Military Review The Professional Journal of the US Army 'April 1982

United States-Netherlands Bicentennial ... see pages 2-28 THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY

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VOLUME LXII APRIL 1982 N04 CONTENTS ~' "A '. ~ <:::=:: ":o"!'~ PAGE 2 THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS CELEBRATE BICENTENNIAL 3 TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN-DUTCH RELATIONS by Major Hans L. Zwltzer, Royal Netherlands Army 13 THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS ARMY TODAY by Lieutenant Colonel A. J. van Vuren, Royal Netherlands Army

29 SCORCHED-EARTH POLICY: SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN by Malor John M. Hutcheson, US Army 38 STRATEGIC CONCEPTS FOR THE 19805: PART II by Colonel William O. Staudenmaler, US Army 60 THE WARS OF ISRAEL IN SINAI: TOPOGRAPHY CONQUERED by Arnon Soffer 73 LETTERS 75 REVIEWS the best from other /ournals 79 NEWS 87 BOOKS contemporary reading for the professional

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The Bicentennial logo for the commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Netherlands has been constructed of several symbolic elements. The logo's basis is the American five-pointed star which passes to the right into a flying, striped banner. Apart from imparting a generally festive air, the seven bars of the banner stand for the seven provinces which constituted the Netherlands in 1782. The undulant motion symbolizes the ocean and the vast distance that separated the two countries two centuries ago. The 13 five-pointed stars in the circle are the 13 states that together formed the United States of America in 1782. The circle itself expresses the friendship that has bound the two countries without interruption for two centuries. The colors applied in the logo-red, white and blue-corre­ spond to the traditional colors of both the American and Dutch flags. Tll£ llBMY NO jI, omEilAl ~711H eQLk(l:~ H KANSAS e6021 OffiCIAl. BUSINESS PENALTV FOR PRIVATE USE S31lO StCUNll eLAS:' 01 uI~IV MICRUF lLI~S 3uO NURfH l~E~ NOAO AlTN ti HOkTUIIJ MI 481()b CGSC LBL5 A I~N A fdl U R 15 OEC 79

Articles to Watch For:

The Operational Art of the AirLand Battle Lieutenant Colonel John S. Doerfel US Army

Maneuver in the• Deep Battle Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder, US Army

The Iron(ic} Horse• From Nikolsk Harold B Hayes III The United States and the Netherlands Celebrate Bicentennial From 19 April to 8 October 1982, the United States and the Netherlands will jointly commemorate the 200th anni­ versary of the establishment of this country's oldest, con­ tinuously peaceful, diplomatic relationship. One year to the day after John Adams informed the States General of the Dutch Republic of his appointment as the United States' minister plenipotentiary "to reside near" them, that sovereign body formally recognized his mlSSLOn. Having thus obtained, on 19 April 1782, diplomatic recognition of the United States as an independent nation, Adams also succeeded in bringing about-on 8 October 1782-the first Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the two countries. In observance of those significant events from the early days of this nation, we highlight two special articles in this issue. The first recounts the long association between the United States and the Netherlands, while the other describes the Royal Netherlands Army of today. -Editor.

2 April '4 ~\J\-IERL41/t .'"'- '\J '-~ 4t~ ,~'- OJ'. A ~ , It. (/ CV 7 CV c.f' q, -p q, -p ~ ., :::: ~ , ::~ ~::: ~ 1'. ~<'/ I' $* ~/ «=.:: * * * * ** ...... If-* .. * * .. ..,.., ..... * .. * TUJo Hundred Years of American-Dutch Relations'

Major Hans L. Zwitzer, Royal Netherlands Army

have occupied themselves extensively Introduction with Dutch history. the average Amer­ ican reader cannot be expected to be familiar with it in all its details. John HE purpose of this article is to Lothrop Motley, for instance, comes to T focus attention on the 200-year-old mind. His four-volume The History of the relationship that has existed between the United Netherlands, written more than a United States and the Netherlands. The century ago, is still very readable. Also subjects discussed will be partly his­ recognized are present-day historians like torical and partly of topical interest, with Robert R. Palmer and Herbert H. Rowen, special attention being given to their the latter of whom published an impor­ military aspects. tant biography several years ago of Jan Some background information is neces­ de Witt, one of the greatest Dutch sary for. the historical section since. statesmen in the 17th century. although prominent American historians An interesting aspect of Dutch history

1982 3 MILITARY REVIEW is that, after they renounced the Spanish treme individualism of its inhabitants, King Philip II as their sovereign in 1581, the putting of local above national in­ the United Provinces had a republican terest, the usurpation of power by small form of government for more than 200 oligarchies." This referred precisely to years, which had both federal and con­ those matters which, among other things, federal features. The Dutch Republic had led ultimately to the downfall of the retained important institutions and func­ republic in 1 795, after which a new state tions from the monarchial past such as arose that aligned itself with revolu­ the office of provincial stadholder. I n this tionary F~ance. office, members of the House of Orange­ The Dutch revolutionaries, who called Nassau played a major role as leaders in themselves "Patriots," did not, however, the revolt against Spain and as army draw their inspiration only from France. commanders in the Eighty Years' War The American example, too, had an im­ which was a consequence of the revolt. portant role in the debates on the con­ Afterward, although the appointment stitution of the new Batavian Republic. was an anomaly, the stadholders consti­ This is illustrated by the fact that, at the tuted an important and powerful factor in opening of the National Assembly in The the republican system of government. Hague in 1796, the Dutch, French and Their involvement in Dutch history American flags were flown alongside one was so great that, after the fall of N a­ another. poleon in 1813, there were no longer any obstacles to proclaiming the last stad­ holder's son sovereign prince and,' l wo The Dutch Republic- years later, king. Apart from the mon­ An Ally of the Rebellious American Colonies archial element, t,here were, at first sight, certain significant parallels between the Republic of the United Netherlands and On 20 December 1780, Britain declared the United States which did not go unob­ war on the Republic ofthe United Nether­ served by the rebels in America. Thomas lands. This act was closely related to the Paine did not hide his admiration of the position adopted by the republic in the republic although he held the office of armed conflict which had broken out five stadholder in no high esteem. It was years previously between Britain and its especially those Americans who were op­ North American colony. At the outset, posed to a strongly centralized state who the Netherlands had tried to derive as pointed to the Dutch example. This was many trading advantages as possible the case, for instance, during the debates from the conflict. The American rebels on a new constitution at the 1787 and were supplied on a large scale with arms, 1788 conventions. ammunition and other items indispensa­ There was also no lack of warnings, ble for the conduct of war. An important however, about following the Dutch intermediate station in these activities, example. "For the federalists," a Dutch which the British regarded as pernicious historian recently wrote, "the history of smuggling, was the Dutch possession of Holland was an example of the tragic St. Eustatius, a small island in the Carib­ failure of a Republic ...." What was bean. This was the center of Dutch trade wrong with the Dutch Republic, as they with America. saw it, was "its eternal dissension, the ex- As early as 1776, the governor of the

4 April AMERICAN-DUTCH RELATIONS island, Johannes de Graaff, caused an incident which greatly irritated the British when he had a salute of 11 guns fired for the American ship A ndrew Doria that had put into St. Eustatius for cargo. Great Britain arrogantly demanded satis­ faction, and the affair was smoothed over by the temporary recall of de Graaff whose portrait, incidentally, hangs in the New Hampshire Capitol. However, there was no reduction of tension between Bri­ tain and the repu blic. What finally led to war was the imprisonment by the British, in September 1780, of the American, Henry Laurens, who had been appointed US charge d'affaires in the republic. The ship in which Laurens was travel­ ing to the Netherlands, the Mercury, was seized by the British. In his baggage, Laurens had the draft of a trade agree· ment between Amsterdam merchants and the United States. Although he had the presence of mind to throw the box con· taining the documents overboard, the British retrieved it from the water. Great was the indignation of the government in himself had shrewdly perceived. The London. The Republic, however, had no small area of the Netherlands'-it was. wish to give satisfaction to the British, and still is. not much larger than Mary· and war with Britain became a fact. This land-and its population which did not was at its height when John Adams, one exceed two million at the end of the 18th of the leaders of the American Revolu­ century lit is now 14 million) were deci· tion, presented his credentials as ambas· sive factors in reducing the republic to sador in The Hague on 22 April 1782, the status of a minor power. The short­ thus making the Netherlands the second lived union with Belgium during 1815-30 country-France was the first-to recog­ scarcely changed the situation. nize the United States as an independent When the two countries finally sepa­ state. rated in 1839. it was obvious that the By sending no less person than Adams N.etherlands, as a minor power, would to the Netherlands, the United States pursue a policy of neutrality. This policy showed that it greatly valued, and was was maintained until the Netherlands concerned in maintaining good relations was overrun in May 1940 by Nazi Ger­ with, the republic. Here, there was a great many and its government was forced to deal of money which the rebellious Amer­ leave the country and go to London. icans would be delighted to borrow. By There was, however, a paradoxical aspect then, however, it had already lost its posi· to the Netherlands' position. The king­ tion as a great power-a fact that Adams dom of the Netherlands, which had been

1982 5 MILITARY REVIEW established in the 19th century, had in­ war on Japan. This was the result in part herited a large overseas empire from the of developments in previous months republic of the 17th and 18th centuries, which had brought the Netherlands, Bri­ and this made it the third most important tain and the United States closer together colonial power in the world. I t is notable regarding their policy vis-a.-vis Japan. that, after a period of calm of almost 200 There was, however, still no alliance. This years following the establishment of rela­ was not formed until after Pearl Harbor. tions between the Netherlands and the The ABDA (American, British, Dutch, United States, it was the Dutch colonies Australian) Command, established in in Asia that brought the two countries in­ January 1942 under British General Ar­ to close alliance. chibald P. Wavell and headquartered in J ava, was unable to prevent the Japanese from achieving one success after another. The Netherlands' Overseas Empire The Java Sea Battle, at the end of Febru­ and the Unlled States ary 1942, in which the American heavy cruiser Houston and four American de­ stroyers-Edwards, Ford, Jones and When, after a short war with Spain in Alden-took part, ended in a heavy defeat 1898, the Philippines became an Amer­ for the Allied fleet. This sealed the fate of ican possession, the Dutch East Indies Java. The Japanese needed only a week to acquired the United States as a neighbor conquer the island. Among the Allied in Southeast Asia. In view of Japan's in­ troops taken into captivity were tens of creasing influence, it was possible that thousands of Dutchmen. 4.000 Britons the Netherlands and the U ni ted States and 500 Americans of the 2d Battalion. would be placed in the position of having 131st Field Artillery Regiment, from to defend interests of a similar kind. This Texas. The Americans had originally became evident in the 1930s when Japan been intended as reinforcements for the began its advance in Asia, culminating in Philippines and had ultimately gone to its attack on Pearl Harbor. At the begin­ Java. ning of December 1941, it was already ap­ Due to their reduced strength, Dutch parent in the Dutch East Indies that the military units were able to play only a Japanese would shortly take action. The subordinate role for the rest of the war in intelligence service of the Royal Nether­ the Pacific. Of considerable assistance lands Indies army had intercepted and was the use of Jackson Air Base in Texas. decoded Japanese signals to this effect. Beginning in April 1942, the base was As a result of these signals-which used to train several hundred Dutch air­ were immediately transmitted to Wash­ crew trainees who had managed to leave ington by the American military attache Java in time. A Dutch brigade of marines in the Dutch East Indies, Lieutenant also underwent training in America, but Colonel Elliott Raymond Thorp-the this was not completed in time for them Dutch East Indies air force was mobilized to be deployed against the Japanese. o~e week before the attack on Pearl Har­ There was also close military collabora­ bor. Although Japanese action was not tion between the Netherlands and the directed against Dutch East Indies terri­ United States in the 1950s, during the tory, the Dutch government, in exile in Korean War, when a Dutch infantry bat­ London, decided immediately to declare talion was assigned to the 38th Infantry

6 April AMERICAN-DUTCH RELATIONS

Participants at the first meeting of the ABDA Command at the house of Vice Admiral Conrad E. L. Helfrich, Royal Netherlands Navy, at Batavia

Regiment of the 2d US Infantry Division. both the Belgian-Dutch border and the The US Presidential Unit Citation was Siegfried line. The British 21st Army conferred upon this battalion for its serv­ Group was on the Allied northern flank, ice in the Houngson-Wonju Battle of while the American 12th and 6th Army 12-15 February 1951 and in the Soyang Groups were operating on the eastern River Battle of 16-22 May of the same flank. The two main efforts of Allied ac­ year. The United States awarded indivi­ tion in the northeastern part of the dual Dutch servicemen 14 Silver Stars, theater of operations were the struggle four Legions of Merit and 62 Bronze' for the port of Antwerp and attempts to Stars. In all, 3,972 Dutch troops served in break through the Siegfried line near Aix­ Korea, of whom 120 lost their lives and la-Chapelle. 645 were wounded. Although Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery failed in September 1944 to force a breakthrough in the Ruhr by The United States gigantic airborne landings near Arnhem and the Liberation of the Netherlands -Operation Market Garden-the Ger­ mans were driven out of the Scheidt e~tuary in November, and the port of During World War II, the Americans Antwerp became available for Allied came into contact with the Dutch in the transport. In this month, the front finally European theater after landing ~n Nor­ came to a definite halt along the Meuse mandy in June 1944 when the Allied and the Rhine from the North Sea to Aix­ armies began to drive the Germans to the la-Chapelle. This situation lasted until north and east. At the beginning of Sep­ February 1945, with the result that it was tember 1944, the front stabilized along' possible to liberate only the southern part

1982 7 MILITARY REVIEW of the Netherlands in 1944. It was here Garden against German positions in the especially that various American Army south of the Netherlands. Their most im­ units, such as the 104th and 30th Infan­ portant mission was to capture a large try Divisions, the lOist and 82d Airborne number of bridges intact in order to give Divisions, and the 2d and 7th Armored the XXX Corps of the British Eighth Divisions, played an important part. Army an opportunity to reach Arnhem, Space does not permit mention of all the where the British 1st Airborne Division units involved. had landed, in two days. The fact that In order to assist Montgomery in driv­ Operation Market Garden was ultimately ing the Germans out of the Scheidt estu­ a failure had nothing to do with the two ary, the lO4th Infantry Division was American units that carried out their mis­ placed under the command of the Cana­ sion very successfully. dian First Army. With Major General The 82d Airborne Division landed near Terry Allen in command', the division Nijmegen and Grave, and the lOlst to the took up positions on 23 October 1944 north of Eindhoven. A Dutch eyewitness along the Dutch-Belgian border on both recorded in his diary: .. Americans every­ sides of the Antwerp-Breda motorway. where. Fine young chaps. Not at all ner­ After heavy fighting, it succeeded in vous. They walk through the town here breaking through the German lines and (Grave) as if they were at home." continued the advance into Dutch ter­ Thanks partly to the excellent leader­ ritory in the direction of the Meuse which ship of the commander of the 82d Divi­ was reached on 4 November, Having suc· sion, Major General James M. Gavin, all cessfully completed its mission, the divi­ the counterattacks by the German units, sion was then withdrawn from the Neth­ which had meanwhile been reorganized, erlands to take part once again in the bat· were repulsed. The lOist Airborne Divi­ tle near Aix-Ia-Chapelle in Germany. sion's action in the Netherlands clearly The troops of the 81st and lOist Air­ indicated that this division would acquit borne Divisions were deployed on 17 Sep­ itself exceedingly well in Bastogne during tember 1944 as part of Operation Market the German Ardennes offensive at the

Lieutenant General Sir Miles C. Dempsey and then Brigadier General James M. Gavin confer during Operation Markel Garden

;,j' ••f[,iJ1'

~1"-~ <.'/ :' "- i:Y1 -p. '?--~ ~ ~ r ~: , L;;;,j ,'" \ r I end of 1944. A British army corps com­ marshy area on the border of the Dutch mander said quite rightly at the end of provinces of Limburg and North Brabant. the campaign in the Netherlands: "I have On 22 September 1944, Montgomery commanded four corps during my army managed to persuade General Dwight D. career, but the 101st Airborne Division is Eisenhower to shift the line in such a way the fightingest outfit I ever had under my that it would be for the Americans to cap­ command." ture the Peel. On 30 September, the 7th In September 1944, the boundary be­ Armored bivision started the attack, but tween the British 21st Army Group and German resistance was more fierce than the American 12th Army Group ran just had been anticipated. A week later, the to the south of "the Peel," an extensive American offensive was hopelessly stuck

9 MILITARY REVIEW near the village of Overloon. The British then resumed the attack Postwar Developments while the Americans were assigned a covering task in the southern part of the area. They were not given much peace. On Following the liberation in 1945, the 27 October, two German divisions of the revolutionary situation in the Dutch East XLV II Panzerkorps began to attack near Indies, where the Netherlands bore the Meijel. However, by offering stubborn brunt of the postwar process of decoloni­ resistance and carrying out a large num­ zation, demanded most of the country's ber of counterattacks, the 7th Armored military effort. When, in 1949, the Neth­ Division was able to halt the German of­ erlands was admitted to NATO and its fensive. On 5 November, the American former overseas territory in Asia became division was relieved by the British 15th the independent Republic of Indonesia-a Highland Division. The 7th Armored development in which America played an Division was to acquire great fame in the important mediatory role-it was possi­ end at the battle near Saint Vith during ble to devote military expenditures to the German offensive in the Ardennes. building up the Dutch armed forces in On the extreme left fhmk of the Amer­ Europe. The American Mutual Defense ican First Army was the XIX Army Assistance Program was of great impor­ Corps which had been stopped by the tance in this. Germans near the Albert Canal during its Immediately after the war, the Duteh advance through Belgium. On 12 Septem­ army had acquired British war equipment ber, the Americans of the 2d Armored which, for the most part, had then been and 30th Infantry Divisions resumed the used up in Indonesia. As the army, which attack and advanced toward Maastricht, had been built up since the beginning of the southernmost town of the Nether­ the 1950s, was to be based on the US lands where they were received by a joy­ Army as far as organization and equip­ ful population. The Germans withdrew ment were concerned, the retraining of behind the Siegfried line, after which the regular and conscript personnel now had American advance came temporarily to to be undertaken. Ambitious plans for the an end. Du tch army to take part in NATO Many American soldiers lost their lives defense arrangements with various army in the liberation of the Netherlands, and corps had to be set aside since the Nazi the war cemetery at Margraten in the occupying forces had literally ransacked Dutch province of Limburg provides the country, and a great deal of m'oney most impressive evidence of this. A sig­ was necessary for postwar reconstruc­ nificant number of Americans also re­ tion. ceived the highest Dutch award for valor, In the end, the country's contribution the Militaire Willems-Orde, in recognition to NATO had to be limited to one army of their share in the struggle to liberate corps. Originally, in the event of a con­ the Netherlands and of their action in the flict, this was to maintain the Issei-Rhine Allied war against Japan. Their name~ defensive line. However, when the Fed· are listed in the accompanying chart. The eral Republic of Germany joined NATO, Grand Cross of this same order was con­ the defense area was shifted to the east, ferred posthumously on President Frank­ and Dutch troops were stationed in Ger­ lin D. Roosevelt by Queen Wilhelmina. many.

10 April list of American servicemen who. in recognition of their deeds of courage. conduct and loyalty during World War II. were appointed Knight 4th class in the MJiltalfe Willems Orde. the highest Dutch order for valor. NAM.E RANK BIllingslea. Charles COlonE'l Action against the Germans near Nlimegen US Army 17 S,ptember-4 October 1944

Bmford Thomas Howell Commander Naval action lombok Strait, Netherlands US Navy East Ind,,,. 19-20 February 1944

Blen,enshrp, Robert C FIrst lIeutenant Actron against the Germans near Nl]megen US Army 17 Sept,mber-4 Octob,r 1944

ChapPuIs Steve ArChie Colonel Action against the Germans near US Army Besl 1944 ,

Chase. Charles Henry Lieutenant Colonel Action against the Germans near US Army ,Uden 25 S,pl,mber 194~

COOk. Juhan A lIeutenant COlonel ActIOn agaInst the Germans near Nfjmegen US Army 17 September--4 Oetobe' 1944

flam. Damel ~rank Malo r Anborne landing near Son US A.rmy Air Corp",. 17 Seplember 1944

Fulmer Ed ..... ard SlmOfl':, Second lleutpnant A,rbOlne !andln~ near FIndhoven, US Army All Corps 18 Seplerrber 1944

Hams Wesley D Captam ActIOn against the GermJn<, near N"megen US Arm,! Ii Seplember-4 Oelober 1944

Jona" Glenn Ser~eant Action against tile Germans near NlJrnegen US Army 17 Seprember-4 October 19~4

Kero. William E Sergeant Action against tr.e Germans near Nqmegen US Army 20 Sl:'ptl:'moer 1944

Kinnard Harry Wilham O<,born COionel A'lbOlne land!/l~ near f.ndhoven US Army 17 Septt'lllber 1944

le<,ter Paul T PrivatI' FHq Cla)~ Action a~aln)t Ihe Germans near NqmPKen US Alm~ 17 Seotember-4 Octob,r 1944

fl\st Lieutenant Action again:::.! the Germans near Nqmegen US Arm\' 30 Sewmber 1944

Parker Ed ..... ard N lieutenant Commander Naval acliOn LombOk Strait Nattle/tanl!:::' US Navy EJlllnd", 19-20 February 194/

RoOkS, A H Java Sea Battt!? 27 February 1942 naval action In Bantam Bay 78 febrlJarv \942

SChulman Herbert f dgar SeLond lieutenant AI/borne lJndtng near Nljmegen US Army Air Corp:::. 17 S,pl,mb,' 1944

. la~lo!. Maxl'yeU Davenport MalOr Gene/al ActJon agamst the• Germans near hndhmen US Arm) 17 S,plember-28 NOIember 1944

Terry Oe.,tt S Sergeant Action against the German':, near Nllmegen' US Army 30 Seplember ,1944

TUCker Reuben Henry Colonel Action against the Germans near Nllmegen US Army September -Oclober '1944

Wray Waverly W first lieutenant ActIon agaInst the Germans near NIJmegen, US Army 21 September 1944

1982 11 MILITARY REVIEW

As a result of further modernization of UNIFIL's best units. equipment and arms in the early 1960s. Due in part to their modern arms and the Dutch army had developed into a efficient communica.tions, these troops mobile force which was both strongly are referred to by many as the backbone mechanized and fully motorized. Chang­ of UNIFIL. While exercising strict ing views in the Dutch armed forces in neutrality, they are attempting to pre­ the 1960s. in regard to the discipline and vent an escalation of the conflict on South appearance of the troops. created a stir Lebanon and, together with the other both inside and outside the country. UNIFIL units, are working in close col­ What had been. as it were, unassailable laboration with the American members of virtues for centuries were suddenly set the Observers Group, Lebanon. aside as obsolete. Saluting disappeared, In 1782, of course, it was not possible to and hair styles were no longer controlled. predict the development of Dutch-Amer­ Compulsory reveilles and evening pa­ ican relations and certainly not that their rades became things of the past. This military aspect would have a relatively process of change did not, of course, take dominant role. Adams had nO illusions at place without shock or incident. Nonethe­ the time about the military power of the less, the older and younger generations in republic which was "overshadowed on all the forces have grown closer together. sides by more powerful neighbors" and internal relations have been adapted according to a dispatch he sent to Con­ to civilian life. gress in 1781. The Netherlands, however, Dutch servicemen have also been carry­ was of the greatest importance as a trad­ ing out a task of some importance in the ing partner and source of loans. I n this peacekeeping operations in the Middle regard, too, Adams achieved substantial East where a Dutch armored infantry successes in The Hague when, shortly battalion has been part of the United Na­ after his appointment as ambassador, he tions Interim Force in Lebanon (UN IFIL) was able to conclude a loan and, later in since March 1979. Dutchbatt, as it is the year, a trade agreement. Late in life. called, is the heaviest mechanized and he again referred to the importance of the best armed unit there. Although the first Netherlands' cooperation with the rebel­ UNIFIL commander. General Erskine, lious American colonies when he stated: was at first somewhat doubtful about the Holland's separation from England, military proficiency of "long-haired union with France and Spain and their Dutchmen" who were not volunteers but treaty with us was the event which ulti­ conscripts, the skill, ability to improvise, mately turned the scale of the American dedication and discipline under fire of Revolutionary War and produced the these Dutch troops place them among Peace of 1783. "R

MaJDr Hans L Zwztzer, Royal Netherlands Army, IS with the Hlstoncal Sectton. Army Headquarters, The Hagu.e. where he deals prin­ czpally u'lth the history althe former Dutch Ea6t Indies and WIth 17th and 18th-century Dutch military hzstory. He IS a graduate in history of the University of Utrecht. He previously served with the Paymaster Corps.

