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Revised edition Paper presented at South-South Symposium on ‘Constitutional Design for Diversity and Conflict in Asia’ International IDEA and NAM CSSTC Four Seasons Hotel, Jakarta, 12-15 October 2009

CONSTITUTIONAL AGENCY AND THE TRANSMISSION OF FAITH : The Indonesian Experience

Azyumardi Azra*

Indonesia is neither an Islamic state, nor is Islam the official religion of the state. However, given the fact that the vast majority of Indonesian population is Muslim, one could love to assume that the Indonesian 1945 Constitution gives only a limited room for diversity, particularly in religion - Islam could be perceived as having hegemony on the state. In contrast, the Constitution that is in effect today - despite four amendments in the post Soeharto period - recognizes the importance of all religion - not only Islam - as well as diversity of the faiths. This can be seen for instance in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which in the very first paragraph states that the independence of Indonesia is a blessing of God Almighty. The Indonesian people had struggled to gain freedom during the Dutch and Japanese colonial periods, but it is only in the aftermath of World War Two, after a series of bloody wars for independence, that Indonesia, with the blessing of God Almighty finally achieved its long-fought independence. 2

This paper is an attempt to discuss the politics of constitutional recognition of religious diversity in the Indonesian context. The paper will also discuss political processes that influenced the Constitution in the course of Indonesian history, as well the constitutional agencies responsible for formulating and amending the Constitution. Finally, this paper will discuss some consequences of the constitutional arrangements of religious life in the country. Diversity within Unity Indonesia is perhaps one of the most pluralistic societies in many aspects of life. There is a great deal of differences when it comes to ethnicity, language, socio-culture, and religion. The Indonesian archipelago - the largest one in the world, which consists of more than 17,800 island, isles, and islets - and various ethnic groups make Indonesia an extremely pluralistic society. Many of these ethnic groups have their distinctive socio- cultural tradition that enriches Indonesia life.

It is important to mention that many of ethnic groups have a body of customary laws ( laws) that become one of the sources of national law. Therefore, the customary laws to a certain degree have their place in the Indonesian legal system. But of course not all the customary laws are compatible with the basic principles and spirit of the national laws. That is why, as a rule, there should be some changes and adjustment of customary laws in order for them to be adopted in certain national laws and regulation.

The existence of adat laws is a part and parcel of Indonesian diversity. Recognizing ethnic diversity of the nation, since the time of independence, the Indonesian state officially adopts the principle of ‘ bhinneka tunggal ika ’, meaning ‘diversity within unity’—a multi-cultural principle. Soekarno, the 3 first was one of the most important proponents of this multi-cultural principle. Even though he always appealed for the unity of the young nation-state of Indonesia, at the same time he emphasized the importance of bhinneka tunggal ika that recognizes differences among the Indonesian people.

However, various efforts were made by President Soeharto’s regime in the late 1980s to 1990s to impose a kind of mono-cultural policy to no avail. He tried to make the the basic paradigm in the political and cultural development on the country. With the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998, the principle of bhinneka tunggal ika has been revived as one of very important principles in the life of the Indonesian people.

Religious Diversity

In the context of religious diversity, it is important to give some ideas on the composition of the Indonesian population in terms of religious following. According to some latest estimates, 88.2 percent of the 235 million are Muslim; 5.87 Protestant; 3.05 percent Catholics; 1.81 percent Hindu; 0.84 percent Buddhist; and the remaining 0.20 percent are of other religions and animists. It must also be kept in mind that none of these religions is monolithic; in the case of Islam, Protestanism and Hinduism, for instance, there is a variety of schools of thought or denominations that lead to some different understanding and practices of Islam among the believers; even worse, the differences sometimes lead to conflict and even violence among the faithful.

In the last two decades, religious diversity has been gaining momentum with the improvement in transportation, migration and 4 information. New forms of religion and spiritual tendencies are introduced from within and without, challenging mainstream and established religions. Therefore, some of these new tendencies are regarded by the mainstream as being splinter religious groups that would lead the faithful astray. In this context, it is not unusual that mainstream leadership of particular religions put a lot of pressure on the government to ban ‘religious splinter groups’ it considers as having gone astray.

Despite those kinds of cases, recognition of religious diversity is order of the day; peaceful co-existence, mutual respect and tolerance have been practiced by the Indonesian people for centuries. This long history of Indonesian religious diversity is mainly due to the fact that Indonesia has long been a country where practically all great world religions meet, find followings and develop in peaceful co-existence. Even though in certain course of history—not only in the past, but even also today—there were rivalries and conflict among the faithful in the efforts to gain more following of each religion. Therefore, this religious diversity needs to be constitutionally, politically and socially arranged, in order to maintain and strengthen healthy and harmonious intra- and inter-religious relations.

The earliest world major religion that came to the Indonesian archipelago was Hinduism. According to some archeological evidence, Hinduism was introduced around second and third centuries CE. In the period between eighth and fifteenth centuries, Hindu kingdoms appeared in Java, namely the old Mataram, Singasari and followed by the - one of the greatest kingdoms in the history of the archipelago. Around the same period, particularly in the seventh to fourteenth centuries, also found fertile grounds in the archipelago, and led to the rise of the 5

Srivijaya kingdom in South Sumatra, another great kingdom in the archipelago. The influence of the two religions in the archipelago can be observed to this day in the forms of the great Buddhist temple and Hindu temples in Central Java. Existing in the sea of Muslims who form the single largest majority of the population, these historical monuments symbolize religious tolerance in today’s Indonesia.

