Atomkraft? Nein, Danke! Nuclear Politics and the German Left, 1977-2005
Andrea Humphreys History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, University of Queensland
In the lead-up to the September 2005 German federal election, the governing Social Democrats and Greens both campaigned on a policy of adhering to the agreed remaining lifespan for each of Germany’s seventeen nuclear reactors still on the national grid, and opposed the construction of new reactors. The new leftist alliance, Die Linke.PDS, had a more radically anti-nuclear programme, demanding a swifter end to nuclear power in Germany. Christian Democrat and liberal challengers, on the other hand, argued that reactors should continue running as long as “technically possible” rather than be constrained by the agreement on a phase out of nuclear power reached in mid-2000 between the utilities and the red-green government. CDU Chancellor candidate Angela Merkel is enthusiastic about nuclear power; the CDU remains open to the possibility of new plants.1 2At one point Merkel attempted to negotiate with the utilities, offering extended operating periods if the companies used part of their profits to lower energy prices for industrial consumers, and to support renewables. However this suggestion that they give up some of their profits was declined by the nuclear power companies operating in Germany’s liberalised energy market." As it is the companies stand to profit greatly from running each reactor for the remainder of the average thirty- two-year lifespan agreed five years ago. In addition, opinion polls consistently show the majority of Germans remain opposed to nuclear power — inspiring this year’s SPD slogan, “Atomkraft — Nein danke! Merkel allein im Land."3 The Social Democrats’ adoption of the anti-nuclear slogan — Nuclear power? No thanks! — illustrates great change in the party’s attitude to nuclear power. In
1 SPD. “Wir wollen eine moderne Energiepolitik für unser Land und global”
the SPD’s 1956 “Nuclear Plan”, nuclear power was described in utopian terms as an “inexhaustible source of energy,” which would usher in “a new era”.4 By 2005 it was campaigning on a nuclear phase-out. Green nuclear policies have also changed since 1977, when the first Greens began contesting local elections in Germany, largely as a way of taking their fight against nuclear power to a new arena. In the context of the recent elections, it is interesting to reconsider, in historical perspective, the politics of nuclear power in Germany. It is also interesting to look at the case of Germany, an advanced industrial country abandoning nuclear power, from an Australian perspective at a time of reports that the Australian left may be facing its own split over questions of uranium mining, nuclear waste and, potentially, nuclear power plant construction, and where the Australian government is making the case for an increase in uranium exports for economic and, ostensibly, environmental reasons.5 This paper examines the development of nuclear power policies in the Greens and the SPD from 1977 to the present, with a focus on how the two parties arrived at June 2000 when they agreed on a plan to phase out nuclear power known as the Atomausstieg, or “getting out of nuclear power”. Explaining developments in Green and Social Democratic nuclear policies in terms of ideological reorientation within the parties and electoral competition between them, I argue that developments in Green nuclear policy represent fundamental change in Green ideology, from “fundamentalist” to “realist”, whereas for the SPD nuclear power was largely part of an electoral strategy for dealing with the Green challenge. Finally, the paper examines the Ausstieg's progression since 2000, and considers whether it can be considered a success for the Greens. The period from 1977 to the present saw four main shifts in nuclear politics. 1977-1983 saw the rise of the Greens and a struggle within the SPD between labour and “greenish” factions. 1983-1990 was defined by Green fundamentalism in nuclear policy and opposition status for the SPD, where it adopted a policy of a gradual phase-out of nuclear power. This period was marked by the catastrophic nuclear accident at Chernobyl, which radicalised German nuclear politics. 1990 - 1998 began with German reunification and ended with the first red-green national coalition. The red-green coalition has been in power ever since, and the Ausstieg in progress since 2000. The enduring explanation of postmaterialism was developed in 1977 by Ronald Inglehart, who explained it as a shift in values in Western publics, associated with the politicisation of new classes: The values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life [...] We hypothesize that a significant shift is also taking place in the distribution of political skills. An
4 Greenpeace. “Atomkraft: Eine Frage der Wahl?”
increasingly large proportion of the public is coming to have sufficient interest and understanding of [...] politics to participate in decision-making at this level.6 7 To postmaterialists, nuclear power stations had deep symbolic significance. Power plants were centralised, anonymous, technologically complex, and hazardous. Surrounded by secrecy and linked to nuclear weapons, they reinforced the domination of experts and authoritarian tendencies, threatened the individual’s freedom (in the terrifying Atomstaat)? and illustrated the “frozen” state of the political system and the alliance between state power and commercial interests. Nuclear power was both a catalyst to action and representative of what postmaterialists thought was wrong with society.8 The West German SPD transformed itself in 1959 from a workers’ party with socialist economic principles to a Volkspartei with wider appeal, and accepted the principles of the capitalist market economy. The 1959 Basic Programme committed the SPD to continued economic growth; the peaceful use of technology was a way to achieve this.9 The SPD also wanted to gain the support of the new middle class of white-collar workers and civil servants. Under Chancellor Willy Brandt (1966-1974), the SPD’s share of both the worker and the new middle class electorate increased, but this created problems — and an ambivalent attitude to nuclear power. As Ian King explains, the two groups had different aspirations: A salaried and practically unsackable schoolteacher was more likely to be worried about environmental damage than personal poverty and had more time and energy for political participation than the average assembly-line worker at Wolfsburg. Often the new middle class associated the police with violence against demonstrators rather than with helping senior citizens across the road, and if they lay awake at night, their thoughts turned to nuclear accidents rather than Russian invaders pouring through the Fulda Gap.10 According to “materialists”, nuclear power was necessary for Germany’s economic prosperity and independence. Following the first OPEC oil embargo, the SPD made the massive expansion of nuclear power the cornerstone of its energy policy.11 Nuclear power is compatible with social democracy in that it can be equated with economic growth and therefore jobs (a perception increasingly
