Table of Contents
(Front Image) Transperth train, Western Australia
Table of Contents
4 The Regulator’s Message 4 Abbreviations
Introduction
6 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator 8 Scope and Methods
Rail Safety Statistical Summary
10 Overview 13 Railway Related Injury 15 Passenger Train Derailment 16 Freight Train Derailment 18 Derailment Not Involving Passenger or Freight Rolling Stock 19 Collisions Between Trains and with Rolling Stock 20 Level Crossing Collision 24 Workforce Struck by Rolling Stock 24 Fire 26 Other Risks
A Year in Review
28 2015–2016: A Year in Review 33 National Priorities 39 Safety Improvement 40 Major Projects
Appendices
42 Appendix A: Data Tables 45 Appendix B: Normalised Summary of Main Data 46 Appendix C: Scope and Methods
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 3 The Regulator’s Message
Nullarbor Plain, Western Australia
THE REGULATOR’S In time I am very confident that collective ABBREVIATIONS approaches between the regulator and MESSAGE industry can drive development of the ALCAM How safe are Australia’s railways? It’s smart systems that will allow us to one Australian Level Crossing a question I ask myself on a daily basis. day view the rail safety landscape Assessment Model from unique angles and with ALTRAC The Office of the National Rail Safety unprecedented foresight. Regulator’s (ONRSR) Rail Safety Report Light Rail consortium, which includes 2015–2016 is our organisation’s formal For now, this report is our latest Acconia, Transdev Sydney, Alstom answer to that question. Our fourth snapshot in time charting performance, Transport Australia and Capella Capital pitfalls and priorities alike. annual record of safety performance ATSB across the Australian rail industry, While it presents rail as a fundamentally Australian Transport Safety Bureau for the first time it includes data and safe sector and highlights important CBD insights from Western Australia following advances, it also identifies where time Central Business District the start of ONRSR operations in that and resources must be devoted to state in November 2015. address shortcomings. Most notably it ITSR Establishing our presence in the west reinforces the need to stay focused on Independent Transport was another significant step forward the four key safety priorities ONRSR Safety Regulator (NSW) identified in 2014–2015: for rail safety in this country and, as I NCR write, we are making very encouraging 1. Track condition Non-Conformance Report progress toward welcoming Queensland into the ONRSR fold and realising our 2. Track work — competency OC-G1 aspiration to be a truly national rail and communication Occurrence Classification Guideline safety regulator. 3. Rolling stock maintenance ONRSR It is important too to recognise that Office of the National Rail Safety 4. Road Rail Vehicle (RRV) safety with progress of the administrative Regulator elements of the national reform, These may seem like the basics, and ON-S1 come the genuinely game-changing generally speaking they are, but like Occurrence Notification Standard opportunities to harness our collective any pursuit in life and in business, experience and expertise and apply it to we must get the basics right. REPCON the core business of playing our part in Rail Voluntary and Confidential In sharing this year’s Rail Safety making our nation’s railways safe. For us Reporting Scheme Report, I trust it will once again serve a key aspect is applying the rail safety as an invaluable resource for the rail RIM data notified by industry through a industry and help all of us with a stake Rail Infrastructure Manager framework of risk-based regulation in rail safety to retain that important — an important area we devote RISSB sense of assured vigilance. several pages to in the report. Rail Industry Safety and How safe are Australia’s railways? Standards Board (Australia) I firmly believe we should take great RRV pride in knowing they are safe but Road Rail Vehicle never shirk from our collective responsibility for making RSNL them even safer. Rail Safety National Law RTO Rail Transport Operator SFAIRP So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable Sue McCarrey SPAD National Rail Safety Regulator Signal Passed At Danger (without authority) TfNSW Transport for New South Wales TSV Transport Safety Victoria
4 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 5 Introduction
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL RAIL SAFETY REGULATOR (ONRSR)
Our vision Safe railways for Australia
Our values Integrity, Respect, Figure 1: Independence, Major Inter and Intrastate Freight Diligence, Networks Administered Excellence under the Rail Safety National Law as of 30 June 2016.
6 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Functions The scope of ONRSR’s regulatory Applying a risk-based approach to responsibility as of 30 June 2016 is regulation has parallels to the RSNL’s The functions of ONRSR are legislated in shown in Figure 1. Of the 197 accredited requirement for Rail Transport Operators the Rail Safety National Law (RSNL)1 and Rail Transport Operators within Australia, to apply a risk-based approach to safety described in ONRSR’s Statement of 159 (81%) are accredited by ONRSR. In management. It also enables ONRSR Intent2. In summary they include: addition to accredited railways, ONRSR to focus resources on the basis of risk • working with Rail Transport Operators, has registered 199 Rail Infrastructure and to improve the effectiveness of rail safety workers and others involved Managers (RIM) of private sidings. regulatory interactions. in railway operations to improve rail They are exempt from the requirement ONRSR uses various sources of safety nationally; to be accredited (in relation to rail intelligence to inform its risk-based infrastructure-related operations decision making, including notifiable • facilitating and providing advice, in these sidings) but they must be occurrence data, investigation reports education and training in relation registered or hold an exemption from the Australian Transport Safety to rail safety; from registration under the RSNL. Bureau (ATSB), Rail Voluntary and They operate under the same safety • conducting research, collecting Confidential Reporting Scheme duties that apply to accredited and publishing information relating (REPCON) reports, Rail Transport Rail Transport Operators. to rail safety; and Operator safety performance reports • monitoring, investigating and enforcing and the outcomes of audits, inspections and other regulatory activities. compliance with the RSNL. Rail safety regulatory approach The RSNL defines the functions of Role ONRSR but does not describe the way in which ONRSR will deliver them. ONRSR performs its functions under ONRSR’s aim, as defined in its Corporate a co-regulatory framework, in which Plan4, is to enhance and promote safety responsibility for regulation and safety through effective risk-based regulation. is shared between industry, government and ONRSR. The principle of shared Risk-based regulation is the application responsibility is underpinned by specific of a systematic decision making duties defined under the RSNL. In framework, which prioritises regulatory particular, section 52 states a Rail activities and informs decision outcomes, Transport Operator must ensure, based on an assessment of risks to so far as is reasonably practicable rail safety. It involves: (SFAIRP), the safety of its railway • Developing an understanding operations. This duty is consistent with of the risks to the safety of railway the principles of safety risk management operations in Australia; generally where those responsible for safety risks must ensure all reasonably • Determining which of these risks practicable measures are in place ONRSR is able to influence through to protect people from the harm its regulatory activities; and that may arise. • Designing and prioritising regulatory activities and outcomes in a way that best maintains and improves Coverage rail safety. At the start of the 2015–2016 financial year ONRSR had responsibility for rail safety regulation in the jurisdictions of South Australia, New South Wales, Tasmania, Northern Territory, Victoria3 and Australian Capital Territory. ONRSR’s coverage expanded on 2 November 2015 when the RSNL was enacted in Western Australia.
