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Moving to a multi-track approach?

Despite improved procedures at the UN­ Deterioration is a partnership encompassing the Portuguese sponsored Tripartite Talks, and new Inside , however, things are very and Indonesian authorities, the UN, East voices at the All-inclusive Intra East different. While Bishop Belo and Jose Timorese political leaders, and Indonesian Timorese Dialogue (AIETD), hopes for Ramos-Horta were receiving their Nobel and East Timorese religious leaders. This progress towards peace in East Timor peace prize late last year, human rights would build on and support processes at work are tempered by the reality on the abuses in East Timor were multiplying. at the grassroots, where any diplomatic ground. With a growing number of The first half of 1997 represented a agreement has to be accepted and lived out people falling victim to human rights 'marked deterioration' in violations, if it is to work. abuses, future peacemaking initiatives according to the East Timor Human Rights On 23 September this year the European must involve voices from below. Centre in Melbourne. Indeed, there seems Union defended the rights of East Timor little chance of change while the peace as represented in UN resolutions. EU t the diplomatic level things seem to have process remains one-dimensional, could reinforce this stance by Aimproved for East Timor. The first round operating almost entirely from the top calling for a broadening of discussions as a of Tripartite Talks under UN auspices to be down. first stage towards achieving international held since Kofi Annan took over as UN Research on peace processes suggests partnership. This would also be in line secretary-general introduced changes in that multi-track approaches, with with the EU 's Common Position on East negotiating procedures: senior officials will in simultaneous initiatives at many levels, Timor, which is analysed in a special future meet for longer and more frequently work best. While the AIETD is itself an supplement in this issue of Timor Link. The and their meetings will be chaired by Annan's attempt to move beyond the ministerial recommendations made in this paper personal representative on East Timor, meetings, it remains inadequate . The might prompt stronger calls for serious Jamsheed Marker. Meanwhile, the next exclusion of political questions from the dialogue between all concerned. • AIETD meeting in October will include more agenda bars discussion of fundamental representatives of women and young people. issues while, despite the addition of five Summary Hopes offurther diplomatic progress were more participants, the hand-picked aroused in July when the South African delegates do not represent the entire This month's Timor Link is a special issue president, Nelson Mandela, visited the spectrum of East Timorese opinion. canying an in-depth supplement on the imprisoned Timorese resistance leader, What is needed is a mechanism for European Union's Common Position on East Xanana Gusmao, and called on President consulting far greater numbers of Timor, adopted in June last year. Written by Suharto to release him. Despite good relations ordinary East Timorese people, Eilis Ward, a PhD candidate in Political between South Africa and Indonesia (bilateral particularly women. A peacebuilding Science at Trinity College, Dublin, 'EU Policy trade between the two countries has more in1t1ative that works from below, on East Timor: Fulfilling the potential of the than tripled since 1993) the Indonesian complementing the top-down approach, Common Position' argues that the Common quickly discounted an early would be timely and could have a lasting Position can provide a solid framework for release of Gusmao. Officials said they would effect, a lthough no one should progressive change in the region. Ward also be prepared to consider it only in exchange underestimate the difficulties. makes firm recommendations for using the for 's recognition of Indonesian European policy to further the cause of sovereignty over East Timor. Nevertheless, Partnership peace. the initiative has opened up fresh discussions Peacemaking at the diplomatic level needs Also in this issue, we report on the which may well be taken forward during to be supported and linked to continued deterioration in human rights in Suharto's visit to South Africa in November. peacemaking among the increasingly East Timor in the first half of this year. We diverse population of East Timor. The argue that, despite improvements in the IN THIS ISSUE church has the capacity to appeal to procedures for peace talks, a more participa­ Groundswell of abuses 2 people for recon~iliation, and to secure it. tory approach to peacemaking is needed. inlD8 for change 2 It has already made some effort to do so, as Plus, Pat Smythe describes the Portuguese A shift in view 3 we can see from the successive calls for Catholic church's growing awareness of the lnlvllew: Jase ...... 4 peace and reconciliation in Bishop Belo's situation in East Timor and the plight of the "-" af tlle real 4 pastoral letters. But a universally owned Timorese, and we review a new publication i5Peetal ...... process could do much more. with shocking photographic evidence of EU paliCJ an ,,_ At the international level what is needed torture in the territory. REPORT NEWS FROM EAST TIMOR

Groundswell /) Atauro East {jMaumeta of abuses Tim or

alibo Alnaro ' o : •. • • • Same Human rights abuses on the ground in Pante- '- -··· ! Malians East Timor have continued to increase Mecassar •••• _.I Betano o

OecusseJ IM 'r. \ Suai • Pacific this year, according to a new human ~ .• ---. :' est 11mor ._ so - -.,) {Indonesia) : Ocean rights report. Kl!omt1res