12 April The Royal N etherlands Arnty Today

Lieutenant Colonel A. J. van Vuren. Royal Netherlands Army

HIS article is intended t.o provide a T survey of the Royal Netherlands MISSIONS ANO ORGANIZATION Army as it is today. It deals only with features that are considered to be of major interest to American readers. The geopolitical situation that These features include a brief description developed after World War II had a of the Dutch mobilization system that decisive influence on the missions and attracts increasing professional attention organization of the Royal Netherlands from abroad. Army. Important factors were the War-

1982 13 MILITARY REVIEW saw Pact threat, the NATO Alliance, and sea and airports, together with the exten­ the geographical situation of Western sive and excellent road, rail and inland Europe and, in particular, that of the waterway systems in the Benelux and the Netherlands. Federal Republic of Germany (GE), form The first two factors .. are well-known the lines of communication to the and will not be elaborated here. The American and British forces in the latter geographical position of the Netherlands country. I is shown in Figure 1. Because France These lines of communication also play withdrew from the integrated military a vital role in the reception and forward structure of NATO, the lines of com­ movement of reinforcements from the munication to the Central Region of United States, Britain and Canada Allied Command Europe lead through destined for the Central Region. The Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxem­ economies of the G E and the Benelux bourg. These three countries are often and, in a sense the forces of these coun­ referred to as the Benelux. tries, also depend on the same lines of Major ports from north to south are communication. The safeguarding and Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Neth­ continuous functioning of these lines are, erlands and Antwerp in Belgium. Fur­ therefore, of vital interest to NATO. thermore, there are the large interna­ NATO strategy calls for the forward tional airports of Schiphol near Amster­ defense of NATO territory. The relevant dam and Zaventem near Brussels. These NATO territory in this case is formed by

lior!h C.~rman Pia 0

) BuM • Magdeburg •

france

.. Fra~k'orl \---- '\ Czechoslollakl3 ,German Democratic RepubliC , Federal Republic 01 Germany boundar~ ,

t(OIHHAG-/(ortlleln Army Gro~p CEHTAG-Cenlral Army Group Central Europe

Figure

14 April THE NETHERLANDS

the North German Plain, the northern battalion has been deployed in Lebanon part of the GE. The North German Plain for the past three years. is a wide and excellent avenue of ap' proach that leads directly from Warsaw Contribution to NATO Pact territory, extending west of the river Elbe, to the area west of the Ruhr, the in­ The contribution of the Royal dustrial heart of the GE. A high-speed, Netherlands Army to NATO consists successful attack by Warsaw Pact forces primarily of the 1 (NL) Corps (see Figure through the North German Plain would 2). The brigades and other units are result in the envelopment of the Ruhr and directly under the corps. In the corps control of the Benelux sea and airports. organization, there are three divisional The GE would be paralyzed militarily, staffs. To each of these, the corps com­ economically and politically, and the vital mander can attach a number of brigades lines of communication would be cut. and combat support units, dependirig on the mission given to the division. Thus, Missions unlike a US division, a Dutch division has no fixed organization. The missions of the Royal Netherlands The wartime organization of the I (NL) Army are related directly to the Corps comprises six mechanized bri­ geographical situation shown in Figure I: gades, three armored brigades. and one • The North German Plain must be infantry brigade. The brigades have a defended against a Warsaw Pact attack. fixed organization and have sufficient This i:; the task of NATO's Northern logistic resources to continue operations Army Group (NORTHAG). The Royal for at least 48 hours. Netherlands Army has assigned'the 1st A mechanized brigade has two mecha· Netherlands Army Corps {l (NL) Corps) nized infantry battalions and One tank to NATO. This corps is one of the forward battalion. It also has a mechanized deployed corps of NORTHAG. artillery battalion, an armored recon­ • Netherlands territory must be naissance troop, an armored antitank . defended, and, in this way, the lines of company, an armored engineer company, communication leading through the an armored air defense battery and a Netherlands can be secured. -External logistic battalion. The organization of an reinforcements must also be received, armored brigade is similar. However, moved forward and deployed. For this there are two tank battalions and op.e purpose, the Netherlands will provide so· mechanized infantry battalion, and there called host nation support to US and is no armored antitank company. The other NATO forces. The National Ter­ infantry brigade has three infantry bat­ ritorial Command is responsible for the talions and only one tank company. There execu tion of these tasks. is no antitan~ company or air defense bat-. • Finally, reference must be made to tery. The remainder of the infantry the commitment of the Royal brigade is an unarmored copy of the other Netherlands Army to the United Nations brigades. The normal task of the infantry (UN). Forces may be deployed for UN brigade is rear area security. peacekeeping operations and for assist­ All combat support and combat service ance in case of disasters. Arising out of support units which are not part of a this commitment, a mechanized infantry brigade belong to the corps: elements

1982 15 MILITARY REVIEW

I (NL) Corps

XXX Corps Artillery Group

DIVISion Corps Headquarters Engineer Group Atr Defense Artillery Group

Corps Support Corps Command Signal Group

Corps Army A\'ratlon Group lOX Supply and Medical Transport Maintenance Group Battalion

Figure 2

may be attached to the divisional staffs. combat service support command to sup­ There are three reconnaissance. squad· port the units, other than the brigades, rons, two engineer groups with a total of attached to the division-for example, a seven engineer battalions, four field reconnaissance squadron, an engineer artillery groups with -a total of 13 artillery battalion, a field artillery group, and so battalions, an air defense group with six forth. air defense battalions, an aviation group, Thus, the logistic support virtually a combat service support command and bypasses the divisional level-the corps other corps units. directly supports the brigades and other All logistic support resources are con­ units placed under the command of a divi­ centrated in the combat service support sional staff. The divisional staff co­ command at corps level except for 10 ordinates the logistic support to units logistic battalions which are organic to and establishes priorities in order to en­ the brigades. A divisional staff may sure a balance between operations and receive a logistic battalion from the corps logistic support.

16 April THE NETHERLANDS

Territorial Defense panies are used as local reserves (within and Protection 01 Lines 01 Communication the regional commands) to reinforce as re­ quired. The battalions safeguard very The National Territorial Command large and important installa.tions vital to (Figure 3) is responsible for the defense of the lines of communication and to NATO. Nethetlands territory and for securing The two brigades are directly under the and operating the lines of communica­ command of: the National Territorial tion. To accomplish this task, the com­ Command and are committed when a mand has, at its disposal, two infantry serious threat develops~for example, in brigades, four independent infantry bat­ the case of a large-scale airborne attack. talions, about 50 independent infantry The National Territorial Command also companies and more than 100 independ· has an engineer group at its disposal ent infantry platoons. which is primarily intended to keep the Thc National Territorial Command lines of communication open.' covers the whole of the Netherlands. It is subdivided into 11 regional commands. Training and Logistic Support The independent platoons, consisting of local volunteers, safeguard important in­ The Royal Netherlands Army has a stallations, while the independent com- Training Command which is responsible

Reg10nal EngHleer Command .l-, 3X Command RelilSIOn ~~ ExerCIses 55 X 113 X Royal Military Band

Map Storage and Supply Figure 3

1982 17 MILITARY REVIEW

for all training conducted outside the 1 vestment in capital equipment to about (NL) Corps and the National Territorial 30 percent of the budget. This has Command. The formation and training allowed significant' procurement pro­ system of the Royal Netherlands Army is grams to be carried out. A survey of dealt with in more detail later on in this equipment. either recently introduced in­ article. Training in an army dependent on to the forces or presently on order, conscription is of the utmost importance. follows. as is the Training Command. Each year about 40.000 conscripts enter one of the Infantry Training Command centers. Regular per­ sonnel are also trained by the Training The Netherlands has selected an Command. It is not surprising. therefore. armored vehicle that. in close cooperation that the Training Command conducts with the Royal Netherlands Army. was about 1.400 different types of training to developed by the Food Machinery Cor­ provide the army with personnel possess­ poration in California. This vehicle. called ing the required skills. the YPR. combines fighting power. The Training Command has about agility and maneuverability with tech­ 5.500 regular personnel at its disposal for nical and logistic complexity that can be instruction and staff duties. In the event managed by an army dependent on con­ of mobilization. the regular personnel of scription. For the same reason. Belgium the Training Command are one of the has selected this vehicle. and other allied main sources of regular personnel for the and friendly nations are considering it for reserve uni ts. procurement. The Royal Netherlands The National Logistic Command is Army placed orders for some 2.100 of tasked with the logistic support of the 1 these vehicles, of which approximately (NL) Corps, the National Territorial Com­ 1,000 have already entered service. There mand. the Training Command and other are several versions of the YPR: com­ commands. Similarly. there are com­ mand. antitank. infantry. mortar, mands at the national level for com­ medical. transport, observation, radar. munications. medical support. and so and so on. forth. It is not only the mechanized infantry that is equipped with the YPR. Antitank companies are also receiving this vehic1e MAJOR EOUIPMENT as are tank battalions. brigade and divi­ sional headquarters. and other units. The armored infantry fighting vehicle is At the beginning of the 1960s, the equipped with a 25mm cannon. There is Royal N etherlands ~rmy was, to a large also the YPR-mounted TOW. of which extent, infantry-oriented and in need of the mechanized infantry battalion will modernization. The budget available at receive 12 and each armored antitank that time allowed only for an investment company 24. Because the YPR is used for in 'capital equipment amounting to less a variety of functions. each mechanized than 20 percent of the budget. By infantry battalion will eventually have 88 rationalizing the organization and in­ YPRs. This generous allotment will make creasing the defense budget. it has been the mechanized infantry battalions possible, in recent years, to increase in- somewhat heavy.

18 April THE NETHERLANDS

... YPR YPR·mounled TOW ,

1982 19 MILITARY REVIEW

Tanks 175mm. 8-inch and Lance. The remaining 105mm and 175mm. calibers are in the Currently. the Royal Netherlands process of being replaced by 155mm and Army has two types of tanks: the ob­ 8-inch calibers. Thus. all 1 (NL) Corps' solete Centurion and the Leopard 1. An tube artillery will be standardized with improvement program is in hand for the 155mm and 8-inch calibers. Leopard 1 that comprises the application When current programs have been com· of additional armor. improved fire con­ pleted in 1984. there will be 10 battalions trol. improved ammunition and thermal equipped with M109A2s, seven battalions imaging. The Centurion tank will be equipped with the towed, 155mm M1l4 replaced by 445 Leopard 2 tanks. the first howitzer, five battalions equipped with of which was handed over to the army in MllOA2s and one Lance battalion. Part September 1981. of the artillery is dual capable. Both the delivery of the Leopard 2 and the improvement program for the Air Defense Leopard 1 are scheduled for completion by 1986. The Royal Netherlands Army The armored air defense batteries of the will then have well over 900 modern mechanized and armored brigades each tanks. The tanks are mainly organized in have nine modern twin-barreled cannon tank battalions. of which there are. at the systems on Leopard chassis. The six air present time. 12 in the 1 (NL) Corps. The defense battalions at corps level are reconnaissance units of both corps and equipped with 40mm cannon systems. An brigade are also equipped with the same order for Stinger self·defense, air defense types of tanks. weapons is under consideration.

Cavalry Well-Equipped Force

The reconnaissance squadrons at corps Mention cannot be made here of all the level and reconnaissance troops at brio equipment that has been ordered or has gade level resemble US reconnaissance already been introduced into the forces. units in organization and equipment. The However. from what has been described Netherlands' reconnaissance units are so far. it should be obvious that the 1 (NL) equipped with the M1l3 series vehicles. Corps, considering its current equipment, The basic unit is the platoon with five as well as the equipment that is now on MII3 command and reconnaissance ve' order, is a modern, well·equipped force hicles. one M106 with 4.2-inch mortar and that compares favorably with other one M1l3A1 with an infantry squad. N A TO forces. Each platoon also has two Leopard 1 or The infantry brigade of the 1 (NL) Leopard 2 tanks. Corps. as well as the brigades. battalions, companies and platoons of the National Artillery Territorial Command, are lightly equipped. The main components are light infantry The 1 (NL) Corps is well·equipped with and artillery. Only the infantry brigade of artillery; in all. there are 23 battalions. the 1 (NL) Corps has a tank company; There is a rather large variety of calibers apart from this, there are no armored or at present-namely. 105mm. 155mm. mechanized units.

20 April niE NETHERLANDS

Leopard 2 • 'M109A2' ,

1982 21 Leopard chassis with twin·barreled cannon system

positions. The remainder of the forces, of PLANS which a sizable portion must first be mobilized, have to move from the Neth­ erlands to their wartime positions. This The present planning aims at correct­ situation, in view of the erosion of warn­ ing current deficiencies and reducing ing time, causes concern among NATO operational risks. As far as equipment is commanders who urge reduction of concerned, short and mid·term plans are deployment time, preferably by station­ aimed at the improvement of command ing additional units in the GE. The and control, the introduction of a modern Netherlands, however, is planning to im­ corps trunk system, the establishment of prove the reaction time of the entire 1 an electronic warfare battalion, the (NL) Corps rather than the readiness of replacement of the towed 155mm M114 only a few selected units. The army in­ howitzer of the seven nonmechanized ar­ tends to take a number of cost-effective tillery battalions, and the improvement of measures to accelerate the mobilization air defense capabilities by acquiring light and movement of the entire 1 (NL) Corps systems guided weapons, Stinger self­ to its wartime positions. defense systems and by replacing the These planned measures include: 40mm cannon systems of the air defense • The procurement of flatcars for the battalions at corps level. The procure· railways to enable fast transportation of ment of antitank helicopters is also tracked vehicles, thus avoiding wear and planned. In the longer term, programs tear. Provide for improving battlefield • The early completion of forward surveillance and target acquisition. storage sites. An important plan deals with the • The acquisition of additional equip· malstationing of the 1 (NL) Corps. Only ment for the Training Command to enable one reinforced armored brigade is cur· the equipment in use with the Training rently located in the G E near its battle Command to be returned to the reserve

22 April THE NETHERLANDS units to which it actually belongs. The National Territorial Command is • The stationing of some additional made up of reserve units to an even larger troops in the GE. extent. The Training Command is abol­ • The forward storage of equipment of ished in wartime; almost all the regular a few selected reserve units in Germany personnel of this command join reserve in order to reduce deployment time. units. In wartime, the remainder of the Training Command is reorganized into the Replacement Command which is THE ARMY FORMATION SYSTEM tasked with the provision of replace· ments. The difference between' peacetime and The Royal Netherlands Army enlists wartime organization highlights the both regular personnel and conscripts. great importance of a quick and effective The conscripts are on active duty for mobilization system. The Royal Nether­ either 14 or 16 months. In this pf'riod. lands Army's mobilization system com· they are trained for either four or six bines the two requirements mentioned months. During the remaining 10 months. above-the continuous intake of con· they serve in active units. After this first scripts that causes an intensive training period of active"duty, conscripts can be effort but yields a vast reserve of trained recalled for short training periods. in personnel. and the need to expand the periods of tension or in the casle of full army speedily and effectively in times of mobilization. This causes a rapid turn· tension. A brief explanation of the train· over of conscripts and necessitates an ing and mobilization system follows. enormous training effort. Figure 4 shows the wartime strength of Training the Royal Netherlands Army. As it is, of course, quite impossiblf' to maintain such The training of regular personnel in the a force in peacetime, the peacetime Royal Netherlands Army does not differ organization is much smaller. For ex· greatly from practices in other countries ample, only six of the 10 brigades of the I and requires no further discussion. The INL) Corps are active. The same applif's training of conscripts is closely relatf'd to to the other units of the 1 (NLI Corps. the formation of a unit. This will be fur-

NatIOnal 1 (Nl) Corps Ternto",1 Training All Other Total Strength MIlitary Command Units ~Strength Command WartIme 87.000 40.000 - 76.000 203.000

PeacetIme 35.000 5.500 21.000 6.500 68.000

----

1982 23 MILITARY REVIEW

ther explained using a mechanized iff­ same number leave the unit. This system fan try battalion as an example. 'Figure 5 is termed the Individual Replacement shows the organization of an infantry bat­ System (IRS). talion. In the battalion, there are three A company filled according to the IRS identical infantry companies, three iden­ consists of conscripts of seven or eight tical mortar platoons (each with three different drafts. A company filled accord­ 120mm mortars) and three'identical TOW ing to the URS consists of conscripts of platoons (each with four TOWs). There is the same draft. An advantage of the URS only one headquarters and support com­ is high unit cohesion. However, the URS pany and also only one headquarters in cannot, for example, be applied to the the combat support company. headquarters and support company in The units, of which there are three in order not to disrupt the continuous com­ the organization of the battalion, arE) mand and control and support of the bat­ trained and replaced in their entirety. talion. This unit-type system of training and Conscripts are trained in two different replacement is called the Unit Replace­ ways in accordance with the two replace­ ment System (URS). This system applies ment systems: neither to the headquarters and support • Conscripts who enter service im­ company nor to the headquarters of the mediately form companies or, as the case combat support company. Replacement may be, troops, batteries or platoons. in these units takes place on an individual During the first four months, such a com­ basis. Every two months, a number of pany is known as a training company. trained conscripts enter the unit and the After four months, it achieves active

I

Headquarters and Support Combat SUPPOIt (Individual Replacement System) ~Infantry (Un,t Replacement System)

Headquarters ~ (Individual Replacement System) ~ >-If-::) Mortar Platoons TOW Platoons (Unit Replacement System) (Unit Replacement System)

Figure 5

24 April THE NETHERLANDS

status. The training company is normally the battalion and starts its training (mor­ part of the battalion it will join as an ac­ tar and antitank platoons are no longer tive unit. The company is not part of the mentioned separately). The active bat­ Training Command. This ensures the con­ talions in peacetime cons,ist of three tinuous interest of the battalion com­ trained companies, one of which is on so­ mander and his staff in the training of the called short leave. Short leave means that company. the company still belongs to the bat­ The battalion has a special group of in­ talion, but that the conscripts have been structors (regulars) to conduct the train­ sent home. The conscripts' period of ac­ ing. The company commander. his second tive duty would otherwise need to be four in command and a number of noncommis­ or six months longer (Figure 6). sioneJ officers (NCOs) stay with the com­ In addition. the battalion has a training pany after it becomes part of the active company. The equipment of the short­ - battalion. The other instructors move on leave company is in use with the training to the next training company. company. When the short-leave company • Conscripts who enter service join is recalled in times of tension. the instruc­ one of the training centers of the Training tors and equipment of the training com­ Command. They stay there. depending on pany are transferred to the recalled short­ the type of training. for two. four or six leave company which is immediately com­ months. When they have finished train­ bat-ready. The minister of defense has the ing. some join units which are filled authority to recall short-leave units and according to the IRS. while others join does not require parliamentary approval the training companies of the URS. This for this. is how the training companies obtain con· scripted personnel who require a form of System for Direct Intake Into Reserve Units training which is too specialized to be pro­ vided by the training company itself-for The immediate combat readiness of example. mechanics. drivers. 25mm gun­ short·leave units when recalled results ners. cooks. and so forth. from the fact that these units have a high The latest moment at which such degree of cohesion and have recently com­ specialists can enter a training company pleted a period of intensive training. Prac­ is when the training company becomes an tice shows that this cohesion can also be active unit. Thus. the training of a con­ exploited after the short-leave period has script either with the Training Command ended. This leads to a phenomenon pecul­ or with a training company may never iar to the Royal Netherlands Army: the last longer than four or six months for Direct Intake Into Reserve Units System conscripts with 14 or 16 months of active (DIRUS). Essentially. it is a system in duty. respectively. The conscripts stay which an active "parent unit" - for in­ together for the remaining 10 months of stance. a battalion-fills a designated their period of active duty. during which reserve unit. time the company is active. Figures 6 and 7 show how the system works. The parent battalion is mainly Formation 01 Active Units filled in accordance with the U RS. When a company enters the battalion after com­ Figure 6 shows that every four or six pletion of the training period. the oldest months a new training company enters active company becomes a short-leave

1982 25 MILITARY REVIEW

o 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52

A

B

c

A ~ Short· leave PerIOd

~ Training Period B o Active Status

company. The previous short·leave com· The DIRUS can be used only when the pany is no longer needed in the active bat· parent unit and the reserve unit are iden­ talion. tical in organization and equipment. In The entire previous short-leave com· the event of an emergency. a reserve bat· pany enters the reserve battalion talion filled in accordance with this !DIRUS). Since there were already three system can be recalled. equipped and companies in the reserve battalion. the deployed without additional training. The oldest company leaves the reserve bat­ recall of units is exercised frequently. and talion. Thus. the unit cohesion of the com· results are satisfactory. A reserve unit pany is maintained for another 18 months can be ready for forward movement and after the short-leave period has ended. subsequent deployment within 24 hours. and the reserve battalion has conscripted Further conditions for quick mobiliza­ personnel who left the service no longer tion and deployment of these units are: than two years previously. • The short traveling distances in a Units filled in accordance with the IRS country like the Netherlands. follow the same procedure although • The maintenance of unit cohesion. changes occur more frequently. • The measures taken to ensure the

26 April THE NETHERLANOS

quick drawing of equipment. For ex­ identical reserve unit. However, the ample, radios remain installed in vehicles. system provides personnel for almost all the equipment of an infantry squad is combat units and most of the combat sup­ stored in or near its vehicle and so on. port units of the 1 (NL) Corp$. Because of • The measures taken to ensure quick a lack of parent units or because of dif­ employment of the unit. For example, all ferent organizations or equipment, the personnel know where and how the equip­ system can neither be applied to a sizable ment is sLored; officers and certain NCOs part of the combat service support units know how the unit moves to its wartime of the 1 (NL) Corps nor to most of the position, have been briefed about their in· units of the National Territorial Com­ dividual missions and have reconnoi­ mand. tered, in detail, the terrain where they For these units, a more commonly ap­ must execute their tasks. plied mobilization system is used. The principle of keeping units together. also Mobilization of the Remaining Reserve Units after they have left direct intake reserve units, is applied to the maximum extent. The DIRUS can be used only within However. the passing of time causes un­ limits. One parent unit can fill only One avoidable changes in the manning of

T,me T r-----' ---- -L_~~"':'_.J!oI----"'~ T,me T +6 Month, r---:--' , I.. _____c J~l------" T,me T '10 Months FIgure 7

1982 .27 MILITARY REVIEW

units. and unit cohesion diminishes. The large number of conscripts also When such units are recalled. it takes results by tradition in the strong integra­ time to organize the unit. and additional tion of the army in civil society. One of training is required. Refresher training these traditions is the military "unions." enables the time thus required for The first was founded in 1898. and the mobilization to be kept to a minimum. legal recognition and pertaining rules were established around 1920. In these National Conditions rules. the absence of the right to strike is counterbalanced by the obligation of the The entire system of forming the army. minister of defense to discuss matters training. the ratio between active and reo related to salary and fringe benefits with serve units and the mobilization system. the delegates of these associations. thus including short leave and direct intake. is lifting the burden of these matters from also influenced by conditions which typify the military chain of command. Some the Netherlands. These conditions in­ aspects of this integration. like long hair clude short travel distances. an extensive and a more recently founded "union" of road and railway system. and the high conscripts. attracted a great deal of atten­ density of radio and television sets. tion in the 1970s. It seems. however. that Consideration was given to the pos­ a certain balance is emerging. Profes­ sibility of converting the Royal Neth­ sional leadership has adapted and done 'erlands Army into a regular army: away with certain habits and rules that However. huge recruiting problems were were definitely not very functional. Con­ foreseen in obtaining motivated and in­ sequently. society at large does not press telligent personnel in the required num­ for further reforms or changes. bers. and it appeared that it would be im­ Both General Bernard W. Rogers and possible to maintain the current defense General Alexander M. Haig. the current strength. The current system will. and previous supreme allied commanders. therefore. be continued. The initial period Europe. respectively. have praised the at­ of servic\l time for conscripts of 14 or 16 titude. training and combat readiness of months compares favorably with other Dutch soldiers. This. together with the NATO countries. The time available is massive procurement programs currently used in a most efficient way. Intensive in hand. ensures that the Royal Nether· training is demanding for regular person­ lands Army is capable of executing its nel. but it keeps them on their toes. missions. "4.

Lieutenant Colonel A J. van Vuren. Royal Netherlands Army. is chief of the Short and Medzum-Term Planmng Bureau. Army Head­ quarters, Thp Hagup. He lS a gl ... duate of the Royal Military Academy, the Royal Netherlands Army Military Staff College and the USACGSC. He has had variolLs assignments in a mecha­ nhed infantry battalion. an.d has served with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers. Europe. Belgium.