1 RSNL refers to the Rail Safety National Law (South Australia) Act 2012 and Rail Safety National Law (WA) Act 2015 2 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator, Statement of Intent 2016 to 2019, ONRSR, Adelaide, June 2016 3 Victorian light rail operators and some Tourist and Heritage operators continue to be regulated under local Victorian law, administered by Transport Safety Victoria (TSV)
4 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator, Corporate Plan 2016 to 2019, ONRSR, Adelaide, June 2016
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 7 Introduction
The role of this report ONRSR’s Rail Safety Report provides a summary of rail safety performance in the 2015–2016 financial year. This performance is described in terms of safety statistics based on rail safety occurrences notified to ONRSR, and intelligence gathered through regulatory activities. ONRSR also summarises some of the key areas that have been the focus of regulatory attention. Analysis of these sources provides the focus areas for compliance and safety improvement in the coming year. This report is designed to consider rail safety from a national perspective rather than to single out individual operators or specific incidents. It is an ongoing function of ONRSR to work with individual Rail Transport Operators on Sydney Trains, issues that pertain specifically to them. ONRSR does, New South Wales however, highlight specific examples of incidents where they demonstrate issues considered relevant to the wider industry.
SCOPE AND METHODS Reporting period Data sources The scope and methods used for the A minimum reporting period of 1 July The information presented in this presentation of data are described in 2015 to 30 June 2016 applies to this report is principally based on notifiable Appendix C. The general approach report with the exception of data related occurrences — the initial written advice is outlined below. to Western Australia which is included of a rail safety incident that a Rail from the date ONRSR commenced Transport Operator submits to ONRSR regulatory oversight in this state — in accordance with section 121 of 2 November 2015 — until 30 June the RSNL. Geographic coverage 2016. A longer period of data is Except where explicitly stated, all considered where appropriate descriptions and statistics in this report and available for analysis. Definitions apply only to those railways within ONRSR’s area of operation in the 2015 Most statistical summaries in this report are based on the incident definitions of –2016 financial year — South Australia, Operations New South Wales, Tasmania, Northern the national occurrence classification 5 Territory, Victoria, Australian Capital The analysis covers all railway operations guideline (OC-G1, 2013). Some statistics Territory and Western Australia. within the aforementioned geographic are based on definitions specific to this bounds with the exception of Victoria. report to support a more meaningful All tramways operating in Victoria, risk-based analysis of critical events, including the metropolitan tram operator and in such cases these definitions in Melbourne and several tourist and are presented. heritage railways are regulated under Victorian local law and are therefore not subject to the RSNL. 5 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator, Classifying Notifiable Occurrences. Occurrence Classification Guideline (OC-G1), Version 1.1, ONRSR, Adelaide, March 2013
8 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Rail Safety Statistical Summary
RAIL SAFETY STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 9 Rail Safety Statistical Summary — Overview
10 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 11 Rail Safety Statistical Summary
Semaphore and Fort Glanville Tourist Railway, South Australia
A large part of ONRSR’s regulatory Notifiable occurrences are an important As a national body, ONRSR intelligence is gained from the thousands input to ONRSR’s risk-based regulatory presents the information in this of rail safety occurrences reported each approach. The type of events, their chapter at a national level but includes year. The RSNL in conjunction with frequency and their actual or potential jurisdictional breakdowns in Appendix A. ONRSR’s occurrence notification consequences assist ONRSR in This appendix also includes track standard6 defines the types of events understanding the rail safety risks kilometres and train kilometres for railway that must be notified to ONRSR and that exist in the industry. Some events operations broken down by jurisdiction. what information should be reported. result in more significant consequences Appendix B includes the national or have the potential for greater risk, Some of these events lead to an rates of some of the more serious and these events are the focus for immediate response by ONRSR while types of occurrences reported. presentation of occurrence others are categorised and analysed statistics in this report. over time to build a picture of rail safety performance in the rail industry. This The statistics presented in the following 6 Office of the National performance provides insight into which sections focus primarily on the events of Rail Safety Regulator, Reporting Notifiable safety areas require focus by ONRSR the 2015–2016 financial year. The report Occurrences. Occurrence and which sectors and individual continues a number of charts that have Notification Standard operators should be the subject been published in previous years which (ON-S1), Version 1.1, of this focus. show the last five years’ performance. ONRSR, Adelaide, March 2013 ONRSR has conducted benchmarking against international performance and highlighted selected events judged as the more serious in the year, from ONRSR’s review.
12 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Figure 2: Railway fatal injury, July 2011 to June 2016 All rail operations regulated under RSNL as of 30 June 2016 (Victorian data from 2013–2014 onwards, ACT from 2014–2015, WA from 2 November 2015). Non-passenger level crossing fatalities are classed as public if neither trespass nor suicide is suspected. Suspected suicide at level crossing is coded as trespass.
PASSENGER WORKFORCE
3 3
2 2 fatalities fatalities of of 1 1 umber umber N N
0 0 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –15 –15 –15 –15 –15 –15 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 11 15 11 12 13 14 15 12 13 14 11 11 15 12 13 14 12 13 14 11 11 15 12 13 14 12 13 14 15 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Rail accident Level Crossing Fall, assult, other Rail accident Level Crossing Fall, assult, other (incl. strike) (incl. strike)
PUBLIC TRESPASS (including suspected suicide)
7 80 6 70 5 60 50 fatalities fatalities 4 40 of of 3 30 2 20 umber umber N N 1 10 0 0 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 5 –1 5 –1 5 –1 5 –1 5 –1 5 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 11 15 13 14 11 12 15 13 11 12 14 15 11 13 14 12 13 14 11 12 13 14 11 12 13 14 12 15 15 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Rail accident Level Crossing Fall, assult, other Rail accident Level Crossing Fall, assult, other (incl. strike) (incl. strike)
RAILWAY RELATED INJURY Appendix A1 presents summary statistics, segmented by jurisdiction. Injury data provides a reliable and direct measure of harm associated with some Approximately 450 people were railway safety hazards. recorded as receiving a serious injury on rail premises in the 2015–2016 financial There were 84 fatalities in the 2015–2016 year. More than 80% of these related financial year on railways regulated under to slips, trips and falls. the RSNL. These consisted of: The five-year history of fatality on • 72 incidents involving members railways is summarised in Figure 2. of the public (suspected suicide); • six trespassing members of the public struck by trains; • three fatalities involving members of the public not suspected of suicide or trespass; • two fatalities from passengers falling on escalators; and • one worker who was struck by a train.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 13 Rail Safety Statistical Summary
Table 1: 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 3 Years Railway fatality — ONRSR (SA, Fatalities 19 9 12 40 ONRSR, Great Britain NSW, NT, TAS, Train km (million) 118.2 115.7 155.3 389.2 and United States VIC, ACT, WA) Rate 0.161 0.078 0.077 0.103
Fatalities involving passengers, Great Britain Fatalities1 37 39 45 121 workforce, public and trespass (GB) Train km (million2 552.6 558.5 556.7 16 67.8 (excluding suspected suicide). Rate 0.067 0.070 0.081 0.073 These ONRSR statistics include United States Fatalities3 744 811 826 2381 ACT from 2014–2015, and WA (US) Train km (million)3 1060.6 10 67.1 982.3 3109.9 from 2 November 2015. Rate 0.701 0.760 0.841 0.766
1 Source: Rail Safety and Standards Board, Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16, RSSB, UK, 2016 2 Source: Office of Rail and Road, National Rail Trends (NRT) Portal (accessed 25 October 2016) http://dataportal.orr.gov.uk/ 3 Source: Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Analysis: online database query (accessed 25 October 2015) http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov
Table 2: Date Description Location All fatalities and injuries by 18/07/2015 A pedestrian was waiting at the Church Street level Church St passengers, workforce and public, crossing for a train to pass. Once this train passed, level crossing, excluding trespass or suspected the pedestrian crossed and was struck by a train Brighton, travelling in the opposite direction. VIC suicide, July 2015 to June 2016 Railway operations within SA, NSW, 30/07/2015 A person was reported to have stumbled off the Emerson TAS, NT, VIC, ACT and WA from 2 platform and was subsequently struck by a train. Station, SA November 2015 regulated under the 23/09/2015 A road-train truck struck a freight train at a level Tullamore Rd, RSNL. Excludes fatality associated crossing. The truck driver was killed in the collision. Narwonah, with trespass or suspected suicide. NSW
25/03/2016 A passenger fell down an escalator at Murdoch Station, Murdoch suffering multiple injuries. The passenger later died Station, from the injuries sustained. WA
03/05/2016 A passenger fell from an escalator and died Subiaco due to the injuries sustained. Station, WA
18/06/2016 A track worker (signal maintainer) was struck and Clyde, fatally injured at Clyde by a passing passenger train. NSW
5 Figure 3: 4 Passenger train
3 running line derailment
derailments July 2011 to June 2016
of 2 All railway operations regulated under RSNL (Victorian data from 2013–2014
Number 1 onwards, ACT from 2014–2015, and 0 WA from 2 November 2015). Includes 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 5 –1 5 –1 5 –1 5 –1 –1 –1 –1 derailments on non-running lines –1 –1 –1 –1 11 15 11 15 12 14 11 12 14 13 15 13 14 11 12 13 15 14 12 13 affecting the safety of running lines. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 “Other” here comprises empty Heavy Rail Light Rail Tourist & Heritage Other heavy rail passenger trains.