he report, Human Rights Deteriorate in TEast Timar from the Melbourne-based East Timor Human Rights Centre (ETHRC), documents violations of human rights in the first half of 1997. Many of Indian these were carried out by security forces Ocean responding to the occupation of the 1000 Austrian embassy in Jakarta in March, to @John W1ddlngh1m demonstrations held during the visit of UN special representative , Jamsheed Marker, and during the Indonesian EAST TIMOR: Time for change national elections in May. The report also documents a large number of arbitrary Timor, area 7,400 square miles, is one of the been unable to eliminate the desire of the East arrests and detentions, many involving easternmost islands of the Indonesian T11Dorese for self-determination and an anned torture and disappearances. It estimates archipelago and lies 300 miles north of resistance movement still remains in the hills. that 707 people were arrested between Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western Although the invasion has been condemned January and July, twice as many as in the part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, by successive UN resolutiom, the international previous year, and points out that these belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was community has done little or nothing to arrests are usually conducted by the for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. implement them, given the major economic military rather than the police In 1974 Portugal began decolonising East and geopolitical interests of the United States, (contravening Indonesian law), that they Timor. Newly formed political parties Japan and particularly Australia in the region. are made without warrants, and that discussed options for the future. The Indonesia's crucial strategic location and usually lawyers are not provided. Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially regional status - it has the world's fifth largest The report notes that at least 40 people favoured federation with Portugal but then population, and large reserves of oil and other died as a result of Operasi Gerakan Tuntas formed a coalition with , the natural resources - have all encouraged the (Operation Extermination), which aimed nationalist liberation movement, to demand world to downplay East Timor's agony. to crush Falintil (the armed East Timorese independence. A small third party, Apodeti, In recent years, however, several events resistance) and the Clandestine Front was used as a vehicle for Indonesian have combined to break East T11Dor's isolation following an increase in Falintil activity propaganda in favour of integration. and bring its continued occupation to inter­ during the election period. Among the On 11August1975 the VDT staged a coup national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited dead was David Alex, a prominent Falintil to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene the territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a commander, deputy to Konis Santana, and if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still leader of the resistance in the Baucau war 1,500 people lost their lives. By September considered the administering authority of East area. The circumstances surrounding 1975, however, Fretilin was in control of Timor by the UN, created huge expectations Alex· s death are still unclear. virtually all of , following of change. To great disappointment in East The overall picture presented by the the defection of Timorese colonial troops to Timor, the delegation was forced in October report is bleak, and efforts must be the liberation movement's side. 1991 to call off its visit. redoubled to persuade Indonesia to Indonesia, like the United States, was On 12November1991 Indonesian troops implement the resolution passed in April worried by the proximity of an independent shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese by the UN Commission on Human Rights state with radical policies and continued to civilians dming a funeral procession held at the and to permit a UN presence in East threaten East Timor, despite previous Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the East Tanorese Tim or. assurances that Jakarta would respect the right capital, for a victim of repression. Witnessed of the East Timorese to independence. In by foreign journalists, the Santa Cruz llUl8ll8Q'e • On 15 Mav the UN Working Group on September 1975 Indonesia dosed West Timor provided indisputable evidence of Indonesian Arbitrary Detention accepted evidence to journalists and on 7 December it launched atrocities. submitted bv the ETHRC and ruled that a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the The Santa Cruz massacre has forced the arrest of a group of East Timorese in knowledge of the United States and the June 1996 had been arbitrary and encouragement of Australia. After a fraudulent contravened Articles 9 and 10 of the 'act of self-determination' in May 1976, East Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Timor was declared to be Indonesia's '27th It referred the cases of three of the Province' in July 1976. The United Nations detainees to the Committee on the regards the annexation as i11egaL Rights of the Child and called on The invasion and annexation ofEast'IDnor Indonesia to conform to international has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, a third standards. • of the population, have died as a result of Indonesian nde. But the majorityof'llmalw have notaa:eptedsubjupdomlndoamil Im

2 TIMOR LINK November 1997 ¥¥¥ ¥ c!J ¥ 01 •••• EU Policy on East Timor Fulfilling the potential of the Common Position

The European Union 1 Council of Ministers adopted its first Common Position on East Timor2 on 26 June 1996 after months of debate and years of pressure from campaigning groups in member states, who greeted it as a potentially useful tool. While there is a danger that EU institutions will use the Common Position in a limited way, Ellis WARD argues that alongside the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) statement of April 1997, it could provide a solid framework for progressive change. Here she analyses the content of the Common Position and suggests what European and other northern voluntary organisations (NVOs) can do to maximise its potential.

The main part of the EU Common Position on East hampered by serious obstacles; I Timor is contained in two articles: 3) encourages the continuation of Intra-Timorese Dialogue meetings in the context of this Article 1 process of dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations; The European Union, referring to its previous 4) calls upon the Indonesian government to declarations on the situation in East Timor, adopt effective measures leading to a intends to pursue the following aims: significant improvement in the human rights 1) to contribute to the achievement by dialogue of situation in East Timor. In particular by a fair, comprehensive and internationally implementing fully the relevant decisions acceptable solution to the question of East adopted in this connection by the United Timor, which fully respects the interests and Nations Commission on Human Rights; legitimate aspirations of the Timorese people, 5) supports all appropriate action with the in accordance with international law; objective of generally strengthening respect for 2) to improve the situation in East Timor regarding human rights in East Timor and substantially respect for human rights in the territory. improving the situation of its people, by means of the resources available to the European Union and aid for action by NGOs.3 Article 2 To pursue the aims referred to in Article 1, the This paper examines how the Common Position European Union: came to be adopted; how significant it is; how it 1) supports the initiatives undertaken in the has been implemented so far; and what should be United Nations framework which may done if it is to be put to its maximum use. contribute to resolving this question; 2) supports in particular the current talks under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary Eilis Ward lectures in the Department of Political Science, General with the aim of achieving the solution Trinity College, Dublin. She is currently researching the referred to in point 1) of Article 1, effective involvement of civil society in Irish foreign policy and among her progress towards which continues to be case studies is the evolution of Irish policy towards East Timor.