28 April Scorched-Earth Policy: 'IIA)~\\\' . S.' · ;tf(jf/t;~~?~fb:j'f!l?: oVIets In

Ir Major John M. Hutcheson, US Army

Soviet operations in Afghanistan continue. Here, we examine those actions in an effort to determine if the Soviets have established a "doctrine of internal defense and development. " Soviet actions are also considered in light of this country's In­ ternal Defense and Development concept.

1982 29 MILITARY REVIEW

Scipio unleashed the Roman Legions who razed the city to the ground, sold the surviving inhabitants into slavery, and sowed the ground with salt. -Polybius, 146 B.C_

The views expressed m thlS article are those of suppress the insurgency in Afghanistan. the author and do not purport to reflect the pOSt­ as they have historically done elsewhere. tion of the Department of the Army, the Depart­ ment of Defense or any other gouemment offrce their ability to control the insurgents or agency.-Editor. completely is.in question. This dilemma provides a unique opportunity to study Soviet actions in Afghanistan in order to N REVIEWING Soviet actions in determine if these actions constitute a I Afghanistan, a pattern emerges Soviet "doctrine of internal defense and which strikingly parallels the Roman development'" and to review those ac­ treatment of Carthage in the Third Punic tions in light of US Internal Defense and War. Livestock and grain are system­ Development (lDAD) doctrine. atically destroyed. Villages suspected of providing support to the insurgents are razed.! Surviving male villagers are con­ US lOAD Doctrine scripted for the Afghan army, armed, moved immediately to the front and forced to assault rebel strongholds at The US IDAD concept is based on a gunpoint. Atrocities are commonplace.' strategy of simultaneous programs in in­ While the Western nations and the Third ternal defense and development. Field World express a common outrage, long­ Manual 100-20. Low Intensity Conflict, time observers of the Soviet Union see places the US concept in useful perspec­ the Soviet method as entirely consistent tive by viewing IDAD strategy as being with Soviet history. composed of three interdependent compo­ The Soviets have never been hesitant to nents-balanced development. mobiliza­ use force to impose their will on others. In tion and neutralization. Insurgency is the 1920s, the Red army crushed the viewed as preventable or defeatable by a Muslim Basmachi movement in the visible, balanced. development program Soviet Central Asian republics. In the that provides individuals or groups the 1940s, the Soviets faced particularly stiff opportunity to progress toward the guerrilla resistance in the Ukraine and attainment of popular expectations; by Baltic, particularly Lithuania. Opposition adequate surveillance and subsequent was eventually crushed in both cases by neutralization of the insurgent organiza­ the combined use of armor, aircraft and tion; and by organizing and channelizing infantry troops by the thousands.' There the populace and its resources into has been no deviation from this historical positive programs which mobilize sup­ approach in the recent Soviet venture in port for the government. Afghanistan. Implied by the very definition of the While the Soviets have the ability to term "internal development" is an

30 April SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN

underlying US principle-to build viable 'institutions (political, economical and Soviet Intervention social) that meet the needs and desires of the people. In executing this principle, US planners observe four fundamental There are anum ber of theories as to "guidelines" -maximize intelligence, why the Soviets intervened. These in­ unify effort, improve administration and, clude the historical desire for a warm­ most importantly, minimize violence. water port, the fear of an Islamic awaken­ By comparison, the Soviets in ing within its' own borders and the Afghanistan appear to ignore balanced necessity to prop up a Marxist regime development and mobilization of popular with a show of force which backfired. Un­ support in favor of a singular strategy of doubtedly, Moscow did consider the im­ neutralization through unlimited pact on its own Muslim minorities of the violence. The question immediately arises Muslim proclamation that the insurrec­ as to whether the harsh approach detailed tion was against "atheistic commu­ in this article is truly representative of njsm."9 Soviet lDAD doctrine or peculiar to the As former US Secretary of Defense intervention in Afghanistan? To answer Harold Brown noted, the invasion could the question requires that we review be a natural outgrowth of a recent Soviet methods in Afghanistan in light of development of a Soviet power projection the Soviet reasons for intervening. the capability.lO A close examination of roots of the insurgency, the nature of the events reveals another plausible reason insurgent and his base of support. for intervention. In April 1978, the Soviets established a Marxist government under President Nur Nature of Afghanistan Muhammad Taraki. Hafizullah Amin suc­ ceeded in September and initiated a cam­ paign to indoctrinate the Afghan popula­ Afghanistan has a political character tion in Communist ideology. II The cam­ which over the span of centuries remains paign included a redistribution of lands obstinate. defiant, inward· looking and un­ which forced many households to move consciously hostile to all foreigners." Il­ hundreds of miles away from where literacy and a rural population, which is families had lived for generations. They practically all Muslim,' contribute to a moved to regions of the country domi­ fierce sense of nationalism. The land itself nated by other tribes that spoke other is harsh with an infant mortality rate of languages." There was a resultant short­ 50 percent before age five and a per capita fall of wheat!' income of $150 per year.' The government campaigns to reduce The 20 million inhabitants occupy an illiteracy, curb the powers of feudal lords arid landmass roughly the size of Texas and eliminate the bride price went against and are more than accustomed to hard­ centuries of tradition." Despite the ship. It should not, therefore, be surpris­ religious significance of the green flag of ing that the Soviets, in Arnold Toynbee's Islam, the Amin government adopted a words, have found .. a still unbroken peo­ red flag which became the symbol of ple whose spirit and capacity for resist­ tyranny. ance takes them by surprise. "B These ill-conceived attempts to reform

1982 31 MILITARY REVIEW a conservative society. almost overnight. recognition and foreign aid. It also caused resentment and led to an insur­ prevents a challenge in the United Na­ gency. The Amin government was unable tions of the legitimacy of the government to repress the now widespread insurgency of President Babrak Karmal. which developed into a holy war or jihad. By December 1979. the rebels. or mu­ jahidin. controlled 21 of 28 provinces." The Base of Support A case can be made that the Soviets. seeing the danger that a popular revolt against the Amin style of "progressive" The insurgent base of support is largely communism could turn into a popular. internal to Afghanistan. In November religious and nationalistic anti-Com­ 1980, the Soviets annexed the Wakhan munist crusade that would imperil the Corridor-that narrow strip between the Soviet state and its own Islamic Soviet Union and Pakistan-and forced minorities. intervened to restore stability the Muslim Kirghiz tribesmen into Gilgit, by "tempering" the Marxist revolution Pakistan.20 Thus, the narrow corridor and putting an end to the rebellion by linking China with Afghanistan was force." Thus. control of a border state severed. was maintained. and the spread of The logical base of support for arms Islamic fundamentalism was prevented. would then appear to be Pakistan with its lengthy contiguous border. However, mountainous terrain, mined passes and The Insurgent Pakistan's reluctance to accept aid from the United States (partly for fear of Soviet reprisals and largely for want of a Afghan nationa,lism focuses on the date better offer)" prevent Pakistan from be­ of 1919 which marks its independence ing a major supplier. Despite assurances from Great Britain after King Amanullah by the Chinese of support. few weapons fought a month-long war. For the rebels, have reached the insurgents. After a the king was a great patriot who freed quick look at Iran, one would surmise Afghanistan from an imperial yoke. To· that the Muslim revolutionaries would be day's insurgents see themselves fighting anxious to assist, but three factors inhibit to evict the Russians much as King any tangible aid: Amanullah expelled the British." • A costly war with Iraq. The mujahidin number from 150,000 to • Fear of the Soviets garrisoned at the 200.000 and occupy mountain positions border. and redoubts in the valleys." While there • The fact that, while most of is no nationally accepted leadership and Afghanistan is of the Sunni sect, the ma­ centers of resistance are independent, this jority of Iran is Shiite. very disunity appears to have become a To date, the most tangible external sup­ strategic advantage." Since there is little port of the Afghan rebels has come from or no coordination between the different Mawlavi Abdol-Aziz Mollazadeh," reli­ insurgent groups, it is more difficult for gious leader of a half-million Sunni the Soviets to plan any coherent line of at­ Muslim Baluchis in the province of Balu­ tack. This same political disunity serves chistan in southwest Afghanistan. It is as a handicap in achieving international an easy task to generate a scenario of

32 April SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN

Soviet intervention in Baluchistan on the been estimated as high as 15,000." Even excuse of protecting the "established if this figure is higher than the actual government" of Afghanistan against out­ count, we may surmise that the cost of side intervention. Were this to occur, the the intervention is higher than the long-held desire for a port on the Arabian Soviets are willing to report to their own Sea wou)d be realized. people. Casualties are now being evac­ The rebels enjoy a wide base of support uated to East Germany, and the practice from the people, with merchants virtually of burial of Soviet soldiers iiI Afghanistan funding the rebellion. In Kandahar prov­ has become more widespread. ince alone, each town has a well-organized system for collecting and smuggling out the contributions." Politically, the Kar­ Soviet Methods mal government is split on the issue of Soviet intervention. Of the two main Communist Parties, the Khalq and the Because of the Soviet propen~ity to use Parcham, the Khalqis oppose an indef­ force, it is difficult to differentiate be­ inite Soviet presence." tween those measures which would nor­ President Karmal, who heads the Par­ mally be classified as purely tactical and cham faction, is heavily purging the Khal­ those which are classified as internal qis. Karmal's purges have not driven the defense measures. The initial strategy in Khalqis to join the mujahidin. but Khalqi all the zones has been to control the major followers in significant numbers have population Centers, establish security crossed over. As the base of the Com­ zones along the lines of communication, munist Party narrows with purges, there drive the rebels into the mountains and seems to be little Moscow can do to eliminate the centers of resistance.-This strengthen the regime apart from using strategy has been further extended to its military might. denying the rebels any external base of support. In October 1980, the Soviet army re­ Soviet Forc~s portedly divided Afghanistan in'to seven geographical zones, each under the com­ mand of a Soviet military officer and an The number of Russian divisions in­ Afghan political commissar. These men volved has been estimated at eight to 10, were given authority to adopt specific with a total strength of between 90,000 to tactics suitable to their districts. 27 While 130,000. Tanks have been estimated at the tactics and techniques may vary irre­ 1,850 and armored personnel carriers at spective of which geographical zone is 2,700. Air support consists of at least five analyzed, there is evidence of a common squadrons of MIG21s." The lines of COID­ dottrine of unrestricted force. munication are virtually nonexistent, but Soviet airlift has so far overcome the logistical problems. The Scorched Earth After widespread desertion and mu­ tiny. the Afghan army is virtually ineffec­ tive, and the Soviets have assumed the Search-and-destroy operations are con­ brunt of any fighting. Casualties have ducted on a wide scale in the Andarab

1982 33 MILITARY REVIEW

Valley north of Kabul. In the Logar prov­ men to death by running over them with ince south of Kabul, the Soviets use tanks. " bombs, napalm and artillery fire to Following such an attack, the Soviet destroy the livestock, grain and buildings force takes away all the cattle (there is of villagers "suspected" of abetting the already a serious shortage of beef caused rebels." Consider the following single by the exodus of some 1.4 million cattle incident which occurred in Tangi Canyon, with the refugees who have migrated to Wardack province: Pakistan), presumably to remove both The Soviet force with tanks and the incentive for the inhabitants to return armored personnel carriers, entered the and the source of food for the resistance narrow canyon and blocked escape routes. fighters." We may surmise that, as the Search parties directed by Afghans who families of the victims in Tangi Canyon remained hidden in armored personnel were required to watch the "reprisal," the carriers, but used loud speakers, rounded Soviet commander of that geographical up rebel sympathizers and crushed twelve zone is not waging a campaign to "win

Sovle' .roo.,. In AfghanIstan

34 April SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN

the hearts and minds of the people." mass training of Afghan students is con­ Having forced the populace to desert ducted inside the USSR and weekly publi­ the fields, the Karmal regime took the cations oriented at youth are dissemi­ next logical step and issued a directive nated." ordering that no land should be left uncul­ In an effort to mediate the political tivatecT and gave cooperative and state power of the Islamic revival, the Kabul farms the right to take over land "aban­ government has changed its all-red flag to doned" by the owners. At a high-level the I slamic green. An office of "I slamic m~eting on 20 July, it was announced teachings" and a national conference of that all surplus wheat crops would be pur· "religious scholars and clergy" were initi­ chased by the government through coop­ ated to persuade the population that com­ eratives, with the aim of "stabilizing munism and Islam are compatible. The prices for the farmer and ensuring ade­ success of the latter venture is unknown. quate grain supplies to essential recipi­ One innovative approach saw the import ents"l1 (ostensibly the Soviet army and of 5,000 Soviet Muslim troops who were with the apparent intent to deny the same to work on a Soviet "hearts and minds" resource to the insurgent). project. But they were just as rapidly ex­ The effect thi9 ha9 had on the insurgent ported when they began to show signs of movement is best expressed by Abdul having more in common with the insur­ Rasul Sayof, leader of the Islamic Alli­ gent point of view than with the ance for the Liberation of Afghanistan. an Soviets',d4 organization representing five resistan("p There has been an attempt to exploit groups. based in Peshawar. Pakistan: conflicts between tribal leaders, primarily You must know that beside the military between the eastern and central tribes. conflict u'e are also figh ting an economic Cubans have been reported by a number uar. We haue inflicted heaL'}' losses on of sources to have been imported to them (Souiets) but they too have bombed capitalize on their skills in guerrilla war­ our fields and burned Ollr crops, forcing a fare." There is an ongoing effort to famine in our country Besides arms and rebuild the Afghan army based on a ammunition, we also need food, not only nucleus of noncommissioned officers for the freedom fighters but for the com· trained in the Soviet Union on the Soviet man people who are supporting them and modeL 16 The strategy of occupying the git'ing them refuge. Unless we meet the cities and training local forces to garrison food requirements of our people, the war the countryside is somewhat different cannot be continued in the countryside." from the US lDAD doctrine but may be It appears that starving the population peculiar to Afghanistan as the insurgents in the areas of greatest resistance own the countryside. • through destruction of the region's agri· :rhe picture of Soviet IDAD doc;trine is culture is a calculated Soviet strategy of admittedly incomplete. On 18 January internal defense and may prove to be suc· 1980, the US press was accused of "bias cessful in the short run. and in terference" and deported by the The Soviets are attempting other, more Karmal government." Thus, the informa­ subtle, measures comparable to the men­ tion flow is virtually niL Nonetheless, the tal image we invoke of US IDAD activi­ impression that so clearly comes through ties. New Afghan schools are devoted to all sources of information is one of a doc­ ideological training of Afghan youth, trine of "unlimited force." As a final iI-

1982 35 MILITARY REVIEW lustration, the use of soman or a similar very location of Afghanistan, contiguous nerve agent has been reported. (As the to the Soviet landmass, causes a different United States has been unable to verify outlook by Soviet pianners. The threat to the allegation, no formal condemnation Soviet well-being is at least "perceived" 38 has been issued. ) as high, and the risk of superpower What has emerged is a doctrine that in­ confrontation is perceived as low. The corporates: ability to project forces, as noted by • A willingness to use any level of former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, force required. is high. Actions in a distant African • A willingness to ignore world adventure might, therefore, be quite dif­ opinion. ferent. • A policy of scorched earth to deny In any case, the Soviet doctrine is quite food and shelter to both the popUlation divergent from US doctrine. The single and the insurgent. aspect of public opinion alone which • The use of guerrilla warfare experts. ultimately may spell success or failure for • A somewhat flexible approach a US venture does not appear to be even authorized by the subordinate com­ an operative factor for the Soviet planner. mander. But what of Afghanistan? In the long • A limited range of psychological term, the Soviet doctrine in Afghanistan operations to include propaganda, school may have one or more of the following reform, news media, use of ethnic agents outcomes: and exploitation of conflict between in­ • A Soviet-dominated Afghanistan. surgent factions. • A protracted war. Are the actions of the Soviets in Af­ • A neutral Afghanistan. ghanistan peculiar to that intervention • The spread of conflict to Pakistan. alone, or do they represent a duly consti­ It is evident that the Soviets intend to tuted lOAD doctrine? The similar range stay. They are constructing underground of measures which each of the autono­ facilities for fuel and ammunition, a per­ mous military zone commanders has em­ manent bridge over the Amu Darya River ployed argues for a common predisposi­ at Termez, lengthened airfields, enlarged tion to a doctrine of "unlimited force." maintenance shops, permanent troop Thus. it may well be that, regardless of billets and a railroad into Afghanistan." the options available, the Soviet c6m­ Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union has the mander because of historical precedent, will and the means to subdue Afghani­ training and predisposition will resort to stan completely. However, the subjuga­ force in order to achieve an immediate, tion of a country the size of Texas with an tangible result whenever it is possible to alienated population of roughly 20 million use force with impunity. It may, will be a long and costly process. Unlike therefore, be that the situation in the United States' concept of success in Afghanistan can be generalized to the counterinsurgency operations, which Soviet doctrine as a whole only in regard equates to the withdrawal of conventional to this "predisposition." forces concurrent with stable self-rule, There are other factors which restrict the Soviets have a different concept and the extent to which actions in may simply elect to occupy Afghanistan Afghanistan may be generalized to a permanently as they have East Germany, universal Soviet lOAD doctrine. The Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.

36 April SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN

NOTES

1 Soviets Attack Afghan !=Iebels' The Washington Post and 18 Haggerty,op Cit the ASSOCIated Press. 21 November 1980 19 'Soviet Armament A ..... e~ome. But Afghan Ta.:.tlcs 2 Iblf;/ Ineffective. The WaShington Post, 12 August 1980 3 Jim Hanson, USSR-Afghanistan PerspectIVe on the Con 20 . Afghamstan_A Win In the Great Game. far eastern fhct, ' Military Intelligence Apnl June 1980 p 43 EconomIC Revle ..... 14 November 1980. p 23 .<\ Field Manual 100·20. Low IntenSIty Conflict. Department 01 21 Pakistan DIsmIsses $400 Mtliion as Peanuts. The 'New the Army, Washington. D C January 1981. defines the",e terms as Yorl< TImes 18 JanUar'1 1980 follows Internal Defense-Ihe full range of measures taken by a 22 Ibid government and Its allies to free and protect ItS SOCiety from 23 KWllny. op Cit, p 28 subversion. ,a ..... ,essness and inSurgency Internal De~e/opment­ 24 Arul B LOuiS Purges Coups and E~ecutlons Far Eastern actIOns taken by a nation tn promote It", balanced growth by EconomIc ReView 1 7 August 1980 pp 17 18 bUilding Viable 1r1stltutlon",- potllical, economiC, and soclal-Ihal 25 Haggerty op CIt pp 39 40 respond to the needs 01 the people 26 ABC Evenmg News. 18 September 1980, 5 lord Samt 8ndes Afghanistan The Fmplle Play", to Win 27 Della Denman 'Press Gangs & Punishment Flu Eas/ern Orb/s, Volume 24 Number 3, Fall 1980. p b36 EconomiC ReView 5·11 December 1980 pp 36 37 6 Colonel Jerome J Haggerty Afghanlstan- The Great 28 Soviets Allack Afghan Flebels op CIt Game," Military Aevlew, August 1980, pp 37 44 29 IbId 7 Jonathan KWltny 'Afghamstan Cross/naos 01 Conflict 30 'Afghanlstan A Background Brtel-VI Bntlsh/nlo/matron rheAt/antIC. May 1980'P024 31 SerVII:es September 1980 pp 1·4 8 HarOld 8rown The PerSian Gulf and Southwest ASia 31 IbId Defense/80 June 1980 p 5 32 A,ab News 22 Junp 1980 9 Haggerty.oP cd, p 39 33 lalma~ Khalllzad. Soviet Occupied Afghanistan Problems 10 ~rown. op Cit p 3 Of CommunIsm. November Decembel 1980. PO 2340 11 Samt Bndes op CIt pp b33 40 34 0 Ballance op c" 0 52 12 KWltny op CII p 26 35 Denman.op CII 13 IbId 36 SO~lets Take ROof In Afghanlslan The New York T.mes 9 14 Kabul Aemnves Political S'ogans 10 Appease Moslems October 1980 p A 23 The New Yorl( TImes. 28 January '979 p 10 37 'U S JOurnallsls Are OrdereO Oul by Afghans. The New 15 Edgar 0 Ballance. Soviet TactICS In AfghanIstan. Mllrlal~ YOlk Times 16 January 1980 ReVIew, August 1980 PO 4552 36 US TOld SO~let Uses POison Gas on Alghans Tne New 16 KWltn'1 op Cd Yorl< TImes 23 January 1980 17 Kaufman 'New RuSSian Mdltary ActIon Reported m Kablol 39 Tne 'I'oashlnglon Post. 8 January 1980 Thp Npw YOlI< TImes 21 August 1980

Major John M. Hutcheson lS operations of ficer, 2d Battahon, S03d Infantry, 3d Bngade, JOIst Airborne (Azr Assault) Diviswn, Fort Campbel~ Kentucky. lie receiued a HA. and an .(!'J Al Ed. from North Georgia College and lS a 1981 graduate of the USACGSC. He ha5 serued in uanous command and >staff positions, to include Alaska and Korea, and, in 1970. served as the US Army's first TOVv· mlsszle platoon leader wzth the Combat Deuelopments Experimentation '-i.. Command and the 197th Infantry Bngade

Maps Available. Military travelers will find a map published by the Defense'Mapping Agency a useful travel aid. The map, which is 58 by 42 inches, details interstate and federal and state highways with two or more lanes, and pinpoints all Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force installations in the United States, The map costs $2.55. When ordering, ask for map number 8205X MILINST. Check payments should be made to the Treasurer of the United States and sent to: Director, DMAODS, ATTN: DDCP, Washington, DC 20315.

1982 37 Part II

Colonel William O. Staudenmaier, US Army

In Part I of this two-part review of contemporary strategic con­ cepts, the author discussed the interrelated concepts ofnational purpose, national interests; national goals or objectives, na­ tional strategy and military strategy. He defined three levels of military strategy-national military strategy, coordinative military strategy and operational military strategy-and discussed the impact ofstrategic constraints on the development of military strategy. Here, in Part II, the strategic trends of the midterm are examined for their effect on four fundamental ele­ ments .of US national interest: survival, preservation of ter­ ritorial integrity, maintenance or enhancement ofthe US stand­ ard of living and world order. Then, strategic guidelines are developed and used to propose a military strategy that would be relevant to the strategic environment of the 1980s.

38 April " The views expressed En this article are those of Regardless of which method is used. the author and do not purport to reflect the posi­ tion of the Department of the Army, the Depart­ the requirements posed by the future ment of Defense or any other government office strategic environment must somehow be or agency - Edltor. translated into strategic decisions that will impact on today's program or budget process. Without such impact. long-range A Strategic Model planning becomes an interesting. Lut largely sterile. exercise. BasicaIIy. what has been said of long-range planning is also true of midrange planning (3 to 10 F THE three levels of military years). Ostrategy-national. coordinative Most military planners would agree and operational-the latter is the least that an examination of the f1,lture stra­ difficult to cope with because it is con­ tegic environment is necessary to develop cerned with either current operations or strategies that will be useful in fighting future short-range contingencies. This future wars and in making the force struc­ means that operational military strategy ture decisions that will provide the considers only the existing military capa­ necessary military- capabilities for such bilities of the United States and its wars. To determine where the United enemies. As the uncertainty is greater. States might use military force. the issue the problem is more complicated when of what the United States will fight for dealing with the other levels of military must necessarily be considered. strategy which look further into the Analysis of the strategic environment future. The core planning issue is how to points to significant challenges to some come to grips with uncertainty. fundamental US interests in the midterm. There are basically two ways that the Four categories of US national interests military attempts to cope with un­ will be used as a focal point here: survival certainty: Either the planner can attempt of the United States (with its national to predict the future. or he can postulate a values intact). preservation of the terri­ range of alternative futures. Both have torial integrity of the United States. been used in the Joint Strategic Planning maintenance and enhancement of the US System. The Joint Long-Range Estima­ standard of living and maintenance of a tive Intelligence Document (JLREID) at­ favorable world order.' tempted to predict the factors and trends The regional matrices shown in Figures that would affect world power relation­ 1 through 7 summarize chaIIenges to US ships in the long-range planning period interests in the Western Hemisphere. (10 to 20 years). The Joint Long-Range Western Europe. the Mediterranean Strategic Appraisal. which replaced both Basin. sub-Saharan Africa. the Indian the JLREID and the Joint Long-Range Ocean region. East Asia and the Pacific. Strategic Study. outlines four distinctly and the Soviet Union and non-Soviet different and discrete future worlds which Warsaw Pact area. A discussion of the coIIectively represent a spectrum of possi­ major strategic trends suggested by ble future worlds. these regional appraisals foIIows.

Part I of thiS article appeared in the March 1982 Military ReView.

