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Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e79

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Habitat International

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‘Negotiated planning’: Diverse trajectories of implementation in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, and Harare

* Liza Rose Cirolia , Stephen Berrisford

University of Cape Town, African Centre for Cities, South Africa

article info abstract

Article history: This paper unpacks how plans are implemented in three African cities: Nairobi, Addis Ababa, and Harare. Received 28 August 2015 Three planning implementation instruments form the basis of the comparison across cities. These in- Received in revised form struments aim to give effect to plans and include development regulation, infrastructure investment, and 13 October 2016 land allocation. In contrast to reading African planning efforts as a catalogue of failures, this analysis Accepted 11 November 2016 allows us to see the many actors and complex alliances and dissonances which play out through Available online 26 November 2016 implementation. Here we propose the concept of ‘negotiated planning’ as a useful conceptual tool. We argue that the concept is useful for: its departure from normative assumptions about good or proper Keywords: African cities planning; unpacking the everyday nature of implementation; grounding and contextualising practices; Development and depathologizing the African city. Governance © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND Implementation license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Master planning Negotiated planning

1. Introduction In line with this thinking, Watson (2013) calls for a shift in planning theory, away from normative frameworks and assess- Spatial planning is seen as central to fixing the challenges which ments and towards a study of planning contexts and practices. rapidly urbanising cities face. Emerging consensus over the ne- Understanding context requires unpacking particularities of places cessity and centrality of planning has been solidified through the and focussing on what is actually happening. In response to these UN Habitat ‘New Urban Agenda Debates’, which form part of the calls, we have explored the actual practices of plan implementation Habitat III preparations, and will likely feature heavily in the final in Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Harare across three planning imple- commitments (Turok, 2016). Never has it been a better time to mentation tools e investment in infrastructure, regulation of question if our understanding of planning, particularly in African development, and land allocation. These three tools are important cities, is sufficient. ways in which states work to materially shape urban outcomes and In African cities, planning is often seen as a failure. Most of the implement urban plans. planning literature focusses on the departures from ‘good practice’ We argue that planning implementation and outcomes in Afri- (Myers & Murray, 2006; Pieterse, 2010). Centralised plan-making, can cities can best be described as ‘negotiated’. This negotiation is rigid regulations, lack of implementation capacity, abuses of hu- not a product of discursive and collaborative decision-making to- man rights, corruption and many more negative traits are associ- wards a shared vision, but rather built on persistent and power- ated with planning and planners in African cities. It would be laden compromises, contests, and deals among various arms of irresponsible to suggest that these critiques are wholly incorrect. the state, civil society, and the local and international private sector However, as Goodfellow (2013) points out, the implementation of (in particular developers and lenders). It reflects the actions and plans across and between cities varies considerably. Variation is agendas of a whole range of stakeholders who together work to even more obvious when implementation is disaggregated into configure a fragile system which is constituted through and co- specific planning implementation tools, as we do in this paper. constitutive of each urban context. This paper contributes to the refinement of a comparative approach in urban studies (McFarlane, 2010; Myers, 2011, 2014; Roy, 2009; Watson, 2009a). Within the growing debate on * Corresponding author. comparing cities (particularly in the global south), there is growing E-mail address: [email protected] (L.R. Cirolia).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2016.11.005 0197-3975/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). 72 L.R. Cirolia, S. Berrisford / Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e79 emphasis on exploring difference, rather than searching for standards or guidelines for the provision of infrastructures (e.g. sameness (Robinson, 2014). To this end, the research utilised the road width, public space, service levels), zoning regulations and multi-case method, a critical mode of inquiry within the study of schemes, density regulations including minimum plot size and cities (Duminy et al., 2014; Yin, 2003). The purpose is both to subdivision regulation and ‘floor area ratios’. compare cases, recognising the incredible difference among African - Infrastructure investment: Infrastructure investment is the cities, as well as use the cases to jointly speak into existing planning material development of systems which provide necessary ur- theory. ban services. Water, sanitation, electricity, and road develop- Interviews with local and national officials, developers, para- ment can be used to realise urban plans. Infrastructure works to statals, academics, and NGOs aimed to understand the nature of ‘open up’ new areas for development or creates additional bulk planning implementation, paying particular attention to the actors capacity where intensification is desired. and practices involved. The interviews and a detailed policy review - Land governance: Turok (2016) defines land governance as ‘the were conducted between December 2014 and June 2015. The institutions and mechanisms that allocate land to appropriate structure of the paper includes a selective review of the literature uses within urban areas, including property rights, land valua- on planning in African cities. Following this, the paper unpacks the tion systems and rules that control property development’ (35). planning implementation practices in the three cities, focussing on These systems have