Timor Link 41, Special Supplement - EU Policy on East Timor l THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EAST TIMOR: sale of military equipment to Indonesia until the A BRIEF HISTORY illegal occupation is ended, and requested the Council to work towards a ceasefire in the 6 EU policy on East Timor has evolved slowly. The territory so that a referendum could be held. European Parliament never doubted that Another motion, following Indonesian repression Indonesia was infringing international law in East during a visit by Pope John Paul II to East Timor Timor. However, it was only when internal in 1989, referred to the 'genocide' being pressures (from EU member states and civil perpetrated by Indonesia in the territory.7 In 1991 society) and external pressures (as a result of East the Parliament again promoted the idea of a Timor's increased profile within the United referendum on self-determination and requested Nations and other multilateral fora) were felt that that it be allowed to send a delegation to East a common position within the EU became Timor.8 desirable. Unfortunately, the European Parliament has a There are at least three reasons why it took the very limited role in making EU policy. It was not European Union so long to develop a coherent until the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, policy towards East Timor. First, when Indonesia when firm evidence of Indonesian oppression was invaded East Timor in 1975, issues of justice and broadcast on television screens the world over, human rights were understood through the that the EU issued a statement condemning divided loyalties of the Cold War - the larger Indonesia. 9 This did not translate into a western powers, such as the United States, Japan consensual position within the United Nations, and Australia, defended Jakarta, while the rights however. Attempts during Portugal's presidency of the East Timorese were defended by the Soviet of the EU in 1992 to get the 12 EU members to bloc within the United Nations. Most European agree a submission for the UNCHR were stymied powers remained silent and usually abstained in in Geneva by the United States which sought a votes on the issue at the UN General Assembly. more conciliatory approach.10 Second, Indonesia's role in aiding European In 1994 the Council of the EU issued a countries' relations with other ASEAN (the statement reaffirming the need for human rights Association of South East Asian Nations) states to be observed if the 'efforts undertaken under meant many EU members were reluctant to the auspices of the United Nations Secretary­ support self-determination for East Timor. 4 Third, General with a view to a just, lasting and before Portugal joined the European Community internationally acceptable solution to the East in 1986 no member state had a particular interest Timor question' 11 were to be successful. It also in promoting the case of the East Timorese called for international organisations to have free people. access to the territory. The Portuguese , adopted after the During 1994 and 1995, the European Parliament 1974 revolution, obliges Portugal to 'promote and was particularly active on East Timor: four safeguard the right to self determination and resolutions were passed and nine questions were independence of East Timor' and empowers the asked. During this time the Commission's concern Portuguese president and government to for East Timor was largely focused on the Asia 'perform all acts necessary for achieving the[se] Working Group, which was preparing the aims' .5 Consequently, after Portugal became an Common Position for eventual approval by the EU member, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The Asia Working Group is Council of Ministers began to discuss East Timor. made up of diplomatic officials from each of the Between 1986 and June 1997, the European member states and meets approximately once a Parliament passed 16 resolutions on the territory, month to work out the nuts and bolts of policy in response to particular incidents or as general goals set out by the Council. It was within this statements of policy. group that competing or harmonious national The first clear signal that EU policymakers had interests were worked out in detail to achieve the begun to pay attention to East Timor came in consensus required for the Common Position. September 1988, when the EU president (at the time the presidency was held by Germany), addressed the 43rd plenary session of the UN THE COMMON POSITION General Assembly. He spoke of the need for an acceptable international settlement in the territory. The Common Position can be viewed as a limiting However, he did not refer to the right to self­ document, where only the actions specified in it determination of the East Timorese people or to can be considered; or it can be viewed as an human rights. enabling document, one that provides a basic A European Parliament resolution of October framework for many different policies or actions. 1988 included 18 recommendations for action and Before attempting to assess it according to these a request to the Indonesian government to allow alternatives, we must look at the significance of human rights organisations complete freedom the Common Position itself. within East Timor. It also called on the The Common Position asserts that East Timor is governments of all EU member states to halt the an international issue, implicitly rejecting

tl Timor Link 41, Special Supplement - EU Policy on East Timor THE EUROPEAN UNION

EU stnacture first pillar where the Commission plays the most The EU has three significant institutions, the significant and powerful role. All other foreign European Commission, the Council of Ministers and security policy decisions come under the (known as the Council), and the Parliament, second pillar - they remain intergovernmental each of which has its own interests, powers and and in these cases the power to devise and shape functions. Their roles are not always smoothly policy is still held by national governments. The coordinated and competition between them for distinction between these two pillars largely authority and jurisdiction in particular areas derives from the reluctance of member states to does occur. To complicate matters further, the hand over aspects of national sovereignty to the institutional and legal basis of the EU' s external collective community process. relations is still somewhat in flux. The Common Foreign and Security Policy In general, however, the European (CFSP) is a decision-making institution. The Commission has the power to make policy result of the Single European Act of 1986, the proposals. The ideas for these can come from Maastricht Treaty, and the Treaty of Amsterdam the Commission itself, from the Council, from a of 1997, it was designed to provide a single court judgment or from other relevant groups European voice on foreign affairs. 13 Common such as national or EU-wide pressure groups. A Positions and Common Actions are devised proposal goes from the Commission to the from a consensual decision-making procedure, Council of Ministers which has the power to which means that those with the strongest enact and sign it. The Council is made up of positions compromise towards a more widely representatives of members states (usually acceptable middle ground. The process of ministers for foreign affairs) and the presidency forming Common Positions inevitably produces of the Council rotates among the member states the lowest common denominator. every six months . The Council also consults the The Treaty of Amsterdam this year European Parliament whose members are introduced changes to the CFSP designed to directly elected by the citizens of member overcome the enormous difficulty of arriving states. The Parliament may offer its opinion on at a consensus between 15 different states with any proposal and, in some cases, has the power different economic and political interests and to delay the and propose different ethical concerns. While not rejecting amendments. The Council can ask the the ideal of consensus, a 'constructive Commission to redraft proposals in line with abstention procedure' which allows states to Parliament's amendments. All proposals must withdraw from implementing decisions rest on an article of the EU Treaty. 12 without vetoing them, was adopted. On 'minor Although the Parliament now has some matters' decisions can be taken by qualified control over budgetary decisions and there is a majority voting, where such matters are procedure in place for stopping a proposal, it understood as specific aspects of an already has little real influence over the policy process. agreed Common Position or Common Action. This effective lack of accountability has However, if any state objects for 'important implications for the EU's foreign policy agenda. and stated reasons of national policy' to a The role of NVOs in EU policymaking must particular vote, the vote will not proceed also be recognised. EU foreign policy is made unless the Council decrees, by unanimous by heads of states and they and their vote, that it should.14 In this way, the members are sensitive to public opinion and Amsterdam Treaty (which has not yet been coordinated campaigns on issues of foreign ratified) both smoothes the way towards policy. For example, in the early 1990s the East greater coordination of foreign policy and Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (ETISC) allows states an 'out' from policies which they ensured that East Timor became a priority do not support. foreign policy issue for the government during As the Common Position on East Timor Ireland's tenure of the EU presidency in preceded the Amsterdam Treaty it is still 1995/96. unclear whether the new provisions allow states to opt out of implementing the policies on East Timor. It is possible, for instance, that a state which feels that a key national policy might be damaged by sanctions against Indonesia, might want to use the constructive abstention procedure and thus diminish the impact of a Common Action.