1982 39 MILITARY REVIEW

The world environment is no longer the Strategic Trends simple bipolar miliE)u of the recent past. The need of· major regional powers to assume greater responsibility in intra­ The United States, in the opinion of regional affairs has been stimulated by most strategic analysts, is no longer two factors. The first is the near insti­ superior to.the Soviet Union in strategic tutionalization of conflict avoidance be­ nuclear power. Proponents of this view tween the United States and the Soviet are concerned that, if the present adverse Union. The second is the reduced trends in the strategic nuclear balance credibility of the United States as the continue, the United States will be in a protector of the rights of lesser states to "period of maximum peril from 1983- self-determination and national sover­ 1987.'" Comparisons of the strategic eignty. The post-World War II gravita­ nuclear forces by the Organization of the tion of medium and smaller regional Joint Chiefs of Staff reveal that the states to either of the superpowers is no Soviets lead the United States in missile longer the dominant trend in national throw-weight and equivalent megatons alignments. In contention with the and the trends favor the USSR in hard bipolar balance, there is the continuing target kill potential. The decline in the US trend toward greater interdependence advantage in numqer of deployed war· among nations, combined with a grad­ heads that leveled off in the mid-1970s ually developed system of regional and with the fielding of the multiple inde­ subregional centers of power. pendently targetable re-entry vehicle has Nuclear proliferation is a significant pegun again. The chairman of the Joint issue in the emerging strategic environ­ Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, ment. There were only four nuclear powers evaluates the balance in these terms: 20 years ago: the United States, the Soviet There is no question that Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom. momentum has brought them from a posi­ Today, the People's Republic of China tion of clear inferiority to their present (PRC) has joined these ranks, and India status of at least strategic equalz'ty with has exploded a nuclear device. Former the United States and the trends for the Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance has future are adverse. 3 estimated that .. at least a dozen more In 1980, then Secretary of Defense [countries] could produce a weapon within Harold Brown echoed these sentiments: a few years of deciding to do so. '" In strategic nuclear forces, 'the Soviets While the availability and rising cost of have come from a position of substantiitl hydrocarbons currently hold the in­ numerical inferiority 15 years also to one dustrialized world's attention, access to of parity today-and a potential for stra­ other important nonrenewable resources tegic advantage if we fail to respond with could also become a problem during the adequate programs of our own.' next decade. Recent energy problems Regardless of how one views the poli­ have served far more than the previous oil tical value that may be· gained from embargo of 1973-74 to alert the Western nuclear superiority, the fact remains that World to the serious consequences of the Soviet Union has progressed from a dependence on foreign oil. They highlight position of nuclear inferiority in 1962 to the constraints on the use of military one of parity. force in assuring access to strategic

40 April Basic US National Interests in the Western Hemisphere

Categories of Nallonal Inleresl Elemenls of Policy Military Siralegy Siralegic !ssues

Survival Deterrence of nuclear Assured destrLlction Proliferation potential war • Second strike Nonproliferation • Triad FleXible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States

Terrltonal Prevent hostile Forward defense in Role of Latin America Integr1ty power on mainland Caribbean and in NATO war and sea approaches Panama US force presence In Protect Caribbean North American Air Panama . Basin Defense Command US response to Caribbean Defend air and sea Collective secunty contingency approaches to Secunty assistance Puerto Rico's status North Amenca Coalition warfare Brazil Defend AtlantiC Mil ~tary-to-mllJtary Inter-American system lines of communication relations Defend Panama Canal Inter-American Defense according to Board prOVISions of Multinational defense 1978 treaties arrangements

Economic Retal n access to Security assistance Naval requirements to Well-Bemg critical raw Forward defense In )l;eep Canbbean and materials and Caribbean and AtlantiC lines of com­ markets Panama municatIOn open Malntam and expand MeXICO'S future regional trade security role Promote eCOnomIC Interdependence among key regional states

World Order Peaceful resolution SeCUTlty assl5tance Canadian separatism 01 conlilct through Multilateral peace­ Cuban problem the Organization of keepmg Canbbean instability American States pursue human rights

NOle Some Strategic Issues Itansce .... d the analytical categories establ sheO here For e.ample Ire I.,,,, .. es relall"g 10 gpnp'al '"'"cleal ""ar would Impact on all categories 0 1 nallonallnterest Stra1eg.e Issues t)a~e been Ilsted on'v once and then under the ca1egory \'jh Ch seem eO most apprOpriatE'

resources when their denial is caused by Current trends portend. if anything, a governmental collapse, as in Iran, rather worsening of the availability of foreign oil than the usually assumed denial scenario to the Western World in the face of involving interdiction of choke points, gradually increasing demands. This blockades or embargoes. trend. coupled with forecasts that the

1982 41 MILITARY REVIEW

Soviet Union may become an oil importer, weapons by terrorist organizations will indicates strongly that the worldwide remain a threat which may become energy crisis and its security implications greater as more countries acquire a will worsen in the midrange. The avail­ military nuclear capability. No precedent ability of a large amount of Mexican oil or yet exists for the use of nuclear weapons access to new resources could. of course. by terrorists. but it is not likely that. once have a leavening effect on the seriousness acquired. nuclear weapons would be used of US energy-related problems during the in th!) same fashion as traditional means. next decade, but there is still no certainty Since it is difficult to envision even sub­ as to Mexico's intentions or future pro­ kiloton nuclear weapons being used dis­ duction capabilities. criminately in a noncombat environment, The reassertion of Islamic fundamen­ and assuming some discretion continues talism, exemplified most recently by its to be a basic precept of terrorist strategy. contribution to the revolution in Iran.'the it is doubtful that terrorists could arhi­ ongoing counterrevolution in Afghani­ trarily detonate a nuclear weapon in a stan and its influence in affecting certain populated area without estranging their reforms in Pakistan, is a trend which is cause. In a situation involving terrorist likely to continue. The rise in Muslim in­ possession of a nuclear weapon. the more fluence in the Middle East and South and likely tactic would be its use as a bargain· Southeast Asia will provide a platform ing device. for criticism of government and national Uncertainty over the course of US­ development. China relations. combined with the likeli­ However, the Islamic "movement." hood of offsetting Soviet maneuverings while transnational. does not appear to as a consequence of closer Sino-American have a coordinated international direc­ ties. casts superpower competition in an tion. Universal lslamic resistance to increasingly complex setting. The recent Marxism does serve as a powerful impedi­ record of the US-Soviet relationship ment to the spread of communism. shows a considerable increase in tensions. Whether Islam can provide the basis for caused in part by the normalization of US unified government in. for example. Iran relations with China, by Soviet and and eventually in Afghanistan. remains Cuban activity in Africa, and by the to be seen. To date. however. it has not presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. provided an alternative to government in Nonetheless, the basic purposes of these countries. nor is it certain that the detente, as they seemingly have come to movement can deter political separatis~ be agreed upon by both sides. continue to sentiment. . be fulfilled: the avoidance of direct US­ At least into the early 1980s. Western Soviet conventional military conflict and Europe. Latin America and the Middle ultimately of a nuclear war. A danger will East are likely to continue to bear the continue to be the superpower arms race brunt of terrorist acts. with business ex­ played out against the backdrop of un­ ecutives and influential government offi­ relenting competition for worldwide in­ cials the primary targets. High visibility fluence. Barring the early commencement bombings. arson. kidnapping and assas­ of serious Strategic Arms Limitation sination will remain the main tools of ter­ Talks (SALT) negotiations which could rorists throughout most of the midrange lead to progress toward demilitarization time period. Acquisition of nuclear of the superpower relationship, this trend

42 April Basic US National Interests in Western Europe

Categories of National Interest Elements of Policy Military Strategy Strategic Issues

Survival Deterrence of nuclear Assured destructIOn Nuclear trends war • Second strike Proliferation potential Nonproliferation • Tnad FleXible nuclear Escalation options Withheld reserve Essential eqUivalence TerminatIOn favorable to the United States

Territorial Protect US bases and Forward defense based Detente! con f r on tat ion Integrity terntory on the continent of Maintain general Defend air and sea Europe equilibrium between approaches to North Protect lines of com­ East and West America municatIOn between Maintain mtegnty of US and forward NATO countries deployed forces/ Maintain air and sea NATO allies approaches to Europe

Economic MaIntain and expand US/NATO naval force Burden sharing Well-Being trade and Investments presence to demon­ RatIOnalization, Continue free passage strate access to standardizatIOn over international lines of communica­ and Interoperability air/sea routes tion Forward baSing to en­ hance force presence

World Order Prevent extenSion of Collective security Strategic fleXibility Soviet Influence In Maintain credible mili­ Exploit Soviet vulner­ Europe and around tary posture In abIlities outside the world Europe NATO Matntam US credibility Promote Soviet concern Presence/rei nforcement and regional influence with two·front war Prevent the outbreak of Secuntyasslstance hostilities In region threatening US in­ terests

Note Some Str8teglc 'ssues Iranscend Ihl;' al1al,.l,cal CalegOr,pc; ec;labl,c;hed here For e~ample Ihe 'ssues relal'ng 10 ge'lerdl nuclear >'

Figure 2

will easily continue into the 1990s. with the United States in the future: the negative domestic implications for both growth in the number of newly independ­ countries. not to mention the increased ent states whose leadership-as in much risks of direct US-Soviet military conflict. of the Third World-will find it impos­ Current trends suggest a number of sible to maintain order because of the potentially troubling developments for pressures for and of modernization; the

1982 43 MILITARY REVIEW continuing dependence of the United the waning years of the 20th century will States and its important allies on raw complicate this iss\le. materials and oil from a capricious Third • Preservation of territorial integrity. World; the proliferation of nuclear I t does not appear that the United States weapons, as well as, and probably of need be overly concerned regarding the greater short-term significance, the preservation of its territorial integrity. spread of high-technology conventional The oceans that separate the United weapons; and the growing strategic im­ States from the Eurasian landmass, portance and role of the developing coun­ although no longer an obstacle to stra­ tries in the continuing East-West tegic nuclear attack, are still effective struggle for primacy. barriers to conventional invasion. So long The strategic environment that these as the United States maintains relatively trends seem to indicate as the most likely strong armed forces, it need not fear for is muitipolar-a future world that envi­ the security of its base area. However, re­ sions five major power centers (the cent developments in the Caribbean must United States, the USSR, the PRC, be closely monitored lest instability or Western Europe and Japan), a prolifera­ Soviet military capabilities in that area tion of nations, low economic growth and hamper our ability to project power resource availability problems for the elsewhere in the world. United States and a world in which • Maintenance or enhancement of thl! nuclear weapons have been proliferated. us standard of living. This national in­ While it is by no means inevitable that terest has two major subelements: access the world will develop in this way, the to US trading partners and access to re­ United States has an opportunity now to quired critical resources, especially choose a national strategy that will, in energy. Access to the major trading some degree, put the country in a favor­ partners of the United States in the able position to' cope with the serious Western Hemisphere is not a significant issues that would accompany such an en­ problem. Access to the major markets vironment. outside of this hemisphere is assured by From this analysis of the emerging maintaining the two main centers of strategic environment, the following con· strength in Western Europe and in North­ clusions may be drawn regarding the im­ east Asia and by ensuring freedom of the pact of strategic trends on the four funda­ seas. mental elements of US national interest: Since the United States is primarily a • Survival. The Soviet Union, pres­ maritime and commercial nation, world­ ently and into the 1980s, will be the only wide stability is also an important US nation that will posses the nuclear global objective. Maintaining access to weapons and delivery means in sufficient energy and critical resources in the Third quantity to decimate the United States. World at reasonable cost may become It may be of little solace, but it is of im­ more of a problem in the waning years of mense strategic importance that the the 20th century, perhaps even calling for USSR may be similarly vulnerable to a the use of force. In that eventuality, a US nuclear strike. The superpowers have strategic military reserve, capable of pro­ attained a "balance of terror" that must jecting its power from the United States, be maintained as a matter of first prior­ will be essential. Equally essential, due to ity. Proliferation of nuclear weapons in the dangers of escalation present in

44 April Basic US National Interests in the Mediterranean Basin

Categories 01 National Interest Elements 01 Polley Military Strategy Strategic Issues

Survival Deterrence of nuclear Assured destruction NATO preparedness lor war war • Second strike French nuclear forces Nonproliferation • Triad and export of tech­ Flexible nuclear options nology/materials Withheld reserve Avoid Israeli and Arab Essential equ~valence development and use Termination favorable of nuclear weapons to the Untted States

Territorial ContrOl of sea/air Forward defense Importance of sea and Integrity approaches to North Present USSR With air lines of communica­ America multiple threats tIOn control , from multiple Importance of defense directions of Europe and role of Presence of US 6th the Mediterranean Fleet If deterrence fails. what concept for waT in the Mediterranean']

Economic Deter attacks on Naval force presence Importance of lines of Well-Being sources of raw to demonstrate access communicatIOn for materials and to lines of commu- access to matenals associated sea Imes nlcatlOn Defense of Saudi Arabia of communtCatlOn Increase security Protect access to 011 relations and facilities Oeterloffset SOVIet Promote regIOnal efforts to Increase stability presencefpower, Promote trade and intervention Investment and Security assistance free passagellines of communtcatlon

World Order Prevent POlitical .. Coalition strategy Importance of lines of coerCIOn of US Present USSR With commUnIcatIon to assist allies and multiple threats allies/protect security friends from multiple Interests Preserve alliance directions Improve mobility, 11ft, territory Permanent naval deployabrtlty, base Limit Soviet access deployment In the systems, RapId Deploy to aliled/citent Mediterranean ment Force states Control Soviet access Settle Greek·Turklstl ReVitalize southern to the MedIterranean dIspute flank strategy through the Turkish More closely Integrate Firm defense of Straits. to the Portugal Israel AtlantiC through Italy Settle Arab·lsraeh Gibraltar Greece conflict Turkey and AVOid destablllzmg France force e)(pans1ons POSSIble roles of Spain Combat terrorism Morocco and TuniSIa Egypt Greater allied partiCipation

Nole Some sltaleg,e I',Sue<; tran['cend the ana'yt'eal calegorles esfa.bl·shed here For e.arnp e the rssues 'elatlnq to genp'al nuClear war would Impact on all ~atego"es of natIOnal 1I'llpresl SlralPg.e Issues l1ave been I c;lpd only oncp aro the" ,,'ldP' Ihp (alego'". ,.,h'ch ':>eefTJed most appropnate

Figure 3

1982 45 MILITARY REVIEW superpower conflicts, will be the neces­ already volatile region. A US-Soviet mili­ sity to ensure that these Third World ven­ tary confrontation ·could very possibly tures are not linked to superpower rela­ occur in this region. If such a direct con­ tions_ frontation should occur, it would repre­ • World order. This is an interest that sent the end of an era in superpower mili­ requires the lessening of tensions tary relations. throughout the world, especially with regard to superpower relationships. The United States should, so far as it is possi­ Conflict Avoidance ble, influence international relations so that it will not become a beleaguered na­ tion in a hostile world. In practical terms. During the post-World War Il period, this translates into a policy that will en­ the United States and the USSR have sure that no single nation or group of na­ wisely avoided situations that would in­ tions hostile to the United States can volve direct military involvement against establish hegemony over either Western each other. This mutual. tacit inhibition Europe or Japan, or establish clien t is based primarily on an assessment of states in Latin America that could di­ the dangers of escalation inherent in rectly or indirectly threaten neighboring superpower confrontations. The dire con­ states or serve as a base for subversion. sequences of escalation in such a confron­ The interaction of the strategic trends tation are potentially so great, partic­ with the four fundamental national in­ ularly in view of the huge nuclear arsenals terests of the United States indicates maintained by the superpowers, that it possible areas where military conflict has been clearly more prudent to avoid could erupt. The United States must be such clashes than to attempt to control prepared to fight in Western Europe and them should conflict erupt. Moreover, for Korea to oppose Communist expansion­ most of the period. the United States en­ ism. The security of Western Europe will joyed a perceived superiority of strategic probably remain the pre-eminent world nuclear weapons and power projection order interest of the United States capability_ although outbreak of hostilities there is A nuclear stalemate currently exists probably the least likely conflict that because neither superpower has the tech­ could occur during the midterm. A more nological capability to execute a disarm­ likely area of conflict is the Korean penin­ ing first strike against the other. Implicit sula though fighting could break out iI;! in this judgment is the underlying as­ other areas where interests have been less sumption that the US fundamental deter­ clearly defined and where adversaries are rent concept-assured destruction-will more willing to probe. not be invalidated in the midrange be­ During the midrange. the United cause of technological advances. Fully States might be required to respond mili­ realizing that this concept may not be ac­ tarily to threats in Southwest Asia cepted by the Soviets, who emphasize because of the confluence of Western damage-limiting and warfighting capa­ resource interests, espedally oil. and bilities. the terrible destructiveness, because of instability-fueled by Islamic frightening uncertainties and cataclysmic religious issues, Arab-I sraeli issues and consequences associated with nuclear Soviet destabilization efforts-in an warfare should continue to convince both

46 April Basic US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

Categories 01 National Interest Elements 01 Policy Military Strategy Strategl~ Issues

Survival, Deterrence of nuclear Assured destruction Nuclear trends war • Second strike Proliferation potential Nonproliferation • Triad • South Africa Flexible nuclear options • Possibly others Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States

Territorial Defend air and sea Protect lines of com­ Soviet bases In sub­ Integrity approaches to munication between Saharan Africa North America Umted States and Western Europe

Economic Maintain and expand Military access and Majority rule in Southern Well Being trade and Investments transit fights Afflca Access to natural Security assistance SovietlCuban presence resources of region Limited peacekeeping US military presence Continue free passage functions over international Coalition warfare alrfsea routes Protect US personnel Promote economic devel­ and property opment in the region

World Order No hegemony In sub­ limited peacekeeping Soviet/Cuban presence Saharan Africa functions Majority rule In Southern hostile to the Security assistance Africa United States CoalitIOn warfare US military presence Maintain US credibility Protect US personnel and regional Influence and property Prevent the outbreak of hostilities In region threatening US in­ terests Reduce the threat of Communist Insurgency in non-Communist countries Promote respect for human rights Prevent regional arms races

Note Some s.trateglc !'3sues transcencl1he ana!vtlcal categories estahsheo here For example. the Issues relating to gener.a1 nuc'ear VIIar would Impact on all categories of national Interest StrategiC Issues ha"e been hsted o'1ly once and then under the category WhiCh seemed most appropriate

Figure 4

1982 47 MILITARY REVIEW sides that the avoidance of a strategic of strategic mobility although it is in nuclear exchange is by far the best strat­ danger of losing that capability over the egy. next decade. Certainly. limited nuclear options to During the midrange. the Soviet Union cope with nuclear launches caused by ac­ will remain unable to compete success­ cident or miscalculation. a withheld nu­ fully with the United States across the clear reserve for intrawar deterrence and spectrum on political. social or economic essential equivalence for political pur­ terms. but Soviet military strength may poses are all necessary and useful embolden them to use their military capa­ elements of US nuclear strategy. At bed­ bility to achieve strategic objectives in rock. however. an assured destruction the Persian Gulf and to project either capability is the factor that will continue their own. Cuban or possibly other sur­ to underwrite nuclear deterrence. The rogate forces in other more distant areas. strategic nuclear triad and new inter­ Present Soviet capabilities to use force at continental ballistic missile (ICBM) bas­ long range against significant military ing options will increase the likelihood opposition are still limited. but these that technological improvements to capabilities will increase in the midrange Soviet offensive missile accuracy. which as improvements to Soviet naval and air­ could place the US land ICBM force in­ lift forces continue. creasingly at risk during the midrange. It should be noted, however. that the will not provide the Soviet Union with a Soviet military posture also constrains disarming first-strike capability. its politico-military flexibility and ability One consequence of the change in the to project military power beyond its con­ strategic nuclear equation over the past tiguous borders. The preponderance of 15 years has been the flexing of Soviet Soviet combat-ready divisions are al­ political and military muscles in areas ready deployed against its two most formerly the preserve of the United serious threats-NATO and China. In ad­ States. When the United States had a dition. except for eight airborne divisions. clear lead in strategic nuclear forces. all other Soviet divisions are heavy and. Soviet military activities throughout the therefore. cannot be rapidly diverted or Third World appeared to be restrained. transported to counter various other con­ Since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. the tingencies. The degree of difficulty in Soviet Union has not only built up its rapidly diverting or transporting Soviet strategic nuclear force to its present combat-ready divisions is underscored by dimensions. but the Soviets show few the lack of Soviet strategic lift. signs of slowing their momentum. The Currently. there are only about 50 air­ USSR has also designed and fielded an craft in the Soviet military which can lift improved navy that sails in all of the outsized loads. Range limitations and the oceans of the world. lack of adequate in-flight refueling capa­ This is not to say that the USSR has bilities also restrict Soviet airlift abilities. achieved a significant power projection Moreover. despite significant im­ capability such that major forces can be provements in Soviet naval capabilities moved and sustained in a hostile environ­ made during the last 20 years. Soviet ship ment outside of the lands that rim the construction remains focused on its two Soviet Union. In many areas of the world. historical areas of interest-strategic the United States is still superior in terms nuclear submarines and antisubmarine

48 April Basic US National Interests in the Indian Ocean Region

Categories of National Interest Elements of Polley Mililary Stralegy Stralegle Issues

Survival Deterrence of nuclear Assured destruction Theater nuolear forces war • Second strike Proliferation potential Nonproliferation • Triad - Escalation control Flexible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States

Terrltonal Integrity

Economic Retain access to all Maintain rapid reaction Rapid deployment force Well-Being and other natural force in the Conti· • Deployability resources nental United States constraints Continue free passage Naval force presence to • Sustainability over International demonstrate access • Command and control air/sea routes to lines of communica­ • Intratheater swing Maintain and expand tion In the Indian (paclhc CommandJ trade and Invest· Ocean Southwest Asia) ments Develop theater infra­ Iraq/Iran structure Iraq/USSR Act as NATO/Japan Multinational naval force "executive agent" m Japanese self-defense Southwest ASia force Increase (naval) Can 011 be protected at reasonable cost?