profound impacts on the spatial develop- the explicit and tacit negotiations among actors implicated in urban ment of urban areas. Most economists argue that market-based spatial outcomes. Finally, there is a discussion on the implications systems are much more efficient at allocating land based on the of the case findings for planning theory and practice, in particular principle of ‘best and highest use’ (Alexander, 2001). the value of the concept of ‘negotiated planning’. The connected logic of these tools (and the systems which un- 2. Spatial planning in African cities: a review of key concepts derpin them) requires explanation. Turok (2016) describes this as the ‘urban land-infrastructure-finance nexus’. This logic rests on a 2.1. Spatial planning reinforcing cycle of activities. The urban land use regulations set out the criteria, indicators, standards and rules in terms of which the There has been much debate about what planning is and how it state regulates land use and development. The land use and for- happens. Peter Hall (1992) describes planning as “the making of an ward planning frameworks guide the type and location of invest- orderly sequence of action that will lead to the achievement of a ment in different infrastructures. The nett effect of these two land stated goal or goals” (3). Cities, Healey (2006) argues, have been use activities is the creation of better living and working conditions planned, using various instruments and to differing extents, since for society, through the promotion of a higher quality urban envi- their inception. ronment and the rationing of opportunities for land development Spatial planning (also called physical planning) is a particular by the public. This leads to more efficient and increased investment type of planning, focused on the making of spatial order. The core in urban land by the private and public sectors and rising land scale of the town or city is of particular significance as it is usually at values, which in turn leads to increased revenue to government this scale that the urban spatial planning apparatus is constructed (and especially local government). Therein lies the inherent logic (Hall, 2014). Healey (2006) identifies spatial planning as unique that drives planning-led urban management: land use regulation from other forms of planning (such as economic or operational) in and planning creates land value, which translates into increased its focus on spatial plans and their implementation. Spatial plans state revenues, which then enables the state to invest more in the are forward looking and two dimensional visions of how a town, human and other capabilities needed to manage and enhance the city, or region should look. Historically, master plans were the core urban environment. Where the underlying land tenure, land mar- tool of spatial planning. Master plans are a complete spatial picture ket, and land governance conditions are weak or compromised, the of the future of an area (Goodfellow, 2013). Academics have criti- cycle described above cannot even begin to move. Not surprisingly, cized the rationalist tendencies of master planning, advocating for this ideal falters when plans and regulations fail to trigger private more strategic and less prescriptive planning instruments and public investment or when tax and budget systems fail to (Fainstein, 2000; Healey, 1992; Winkler & Duminy, 2016). This has capture and distribute rising values. led to a move towards spatial development frameworks, strategic Spatial planning, since its inception, has embodied normative plans and other new tools. assumptions about what makes for a ‘good city’ (Healy, 2006). Within the literature on urban planning implementation, focus Plans, regulations, and land systems have been designed and pur- is generally on regulation (Goodfellow, 2013). This is largely sued with the intention of realising these normative goals. In this because it tends to be the core implementation tool which the case, ‘good’ takes clearly spatial and often aesthetic forms, and is planning department itself has in its purview (Ennis, 1977). How- premised on the revenue-generating value of planning. Within ever, regulation is just one aspect of plan implementation. Infra- planning discourses, attention is not only given to what a good plan structure investment and land allocation practices, when viewed in looks like, but also what good planning processes, to arrive at this conjunction with regulatory efforts, in fact make up a fuller picture plan, would be. Two important themes which continue to resonate of the implementation toolbox. in current debates are that planning should be based, firstly, on This framework for thinking about urban spatial planning, in evidence and data and, secondly, on participatory or collaborative terms of land use regulation, guided infrastructure investment and decision-making. These are dicussed below: land allocation, is particularly useful as it brings to the fore the many tools with which states work to influence the spatial direc- - Data: In the lineage of the European Enlightenment movement, tion of urban areas. These tools are discussed in more detail below: physical planning was seen as a scientific practice, the outcomes of which could be best achieved through rational, technological, - Regulatory controls: Land use regulations are the rules which and analytical reasoning (Healey, 2006). The logic was that data indicate how land in particular areas can be used and developed and the scientific method should be used to inform plan-making (Goodfellow, 2013). Common land use regulations include: (Davoudi, 2006, 2012; Krizek, Forysth, & Slotterback, 2009). building codes pertaining to the development of physical Even in cases where it is recognized that planning is contested structures and the standards of construction, minimum L.R. Cirolia, S. Berrisford / Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e79 73