6 Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1977), p. 1. 7 In the Atomstaat, or nuclear state, civilian and military uses of nuclear power are inseparable, and the authoritarian state represses its citizens and keeps them under surveillance in order to protect its nuclear installations. Robert Jungk, The Nuclear State (London: John Calder, 1979). 8 Stephen Cotgrove and Andrew Duff, “Environmentalism, Middle-Class Radicalism and Politics”, Sociological Review, Vol. 28, 2 (1980), p. 338; Anthony E. Ladd, Thomas C. Hood and Kent D. Van Liere, “Ideological Themes in the Antinuclear Movement: Consensus and Diversity”, Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 53, 2/3 (Spring 1983), pp. 252-272. 9 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, “Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands von 1959, Beschlossen vom Außerordentlichen Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands in Bad Godesberg vom 13. bis 15. November 1959”
challenged throughout the 1980s) and faith in technological progress.12 Matthias Stolz argues this was also the real reason for Merkel’s pro-nuclear stance — people were not begging for their beloved reactors, it was the symbolic value of nuclear power. “Black-yellow [i.e. CDU/CSU-FDP] needs nuclear power so that everyone understands: We believe in progress! We trust our engineers! We’re not afraid!”13 However nuclear power does not fit other aspects of social democratic thought, including wariness of technological innovation that may involve labour substitution or endanger occupational safety.14 Moreover, opposition to nuclear power was seen in West Germany as an environmental and leftist issue, not a “deep green” belief15 — Die Linke. PDS has a more radically anti-nuclear stance than red-green. Conflict erupted in 1975 over a proposed nuclear plant at Wyhl. Peaceful protestors occupied the site, creating a powerful image of ordinary citizens as opponents of nuclear power — repressed by the state, unrepresented by established parties.16 Nuclear power became a national issue in 1977, also the highpoint of left wing terror. Anti-nuclear sentiment peaked in 1977, after the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, and after Chernobyl. In 1977 protest focused on proposed reactors at Brokdorf and Grohnde, a waste repository at Gorleben, and a fast breeder reactor at Kalkar. Where Wyhl had been celebrated as “exemplary non violent resistance”, demonstrations now became violent.17 Three key demonstrations at Brokdorf, compared to civil wars, saw around 8,000, then 30,000, then 50,000 protestors.18 The movement split over the use of violence. When 50,000 people marched towards Brokdorf on 19 February 1977, turning around at police barricades, militant groups held demonstrations of up to 5,000 participants. At Grohnde on 19 March 1977, 20,000 demonstrators broke through barricades and fought 5,000 police and border guards.19 Violence, as well as the perception that site occupations were no longer effective, (police had been able to prevent them since Wyhl), encouraged many in the anti-nuclear movement to consider participation in formal political processes. The SPD at the time did not offer an avenue for this. From May 1977, anti-nuclear groups entered candidate
12 For a discussion of the validity of the labour-environmentalist dichotomy, see Heinrich Siegmann, The Conflicts Between Labor and Environmentalism in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States (Aidershot: Gower, 1985); For Social Democratic faith in technology, see Andrei S. Markovits and Stephen J. Silvia, “Changing Shades of Green: Political Identity and Alternative Politics in United Germany,” Debatte, Vol. 5, 1 (May 1997), p. 59. Ij Matthias Stolz. “Atomkraft,” Die Zeit, Vol. 29 (2005). 14 Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak. “Political Parties and the Nuclear Energy Debate in France and Germany”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 12, 2 (January 1980), p. 136. 15 P.R. Hay and M.G. Haward, “Comparative Green Politics: Beyond the European Context?” Political Studies, Vol. 36, 3 (September 1988), p. 437; Thomas Poguntke in Ferdinand Müller- Rommel, ed., New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 179. 16 Wolfgang Rüdig, Anti-Nuclear Movements: A World Survey of Opposition to Nuclear Energy (Harlow, UK: Longman. 1990), pp. 304-310. 17 Sara Parkin, The Life and Death of Petra Kelly (London: Pandora, 1994), p. 74. 18 Rüdig, Anti-Nuclear Movements, pp. 151-152. Rüdig uses figures which are at the lower end of the range of participant estimates for the three main Brokdorf demonstrations. IQ Paul Reimar, ed.. [...] und auch nicht anderswo! Die Geschichte der Anti-AKW-Bewegung (Göttingen: Atomexpress, 1997), pp. 50-57. Atomkraft? Nein, Danke! 53
lists in local elections.20 During 1977-1978 green and alternative lists won scattered council seats. In March 1979 the alternative political alliance of green lists, minor parties, alternative groups and citizens’ initiatives, (Sonstige Politische Vereinigung “Die Grünen ”) was founded to contest European elections. A national party called Die Grünen was formed in January 1980.21 Herbert Kitschelt’s political opportunity structure explains why new political movements emerge and what makes them successful. He argues that the numerous elements in West German politics which reinforced the status quo rather than reform initially suppressed new parties and political issues. However lack of reform also opened a political space for opposition to the left of the governing SPD, and lack of responsiveness radicalised that opposition. Factors which served to reinforce the status quo included Germany’s federalism which gives states policy input and means no major party is ever out of power, and its