World Order Maintain US c,edibility Deter USSR use of mill Arab Israeli dispute and regional Influence tary force In South­ Palestinian question limit Soviet Influence In west ASia Prtonty vfs-a-vls Southwest Asia and Security assistance NATO/Northeast As," the Indian subconti­ Malntam Pakistan, TerroTlsm nent Turkey and Saudi Reduce threat of Com Arabia as US allies mumst Insurgency in non Communist countries Prevent the outbreak of hostilities In region threatening to Western natlOns Settle Arab-Israeli dispute without lOSing moderate Arab states AvoId destablllzmg force expansions

• Not apohcab1e

Note Some strategic Issues transcend Ihe a"a1",1.c.al c.ategones established here For example the I%ues relating to general nuclear war would Impact on all categorle'O of natIOnal Interest Strategic Issues have been listed 0'11", once and then under the categoT\I whiCh s.eemed most appropriate

Figure 5

1982 49 MILITARY REVIEW

warfare. Suffice it to say that Soviet of the Third World. in which the vital in­ military forces are primarily oriented terests of only one of the superpowers or toward a European and Asian land war­ neither are involved. The use of coercive fare contingency and not toward a con­ diplomacy in these resource-rich areas, flict which would require massive move­ where the utility of force is high. partic­ ment of Soviet forces to distant areas. ularly in the proxy wars being waged by This posture obviously provides Moscow the Soviets and Cubans. carries the very with certain advantages. but it also limits real danger of uncontrollable escalation. Soviet military flexibility. Relations between the United States and The deployment of new conventional the USSR are tense and could easily snap weapons in the NATO armies that can ac­ if put to stress by a crisis somewhere in curately acquire targets in the air or on the Third World where it is not in the the ground. track them relentlessly and mutual interest of both of the super­ destroy them unerringly. usually with a powers to preserve the status quo. single shot. introduces a new battlefield Because the vital interests of both calculus. These lethal. sophisticated superpowers would not immediately be weapons could make it very difficult for a called into question, there could be room Soviet attacker to plan the outcome of a to maneuver. and the crisis might be pro­ battle with confidence. even when the longed. Once this happens. prestige. defender is seriously outnumbered. This honor and credibility could replace uncertainty. coupled with the inhibitions original. less rigid policy objectives. arising from the dangers of escalation to thereby increasing the chances for acci­ nuclear war. should convince Soviet dent or miscalculation that might lead to policymakers and strategists that the use war. If escalation in the local areas failed of military force in Central Europe would to provide a solution. the door would be be a losing proposition. opened for escalation outside of the local Given an environment in which neither area perhaps leading to threats to in­ superpower seems likely to achieve a terests more vital than those initially in­ first-strike nuclear capability against the volved. This scenario is by no means in­ other and in which neither the Warsaw evitable. but has become more likely con­ Pact nor NATO can "win" in Europe sidering the convergence of interests. op­ with any degree of certainty. it would portunity and activity of the superpowers then appear likely that the unarticulated in the Third World. policy of conflict avoidance between the Conflict avoidance is not the only United States and the USSR should conJ change in the strategic environment tinue. at least throughout the midterm. driven by the destructive power of Unfortunately. however. this does not nuclear weapons. From the time of preclude a superpower confrontation Napoleon until the end of World War II. brought about either through accident or the role of the decisive battle was central miscalculation. to operational military strategy. There is The chances for a crisis beginning this evidence now that the importance of the way increase as the locll;s of superpower decisive battle is waning. Military con­ conflict shifts from Central Europe or frontations since 1945 reflect a pattern Northeast Asia. where the vital interests that includes. a desire to end a crisis or of both superpowers are immediately en­ conflict quickly. to stabilize the situation gaged. to the more turbulent. gray areas or conflict before it can escalate to some-

50 April Basic US National Interests in East Asia and the Pacific

Categories of Natidnal Interest Elements of Policy Military S.trategy Siraleg!c Issues

Survival Deterrence of nuclear Assured destruction Nuclear trends war • Second strike Proliferation potential NonproliferatIon • Tnad Flexible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States

Terrttonal Protect HawaiI, Alaska, Forward defense based Status of 2d Infantry Integnty US bases and tern tory on South Korea and DIVision Defend air and sea ASian offshore bases Europe first priority; approaches to North Maritime/air onented­ economy of force m Amenca avoid major ground East ASia troop involvement on ASian mainland Protect Imes of commu· nlcatlon between US and forward deployed forGes/ Pacific allies

Economic Malntam and expand Naval force presence Possible overextension Well· Being trade and Investments to demonstrate access of US Pacific Fleet Access to natural to lines of commu­ between Northeast ASia resources of region nication and Soulhwest ASia Continue free passage Forward basing to over International enhance force am sea routes presence

World Order No hegemony In North Collective security Increase of Japanese self east ASIa hostile to Maintain credible mili­ defense force the United States tary posture In the Strategic flexibility Maintain US credibility Western Pacific to regarding Western and regIOnal Influence respond to can Pacific contingencies Prevent the outbreak of tlngencles Proper mdltary rela­ hostilities In region Promote Soviet concern tionship between threatening US In· with two-front war United States/People's terests _Security aSSistance Republic of China Reduce the threat of Exploit Soviet vulner­ Communist Insurgency abilities outside NATO In non·Communlst countries Improve relatiOns with People's Republic of China while purSUing sattsfactory resolution of Taiwan Issue

Note Sorne strategic Issues transcend the analytical categories established here For example the Issues relating 10 general nuclear war would Impact on all categories at natlona! Interest Strategic Issues have been listed only once and then under Ine category which seemed most appropriate '

Figure 6

1982 51 MILITARY REVIEW

thing more dangerous and to end the the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when the crisis through negotiation before the United States went on a global military stakes and risks become too great. The alert. . central battle. which traditionally re­ In situations less critical. the United sulted in the destruction of the enemy States has perceived it to be in its best in­ army and in peace terms dictated by the terest not to resolutely pursue a military winner of that battle. no longer seems solution toward its ultimate nuclear end. relevant in the nuclear era. Rather. it limited the political goals it The Korean conflict. the Cuban missile sought. This lowering of diplomatic and crisis. the Vietnam War. the 1973 Arab­ military sights results from the view that Israeli War and the Sino· Vietnamese War the outcome of war is so uncertain and all ended similarly. First. the battlefield the risks so high that the use of military was stabilized. and. second. a negotiated force by a nuclear power is an unprofit­ settlement to the conflict or crisis was ef­ able venture at mid and high-intensity fected. This pattern is rooted in the levels. perception that war between the super­ If either through miscalculation or by powers or between other major military accident deterrence fails. this pattern of powers has become too costly in terms of battlefield stabilization and negotiatio;" human life and material resources to be could dictate warfare in Central Europe pursued to its ultimate Napoleonic end­ and Northeast Asia. provided that the destruction of the enemy army. neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact Few countries have the financial or allows the other side to gain an over­ military resources necessary to sustain whelming preponderance of combat modern warfare at the high level of in­ power. Once the battlefield was stabil­ tensity required to destroy an opposing ized. negotiation would quickly follow to force. The proliferation of the highly ac· prevent the war from becoming too costly curate and lethal 'precision weapons pro· or escalating to nuclear warfare. duced by the new military technology. as well as the fear of escalation of nuclear warfare on the part of the superpowers. StrategiC Guidelines their allies and their client states. has brought about this change in the nature of modern mid-intensity conflict. One of the major problems facing con­ The United States. without the capa­ temporary US military planners is that of bility to launch a disarming first strike. ensuring that the national. coordinative without an adequate active defense which and operational military strategy are in could intercept missiles' in flight and harmony. This seemed completely beyond without an effective civil defense for pro­ our capability during the Vietnam War. tection of its population and economy. During that conflict. General William C. has. since 1960. deterred the launching of Westmoreland controlled the ground war the USSR's nuclear force by threat of in South Vietnam; pacification. until massive retaliation. But nuclear threats 1967. was the responsibility of the cannot be used lightly. In fact. a threat to American ambassador; the naval war was escalate to nuclear war was used only fought by the commander in chief. twice against the Soviet Union-in the Pacific; and the air war over Hanoi was Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and during planned from Washington. D.C.

52 April Basic US Interests in the Soviet Union and the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact

Categories 01 National Interest Elements 01 Policy Military Strategy Strategic Issues

Survival Deterrence Assured destruction Nuclear trends Nonproliferation • Second strike Proliferation potential • Triad Arms contrel Flexible nuclear options Withheld reserve Essential equivalence Termination favorable to the United States Control escalation

Territorial Protect Hawaii, Alaska, Defend air and sea Integrity US bases and terrj. approaches to North tory America

Economic Mamtain and expand Increased worldWide QUids for access could Well-Being US standard of force pressure to create conflicts with hvmg ensure access to other interests Access to world's lines of communica­ natural resources tIOn and raw Continued free passage materials olter International Forward basing to air/sea routes Influence events from POSition of recognizeu military strength

World Order Ensure that region does Containment ExplOit Soviet vulner­ not become major area • Collective security abilities outSide NATO of East-West confron· • Forward defense and terminate strategiC tation causing mili· Return suffiCient Inltlatlv~s once started tary conflict military fleXibility Proper balance between Encourage Independent to counter Soviet Europe first and other actions and loosemng worldwide military US military requirements of economiC, political Initiatives Reconfirm alliance and military ties Promote Soviet concern strategy With proper among non-Soviet for two-front war recognition of benefits Warsaw Pact Nations Ensure SovIet worldWide and costs and USSR presence not lead to Status, positIOning of Improve US political· US allies seeking forward deployed units economic relations accommodation With In Europe and Korea with USSR USSR Encourage USSR to be Maintain credible milt­ come a more respon­ tary forces to con­ Sible actor in inter· duct global operations national environment from POSItion of Promote order and sta­ strength bility and peaceful Protect lines of com­ solution of world mUnication to forward problems deployed troops

• Not apolrcable

Note Some strategic Issues transcefld the analytiCal categories established here For example the Issues relating to general nuclear war wOuld Impact on all categones of national ,nterest Strategic Issues have been listed only once and then under the category whiCh seemed most appropriate

Figure 7 /

1982 53 MILITARY REVIEW

There never was any combined com­ taken into account, they should not be mand of US, allied and Republic of Viet­ overemphasized, Since 1945, overem­ nam forces. Instead, there was a policy of phasis has seemingly been the norm. To cooperation which is a difficult way to run disregard completely the military capa­ any war and a particularly poor way to bilities of our enemies would also be conduct a counterinsurgency. The end foolish, but neither must we conform to result of this fragmentation was strategic them unthinkingly. Herbert Rosinski has discord. In seeking unity-the cement stated that military strategists must use. which binds the various layers of military ... sufficient realism in assessing our strategy-there are several guidelines opponents not to be taken again and which may help to produce a more again by surprise by them and suffi­ coherent strategy. ciently consistent so that the strategy can The establishment of such guidelines is be conducted as a continuous process and far from easy, but would be highly not a series of 'crash program,s. ' desirable because, before any unity of Focusing .mr national military and na­ strategic effort can be achieved. there tional strategy on US national interests must be common understanding and also has implications for relations with shared values among strategists and our allies. We must only surrender that policymakers at all levels. This was not a portion of freedom of action to the allied problem when the Tuler was both the cause that is absolutely necessary. The policymaker and the military strategist. dilemma, of course, is that, under the Today, however, there is a tension be­ realities of the current strategic environ· tween the policy maker and the military ment, the United States needs allies to strategist. between the strategist and the counter the military power of the USSR. programmer. A second, closely associated strategic Strategic guidelines could help to ease factor is flexibility. This guideline ad­ this tension. This attempt to harmonize monishes the strategist not to design the types of military strategy, particu­ military strategies that are based on larly national military strategy and coor­ rigid, single scenarios. Flexibility reo dinative military strategy, is not in· quires that the United States stay a step tended to replace the traditional prin· ahead of its opponents in sensing trends ciples of war which are still appropriate to and in exploiting opportunities. Today, considerations of operational military strategy and force programing are tied to strategy. Nor is the following listing of the threat to US interests. This is not to strategic guidelines to be considered com, say that the threat is not a vital con­ prehensive or complete. Rather, it is a sideration; it is, but it must not be the first approximation, hopefully, to be sole consideration. To make it so, as the refined later. United States seemingly has in the Plan­ The first general guideline is independ­ ning, Programing and Budgeting Sys­ ence of action." Independence of action tem, is to be condemned to react and not implies that the United States must to initiate. devise its own strategy in terms of its The third guideline is preparedness own national interests. While the inten­ which recalls the more classic term of tions and capabilities of other nations to "security of the base area." Preparedness t,hreaten our national interests, par­ involves such things as the morale and ticularly our vital interests, must be will of the people, the nation's mobili-

54 April zation capability and the ability of the is based on the notion of a decisive battle. military to project power globally from The maritime theory assumes that land the United States. In the past several areas can be controlJed from the oceans. years. strong evidence suggests that the Douhet. in the air theory, ignored both United States faced the temporary ero· the land and the sea by assuming that the sion of its base. The weakening of na­ enemy nation could be controlled by tional will and morale during and after strategic bombing and command of the the Vietnam War foreclosed strategic op­ air. And Mao believed that a revolution tions. particularly in Angola. simply could be based on the rural peasant. because of the pUblic attitudes that ex­ While a comprehensive military theory isted toward intervention at that time. might not solve many practical problems. I n a democracy. a firm. articulated and it would enable the experience of the consensual public opinion can be decisive. senior military leaders ttf all services to be and the strategist ignores it at his peril. communicated to oth~s. The current During the post· Vietnam period. the man­ divergence of service views is enough to power mobilization system was dis­ make the development of such theory a carded. and industrial preparedness was matter of first priority. in disarray. Currently. strategic analysts Another concept that is particularly im· are becoming concerned about instability portant at the interface between coor­ in the Caribbean Basin. which might dinative military strategy and opera­ cause the United State~ either to divert tional military strategy is dislocation or US military forces to the area or to with· what Clausewitz caIJed center of gravity. hold forces in anticipation of a need to This was also the key concept behind B. secure its base area to the detriment of H. Liddell Hart's strategy of the indirect the ability of the United States to project approach. Dislocation seeks to attack the military power elsewhere in the world. point that would so psychologicalJy shock The next concept-integration-has al· the enemy as to cause his defeat. Discern· ready been alluded to as strategic unity. ing the enemy's point of ~islocation is no I t is the need for cohesion and coherence easy task as the United States discovered among the elements of the national mili­ in Vietnam. To further complicate the tary strategy. the coordinative military matter, this point need not even be a mili­ strategy and the operational military tary target. For example, many strategic strategy. This unity or integratIOn does analysts believe that the point of dis­ not come easily. One reason that it does location in today's strategic environment not is the absence of and an urgent need for the Western industrial nations and for a comprehensive military theory. Japan is access to Persian Gulf oil. Several military theories exist today. but The last guideline. and one appropriate there is no single theory of military fo'r national military ~trategy and co or­ power. There are. for example. the con­ dinative military strategy, is selectivity. tinental theory of land warfare (Karl von I n an era of constrained defense budgets, Clausewitz), the maritime theory (Alfred it is more important than ever that a Thayer Mahan), the air theory (Giulio strategy make the most efficient use of Douhet) and the revolutionary warfare manpower and resources that is possible. theory (Mao Zedong). However. each of There must be no wasted effort in achiev­ these theories have limiting assumptions. ing the military and political objectives of The continental theory of land warfare the strategy.

1982 55 MILITARY REVIEW

theater nuclear forces in Europe and the Military Strategy in the 1980s Pacific for deterrence against both con­ ventional and limited nuclear attack and for warfighting as well. The US employ­ The current military strategy and at­ ment policy governing these forces does tendant force structure is the base from not preclude their first use. thus broaden­ which any future change must be ing the range of available options should measured. A basic element of this deterrence fail. However. the thrust of US strategy is to deter nuclear war through a strategy is to conduct a nonnuclear reliance on a countervailing strategy. The defense. using theater nuclear forces only United States maintains a Bet of flexible if used against the United States or its nuclear options in order to provide intra­ allies or as a hedge against an uncon­ war deterrence. to control escalation and tainable attack. In broad outline. this is to limit undesired collateral damage. The the current US military strategy. strategic nuclear triad must also main­ Using the strategic guidelines that tain essential equivalence with enemy were developed earlier. a framework for nuclear forces in order not only to maxi­ new strategic directions for the United mize our deterrence posture. but to en­ States may be constructed. Some broad sure that all nations perceive that a true strategic considerations that are relevant nuclear balance exisrs between the super­ mainly at the national military and coor­ powers. Essential equivalence will also dinative military strategy level will be help to provide the United States with developed. Specific changes to opera­ the flexibility and the influence that it re­ tional military strategy would require a quires in its relations with the Third detailed exposition of the higher levels of World. SALT negotiations are aimed at US strategy. achieving nuclear' deterrence at lower The concept of independence of action force levels. would require a rethinking of the national The United States also hopes to deter interests of the United States. If the conventional war in Europe and East United States is to pursue its own na­ Asia. In order to accomplish this. the tional interests in a constantly changing United States is committed to a forward international environment. it must re­ deployment. forward basing posture in evaluate the relative value of a continued both the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is military commitment to NATO of large also committed to a forward defense in numbers of US forces. This will re­ Europe and to an economy-of-force role in quire a precisely stated national strat­ Asia should deterrence fail. The strategic egy-something which presidents are reserve in the United States is largely either unable or unwilling to provide. The configured to its supporting role in current perception of the overriding value Europe. The military establishment. par­ of Europe to US security is long overdue ticularly the Army. is heavily dependent for serious reassessment by the National on mobilization and the Reserve com­ Command Authority. ponents not only for a long war hedge. The concern of current defense pro­ but for round out of many of its Active grams with the threat posed by a short­ forces. particularly with respect to sup­ notice Warsaw Pact attack. the need for port units. national mobilization and continuous re­ The United States also maintains inforcement seem to be more appropriate

56 April to the doubts of the 1950s and less rele­ military needs, primarily naval, in other vant to the problems posed for the 1980s. areas of the world. The demanding re­ Military strategists seeking to achieve quirements of forward deployment and greater independence of action must forward defense are threatening to realistically assess the contribution to bankrupt US strategy now. Because of overall 'US national security of the cur­ this, flexibility and selectivity are indis- rent emphasis on NATO defense. A solubly linked. . retreat from NATO is not contemplated Selectivity is a guide to the setting of here, simply a re-evaluation of its prior' priorities based on the probability of war ity, given other competing US interests. and the risks or consequences of losing a The concept of flexibility presents the conflict should deterrence fail. I f one ac­ United States with its most formidable cepts the argument advanced earlier, that problems. US strategists are in a di­ the fear by both superpowers of the con­ lemma. By preparing to fight a single sequences of a nuclear war will lead to scenario war in NATO and by commit· conflict avoidance, then the estimation of ting virtually the entire Army to that the risk or probability of war in NATO is rigid defensive scenario, the services in lowered. Not to be misunderstood, this is general, but the Army in particular, may not intended to suggest that the US com­ be in the early stages of a sort of strategic mitment to NATO is not important or rigor mortis. The most urgent strategic that it should be abandoned. What is sug· need is to make the Armed Forces more gested is that the United States might be flexible. If we permit the major portion of ahle to preserve its national interest in the Army to be tied down, both physi­ Western Europe at reduced cost in both cally and intellectually, to the static dollars and committed troops. The need is defense of Europe and Northeast Asia, for a flexible strategic reserve force that the USSR and its proxies will be free to could be used not only to respond to the challenge US interests in the Third World more likely challenges in the Third World with virtual impunity. in the future, but in NATO and the Flexibility also implies that the United Pacific as well. States should be free to take advantage of Dislocation of the strategic center ot opportunities to advance its interests gravity is also an important concept in throughout the world. This is a recogni­ this context. The USSR has apparently tion that, in this imperfect world, there decided that, under the current condi­ may be times when the United States will tions, the US center of gravity lies in be forced by other nations to resort to the Western Europe and that the' West Euro­ use of military force to secure its national pean's major point of vulnerability is ac­ interests. If this is so, then the necessary cess to Persian Gulf oil. Therefore, the military capability to accomplish this ob­ paint of dislocation for NATO may be the' jective must exist. A flexible or multi­ Persian Gulf. Paradoxically, the United purpose force will be required because it States, in structuring to meet We re­ is unlikely that the specific area in which quirements of NATO, had virtually pre­ the force will be needed can be predicted. cluded itself from developing an aaequate In an era of economic austerity, the joint force for the Persian Gulf contin­ United States may not be able to afford gency. the expense of continued forward deploy­ The point to attack to dislocate the ments at current levels and to respond to Soviet center of gravity is more difficult

1982 57 MILITARY REVIEW to pinpoint. There is some evidence that it the United States might participate will may be in the Far East opposite the PRC. have to be relatively short. The United It may not even be political or geo­ States is preparing'to fight a war of strategic at all; it might be psychosocial. singular violence in Europe based on the The growing populations of eastern Napoleonic concept of the decisiveness of Russia. together with their cultural dif­ the central battle. This orientation is rob­ ferences from the European Russians, bing the United States of flexibility in may in the end prove to be the Achilles other more volatile areas. heel of the Soviet Union. In any event, the If the view that both superpowers con­ interest shown in the past few years in sider escalation to nuclear warfare both studying the problem of Soviet vul­ inevitable and unacceptable is correct. nerability should soon pay dividends and then battlefield stabilization and negotia­ assist in the search for the point that will tion might be the prime factors in a future dislocate the Soviet center of gravity. NATO conflict. If this is the case. more Preparedness relates to securing the thought and study should be directed to US base. To secure the US base obviously war termination possibilities short of the means 'continued emphasis on nuclear destruction of the enemy army or uncon­ deterrence; maintenance of a secure and ditional surrender. stable North America, with special em­ The final strategic factor, and one of phasis on the Caribbean; a sound the most important, is integration. The economy; and the revitalization of the lack of unity among the types of strategy American people. This is a prerequisite to in Vietnam has already been mentioned. the re-establishment of an effective man­ The current European strategy of the power mobilization system (not necessar­ United States and its implementing pro­ ily a draft) and an effective industrial grams display a serious disconnect be­ mobilization base. tween fighting the initial stages of NATO It seems clear' that, so 'long as the war and the ability to sustain that, United States maintains its global in­ fighting over longer periods of time. terests. there will be a need for some However. a greater disconnect is between degree of mobilization to provide the our more global interests and our ability manpower needed to back up the Active to protect them. force. But manpower mobilization is not In an era of constrained economic re­ only sensitive to the requirements dic­ sources, it does not appear likely that cur­ tated by a more turbulent world. It is rent defense programs projected into the even more profoundly sensitive to the mid-1980s in support of military strategy current nature of the US social order and will be achievable. There must not only be the willingness of the US citizen to make a unity among the levels of military sacrifices to preserve the basic American strategy. but also between strategic reo values-not to mention a comfortable quirements and available resources. standard of living. When the military at the coordinative In this respect, it is important to think level translates the objectives and broad through the type of war that the United strategic guidelines determined at the na­ States is prepared to fight. Clausewitz in­ tional military level into strategic plans dicated that the shorter a war, the more and programmatic requirements. the job popular it is likely to be. Given the US is just begun. The secretary of defense character, any conflicts or wars in which must then consider these plans and issue

58 April guidance to allocate the available re­ cians to decide if the new "strategy," sources. which, of necessity, must eliminate some Still, the job is not complete. The joint military capabilities, is adequate. If it is planners then assess the risk associated not, the politicians then Illust allocate with the program force as measured more resources or determine which US in­ against the plans or strategy. Today, this terests or objectives must be lowered in is the end of the cycle, but it need not be. priority. To ensure that there is unity between the Measures such as those outlined above strategy and its resources, one further or others like them would go a long way step is needed, and that is that the objec­ toward the creation of a more flexible tives and strategic concept should be ad­ military strategy. A more flexible US justed to be compatible with the re­ strategy and force structure would en­ sources allocated. hance the ability of the United States to This last step is seldom taken or what is secure and protect its vital interests in done is ineffectual. If it were taken. then the emerging strategic environment of it would be the responsibility of the politi- this decade.

NOTES

, Donald E Nuechterle.n NatIOnal Interests and Plesloenr,J,i 1960 p '" Leade;sn'JJ rhe Setting of Pno"',es Weslv1ew Press BOulder onal Strdtegy Ion DC 27 MarCh 1960 Into/matlon Center N '( . 1979 r x.o 6 These gU1dPI,nes '0' rnd.tar,. st'ategy ",ere s"gge",led ,n 3 G",neral DaVid C Jones Un,ted Slates MilderI' POSture fOf F V another conte~t by HerDer! Hos,n",kl 81 Organ1zat,on at Ihe Jo.nt Chlels 01 ola!!. WaShington DC

Colonel ti'dllam n Staudenmaler l~ a !ltrateg1c analyst at the Strategic Stlldl(,S Iw,tltldc. US Arm\.' War College, CarbslC' Barracks. Penn~'yl· tlanlQ He Ncelved a bachelor's degr('(' Ul uelleml educatlO1Z from the Unwerslty of Chattanooga. a master'" degree In plibhc admlnl~tratlO1Z from Penn''''Yh'ama State Unwerslty and l~ a graduate of the USACGSCand the US Army ~tar(,ollegc He has sen'ed a~ a dU'ISlanal all" defense bat­ talion commander In Germany and In t'anou~ staff assignments at the Ucpartrnpnt of til(! Army, Washmgton. U.C Hzs artzcle "Somr Strategic Implications of Fighting Out­ numbered on the NA TO BattlefIeld" appeared lIZ the A1ay 1980 Military ReVIew

1982 59 Topography is often critical to the outcome of battles. This is particularly true for the Sinai Peninsula which is marie up of contrasting kinds of terrain. This article describes the penin­ sula and points out the routes and areas that have historically been used in the wars between Israel and Egypt.

HIS month. the entire Sinai Penin­ with greater intensity in the study of the T sula is due to be returned by Israel military options in the peninsula in the to Egypt as part of the peace agreement event of a new deterioration in the rela­ between the two countries. Henceforth, tions between the two states.' Will there the strategists will once more engage indeed be new options for the armies?