Timor Link 41, Special Supplement - EU Policy on East Timor ttt Indonesia's claim that involvement by any other guarantee of promoting democratisation, civic s tate is an infringement of sovereignty. The freedoms and global stability. Common Position affirms tha t international Although all EU member states are obliged to human rights laws (such as the Universal comply with the decision-making procedure of Declaration on H uma n Rights) act as a the CFSP, bilateral relations between any member counterweight to the national law of Indonesia state and Indonesia are not precluded. Because an d the occupied territory. Article 2.4 of the the CFSP is still intergovernmental, individual Common Position calls on the Indonesian member states may decide to go it alone, taking government to implement relevant decisions unilateral action against, or indeed in support of, ad op ted by the UNCHR and supports the Indonesia. As is clear from the arms trade16 or longstanding UN-sponsored talks between from Portugal's role in the UN talks, the thrust Indonesia and Portugal and the All-inclusive Intra towards coordination does not prevent member East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD). states from carving out individual relationships Article 2.5 specifically commits aid resources to with Indonesia. The relevant article in the strengthen human rights in the territory. Its Maastricht Treaty obliges member states to ensure wording is important: it says the function of aid is that their national policies 'conform' to the both to improve the conditions of the people on Common Position.17 the ground (in other words provide humanitarian Ironically perhaps, the relative vagueness of the aid for material conditions) and to strengthen Common Position on East Timor makes it a respect for human rights in the territory. The potentially powerful document. For example, focus on aid' s potential to improve human rights although it does not spell out the goal of is echoed throughout the Common Position. establishing a human rights monitoring unit in However, the Common Position makes no East Timor, its general commitment to specific reference to self-determination. Article 1.1 strengthening human rights would not preclude a refers to the 'legitimate aspirations' of the member state from seeking to promote such a Timorese people, a vaguer notion which may or policy within the EU. In this way member may not refer to the political status of the governments and civil society groups could use territory. Given that the United Nations had the Common Position on East Timor to great declared the occupation illegal under effect. international law and that the Common Position Over the next year, the policies of the UK will reasserts its support for UN involvement in the provide a test case for the ability of EU member region, and given that all EU statements on East states to implement the spirit of the Common Timor have been framed by the notion that Position through a more active national policy. Indonesian rule is illegal, this anomaly is difficult Attention will be focused on the UK, not just to explain. It could be that EU members were because of new Labour's commitment to anxious not to provoke an angry response from changing its policies on Indonesia, but also the Indonesians by explicitly referring to self­ because the UK presidency of the EU begins in determina tion. In addition, four of the five January 1998. The UK government has agreed to policies which the Common Position refers to deal tighten the criteria for arms exports to prevent with initiatives which already exist under the weapons being sold which might be used for aegis of the United Nations. Only the proposed internal repression or external aggression, and to aid package offers anything that does not suggest shift the emphasis of its aid policies from the EU is deferring to the United Nations as the promoting trade to promoting human rights. At lead agency for bringing change and exerting meetings with the Nobel peace prize winners, pressure on the Indonesian government. Jose Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo, It is certainly important that the European foreign secretary Robin Cook also pledged that Union supports UN initiatives on East Timor - the UK would continue to support UN-mediated the more coordinated the international efforts to negotiate a settlement within East community is the more powerful its impact can Timor. 18 The arrival at the Council of Ministers of be. But the importance of the European Union as a government concerned for East Timor will a single voice cannot be underestimated, significantly boost the Portuguese government's especially as there is a growing relationship initiatives within the EU. between the EU and the ASEAN, in which Indonesia is a key actor. In the early 1990s the EU' s aid policy towards the Asian region shifted IMPLEMENTING THE COMMON POSITION from one based on development cooperation to one based on economic cooperation, and EU states have been slow to implement the Common diplomatic initiatives on democratisation and Position, and any efforts to do so have lacked trans­ human rights shifted from confrontation to parency. Portugal was the main proponent of action 'constructive engagement'.15 This shift is best in the months immediately after the adoption of the understood in terms of dominant norms in Common Position, proposing in October 1996 that international relations where trade is seen as the moves be made on two fronts: delivering aid and engine of economic development and the best improving the human rights situation.

lV Timor Link 41, Special Supplement - EU Policy on East Timor However, in April 1997, 10 months after the monitoring, assessment and evaluation. They will Common Position was agreed, Christine Oddy (a also be looking for a human rights implementation UK MEP of the Socialist Group) was told that no component within the aid package. Lastly, it is decision had yet been taken by the European important that aid does not become an excuse for Commission about how to implement the Common EU political inactivity on East Timor. Position. Commissioner Manuel Marin, said that 'all possible means for assisting the development of the people of East Timor, particularly in the fields of 2. Strengthening human rights health, sanitation and education' were being To date there is no evidence that the European Union explored. 19 The Commission has issued no other plans to implement policies arising from the public statements. Common Position which directly target human rights There are three policy areas to consider: the aid violations in the territory. However, EU members, package, the commitment to strengthen human led by the Dutch presidency, orchestrated an effective rights, and the EU' s support for UN peacemaking campaign to persuade a majority in the United , activities. The fraught issue of coherence - whether Nations to support a strong condemnation of the policies of national governments 'cohere' with Indonesia's human rights record in East Timor at the the general principles of the Common Position - is UNCHR in April 1997.21 The vote was carried by a also important. margin of seven, and although the UN resolution did not necessarily derive from the Common 1. Aid Position, it has been suggested that the agreement already reached in Europe made its adoption easier. On the basis of the 27 November 1996 Council Normally, the state under consideration at the decision, the Commission decided to launch a 6 UNCHR participates in informal negotiations million ECU aid package over three years for health, before the vote, but in this case Indonesian repre­ sanitation and education. So far the International sentatives chose not to. They were reported to be Committee of the Red Cross has received funding 'furious' with the resolution, saying it was one­ for a water and sanitation project. However, other sided and highly intrusive.22 Perhaps Indonesia NGOs are being consulted, including European­ underestimated the strength of opinion and failed based Catholic aid agencies. It is expected that further to keep a significant number of key players on its details of the package will be made public before the side and in favour of the principle of sovereignty. end of 1997. The result was a serious blow to the Indonesian representatives at the UN. Preliminary assessment On the other hand, it has been argued that the That the EU has decided to channel its funds through resolution must be viewed with caution until there is non-governmental agencies rather than through the greater coherence between the trade, aid and financial Indonesian government is encouraging, as are the policies adopted by individual UN members towards choices of priority areas. Health, education and Indonesia.23 Although the motion is welcome, there sanitation are all crucial development needs. But the is evidence that human rights violations in the aid must be effective. International NGOs with a territory have continued in 1997,24 and eye witnesses good track record on East Timor now need to monitor at the May 1997 elections claimed that not everything implementation while the European Union must was entirely above board.25 continue to consult with legitimate representatives of The effectiveness of UN declarations, when little the East Timorese people on priorities. action follows from its members at regional or global Accountability procedures will also be important, level, is open to question. given the European Union's dominance in the provision of aid. There is a potential clash between 3. Supporting UN talks the institutional interests of the EU in ensuring clean and efficient delivery of aid and the interests of aid Two series of talks have been running under the aegis recipients and the NGOs delivering the programme. of the UN, the tripartite talks between the UN and A detailed study of an aid programme undertaken by the governments of Indonesia and Portugal, and the NGOs and the EU in Cambodia has shown that AIETD. The latest round of the tripartite talks took NGOs (both international and local) prefer small place in New York from 4-7 August 1997 and were scale projects which take a long term view and are chaired by a special ambassador from the UN, based on community development. The EU, on the Pakistani diplomat Jamsheed Marker. The talks were other hand, prefers large scale projects which work unique in that they took place between officials (as through governments, use sophisticated technology, opposed to politicians). Although no great break­ and have a short term 'rapid impact'.20 through took place, the shift to diplomat-based talks Although in East Timor the European Union will may be a sign of progress as it indicates that there is not work through the Indonesian government, the a possibility of real negotiations between Portugal research does suggest there are some difficulties and Indonesia. Similar procedural developments at inherent in implementing aid policies. NVOs the AIETD talks are also hopeful - there is to be greater monitoring the package are keen to see evidence of participation from the Timorese side, with new rep­ a gender based approach to project formulation, resentatives of youth and women.