corporatist character, whereby the federation cooperated with the states, and the government cooperated with major organised economic interests — Social Democrats worked with traditional labour union allies but also with corporate elites.22 Werner Hülsberg summarises the SPD’s dilemma — Faust: “Lord, the times are hard. The spirits I called on, I cannot now be rid of.”23 The SPD had been the party of progressive politics. Idealistic young voters had been attracted by Brandt’s “dare more democracy”. However, in power from 1966-1969 with the CDU/CSU, from 1969-1982 with the FDP, the SPD had alienated many with its internal security policies and its ethos of growth — “Wachstum, Wachstum, über alles” — symbolised by the building of nuclear power plants.24 At the same time, the SPD was blamed by many for Germany’s economic downturn and rising unemployment. Social Democratic austerity measures angered the working class. The postmaterialist-Old Labour split in the SPD was personified in two leaders, party head Brandt and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982). Brandt’s proteges the Brandtenkel were young, left-leaning members interested in environmentalism.25 Schmidt was a pragmatist who had turned off many leftist voters with his support for US nuclear weapons policy and nuclear power.26 SPD environmentalist Erhard Eppler thought nuclear opponents could be incorporated
20 The first organised nuclear opponents to participate in elections were in the region of Hameln- Pyrmont in Lower Saxony, registered under the name “Atomkraft? Nein danke!” Reimar, anderswo, p. 60. 21 For the early history of the Greens, see E. Gene Frankland in Müller-Rommel, New Politics, pp. 61- 79 or Sara Parkin, Green Parties: An International Guide (London: Heretic Books, 1989), pp. 111- 147. 22 Herbert Kitschelt, Political Opportunity Structures, pp. 57-85. Tad Shull similarly argues that the key determining factor in the success of a new green party is whether the major left-wing party in that state is in power or in opposition when the green party is formed, Tad Shull, Redefining Red and Green: Ideology and Strategy in European Political Ecology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). 23 Werner Hülsberg, The German Greens (London: Verso, 1987), p. 64. 24 W.E. Coleman, Jr. and W.E. Coleman, Sr., A Rhetoric of the People: The German Greens and the New Politics (Westport: Praeger, 1993), p. 117. 25 Siegmann. Conflicts Between Labor and Environmentalism, p. 186. 26 Jonathon Carr, Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), p. 168. 54 Andrea Humphreys
into the SPD.27 Schmidt showed his contempt for them. “Green” elements in the SPD such as Eppler did not satisfy the fledgling Greens. Co-founder of the Greens, Petra Kelly, explained regarding the Schleswig-Holstein state election of 1979, when green participation meant declared Brokdorf opponent Matthiesen (SPD) lost to pro-nuclear Stoltenberg (CDU): But what does Mr Matthiesen mean, in a nuclear party under Helmut Schmidt? Where’s the anti nuclear faction in the SPD, where has it ever gotten its way, where is it represented in the cabinet, where is it represented in the Bundestag? [...] There are only those couple of fig-leaves, Lafontaine and Eppler. Of course the base of the SPD is partly very green. But they are not [...] breaking through.28 The SPD experienced internal wrangling over nuclear power from 1977 to 1980. The Hamburg state executive opposed Brokdorf and the Schleswig-Holstein SPD demanded a moratorium on construction,29 while the Schmidt Government pushed through its nuclear programme using repressive police action — Green fundamentalist Jutta Ditfurth remarked, “even the CDU couldn’t have bashed the anti-nuclear movement any better”30 — and “consensus building” through an information campaign.31 Minister for Research and Technology Hans Matthöfer urged consensus based on cautious expansion of nuclear energy. However he allocated 4.5 billion DM out of a budget of 6.5 billion for nuclear research.32 Adolf Schmidt, chairman of the energy workers’ union and Bundestag representative, pleaded for nuclear energy as a means of achieving full employment, environmental protection, and aid for the Third World. In November 1977 40,000 trade union members demonstrated for nuclear power.33 At the party congress that month a compromise was reached — retain the nuclear option but impose a de facto moratorium. New plants could be built only if expanded coal production could not meet demand for energy and the nuclear waste problem was solved.34 Three Mile Island led to the largest anti-nuclear demonstrations yet, with 120,000 people converging on Hannover to protest against Gorleben, 150,000 in Bonn.35 The Lower Saxony SPD revolted against Schmidt’s pro-nuclear policy, and the SPD’s young socialists (Jusos) led by Chairman (today outgoing Chancellor)
27 Erhard Eppler, Komplettes Stückwerk: Erfahrungen aus fünfzig Jahren Politik (Frankfurt: Insel, 1996), pp. 66-72; Erhard Eppler, Wege aus der Gefahr (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981). pp. 42-78. 151- 192. 28 Petra Kelly, “Spiegel Gespräch: Wir sind die Antipartei-Partei”, Der Spiegel. 24 (14 June 1982), p. 47. 29 Kelly, “Spiegel Gespräch”, p. 47; Nelkin, “Political Parties”, p. 130. j0 Jutta Ditfurth, Träumen, Kämpfen, Verwirklichen: Politische Texte bis 1987 (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1988), p. 300. 31 K. Lang, Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, “Information on Nuclear Energy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Establishment of a Dialogue Between the Public and Government Authorities”, Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle 7 (IAEA-CN-36/81: 1977). pp. 121-136. 32 Elim Papadakis, The Green Movement in West Germany (London: Croom Helm. 1984), pp. 101- 102, 198. 33 Der Spiegel 48 (21 November 1977), pp. 44-46. 34 Jeffery Boutwell, The German Nuclear Dilemma (London: Brassey’s. 1990). pp. 96-97; Gerard Braunthal, The West German Social Democrats, 1969-1982: Profile of a Party in Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 256-260. j5 Hülsberg, German Greens, p. 59. Atomkraft? Nein, Danke! 55
