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FHFA V. Goldman Sachs & Co

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FHFA V. Goldman Sachs & Co UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, AS CONSERVATOR FOR THE FEDERAL ___ CIV. ___ (___) NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, COMPLAINT Plaintiff, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED -against- GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO., GS MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., GOLDMAN SACHS MORTGAGE COMPANY, THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., GOLDMAN SACHS REAL ESTATE FUNDING CORP., PETER C. ABERG, HOWARD S. ALTARESCU, ROBERT J. CHRISTIE, KEVIN GASVODA, MICHELLE GILL, DAVID J. ROSENBLUM, JONATHAN S. SOBEL, DANIEL L. SPARKS, AND MARK WEISS, Defendants. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page NATURE OF ACTION ...................................................................................................................1 PARTIES .........................................................................................................................................9 The Plaintiff and the GSEs ...................................................................................................9 The Defendants ..................................................................................................................10 JURISDICTION AND VENUE ....................................................................................................13 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ........................................................................................................14 I. The Securitizations .............................................................................................................14 A. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securitizations in General .....................................14 B. The Securitizations at Issue in This Case ..............................................................16 C. The Securitization Process .....................................................................................19 1. Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company Pools Mortgage Loans in Special Purpose Trusts ...............................................................................19 2. The Trusts Issue Securities Backed by the Loans ......................................21 II. The Defendants’ Participation in the Securitization Process .............................................25 A. The Role of Each Defendant ..................................................................................25 1. Goldman, Sachs & Co................................................................................25 2. GS Mortgage Securities Corp. ...................................................................26 3. Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company .........................................................27 4. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ................................................................28 5. Goldman Sachs Real Estate Funding Corp. ...............................................29 6. The Individual Defendants .........................................................................29 B. Defendants Failed To Conduct Proper Due Diligence ..........................................32 III. The Registration Statements and the Prospectus Supplements ..........................................37 A. Compliance with Underwriting Guidelines ...........................................................37 i B. Statements Regarding Occupancy Status of Borrower ..........................................40 C. Statements Regarding Loan-to-Value Ratios .........................................................43 D. Statements Regarding Credit Ratings ....................................................................45 IV. Falsity of Statements in the Registration Statements and Prospectus Supplements ..........47 A. A Review of Loan-Level Data Indicates That the Statistical Data Provided in the Registration Statements and Prospectus Supplements Concerning Owner Occupancy and LTV Ratios Was Materially False ....................................47 1. Owner-Occupancy Data Was Materially False ..........................................48 2. LTV Data Was Materially False ................................................................50 B. The Originators of the Underlying Mortgage Loans Systematically Disregarded Their Underwriting Guidelines .........................................................54 1. Government Investigations Have Confirmed That the Originators of the Loans in the Securitizations Systematically Failed to Adhere to Their Underwriting Guidelines ..............................................................55 2. The Collapse of the GSE Certificates’ Credit Ratings Further Indicates that the Mortgage Loans Were not Originated in Adherence to the Stated Underwriting Guidelines ....................................64 3. The Surge in Mortgage Delinquencies and Defaults Further Demonstrates that the Mortgage Loans Were Not Originated in Adherence to the Stated Underwriting Guidelines ....................................66 V. Goldman Sachs Knew Its Representations Were False .....................................................68 A. Evidence Regarding Goldman’s Due Diligence ....................................................69 1. Goldman’s Due Diligence Benefitted From a Direct Window Into the Originators’ Practices ...........................................................................69 2. Goldman Had Actual Knowledge, on a Daily Basis, of the Number of Non-Performing Loans ..........................................................................72 B. Other Evidence Of Goldman’s Willingness to Capitalize on Its Unique Knowledge at the Expense Of Investors ................................................................75 1. Goldman Began Shorting Its Own Offerings Beginning in 2006 ..............76 2. Goldman’s Targeted Campaign to “Put Back” Defective Loans to Originators Demonstrates That It Knew the Targeted Originators’ Loans Breached Underwriting Guidelines .................................................79 ii C. Numerous Government Investigations Have Confirmed Goldman Acted With Scienter .........................................................................................................82 D. Further Evidence that Goldman Knew the Appraisals Were Inflated ...................84 VI. The GSEs Justifiably Relied on Goldman Sachs’s Representations .................................85 VII. Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Purchases of the GSE Certificates and the Resulting Damages ............................................................................................................87 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ........................................................................................................89 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................................93 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION .......................................................................................................98 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION .................................................................................................103 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION ......................................................................................................107 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION .....................................................................................................112 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ...............................................................................................116 EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION ..................................................................................................122 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION .....................................................................................................125 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ....................................................................................................128 PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..............................................................................................................131 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED .......................................................................................................131 iii Plaintiff, The Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), as conservator for The Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), by its attorneys, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, for its Complaint herein against Goldman, Sachs & Co., GS Mortgage Securities Corp., Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs Real Estate Funding Corp. (collectively, “Goldman Sachs” or “Goldman”), Peter C. Aberg, Howard S. Altarescu, Robert J. Christie, Kevin Gasvoda, Michelle Gill, David J. Rosenblum, Jonathan S. Sobel, Daniel L. Sparks, and Mark Weiss (collectively, the “Individual Defendants,” and together with Goldman Sachs, the “Defendants”) alleges as follows: NATURE OF ACTION 1. This action arises out of Defendants’ actionable conduct in connection with the offer and sale of certain residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (collectively, the “Government Sponsored Enterprises” or the “GSEs”). These securities were sold pursuant to registration statements, including prospectuses and prospectus supplements that formed part of those registration statements, which contained materially false or misleading statements and omissions. Defendants falsely stated that the underlying mortgage loans and properties complied with certain underwriting guidelines and standards. These false statements and misleading omissions significantly overstated the ability of the borrowers to repay their mortgage loans
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