Timor Link 41, Special Supplement - EU Policy on East Timor v Has the Common Position brought change in EU one. However, the shape that the package takes _has support for the talks? There is no evidence that the implications for the EU's foreign policy, and particu­ EU has provided any particular support for the talks. larly for political relations between the EU and Although Portugal keeps its EU partners informed Indonesia. of progress, it is not clear if a more active part played To date, the Common Position on East Timor has by member states or the President would be welcomed been regarded by the EU as largely a humanitarian by the Portuguese. Indeed, there is an apparent policy, perhaps because the Commission office reluctance to establish another set of parallel or responsible for aid was instructed to devise the supporting structures which might diminish the focus policies. However, the nature of EU-Indonesian on the tripartite talks. relations may also play a part. Several officials have pointed out that the size of Indonesia's market, its importance in the ASEAN region, and its rejection of 4. Coherence any attempt by the international community to The Common Position has highlighted the issue of intervene in what Indonesia insists are internal affairs, 'coherence' between the values of the document and are significant factors. the trade, economic and diplomatic policies of Nonetheless, in implementing the aid package individual member states. The difficulty is that there the EU will be forced to confront the root of the is little consistency between the policies of the EU and problem within the territory - its illegal occupation those of its individual member states, nor between by Indonesia. Aid may be a 'softer' option than the external relations developed by the European taking a stand on human rights but Indonesia will Union and the positions taken in the CFSP. 26 This is not have to be negotiated with or worked around. peculiar to the European Union's relations with Workers will have to be placed within the territory Indonesia but is especially acute in this case because and the impact of aid on the ground will have to be of the issue of sovereignty. Coherence is also a problem evaluated. In all of this, the EU will do its utmost at the United Nations. not to be seen to be legitimising the illegal According to the UN motion and the EU Common occupation. Thus the stated commitment of the EU Position, EU member states do not accept the to finding a solution which respects international legitimacy of Indonesian rule in East Timor. Yet there law means that the will have is ample evidence that individual member states are to be faced. NVOs, as a voice of civil society, can trading weapons and providing military support push for greater coherence between the aid which bolsters Indonesian rule in the territory. 27 The package and the EU' s political and economic stance same lack of 'coherence' can be seen between the EU' s in the region, thereby ensuring that the sum total of condemnation of human rights abuses and the EU activity arising from the Common Position is continued supply by its members of weapons which not a three-year aid programme. • can be used to abuse human rights. Aside from the ethical aspects, the EU' s double standards undermine Specific lobbying issues for NVOs European involvement in the region in the eyes of Indonesia and other ASEAN nations. 1. Press for adequate monitoring and evaluation of the aid package, and for EU countries' bilateral aid to be harmonised with the EU Common Position. DISCUSSION 2. Insist that EU leaders demand Indonesia implements the 1997 UNCHR resolution. The EU' s focus on implementing the aid package, and 3. Continue to press for the permanent establishment its neglect of the other dimensions of the Common of a human rights monitoring presence in East Position, could suggest that the EU has taken a Tnnor. This could be facilitated through the UN or minimalist approach to that position. However, it through the offices of the EU. could also reflect lack of coordination among EU insti­ 4. Use the forthcoming Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) tutions and the inherent slowness of the process of in London on 3-5 April 1998 as a focus for tactical deciding on and enacting legislation. lobbying on the Common Position. There does appear to be particular ambiguity about 5. Highlight the lack of coherence between the EU which pillar of the EU Treaty the aid package falls member states' relationships with Indonesia, par­ under. Is it entirely derivative of the Common Position ticularly in relation to the arms trade. The arms and therefore within the remit of the CFSP (pillar two), trade comes under the jurisdiction of the member subject entirely to the direction and control of national states (not the Commission) and therefore decisions governments? Or is it entirely in the remit of economic on it are accountable within the national politkal cooperation (pillar one) and hence controlled by the arena. EU governments should be pressed t.o emnn Commission, specifically Commissioner Manuel that no arms are sold to Indonesia in COldnllv.e., Marin, who has responsibility for external affairs and tion of the Common Position on B development cooperation for parts of Asia and Members of the European Parliament SllOIJll,U• elsewhere? Perhaps all that can be said for certain is that engaged through the Intergroup on design and implementation of the package is being and the Human RighlB Group negotiated through the office of Commissioner Marin, 6. Overall, the C o Poeli"i _.kfil•(IAflll· which implies that it is viewed as belonging to pillar monimred~---~...... _,. .. llk l Vl Timor Link 41, Special Supplement - EU Policy on East Timor RECOMMENDATIONS Both a thorough examination of the consequences of the arms trade and a strengthening of existing regulations on arms sold to Indonesia are needed. 1. EU aid package Sales of weapons should not be allowed to undermine human rights protection in East Timor. The European Commission should monitor and evaluate the aid package to ensure it improves the material situation of East Timorese people and strengthens respect for human rights. The aid 4. The European Parliament package should not be an end in itself, but an The European Parliament should pursue its instrument to help settle the conflict within East intention of sending a parliamentary delegation to Timor. The broader perspective of the Common East Timor. In particular, the Parliament can use Position, and commitments given by the EU at the this trip to push the Commission and the Council to 53rd session of the UNCHR, must be kept to the pursue aspects of the Common Position relating to fore. Ultimately, the test of any policy is its impact human rights and peace talks. This could be on the ground. coordinated through the new Intergroup for Solidarity with the People of East Timor.27 This group should monitor the planning, conduct and 2. The UNCHR resolution outcome of any visit by the Council, such as the EU troika visit to East Timor suggested by British As sponsors of the UN resolution, EU member states foreign secretary Robin Cook. should ensure that the key recommendations are implemented. In particular, they should pursue their commitment to strengthening human rights in 5. European NVOs the territory before the 54th session of the UNCHR in April 1998, by seeking action on the recommen­ European NVOs should coordinate their activities dations to: to ensure the above ends are met. They should not a) invite the special rapporteur on torture to visit lose sight of the framework for action provided by EastTimor the Common Position on East Timor and should b) provide access for human rights organisations attempt to hold their home governments to account to East Timor in their relations with Indonesia. The Common c) ensure the early release of East Timorese people Position is the only mechanism through which EU detained or convicted for political reasons. and national policy towards East Timor will be In addition, EU governments should bear in mind framed in the foreseeable future. NVOs should that these are only elements of a broader regard the Common Position as an enabling programme - on-site human rights monitoring document, with potential, rather than a narrow and might also be needed. restrictive policy. While the document is not binding in any legal sense it is binding politically and morally. In particular, NVOs should focus on the member 3.Coherence states of the EU troika (the current President, the EU member states should coordinate their aid and immediately preceding one and the forthcoming trade policies to ensure coherence around the one). The UK - as a forthcoming president - Common Position. Bilateral aid programmes should provides a focus from January 1998. The UK's arms be harmonised with those of the EU, and multilat­ trade with Indonesia is a key issue where coherence eral aid programmes should be brought into line. may be legitimately raised.