and political, ‘evidence based’ planning is still posited as a (Goodfellow, 2013; Kamete & Lindell, 2010; Pieterse, 2008). Despite cornerstone of rigorous plan-making. the overwhelming criticism of rigid, centralised, prescriptive - Collaboration: In line with liberal democratic discourses, there planning dated master plans and often excessive regulations are has been the rejection of top-down planning processes. Ideal being implemented, often at the behest of national governments planning processes would source, rationalise, and finally incor- (Kauzya, 2007, pp. 75e91; McAuslan, 2013; Ndegwa & Levy, 2003; porate the ideas and perspectives of all stakeholders. The lan- Suzuki, Dastur, Moffatt, Yabuki, & Maruyama, 2010; Watson, 2013). guage of participation permeates much of planning discourse. These critiques have come to form an important narrative about However, there is continued disagreement about methods, planning in African cities, one which has penetrated both popular tools, and the extent to which more radical agendas are and academic discourses. Sub-Saharan Africa has become the embraced or sanitized (Watson, 2013). poster child for urban planning gone wrong e a story of central- isation, rigid legislation and ad hoc enforcement. Oppressive city There are substantial critiques of both the rationalist basis of ‘clean ups’ (Huchzermeyer, 2011; Potts, 2006; Watson, 2009b), planning (Alexander, 2001; Kamete & Lindell, 2010; Winkler & rampant peri-urban land speculation (Adam, 2014; Allen, 2003; Duminy, 2016) as well as the ‘Habermasian’ ideals underpinning Kombe, 2005; Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002), collapsing infra- collaborative planning (Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998). structure networks (Gandy, 2006; Pieterse, 2008), persisting Watson (2013) writes that ‘planning debates on state-society informal settlements (Gulyani & Basset, 2007; UN Habitat, 2003), engagement are now in a “post-collaborative” phase, with atten- and elite enclaves (Lemanski, 2007; Murray, 2011; Watson, 2013) tion shifting to the difficulties of these processes as well as to the are read as signs of planning's failures in African cities. range of contexts and conditions within which participation takes However, many authors challenge this reading of African cities, place’ (2). arguing for the need to depathologize the cities (Pieterse, 2008; Watson (2009a), referring to a growing body of literature on Lemanski & Oldfield, 2009; Jaglin, 2014; Diouf, & Fredericks, ‘seeing from the South’, argues for a much closer look at ‘context’ 2014). Writing on African cities, Jaglin proposes and ‘place’. Concerns, therefore, are less that normative ideologies ‘a radical change in perspective, taking as a starting point not the are inherently bad, but that they fail to take into account the actual failure of urban services and the institutions responsible for their processes of places and contexts. Myers (2011), Pieterse (2008), delivery, but the vitality and multiplicity of actual delivery systems Watson (2011) and others argue that this failure to look at which, despite policy announcements and reforms, and notwith- context is of particular consequence to studies of African cities, standing imported models, survive and contribute to the func- where northern and western policy thinking and theorization have tioning of cities.’ (434) been adopted wholesale. Lemanski and Oldfield (2009) call for work which explores cities ‘as complex and contradictory sites in which diverse residents and urban processes function in the Inspired by this line of thinking, this paper argues for a nuanced context of state (dis)engagement’ (pg 634). It is with this in mind reading of planning in African cities. In charting three cases, we that we turn to the literature on planning in African cities. demonstrate the ‘negotiated’ nature of spatial decision making and outcomes. The following cases show that planning implementation 2.2. African cities reflects explicit and tacit power relationships rather than a process of explicit consensus building or data application. Planning has a long and complex history in Sub-Saharan Africa. The concept of ‘negotiated planning’ is useful for a number of Njoh (2004) points out that prior to the colonisation of Africa there reasons. First, it focusses less on normative expressions of how were many functioning towns; these towns were a subject of planning should be (i.e. informed by evidence and participation) fascination to and documentation by early explorers and co- and more on the actual practices evident in cities. The focus on lonialists. With the expansion of European colonialism in the late actual practices falls in line with Southern Urban efforts to insert 19th century, what had been small, often coastal outposts func- the ‘ordinary’ and ‘everyday’ into urban and planning theory, thus tioning as fuelling or slave trading stations, burgeoned into urban strengthening this debate (Harrison, 2006; Parnell & Oldfield, centres. Colonial centres were often geographically set apart from 2014; Pieterse, 2008; Robinson, 2008; Watson, 2011). Second, it the villages of the indigenous people or designed with segregated seeks to explain these practices and outcomes with reference to quarters, and strictly adhered to European standards of construc- social, economic, and political processes underway in specific cities. tion and urban development (Bekker & Therborn, 2012; Njoh, It allows for complex power dynamics among many stakeholders 2009). European planning tools, including master plans, land use throughout the planning implementation process to be surfaced regulations, and the formation of legal land rights systems, were and the political nature of planning to be more rigorously under- used to control where and how development could take place, stood. Finally, it combats simple and pathologizing narratives of often using pseudo-scientific or social rationales (Mabogunje, African planning and plan implementation. 1990). Decolonisation of African countries between the 1950s and 3. Planning implemention: three cases 1970s did not dismantle European planning. The majority of plan- ning legislation and instruments remained intact and centralised Here we move to a discussion of the three case study cities. within newly formed African states (Todes, Karam, Klug, & Malaza, Nairobi (Kenya), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and Harare (Zimbabwe) 2010; Watson, 2011; Wekwete, 1995). In fact, at the behest of post- are capital cities and the largest in their respective countries. Nai- colonial governments, planning African cities (particular capital robi and Addis Ababa are large cities, hosting more than 3.5 million cities) became important sites for the exhibition of state power and people each. Harare, on the other hand, is smaller, home to less than governments sought to impose upon the built environment this 2 million. However, all three are growing, experiencing increases in quest for legitimacy (Abubakar and Doan, 2010; Adebanwi, 2012; the demand for urban space. Bekker & Therborn, 2012; Fourchard, 2012). This often took the The first plans for Nairobi were created by British colonial form of impressive master plans and new master-planned capital planners in an effort to create a ‘settler capital’ out of a rail town. cities. The 1948 Master Plan for a Colonial Capital consolidated this early Planning in African cities has been heavily critiqued vision. By the mid-1970s it became clear that the functional area of 74 L.R. Cirolia, S. Berrisford / Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e79