Hinduism and Buddhism were soon followed by the coming of two other major world religions—Islam and Christianity. The early history of the spread of Islam and Christianity in the archipelago had also been largely peaceful, though bitter contests and struggles took place in certain areas such as the Straits of Melaka in the West and the Maluku islands in the East of the archipelago. Conversion to and consolidation of Islam and Christianity which took place in much of the period of the twelfth to seventeenth centuries produced clear boundaries among the adherents of these religions (Reid 1993; Azra 2000b).

It is important to point out that although most of the population of archipelago converted to Islam, the region remains one of the least Islamized areas throughout the Muslim world. This has a lot to do with the nature of the spread of Islam in the archipelago which was mainly peaceful; there was a lot of accommodation and acculturation between Islam on the one hand and local beliefs and practices on the other. Wandering preachers of Islam introduced Islam to local populations in a very compromising and accommodative way; what was important for them was that local people pronounced the two pronouncements of Islamic faith, e.g. belief in God (Allah) and in Muhammad as the prophet of God. This nature of the 6 propagation of Islam in the end contributes to some distinctive features of Indonesian Islam that have some mixture with local beliefs and practices.

Geographically the archipelago is also one of the farthest Muslim areas from the Arabian Peninsula, or more precisely Mecca and Medina where Islam was originally revealed and developed. Therefore, Islam in the archipelago was sometime regarded by some outsiders as “marginal” or “peripheral” Islam, as “impure” or “syncretic” Islam. As a result, Islam in the archipelago was regarded as having little to do with Islamic orthodoxy attributed to Islam in Arabia, or the region which is known today as the Middle East.

The most important proponent of this perception is the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz. Having a great reluctance to recognize the deep influence of Islam in the Java in particular, he called his work “religion of Java” (1960) rather than, for instance, “religion of Islam in Java”. In this seminal work, he proposed that there are three variants of Islam in Java particularly and, by extension, in the archipelago generally. The three variants were; (aristocrat Muslims), (strict and practicing Muslims), and (nominal or ID card Muslims). According to Geertz, the priyayi variant was heavily influenced by Indic-Sanskrit culture, whereas the abangan variant was too indigenous, syncretic, and even animistic. Therefore, in his judgment, it is only the santri variant, with its heavy orientation to Middle Eastern Islam, is the real Islam; and members of this variant are numerically few amongst the population. With that, Geertz implies that the majority of Javanese or Indonesian is not real Muslims, and Islam is adhered to only by a small fraction of the population. 7

Geertz’s arguments have been opposed by many scholars; and one of Geertz’s fiercest critics is Marshall G.S. Hodgson, a prominent expert of Islamic civilizations from the University of Chicago. In his celebrated work The Venture of Islam (Vol. 2, 1974) he admits the importance of Geertz’s Religion of Java . Then comes Hodgson sharp criticism: 8

“…it deals with the twentieth century, and with inner Java in particular, but much in it throws light on what happened earlier and is relevant to other part of the archipelago. Unfortunately, its general high excellence is marred by a major systematic error: influenced by the polemics of a certain school of modern shari`ah- minded Muslim, Geertz identifies “Islam” only with what that school of modernists happens to approve, and ascribes everything else to an aboriginal or a Hindu- Buddhist background, gratuitously labeling much of the Muslim religious life in Java “Hindu”. He identifies a long series of phenomena, virtually universal to Islam and sometimes found even in the Qur’an itself as un-Islamic; and hence his interpretation of the Islamic past as well as of some recent anti-Islamic reactions is highly misleading. His error has at least three roots. When he refers to the archipelago having long been cut off from the centers of “orthodoxy” at Mecca and Cairo”, the irrelevant inclusion of Cairo betrays a modern source of Geertz’ bias. We must suspect also the urge of many colonialists to minimize their subjects’ ties with a disturbingly worldwide Islam (a tendency found also among the French colonialists in the Maghrib); and finally his anthropological techniques of investigation, looking to functional analysis of a culture in momentary cross-section without serious regard to the historical dimension. Other writers have recognized better the Islamic character even in inner-Javanese religion: CAO van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague: 1959), but Geertz stands out in the field. For one who knows Islam, his comprehensive data—despite his intention— show how very little has survived from the Hindu past even in inner Java and raise the question why the triumph of Islam so complete (Hodgson, Vol. 2, 1974:551).

Recent studies have further refuted much of Geertz’s assertion. As have been shown by Azra (2004) - for the period of the 17 th to 18 th centuries and beyond - and by Laffan (2003), Islam in the archipelago has never been cut off from the one in the Middle East. In fact there is a great deal of intense connections, networks, religious and cultural exchanges among Muslims in the two regions. All these in turn have influenced the course of Islam in the archipelago, including in Java. These also have been shown by such scholars as Hefner (1985), Woodward (1985), Ricklefs (1998), Riddell (2001) and many others. All of them basically argue that Islam in fact forms an obvious layer of Javanese and, by extension, Indonesian cultures.