Gerhard Schröder demanded all reactors be shut down.36 Schmidt tried to raise support for a resolution that coal prioritised but existing nuclear plants should continue operating, plants under construction should be finished, and some new plants constructed if waste disposal and safety requirements were met. At district conventions about 40 per cent of delegates were opposed.37 To Old Labour, on the other hand, the resolution did not seem an adequate response to economic problems. The Greens received 1.5 per cent of the vote in the 1980 Bundestag elections. Green programmes for the 1980 and 1983 elections featured an uncompromising anti-nuclear position — an immediate halt to planning, construction and operation of all reprocessing and enrichment plants and reactors, a nuclear export ban, safest possible waste disposal, and support for alternative energy sources and conservation.38 Notorious for their in-fighting, Greens agreed on nuclear power. They claimed neither of the established parties was better, although survey and election results showed Green voters disagreed.39 The Greens did not try to maximise votes: “Green party activists [...] did not intend to find their votes [...] but rather meant to ‘create’ their voters by leading them to the neglected issues of [...] the dangers of nuclear power and weapons.”40 In 1980 the SPD campaigned on traditional issues to court voters from the centre — peace, stability, economic and social guarantees — and continued its cautious pro-nuclear policy, yet tried not to alienate green voters.41 For example before the election a Bundestag-appointed commission on nuclear energy reported that energy demands had been grossly overestimated and recommended postponing the development of the nuclear option. After the election Schmidt rejected these modest recommendations, nuclear power remained the major long-range option with massive government assistance.42 The success of this strategically ambivalent nuclear policy is illustrated in a 1982 survey — 26 per cent of active supporters of the anti-nuclear power movement, and 24 per cent of its opponents, voted SPD.43 The FDP left the coalition in 1982 and joined Kohl’s Christian Democrats. A CDU-FDP government replaced the SPD-FDP and elections were called for 1983. Hans-Jochen Vogel replaced Schmidt as SPD candidate. The SPD in opposition meant both genuine Green-SPD cooperation and a change in tactics. Kitschelt describes the SPD’s new strategy as “oligopolistic competition”, aimed at
36 Braunthal, West German Social Democrats, p. 260. 37 Papadakis, Green Movement, p. 21. 38 Die Grünen, The Program of the Green Party of the Federal Republic of Germany 1983 (Bonn: Die Grünen, 1984); Die Grünen, Programme of the German Green Party 1980 (London: Heretic, 1983). 39 For example 50 per cent of voters who cast their first ballot for the Greens cast a second ballot for the SPD. Karl H. Cerny, ed., Germany at the Polls: The Bundestag Elections of the 1980s (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 157. 40 Cerny, Germany at the Polls, p. 161. See also surveys by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, quoted in Cerny, Germany at the Polls, p. 288. 41 Cerny, Germany at the Polls, pp. 92-93. 42 Klaus-Michael Meyer-Abich and Robert A. Dickler, “Energy Issues and Policies in the Federal Republic of Germany”, Annual Review Energy (1992), pp. 246-253; International Energy Agency, Energy Research, Development and Demonstration in the IEA Countries (Paris: OECD, 1979-1984). 43 No other parties were supported by significant numbers of both nuclear opponents and proponents. As a popular saying at the time said, “With Schmidt and Eppler, for and against nuclear power”. Joppke, “Models of Statehood in the German Nuclear Energy Debate”, p. 274. 56 Andrea Humphreys
eliminating the Green threat by suddenly turning the SPD toward the left libertarian agenda, followed by a vote-maximising strategy once the Greens had vanished.44 For the 1983 elections, without renouncing nuclear power, the SPD tried more openly to co-opt Green themes. On 6 March 1983 the Greens won 5.6 per cent of the vote and the SPD 38.2 per cent. The realist-fundamentalist (or Realo-Fundi) divide preoccupied the Greens from 1983 to 1991. Fundamentalists believed that compromise on key issues such as nuclear power was inexcusable, denying the possibility of coalitions. Realos believed the party should become a pragmatic force, and they should negotiate compromises with other parties, particularly the SPD, to institute reforms. Both Realos and Fundis used nuclear power to bolster their claims. In 1986 Joschka Fischer, then Hessen’s Green Environment Minister, Foreign Minister since 1998, stated his case: Assume the Greens were in parliament, and it was time to do something constructive. Block C in Biblis could be stopped by parliamentary compromise [...] think about it seriously. What do your voters want? What do you want? To stop Block C of the nuclear power plant at Biblis, and that means really stop it (turn the construction site into a meadow again!), by giving up something — who wouldn’t become weak at the chance? Why are Greens in parliament otherwise?45 Kelly, closer to the Fundi faction, described nuclear power in existential terms: “There are certain topics — the right to life and the right to a safe environment, that are not negotiable.”46 The SPD, trying to hold onto new and old electorates, was tom between competing strategies from 1983 to 1990 — contain the Greens in an embrace or woo the centre. The debate influenced SPD nuclear policies, as opposition to nuclear power was key to winning Green votes. The SPD started on an anti-nuclear track, for example joining the Greens against the CDU/CSU-FDP in a dispute over the proposed reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf.47 In 1984 the SPD passed an Ausstieg resolution (acted upon after Chernobyl) calling for a moderate phase-out of nuclear power. The Greens saw this as SPD cooptation of Green ideas.48 Internal cleavages in the Greens and SPD can be seen in the earliest attempts at state-level red-green cooperation. Realist Greens were in favour of coalitions, as long as certain substantive conditions (such as agreement on nuclear power) were met. Fundamentalists were philosophically and tactically opposed — why help the SPD achieve their ultimate goal of absorbing us?49 In Hesse in 1982 Greens received 8 per cent of the vote and Social Democrats 42.8 per cent; they discussed but did not agree on a toleration arrangement. Most Green deputies initially identified as fundamentalists. A turning point occurred in 1983 when they voted in the state legislature against a resolution to fight acid rain because the SPD had not accepted an amendment to shut down all nuclear reactors. This forced the state