Notes responsible for follow up, that the Common 1. The EU is used in this document to refer to the Position would apply from the date of its political entity which was born as the EEC (or adoption and that it would be published in the the Common Market) with the Treaty of Rome Official Journal of the EU. in 1957. As referred to here, the EU includes the 4.de Vasconcelos, Alvaro, 1996: 125. European Commission, the Council of 5. Constitution of the Portuguese , 1989. Ministers, the European Parliament, other Articles 293.l and 293.2, (second revision). institutions, member governments and NGOs. 6.Resolution on East Timor. Doc. A 2-143/88. 2.Common Position 25 June 1996, No. 96/407 Official Journal of the European Communities, No. CFSP, Official Journal of the European Union, C 262/142, 15 September 1988. L168/2, 6 July 1996. 7.Resolution on the situation in East Timor. Doc. 3. The remaining three articles met the B3-524/89, Official Journal of the European conventional requirements of such statements Communities, No. C 323/107, 27 November indicating that the Council would be 1989.

Timor Link 41, Special Supplement - EU Policy on East Timor vu 8.Resolution on the situation in South-East Asia. Affairs, Dublin, No. 9, June: 5. Doc. A 3-0219 /91. Official Journal of the European 15.Stankovitch, Mara, 1996. Communities, No. c 267 /160, 14 October 1991. 16.For details of arms trade between EU 9.Bulletin of the European Communities; No. 12, members and Indonesia see ENAAT, 1997. 1991. The European Parliament had also issued 17.Article J.2, Title V of the Maastricht Treaty of a resolution condemning the massacre. See 1992. Joint Resolution on the Massacre in East Timor, 18.See Timar Link, No. 40, July 1997, for a detailed Official Journal of the European Communities, No. analysis of new Labour and East Timor. C 326/ 182, 16 December 1991. 19.Manuel Marin to Christine Oddy, 25 April 10.de Vasconcelos, Alvaro, 1996: 126. 997. Doc EN/QE/322/322301. 11 . Council of the European Union, 'Statement by 20.Bullard, Nicola, 1996. The study was of a the European Union on East Timor', 18 July US$44 million project for rural development 1994, P.65/94, press release. Some months later, in Cambodia which ran from January 1995 to in conjunction with Sweden and Norway, the June 1997. Council expressed its concern over the 21.Resolution on Situation of Human Rights in sentencing of Indonesian labour leader East Timor, 53rd session of the UNCHR, Muchtar Pakpahan. See Council of the Geneva, 16 April 1997. See Timar Link, CIIR, European Union, 'Statement by the Presidency No. 39, April 1997 for complete text. on Behalf of the European Union on 22.Maubere, June 1997. Indonesia', 22 November 1994, P.99 /94, press 23.Timor Link, No. 39, 1997. release. 24.East Timor Human Rights Centre, 1997, 12.For a step by step account of the relations Human Rights Deteriorate in East Timar, between the institutions see chapter 4 in ETHRC, Collingwood, Australia, Ref: SR2/97. Nicoll and Salmon, 1994. 25.Carey, Peter, 1997, Irish Times, 28 May 1997. 13.Article J.2 of the Maastricht Treaty established 26.Krenzler, Horst-Gunter, and Schneider, that, where necessary, a Common Position on Henning C, 1997: 133. a particular issue area would be adopted and 27.The three co-chairs of the group are Heidi that the national policies of all members states Hautula (Greens, Finland), Tony Cunningham would adhere to that position. (Labour Party, UK) and Carlos Costa Neves 14.IGC Update 1997, Institute of European (PSD, Portugal).

