Changes in Partners' Relative Incomes and the Gender Revolution
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Changes in Partners' Relative Incomes and the Gender Revolution Agnese Vitali University of Southampton and ESRC Centre for Population Change [email protected] Extended abstract prepared for the Population Association of America Annual Meeting 2017 Aim This paper provides an overview of trends in couples’ relative incomes between the 1980s until the 2010s across 15 OECD countries. Theoretical framework and hypotheses The multiple equilibrium and the two-phase gender revolution theories (Arpino et al., 2015, Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015, Goldscheider et al., 2015) predict that, once gender equality in all spheres of life is reached, a new model of the family will become widespread, with higher fertility and more stable unions. During the different phases of the gender revolution, partners’ relative incomes change adapting to the new roles of women and men (Bianchi et al. 1999; Esping-Andersen 2009; England 2010; Goldin 2006). In a gender-egalitarian society, such changes will be fuelled by the eradication of those structural barriers which today interfere with the possibility of women and men to earn an equal pay for an equal job such as gender pay gaps, motherhood wage penalties, lack of parental leave provision for men, etc. (OECD 2016). This paper asks how will the distribution of relative incomes look like in the gender-egalitarian equilibrium? We could envisage that, in equilibrium, men and women will be engaging in both market-work activities and in caring responsibility equally, i.e. for an equal amount of time and with an equal pay. It would be however unrealistic to expect that each partner will contribute exactly 50% of the couple’s incomes. In fact, men and women in a gender-egalitarian partnership need not share equally all caring responsibility, nor need they be expected to work an exact amount of hours throughout the length of their relationship. We could envisage that, in a gender-egalitarian equilibrium, partners are flexible and exchangeable into both breadwinning and caring responsibilities (Gerson, 2010). They may take turns and engage more in work responsibilities at particular stages of their (or their partners’) life course and more in caring responsibilities in other stages. Taking turns may be the result of individual preferences e.g. driven by the will to experiment a particular career, or may be imposed by structural characteristics of the labour market. Under this scenario, we shall find that the distribution of partners’ relative incomes has shifted over time from being positively skewed (i.e. with the majority of couples abiding to the male-breadwinner model) during the 1980s, to becoming more symmetrical (i.e. with the majority of partners being equal earners). In equilibrium, we expect the share of the income provided by the woman to resemble a bell-shape distribution with a mean equal to 50%, i.e. we expect the arrangement whereby partners contribute equally to the household income to be most frequent. The symmetry of the distribution means that the expected frequency of any deviation from equality of incomes is non-gendered: the share of couples where the woman contributes x% of the couples’ incomes to be equal to the share of couples where she contributes (100–x)%. Also, in equilibrium, we expect the share of male-breadwinner couples to be the same as the share of female-breadwinner couples. Furthermore, we expect couples with a perfect specialization of gender roles at a given point in time to be more numerous than dual-earner couples with women or men. In other words, we expect the distribution of couples’ relative incomes to have three peaks: one corresponding to equality of earnings among partners, and the other two corresponding to the male and the female-breadwinner couples. Such scenario is represented in Figure 1. We shall also expect the above- mentioned changes to be more pronounced in those countries which are closer to completing the gender 1 revolution, namely the Scandinavian countries, and more modest in those countries where the revolution is still in its infant phase, such as the Southern European, German-speaking and Eastern-European countries. The scenario presented in Figure 1 implicitly hypothesises that the majority of couples will be characterized by a certain degree of homogamy among partners in terms of e.g. education, occupation and age (hence work experience). Such an assumption seems reasonable in light of recent findings on assortative mating in Europe and North America which documented a substantial increase in couples’ educational homogamy (Grow and Van Bavel 2015). Partners’ relative incomes were found to be affected by the shift in the educational composition of couples: the share of equal earners as well as female breadwinners has been increasing with the increasing educational attainment of women (Klesment and Van Bavel 2017; Esteve et al. 2016). However, age hypergamy still prevails (England and McClintock 2009). Figure 1: Expected distribution of couples’ relative incomes in gender-egalitarian equilibrium Data This contribution makes use of data form the Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS) which provides cross- sectional micro-level household data on income and socio-demographic information for several OECD countries. This paper focuses on 15 OECD countries for which LIS provides data spanning between the late1980s and the 2010s: Austria, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany (West), Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. LIS was not expressively designed to compare countries instead it harmonizes existing national datasets. It follows that the reference period is not the same across all samples. The sample is constituted of currently co-residing heterosexual couples where partners are aged between 25 and 54 years old (prime earning age), none of the partners is disabled, in education, or retired and such that the couples’ combined labour income is not equal to zero. Preliminary Results Figure 2 reports the distribution of the woman’s contribution to the couple income for selected countries. This distribution for the latest years is conform to what found for the 2010s by (Bertrand et al. (2015), Klesment and Van Bavel (2015)) using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), respectively. The greatest change in terms of couples’ relative incomes between the late 1980s and the early 2010s is the decline of the male-breadwinner couple: the share of women who do not contribute at all to the couple’s income declined substantially in most countries. In Sweden the share of women with no income was as low as 6% already in 1987 and did not change up to 2013. Today, the share of women with a zero income still varies remarkably across countries, ranging from 6% and 8% in Sweden and Norway, respectively, up to 39% in Italy. Between the late 1980s and the 2010s women’s contribution to the couples’ income increased in all countries. However, the increase has been uneven and concentrated in the left tail of the relative incomes’ distribution. In other words, it is the share of couples where women contribute 50% or less that increased the most since the 1980s. The share of couples where women earn between 50% and 70% of the couples’ incomes has also increased, but to a lesser extent. The highest increases in the share of couples with women as main earners (i.e. earning more than 50% of the couple’s incomes) are found in Norway, United Kingdom, and Canada. Remarkably, there is no or very little change over time in the share of couples where women earn between 71% and 99% or more of their household income. Interestingly, in most countries, the share of female-breadwinner couples (i.e. couples where the woman earns 100% of the couples’ incomes) increased substantially between 2005 and 2013 in those countries especially affected by the 2008 economic crisis, passing from 2.52% to 10.23% in Spain and from 1.69% to 4.49% in Italy. Such trend is observed also during the late 1980s and the early-1990s, i.e. during the economic downturn which followed the 2 1987 Black Monday and caused unemployment rates to soar, especially in the male-dominated job sectors. We can interpret the high share of female-breadwinner couples in such years as a result of the increased unemployment for men during times of economic crisis (Vitali and Arpino 2016). Conclusions The distribution of the couples’ relative incomes has become, during the past forty years, more symmetrical and shifted towards the right, consistently with the gender revolution theory. The distribution of relative incomes appears to be more symmetrical in Denmark, Sweden and Norway than elsewhere. In all Scandinavian countries, the mean of the distribution is however still below the 50% that we would predict in a gender-egalitarian equilibrium. Also, the share of male-breadwinner couples is still higher than the share of female-breadwinner couples, although such differences have been declining over time. The prevalence of female-breadwinner couples, instead, is not higher in Scandinavian countries, as the gender revolution theory would predict. The existence of female-breadwinners seems to be linked to the business cycle more than to gender equality. The economic crisis has recently boosted the increase in dual-earners and female-breadwinner couples in Southern- European countries and might have accelerated the diffusion of gender-egalitarian attitudes, at least among certain population strata. The final version of the paper will include other OECD countries for which data are available and will include figures of couples’ relative incomes by the partners’ socio-demographic characteristics e.g. education, birth cohort, presence of children. The theoretical framework will incorporate expectations on such individual characteristics. References Arpino, B., Esping-Andersen, G.