44 Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 165. 45 Joschka Fischer, Von grüner Kraft und Herrlichkeit (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1986), p. 96. 46 Kelly, quoted in Parkin, Life and Death, p. 128. 47 Rüdig, Anti-Nuclear Movements, pp. 157-165. 48 Eva Kolinsky, The Greens in West Germany: Organisation and Policy Making (Oxford: Berg, 1989), p. 66. 49 Periy Anderson and Patrick Camiller, eds., Mapping the West European Left (London: Verso. 1994), p. 111. Atomkraft? Nein, Danke! 57
Greens to reconsider the virtues of cooperation.50 New elections were held in September 1983. The SPD gained and the Greens lost votes and turned to a more moderate strategy. The Greens agreed to tolerate an SPD government, though not formally to participate. However the toleration agreement was soon disrupted by quarrels over the expansion of nuclear fuel plants. Negotiations began anew, now for a coalition. Realists hoped thus to force more concessions, such as shutting down certain plants.51 A coalition was finally approved at the state conference in October 1985, despite fundamentalist objections. The red-green experiment, from December 1985 to February 1987, was difficult. State SPD leader Holger Börner had little patience for Greens or anti-nuclear protestors. A coalition condition had been Green acceptance of a Commission of Experts’ report on the Hanau plant, which meant leaving the decision to the pro-nuclear federal government.52 This Green position fell short of principled opposition to nuclear power, with Realos satisfied with general declarations of intent such as “the SPD would think about ending nuclear power”.53 However meltdown in Chernobyl in 1986 created a climate of shock and fear. Anti-nuclear demonstrations flared up around the country. Joseph Joffe wrote: Up and down the land, the sacred word is Ausstieg, literally “getting out” of nuclear power, as if those 19 plants making up a third of West Germany’s generating capacity were jalopies only safe enough for one last trip to the shredder. The Greens want Ausstieg now; the Social Democrats — formerly the staunchest defenders of the nuclear faith — want it a bit later. Only the Christian and Free Democrats are still holding on, yet anxiously looking over their shoulders for a safe avenue of retreat.54 Green fundamentalists came to the fore. “By confirming their dark vision of an eco-apocalypse”, write Markovits and Gorski, “the Chernobyl disaster greatly strengthened the position of the fundamentalists within the party, while the gradualist stance of Hesse’s ‘Fischer gang’, by contrast, was called into question.”55 At the party conference in Hannover a leftist fundamentalist resolution was passed: “for the Greens in parliament Chernobyl means that they categorically reject every form of politics which — for whatever reasons — precludes the immediate shutdown of all nuclear power plants.” The resolution criticised the half-hearted initiatives of the SPD and called for an end to the Hesse coalition. A competing realist resolution also called for an immediate end to nuclear power, without attacking the SPD or Hesse.56 Realists were critical of what they viewed as fundamentalist overreaction. To sociologist and Realo Helmut Wiesenthal, reacting to Chernobyl with a “we want it all and we want it right now” demand for
50 Kitschelt, The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 262. 51 “Green and Red All Over”, The Economist, Vol. 291 (16 June 1984), pp. 34-39. 52 Hülsberg, German Greens, p. 172. 53 Ibid., p. 173. 54 Joseph Joffe in The Wall Street Journal (28 May 1986), quoted in Cemy, Germany at the Polls, p. 198. 55 Andrei S. Markovits and Philip Gorski, The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 212. 56 Joachim Raschke, Die Grünen: Wie sie wurden, was sie sind (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1993), p. 202. 58 Andrea Humphreys
shutdown instead of putting forward a conversion scheme for the energy industry that could have commanded consensus, was an avoidable error.57 Ten months after Chernobyl the coalition was tom apart by its failure to agree on Hanau. For Richard Meng, the fact that the Hesse agreements twice collapsed over nuclear power shows how central the issue was to both parties: For the Greens the permit was the same as Hesse joining the plutonium economy. If they had agreed, the Greens would have lost so much credibility, that the whole path of Realpolitik would have been discredited [...] That the question of the Hanau nuclear installations represented the coalition’s breaking point can in part be attributed to the fact that the threatened loss of jobs touches on original Social Democratic interests.58 After Chernobyl the SPD rediscovered its 1984 Ausstieg policy. Partly based on an accurate reading of opinion polls,59 the SPD advocated a ten year Ausstieg, to be agreed on with industry and all political parties.60 Greens attacked this as an electoral manoeuvre, and were disturbed by the lack of fixed starting or finishing dates: Whoever makes an Ausstieg dependent on their [the industry’s] agreement doesn’t want it at all. The meaning of the decision is transparent: the SPD wants what is always the function of the SPD — to capture [...] those people who want to get away from deadly nuclear power. With this decision they take the pressure off the shoulders of the grateful nuclear power industry — the fact that they protested loudly is part of the game [...] the SPD thus only agreed on the excuse with which in ten years they will shrug their shoulders and explain why it didn’t work.61 Raschke describes the SPD’s anti-nuclear resolution as “the lowest common denominator of the anti-nuclear power movement”.62 The SPD’s actions stabilised Germany’s anti-nuclear mood where Greens could not. The Greens and the SPD led by Schröder were expected to do well at the first state elections after Chernobyl on 15 June in Lower Saxony. Schröder gave ambiguous signals about red-green cooperation,63 and used nuclear power tactically. His election slogan became “Vote the risk away”, and he announced “enormous security concerns” with regards to the Stade reactor though he ignored another, larger reactor.64 The Greens’ share of the popular vote only increased in Lower Saxony by 0.5 per cent — partly blamed on Green fundamentalism — and the SPD won only 42.1 per cent. In the 1987 Bundestag elections both parties were again expected to benefit in electoral terms from Chernobyl, the Greens because they had predicted it and the SPD because of their sound anti-nuclear policy.