It is important, however, to point out that despite continuing networks and exchanges between Indonesia and Middle East, Indonesian Islam at the

8 9 same time continue also to develop its distinctive social, cultural and political expression. Prominent contemporary Indonesian Muslim thinkers such as Munawir Sjadzali, , , , Ahmad Syafii Maarif and many others continue also to contextualize the great tradition of Islam with the Indonesian realities. As a result, Indonesian Islam, by and large, remains faithful to ‘washatiyyah Islam ’, middle path Islam, that takes a middle course, rather than taking an extreme position either right or left. This is also one the reasons why Indonesian Muslims in general can accept the constitutional arrangement of the nation-state Indonesia after a series of debates and struggles in the formulation and amendment of the constitution. Constitutional Agencies The original Indonesian Constitution of 1945, before it was amended four times in the post-Soeharto period (from May 1998 onward), had a history from the final year of Japanese occupation in 1945. The Japanese seemed to realize that Indonesian independence was in the end unavoidable because of some setback they experienced in many fronts. That is why on April 29, 1945, the Japanese administration formed the BPUPK (Badan Penyelidikan untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan, or the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of [Indonesian] Independence). The BPUPK consisted of 62 members from among leading senior and experienced [secular] nationalists and Muslims who had been involved in nationalist and Islamic movements. The BPUPK was led by Dr Radjiman Wedyodiningrat as its president and RP Soeroso as its vice-president. With the formation of BPUPK, apparently the Japanese wished to have a peaceful transition of Indonesia from being under its administration to be a fully independent state. Therefore, the BPUPK was assigned, among

9 10 others, to prepare the ideological basis and constitution of the future state of Indonesia as well as to develop its apparatus and administration. Thus, the BPUPK was the first agency responsible to draft the Indonesian constitution, better known later as the 1945 Constitution. The efforts to draft the 1945 Indonesian constitution by BPUPK were, however, marred by bitter struggles in the first session of the agency from 1 May to 1 June 1945 between the two major factions in the body. On the one hand they were ‘secular nationalists’ who wished that future Indonesian state should be a ‘secular’ one; they were challenged by the Muslim nationalis who aspired that the future Indonesia should be an ‘Islamic state’. In order to avoid a deadlock on this very crucial issue, the BPUPK formed a sub- committee of nine members (Panitia Sembilan) that represented the two factions; they were Soekarno, , A.A. Maramis, Muhammad Yamin, and Ahmad Soebardjo of ‘secular nationalist’ group, and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Haji , and Abdul Wahid Hasjim of Islamic-oriented faction. A crucial agreement was reached on 1 July 1945, among them that Indonesia would not be based on Islam and that either Muslim or non- Muslim could become the president. At the same time, a five-principles later known as was introduced in the Preamble of the Constitution draft. The original five principles were: first, the belief in God with the obligation to implement Islamic shari’a for its adherents ; second, a just and civilized humanity; third, the unity of Indonesia; fourth, democracy guided by wisdom arising from consultation and representation; and fifth, social justice for the whole Indonesian people (Elson 2009: 112-3, Hosen 2007: 61-2).

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With the agreement on the Constitution, the BPUPK was disbanded and replaced on 7 August 1945 by the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/PPKI) with Soekarno as its head. The PPKI was also assigned to ‘finalize’ the agreed draft of the 1945 Constitution; and for that purpose it met for the first time on 18 August 1945, one day after the declaration of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945. The PPKI meeting, attended by its 27 members proved to be very crucial. In the words of Elson, “[the PPKI] moved quickly to finalize and formally adopt the draft constitution produced by the BPUPK. In the process, such limited gains as had been made by the Muslim group in the BPUPK were entirely erased” (Elson 2009: 119). What Elson refers to as ‘such limited gains’ were related to the phrase in the preamble of constitution concerning the first basis of the Indonesian state that said ‘with the obligation to implement Islamic shari’a for its adherents’ which in the Indonesian language known as ‘famous’ seven words ( dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya ), which were generally also called as ‘the ’. It is reported that in the evening of day when Indonesian independence was declared (17 August 1945), Vice-President Mohammad Hatta had received ‘a Japanese navy officer’ who conveyed the messege that Christians from Eastern Indonesia had strong objection to that particular phrase. They warned Hatta that if the phrase was not deleted or changed, it was possible that their fellows Christians from Eastern Indonesia would prefer to be outside of the Republic of Indonesia. Alarmed by this, Hatta soon in the following morning convened Muslim leaders who in their fifteen minute meeting wisely accepted to drop the phrase from the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution for the sake of the national unity.