Nairobi was a metropolitan region, and not a single municipal area. 3.1. Regulation and development control A series of spatial plans and strategies attempted to give life to this concept, most of which remain partially implemented. The Nairobi Much of urban planning has to do with regulating urban City Council, with the support of the Japan International Coopera- development; many authors focus on this function as a core tion Agency (JICA), is currently drafting the Integrated Urban component of planning implementation (Goodfellow, 2013; Development Master Plan (NIUPLAN), to replace the 1973 strategy. Watson, 2009b). This section looks at the ways in which develop- Under Kenya's 2010 constitutional dispensation, the functions of ment regulations are actually implemented in the three cases. forward planning and development control have been devolved to In Nairobi, the function of development control, undertaken by county governments (section 104 (1) of the County Government NCC with some support from the UMDU, largely focusses on ap- Act of 2012). Nairobi is both a city and a county. Within the newly provals or rejections of development in line with the zoning formed Nairobi City County (NCC), the Department of Lands, scheme. The last zoning review was carried out in 2004 and Physical Planning and Housing is technically responsible for all resulted in the approval of 20 key zones. Both the National and local planning functions. However, the national Urban Metropolitan departments claim to use the development control guidelines Development Unit (UMDU) continues to play a central role (per- provided in terms of the Physical Planning Act, the Physical Plan- sonal communication UMDU planner, Nairobi, April 2015). ning Handbook (Kenya Ministry of Lands and Housing, 1991) and The first plan for Addis Ababa was drafted by the Italians during the Building Code of 1968. a brief colonial stint in the 1930s (Fuller, 1996). Since then a suc- In practice, however, officials in the local planning department cession of plans have shaped the development of the city, most of and the UMDU noted that even when there is no infrastructure which were developed by European architecture and planning capacity or the project fails to align with the plan, rejections are firms (Parker & Ghafur, 1991). The plans for Addis Ababa were very rare. This is due to what was described as an ‘overwhelming shaped as well by the socialist military regime in power from 1974 need for development’ and ‘political motivations’ (personal to 1991. As per legislation, Addis has two types of plans: city-wide communication Assistant Director NCC Forward Planning 1, Nai- plans (a master plan for the city) and Local Development Plans robi, April 2015). Planners often enter into ad hoc commitments (strategies for local areas). Addis Ababa recently drafted a new city- with developers, requiring them to provide additional infrastruc- wide plan, the Integrated Regional Development Plan, to replace ture (such as a school or community hall) if they want their the plan for 2004 to 2014. It has been violently resisted by the application to be approved. peripheral communities which cited ‘fear of eviction’ and long Despite the high likelihood that plans will be accepted, this standing tribal tensions as core concerns. The 1994 Constitution of process is cumbersome and often circumvented by developers. Ethiopia granted Addis Ababa City Government powers of self-rule Developers generally do not apply for development permission at within a federal system (with implications for the fiscal arrange- all or submit an application only very loosely resembling the ments in the country and city). The national frameworks for land development eventually built (notable examples include important and planning empower Addis Ababa to make and implement urban donor headquarters and a number of prominent hotels). Within the plans. local planning department in the City County, a special division has The city of Harare (previously Salisbury) was the subject of a been created to address the plethora of unapproved and ‘deviant series of city wide plans under the colonial and Rhodesian gov- properties’ developed across the city. The focus of this team is on ernments, as well as since independence. City planning in informally developed high rises (tenements) and property devel- Zimbabwe continued to reflect the pre-independence Rhodesian oped on the urban fridge by land buying companies (LBCs) government's concern with controlling urban development and (Huchzermeyer, 2011; Charles, 2013). Tenements are often con- maintaining orderly spatial planning, a policy which effectively structed on road reserves, public spaces, or within the set back of perpetuated the race and income segregation established under the another property, with scant regard for applicable land use or previous regime (McAuslan, 1993). Harare continues to use the building regulations. Officials in this department retroactively Harare Combination Master Plan. The plan covers the greater approve or reject tenement development which has been con- Harare area and provides a framework for local area plans. Dating structed (personal communication, NCC Forward Planning official back to the 1980s, but periodically amended since then, the Com- 2, Nairobi, April 2015). LBCs, another focus of the special division, bination Master Plan is now scheduled for fundamental revision, are groups of households which have pooled resources to buy un- together with a City Development Strategy (Harare City Council, serviced peri-urban land with the hope of eventual title 2012). Zimbabwe's constitution, adopted in 2013, devolves plan- (Huchzermeyer, 2011; Yahya, 2002; personal communication, ning decision-making to local governments. However, without Stanley Ndungu, Nairobi NACHU Head Office, April 2015).1 Officials supporting legislation, the central government remains heavily note that these areas are often allowed to subdivide, despite not involved in local level planning. In Zimbabwe, the National meeting the basic