14 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Date Description Location Table 3: 08/09/2015 A heritage railcar with no passengers on board Stirling North, Passenger train derailed owing to a broken axle. SA running line derailments July 2015 to June 2016 12/09/2015 A heritage train with no passengers on board derailed. Gemmells, SA Railway operations within SA, 21/12/2015 An empty suburban passenger train exiting a siding South NSW, TAS, NT, VIC, ACT, WA derailed at a set of points, blocking the main line. Geelong, VIC from 2 November 2015
regulated under the RSNL. 06/02/2016 A metropolitan passenger train derailed. Near Rushall One passenger was reported to have been taken Station in to hospital, with approximately 200 passengers Fitzroy North, detrained between stations. VIC
20/03/2016 A wagon attached to a heritage passenger Mornington, train derailed. No injuries were reported. VIC
16/04/2016 A heritage tram derailed. No injuries were reported. Whiteman Park Village, WA
17/05/2016 While docking from sidings to a platform, a suburban Southern passenger train derailed after passing a signal at stop Cross Station, without authority, resulting in the main line being fouled. VIC No passengers were on board.
12/06/2016 A heritage passenger carriage derailed when leaving Cobdogla the museum. No injuries to passengers were reported. Main Line, SA
A comparison of the rate of fatality The fatality rate for ONRSR’s area of These accidents involve a range of between ONRSR-regulated railways operation over the three-year period passenger train operations, as follows: and selected overseas railways (0.103 fatalities per million train km) is • one derailment involved an in- is summarised in Table 1. The higher than that of GB (0.073) but well service heavy rail passenger train; ONRSR-based data in Table 1 is a below that of the US (0.766). A review subset of the fatalities summarised in of the US figures by individual incident • one derailment involved a Figure 2 to align with the overseas data type suggests the rate reflects a light rail passenger tram; definitions. For example, for the purpose significantly higher proportion of of benchmarking, local data excludes trespass and level crossing-related • four derailments involved tourist suspected suicide as these are also fatalities in the US compared to and heritage trains (all four excluded from overseas data. the figures within ONRSR’s occurred on isolated lines); and area of operation. The comparison is most valid for the • two derailments involved empty GB statistics because information on heavy rail passenger trains individual GB incidents is available to Appendix A2 presents summary confirm consistency of scope with local PASSENGER TRAIN statistics, segmented by jurisdiction. data. GB is also a suitable benchmark DERAILMENT to compare with ONRSR data because The five-year history of passenger train of its comparatively high rail safety Passenger train derailment risk is derailment is summarised in Figure 3. performance compared with the other characterised by rare events that have A summary of passenger train 27 member states of the European the potential to result in catastrophic derailments is presented in Table 3. Union. The US data is less reliable outcomes, owing to the large numbers because of definitional uncertainties. of passengers exposed to harm. There were eight running line passenger train derailments in the 2015–2016 financial year on railways regulated under the RSNL.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 15 Rail Safety Statistical Summary
45 Figure 4 40 35 Freight train 30 25
running line derailments derailments 20 July 2011 to June 2016 of 15 All railway operations regulated under 10 Number RSNL (Victorian data from 2013–2014 5 onwards, ACT from 2014–2015, and 0 6 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 WA from 2 November 2015). Includes 2 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 5 –1 5 –1 5 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 11 15 12 13 14 15 11 15 12 13 14 11 derailments of freight trains and freight 12 13 14 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 rolling stock on non-running lines 20 20 20 affecting the safety of running lines. TrainLight Locomotive Wagon
Table 4 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 3 Years Passenger train ONRSR (SA, Derailments 4 4 5 13 running line derailments NSW, NT, TAS, Train km (million) 82.9 82.3 102.7 267.9 ONRSR and Great Britain VIC, ACT, WA) Rate 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.049
Heavy rail in-service passenger Great Britain Derailments1 0 0 3 3 trains only, including tourist and (GB) Train km (million)2 510.6 517.5 521.8 1549.9 heritage mainline operations. Includes Rate 0 0 0.006 0.002 derailments on non-running lines affecting the safety of running lines. 1 Source: Rail Safety and Standards Board, Annual Safety These ONRSR statistics include Performance Report 2015/16, RSSB, UK, 2016 ACT from 2014–2015, WA from 2 Source: Office of Rail and Road, National Rail Trends (NRT) Portal 2 November 2015. (accessed 25 October 2016) http://dataportal.orr.gov.uk/
A comparison of the rate of mainline FREIGHT TRAIN There were 30 running line derailments passenger train derailment between involving freight rolling stock in the ONRSR regulated railways and the DERAILMENT 2015–2016 financial year: mainline railway of GB is summarised Freight train derailment risk is generally • 28 freight train derailments; and in Table 4. observed to have a higher frequency of occurrence but a lower consequence of • 2 light locomotive derailments. event in comparison to passenger train Appendix A3 presents summary The ONRSR data in Table 4 are a derailment. However, depending on the statistics, segmented by jurisdiction. subset of the derailments summarised location of the freight train derailment, in Figure 3, and only includes heavy rail there is potential for post-derailment The five-year history of freight train derailments together with mainline tourist interaction with other trains, including derailment is summarised in Figure 4. and heritage passenger operations. passenger trains, or members of the A summary of some of the public in the vicinity of the rail corridor, The passenger train derailment rate more significant freight train in which cases the consequences for Australian operations over the past derailments follows. can be higher. three years (0.049 per million train km) is over 20 times higher than that of GB (0.002 per million train km). This result arises from GB having no passenger train derailments for two years running from 2013–2015.