Arnon Soffer The Wars of Israel In•

opo

Con uered SINAI

This article aims to show how the topography of Sinai dictated unequivo­ physical surface of Sinai dictated both to cally the routes in it and thus, in fact. Israel and Egypt the axes of warfare and determined the axes of warfare there. the key points in the wars of 1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973. Further, it intends to prov,e that the same vulnerable points The Topography of the Sinai Peninsula in the topography that played a part in the earlier wars may be the key' points again in a military conflagration in the The coastal s~rip. The northern bound­ fu.ture. These statements are based on the ary of the peninsula is the shoreline of the assumption that. in the future also, in Mediterranean Sea. The section between spite of the introduction of new arms, the Gaza and Abu Oudeh (west of El-Arish) is war will proceed in the Middle East and accessible from the sea as the coast is will be decided along the axes of advance sandy. From Abu Oudeh to the railway of mechanized vehicles-that is, tanks.' station at Rumaneh, the coast is a narrow offshore bar which encloses the Bardawil Lagoon whose greatest width is approxi­ Transport Routes-BasiG Assumptions mately 20 kilometers. The Rumaneh area is also sandy for a stretch of 10 kilo· meters and also is accessible from the sea. Wars are largely battles for routes. The From Rumaneh to Port Said. a new off­ ability of an army to move into battle and shore bar begins which encloses a broad its mobility in the battle. control of ter­ salt marsh. Neither the sector of the ritory. and transfer of men and equip· swamp nor that of the salt marshes is ac­ ment all depend on control of the network cessible from the sea. of routes within the battle sector. The south of the peninsula is sur­ Throughout history. good transport rounded by the Red Sea (from the Gulf of routes, especially when there was no Aqaba to the Gulf of Suez). the length of alternative. have been theaters of battle. the coast being 643 kilometers. The A route having the following charac­ coastal strip on the Gulf of Aqaba i~. for teristics is the most advantageous: the most part, hilly. In some parts. it is • I t connects the starting point to the not passable even by foot. Penetration target by the shortest distance. from the sea is also difficult over lengthy • It traverses a plain. sections owing to the coral reefs that pro­ • It has no obstacles such as dunes. tect the shore. Two large silt fans stand sands. marshes. terraces Or craters. A out along this coast. one at Nueiba route with a hard surface is particularly (Neviot) the other at Dhahab IDi-Zahav), useful (such as Hamada. the rocky up­ but an invader attempting to gain access lands of a desert). into the peninsula this way would be • It does not traverse mountain caught up in the maze of narrow valleys passes which could become death traps. of difficult passage. • It has water sources. Until recently, The coastal strip on the Gulf of Suez is this was an essential condition, but this constructed differently. For the most factor has lost some of its importance in part. it is a flat shore. about 15 kilometers modern warfare. wide. and only a small section of it is hilly In" the following. we shall see how the with almost no possibility of passage.

61 MILITARY REVIEW

Here and there, coral reefs separate the of it with supply routes of equipment and shore from the open sea and make pene­ men via the sea. The need to guard the tration by an enemy difficult. Strait of Tiran, the rich oil fields of In general. then, this is an area where southern Sinai and those that are yet to invasion is possible and it is penetrable be discovered. and the possibility of over large sections. In part of it, oil fields tourism that the region offers all impart are found opposite the Egyptian coast. to this section an importance which it However. an enemy invading on this or never had before. any other section of the Red Sea coast The northern unit is divided into two would find it difficult to advance toward subunits from the viewpoint of pass­ the interior of Israel as is explained ability. The southern su);mnit is marked below. by broad Hamada plains and the exten­ The interior of the peninsula. From the sive flood plains of the El-Arish riverbed viewpoint of transport. two main topo­ whose height is, on average. 500 meters. graphical units in Sinai may be distin­ These plains stretch from the region of guished: the south of the peninsula and the Thia cliffs and Jebel Egma to the the north. mountain chain in the north, and from the The southern unit is a high area, forti­ mountain chain in western Sinai to the fied by many narrow twisting gullies. Negev and the Arava in the east !Figure their beds covered by sand and difficult 1). The mountain chain in the west for traffic. This region is separated from crosses from the north of the Thia cliffs to the northern unit by a system of high the Bir Gafgafa IRefidim)-Tasa-Is­ cliffs Ithe Thia cliffs). rising to a height of mailia road, and its height varies from 400 to 600 meters. which extend from the 950 meters in the south to 600 to 700 area of Abu Zneima in the west to the meters in the north. I t is broken by region of Nueiba ill the east Isee Figure 1). several dry rivers running south and This system of cliffs splits Sinai in half. north !Figure 2). In the past. it was possible to pass be­ The western side of this chain is tween the two units only along the coast marked by a line of cliffs la branch of the of the Gulf of Suez or through the large Syrian-African rift) which extends for 120 riverbeds in eastern Sinai Ithe Israeli kilometers. The line of these cliffs and the Defense Forces 9th Brigade did this in Gulf of Suez coast is separated from the the Sinai war in 1956) and. more recently. Suez Canal by a plain 15 kilometers wide along the new Elath-Ophira road. in the south broadening to about 30 kilo­ For this reason. the southern unit has meters in the north. This plain is crossed never served as a theater in the wars be­ by wadis, sand fans. low hills and sands. tween Israel and Egypt, and control of especially in its northern part. This area this part was always conditional upon is largely passable for a length of about control of the northern unit. However. 80 kilometers. as far as the region of Jebel this does not mean that, in the future, Haman Faron in the south. there will be no possibility of control of The northern subdivision is composed part of southern Sinai independent of the of several columns of mountains whose north. Possibly, this may be because the general direction is from the east to the Elath-Ophira road will allow easy access west. These are the Jebel Halal. Jebel to the south from the direction of Israel or Yalek and Jebel Urn Hashiba which is the because of Egyptian control of some part connecting point between the east-west

62 April Sinai-Topography

• Gaza

=Mountains t':':'J~;; I Sand dunes ---'t- WadIS o Scale I Wad, MIlia 4 Jebel Um Hash,ba Jebel Halal 5 Jebel Jiddl Um Ma,haseh Wadi J,dd,

Figure 1

1982 63 MILITARY REVIEW column and the western column. The Elath, to Thmad, Nakhl and the Mitla northern column is composed of Jebel Pass). . Libni and Jebel Maghra (Figure 1). • A road from Elath to Thmad, From the north of this column extends Nakhl, the Mitla Pass or Wadi Sudar at the widest dune area in Sinai, beginning the approaches to the town of Suez. near the Suez Canal in the west and ter­ Connection between the four axes may minating in the Halutza and Beersheba be made at several points. Between the sands in the Negev. This area is 200 kilo­ first and second axes, there is an easy meters long, and its maximum width is 40 passage via the EI·Arish riverbed; be­ kilometers. It is interrupted once by the t ween the second and third axes, there are EI-Arish riverbed which crosses it. The four links (Figure 2); and, between the dunes, for the most part, are steep on third and fourth axes, the entire plain is their other side, and their ridges look like open to traffic. elongated knife blades. It is, therefore, The Bir Gafgafa-Thmadeh axis is con­ almost impossible to cross these sand nected to the Suez Canal as follows. The barriers with any kind of vehicle. western mountain chain is split by a To the north of the dune region extends series of dry valleys which serve as the northern coast plain of Sinai con­ passes. I n three of them, traffic is possi­ sisting of sand dunes, sand flats, salt ble, and, in two, it is possible after minor marshes and swamps. The area is rich in road works. The Jiddi, Mitla and Sudar ground water, both sweet and salty, and Passes lead to the Suez Canal and Ras there are hundreds of palm trees along its Sudar and the south. The two dry rivers length. in the south-Wadi Gharandal and Wadi Sumar-are difficult for passage at pres· ent, but may be made usable for motor The Route Map of Sinai vehicles when necessary. The network of roads in Sinai has developed along these axes. Every war From the description of the compo­ has served to expedite the building of ad­ nents of the landscape, the map of the ditional roads to the existing system axes of movement in Sinai may be drawn (Figure 2). (Figure 2): • The northern coastal route (the his­ torical sea route) from Gaza through EI­ Axes of Fighting in Four Israel-Egypt Wars Arish to Kantara. • The route that passes between th~ two mountain columns mentioned above. A reconstruction of the battle theaters It begins at Beersheba, continues and the axes of advance of the Israeli through Nizzana, Abu Agheila and Bir army in three wars-1948, 1956 and Gafgafa. and ends at Ismailia. 1967-provides the following picture. In • From Nizzana to Kassima, Bir general, it reflects the aim of the Israeli Hasneh and Sir Thmadeh, and thence to army to move from east to west toward the Mitla and Jiddi Passes or the Sudar the Suez Canal sector. Pass. From Kassima, the region of the The War of Independence (the Horev great plains opens where move)l1ent is Campaign, 22 December 194B-BJanuary possible in all directions (to Kuntileh and 1949). The central problem was the cap-

64 April Sinai-Natural Routes 'and Roads

Surfaces easy CJ for movement

_._. Jordanian border __ Road up to 1948 = Road from 1948 to 1956 ___ Road from 1956 to 1967 _ Road from 1967 to 1973 ____ Unpaved track Scale lOa kilometers I

1982 65 The Horev Campaign 22 December 1948-8 January 1949 Gaza • Beersheba EI-Arish l ·

Abu Aghella (Urn :~.~}~N./ luana Bir Harna V- • /'" • Kasslrna Bir Hasneh • .,;

Elath

Axes of Advance -+IFr~;~:SO:::."Cske

Scale Figure 3

ture of Nizzana and then the Abu Agheila The Sinai Campaign (29 October 1956- j unction. After the forces J1ad captured 5 November 1956). The main battle took Abu Agheila (Figure 3), they moved in place at the Abu Agheila junction. After three heads: toward EI-Arish, toward Bir this was taken, the Israeli Defense Forces Hama (the Ismailia axis) and toward Bir moved in two main columns: to Bir Hasneh (the axis to the south of the Gafgafa via Bir Hama and to the Mitla column of mountains). An additional Pass via Bir Hasneh. A third force at­ "force moved from Nizzana to Kassima.' tacked Rafa and moved along the north-

66 April The Sinai Campaign 29 October 1956-5 November 1956

------"o..lsrae" Defense -----".. f orees attack

Scale Figure 4

ern axis to EI-Arish and thence toward wliose target had been Sharm ai-Sheikh Kantara (Figure 4). The fourth force made from the start set out from Elath and use of the Elath-Mitla route in order to made its way via the winding wadis of reach Kuntileh and thence Thmad. Nakhl eastern Sinai.' and the Mitla Pass. From here. the force The Six-Day War (5 Jzme 1967-lOJune crossed Wadi Sudar and reached the Gulf 1967). To a large extent. this was a repeat of Suez (Ras Sudar) and moved on from of the deployments of the· Sinai Cam­ there to Sharm ai-Sheikh. Another force paign. One division fought for the

1982 67 The Six-Day War 5 June 1967----10 June 1967 Gaza •

Figure 5

northern road leading to Kantara. A part J iddi Passes. and thence via the passes to of this force went south down the El­ the canal. A third division attacked the Arish-Bir Lahfan axis (Figure 5) and Abu Agheila junction and continued to continued west along the Abu Agheila­ the Hamada plains to the south and from Ismailia road. A second division by­ there to the Mitla Pass. A part of this passed the Abu Agheila junction tUm force began its march from the area of Katef) and continued along the southern Kuntileh. and it too swung toward the axis toward the Wadi Sudar. Mitla and Mitla junction. The battle areas in this

68 April SINAI war were the following junctions: Jebel zana, Kassima and Ismailia. It is almost Libni, Urn Katef, several sections on the impossible to emerge from that route ow­ Gaza-Rafa-El-Arish axis, and at the ing to the physical conditions. Therefore, entrance to the Mitla Pass.' ~en Israeli Defense Forces attacked There is thus a great similarity in the from east to west, they were obliged, in all axes and locations of fighting in the three three wars, to capture this junction first. wars." The difference largely lies in the • Rafa. Like Abu Agheila; this served selection of the axis of surprise attack, as a theater in all three wars. the size of the forces and the quality of • The El-Arish junction. The roads to the weapons. Gaza, Kantara and Abu Agheila or Jebel In summarizing these movements, Libni start here. I t was a battle theater in several key points in Sinai stand out: two wars and a target in the third. • The Abu Agheila junction. From • The passes in western Sinai- the here, easy routes extend to El-Arish, Niz- Jiddi, the Mitla and the Sudar. Passage

The southern part of the eastern coast of Slnai-a wadi near Dhahab village

1982 69 MILITARY REVIEW

through these from east to west leads to from the previous wars in several ways, the Gulf of Suez or the southern stretch of two of them topographical. The initiative the Suez Canal. Passage from west to ea~t this time came from the Egyptians who leads to the central plain of the Sinai. selected the axes of fighting, and the From, there, the way to the Negev and fighting began and was conducted on the every location in northern Sinai is open. western side of Sinai unlike the previous • Bir Hasneh, Bir Hama (or the Jebel occasions. Libni junction), Bir Thmadeh (or the In spite of these basic differences, in Mitla Pass from the east) and Bir Gafg'afa this case, like the others, it is seen (Figure (Re{idim). These four corners of the block 6) that the Egyptian effort- was concen­ of the Yalek mountains are of secondary trated on the axes of advance listed importance. above. As a result, the containing battles The 1973 Arab-Israeli War (6 October waged by Israel developed over a wide 1973-25 October 1973). This war differed portion of the Kantara-El·Arish and

70 April The Western Sinai- 1973 Arab-Israeli War

I~~'Q'~:- I Marshes

I·:·::·:·~:-:I Sand dunes

~ Attack by Egyptian army 'I'1'IIIII\'It> lm, of cliffs

Figure 6

1982 71 MILITARY REVIEW

Ismailia-Tasa-Bir Gafgafa axes. The features that underlie the axes of advance Egyptians tried to penetrate through the in the distant and recent past are likely to Mitla Pass and to advance toward the be the principal features in conventional coast of the Gulf of Suez. 7 wars in the future also-in spite of the continuous introduction of new types of weapons such as helicopters and amphib· Conclusions ious vehicles. In the final analysis, the battle is determined by armor and other mechanized vehicles, and these are, of An examination of the topography of necessity, bound to easy axes. The war Sinai and the stages in the wars that between Iran and Iraq bears out this fact preceded the 1973 Arab·lsraeli War and yet again. the reconstruction of the Egyptian war Finally, the physical determinism in aims ~n the 1973 Arab·lsraeli War leads Sinai will necessarily also shape the us to the conclusion that the natural deployment of the international force routes of Sinai may once again playa part that is to be established after the Israeli in a future military operation. As in the withdrawal to safeguard the separation of past. the only axes of advance are likely Israeli and Egyptian troops. This force is to be the Kantara-EI·Arish-Gaza road; bound to be aware of those selfsame the Ismailia-Bir Gafgafa-Nizzana sensitive physical elements in northern road; and the southern road on the Suez­ Sinai which in the case of deterioration Mitla-Kassima axis. will be taken by the confrontation armies From these facts, a more general con· and thus cancel out the function of the elusion emerges. Basic topographic force.

NOTES

1 On the fear~ ot both Slde~ 01 renewed warfare In Sma' see J 1968, pp 613, M Pa II, Three Baflles ell Rata-EI An",h 1949 1956 E MorOl. Beyond Secunt'l Int8"'atIOIld,) Peace ACddemy PUb!iCd arld 1967 M'a arachot VOlume LlH. pp A 6, and ,dem IDF Atlack.S !lon Jerusalem !5rael 1980 on Abu Aghella In Three Wars M'a arachot 1970 pp 3,23 The 2 And discounting the POSSibility Of general nuclear waf In Ihe tacts as presented contra~lct the theor\, put forward b\, 5 J regoon R05en M'JI!far'l Geography ana the M'I/dar'y Balance In the Arab· J The HISIOr~ ollhe War Of Independence Ma aracnOI. 1966 Israeli Conflict Leonard DaVIS Institute for InternatIOnal Relations p347 Jerusalem Israel 1977 p 64 Here, the author f;tates that the 4 A Golan The 8aflles of S,nai, Israel! Defense Force Tel northern alliS In Sinai IS ummportant as a mllJlaf'l aXIs Avl'''. Israel 1958 7 Ehzur Peled One Year Alter the Yom Krppur War 5 Sl~ DayS edited b.,. Mordecha, Bar On, Ministry of Defense. M'a'arachot, speCial Issue, 1914 and Hassn,n M Helkal, The Roaa Jerusalem Israel 1968 to Ramadan Collins, Londofl Eng 1975 p 215, In whiCh he states 6 A Ayaton. The War of Independence the Smal Campaign IllS m'l belief that had the passes been reached and oCCuPied the the Sl~ Day War-lines lor Companson" Ma'arachot, Volume Lit .... hole 01 Smal would have been liberated

Arnon Saffer lS a semor lecturer In geography at the Unwerslty of Halfa. Israel He has been a lecturer at the Command and Staff College of the Israeli Defense Forces He recewl'd a B A and an M A in geography and a Ph.D from the Hebrew Unlllerslty of Jerusalem. Israel. He is the author of Atlas of HaIfa and Mt. Carmel. Geographical Changes in the Middle East and Changes in the Arab Village in Northern Israel

72 April ~ETTERS

He Cannot Stand It Any Longer In general, a Soviet division will not be moving on a single road; it would stretch I cannot stand it any longer! Captain farther than 100 kilometers if it did. The Anthony M. Coroalles' article, "Maneu­ road net in Europe, for example, is more ver to Win: A Realistic Alternative" than adequate to accommodate several (Military Re,view, September 1981), is the parallel routes of advance for a division. last straw! I have no quarrel with his con­ Even if it were moving on a single road. clusions, but with the choice of graphics the division would quickly deploy into to support his thesis. Coroalles ap­ combat formation after the first engage­ parently selected his graphics without ment. No Soviet commander would con­ regard to a realistic portrayal of Soviet tinue to push his division forward while tactics. US units chewed him up from the fire Although Coroalles' thesis is valid pocket. despite his poor selection of supporting Finally, I question the whole concept of graphics, others, I am afraid, have not engaging an advancing Soviet force from been so lucky. There are dozens of articles the fire pocket. I concede that, some­ and military publications containing such where at sometime during a battle with graphics which follow a general pattern: the Soviets, this tactic might work-once. Soviet units are depicted by a nice neat If the Soviet commander's reconnais­ arrow astride a single road which is con­ sance elements fail, if all of his other in­ veniently surrounded by a horseshoe­ telligence assets fail. if he fails to analyze shaped chain of hills forrning a fire pocket the terrain to his front properly and if he from which the US combined arms teams has not read Field Manual (FM) 100-5, engage and annihilate the arrow. then. with a little luck and ideal terrain, it A picture is worth a thousand words. might work. We are engaging in wishful But an incorrect diagram in a presenta­ thinking if we assume it will work fre­ tion of military tactics is worth a thou­ quently through several days or weeks of sand wrong words and promotes faulty battle. reasoning, incorrect conclusions and. in A Soviet regiment or division moves on the worst case, questionable tactics. several parallel march routes with 1 to 5 Specifically, Coroalles depicted an en­ kilometers between columns. This means tire Soviet division in a space no division that the fire pocket will find itself be­ commander would be caught dead in. tween two columns and quickly engaged much less physically fit. A single regi­ from two directions and likely cut off. FM ment moving in two parallel columns 100-5 recognizes that the likelihood of be­ would occupy about 25 kilometers of road ing cut off is great and urges US com­ space for each column. If it were the lead manders to be prepared to conduct a regiment of the division during a road breakout. However, I believe that we are march, the distance from the lead element not prepared for the frequency with which of its advance guard to the rear of the our units will be surrounded-although, main body could be as much as 55 to 80 as Coroalles points out, we must also kilometers. Coroalles depicted a division avoid being defeated piecemeal. There are in a space that a regiment would find other ways of engaging the Soviet flank cramped and inadequate for maneuver. other than from the fire pocket.

1982 73 MILITARY REVIEW

Come on, you tacticians, just how Although few Army National Guard stupid do you think the Soviets are? All units were deployed to Vietnam, those too often, it has suited your purpose to which were achieved high levels of per­ believe that they are incapable of flexi­ formance there. This was probably due in bility, quick reaction, initiative and in­ some measure to the cohesion built up novation. You are flat wr()ng. Their equip­ over the years during their monthly ment, tactics and training will give' them drills. Perhaps you would like to share the the capability to see and analyze the bat­ enclosed account of D Company's per­ tlefield and quickly react in a variety of formance with MR's readers. ways. The unthinking automaton stereo­ type of the Soviet soldier-especially in Maj Robert P. Fairchild. ARNG, the officer corps-is outdated. Employing Fort Hood, Texas the fire pocket tactic against the American version of a Soviet advance (Although space will not permit the printmg of the looks good in the diagrams that Coroalles abstract, MR readers can find the mformation on and others have provided. Now, if we pages 188-89 of the above cited reference. Briefly, could only get the Soviets to behave as we Company D. which operated in Greenfield and want, we can win all the battles of the Evansville, indiana. was activated m April 1968. After several months of mtensive training at Fort next war. Benning. Georgia, it was asslgned as a part of the Jl Field Force m Vietnam. The unit, which was deslg~ Mal Donald L. Mercer, USA, nated as an LRRP, had as its mission reconnais~ Threals 0lr8clorate, CACOA sanee and mtelllgence gathering. often behind Fort Leavenworth. Kansas enemy lines, Before bezng deactivated in November 1969. the unzt members earned 19 Silver Stars, 175 Bronze Stars and 110 Purple llearts. Two of its members were killed in action. and one dted In a helicopter crash. - Editor.) Bring Back the LRRP Bravo to Lieute,nant Colonel Henry G, Gole and his article, "Bring Back the Fine Recommendation LRRP" (Military Review, October 1981). We not only need to get long-range recon­ I often regret that some of my civilian naissance patrols going again, but we also friends who read widely in an effort to be must emphasize patrolling by our soldiers well-informed citizens do not have the op­ in line battalions. Human sensing sys­ portunity to see articles such as "The tems are God's creation. I lean toward the Military Significance of Language Com­ human sensing systems for obvious petence" by Major Kurt E. Muller and reasons. "Will Afghanistan Become the Soviet Union's Vietnam?" by Major Terry L, Lt Col Joe Blair III, USA, Heyns (Military Review, October 1981). G2, 193d fnfantry Brigade, Panama Americans need to know the military has problems beyond marijuana in the barracks and the poor reading ability of • Mention should have been made of D the average 18-year-old, Too bad you can­ Company, 151st Infantry, Indiana Army not circulate a million copies of your fine National Guard, in Lieutenant Colonel publication. I appreciate the fact that it Henry G. Gole's article. I am enclosing a turns up in my "In" basket. brief abstract from Indiana's Citizen Soldiers, edited by William J. Watt and Virginia A. Hendrix. Editor, Driver Magazine. R, H. Spears, State Armory Board, In­ Air Foroe tnspection and Safaty Canter, dianapolis, Indiana, 1980. Norton Air Force Base. California

74 April ~EVIEWS ':

International Terrorism Palestinian terrorism, which gained at­ tention in the early 1970s, attracted a By Colonel Edgar O'Baliance, devoted following and served as the British Army, Retired model many terrorists tried to emulate. Soon, terrorist groups from several dif­ The Retired Officer, November 1981 ferent lands were attending international conventions, pledging mutual aid and Terrorism has become a dark fact of life planning joint terrorist activities. (or death) in virtually every corner of the Some of the fledgling groups were world. Amnesty International attributes nourished by the Soviet KGB (Committee the violent deaths of more than 500,000 of State Security). The infamous "Carlos people in the world to terrorist activities the Jackal," a native Venezuelan edu­ over the last decade. The increased range cated in Moscow. was hand-picked by the of "international" terrorism involving KGB as "good terrorist leadership mate­ multinational "hit teams" presents rial" and put in charge of the Paris ter­ potential danger for US cities which have rorist cell. Carlos was nearly captured in been relatively immune from such calami­ Paris in 1975, but shot his way out. He ties to date. Who these terrorists are, ended up in Libya where he teamed up what motivates them and how to deal with that country's notorious leader, with them are topics discussed in this Colonel Muhamed Qadhaafi. Fidel Castro article. of Cuba and Qadhaafi have been supply­ Edgar O·Ballance. a retired British ing terrorist groups with money, arms Army colonel and member of the Interna­ and training facilities for years. Given tional Institute for Strategic Studies and sanctuary and support. the groups have the Foreign Affairs Research Institute, been able to grow and expand their scope categorizes three broad motives for of operation enormously_ political terrorism: liberation movements In combating terrorism. some countries demanding independence or autonomy; have evolved specially trained antiter· crusading missionaries who want to im­ rorist squads from their own security pose their own political philosophy on forces, and private security firms have their governments; and political nihilists provided personal protection to in­ preaching world revolution of one sort or dividuals. Increased security and more another without having any idea of what thorough search procedures have reduced to put in its place. hijacking incidents. and a growing com­ Terrorists crave attention to their Pllter file of information is a valuable tool causes and thrive on publicity. Of course, in tracking down terrorists and warning the top international terrorist must have potential victims. . a political cause; otherwise, he or she is a Although improvements have been mere criminal. Courage and dedication to made in counterterrorist measures, the the cause are essential since death is a terrorists continue to gain more exper­ constant risk. Above all, he must have tise. O'Baliance cautions us that inter­ the killer instinct and be devoid of all pity national terrorism does not seem to be and remorse. declining, pointing to several recent in·