Select bibliography Algieri, Franco, and Regelsberger, Elfriede, (eds) Synergy at Work: Spain and Portugal in European Political Co-operation, Institut Fiir Europaische Politik, (IEP), Bonn, 1996. Bullard, Nicola, Differing Approaches to Development Assistance in Cambodia: NGOs and the European Commission, IN]RAC, Oxford, August 1996. de Vasconcelos, Alvaro, 'Portugal: A Case for An Open Europe', in Algieri F and Regelsberger (eds.), op cit, 1996. European Network Against Arms Trade (ENAAT), Indonesia. Arms trade to a military regime, ENAAT: Amsterdam, 1994. Holland, Martin, EU Common Foreign Policy: From EPC to CFSP joint action on South Africa, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995. Krenzler, Horst-Gunter and Schneider, Henning, 'The Question of Consistency', in Regelsberger, E et al (eds), op cit, 1996. Nicoll, William and Salmon, Trevor, Understanding the New European Community, Harvester, Wheatsheaf, New York and London, 1994. Putzel, James, European Official Development Assistance: Accountability and Transparency. The Philippines: A case study, paper prepared for CUR Seminar, 1995. Regelsberger, Elfriede et al (eds), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Lynne Reiner, Boulder/London, 1997. Santos, Ronet, 'Transparency and Accountability of European Development Assistance', Philippines Development Briefing, No. 9, CUR, London, 1995. Stankovitch, Mara, The European Union and ASEAN: a background paper, CUR, London, 1996.

Other newspapers, magazines, journals and information sheets used: CUR Comment, East Timar: The continuing betrayal, London, September 1996. Irish Times, Dublin. Timar Link, CUR, London. Maubere, East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign, Dublin. Making Solidarity Effective, CUR, London, 1997. This supplement is published with issue 41 of Timar Link by CUR, Unit 3 Canonbury Yard, 190a New North Road, London N1 7BJ, UK.

Vttl Timor Link 41, Special Supplement - EU Policy on East Timor CHURCHES A shift in view At first glance the response of the equipment, and some financial help. Dramatic change Roman Catholic church in Portugal Timorese culture and identity have also But the Cold War is over, Portugal has to the suffering of the East Timorese been supported, through liturgical and joined the European Union, global people appears less than adequate. But social commemorations of certain public communications have expanded, and more is going on than meets the eye, events in Timor (such as the anniversary of international recognition of the East Timor says Reverend PAT SMYTHE. Changing the Santa Cruz massacre) and celebrations issue has grown. All this, together with such circumstances in East Timor, and in of family occasions, such as baptisms and events as the Dili massacre and the Nobel Portugal itself, have encouraged marriages. peace prize award to Bishop Carlos Belo vigorous and concerted action. Overall, however, concern for the East and Jose Ramos-Horta, has dramatically Timorese political cause has been less affected the way the church, and the nation, h e Portuguese Catholic church apparent. One explanation for this seeming perceive and respond to the situation. More Texercised a pastoral ministry in East lack of solidarity can be found in Portugal's is being thought, said, and done for the East Timor for several centuries, and was part of own political development since the crisis Timorese than ever before. the colonial administrative structure. It in East Timor erupted. Political debate and Within the community of the church even had a specific responsibility for activity in Portugal were suppressed during there is now an increased commitment on educational provision in the territory. With the Salazar dictatorship ( 1930-68) . After the the part of many to promote the 'just, such an intimate historical association with bloodless revolution by the Armed Forces comprehensive, and internationally the country and its people, one would Movement (MFA) in 1974 there was great acceptable solution' proposed by the United expect to find an ongoing concern for turmoil, exacerbated by tensions in Nations. Dom J anuario dos Reis Torgal, Timorese welfare within the church in Portugal's African colonies and the arrival auxiliary bishop in Lisbon, takes every Portugal today. of huge numbers of refugees fleeing those opportunity to urge greater attention for It is perplexing, then, to discover that the conflicts. A leftward trend within the MFA the Timorese cause and lay communities Portuguese Bishops' Conference has made and the rise of the Portuguese Communist have become more concerned and active, few official statements on the subject in the Party, and pressing domestic concerns - with or without the active support of the 22 years since the Indonesian invasion and political instability, widespread poverty, and clergy. occupation. And only a handful of its 35 a sense of lagging behind the rest of Some Catholic laity and other Christians bishops have been outspoken or active in Europe in economic and social have been active in the various NGOs (such trying to remedy the plight of the Timorese development - occupied the thoughts and as CDPM and A Paz e Possivel) which have in their homeland, or of those who are activity of the church, among others. East formed in Portugal to defend East Timorese refugees in Portugal. Bishops who have Timor was far away, and (compared to the identity or provide welfare help. Most of the taken up the Timorese cause, most notably African wars of liberation) seemed passive. faithful knew little of the suffering of the East Dom Manuel Martins of Setubal, have acted Moreover, information about the Timorese people, or of the need for action with courage and persistence - but as situation in East Timor was inadequate and on their behalf, until the television report of individuals rather than in episcopal distorted. The Indonesian regime's the massacre in Dili cemetery in 1991. But cooperation. There is no common church isolation of the territory and the church's since then the 'family of faith' - and indeed policy and the church offers no 'official' own traditional opposition to Marxist the nation as a whole - has taken the East welcomes or ecclesiastical support to the ideology meant the depiction of Fretilin Timorese plight much more to heart. many Timorese who have fled to Portugal and the East Timorese resistance as Humanitarian aid and educational to escape oppression. 'communist inspired' was too readily supplies now reach the territory, detailed accepted. No doubt the political priorities and reliable information on human rights Limited response of Portugal's western allies also fostered violations is regularly communicated, and The response of the diocesan clergy has such an interpretation. Meanwhile, the the East Timorese cause is promoted in the been similarly limited, and again what has Vatican's concern to protect the church in corridors of diplomacy. Above all , personnel been done is down to individuals acting Indonesia meant restraints were put on from the Portuguese Catholic church - alone. Their efforts, evident in parishes those like Dom Manuel who sought to raise clergy, religious and laity - have served and where Timorese refugees have come to live, concern for Timorese welfare and support still serve the many needs of the Timorese consist largely of humanitarian assistance - for an authentic plebiscite on the country's people.• provision of food, clothing, domestic political status. Bishop Aloysius Soma