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Not only that, in further meetings of the PPKI, further revision was made to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. First, the word ‘Allah’ (God) that was associated mostly with Islam was replaced by a more neutral or generic Indonesian term ‘Tuhan’ (God); second, the stipulation that the president be a Muslim was also deleted, so that either Muslim or non- Muslim could become president of the Republic. In retrospect, many Muslim leaders particularly during the era of President Soekarno lamented those revisions of the 1945 Constitution; they felt that they had sacrificed a great deal, but at the same time had been heavily defeated. That is why, the longing among some Muslims for the Jakarta Charter has been on and off in the course of Indonesian history as can be clearly observed in the post-Soeharto Indonesia when the 1945 Constitution was being amended, certain Muslim figures, Islamic political parties and groups wished that the Jakarta Charter should be reinserted into the Preamble of the Constitution. It is good to mention in passing that since independence, Indonesia has adopted three constitutions; first, the 1945 Indonesian Constitution that came into effect on 18 August 1945. Then, with the return of the Dutch colonial government on 27 December, which resulted in the breaking up of the Republic of Indonesia and creation of the Republic of United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat/RIS), the 1949 Constitution was introduced. The RIS did not last long. On 17 August 1950, Indonesia returned to its original form as a unitary state; and a Provisional Constitution of 1950 was adopted. The period of the Provisional Constitution was marked by political struggles between Islamic-oriented group that attempted to make Islam as the basis of the state and the ‘non-Islamic oriented group’ that wanted to keep Pancasila as the basis of Indonesian state. This resulted in a

12 13 long political impasse that led President Soekarno to take decision into his own hands and return to the original 1945 Constitution. Since the return by President Soekarno in mid 1959 to the 1945 Constitution, the agency responsible for the constitution was the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People Consultative Assembly). In the early years of General Soeharto period, the MPR was made into MPR- Sementara (Temporary People Consultative Assembly). When President Soeharto was firmed in office, the MPRS was disbanded and replaced by the (permanent) MPR that consisted of parliament (DPR—Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) members and appointed representatives from different segments of society. It is important to mention that throughout the 32-year-long reign of President Soeharto, no amendment of the 1945 Constitution was made. The MPR played a role mostly in the election of the President and issuance of Broad Guidelines of State Policy ( Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara/GBHN ), which was basically outlining state policy in the national development. And every five years, the MPR reelected President Soeharto; that is why the MPR was regarded as being only a rubberstamp in the maintenance of President Soeharto in power rather than anything else. It was only after the resignation of President Soeharto from power in May 1998, that the MPR returned to its role as the constitutional agency. The MPR, consisted of 695 members, for the final time, in 1999, elected Abdurrahman Wahid as new Indonesian President, replacing ‘interim’ President BJ Habibie who replaced President Soeharto. But, it was also the MPR who impeached President Wahid in 2001 for misadministration and replaced him with his Vice-President, Megawati Soekarnoputri.

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In addition to this, the MPR played its role as the Constitutional Agency by introducing a series of amendment of the 1945 Constitution. In fact, the 1945 Constitution was amended four times; first amendment was passed by the MPR on 19 October 1999, following the first democratic parliamentary general election; second amendment was accepted by the MPR on 18 August 2000; third amendment was passed in November 2001; and the fourth amendment was approved in August 2002. These series of amendments were conducted, because of the strong pressure from many sectors of Indonesian society who felt that the 1945 Constitution was too vague in many ways that in the end had made possible the authoritarian rules during the Soekarno and Soeharto periods. For the purpose of amendments, the MPR formed an Ad-hoc Committee which is responsible for evaluating and drafting the amendments. I was involved as one of ‘Team of Experts’ selected by the MPR Ad-hoc Committee. The Ad-hoc Committee held a good number of hearings, discussion and workshops with various segments of Indonesian society in different cities across the country; and as one might expect, the Indonesian people in general supported the amendments of the Constitution. It is not necessary to delineate all of the amendments here; but one of the most important—if not the most radical—amendments (Lindsey 2008: 33-4) is that the President (and Vice-President) is no longer elected by the MPR, but directly by the people as conducted for the first time in the 2004 election and lastly in the 2009 election. This means that the role of the MPR has been significantly reduced to a more symbolic presence rather than being the highest political body in Indonesian state-system. Another important agreement of all political factions in the MPR during the amendments is that there will be no amendment of the Preamble

14 15 of the Constitution. This simply means that there will be no reinsertion of the ‘famous seven words’, or Jakarta Charter. The MPR also rejected the proposal from certain members of MPR of the amendment of Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution on religious freedom in order to make the practice of shari`a a constitutional obligation for the Muslim citizens (Lindsey 2008: 40-1; Hosen 2007: 93-6). Despite that, there are still a few Muslim figures and Islamic movements such as Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) that continue to campaign and conduct various efforts for the transformation of Indonesia into a Caliphate or into an Islamic state, and/or for the adoption of the shari`ah by the state. Before long, it should be made clear that the majority of prominent Muslim figures, leaders, thinkers and Islamic organizations accepted those existing political arrangement and realities, particularly the Pancasila and the current form of the Indonesian state as being final. It is also clear that political, social, cultural and religious dynamics in the last two decades at least have brought Indonesian Islam into a new stage. So, as far as Islamic law is concerned, shari’ah both at the levels of thought and institution has reached one of the most important stages since the early 1990s, when President Soeharto gave his blessing to the foundation in the country of the very first Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat. From then onwards, various national legislation that were in line with the shari’ah injunctions have been adopted, paving the way for further entrenchment of shari’ah- based institutions in the country as one might observe in today’s Indonesia. This is one of the factors responsible for driving certain small Islamic political parties and groups of Muslims in the post-Soeharto Indonesia to accelerate their efforts for official implementation of Islamic law in all its aspects, particularly the jinayah (criminal law) that contains the hudud law,