1982 75 MILITARY REVIEW cidents. These incidents include the Study (two volumes) and China and the bombing of the US Air Force, Europe, Taiwan Issue, and ,is currently professor Headquarters, Ramstein Air Base, Ger­ of law at the University of Maryland. many, and the grenade attack on General believes that unification at this time Frederick J. Kroesen, commander in would not be beneficial for Taiwan. He chief, US Army, Europe. believes that, after 30 years of separation, The author feels that international the ROC on Taiwan has a radically dif­ cooperation between governments in ferent political, economic and social either extraditing or trying terrorists is system from the PRC on mainland China. an ideal solution, but numerous attempts The Chinese on Taiwan are far better off at treaties along this line have been than the mainland Chinese because the fruitless. The bottom line is, then, "as ROC governmental system has demon­ long as . . . terrorists can freely cross strated its superiority to the less than national frontiers, one must sadly con­ successful Communist system of the clude that there is more international ter­ PRC. rorism to come."-PRD. The ROC. according to Chiu. has developed a society and a living standard for its citizens that can only be envied by the PRC. The country is becoming highly A Rapprochement Between the industrialized (the ROC is the 20th Two Chinas? largest trading country of the world), and the gap between the rich and the poor is By Hungdah Chiu steadily narrowing. All major epidemic diseases have been practically eradicated, and the life expectancy of 72 years is among the highest in the world and many of its Solving the Taiwan Question people are now enjoying modern conven­ iences and luxury items. By Thomas A. Marks The Chinese on the mainland are not as fortunate, Their government has had a The Military Engineer, history of power struggles and instability November-December 1981 with devastating effects on the lives and welfare of its people. Such campaigns as Will there ever be a solution to the twu­ the "Hundred Flower Campaign" (1957), China question? Will it ever be possible the "Great Leap Forward" (1958-61) and for the People's Republic of China (PRC) the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu­ and the Republic of China (ROC) to be tion" (1966-76) have brought social chaos unified? These are the questions di,s­ and economic disaster to millions of PRC cussed by both Professor Hungdah Chiu citizens. The standard of living in the and Thomas A. Marks in their con­ PRC is one of the lowest in the world, and trasting articles on the unification of the nearly 120 million of its young people are PRC and the ROC. Although neither officially considered illiterate. And, fi­ author believes unification will be coming nally, according to the author, skepticism soon or is necessarily inevitable, both about the government's ability to solve gentlemen believe that the status quo pressing social and economic problems is now in existence between both countries increasing. is neither the final nor even the best solu­ Chiu does not believe it would be advan­ tion. tageous for the ROC to undertake unifica­ Chiu, who has authored People's China tion with the PRC at the present time. and International Law: A Documentary The Communists, he says, have demon-

7.6 April REVIEWS

strated a lack of trustworthiness by viola­ the ROC in a manner which would give tion of their nonintervention agreement them some degree of autonomy and free­ with Tibet. and there is no guarantee that dom. Marks believes that the PRC is now they would honor a similar agreement at the point where such accommodations with the ROC_ He believes that the move might. be forthcoming. Both gentlemen being Ip.ade by the United States to pur­ agree, however. that the current status sue closer relations with the PRC is short­ quo that now exists between the two sighted and that the Communists are Chinas is unhealthy and adds to the in­ merely using the United States for their stability of the region. The main cause for own ends. optimism on the subject of unification is Marks believes that unification of the that at last the PRC is now taking a more two Chinas would be beneficial to both conciliatory attitude toward the ROC. the PRC and ROC. He says that. "A The main concern of Marks is that, "the union of the ROC and PRC could result in U.S. must decide where it wants its rela­ a China which was truly a world power tionship with the PRC-and a united and which provided adequately for the China-to go." Does the United States welfare of its people." He further states desire to help create what inevitably that a combination of Beying's "enor­ would become a superpower? And Chiu. mous natural and human resources with for his part. warns that "one must realize the technological and management exper­ that. because of fundamental differences tise of Taiwan could. in time. produce a in social and political systems. the PRC modern and powerful nation." He asks c an never be a true ally of the the question, Is that what the United U.S."-SIK. States really wants? Marks. who is a 1972 graduate of the US Military Academy and served five years on active duty before joining the A Proposed Step Toward Middle Easl 29th Infantry Brigade, Hawaii Army Na­ Peace tional Guard. is now a doctoral candidate and teaching assistant in political science By Colonel T. N. Dupuy. USA. Reiired at the University of Hawaii. Honolulu. StrategiC Review. Fall 1981 I'. He has spent considerable time in Asia and published numerous articles and monographs on political and military There is no end to the many voices in aspects of the region. According to the Middle East proposing immediate, Marks, the US policy toward the PRC far-reaching solutions to the problems of must be predicated on the future relation­ that region. Each proposal cites the ship desired-a strong partner or a weak righteousness of a cause and the need to adversary. right an obvious wrong. Of course, each Marks. although no more trusting of proposed solution and the wrong to be the PRC's motives than Chiu, believes ac­ righted are colored by a particular commodation between the two Chinas is perspective and. in itself. invokes more not only possible but practical in the long tension than peace. run. For the PRC. he says, the benefits of But, one man, Colonel T. N. Dupuy. US accommodation are many. For the ROC. Army, Retired. who has met with a broad this would mean a return to the mainland spectrum of Israeli and Arab officials and the gaining of their one-China goal. while traveling in the Middle East and Whereas Chiu believes that the PRC who is also executive director of the would not be willing to approach the HIstorical Evaluation and Research question of ultimate accommodation with Organization. proposes a unique solution.

1982 77 MILITARY REVIEW

The key element of his solution is simply trusteeships, and the laws in each "time." He believes that the healing prop­ trusteeship would be the legal code that erties of time are needed to bring peace to existed prior to 1967. The trusteeships this region. would be established for a period of five His proposal is to defuse the current an­ years and could be automatically renewed tagonism in this region by developing a for an additional five years. framework which will establish working The purpose of the trusteeships would relationships between the Arabs and be to expedite the establishment of a just Israelis while ensuring them that their in­ and lasting peace in the region; to assure terests and security will be safeguarded. the security of the adj acent states The ideal means of doing this, he believes, against any threat from within the trust is to establish two trusteeships: one in the territory or from a neighboring state; to Gaza Strip and the other in the West assure the right of the peoples of each Bank. trust area to choose their own form of The trusteeships would have three par­ local government; to maintain security by ticipants. The United States and Israel establishing a joint three·power military would participate in both trusteeships, force; and, at the conclusion of the while Egypt would be the third party in trusteeship period, to return each trust the Gaza Strip and Jordan the third party area to the appropriate country which ex­ in the West Bank. If Jordan, which now ercised sovereignty prior to June 1967. does not have a formal relationship with There would be some differences be­ Israel. refuses to enter into this agree­ tween the administration of each trustee­ ment, Egypt could temporarily act as its ship. The West Bank trusteeship would surrogate in administering the West be somewhat more complex. especially if Bank. The acceptance of the United Jordan refused to participate in its ad­ States in this process would appear ministration. In addition, it would prob­ favorable as only the United States could ably not be feasible to include the provide the guarantees that would un­ administration of Jerusalem within this doubtedly be insisted upon in such an framework. This issue should be nego­ agreement. tiated separately during the trusteeship In both trusteeships, a tripartite treaty period. establishing an Administrative Author­ What are the chances of such a solution ity would be drawn up among the coun­ bringing peace to the Middle East? Ac­ tries involved. Each of the three member cording to the author: states would appoint a high commis· Such a trusteeship arrangement will sioner as its representative to the author­ "not mean peace. But it CQuld, for the first ity, the chairmanship of which would time, provide a basis and a rationale for a rotate among the three members every long-term political solution which can be four months. The authority would -have accepted, eventually, by all of the major full governmental control of the participants.-SIK.

These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort IS made to ensure accurate translation and summarization. However, for more detailed accounts, readers should refer to the original articles. No official endorsement of the views, opintons or factual statements in these Items is intended or should be inferred.-Editor

78 April ~EWS

UNITED STA TES

VEHICLE CLEARS MINES

A vehicle equipped with mine­ The vehicle, operated remotely clearing equipment has demon­ by personnel located a mile from strated the feasibility of breaching the site, was used in a simulated an antitank minefield with an un­ combat sc·enario. The test was suc· manned, remote-controlled sys­ cessful and demonstrated that the tem_ The test of the system used a robot vehicle concept could be modified M60A2 tank chassis fit­ successfully employed in clearing ted with a mine-clearing roller, a enemy minefields. Other similar Marine Corps M58A 1 mine-clearing systems will be tested in the line charge and a Clear Lane Mark­ future. ing System_

The Military Review, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no responslbifity for accuracy of information contained In the News section of thiS publtcation Items are printed as a service to the readers No official en.dorsement of the views, opinions or factual statements IS intended - Editor

1982 79 MILITARY REVIEW

MX TRANSPORTER CONTRACT AWARDED

A $3.6 million contract has been chanical drive shafts and gears. awarded for design and assembly After MX test missiles are of a murtiwheeled transporter to assembled in their launch canis­ move MX test missiles among ters, they will be loaded onto the facilities at Vandenberg Air Force transporter and carried to launch Base, California, the MX flight-test pads a few miles away. With the location. The McDonnell Douglas canister and missile together Corporation contract calls for the weighing 288,000 pounds, the com­ building of two transporters. bined weight of the vehicle and its The transporter, which is used load will be about 480,000 pounds. exclusively inside the base, is a Delivery of the transporter to self-propelled vehicle, 82'12 feet in Vandenberg Air Force Base is length and 13 feet wide. The MX scheduled for this summer. The missile, encased in its launch can­ first use of the transporter will ister, is carried on the transporter's coincide with the first MX test bed which can be raised from 7 to flights, scheduled for early 1983. 10 feet. The vehicle has 80 tires The transporter wi II be used mounted to 20 axles, each of which throughout the operational life is independently steerable. Power span of the deployed MX system, is transferred from the diesel en­ when missiles in their canisters gine to the wheels by hydraulic will be brought periodically from pumps and lines rather than me- the deployment sites for testing.

80 April NEWS

HARRIER /I MAKES DEBUT

The first vertical/short takeoff pected to be operational with the and landing AV88 Harrier /I (MR, Royal Air Force by 1986. Aug 1981, P 83) light-attack aircraft Harrier /I aircraft delivered to the was recently unveiled by the Marine Corps will include im­ McDonnell Douglas Corporation. proved engine inlets and rede­ The A V88 is an advanced version signed nozzles, lift improvement of the A V8A Harrier now in service devices, a new ali-graphite/com­ with the US Marine Corps. posite super-critical wing, forward The new aircraft is a joint project fuselage, horizontal stabilator and between McDonnell Douglas and rudder, a new GAU12 25mm gun British Aerospace. The US and Brit­ and leading-edge root extensions ish governments ;;Igreed, in a re­ designed to increase the instan­ cent memorandum of understand­ taneous turn rate by four degrees ing, to a coproduction program for per second. The GR Mark 5 will be the Harrier /I. The British version of equipped with a Martin-Baker ejec­ the aircraft is designated the GR tion seat rather than the Marine Mark 5. Corps' Stencel ejection seat, a The Marine Corps will receive moving map display in addition to the first pilot production Harrier /I the Marines' electronic display of in 1983 and proceed toward a 1985 data on a cathode ray tube, a initial operational capability. The thicker windscreen and inlet corps plans to acquire 340 A V88s. strengthening against bird strikes, The new aircraft will replace five a panoramic camera and a British­ squadrons of A4 Skyhawks and built electronic countermeasures three squadrons of A V8A aircraft. suite. The GR Mark 5 Harriers are ex-

1982 81 MILITARY REVIEW

TORPEDO TEST SUCCESSFUL

A full-propulsion system proto­ submarine and vertical-launched type of the US Navy's next genera­ rockets currently in the fleet and tion lightweight torpedo was suc­ under development. The new EX50 cessfully tested undersea recently is seen as an important weapon for in Navy test waters off Keyport, the Navy in its mission to effec­ Washington. A team from the Hon­ tively counter an increasingly eywell Defense Systems Division sophisticated Russian submarine of Hopkins, Minnesota, and the threat. Garrett Pneumatic Systems Divi­ The Garrett propulsion system is Sion of Phoenix, Arizona, was called SCEPS (Stored Chemical selected as sole contractor by the Energy Propulsion System). It uses Navy last year. the reaction or combustion proc­ The contract was for research ess between lithium, the fuel, and and development of a torpedo to sulfur hexafluoride, the oxidant, to eventually replace the existing create superheated steam to lightweight Mark 46 torpedo. The power a sma:1 turbine. Because Mark 46 was designed to combat SCEPS employs a closed Rankine conventional and early-generation cycle, the power plant emits no ex­ Soviet nuclear submarines and has haust and is, therefore, insensitive been in use since the mid-1960s. to operation depth. This feature Both the Mark 46 and the new tor­ also assures a low noise level that pedo, designated the EX50, can be could otherwise adversely affect launched from helicopters, air­ the torpedo's sonar and render the planes and surface ships. Addi­ weapon more detectable to its tional launch platforms involve target.

TRUCK CONTRACT AWARDED

The US Army Tank-Automotive Command has awarded a contract for the manufacture of 2,511 trucks to AM General Corporation. The basic contract value is $130 million, with a 100-percent option for an additional 2,511 units. The contract is for the M915A 1, 6 x 4, line-haul tractor which is used to haul bulk cargo. This truck is similar to the 6 x 4 tractor AM General built for the US Army under a contract completed in mid-1980.

82 April NEWS

SIKORSKY MAKES FIRST FLIGHT

The US Army's new YEH60A heli­ modate a I,BOO-pound electronics copter made Its first flight at Sikor­ packa·ge. Four dipole antennas are sky Aircraft's plant in Stratford, mounted on the rear of the fuse­ Connecticut. The flight consisted lage, and a deployable whip an· of programed maneuvers to evalu­ tenna IS mounted underneath the ate handling qualities and perform­ fuselage. ance of the aircraft. The first flight aircraft, a prepro­ The helicopter, called the "quick duction prototype, was equipped fix" special electronics mission with the dipole antennas and the aircraft by the Army, is a derivative deployable whip antenna. After a of the SikorskylArmy UH60A Black month of flight testing, the aircraft Hawk utility transport. Its mission was to undergo additional modi­ will be intercepting, monitoring fications prior to being flown to the and jamming enemy radio com­ Electronics Systems Laboratories, munioations signals. Sunnyvale, California, for full in­ The basic Black Hawk configu­ strumentation and testing. ration has been modified to accom-

1982 83 MILITARY REVIEW I'

UNITED KINGDOM MILLIMETRIC RADAR TEST SUCCESSFUL A series of trials, sponsored by tracking of targets flying a few feet the Royal Navy, has enabled Mar­ above the surface is considerably coni Radar Systems Ltd. of Britain enhanced, ensuring a high prob­ to demonstrate the effective use of ability of successful engagements millimetric radar to further improve by the Sea wolf missile. the GWS25/Seawolf anti missile At present, this type of low-angle system's performance against low­ tracking is carried out by a tele­ level targets. vision system. Use of the DN181 Using a derivative of the DN181 millimetric radar gives an all­ Blindfire radar on the same mount weather, around-the-clock capabil· as the Sea wolf Type 910 tracker ity.-Journal of Electronic Defense, radar, the trials showed that the ©1981.

NUCLEAR

SUBMARINE

LAUNCHED

The HMS Trafalgar, first of a new with specially developed insulat­ class of nuclear-powered subma· ing tiles to give it one of the quiet­ rines, was recently launched from est noise reduction systems. the Vickers' Yard at Barrow-in­ The main armaments include an Furness, northern England. underwater-launched, air-flight The 272-foot-long vessel dis­ guided missile and torpedoes. The places 4,500 tons and can carry a HMS Trafalgar is the 13th nuclear­ crew of 98 officers and men. The powered fleet submarine and the new submarine has the latest fifth Royal Navy vessel to bear this sonar underwater detection equip­ name.-Military Technology and ment and is covered on the outside Economics, © 1981.

84 April NEWS

AUSTRALIA

F18 HORNET SELECTED

Australia has selected the F18 tralian Hornets will be assembled Hornet (MR, Oct 1981, p 79) as its and tested in Australia at govern­ new tactical fighter and plans to ment aircraft factories at Avalon. purchase a total of 75 aircraft for These factories are scheduled to use by the Royal Australian Air turn out three F18s every, two Force (RAAF). The aircraft is made months by the middle of 1986. by McDonnell Douglas. Deliveries should be completed in The RAAF expects to receive the 1990. The engines will be as­ first Hornet before the end of 1984 sembled at the Commonwealth Air­ with operational training to begin craft Corporation, Melbourne, Aus­ the second half of 1985. The Aus· tralia.

, 1982 85 MALAYSIA

GERMAN FRIGATE CONTRACT

The Malaysian navy has signed diesels and will be capable of a a contract with the German maximum speed of 26.5 knots. The Howaldtswerke (H DW) shipyard for frigates have a range of 5,000 the construction of two 1,500-ton nautical miles at a speed of 18 corvettesllight frigates. knots. The corvettes are of the FS1500 The vessels will be armed with design and have already been one Creusot-Loire 100mm gun, two adopted by the Colombian navy for 40/70mm BredalBofors twin-turret a class of four units. The Malay­ guns, one Emerlec 30mm twin­ sian frigates, however, will have mounting gun, and six to eight both a different weapon fit and antiship missiles. The vessels will electronics system than the Co­ also have six 324mm antisubma­ lombian vessels. rine warfare torpedo tubes and one The HDW FS1500s will be pow­ light helicopter.-Military Technol­ ered by two MTU 15,600-kilowatt ogy and Economics, \cl 1981.

Army Helicopter Improvement Program Underway. A 1$148 million contract to develop the new near-term scout helicopter has been awarded to Bell Helicopter Textron, Fort Worth, Texas. Development of the new helicopter is part of the Army Helicopter Improvement Program which provides for modifica· tion of 720 OH58A helicopters. The near-term scout helicopter will provide the Army with a combat support target acquisition/designation system which will operate day arid night and in periods of reduced visibility. The helicopter will be used to conduct reconnaissance, gather target information, direct and adjust indirect artillery fire, designate targets for precision guided munitions, select battle positions and provide local security.

86 April ~OOKS THE VICTORS. Edited by Brigadier Peter Young Foreword by Douglas Haig for his contribution to Ger­ General amar N Bradley 256 Pages Rand McNally & Co many's defeat in World War I is of ques­ Chicago III t981 $24 95 tionable merit. In both cases, however, these Acceptance of a basic thesis is essential commanders exercised ultimate responsi­ to full appreciation of The Victors. The bility in critical engagements and, there­ thesis is that history has shown that fore, perhaps are fully deserving of inclu­ every great general earned his reputation sion. Final choices in the winnowing on the basis of one great victory. Military process would be formidable considering historians and students of the art of the galaxy of deserving great captains leadership will find Brigadier Peter who served during the period covered_ Young's book to be an absorbing treat­ The Victors is not a book about great ment of that notion. Those of pedantic captains. It is a thought-provoking treat­ bent will, however, search in vain for a ment of military command put to test commonality of approach to battlefield during moments of delicate balance success among the 16 principals who between success and failure. Unique in share the pages of The Victors. In the concept, it adds a new perspective to the timespan covered (1805-1950), it would be chronicles of military history. difficult, if not impossible, to select 16 Differing though each of the principals other leaders with more divergent at­ were in their styles of leadership, there titudes and practices under the stress of were similarities as well. Chief among command. these were self-confidence, boldness and a Among the 16 whose instant of glory is wiJIingness to take the large gamble in chronicled in this fast-paced presentation the high-risk environment of forces en­ are four Germans (Von Moltke, Hinden­ gaged. These traits in common are dra­ burg, Guderian and Rommel); three matically illustrated by Napoleon's dar· Englishmen (Wellington, Haig and Mont­ ing flexibility at Austerlitz, Wellington's gomery); three Frenchmen (Napoleon I, steadv coolness at sunset at Waterloo, Joffre and Petain); one Russian (Zhukov); Rom~e]'s slashing defeat at dawn of the and five Americans (Lee, Grant, Meade, British at Tobruk, Patton's swift and Patton and MacArthur)_ Within the spec· decisive assault on the southern flank of trum of personal and professional traits the Bulge, Zhukov's relentless hammer­ displayed by this group are brilliance and ing into submission of the fanatical plodding conservatism, creativity and defenders of Berlin and MacArthur's blind luck, flamboyance and reticence, aloof concentration on the tides of Inchon arrogance and humility-all in vast dis­ to turn failure into victory in Korea. proportion within the grouping. These and other exciting examples in Informed readers will question the Young's superb historical anthology selection of some of the subjects included maintain reader interest to the last page. in The Victors_ For example, the selection Young's credentials as the editor of The of Hindenburg is debatable_ As Young Victors are impressively solid. His sensi­ makes clear, Hindenburg "merely sup­ tive portrayal of commanders under plied the backbone and personality for his supreme trial reflects the objectivity of a chief of staff (Ludendorff)." Similarly, the professional soldier, the astuteness of a distinction accorded Field Marshal Sir postwar director of war studies (Sand-

1982 87 MILITARY REVIEW hurst) and the talent of a splendid writer application of mathematical analysis to who has had published more than a score the field of political s<;ience. Heldman has of books on various military subjects. The assembled a comprehensive bibliography liberal use of hundreds of action photo­ that must be considered a definitive work graphs, historical paintings and finely of scholarship. This book should be read structured maps and diagrams adds great by all those professionals charged with depth to the book. anticipating and countering Soviet The Victors will be a valued addition to policy. the bookshelves of the dedicated student of military lore and neophyte reader alike. Col John W Mossor, USAR

Maj Gen Stan L McClellan. USA. Ret/red

EL SALVADOR Central Amori.a in the New Cold War. Edited by Marvin £ Gettleman Patrick Lacefield LoUIs Menashe THE USSR AND AFRICA' Foreign policy Under Khrushchev by David Mermelstein and Ronald Radosh 397 Pages Grove Dan C Heldman 187 Pages Praeger Publishers. NY 1981 Pless N Y t981 $750 This excellent book delivers much more Stories about Central America have than its subtitle, Foreign Policy Under traditionally occupied the back pages of Khrushchev, implies. Much of Dr. Dan C. US newspapens. Short, terse articles, Heldman's analysis of Soviet policy is as often describing cataclysmic bus crashes valid today as it applied to circumstances or routine coup d'etats, usually appeared in 1956. The author distills the most com­ next to the crossword puzzle or under the monly accepted explanations of Soviet used-car advertisements. This treatment policy into four recurring elements: ideol­ accurately reflected the importance that ogy, institutions, events and personali­ most readers attached to events in the so­ ties. In a carefully reasoned analysis, called "banana republics." Heldman concludes that ideology is more Recent events in Central America have symbolic than driving Soviet foreign changed this. Salvadoran issues are now policy. frequently On the front pages of major The Soviet attempt to mold and influ· newspapers or the lead stories of network ence the newly independent states of news broadcasts. This sharp turnaround Africa offers a case study in the accom· in the level of media attention has left modation by a rigid bureaucracy and many people confused about the conflict ideology to an erratic, opportunistic clien­ in Central America. They now receive tele. The Soviet experience proved similar daily reports about the situation there, to that of the West in many ways, most but, because of the earlier lack of cover­ notably that foreign aid buys influence age, they do not have the background only so long as the benefactor's aims information needed to understand and serve his client's national interest. Held­ interpret events. man's regression analysis of sympathetic The individual seeking to gain insight United Nations voting suggests that and understanding could spend weeks Russian policies toward Africa have poring over the microfiche of old articles proved more successful and durable than from the back pages of newspapers. For­ those of the United States despite often tunately, this is not necessary. A group of spectacular setbacks. .. scholars and journalists, many of whom The decidedly academic style and com­ are associated with universities in New plex input-output analysis of acquired in­ York, have assembled a useful collection terest will limit this book's appeal to of articles, position papers, news dis­ serious students of Soviet policy or the patches and essays pertaining to El Sal-