criteria. Retroactive approval, despite the failures Department of Physical Planning (DPP) remains in control of among of tenements and LBCs to provide infrastructure and services for other things, evaluating master plans, allocating land for state and their development, demonstrate the power of even small scale parastatal activities, and medium to large scale development developers within the regulatory system. applications. In Addis Ababa, the citywide plan is prepared by a special All three cities have urban plans (specifically master plans) and project office set up for this purpose. Within the City Government, have, at least in principle, embraced principles of decentralisation. there are two sub-tiers kebeles (lower level administration) and However, the implementation of these plans, as the following three woredas (an administrative jurisdiction consisting of a group of sections discuss, reveals a much more negotiated and complex kebeles). Kebeles are empowered to administer local matters, system. The following section unpacks three tools of implementa- tion, development regulation, infrastructure investment and land allocation, demonstrating how planning is negotiated in each 1 context. The state was originally reluctant to allow subdivisions before the LBC provided infrastructure to their members. However, the LBCs rarely provide this infrastruc- ture (often becoming defunct rapidly after land acquisition) and the state has conceded to provide it through local government budgets or to allow subdividing without infrastructure in place. L.R. Cirolia, S. Berrisford / Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e79 75 including neighbourhood maintenance and building code represent a state which can only partially regulate building through enforcement. Similar to Nairobi, in Addis Ababa, Local Development ongoing negotiation and compromise. Plans (LDP) include explanatory details on the strategies, imple- menting agencies, concrete standards, development controls, 3.2. Infrastructure investment budgets, and timeframes for implementing plans. Unlike Nairobi, however, the majority of new development is undertaken by the A core part of implementing urban plans is infrastructure in- local state. Because housing delivery is dominated by the state, new vestment. Plans often include future infrastructure investments developments tend to conform to the master plan and LDPs.2 The (especially if plans include strategies for densification or expan- Building Permit and Control Authority is responsible for assuring sion). The laying of public infrastructure (or not) forms a critical that all public and private development conforms to the plans and part of the realisation of plans. regulations. The authority approves designs and monitors The local government in Nairobi has had little ability to invest in implementation. infrastructure due to the anti-urban bias in Kenya's revenue sharing Importantly, no land is formally released to the state or private formula (Cira, Kamunyori, & Babijes, 2016). This impedes the pos- developers without being serviced. This had led to a very slow sibility of surplus funding for capital expenditure (personal release of land and a huge gap between the supply and demand. communication Kathy Whimp, Nairobi, April 2015). Investment in Almost a million households are outside of the formal system, infrastructure and the associated development outcomes in the city building informally in and around the city. Understanding the are instead shaped by national line-function parastatals, private constraint, the state has been lax on enforcing building controls developers, and international development partners, each of which within informal and extra-legal areas. However, when areas fall are discussed below. within critical parts of the master plan, the city takes swift action to Many international donors and development agencies have evict households which do not conform. In these cases households their regional headquarters in Nairobi and play an active role in are sometimes compensated for the cost of their top structure, a setting and funding the agenda. This is particularly evident in roads question of particular concern for human rights and planning and transport. For example, the major highway infrastructure such activists. as the Eastern, Northern, and Southern bypass roads were funded In Harare, unlike Nairobi and Addis Ababa, stringent regulations by the Chinese government together with the national government are applied to urban space and property development within the of Kenya. The World Bank, European Union, and the African city. The property boom (against the anomalous backdrop of a Development Bank are pushing for (and partially funding) a new failing economy) of the early 1990s gave impetus to the state's bus-rapid-transit (BRT) system (personal communication, Anne desire to build Harare into a modern and ordered city, imposing Chaussavoine, European Union, Nairobi, April 2015). In contrast and restrictive policies including the repression of informal trade, despite having the mandate to plan and implement, the County informal settlements, and the minibus industry (for example roads department addresses residential roads (often retroactively), Operation Murambatsvina in 2005) (Kamete & Lindell, 2010; focusing on drainage, junctions, traffic signals, non-motorised Watson, 2009b). The local government plays a role in regulation; transport (NMT). While many donors support the devolution pro- however they are often undermined by higher levels of government cess, all of the long-term donor loans are granted to the national (personal communication, Harare City Council urban planning government of Kenya and their respective parastatal institutions, official, Harare, March 2015). According to a local developer, the and are thus negotiated at the national level. Notably, parastatals building and planning standards applied by all spheres of govern- play a huge role in infrastructure development in the city. Most ment to new developments are onerous, imposing high costs. The parastatals operating in the city are offshoots of the national gov- high standards imposed in the city core exhibit stark contrast to ernment, such as Kenya Power, Kenya Urban Roads Authority that on the periphery. On the periphery beyond the formal city (KURA), and Athi Water Board. Each parastatal has its own sector boundary, building regulations are not enforced and development plans and infrastructure investment programmes. In the NUIPLAN, takes place in an ad hoc