15 16 the most controversial and hotly contested element of shari`ah . In fact, the local parliament of Aceh Province in name of Aceh Special Autonomy in September 2009 introduced a Qanun Jinayat Bill that adopted the hudud law; but the governor of Aceh so far has declined to sign the Bill that will bring it into effect. Discussion on this is still continuing in Indonesia to date. With that, the adoption of shari`ah -by laws has also a lot to do with political contestation both at local and national levels. Continued fragmentation of Indonesian politics since 1998 combined with the introduction of democracy, have been used and abused by certain political parties to support shari’ah -by laws for their own political benefits. This was also seen during the amendment of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution between 1999-2004; certain political parties, such as the Moon and Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang/PBB) and the United Development Parti (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP) together with other supporters of shari’ah put a great deal of pressure on Indonesia’s People Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR) to reinsert the Jakarta Charter into the Preamble of Constitution that will allow the official implementation of Islamic law in the country. The moves were rejected by the Assembly. Despite the rejection, the proponents of shari`ah continue their campaign for adoption of Islamic law both at national and local levels through the introduction of ‘ shari`ah -by laws at the province and district level. The efforts to introduce shari`ah -by laws reached their peaks between 2000-2004; and since 2005 there is marked decline of the adoption of shari`ah-by laws by local government. This tendency could be worrisome for certain circles, particularly among Western observers. But, the efforts for formalization of shari’ah has been opposed by largest mainstream moderate Muslim organizations such as

16 17 the , and many other similar organizations across the country. The Transmission of Faith The Indonesian Constitution clearly does not make a particular religion—in this case Islam—as the basis of the state; nor does it make Islam as the official religion of the state. This is the reason, why many people, particularly the Westerners, consider Indonesia as a ‘secular’ state, even though there is no stipulation in the 1945 Constitution stating that Indonesia is ‘secular’ state. That is why the Indonesian people often say that Indonesia is neither a secular state, nor is it a theocratic (Islamic) state. For Indonesians in general, Indonesia is not a secular state. In fact the term ‘secular’ or ‘secularism’ is an anathema. For them, it is unthinkable that the state is a secular one that—in their mind—would give no room to religion. Furthermore, secularism is very pejorative, since it would make religion play a very limited role in the life of the people as well as in the politics. Especially for many Muslims, who still hold the view that politics in one form or another can not be entirely separated from religion, secularism should be rejected. That is why the Constitutional recognition and accommodation of religion is acceptable enough—or even Islamic enough—not only from purely Islamic perspective, but also from considering the fact that there is a significant number of non-Muslim citizens of the nation-state Indonesia. As stated earlier, both the original and amended versions of the 1945 Constitution recognize the importance of religion in the Indonesian nation- state. The third line to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution—that has been amended four times since the resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998—states among other that the declaration of Indonesian independence

17 18 was due to the blessing of God Almighty. The fourth line states that the Indonesian state is based on the five principles: First, belief in One Supreme God; second, just and civilized humanity; third, the unity of Indonesia; fourth, democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom through deliberation and representation; and fifth, social justice for the entire people of Indonesia. These are the five principles that are called Pancasila, the constitutional basis of the Indonesian state. It is clear that Pancasila expresses the importance of religion in the first of its five principles, that the state is based on ‘belief in the One, Supreme God’. The official explanation of this first principle states that the principle of belief in One Supreme God means that Indonesians are free to adhere to and practice any of the six officially recognized religions. As Hosen argues that believing on One Supreme God becomes the ‘state religion’; and by not referring to any particular belief, the state guarantees religious freedom (Hosen 2007: 194). But Pancasila is more than simply the Indonesian state basis. It is also the ideological framework and common platform for all different groups of the Indonesian peoples. Pancasila is a ‘deconfessional’ ideology that can not be associated with any religion, particularly with Islam, the single largest religion adhered to by the majority of the Indonesian people. The fact that Pancasila is a ‘deconfessional ideology’ is in fact a blessing in disguise for Indonesia. Even though Pancasila can not be associated directly with any religion, it is clear that it is a religious-friendly ideology; in other words, Pancasila is not a hostile ideology to religion. Therefore, Pancasila can be accepted in principle by any religion, particularly Islam as the religion adhered to by the single largest majority of Indonesian population. As a result, there should be no strong reasons to

18 19 replace Pancasila with any other ideology, particularly those based on religion. The freedom of religion is guaranteed not only by Pancasila, but also by the Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. Article 29 of the Constitution – which has never been the subject of an amendment - explicitly guarantees religious freedom as follows: (1). The state is based on belief in One, Supreme God; 2. The state guarantees freedom of every resident to adhere to his/her respective religion and perform religious duties in conformity with his/her religion/faith. Again, this article does not give Islam a special status—with all rights and privileges; all persons are free to believe in and practice their own religion or faith. Article 29 does not stipulate whether the state should or should not interfere in religious affairs; or conversely, whether or not religion could or could interfere in the affairs of the state. But in general, it is agreed that the role of the state is to promote respect among adherents of different religions and to achieve intra and inter-religious harmony. The state emphasizes the need for communal and national solidarity in all aspect of Indonesian life, particularly religious life. Corresponding to the fundamental right of religious freedom, every citizen is obliged to respect the right of other citizens. In this sense, all religions have the right to promote their teachings and to have peaceful co-existence. Again, the 1945 Indonesian Constitution makes the belief in One Supreme God as one of the five pillars of the Indonesian state. The use of generic term ‘Tuhan’ (God) in the Constitution rather than a particular term such as ‘Allah’ that can be easily associated with Islam clearly shows the state recognition of religious diversity. This was stated in the Presidential Decree No 1, 1965 (which was later enacted as Law No 5, 1969), that there