88 April BOOKS vador, Central America and US foreign Winston S. Churchill I I. In the same man­ policy. ner that his grandfather's "iron curtain" The editors make no pretenses about speech in Fulton, Missouri. more than 30 their personal beliefs: They are opposed years ago alerted the W Ilst to Soviet to many of the policies of our govern­ designs in Europe, this Conservative ment. This book is not. however, a polem­ Party member of Parliament has sounded ical tract railing against the perceived the alarm for today. He identifies the evils of US overseas activities. It is, Soviet threat, strategy and method of instead, a discussion of the present policy operation for the dangerous decade of the -a debate in print. It contains the views 1980s. and articles of both the administration's Churchill's critical barbs are directed staunchest supporters and its shrillest not only at the United States for abdi­ opponents. It is an excellent presentation cating its position of responsibility as of the ideologies and philosophies of the leader of the free world. He also criticizes groups engaged in the Central American his own United Kingdom for failing to see struggle for power. the growing Communist juggernaut and While describing the psychological and increasing British vulnerability. France is spiritual factors, the book does not ignore upbraided for aiding and abetting in the the more concrete and practical elements spread of nuclear weapons to Iraq. The of the struggle. Much historical informa· Nixon-Ford-Carter decade of detente tion is given. Military professionals will caused the free world to slip dangerously be especially interested in the genesis and behind the Soviet Union in force devel­ evolu tion of the various guerrilla groups opment. active in the region. The author's arguments are built The book is extremely timely. Mention around statistical comparisons of forces, is made of events occurring as late as weapons systems. combat ratios. types of August 1981. There is a good bibliogra­ weapons systems and Soviet strategic in­ phy and a listing of organizations and tent as witnessed by their actions over magazines that are concerned with the the last 35 years. The time has come for region. the 1\1 A TO nations to face Soviet inten­ As Central America moves off of the tions squarely and make the necessary back burner of US foreign policy concern sacrifices to build a strong mili tary force and out of the back pages of US news­ which can oppose the Soviet rising tide. papers. military professionals will be Churchill's thesis centers around Leo­ expected to be increasingly knowledge­ nid Brezhnev's 1973 speech to the War­ able about events there. This book will saw Pact heads. when he said, "Come help the military reader meet this expec­ 1985, we will be able to exert our will tation. It deserves a place in the libraries wherever we need to." The author re­ of all those interested in Central America. minds the reader that Soviet will is solidly based on the power of the Red 2d It William R Meara. New York ARNG army. That power has increased dispro­ portionately to alleged Western aggres­ sion. I t is currently held in check only by a diminishing US strategic nuclear equiv­ DEFENDING THE WEST Oy WinS Ion S Churchill II M P 256 alence and the army of the People's Pages Arlington House Publishers Westport Conn 1981 $14 95 RepUblic of China. Giant technological advances by Russia in its new series of If American political realists and mili­ missiles, bomber production, naval force tary hardliners are seeking a friend in the development and the sheer numbers of British court, they have found him in men under arms will soon eclipse the

1982 89 MILITARY REVIEW potential of American nuclear con­ planning aggressive war. More substan­ straints. tive are the revelations on how army, Military readers will enjoy this book. navy and Luftwaffe plans led Hitler to Churchill gives a British perspective to new and more expansive political goals at the events of the last three decades and an accelerated pace, all with new identifies himself unmistakably as a hard­ demands for arms. line opponent of the Soviet Union. At last In his examination of the Luftwaffe's a clear-minded politician with a sense of astounding development, Deist shows history has said what needed to be said. how the untimely death of the competent and military advisers have been saying, air strategist, General Walter Wever, in for three decades. The enemy is real, iden­ 1936, permitted decisions that predis­ tified and potent. The time to confront posed the air arm to its later decline. The him is now. lack of a truly strategic German air force Churchill's closing words should dis­ also grew in large measure from this hap­ turb those who face the hard decisions the penstance. Still less fortunate was the free world must face in this decade: German navy whose fate under the "land­ Up to the time of writing there is no minded" Hitler was, in Deist's words, evidence that the Western democracies crossed heavily by the lack of any realism are willing to make even the modest sacri­ in the building program of 1938. fices required to safeguard the future. An official historian at the German Military Historical Research Office, Deist Maj William L Hulham, USA, USACGSC goes beyond the common cliches about German military economic planning of THE WEHR MACHT AND GERMAN REARMAMENT by Wilhelm the 1930s in this thoughtful-if over­ DeIst Foreword by A J Nicholls 151 Pages University at priced-book. As is often the case with Toronto Press, Buffalo N Y 19B1 $3000 sound analyses of bygone foreign military policies, he forces a sober reconsideration Wilhelm Deist's, concise volume, con­ of our own. The balance between national taining a series of his lectures at St. An­ strategy and logistical possibilities re­ tony's College, Oxford, England, pre­ mains one of the most critical questions supposes some earlier reading on the in American policy today. development of German armaments pro­ duction in the Nazi era. Students of that Allred M Beck, US Army Cantar of Military History period, already familiar with the classics of Alan Milward, Berenice Carroll and Berton Klein, will recognize that Deist has used all of them to good effect, He has THE ROAD TO CONFRONTATION' Americ.n Policy Toward supplemented them by comparing the, Chin. and Korea, 1947-1950 by Wilham Whrtney Stueck Jr 326 Pages Unlversrty 01 North CarollO a Press, Chapel Hrll. successive overall German arms plans N C 19B1 $2000 clothbOund $1000 paperbound and the specific service programs with the political programs Adolf Hitler was The impact of Chinese Communist pursuing at the same time. Deist con­ intervention in the Korean War in cludes that, at no time after 1932, when November 1950 resounded far beyond the General Wilhelm Groener evolved the last battlefield. In the United States, news of Weimar armament program, were na­ China's "aggression" fueled McCar­ tional policy and arms production plans thyism and increased the political vulner­ in phase with each other. ability of the Truman administration. In On one hand, this conclusion raises broader terms, the "entirely new war" questions over the indictments of Nurem­ cast the die for two decades of Sino­ berg blaming German military figures for American enmity as vitriolic rhetoric,

90 April BOOKS threats of war and the eschewal of formal between Soviet-American conflict in diplomatic ties became durable features Europe and an assertive US policy in of the relationship between the two coun­ Asia; the interaction of key American tries_ policymakers; official concern and con­ The Truman administration neither fusion over the precise nature of Soviet­ sought· nor desired an armed contest with Chinese Communist relations; and the ef­ Chinese forces in Korea_ Yet, as William fect of budgetary constraints on diplo­ Whitney Stueck Jr_ points out in this ex­ matic flexibility and military capabilities. cellent new book, American policies On occasion, Stueck stretches his evi­ toward East Asia bctween 1947 and 1950 dence or offers, unsubstantiated judg­ contributed significantly to that out­ ments. His conclusions, for example, that come_ In the case of China, the restraint the Truman administration should have demonstrated by American officials in re­ Ict the Soviet Union occupy all of Korea jecting a course of aU-out intervention in at the end of World War II, or that direct that country's civil war was largely viti­ contacts between American and Chinese ated by their unwillingness to curtail eco­ Communist officials in the summer of nomic and military aid to Chiang Kai­ 1949 might have altered the course of shek's Nationalist regime and by their Sino-American confrontation, will not go refusal to explore constructive ap­ undisputed. Still, controversial as these proaches to the Chinese Communists_ The arguments may be, they do provide food success of Communist arms in China led for thought and in no way detract from directly to a deeper US involvement in what is one of the best and most impor­ Korea, tant works to appear for some time on the Accused of "losing" China, concerned origins of the Cold War in the Far East. about America's international image and determined to "hold the line" against fur­ Lawrence A Yates, ther Communist expansion in Asia, the Combat Studies InstItute USACGSC Truman administration, for essentially political reasons, committed itself in vague terms to the survival of the Ameri­ THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR Western Desert. 1941 Oy Barrie P,'I can-sponsored Republic of Korea. Follow­ 506 Pages Jonathan Cape Ltd London Eng 1988 $2495 ing North Korea's invasion of the South in June 1950, that commitment would be This book covers far more than its title backed by military force. The ill-fated at­ suggests. In it, the author, Barrie Pitt, tempt by the United Nations Command focuses mainly on ground campaigns in to unify Korea by military means would, Libya and Egypt from June 1940 to Feb­ in turn, provoke Chinese intervention in ruary 1942. However, he also analyzes the war. the Britisp Midale East Command's Stueck's analysis of the factors that operations in East Africa, Iraq and Syria, shaped American policy toward the Chi­ as well as the Royal Navy's raid on nese revolution and the volatile situation Taranto and the impact of the faU of in Korea is thorough and, on most points, Greece and Crete on the Middle East persuasive. Drawing upon recently re­ Command's plans. leased Truman era documents, the author Pitt, best known for his works on World provides fresh insights into such over­ War I and his editorship of Ballantine's worked themes as the influence of domes­ series on World War II, intends this to be tic political pressure (the China bloc and the first of a three-volume work that will China lobby) on executive branch deci­ span the North African war through the sionmaking; the Truman administration's Axis capitulation in Tunisia. Based on fixation with Europe, and the interplay the impressive quality of this first

1982 91 MILITARY REVIEW

volume, his completed set should become the military legal system will find her the standard unofficial account of the war research very helpful. . in North Africa. His masterful knowledge As everyone acquainted with the Uni­ of this huge and complicated subject and form Code of Military Justice knows, it '" his deft ability in moving from strategy matters greatly whether a specific act to small-unit exploits make his book a occurred during "a time of war." But pleasure to read. when has war broken out? Only Congress Since the period prior to Field Marshal can declare war, but has not done so, even Erwin Rommel's arrival in March 1941 is when we were obviously at war. the least known to most readers, this In the absence of formal declarations, volume is particularly valuable in the the judges have to rely on appeals to com­ light it sheds on the earlier British·ltalian mon sense and common knowledge. Their encounters. During that phase, as well as opinions indicate that the United States through Rommel's first two offensives, is at war when large forces are deployed both sides would experience painful les­ and substantial casualties are sustained. sons in evolving strategy and tactics in But how much force and how many desert warfare. Pitt terminates this casualties make a war? There is no good volume with the stalemate at Al-Gazala answer to this question, and the Court of in early 1942 after Rommel's brilliant Military Appeals will probably continue counteroffensive that recaptured much of making ad hoc judgments. The War Cyrenaica, leaving the British duly im­ Powers Act of 1973 might clarify the pressed by his leadership and frustrated situation in the future for conflicts by their own shortcomings. extending beyond 60 days, if indeed this Pitt relies perhaps too heavily upon legislation turns out to be constitutional. . published materials, especially accounts Schaffter makes no comment on the ~ by British participants and historians. wider implications of her topic. Our last Nevertheless, this book is strongly two wars were fought without any formal recommended for 'its readability, per­ declaration - not because the presidency ceptiveness and authority. Pitt's lucidity is gaining power at the expense of Con­ and vividness succeed in bringing to life gress, but because the Congress had no again the critical struggle for North clear idea when to declare war or against Africa, and indeed the Middle East, in whom. 1940-42. From some points of view, it would have appeared ludicrous for a superpower Clayton James, MISSISSIPPI State Umverslty such as the United States to declare war against a small state such as North Viet­ nam. Had we done so, what would have been the status of the Soviet Union which "WAR" AND THE MILITARY COURTS Judicial Interpretation consistently supplied war material to a of lis Meaning by Dorothy Sehalfter 184 Pages bpOS'lion Press Smithtown N y t 981 $20 00 belligerent? The legal anomalies of Vietnam only The author of this useful compendium, reflect deeper ambiguities in American Dorothy Schaffter, served for many years policy. And there is not much hope that in the Legislative Reference Service of the our situation will become clearer in the Library of Congress. With admirable pro­ future. If recent history is any indication, fessionalism, she has compiled relevant our next conflict is likely to be as poorly excerpts from the legal opinions affecting defined as the last two. Then, this book the definition of "war," particularly as will have great practical value. regards the conflicts in Korea and Viet­ nam. Those with a professional interest in Maj Bruce R Plrnie. USA, AFSC

92 April BOOKS

PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 19805. Edited by DOUGLAS MACARTHUR: Tho Philippine Years by Carol Mor· ChriSIOph Berlram 126 Pages Archon Books. Hamden ns Petillo 301 Pages. Indiana UmverSlty Press Bloommgton. Conn 1980 $1950 Ind 1981 $1750 This is a concise but informative book Professor Carol Morris Petillo does not composed of 15 essays by members of the attempt to recreate William Manchester's Interna,tional Institute of Strategic Stud­ American Caesar or Dr. D. Clayton ies (IISS). The essays include an exami­ James' The MacArthur Years, Instead, nation of a host of factors which will her purpose is to study the story of Gen­ undoubtedly impact on Soviet policy in eral Douglas MacArthur's many years in the 1980s. The factors covered include the the Philippines to gain a better under­ role of ideology, power and policies in the standing of his personal motivation and Third World; the question of leadership lifelong behavioral patterns observed succession; security concerns; and there. Toward this end, her study pro­ economic and population resources. vides an added dimension to the many The editor, Christoph Bertram, who is MacArthur works without becoming just director of the IISS, London, acknowl­ another chronological biography, While edges that any attempt to explore the she does cover the general's life in some nature of Soviet policy-or, for that mat­ detail from his birth through World War ter, Soviet behavior-is a "risky affair." I I. it is with an eye toward explaining his However, the primary contribution of values, fears, strengths and weaknesses. these essays, he contends, is to point out Certainly, the influence of his hero­ the limits of Soviet power. It is evident father and dominant mother are analyzed that formidable problems will confront throughout the work. So, too, are his pat­ the next generation of Soviet leaders. terns of "excessive, premeditated brav­ But, regardless of these problems, which ery, spontaneous conflict with authority, range from defense spending to satisfying and an exaggerated quest for attention," consumer demands to reconciling the new Petillo attempts to analyze the psycho­ technocrats' desire for greater efficiency logical impact of the other women in Mac-' within the party apparatus, major Arthur's life: his first wife, Louise; his changes in Soviet policy appear unlikely. secret Philippine companion, Isabel; and In short, according to Bertram, "con­ his second wife, Jean, tinuity remains the catchword." The author lays bare the specifics of the Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s MacArthur-Eisenhower split in the Phil­ is a comprehensive overview of Soviet ippines in the late 1930s, Of particular in­ policy. The authors of the essays include terest is her discussion of the $500,000 a number of well-known academic schol­ gift presented to MacArthur by Philip­ ars-for example, Alexander DaIlin and pine President Manuel L. Quezon immedi­ John Erickson. In addition, a very inter­ ately after the start of World War II. The esting essay regarding the Soviet Union's analysis for Quezon's offering of the gift military potential in the 1980s is pre­ and Washington's approval cannot but sented by Andrew Marshal, director, Net color the potential impetus of Mac­ Assessment, Department of Defense. Arthur's desire to recapture the Philip­ This is a book which will provide val­ pines regardless of overall Pacific uable insights to the general reader as strategy. well as the student of Soviet politics. It is Petillo concludes that MacArthur was highly recommended as professional deeply unsure of himself throughout his reading. life, His parents' expectations caused him to strive continuously for greater success. Col Jamo, B. Molloy, USA, NalionalOBlense UnivBrslty Once achieved, it was necessary to seek

1982 93 MILITARY REVIEW even greater accomplishments. Mac­ relief of the Marines in December 1942. Arthur judged himself inadequate to this His account of the el1ic battle is an excel­ task, but was unable to escape its influ­ lent one and presents the whole of the ence for fear of failure. fight, linking the separate parts of the The Philippines represented a safe island combat with the air and sea haven that MacArthur turned to through­ battles. out his first 60 years. Its influence is a Guadalcanal is often thought of as a major factor in understanding Mac­ struggle for an island in the Solomons Arthur, the man. Petillo offers an inter­ chain-a single invasion in the transi­ esting insight for MacArthur scholars tional sense. In fact, it was a series of that uniquely supplements the many related attacks and defenses on land, sea works done on this towering figure of and air. It lasted six months and two American military history. days-the longest battle in American his­ tory-and blunted the Japanese Pacific Capt Arthur L Bradshaw. USA. USACGSC offensive. Victory at Guadalcanal is an easy­ reading history. It gives one the sense of being there, experiencing the naval shore VICTORY AT GUAOALCANAL by Robert Edward Lee 260 Pages Presld,o Press. San Rafael Calif f98f $1595 bombardment, the rain and the humidity of the jungle, the onslaught of Japanese Seize and in vest the islands of Tulagi soldiers. It is a book worth reading. and Guadalcanal. This concise tactical mission of monumental strategic impor­ Mal Paul A Blgelman, USA, tance was destined to carry the 18,722 Combmed Arms Combat Development ActIVity Marines of the 1 st Marine Division into history. Through the summer 0f 1942, the J apa­ SINO· SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE MAO by Dr C G Jacobsen nese forces in th~ Pacific were virtually 170 Pages Praeger Publishers NY 1981 $2350 unopposed and were feverishly building air and sea bases from which to launch C. G. Jacobsen's book, Sino-Soviet new thrusts toward Australia. The war in Relations Since Mao. is an update on the the Pacific had been relegated second Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1970s and place to the Allied preparations for the early 1980s. It is Jacobsen's contention assault on Fortress Europe. Yet a man­ that, while the foreign policy of all na­ date from the American public called for tions are colored to a degree by the per­ President Franklin D. Roosevelt to exact sonalities of their leaders, Beijing's for­ retribution for the Pearl Harbor attack eign policy has been .. hostage to the and to stop the Japanese in their Pacifi~ vagaries of a continuing and fundamental conquest. Reluctantly, orders were issued struggle for power" within the Chinese from the War Department. Preparations government. The Sino-Soviet relationship were made, and the 1st Marine Division, has been a victim of Chinese domestic embarked on the 23 ships of Task Force politics. 62, set sail. U sing this 8S his thesis, Jacobsen ex­ History written by a participant is plores several different aspects of the sometimes clouded with the perceptions Sino-Soviet conflict. He begins by ex­ and feelings of the times. This is not so amining the "realities of the Sino-Soviet with Robert Edward Lee's Victory at balance of power" and by outlining recent Guadalcanal. Lee was a member of the growth and developments in the forces of 160th Infantry, 40th Infantry Division, both sides, He plays down the Chinese and served on Guadalcanal following the forces vis-a-vis their Russian counter-

94 April BOOKS parts, claiming that many earlier nomic structures and a consequent belief analyses used too narrow a focus. Chinese that Sino-Soviet negotiations could and might does not seem as formidable when should be conducted as between people considering all aspects of military power. who at least speak the same {anguage . ... Next, Jacobsen looks at Sino-Soviet China wants to develop and needs out­ relatiops from Mao Zedong's death until side help to do it. Deng would feel more the Sino-Vietnamese War. As Deng Xiao­ comfortable if help came from a govern­ ping began to establish his position in the ment committed to similar international Chinese government, Moscow looked for and ideological goals than from one which an opportunity to relax Sino-Soviet ten­ stands opposed to those goals. sions. However, Beijing was as recalci­ Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao pro­ trant as before. Accordingly. the Soviet vides an excellent update on the Sino­ Union began to consolidate its position Soviet conflict. Jacobsen's style is enjoy­ around China's periphery. A major part able, and the organization of the book of that effort included drawing Hanoi makes it easy to follow. While it will not closer into the fold. With the Soviet-Viet­ make the reader an expert on Sino-Soviet namese pact, Moscow was able to put relations (it was never meant to). it serves pressure on Beijing from two fronts and as an excellent companion to previous even draw China into a "proxy war" in works by Zagoria, Griffith, An and Southeast Asia. others. Jacobsen points out that the Chinese failed in their incursion into Vietnam in Capt RDbert H. Van HDrn Jr . USA. that they were unablp to change events in North Caro/ma State Umverslty Southeast Asia or to weaken the Moscow­ Hanoi alliance. The Soviets, on the other hand. had shown themselves much more resolute in their support of Vietnam than BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR The Nature Df InternatiDnal Beijing had expected. CriSIS by Richard Ned! ebow 350 P3ge<; JOh'l5 HoOklns Before drawing his conclusions and U'ljverSIl~ Press Ba1tJ'llore ,\lid 1981 making his prediction for the future. J a­ The true test of a presidency is how the cobsen digresses for a look at the role of president handles the international crises Japan in the Sino· Soviet foreign policy. he confronts. President Ronald Reagan, equation. He discusses historical cultural at this writing. has yet to be faced with a and territorial conflicts between Japan crisis. But it will come, and he will be and its two largest continental neighbors. challenged. He then takes an in-depth look at current There have been a number of books on security and economic issues. crisis decisionmaking. Most have ex­ I n his conclusions. Jacobsen sees im' amined single events such as the Cuban provement in the future of Sino-Soviet missile crisis. Others have analyzed the relations. As Deng broadens his base of differences betwepn or among a number power. his pragmatic world view will con­ of .events. The bottom line of such studies tinue to dominate Chinese foreign policy. is ultimately to improve the quality of and Beijing will move to a more balanced crisis decisionmaking. stance between Moscow and Washington. Richard Ned Lebow has written an out· Jacobsen writes off .Of!ng·s recent anti­ standing book. Its objective is to improve Soviet rhetoric as a tactical response to crisis decisionmaking, as well as to sen' internal power struggles. He reminds us sitize scholars and hopefully policy­ that Deng has: makers to some of the pitfalls of crisis ... lifelong familiarity with and pref­ decisionmaking. This extremely well· erence for Soviet socio-political and eco- documented study is an attempt to in·

1982 95 MILITARY REVIEW

tegrate history and political science. The John F. Kennedy during the Cuban data for his analysis is drawn from 26 missile crisis. He states: historical cases of crisis dating from 1898 The reality of the Executive Committee (Cuba) to 1967 (Arab-Israeli). The author (Ex Com) does not measure up to the has divided his study into three specific myth propagated by Kennedy's admirers. areas of investigation: origins of crisis. The Ex Com proved a relatively pliant outcomes of crisis, and crisis and interna· tool of the President. ... In the final tional relations. analysis the Ex Com could be described Lebow's masterful examination of the as a superb example of promotional many facets of crisis decisionmaking is leadership. seldom seen on such a grand scale. The Lebow concludes that successful crisis manner in which he weaves the historical management is "a function of cultural, discussion of his 26 crisis events organizational, and personal behavioral : throughout his detailed analysis is fasci- patterns established long before the onset nating reading. Particularly interesting is of any crisis." his discussion of the MacArthur-Truman This book is highly recommended for controversy during the Korean War and the student of history as well as political how MacArthur manipulated intelligence science. The National Security Council reports to support his view of Chinese in­ may find it especially useful. tentions. In another section, he takes ex­ ception to those who have praised the Mal Robert R. Ulin. USA. quality of decisiomnaking by President Department of Joint and Combined Operations. USACGSC

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THE MYTH OF THE NATION ANO THE VISION OF REVOLU­ MESSERSCHMITT BF 109 by Robert Grrnsell Illustrations by TION The Dngins 01 Ideological Polarization in the TwentlOth Rlkyu Watanabe 46 Pages Crown Publishers N,( 1980 Century by J l Talman 632 Pages University Of California $1595 Press. Berkeley CallI 1980 $35 00 HElLCAT by DaVid A Anderton illustratIOns by RIf';Yu Wata· FORT BLISS' An fitustrated History by Leon C Metl With nabe 56 Pages Crown PubliShers N '( 1981 $15 95 ~ photographs from the collectIOn of Millard G McKinney 180 SPITFIRE by Bill Sweetman l!1ustratlOns by Rlkyu Watanabe ~ Pages Mangan Sooks EI Paso Texas 1981 $3~ 95 48 Pages Crown Publl5hers NY 1980 $1595 :g SAME TIME NEXT WEEK' How to Leave Your Therapist by P 51 MUSTANG by Robert Gnnsell Illustrations by Rlkyu r Paul Nelmark IntrOduction by Stanford R Gamm M D 168 Watanabe 48 Pages Crown Publishers N V 1980 $15 95 ~ Pages Arlington House Publishers Westoort. Conn 198f ZERO FIGHTER by Robert C Mrkesh illustrations by Rrkyu : $1295 Watanabe 56 Pages Crown PublIShers, N Y t981 $1595 I! THE MIDOLE EAST FiHh Edition by Michael 0 Wormser 275 FDCKE-WULF FW 190 by Robert Gnnsell illustrations by ::: Pages CongressIOnal Quarterly. Washington 0 C 1981 Rlkyu Walanabe 48 Pages Crown PublIShers N Y 19S1 ~ $895 $1595 " CURTISS' The Hammondsport Era, 1907-1915 by LoUIS S THE HISTORY OF THE U S. AIR FORCE by DaVid A Anderton ~ Casey 235 Pages Crown PublIShers NY 1981 $199, 255 Pages Crown PubliShers NY 1981 $1595 if THE PLEOGE BETRAYED America and Britain and the Denazi­ KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, ANO THE TEST BAN by Glenn T !z fication 01 Postwar Germany by Tom Bower Doubleday & Co Seaborg and Benlamm S Loeb Foreword by W Averell ~ N Y 1981 $17 95 Harnman 320 Pages Unlverslty 01 Calltorma Press. Berke ~ CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS' Regionat Perspectives Edlled ley. CallI 1981 $16,95 ~ by Morns Janowrtz 288 Pages Sage Publications Beverly THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD AIR POWER' The World's g Hrlls. Calrl 1981 $2250 Most Comprehensive Military Aviation Encyclopedia. Con- '" 'MAHAN ON SEA POWER by Wrillam E Lrvezey 427 Pages sultant Editor Sill Gunston 384 Pages Crown Publishers. " University 01 Oklahoma Press Norman.Okla 1981 $1595 NY 19S1 '"

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