57 Helmut Wiesenthal, Realism in Green Politics: Social Movements and Ecological Reform in Germany (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1993), pp. 136-137. 58 Richard Meng, quoted in Hans-Joachim Veen and Jürgen Hoffmann, Die Grünen zu Beginn der neunziger Jahre: Profil und Defizite einer fast etablierten Partei (Bonn: Bouvier. 1992). 59 For example a Spiegel survey in May 1986 showed that of those who opposed the construction of nuclear power plants (69 per cent), 12 per cent favoured immediate shutdown (as in the Green proposal), 54 per cent preferred that plants be shut down after a transition period (as the SPD advocated), and 32 per cent thought (with the CDU/CSU and FDP) that existing reactors should keep running. 84 per cent of SPD voters and 96 per cent of Green voters were opposed to the construction of new plants. Der Spiegel 20 (1986), p. 56. 60 Hülsberg, German Greens, pp. 206-207. 61 Jutta Ditfurth, Träumen, Kämpfen, Verwirklichen, p. 20. 62 Joachim Raschke, Krise der Grünen: Bilanz und Neubeginn (Berlin: Schürer, 1993), p. 118. 63 Der Spiegel 16 (April 1986), p. 35; Der Spiegel 19 (1986), p. 71. 64 Der Spiegel 21 (1986), p. 28; Ditfurth, Träumen, Kämpfen, Verwirklichen, p. 68. Atomkraft? Nein, Danke! 59
However neither party did as well as polls had indicated.65 The Greens had fought the election on a fundamentalist platform — nuclear plants must be shut down immediately — the SPD on a centrist one. The Greens rejected the SPD’s attempt to combine economic growth with environmentalism. The SPD’s compromise was to phase out nuclear power over ten years, immediately halting Kalkar and reprocessing.66 SPD candidate, traditionalist Johannes Rau, dismissed the idea of red-green coalitions yet was forced to run on a fairly ecological platform.67 In December 1989 the SPD reviewed their Basic Programme to update social democracy. They adopted the formula “qualitative growth” in recognition of environmental limits to economic growth; nuclear energy was only a transitional source.68 This programme had the same shortcomings as the 1987 election campaign — the attempt to satisfy both traditionalists and postmaterialists meant it lacked clarity and force. This careful “greening” of social democratic principles came at a bad time, just as all eyes turned to German reunification. The CDU won the all-German elections on 2 December 1990. The Western Greens (allied with Eastern civic groups) were marginalised, receiving less than 5 per cent; a one-off quota in the new Eastern states meant eight Eastern representatives entered the Bundestag. The Greens’ failure was attributed to a combination of factors: no credible plan to deal with unity, an irrelevant ecological election campaign, unappealing Green fundamentalism, factional squabbling, and Oskar Lafontaine the SPD candidate, with his environmentalist credentials.69 The SPD also fell prey to the transformed political agenda. The 1990 election shock for the Greens and the SPD affected nuclear politics: influencing Green factional disputes in favour of realists; strengthening the labour wing of the SPD; changing the prospects for a red-green coalition; and reducing the political salience of the nuclear issue by increasing interest in material security. As Chernobyl had seemed to prove the Fundis right, now electoral failure and the transformation of Germany were a boon for Realos: The “purist, exclusionary, and idealistic bent of the non- participatory fundamentalist Greens had brought the party to political disaster”.70 Fundamentalists left the party, and moderation was further aided by the amalgamation of Eastern civil rights groups, not postmaterialists, with the Greens.71 The path was now clear for red-green cooperation. Two red-green and two red-yellow-green coalitions started in 1990 and 1991.72 Dominated by
65 The SPD dropped 1.2 per cent to 37 per cent, and the Greens gained support to reach 8.3 per cent. 66 Der Spiegel 19 (1986), p. 20. 67 Cerny, Germany at the Polls, pp. 243-244; Anderson, Mapping the West European Left, p. 133. 68 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, “Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Beschlossen vom Programm-Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 20. Dezember 1989 in Berlin, geändert auf dem Parteitag in Leipzig am 17.04.1998”,
Realpolitik, the party’s attitude to nuclear power changed: from non-negotiable moral imperative to something that was worth compromising on in coalitions. However the nuclear issue did not disappear from Green programmes. Veen and Hoffmann explain that Realos needed to show a distinctive profile within coalitions, because they were very similar to parts of the SPD. Therefore they had to concentrate on “classic” Green topics, playing the role of opposition within the coalition on nuclear and environmental politics.73 With Lafontaine, the SPD fielded a postmaterialist left-wing candidate in 1990. When the party suffered in the elections and conflicts between economic and environmental concerns increased in united Germany, the SPD moved back towards the centre. Lafontaine had believed a nuclear phase-out by 2010 was possible, but he was criticised by his party for being too green.74 The SPD re committed itself in 1991 to its 1986 Ausstieg declaration in principle: the basis of national consensus had to be “the removal of nuclear power from the network, and not the construction of new nuclear power plants”. However the ten-year limit advocated in 1987 disappeared.75 For the 1994 elections, which brought the Greens back into the Bundestag, the Greens campaigned for an energy revolution, though nuclear power was not the sole focus in light of increasing awareness of the greenhouse effect and the ozone layer. The SPD candidate was Rudolf Scharping who leant towards the centre right. He reasoned in a decade of economic anxieties there was more to be gained at the CDU’s expense than at the Greens’. Moreover, the space to the left of the SPD was now doubly contested — by the Greens and the PDS.76 During the 1990s red and green worked together in local and state governments, which entailed agreement on nuclear issues. For example the red-green coalition in Lower Saxony under Schröder frustrated the CDU by slowing down permanent disposal at Schacht Konrad. However the second waste disposal site in Lower Saxony, Gorleben, went ahead, and the state government cleared many demonstrations against the transport of nuclear waste to Gorleben, sometimes with force.77 In the 1998 Bundestag elections, the SPD programme contained in-principle support for Ausstieg: “The SPD-led federal government will do everything it can to stop using nuclear power as quickly as possible”. However nuclear power was not an important part of their campaign.78 The Greens listed Ausstieg as one of their main goals and explicitly campaigned for a red-green government to bring it about:
7j Veen, Die Grünen zu Beginn der neunziger Jahre, pp. 67-68. 74 Oskar Lafontaine and Christa Müller, Keine Angst vor der Globalisierung: Wohlstand und Arbeit für alle (Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 1998), p. 185. 75 Gerd Rosenkranz, Irene Meichsner and Manfred Kreiner, Die neue Offensive der Atomwirtschaft (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992), pp. 301-302. 76 Dick Richardson and Chris Rootes, eds., The Green Challenge: The Development of Green Parties in Europe (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 40-41; King, “Road to Power”, p. 63; Detlef Jahn and Matt Henn, “The ‘New’ Rhetoric of New Labour in Comparative Perspective: A Three-Country Discourse Analysis”, West European Politics, Vol. 23, 1 (January 2000), p. 26. 77 Rosenkranz, Die neue Offensive der Atomwirtschaft, pp. 296-297; Joppke, “Models of Statehood in the German Nuclear Energy Debate.” p. 265; Reimar, anderswo, pp. 135-160; A. Blowers and D. Lowry, “Nuclear Conflict in Germany: The Wider Context”, Environmental Politics, Vol. 6, 3 (Autumn 1997), pp. 148-155. 78 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, “Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit, SPD-Programm für die Bundestagswahl 1998”,
“The Greens want to immediately stop using nuclear power [...] Energy supply in Germany would be secure if all reactors were shut down immediately.”79 After the elections, the red-green coalition was formed. The contract included an undertaking to create a revised nuclear energy law in the first 100 days, with more stringent safety criteria and an end to reprocessing nuclear fuel abroad; consensus was to be negotiated with the energy industry within twelve months on the phase-out of nuclear reactors. Without consensus, the government was to create legislation.80 These deadlines were not met. However in June 2000, after eighteen months of tense negotiations led by Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin (Greens), Chancellor Schröder (SPD) and the nuclear utilities, the terms of the agreement were set. The agreement came into force one year later. The 14 June 2000 agreement established a nominal thirty-two-year operating period, not measured in calendar years but in an output entitlement of electricity yet to be produced, which can be transferred between reactors.81 Individual reactors may thus run well over thirty-two calendar years. Nuclear waste could still be sent to Britain or France to be reprocessed until 1 July 2005, and waste which had already been reprocessed would return to Germany. Nuclear facilities were to create interim storage for nuclear waste while the search for a permanent site was concluded.82 The terms contradicted all the points put forward by the Greens for negotiation on 15 December 1999.83 Many Greens and all national environmental organisations opposed the terms as too lenient, the CDU/CSU opposed it as bad for business, and said they would reverse the phase-out when re-elected. The Atomforum, the German organisation of nuclear power providers, stated: “The German Atomforum regards the continued operation of nuclear reactors as secured for years to come.”84 The Greens’ party conference at Münster voted in favour of the deal despite objections from the party grassroots,85 and the agreement can only be regarded a limited success for the Greens.