19 20 were five religions recognized by the state; they were Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and. Buddhism. Later, in 2005 the government recognized Confucianism as the sixth religion. Apparently there are followers of other religions in Indonesia that are not ‘recognized’ by state such as Sikhism, Baha’ism, and even Judaism. People of these still- unrecognized religions as one might expect often face problems and discrimination when they want to register their marriages, divorces and births. This is apparently a contradiction of the fair and equal treatment of all religion. That is why now some NGOs on religious rights have brought the case to the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi), appealing for the abolishment of that Presidential Decree No. 1, 1965 concerned. The Constitutional Court decision on this matter is pending One of consequences of the state recognition of the six religion is the formation of Ministry of Religious Affairs in the Cabinet in 1946. The Ministry is responsible for administration of religious communities: in matters of Muslim community it supervises religious education, Muslim marriages, haj administration and Islamic court (now is under the Supreme Court), and haj . The Ministry also plays the role in the strengthening of religious tolerance and harmony among the believers. Therefore, the Ministry consists of Directorate Generals and Directorates that deal with socio-religious affairs of ‘all religious communities’ from Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, and Buddhists—there is yet no Directorate for the followers of Confucianism. Furthermore, it is expected that the Ministry will not interfere in theological and doctrinal matters of each religion; these are the in the hands of councils, functionaries or leaders of respective religion.

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In relations to government, each religious communities is represented by a kind of religious council; Muslims by the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI), Protestants by the Association of Churces of Indonesian (Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia/PGI), Catholics by Conference of Church Authority of Indonesia (Konperensi Waligereja Indonesia/KWI), Hindus by Parisadha Hindu Dharma, Buddhists by the Indonesian Buddhist Council (Walubi), and Confucians by High Council of Indonesian Confucianism Religion (Majelis Tinggi Agama Konghucu Indonesia/MATAKIN). These religious councils have also been involved in inter-faith dialogs and programs. The government, as a rule, takes side with these religious councils when it comes to decide whether or not certain ‘splinter’ religious group is valid or ‘deviant’. Therefore, when the MUI issued a fatwa declaring the Ahmadiyah as ‘deviant’ group, the government aparently supported that decision. In another case, when the Walubi was constested by the Great Sangha Conference (KASI), the government rallied behind the former. Similar attitude is also shown by the government by not accepting certain Protestant’s denominations such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, in line with the decision of PGI. In these cases, it is clear that government has interfered in deciding the ‘true’ school of thought or denomination; the attitude of which is not in line with the principle of freedom of religion and belief. Furthermore, despite their representation in relations to government, most of these religious councils could not claim to be the sole authoritative bodies within their own communities. The MUI has sometime been contested by NU and Muhammadiyah, or other Muslim organizations. The fatwa s of MUI are not necessarily always accepted by the fatwa bodies existing in each Muslim organizations. That is why, some times the

21 22 government is in a very difficult position; and it is not always easy for related government agencies to intervene. Pancasila: The ‘Final Basis’ of Diversity Even though, Indonesia is also known as the largest Muslim nation in the world, it is not an Islamic state. Politically and ideologically, Indonesia is a state based on Pancasila that was (and still is) a compromise between secular nationalists who advocated a secular state and Muslim leaders who demanded an ‘Islamic state’. After a series of debates and struggles, Muslim leaders finally accepted Pancasila and regarded it as having no incompatibility with Islamic teaching (Madjid 1994:57-8).

Therefore, Muslims’ acceptance of Pancasila is no doubt one of the most important Indonesian Islamic roots of the acceptance and recognition of the country diversity and pluralism. For the bulk majority of Indonesian Muslims, Pancasila is, in line with a verse of the Quran, a “ kalimah sawa ”, a common platform, among different religious followers. Addressing the Prophet Muhammad, the Qur’an has this to say: “Say: O the people of the Book [ ahl al-kitab , that is the Jews and Christians]; come to common terms between us and you; that we worship none but God, that we associate partners with him, that we erect not, from ourselves, lords and patrons, other than God…”(Q 3:64).

As Madjid rightly argues, the Pancasila thus becomes a firm basis for development of religious tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia. , who was once Vice President during the Soeharto period, maintained that Pancasila, in Islamic perspective, is in a similar spirit to the modus vivendi that was created by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina after having migrated (hijrah ) from Mecca. The Prophet laid down the modus vivendi in a famous

22 23 document called the “Constitution of Medina” ( mithaq al-madinah ). The document includes a provision which states that all Medinan factions, including Jews, were one nation ( ummah ) together with Muslims, and that they have the same rights and duties as Muslims. Adam Malik interprets the “Constitution of Medina” as a formula for a state based on the idea of social and religious pluralism (Madjid 1994:64).