16 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Table 5 Date Description Location Selected freight train 06/08/2015 A freight train derailed near Nala, Tasmania. The train was Nala, running line derailments, travelling from Boyer to Burnie when 18 wagons derailed. TAS July 2015 to June 2016 28/08/2015 A loaded freight train derailed the 19th wagon as a result Pangela, Railway operations within SA, of a wheel failure. There were no injuries, but the derailment NSW NSW, TAS, NT, VIC, ACT and WA caused damage to over 590 metres of track including from 2 November 2015 regulated 963 sleepers. under the RSNL. 31/10/2015 The rear three wagons of a freight train completely Near derailed and were significantly damaged. The fourth last Marla, wagon derailed its rear platform, but remained upright. SA A comparison of the rate of mainline About 1,500m of track was significantly damaged. freight train derailment between ONRSR There were no injuries reported. regulated railways and the mainline railway of GB is summarised in Table 5. 09/11/2015 A freight train consisting of two locomotives and Nunga The local data in Table 5 are a subset 20 wagons derailed. The trailing wagon derailed and (near Ouyen), approximately 1,500m of track was damaged. There VIC of derailments summarised in Figure 4. were no injuries reported.
03/12/2015 Twenty-four wagons on a freight train derailed causing the Port Hedland, closure of both the East and West Newman Main Lines. WA
04/12/2015 A freight train derailed during a severe storm. Rawlinna, Thirty-nine vehicles derailed, with 12 overturned. A fire WA started within one refrigerated food van and burned itself out. The derailment damaged approximately 550 metres of track. There were no physical injuries to the train drivers, but the two relief drivers were badly shaken when the crew van rolled on its side.
15/12/2015 A freight train derailed 58 wagons in the lead of Tom Price an empty 236 wagon train on the Tom Price Line. Line, No injuries were reported. WA
20/12/2015 A freight train stopped on account of the driver seeing dust Gunningbland, being stirred up behind the locomotive. Upon investigation it NSW was found that a bogie had collapsed under the 20th wagon. There were no injuries but the derailment caused damaged to approximately 2,000m of track including 4,000 sleepers.
29/12/2015 A freight train derailed near the Williams Street level Ouyen, crossing in Ouyen, Victoria. Twelve wagons derailed VIC resulting in significant damage to the wagons, the level crossing and track either side of the crossing. There were no injuries reported.
19/1/2016 An empty freight train derailed the leading bogie of the Denman, 67th wagon in a train of 94 wagons. The bogie continued NSW in a derailed state for about 750m until the wheels of the bogie struck the metal plates of Rosemount Road level crossing and re-railed. The crew of the train remained unaware of the incident and continued until alerted by Train Control owing to failed signalling equipment caused by the derailment.
21/4/2016 Both locomotives, a crew van and approximately six Rawlinna, wagons of a freight train derailed, with the locomotives WA and crew van coming to rest on their sides. One crew member travelling in the crew van received injuries which required medical treatment.
30/05/2016 A freight train derailed twelve wagons, resulting in Kutunga, significant damage to the wagons and the track. VIC There were no injuries reported.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 17 Rail Safety Statistical Summary
DERAILMENT NOT INVOLVING PASSENGER OR FREIGHT ROLLING STOCK In the 2015 –2016 financial year there were 14 derailments associated with rolling stock used for track maintenance, and no serious injuries were reported for any of these incidents. These events tend to occur at low speed and on track closed to normal traffic. Approximately 70% of these derailments involved Road Rail Vehicles (RRVs).
Table 6 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 3 Years Freight train running line ONRSR (SA, Derailments 39 23 28 90 derailments — ONRSR NSW, NT, TAS, Train km (million) 35.3 33.4 52.5 121.2 and Great Britain VIC, ACT, WA) Rate 1.105 0.689 0.533 0.742
Includes derailments on non-running Great Britain1 Derailments1 8 14 6 28 lines affecting the safety of running Train km (million)2 42.0 41.0 34.9 117.9 lines. Excludes light locomotives. Rate 0.190 0.341 0.172 0.238 These ONRSR statistics include ACT from 2014–2015, WA 1 Source: Rail Safety and Standards Board, Annual Safety from 2 November 2015. Performance Report 2015/16, RSSB, UK, 2016 2 Source: Office of Rail and Road, National Rail Trends (NRT) Portal (accessed 25 October 2016) http://dataportal.orr.gov.uk/
Table 7 Date Description Location Selected Derailments 25/07/2015 A Road Rail Vehicle derailed while travelling between Denman, Not Involving Passenger 70–75 km/h. Some damage was sustained to all SA or Freight Rolling Stock wheels on the vehicle. July 2015 to June 2016 14/08/2015 A Road Rail Vehicle derailed at the expansion joints on Seaford Railway operations within SA, NSW, the entrance to a viaduct. The vehicle was travelling at low Line, SA TAS, NT, VIC, ACT and WA from speed when the front axle left the track. No injuries were sustained and there was no visible damage to the machine. 2 November 2015 regulated under the RSNL. 01/01/2016 A Fire Patrol Trolley arrived at Gembrook Station Gembrook, after completing its journey behind a passenger train. VIC After the locomotive of the train had shunted, the trolley driver drove the trolley towards the siding at the station but did not realise that the diesel locomotive was foul of the siding. This resulted in a low speed collision between the trolley and stationary locomotive and a minor derailment. There were no injuries reported or significant damage to either vehicle.
10/01/2016 A Road Rail Vehicle hit a cow and derailed, Marryat, damaging the vehicle. There were no injuries. SA
13/05/2016 A regulator and tamper travelling as one unit derailed, Homebush, resulting in damage to 175 concrete sleepers and two NSW breaks in the rail.
18 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator COLLISIONS BETWEEN TRAINS AND WITH ROLLING STOCK Collisions between trains and with rolling stock are some of the more potentially serious rail safety events. The likelihood and consequences of collisions vary according to factors such as the systems used to manage train movement (for example, signal-based, train order working) and the types of trains involved. A major determinant of risk is the involvement of a passenger train because of the potential exposure of large numbers of passengers to harm. There were six running line collisions involving rolling stock in the 2015–2016 financial year, on railways regulated under the RSNL. These consisted of: • one minor collision between in-service passenger trains; (see table 8) Figure 5 • one collision between a Running line collisions July 2011 to June 2016 runaway tramcar and tourist All rail operations regulated under RSNL (Victorian data from and heritage tram; 2013–2014 onwards, ACT from 2014–2015, WA from 2 November 2015). • one collision between Includes collisions on non-running lines affecting the safety of running lines. a loco and wagons; Excludes trains striking or being struck by out of gauge equipment on trains on adjacent lines. Passenger trains include tourist and heritage trains on • one collision between a freight mainlines and isolated lines. train and banker locomotive; • one collision between RRVs; and • one collision between two 8 infrastructure maintenance vehicles. 7 s 6 Appendix A4 presents summary statistics, segmented by jurisdiction. 5 collision 4
The five-year history of running line of collisions is summarised in Figure 5. 3
umber 2 N 1
0 6 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 5 –1 5 –1 5 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 15 15 15 11 14 11 12 13 14 11 12 13 14 12 13 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Between in-service In-service passenger Not involving passenger trains train & other train in-service passenger train
The running line collisions involving in-service passenger trains and not involving in-service passenger trains, for the 2015–2016 financial year, are summarised in Table 8 and Table 9, respectively.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 19 Rail Safety Statistical Summary
Table 8 Date Description Location Collisions involving 15/05/2016 An unmanned tram rolled away for approximately 300 Loftus, in-service passenger trains metres from a museum and struck another tram that was in NSW July 2015 to June 2016 service on a heritage tramway. No injuries were reported. Railway operations within SA, 16/06/2016 The mirrors of passing passenger trains struck. One train Williamstown NSW, TAS, NT, VIC, ACT and WA was stationary, the other moving out of the station. Station, VIC from 2 November 2015 regulated under the RSNL.