7Q Bündms90/Die Grünen, “Grün ist der Wechsel”. Wahlprogramm 1998. 23,
TIMETABLE FOR PHASING OUT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (31 MAY 2005)
Start of Residual Electricity Residual Electricity Reactor Operation June 2000 (TWh) June 2005 (TWh) Obrigheim 1968 8.70 0.00 Biblis A 1974 62.00 25.89 Stade 1974 23.18 4.79 Neckarwestheim 1 1976 57.35 24.51 Biblis B 1976 81.46 34.70 Brunsbüttel 1976 47.67 22.70 Isar 1 1977 78.35 42.19 Unterweser 1978 117.98 67.45 Philippsburg 1 1979 87.14 45.91 Grafenrheinfeld 1981 150.03 95.76 Krümmel 1983 158.22 108.88 Gundremmingen B 1984 160.92 106.68 Philippsburg 2 1984 198.61 141.54 Grohnde 1984 200.90 142.30 Gundremmingen C 1984 168.35 114.93 Brokdorf 1986 217.88 157.45 Mülheim-Kärlich 1986 107.25 107.25 Isar 2 1988 231.21 168.28 Emsland 1988 230.07 170.16 Neckarwestheim 2 1989 236.04 179.58 Source: Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz (31.5.05 2005),
The liberalisation of Germany’s electricity market began in April 1998 in accordance with an EU directive. Soon afterwards Die Zeit reported that “what the environmental movement has not achieved in twenty years, the market economy is doing in three months.”86 According to utility Bayemwerk, nuclear reactors cost many times the investment needed for gas power plants, and need more than ten years for planning and construction. In that time clients could change energy provider and foreign providers could enter the market. Moreover, a nuclear reactor needs to run for fifteen to twenty years before the initial investment has paid off, meaning a new reactor needs an almost impossible guarantee that it will run for thirty years. In contrast, a new gas plant can be connected to the grid in fewer than two years with costs written off after four to eight.87 It remained profitable to
86 Stefan Kohler, Niedersächsischen Energie-Agentur, quoted in Timm Krägenow, “Atomkraft, nein danke”, Die Zeit 30 (1998). 87 Krägenow, “Atomkraft, nein danke”, Die Zeit 30 (1998). Atomkraft? Nein, Danke! 63
continue operating existing reactors which had already repaid investment costs, however even these were experiencing competition from highly efficient natural gas turbines. Manfred Timm, of utility HEW, said if gas prices continued to fall he would close the Brunsbüttel reactor, remarking the danger for nuclear reactors no longer came from “leftist ideologues” but from “right-liberal euphoria for competition”, (Wettbewerbseuphorikerri).™ An Eon manager admitted in October 2000: “Our position would have been indefensible right from the beginning in the negotiations with the federal government if everyone had known that we would have had to shut down a large number of reactors in the next few months anyway, for purely economic reasons.” In a 2000 article, Wolfgang Rüdig considered whether the Ausstieg was a success for the Greens. His overall judgement was balanced. He acknowledged that “the Greens guaranteed the further operation of the nuclear industry in exchange for a production limitation that was close to if not identical with the likely further production of nuclear electricity without any agreement”, and found “there may have been more radical ways to push forward the end of nuclear power”.* 89 The Greens’ overriding concern to appear reliable as a coalition partner prevented them from “fully using their own conflict potential”, that is risking the coalition over a principled stand.90 On the other hand, the Greens had little choice but to agree to these compromises. Entrenched pro-nuclear interests, Germany’s corporatist governing character, SPD pressure, and legal requirements all contributed. The Justice Ministry argued that nothing shorter than a thirty-year operating period would be defensible in court.91 The Greens were caught between a perceived need to do something about nuclear power, and this highly restricted ability to act. Rüdig also pointed out that survey results showed most Germans and an overwhelming majority of Green voters supported the agreement, more than half the Green voters interviewed saw it as a government victory. While anti-nuclear and environmental groups harshly condemned the agreement, most Greens asked to ratify it at their party conference felt unhappy but saw no alternative.92 Rüdig concluded much would depend on how the phasing-out process unravelled. Results have been mixed. Since June 2001 two reactors have shut down.93 Nuclear power generates approximately 28 per cent of Germany’s electricity. The
QQ _ Mannfred Timm, HEW, quoted in Krägenow. “Atomkraft, nein danke”, Die Zeit 30 (1998). 89 Wolfgang Rüdig, “Phasing out nuclear energy in Germany”, German Politics, Vol. 9, 3 (December 2000), p. 76. 90 The relevant comparison here is the FDP, always the junior coalition partner, occasionally willing to risk the coalition. Rüdig, “Phasing out nuclear energy in Germany”, p. 76. 91 Utilities had licenses to operate the plants indefinitely. Rüdig, “Phasing out nuclear energy in Germany”, pp. 75-76, 79 n. 29. Unlike in Sweden, which is also phasing out its nuclear power plants, no compensation is being paid to utilities. Helmut Steuer, “Das lange Warten: Seit 18 Jahren will Schweden von der Kernenergie loskommen — vergebens”, Rheinischer Merkur 43 (23 October 1998), p. 3. 92 Rüdig, “Phasing out nuclear energy in Germany”, p. 69. In addition, Finnish, French and Belgian Greens in government had not addressed nuclear power to nearly the same extent, Rüdig, “Phasing out nuclear energy in Germany”, p. 74. 93 Obrigheim (11 May 2005) and Stade (14 November 2003). The allocation of Stade’s remaining production allowance is yet to be decided. The legally disputed Mülheim-Kärlich reactor was only 64 Andrea Humphreys