Similarly, for Bellah, the American sociologist of religion, the Medinan state was a root of Islamic modernity and pluralism. He argues that Islam in its seventh century origins was for its time and place “remarkably modern…in the high degree of commitment, involvement, and participation expected from the rank-and-file members of the community” (Bellah 1970:150-1). Despite that, the Prophet Muhammad’s experiment eventually failed because of the lack of necessary socio-cultural pre-requisites among the Arab Muslims. In other words, the modus vivendi failed because it was “too modern” for the Medinan society.

Looking to the Indonesian experience with Pancasila as a common platform, it is a part of what Bellah believes is an effort of modern Indonesian Muslims to depict the early community as the very type of equalitarian participant nationalism, which is by no means entirely an unhistorical ideological participation.

The relation between the Pancasila state and Islam has gone through a number of different stages in the course of Indonesian history. First, during most of the Soekarno period there were tension between him and most modernist Muslim leaders of in particular that once struggled for the establishment through constitutional means of an Islamic state; but they failed to gain majority in the Parliament.

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Tension between the two opposing sides remained, however; and many of these Muslim leaders were jailed towards the end of Soekarno rule. On the other hand, President Soekarno recruited a traditional Muslim group, that is, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) into his axis, the so-called ‘Nasakom’ (nationalist, religious, communist). The NU kiyai s and politician in fact issued a fatwa (independent religious ruling) recognizing Soekarno as Muslim leader who must be obeyed by all Muslims. Second, roughly in the first half of his long rule, President Soeharto implemented some kind of hostile attitude and policies towards Islam and Muslim groups. Early in his rule, he declined the attempts by Muslims to revive and rehabilitate the old Masyumi party; he depoliticized all Muslim parties and forced them to fuse in 1971 in the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or ); engineered through a number of his generals—particularly General Ali Murtopo—of the so-called “Komando Jihad” (Jihad Commands) by recruiting ex-DI/TII to conduct subversive activities in order to discredit Islam and Muslims in general; and lastly forced all Muslim groups and others to accept Pancasila as the sole basis of their organizations. Thus, as a basis of Indonesia pluralism, Pancasila had been unfortunately used by the Soeharto regime as a tool for repression. The forced implementation in 1985 of Pancasila by President Soeharto as the sole ideological basis of all organizations in the country had been unfortunate and resented by many Indonesian. Through a special training ( P4 ), the Pancasila was indoctrinated to Indonesians, which in the end gave the Pancasila a bad name. It is clear that for most Indonesian nothing is wrong with the Pancasila as such, but when it was abused and manipulated for the maintenance of President Soeharto’s political status quo,

24 25 then people rapidly lost their belief in the Pancasila as an integrating factor within plural Indonesia.

Even though there were attempts by a few splinter Muslim leaders in the 1950s to replace Pancasila with Islam as the basis of the Indonesian state, in the end virtually all Muslim leaders recognize that Pancasila as the common platform and ideological basis of the Republic of Indonesia. Virtually all large moderate Muslim organizations across the country are of the opinion that Pancasila as outlined in the Preamble of 1945 Constitution (including the amended version) is the final basis of the Indonesian state, and that the current form of Indonesian state is final.

It is regrettable that Pancasila has been conspicuously absent in the public discourse since the fall of President Soeharto. Indonesian top leaders from BJ Habibie, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have all failed to revive Pancasila. I would argue that in the apparent decline of several integrating forces of the nation-state Indonesia, Pancasila is the remaining one. Therefore, there should be rejuvenation of Pancasila, since it remains the most feasible and viable basis of and common platform for religious pluralism in Indonesia. Conclusion The 1945 Indonesian Constitution clearly gives ample spaces for diversity, particularly for religion; and practically all adherents of religions existing in the country feel that the Constitution has sufficiently recognized the diversity of the faiths. In the post-Soeharto period, as an intended consequence of democratic opening, there are of course a limited number of individuals or Muslim groups who openly struggle to create an Islamic state

25 26 or a caliphate in the country, like the Hizb al-Tahrir (‘party of liberation’). But, they fail to find support from the bulk majority of Muslim population. There are complains and repeated appeals from certain circles of politicians, retired high-ranking military officers, and intellectual that the 1945 Indonesian Constitution should again be amended for the fifth time. But this is related mostly to the recreation of a more balanced power and authority between the executive and legislative branches of government as well as to the position of the Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah/DPD) vis-à-vis People’s Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR), the parliament. It is important to note, that appeal for the fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution is not based on the arguments that the current Constitutional arrangement of religious life should be revised. Therefore, it seems that current and existing Constitutional arrangement has been generally accepted; and therefore, there is no urgent need to change it. In the meantime, we have yet to see whether the fifth amendment of the Constitution would ever take place at all in the near future. Bibliography Anshari, Endang Saifuddin, 1997, Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945: Sebuah Konsensus Nasional tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia (1945-1949) (The Jakarta Charter of 22 June 1945: A National Consensus on the Basis of the State of the Republic of Indonesia (1945-1949), Jakarta: Gema Insani Press.

Azra, Azyumardi & Wayne Hudson (eds), 2008, Islam beyond Conflict: Indonesian Islam and Western Political Theory , Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

Azra, Azyumardi, 2006, Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context , Jakarta & Singapore: ICIP, TAF, Equinox-Solstice.