manner. In the case of housing co- the infrastructure plans of these parastatals have largely been operatives, building regulations simply do not apply. Plots are incorporated into future planning processes, creating an ‘infra- allocated without services and often with little regard for the long structure leads planning’ approach to development. term spatial implications. Parastatals and donors tend to provide the high level infra- The three cases reflect three very different regulation practices. structure which creates the shape of the city; however, patches In Nairobi, the planners ‘strike back’, negotiating to regain lost within this structure are left un-serviced. As a response, private control and respond retroactively to the many forms of informal developers play a substantial role in the provision of infrastructure, building. In Addis, state-led construction, in a sea of urban infor- albeit largely for their own developments. Along the major road mality, forms the basis of their regulatory approach, creating a network, developers provide their own infrastructure such as situation where (new and conforming) high quality construction is boreholes, septic tanks, and solar panels, unlocking land otherwise side by side irregular slums. Control is selectively negotiated, undevelopable. ‘Lifestyle estates’ and ‘new suburbs’ funded by focussing enforcement on new building and ignoring that which global and local investors, are common drivers of this development. already exists. Harare, a combination of the former two, focusses Examples include Thika Greens Golf City, Garden Cities, Four Ways development regulation both on existing building and new build- Junction, and Tatu City (personal communication, Julius Orowe, ing, however this regulation is spatially selective, focussed on the Tatu City, April 2015). In this way, developers reinforce high level core and turning a blind eye to the periphery. All three cases urban plans, filling the spaces ignored by major funders and parastatals. In contrast to Nairobi, infrastructure investment in Addis Ababa follows the forward planning agenda set forth in the master plan 2 The construction sector is booming in Addis Ababa. There are very few private for the city (thus planning leads investment). Extremely advanta- real estate developers; however, the majority of development is being undertaken geous revenue sharing privileges with the central government, the by the state, by construction companies willing to build on the basis of upfront conferring of Charter City status (No. 87/97), and the ability for the payments from the lessors of the land, or by international investors (although this constitutes a much smaller percentage) (personal communication Yohannes Sisay, city to raise revenue through taxes and other instruments have Sunshine Construction, Harare, March 2015). enabled Addis Ababa to have the financial capacity to invest in their 76 L.R. Cirolia, S. Berrisford / Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e79 plans (Goodfellow, 2015). In addition to the funding from the state, loans are granted by foreign governments and donors to the na- international donors are also increasingly investing in the high tional government to invest in high level urban infrastructure. This level infrastructure of the city in line with the urban regeneration process (perhaps intentionally) undermines the local government's project. The most important cases are the Chines-financed Light role in infrastructure investment and entrusts in developers the Rail Transit system (LRT) which is under the ownership of the role of ‘filling in’ the city's structure. In Addis Ababa, the desire to newly established Ethiopian Railways Corporation (ERC). By con- showcase a national and regional success story forms a central trolling the finance, individual sectors’ infrastructure investments plank in the investment strategy of the city and its supporting are compelled to align with these plans. It is possible to compel this funders. Addis Ababa leads the servicing of all formally released alignment because, aside from electricity, the well-funded City land and provides high quality public infrastructure at scale. In Government owns and operates the majority of the infrastructure Harare, in contrast, the desire of the national government to un- assets (for example, roads and water assets). dermine the development of the city (traditionally an opposition As noted in the above sections, the City Government embarked strong hold) is also unlikely to be coincidental. However, in reality on a scaled urban regeneration project, including the redevelop- the acute shortage of finance continues to undercut the national ment and infrastructure investment on fourteen inner city sites government's capacity to exert its urban planning ambitions. These (personal communication Ato Hassen, Addis Ababa City Adminis- cases show that infrastructure investment reflects not only the tration, Addis Ababa, April 2015). Most of the sites house informal technical context of the state (the varied extent to which there is or or unplanned settlements. Most of these programmes involve the is not money available for infrastructure), but also forms the basis of relocation of residents who currently reside on the redevelopment an expression of control and power, the outcome of which is a land. This redevelopment process has been coupled with a huge negotiation between donors, investors, the state and even expansion of the road infrastructure and a planned decentralisation communities. of economic activity (achieved through the direct allocation of land for commercial and industrial uses within assigned hubs, as dis- 3.3. Land management cussed in the following section). Much like Nairobi, the local government in Harare holds little It is not possible to discuss all aspects of land governance or power over infrastructure provision, being reliant on national management for each case. We focus instead on land allocation. government and parastatals to provide funding and services. On the How land is allocated (directly by the state, through the market, or back of economic collapse in the 1990s (and the subsequent string in some combination) has direct implications on the outcomes of of unsuccessful economic reforms) Harare, as well as the national urban planning processes. infrastructure parastatals from which the city relies, have had little Competition over urban land in Nairobi is fierce and determined capital to distribute and invest (personal communication, Regis by and large