Rls wllll sadness that we record the Coalition on East Timor (APCET), he 'Blessed are those who work for justice. The ,...ofBishop Aloysius Nobuo Soma, attended both the conference held in Manila people of East Timor are working for justice ll§lllOPlnterftus of Nagoya, Japan, on in 1994 and the second which was broken up and they are blessed. [ ... ] God is raising up in Malaysia in 1996. His unforgettable words people everywhere to walk alongside the East ·-**"''·$oJna was the bishop in charge of to those gathered at mass during the APCET Timorese [ ... ] In 1989 Bishop Belo wrote that I conference in 1994 serve as an inspiration the world has forgotten East Timor. Let us 1 11m~r·?ea.tt in Japan. He was a great ~ East nmorese, having visite

TIMOR LINK November 1997 3 INTERVIEW: JOSE RAMOS-HORTA commitment to be more positive, and genuine water, beatings, rape and other forms of Steps on the interest on the part of Robin Cook to support sexual abuse, the removal of nails, the the efforts of Portugal and the United Nations. mutilation of toes, and so on. The aim of such road to peace The UK is, as we know, a major player in the practices, over and above the quest for European l'nion. In the past it was the major information on the resistance networks, is to In July, Jose Ramos-Horta, special stumbling block to am initiative on East Timor instil fear. It works. representative of the East Timorese in in the European Union and in the UN The black-and-white and colour exile, met Britain's foreign secretary, Commission on Human Rights in Geneva; and photographs have been passed to human Robin Cook, and stressed the urgent it is the biggest arms supplier today to Indonesia. rights organisations working outside East need to improve human rights in the From an ethical, moral, and strategic point of Timor and, by various routes, have made it territory. He told Timar Link why he is view I think it is in the best interests of the UK into the public domain. Some were taken more hopeful than ever of an end to the to observe a \'erv serious code of conduct in by relatives of the victims, others probably suffering. arms policies. by the violators themselves or East The UK can also play a much more active Timorese compelled to take part. They orta began b\' reiterating his belief that the and constructiYe role in mobilising the depict both torture and the results of Hpeace plan put forward by the National European Union to support the negotiations torture - beaten, bruised and blindfolded Council for Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in under UN auspices. It can also be effective, if bodies showing various degrees of 1992 still provides the only feasible solution to it takes a stand on East Timor, in pushing mutilation. They chronicle events from the the deadlock over East Timor. Timar Link asked the United States, Canada and Australia. • early 1980s to the present day. him to outline the peace plan. The photographs are hardhitting. But as JR-H: The peace plan has three phases. Phase the book states in its introduction, unlike one I call the humanitarian phase whereby there horror movies and TV violence, this is would be a cessation of torture and a permanent happening for real, to people like us, every UN presence to monitor the situation. Phase day. And it has to stop. Pressure must be put two, lasting about five years, would be what we on the Indonesian regime to implement the call the autonomy phase, which calls for limited The shock of demands spelt out by this year's UN autonomy based on total demilitarisation of the Commission on Human Rights and listed in territory, improvements in the human rights the real the conclusion to this book. More pressure situation, and the election of a local assembly. Human Rights Violations in East Timar, is needed than governments around the world The third phase, which could start six, seven or ETISC have so far been willing to exert. 10 years from now - the time frame is not definite because it is a matter for negotiation - his brochure aims to shock. It succeeds. Human Rights Violations in East Timor is would be when we decide the legal status of the TThe particularly brutal violations which published by East Timor International territory through a referendum under UN have been going on in East Timor since Support Centre, Darwin. It is available from supervision. the Indonesian invasion in 1975 are no the Australia East Timor Association, My basic proposition is that we should leave longer news to some of us. Reams of Melbourne, Australia, PO Box 93, Fitzroy, aside for some years the most complex issue, reports from reputable human rights VICTORIA, 3065, AUSTRALIA. Fax: + 61 3 that is, the legal status of the territory. For organisations, such as Amnesty Inter­ 94162746. Email: [email protected]. • Indonesia, East Timor is already an internal national and Human Rights Watch, have affair - it is part and parcel of the Indonesian been distributed over the years, describing ------Republic. For us, East Timor is a non se lf­ in macabre detail the torture practices of governing territory under UN responsibility the Indonesian army. Governments know TimorLink and Portuguese administration. We are at about them but do little. It took Max Subscription form opposite ends of the legal spectrum. So my Stahl's television footage and Steve Cox's proposal is that we put off any discussion on photographs of the Santa Cruz massacre in 0 I wish to subscribe to Timor Link this because we will neYer agree, and negotia­ November 1991, to shake those in power tions will never start if we begin from that most out of their apathy and bring home the D I enclose my subscription fee of £__ difficult point. harsh reality behind those reports. The What we should address are the most pressing images have lasted, and have added human rights and humanitarian problems that impetus to the growing campaign for affect the daily lives of the people of East Timor, justice in East Timor. and address some of the root causes of the Human Rights Violations in East Timor details unhappiness and resentment in the territory: the main types of torture used in the territory jobs, unemployment, transmigration, land - electric shocks, burning, immersion in issues, propern·.justice. If we can tackle these - which would also be in the best interests of the Individual £10.00 for 4 issues Indonesians, because it will give them a better lnstibdion £20.00 for 4 issues image - then we would create a better climate in which to address this issue [i.e. legal status] D I have previously subscribed to Timor in a few vears' time. Link It is HT\' similar to the Israeli-Palestinian D I am a new subscriber interim agreement. Of course, ,,.e cannot talk about exact models, but it is same basic Please send cheques made payable to am approach, a step-by-step resolution of a conflict. to East lunor Project, c/o CIIR, Unit 3, TL: \\'hat part do rnu see the UK government Canonbury Yard, 190A New North Road, :l':. playing in the resolution of the East Timor London NI 7BJ, UK. question? in East Timor Tel 0171-354 0883, fax 0171.JH 0017. JR-H: I am Yen happy with the change of e-mail: [email protected] government. There seems to be a real

4 TIMOR LINK November 1997