# New York: George Do ran and Company, 1920 • 6» Dardanelles Commission Reports, by Dardanelles Commission* Londont His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917#

7* The Dardanelles, by Major General C»Et Callwell, KCB# New Yorkt Houghton Mifflin Con^any, 1919# 8. Allied and Turkish Operations at Gallipoli, 1915, by Andrew Moses* Washington, D#C#* Army War College, I929 (Mimeographed)

All sources except Source 8 were obtained from the Library, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leaverworth, Kansas* Source 8 obtained from the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga#

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