Table 9 Date Description Location Collisions not involving 14/07/2015 A ballast regulator track maintenance vehicle waiting at a Greta, in-service passenger trains signal was struck in the rear by a tamper track maintenance NSW July 2015 to June 2016 vehicle. The tamper was travelling at 15 km/h at time of collision. Minor damage to the vehicles was reported. Railway operations within SA, NSW, TAS, NT, VIC, ACT and WA 13/09/2015 A freight train stopped suddenly due to a signal change Ardglen, from 2 November 2015 regulated on approach resulting in assisting banker engines colliding NSW with the rear of the train. under the RSNL. 18/11/2015 A locomotive travelling from the mainline into a siding Combara, struck a wagon standing on the main line, resulting NSW in minor damage to the locomotive.
10/02/2016 A Road Rail Vehicle ran into the rear of a freight train. Grass Valley, No injuries were reported. Midland - Kalgoorlie Line, WA
LEVEL CROSSING There were 27 level crossing collisions Of the 27 level crossing collisions between trains or trams and road in the 2015–2016 financial year: COLLISION vehicles in the 2015–2016 financial 24 involved trains colliding with Level crossings are the primary year on railways regulated under motor vehicles, one involved a tram means by which the general public the RSNL. They consisted of: and a bicycle, one involved a tram and a motor vehicle and one collision may legitimately traverse the rail • 15 collisions involving involved a RRV and a motorcycle. corridor and they present a unique passenger trains; set of safety hazards. The five-year history of level crossing • eight involving freight trains; There are at least 23,000 level crossings collisions between train and road in Australia. Approximately 93% are road • two involving trams; and vehicle is summarised in Figure 6. crossings with the remainder solely for • two involving RRVs/track pedestrian use. maintenance vehicles. Appendix A6 presents summary statistics, segmented by jurisdiction.
20 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Figure 6 s 16 14 Level crossing collisions collision 12 July 2011 to June 2016 10
ossing 8
Level crossing collisions between cr l
train and road vehicle, July 2011 to June ve 6 le 2016. All rail operations regulated under 4 the RSNL as of 30 June 2016 (Victorian of 2 data from 2013–2014 onwards, ACT from
Number 0 6 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2014–2015, WA from 2 November 2015). 2 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 5 –1 5 –1 5 –1 –1 –1 –1 –1 Includes bicycles which are defined as –1 15 15 15 11 13 14 11 12 13 14 11 12 13 14 12 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 road vehicles in the national occurrence 20 classification scheme. “Other train” Passenger trainFreight train Other train consists of infrastructure maintenance rolling stock, light engines, trams and tourist and heritage trains on isolated railways.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 21 Rail Safety Statistical Summary
Table 10 Date Description Location Selected level crossing 15/07/2015 A cyclist passenger alighted from a tram at Taverners Hill Taverners collisions with road vehicles station, turned in front of the tram to traverse the pedestrian Hill Light Rail July 2015 to June 2016 walkway and was struck, receiving injuries. Stop, NSW Railway operations within SA, 06/08/2015 Passenger train travelling at approximately 115 km/h collided Yarrawonga NSW, TAS, NT, VIC, ACT and with a motor vehicle that was reported to have disobeyed Rd, Benalla, WA from 2 November 2015, warning equipment. The level crossing had boom barrier VIC protection. No injuries to train crew or passengers were regulated under the RSNL. reported. The motor vehicle driver was taken to hospital for observation. Minor damage to the locomotive of the train was reported.
28/08/2015 A motor vehicle towing a trailer drove into the side of a Sandhill passenger train at a level crossing protected by stop signs. Rd, Stratford, No injuries to the train crew or passengers were reported. VIC
31/08/2015 A passenger train collided with a stationary motor vehicle Princes that had driven onto the track from the level crossing. Highway, No injuries were reported, with the occupants having Unanderra, exited the vehicle prior to the collision. The crossing NSW barriers had been working before the incident.
02/09/2015 A motor vehicle foul of the level crossing was struck by Dendy St a passenger train. It was reported that an elderly couple (New St), abandoned the vehicle upon level crossing activation, and Brighton, that efforts to contact the train driver prior to impact were VIC unsuccessful. No injuries were reported.
23/09/2015 A road-train truck struck a freight train at a level crossing Tullamore Rd, controlled by flashing lights and audible warning devices. Narwonah, The truck driver was killed in the collision. NSW
01/10/2015 A cyclist was struck by a passenger train on the railway Main St, crossing and seriously injured. Pakenham, VIC
02/10/2015 It was reported that a motor vehicle failed to stop at a Murray crossing and ran into the side of a passenger train, causing Valley Hwy, minor damage to the train. The motor vehicle driver was Echuca, transported to hospital for observation. The crossing VIC was protected by boom barriers.
24/10/2015 A motor vehicle struck a passenger train at a crossing Locksley Rd, controlled by flashing lights and audible warning devices. Nagambie, No injuries to the train crew or passenger were reported. VIC Minor damage to the train and railway infrastructure was reported and the motor vehicle driver was taken to hospital for observation.
05/03/2016 A passenger train struck a motor vehicle at a crossing Munro St, protected by boom barriers, which were reported as Coburg, operating at the time of the collision. VIC No injuries were reported.
10/03/2016 A passenger train struck a motor vehicle at a crossing Warragul Rd, protected by boom barriers, which were reported as Mentone, operating at the time of the collision. VIC No injuries were reported.
18/03/2016 A motor vehicle crashed through boom gates and collided Liddiard Rd, with a passenger train. No injuries were reported. Traralgon, VIC
22 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator The Ghan, Date Description Location Northern Territory 24/03/2016 A freight train stuck a motor vehicle towing an empty Martin Pelusey horse float at a crossing protected by flashing lights. Rd, Waterloo, A minor injury to the motor vehicle driver was reported. WA
31/03/2016 A motorcyclist collided with a Road Rail Vehicle. The level Sheffield Rd, crossing equipment was unable to activate on account of the Spreyton, insulated nature of the Road Rail Vehicle failing to activate TAS signalling circuits. The driver of the Road Rail Vehicle gave way to vehicles, switched on warning lights and sounded horn before proceeding across the level crossing. No injuries were reported.
21/04/2016 A motor vehicle collided with a freight train at a crossing Henry’s Lane, protected with stop signs. Two occupants in the car suffered Moorland, critical injuries and were evacuated by helicopter to hospital. NSW Another injured motor vehicle occupant, and the shocked train crew, were also transported to hospital for medical treatment.