red-green government plans to close the production gap caused by the Ausstieg through conservation and renewables, supported by generous incentives.* 94 The CDU argues an Ausstieg would necessitate increased reliance on fossil fuels,95 and the next government will certainly change Germany’s energy mix. In July 2005 transport of German nuclear fuel to Britain and France for reprocessing was halted.96 Where once the Greens had been the political beneficiaries of transport conflicts — in 1998 then CDU Environment Minister Merkel had to suspend all transports of nuclear waste in a safety scandal97 — in government they have to defend the return of waste from overseas and have themselves become the target of anti-nuclear protest. Yet they could not cancel reprocessing contracts without compensation, and they cannot refuse to accept waste. 2001 saw massive protests over returning reprocessed fuel, with approximately 15,000 demonstrators attempting to slow the progress of the train carrying it.98 More transports are to come. Finally, little progress has been made in the selection of a permanent repository for radioactive waste — in 1999 a commission was established to decide on the criteria to be used in investigating potential sites, before potential sites could actually be investigated.99 The 2002 red-green coalition negotiations were marred by conflict over Obrigheim, which should have shut down in December 2002. Before the election,
briefly operated in the late 1980s. and its operators RWE will not seek a renewal of its permit; its production allowance is also yet to be transferred. 94 From 2000 to 2005 the percentage of Germany’s electricity generated from renewable sources has risen from 6.7 per cent to 9.3 per cent, and the aim of the red-green Environment Ministry is for renewables to generate 12.5 per cent by 2010, 20 per cent by 2020, BMU, Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen — nationale und internationale Entwicklung (June 2005),
Schröder agreed in secret negotiations with operator EnBW to allow it to operate for longer than the agreed time. Days later, EnBW head Gerhard Goll requested a transfer of credits from a younger reactor to Obrigheim, which would keep it running until 2006 — an attempt to save Obrigheim until a new government was in power which might reverse the Ausstieg.100 At the Green party congress in October 2002 they accepted a modified transfer, but demanded that in future the practice only be used to enable the earlier shutdown of old “Pannenreaktoreri”,101 Trittin negotiated with Goll that Obrigheim would be decommissioned by 15 November 2005 at the latest, a success in that it was (supposedly) within the same legislature period, and the fixed date is more concrete than the formal phase-out agreement.102 Schröder caused another scandal when he discussed the sale of Siemens’ Hanau plant, built in 1991 to reprocess spent uranium fuel rods into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX), but never used, to China. The Greens were outraged, arguing it was hypocritical and dangerous as the process of making MOX creates plutonium, a weapons risk; they also alleged the sale violated export laws. Schröder agreed to make the sale contingent on Chinese agreement for the plant to be supervised by the IAEA.103 The red-green win in 2002 confirmed the continuation of the Ausstieg. During coalition negotiations following the September 2005 elections, the phase-out was seen as the central issue needed to gain Green support; commenting on the quickly discounted “Jamaica” option, (black-yellow-green coalition), the Greens stated their two fundamental concerns were the end to nuclear power and support for Turkish accession talks with the EU.104 Negotiations have now led to the formation of a grand coalition of CDU/CSU-SPD, with Merkel as Chancellor. New environment minister Siegmar Gabriel (SPD) has stated that the Ausstieg will continue, and the Frankfurter Rundschau has predicted that it will remain in place
100 “Rot-Grün: Neuer Streit um Atomausstieg”, faz.net (5 October 2002). 101 “Reactors close to breakdown”, such as Brunsbüttel. Phillipsburg 1. Krümmel and Isar 1, Die Grünen, “Beschluss: Obrigheim”, 20. Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz Bremen (18-19 October 2002),
while other red-green projects do not.105 However some evidence points to the possibility that future requests by operators of nuclear power plants for extended running times will meet more understanding in the grand coalition, including Merkel’s longstanding enthusiasm for nuclear power, the economic advisory role of Heinrich von Pierer, ex-Siemens head, the SPD’s recent history of negotiation over Obrigheim and Hanau, and Gabriel’s uncertain environmental record to date.106 There may be little news for over two years; the oldest reactors are Biblis A, due to shut down in around 966 days, and Neckarwestheim 1, due in around 1,279 days.107 However with neither public support for nuclear reactor construction, nor, crucially, industry interest in investing in nuclear power, at the time of writing it seems unlikely that even a government with no Green participation will commission any new plants.
105 Björn Hengst, "Umweltminister Gabriel: Ewiges Talent”, Spiegel Online (13 October 2005); “Schwere Zeiten für rot-grüne Vorzeigeprojekte”, Frankfurter Rundschau (11 October 2005). 106 On Merkel, see for example Krägenow, “Atomkraft, nein danke”, Die Zeit 30 (1998); On von Pierer, “Schröders Beauftragter wird Merkels Berater”, Spiegel Online (29 August 2005); For a Green critique of Gabriel’s record, see