by the open market. Land for development is bought Makwembere Revenue Collection City of Harare, Harare, March on the open market, often through partially informal processes. The 2015). Given the dire lack of funds for infrastructure and the lack of long history of land grabbing in Nairobi e where public land was interest of international investors, developers are often required by irregularly sold to private individuals e is testament to the perva- local planning authorities to build both on-site and off-site infra- siveness of market forces (Klopp, 2000). Over the past few years, structure. However, developers, relying on commercial finance, face the value of strategically located urban land in and around Nairobi the high risk brought about by rapid inflation and interest rate has skyrocketed. In the past five years plots along major infra- fluctuation, therefore preferring short term borrowing to longer structure corridors have more than doubled and across the city term exposure (personal communication, Darlington Chirima, ZB property prices have increased by an average 25 percent per year. Bank, March 2015). It is therefore also not possible for the private While some research agencies suggest that this process could be developers to provide scaled infrastructure to support large pro- driven by real demand (such as a growing African middle class jects or the larger network of the city. They contribute bits and within Nairobi) (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, pieces to the infrastructure network, most of which directly serves 2014), a number of interviewees argue that increases are the result very small scale development projects. of market speculation, fuelled by overseas investors. Efforts to curb While Harare's master plan purports to develop a World Class land speculation have been minimal, with many officials and pol- City, the Government of Zimbabwe has commissioned plans for a iticians taking part in the scramble (personal communication NCC new capital city in the Greater Harare City region approximately Forward Planning official 2, Nairobi, April 2015). Efforts by the 25 km away from the Harare central business area (personal National Land Commission to curb irregular land sales and rectify communication Percy Toriro, independent town planner Harare, ‘grabbed land’ have proved complex and costly. March 2015). The new capital is intended to replace Harare as the Of the three cases, Addis Ababa has the most complex and centre for political activity, housing a new parliament and various comprehensive land allocation system, based entirely on a lease- social and economic nodes. While this plan will likely be nothing hold system. In Addis Ababa, land leasing has allowed the city near more than one of Watson’s (2013) ‘fantasy cities’, it represents a total control of spatial development (Goodfellow, 2015). The City clear effort on the part of the national government to divert what leases land in two ways. First there is direct allocation wherein a little funds are available from Harare to other areas. In practical ‘base price’ for the land servicing is paid. Second there is land terms however the Government of Harare is struggling to assemble auction, where land is sold to bidders (Yntiso, 2008). In Addis the capital to finance the access road to the site of the proposed Ababa, 94% of land is allocated directly for activities and develop- new capital, not with standing the commitment of the Chinese ment seen to be of strategic importance (Kaganova & Zenebe, government to provide USD 200 million for the construction of a 2014). Housing is one strategic area; the state allocates its own new parliament building (www.newsday.co.zw, 31 August 2016). land for condominium style development or to housing co- These cases show that the capacity and interest of the state to operatives for private construction (Yntiso, 2008). Since there is invest in urban infrastructure is a fundamental (though often little land released to open market, this has constrained supply ignored) part the implementation of urban plans. Furthermore, dramatically. Due in part to the slow release of land (brought about these cases show that infrastructure investment is not driven by the by the requirement to first service land before auction or alloca- state alone, but reflects negotiations between the government, tion), farmers on the edges of the city have taken to illegally sub- parastatals, financiers, and developers. In the case of Nairobi, major dividing their plots and selling off the parcels directly to buyers. The L.R. Cirolia, S. Berrisford / Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e79 77 arrested formal land allocation system is thus supplemented by an constantly chasing the development of the city, seeking, where informal alternative. possible to regain some of its lost power. Harare, as an urban council, is given little control over land In contrast, the state in Addis Ababa, has a strong ability to allocation (save the basic ability to sell land to developers) forward plan and the resources to invest in both infrastructure and (Marongwe et al., 2011). Urban expansion of Harare's functional property development (such as condominium housing). Using a areas is driven by the national government which has the power to tailored land allocation and expropriation system, and tapping into expropriate commercial farmland and allocate it for urban devel- substantial capital for infrastructure and land development, the opment purposes (see the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in state can construct (and deconstruct) the city to match the master Marongwe et al., 2011; Tibaijuka, 2005). The majority of land allo- plans. With practically no private development sector, the con- cation is given to housing cooperatives in peri-urban areas, such as struction of property can also be tightly controlled to fit with the Caledonia, Whitecliffe and Southlea Park (Chirisa, Gaza Bandauko, plan for the city. This story sits in contrast to narratives of ‘failed 2014). However, the state is not the only actor extending the city states’ and crumbling local governments which characterise pop- into the peri urban surroundings, private developers bypass the ular thinking on African cities. However, the power of the state is delimitation laws (i.e. the urban edge) by building developments in not uncontested. Tensions between the city and the resident peri-urban areas surrounding the city which are formally desig- communities in the surrounding area, resulting in