Elson, RE, 2009, ‘Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 1945’, Indonesia , 88, October 2009.

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Hosen, Nadirsyah, 2007, Shari’a and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia , Singapore, ISEAS.

Hosen, Nadirsyah, 2007b, ‘Human Rights Provisions in the Second Amendment to the Indonesian Constitution from Shari’ah Perspective’, The Muslim World , Vol. 97, No. 2, April 2007.

Hosen, Nadirsyah, 2005, ‘Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , 36, 3, 419-40.

Kusuma, AB, 2004, Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar 1945: Memuat Salinan Dokumen Otentik Badan Oentoek Menjelidiki Oesaha2 Persiapan Kemerdekaan (the Birth of the 1945 Constitution: To Include Authentic Documents of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence), Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia.

Lindsey, Tim, 2008, ‘Constitutional Reform in Indonesia: Muddling towards Democracy’, in Tim Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia Law and Society , Second Edition, Sydney: Federation Press.

Mas’udi, Masdar Farid et al, 2009, Syarah Undang-undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 dalam Perspektif Islam (Explanation of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 in Islamic Perspective), Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Mahkamah Konstitusi.

Nasution, Buyung Adnan, 1992, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia : A Socio-Legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959 , Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.

Prawirosoedirdjo, Soemali et al, 1984, Sejarah Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar 1945 dan Pancasila (History of the Birth of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila), Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press.

Salim, Arskal & Azyumardi Azra (eds.), 2003, Shari’a and Politics in Modern Indonesia , Singapore: ISEAS.

*Azyumardi Azra is Professor of history and Director of Graduate School, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia (January 2007-on); and Deputy for Social Welfare at the Office of Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia (April 2007-October 2009). He was rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University for two terms (1998-2002 and 2002-2006). He earned his MA, MPhil and PhD degrees in history from Columbia University (1992) with the dissertation “The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian `Ulama’ in the 17 th and 18 th Centuries”. In May 2005 he was awarded Doctoral Degree Honoris Causa in Humane Letters from Carroll College, Montana, USA.

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He is also a Honorary Professorial Fellow, University of Melbourne, Australia (2004-9); a member of Board of Trustees, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan (2004-9); and a member of Academic Development Committee, Aga Khan International University- Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations (AKU-ISMC), London (2006-8). He has been involved as a member of selection committees for research awards, such as SEASREP (Southeast Asia Studies Research Exchange Program (The Nippon Foundation & The Asia Center, Tokyo, 1998-9). He is also a member of Advisory/Management Board of Asian Research Foundation (ARF), Bangkok (2005-on); Asian Scholarship Foundation (ASF), Bangkok (2007-9); Asian Public Intellectual Fellowship Program, The Nippon Foundation, Tokyo (2007- on). He is also a member of Indonesian National Research Council (DRN, 2004-now); and a life- time member of Indonesian Academy of Sciences (AIPI). In addition, he is a member of advisory board of a number of international institutions such as the Multi-Faith Centre (MFC), Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia (2005-09); the US Institute of Global Ethics and Religion (2004-on); Center for the Study of Contemporary Islam (CSCI), University of Melbourne, Melbourne (2005-09); the UN Democracy Fund/UNDEF, New York (2006-08); LibforAll (2006-on). He is also member of the Tripartite Forum [governments, UN offices and Civil Society organizations] for Interfaith Cooperation for Peace, Development and Human Dignity, launched at the UN in New York on March 24, 2006; member of the Board of International IDEA (Institute for Democracy an Electoral Assistance, Stockholm 2007-on); member of Board of Governors, Bali Democracy Forum (BDF)/Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD), Jakarta/Bali, 2008-on); and member of Council on Faith, World Economic Forum, Davos (2008-on). He is also co-chair of United Kingdom-Indonesia Muslim Advisory Council, formed at the end of 2006 by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He is editor-in-chief, Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies (1994-on); advisory board of Journal of Qur’anic Studies (SOAS, London, 2005-on), Journal of Usuluddin (Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 2005 on); Australian Journal of Asian Law (2008-on); Journal of Islamic Advanced Studies (Kuala Lumpur, 2008-on); and Journal of Royal Asiatic Society ( JRAS , London, 2009-on). He has been international visiting fellow at Oxford University, University of Philippines, New York University, Columbia University, University of Melbourne and many others. He regularly presented papers on various topics at national and international conferences. He has published 21 books; numerous chapters in internationally edited books; his latest books are The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia , Crows Nest, Australia: Asian Studies Association of Australia and Allen & Unwin; Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004; Indonesia, Islam and Democracy, Jakarta & Singapore: ICIP & Equinox, 2006; Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Development, Bandung: Mizan International, 2007; and contributing editor (with Wayne Hudson), Islam beyond Conflict: Indonesian Islam and Western Political Theory , London: Ashgate, 2008. In conjunction with the commemoration of Indonesian independence (August 17, 1945), on August 15, 2005, he was awarded by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono the ‘Bintang Maha Putra Utama’ [lit, the Star of the Greatest Son of the Soil], the highest star for Indonesia civilian, for his outstanding contribution to development of moderate Islam in the country. Early that year, in conjunction with its 50 th year anniversary, The Asia Foundation (TAF) also awarded him for his outstanding contribution to the modernization of Islamic .

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