13/05/2016 A passenger train struck a motor vehicle at a crossing Platform Rd, protected by stop signs. No injuries were reported. Kellys Plains, NSW
01/06/2016 A passenger train struck a motor vehicle at a crossing Main Rd West protected by boom barriers, which were reported as (Main Rd East), operating at the time of the collision. St Albans, No injuries were reported. VIC
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 23 Rail Safety Statistical Summary
WORKFORCE STRUCK FIRE BY ROLLING STOCK There were approximately 600 fires One of the largest risks to railway in the 2015–2016 financial year on workers is being struck by rolling railways regulated under the RSNL. stock while working in the rail corridor. These consisted of: On 18 June 2016 a track worker was • line side fires (approximately 75% struck and killed by a passenger train at of notifications). The majority were Clyde (NSW). On 2 October 2015 a track grass and rubbish fires either within worker was struck and suffered serious or adjacent to the rail corridor injuries in Laverton (Victoria). Both events have been subject to ATSB investigations • train fires (approximately 13% (with the Clyde, New South Wales of notifications). Most of these investigation still underway) and also involved arson on metropolitan led to ONRSR compliance investigations. passenger trains. Freight train fires were associated primarily with locomotive faults; and Track Work • fires on or adjacent to stations Competency and (approximately 12% of notifications). These generally involved small fires Communication in bins, station toilets or sleeper was identified as fires adjacent to platforms. a national priority The vast majority of fires result in for ONRSR in the no injuries. There were no fatalities previous Rail Safety or serious injuries due to fires reported Report. This area for the 2015–2016 financial year. remains a focus and The five-year history of passenger is covered in more train fires is summarised in Figure 7 detail on page 36. (note, Victoria data is included from 2013–2014 onwards and WA data is included from 2 November 2015 onwards). There were 30 passenger train fires in the 2015–2016 financial Figure 7 year. This represents a significant drop in numbers from the previous year (74). Passenger train fires July 2011 to June 2016 A number of factors are likely to have SA and NSW data for full period, Victorian data is included contributed to this reduction in fires from 2013–2014 onwards, WA data from 2 November 2015 including additional cleaning onwards. Data shown is that classified as OC-G1 requirements to reduce combustible top event category Fire — on train. materials on trains, and increasingly modern train fleets with updated fire retardation properties and 150 enhanced security surveillance.
125 s
ence 100
occurr 75 of
50 umber N 25
0 2011–122012–13 2013–142014–15 2015–16
24 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Table 11 Date Description Location Selected passenger train fires 01/7/2015 Passengers were evacuated due to an electrical Elizabeth July 2015 to June 2016 fire within the alternator of a railcar. Station, SA
Railway operations within SA, 17/8/2015 A smoke alarm was activated due to a chair being St Mary’s, NSW, TAS, NT, VIC, ACT, and WA set alight on a passenger train. No injuries reported. NSW from 2 November 2015, regulated under the RSNL. 26/11/2015 Passengers were evacuated and the fire brigade called Katoomba, as a result of smoke being emitted from a train carriage. NSW
09/06/2016 A small fire in the electrical cabinet within the buffet area Coffs Harbour, of a passenger train occurred. No injuries were reported. NSW
Katoomba Station, New South Wales
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 25 Rail Safety Statistical Summary
Figure 8 400 350 Broken rail s 300 July 2011 to June 2016 250
SA and NSW data for full occurrence 200
period, Victorian data is included of 150 from 2013–2014 onwards, WA data 100 umber
from 2 November 2015 onwards. N Data shown is that classified 50 as OC-G1 top event category 0 6 4 3 2 –1 –1 –15 –1 broken rail — detected outside –1 11 15 12 13 14 20 20 maintenance inspection 20 20 20
Figure 9
Signal passed at danger without 250 authority — passenger train s July 2011 to June 2016 200
SA and NSW data for full period, 150
Victorian data is included from occurrence
2013–2014 onwards, WA data of 100 from 2 November 2015 onwards.
umber 50
Data shown is that classified as OC-G1 N top event categories; Driver misjudged, 0 6 4
completely missed while running; and 3 2 –1 –1 –1 5 –1 start against signal. Excludes tourist –1 11 12 13 14 15
and heritage operators. 20 20 20 20 20
OTHER RISKS SIGNALS PASSED AT Within the large pool of minor incidents notified there exists a small number of Infrastructure irregularities are DANGER WITHOUT events representing the precondition a significant contributor to train AUTHORITY for escalation to a more serious derailment risk, noting these consist consequence. These include larger of a wide range of failures including Instances of passenger trains exceeding or high mass objects fouling tracks rail breaks, track misalignment, points the limit of their authorised movement, such as road vehicles, entire trees and failures and track obstructions. The are considered important precursors to landslips. In 2015–2016, six collisions frequency of broken rail occurrences collisions. On signalled systems these between trains (excluding trams) and is summarised as one indicator of occurrences are notified as a signal motor vehicles at locations other than train derailment risk. The five-year passed at danger without authority level crossings were reported, though history of broken rails is (SPAD). SPADs are also an important fortunately none of these events presented in Figure 8. precursor to derailments. The five- resulted in a derailment. year history of passenger train SPADs is summarised in Figure 9. Significant bad weather events can also result in landslips and track washaways, which pose a risk to rail operations. Such a weather event on 5 June 2016 in NSW Train collision resulted in three separate washaway with other objects and landslide events and collisions with passenger trains. Minor damage to a Collisions between trains and track train was reported in one of these three obstructions are a possible cause incidents and emergency services of derailment. For the vast majority had to be called to another. of collisions with objects, however, these Examples of some other potentially incidents represent hazards and events serious occurrences of collisions that pose no direct threat to safety and between trains and objects are have little chance of escalation. These shown in Table 12. events often include instances of collision with vegetation and rubbish being blown onto the track, or the illegal dumping of household items.
26 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator The five-year level of broken rails is high and one of ONRSR’s regulatory priorities is to address track condition as a contributor to derailments.
Table 12 Date Description Location Selected collisions 06/07/2015 A heritage rail car with passengers on board collided Coles Beach, between trains and objects with buffer stops and derailed at Coles Beach, Devonport. TAS July 2015 to June 2016 The buffer stops were pushed approximately eight metres. There were no injuries reported. Railway operations within SA, NSW, TAS, NT, VIC, ACT and WA 21/07/2015 A freight train being shunted was pushed back through Port Pirie Yard, from 2 November 2015 regulated a dead end resulting in the last wagon being significantly SA damaged, with the body of the wagon lifted off the bogies. under the RSNL. 17/10/2015 A passenger train ran over two golf buggies that had East Grange been placed on the track. The buggies became stuck Station, SA and the train was unable to move.
15/11/2015 A heritage tram approaching a temporary terminus stop St Kilda, travelling at approximately 5 km/h through a public reserve SA failed to stop and collided with a temporary construction fence. No injuries were reported, with minor damage to the tram.
16/12/2015 A freight train became disabled on a viaduct after Boggabri, striking metal plates blown onto the line during a storm. NSW Crew had to be evacuated by emergency services and the train was recovered the next day.