scaled protest nated as ‘rural’ but, for all intents and purposes, are urban. These and violence, represent a challenge to state power. For two years developers are colloquially called ‘land barons’ (personal commu- the state has remained unable to implement the new master plan nication Precious Shumba, Harare Resident's Trust, Harare, March due to community backlash. In addition, the prevalence of infor- 2015). Rural district councils wherein these developments take mality demonstrates the limits of the state's control over the place benefit; they are often able to charge property tax for these regulation of existing development and the negotiated nature of developments, without having to provide the infrastructure in re- urban outcomes in Addis Ababa. turn (such as in areas such as Greensyke). In contrast to both of the above cases, Harare experiences very Land allocation powers offer a unique tool by which to shape the little investment in infrastructure given the lack of budget, weak city. In the case of Addis Ababa, this allocation is central to planning interest of international funders, and low capacity of the private efforts given the state's full ownership of land. However, the sector. While state led land allocation forms an important part of requirement of servicing land before it can be released strains urban expansion, it is difficult to assess if this land allocation aligns supply leading to informal land access routes. In Harare, in contrast, with the plans for the city or instead reflects patronage efforts. state-led land allocation is confined to the peri-urban areas and Harare's local government, unable to participate in infrastructure relatively ineffective in spatially guiding the city due to its ad hoc investment or land allocation, fixates on planning and building nature. In Nairobi, the most extreme case, no direct land allocation regulations, working to control both new and existing development takes place and the (formal and informal) market serves as the in the core urban area. This control is juxtaposed with the peri- allocating mechanism. It is interesting that in Nairobi and Addis urban areas where no regulation is enforced. These efforts are a Ababa, the price of land on the open market is incredibly high; the negotiation wherein the local government exercises selective latter being driven by the governmental control of the supply and spatial control. the former being linked to rampant speculation and a complete lack It is not useful to categorise the planning in each city e in fact of government intervention in the land market. These cases show they do not represent discrete categories which can be given simple that the allocation of urban land can take place in many ways and slogans. Differences in the cases exist not as cases of ‘all or nothing’ reflects negotiated, informal or ad hoc practices of actors such as outcomes, but along spectra, creating what might be better officials (Nairobi and Addis Ababa), farmers (Addis Ababa), and considered as assemblage or configuration of planning imple- ‘land barons’ (Harare). mentation (ala Jaglin, 2014). By beginning with the actual practices and contexts in each city, 4. Negotiated planning: reflections and conclusions a number of important issues are brought to the fore. First, the negotiated nature of planning implementation has a clearly spatial It is clear that planning implementation is different in each of logic. The negotiation which takes place in the core of urban areas is the cities discussed above. However, in each case, planning is not markedly different from what takes place in the suburbs, or peri- simply an ad hoc process, with no sense or logic. Instead, planning urban fringe. Different actors and power dynamics are clearly implementation reflects the unique and particular context, contest involved. Second, negotiation is not simple between the planning and on-going negotiation among the stakeholders implicated in departments and developers (as is commonly understood). While realising urban plans. this relationship is important, there are also important and power- In Nairobi, international funders - working with the national laden negotiations which take place with donors, funders, various government - are investing at scale in the road network in and spheres of government, and mobilized citizens. Finally, each around the city, opening up previously inaccessible areas and context has a particular logic. While the logics do not align with the creating the new city structure. The national government is playing ‘virtuous cycle’ of planning, infrastructure, and land which un- a very active role in shaping the high level urban patterns by taking derpins much of western planning discourses, they are not on large loans to pay for these projects e a tacit collaboration which impossible to understand or track. should not be overlooked. However, these efforts remain incom- Undoubtedly, the ability and will of the state to control urban plete and selective. The state expects developers (both formal and space has not resulted in the order envisaged by the early architects informal) to provide services on a project by project basis, and even of the planning discipline or by planners themselves. The planning beyond their projects. There is little expectation that the state will outcomes in African cities do not reflect clear patterns of data provide some sort of central network of infrastructure. However, driven decision making or stakeholder consensus. As these cases even this is not set in stone and, when the sensitive and fractured show, it is precisely the recognition that the state exercises limited, model falters, the state breaks its own planning and development constrained, and contested control that we seek to call planning in rules to enable ongoing development. A similar process of negoti- African cities ‘negotiated’. Undeniably, efforts to improve the ated legality is reflected in the retroactive approval and demolition planning of African cities must begin by understanding this of unapproved properties; the local government appears to be negotiated-ness as it is key to understanding the possibilities and 78 L.R. Cirolia, S. Berrisford / Habitat International 59 (2017) 71e79 limitations of change. Hall, S. (2014). Cities of tomorrow: An intellectual history of urban planning and design since 1880 (4th ed.). Harare City Council. (2012). Strategic plan: 2012e2015. www.hararecity.co.zw. Acknowledgements Harrison, P. (2006). 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