19/12/2015 A passenger train struck formwork at a worksite. Telarah, Minor injuries to a worker on site was reported. NSW
06/02/2016 A freight train travelling at 30 km/h struck debris on the Hanbury Jct, track. The debris was found to be part of a retaining wall. NSW
01/04/2016 A passenger train struck a large rock that had fallen Cowan, from a cliff, resulting in damage to the train. NSW
17/05/2016 A passenger train collided with metal grates, boulders Narara, and debris placed on the track, resulting in extensive NSW damage to the train.
14/06/2016 A passenger train struck a sheet of sound baffling Woollahra, hanging from a tunnel entrance. No damage was reported. NSW
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 27 A Year in Review
2015–2016 A Year in Review
28 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator The summary statistics presented in the Administering the Rail Safety National previous chapter provide a snapshot of Law using a risk-based approach to the rail industry’s safety performance regulation means that key decisions over the last year. This information not within ONRSR, such as the setting of only provides an insight into how safe the national priorities and the development industry is, it also acts as a key source of of the annual compliance and inspection regulatory intelligence that ONRSR uses work program, are informed by an to direct effort and resources inline with assessment of risks to rail safety. its risk-based approach to regulation. This involves: This chapter presents a summary • developing an understanding of of ONRSR’s approach to risk-based the risks to the safety of railway regulation and an update on the four operations in Australia; areas ONRSR set as national priorities • prioritising these risks and determining last year. This section also provides which risks ONRSR is able to influence an update on two other areas of through its regulatory activities; and regulatory attention which ONRSR prioritises by risk — regulatory • designing and prioritising regulatory attention to major rail projects activities and outcomes in a way and safety improvement initiatives. that best maintains and improves rail safety.
RISK-BASED REGULATION IN ONRSR ONRSR’s Risk-based Risk-based regulation is an approach Decisions to regulation in which regulatory effort ONRSR’s Framework for Risk-based is commensurate with risk and scope Regulation categorises regulatory for improvement. It is the application of decisions into one of three tiers of a systematic framework that prioritises importance: Tier 1 decisions, which regulatory activities and deployment are those with the greatest potential to of regulators’ resources on an evidence- impact rail safety and are therefore the based assessment of risk.8 Rather than primary focus of risk-based regulation; focussing on prescriptive rules, risk- Tier 2 decisions, which are of a second- based regulation places assessment, ary focus; and Tier 3 decisions, which quantification and monitoring of risk do not generally impact rail safety. at the heart of regulatory design and This is depicted in Figure 10. implementation. While regulators have always made regulatory design, implementation and allocation choices, 8 Adapted from Baldwin, partly to manage limited resources, R & Black, J (2007), ‘Really risk-based regulation formalises responsive regulation’, Law, Society and Economy and provides consistent structure Working Papers 15/2007, to the decision making process.9 London School of Economics, London and Black, J (2010a), ‘Risk-based regulation’, Presentation to the Future of Legal Regulation Conference, Birkbeck College, London, 14 June.
9 Adapted from Sparrow, M (2000), The regulatory craft, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 29 A Year in Review
Figure 10 • Greatest potential impact on rail safety Decision Tiers of • Made to directly fulfil primary functions of ONRSR Regulatory Importance 1 E.g. Determining the outcome of an ty application for accreditation fe sa
CISIONS il ra
DE TIER on n
• Potential to impact rail safety R decisio
2 • Made to support primary functions of e ONRS
th
ONRSR or to fulfil secondary functions in
of
CISIONS E.g. Determining a topic for a safety bulletin DE
TIER s made impact l
• Generally has little bearing on rail safety l decision al
• Involves decisions of a corporate nature potentia
3 E.g. Selecting a publishing service CISIONS provider for corporate reports TIERDE Represents Increasing
Figure 11 Positioning ONRSR’s Tier 1 Decisions
Basic Model for Authorise entry into Monitor Investigate Take enforcement Regulation regulated industry compliance suspected breaches action
ONRSR Audit & Functional Accreditation Investigations Enforcement compliance Areas
Undertake audits & inspections
ONRSR Take Processing Perform compliance Regulatory enforcement applications investigations Activities action
Undertake Drug & Alcohol testing
ONRSR D8. Determine appropriate D1. Determine the outcome D3. Determine D7. Determine appropriate Tier 1 compliance & of an application national priorities investigation option Decisions enforcement tool
D2. Determine the response D4. Set RTO mimimum to notification of change interaction levels
D5. Determine focus areas for audit & inspection
D6. Determine target areas for D&A testing
30 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator The framework identifies eight Tier 1 decisions and sets out the risk-based Figure 12 requirements to be undertaken during the decision-making process for each. ONRSR’s Model for The eight Tier 1 decisions made by Risk-based Regulation ONRSR are listed in Figure 11, which illustrates the position of each decision Gather Regulatory Intelligence in the wider model of regulation. 1
External Rail Operator Accreditation Complience ONRSR’s Model Reports: Reporting: Activities: Activities: for Risk-based • ATSB reports • Occurances • Variations • Audits • REPCON • Periodic • Conditions • Inspections Regulation Reporting • Coroner • Not. of • Investigations ONRSR applies a four-stage method reports • SPR’s / AAS’s change • Site Visits for risk-based regulation. These stages • Investigation • Applications reports are illustrated in Figure 12 and are R summarised below:
• S tage 1 MONI TO Gather regulatory intelligence Consider Risk to Rail Safety ONRSR gathers regulatory intelligence 2 from a variety of sources, including operator reporting, third party reports, Rail safety Operator risk Change risk hazards factors factors and through its regulatory interactions with industry. This allows ONRSR to monitor operators’ safety Operators’ Rail safety worker Asset risk Safety performance. risk factors factors Performance • Stage 2 Consider risks to rail safety By analysing and drawing Make Regulatory Decisions upon the regulatory intelligence 3 it gathers, ONRSR is able to build D2. Determine a picture of risks to rail safety D1. Determine the D3. Determine response to outcome of an national across the industry. This includes, notification of application priorities for example, understanding safety change risk profiles of operators and the risks associated with
capital investment projects. D4. Set operator D5. Determine focus D6. Determine target minimum areas for compliance areas for Drug • S tage 3 interaction levels audit & inspection & Alcohol testing Make regulatory decisions Operators’ Risk Based on the understanding Management of risks to rail safety from Stage 2, Activities D8. Determine D7. Determine ONRSR is able to make informed appropriate appropriate compliance & regulatory planning and investigation option enforcement tool implementation decisions to best drive and influence risk reduction across industry. Undertake Regulatory Activities • S tage 4 4 E Undertake regulatory activities UENC ONRSR implements the decisions Enforcement Publications: Accreditation Compliance Actions: Activities: Activities: and plans formulated in Stage 3, • Policies INFL • Cancellations • Variations • Audits by interacting with industry using a • Guidelines /suspensions • Conditions • Inspections variety of tools and measures, ranging • Safety • Presecutions from publication of guidelines to bulletins • Not. Change • Investigations • Statutory • Safety • Applications • Site Visits enforcement actions. Notices Alerts • Non- • Rail Safety conformance Report • Education
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 31 A Year in Review
Steam locomotive, Australian Capital Territory
Risk-based Regulation Case Study Setting Minimum Interaction Levels for Operators (D4) The minimum frequencies with which ONRSR undertakes audit and inspection activities on accredited operators are ONRSR assigns risk scores to each Industry Risk Model known as Minimum Interaction Levels. operator by assessing a series of These levels are set annually as part of quantitative and qualitative risk ONRSR’s risk-based approach to the development of the National Audit factors across four categories: regulation is underpinned by regulatory and Compliance Work Program. intelligence gathered by ONRSR from • Inherent Risk internal and external sources. The The general principle behind the setting Score assigned based on the current development of an industry risk model of Minimum Interaction Levels is that the size, scope and complexity of an is a key element which is expected to greater the level of rail safety risk an operator’s railway operations. present a new and important source of operator exposes the community to, • Dynamic Risk regulatory intelligence. Once complete, it the greater that operator’s Minimum Score assigned based on the level is expected that the model will help guide Interaction Level will be. of operational, organisational or asset industry and regulatory decision making change either recently completed, or and enable a shared understanding currently underway, with the potential of safety priorities, reinforcing to affect the safety of the operator’s co-regulation. rail operations. • Compliance Risk Score assigned based on the operator’s recent performance during regulatory interactions. • O ccurrence Risk Score assigned based on the operator’s safety performance, determined through analysis of notifiable occurrence statistics. The risk scores are then combined with input from subject matter experts to set Minimum Interaction Levels for each operator. This is a key input into ONRSR’s annual work program.
32 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator National Priorities Four national priorities were selected by ONRSR in 2015 and have been the focus of regulatory attention over the last 12 months. While individually unique, each of the priorities shares specific characteristics — the topics require sustained regulatory focus of at least 1 year, the issues affect railways across the country and the areas are those where compliance and enforce- ment methods are appropriate regulatory responses.
The four priorities are: 1. Track condition; 2. Track work - competency and communication; 3. Ro lling stock maintenance; and 4. Road Rail Vehicle (RRV) safety
While progress has been made with all of the priorities, further work is required to achieve the safety outcomes set. Each of the priorities will be retained moving into 2017. What follows is further information on why the priority was chosen, what the specific focus for ONRSR is and what progress has been made to date.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 33 Current Regulatory & Safety Improvement Focus
Track Condition
Track condition was selected as a Further analysis of the investigation b. Degraded track national priority after a review of literature reports identified a number of precursors condition not corrected and available occurrence data identified and contributing factors, including; a number of higher risk issues with the i. Series of track geometry a. Degraded track potential for derailment. These were: irregularities, causing undesirable condition not detected broken rails, track geometry (including harmonic response in rail vehicles
wide gauge), misalignments (heat i. Limitations of ultrasonic testing buckles), and broken (defective) joints. ii. Rough ride reports not being and over-reliance on ultrasonic testing Initial concerns were supported by a verified before next train
review of ATSB Investigation reports, ii. Inaccuracy of recorded which identified poor track condition iii. Defects past intervention location by inspection vehicle as the most common causal factor levels being mitigated by speed
of the derailment events investigated. restrictions — acceptance of iii. Inadequate inspection method low speed derailments
iv. Insufficient inspection regime or iv. Defects with monitoring status inspection regime not adhered to being left untreated until reaching
emergency status v. Inability to inspect rail and
fasteners due to being covered v. Insufficient or inadequate — for example at level crossings rail creep management
vi. Rough rides not being reported c. Adverse weather vii. Vintage rail in use without adequate inspection regime/ i. Hot weather controls not replacement strategy implemented or adhered to
ii. Insufficient guidance on hot weather speed restrictions
iii. Insufficient or inadequate adverse weather management
34 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator To tackle this national priority, ONRSR To date the program has resulted e. Insufficient objective evidence around is reviewing track standards and the in a number of Non-Conformance the elimination and minimisation of inspection regimes applied by Rail Reports (NCRs) being issued and risks ‘So Far As Is Reasonably Transport Operators to verify these findings, which include the following: Practicable’ (SFAIRP) in respect regimes through compliance inspection to management of the track a. Lack of sufficient monitoring/ of those operators responsible for buckling risk; and auditing of compliance to standards; managing rail infrastructure. The f. Ineffective training and assessment principal focus of these inspections b. Lack of sufficient monitoring/ of field staff in respect to summertime is on track stability, track geometry auditing for the implementation of maintenance practices. /rail management and general track asset management systems; track condition. ONRSR is working with the operators c. Insufficient clarity of management involved in addressing these issues As part of the project there has responsibilities, accountabilities, and work on this priority with been active engagement between authorities and limits of authority other operators continues. ONRSR and RTOs, which has resulted (from provisioning centre/ in improvements being identified and maintenance depot level to implemented in relation to track head office); stability management. The objective of the project is to d. Insufficient management oversight promote, enhance and increase ONRSR’s focus in 2015–2016 included and verification of maintenance safety in relation to track condition. compliance inspections and activities documentation to satisfy ONRSR Outcomes stemming from on lateral track stability and summertime that risk controls implemented the program include: maintenance. The inspections used a have been suitably reviewed number of factors, such as tight radius prior to their implementation; a. An aligned understanding between curves, opposing gradients and other ONRSR and operators in relation intelligence to determine the locations to risks associated with adverse to be targeted. track conditions. b. A more detailed understanding of RIM’s implementation of systems/ procedures/processes surrounding effective and adequate management of adverse track conditions. c. A more detailed understanding of RIM’s implementation of systems/ procedures/processes surrounding the effective management of track geometry and rail defects. d. Regulatory reporting (Compliance Inspection) detailing any potential observations, non-conformances and improvements to the responsible RIM.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 35 Current Regulatory & Safety Improvement Focus
Rusted dog spike, Old Ghan Railway, Northern Territory
Track work — Competency and Communication
During the 2014–2015 financial year there were over 400 occurrence reports relating to track work safe working breaches notified to ONRSR, with rail safety worker competence and safety critical communication a recurring theme. An analysis of the data available to ONRSR identified the following common safety factors associated with worksite occurrences: • protection types being insufficient or incorrect;
• protection location being The inspection/audit activities have To date a number of inspections/audits incorrectly positioned (worksite been selected based on the intelligence have been completed in 2016 with being incorrectly defined); and knowledge available on specific compliance reports completed by • protections being incorrectly operators with at least one inspection ONRSR Rail Safety Officers identifying removed; and of each rail transport operator that operator specific issues. undertakes or manages on-track There has been positive engagement • worksite location being rail safety workers on the major rail between rail safety officers and operators incorrectly identified. networks within ONRSR jurisdictions. during the compliance activities under- The inspection/audit activities are These issues were considered taken thus far and learnings have been not limited to workers of accredited significant enough to warrant identified by all parties. These learnings operators and may also cover labour hire inclusion as a national priority. will assist the ONRSR in planning and companies and training organisations as conducting future activities and for the circumstances require. ONRSR is operators, this will progress the also reviewing the role of the industry intended safety outcomes from ONRSR established an internal project track worker cards and associated the program which include: to improve its understanding of how training management in assisting with operators are addressing ongoing track the management of worker competency. • a reduction in track worker related safety worker occurrences and to incident(s) and occurrences, promote, enhance and increase track ONRSR’s Rail Safety Officers are worker safety through inspection or audit requesting and reviewing operator • a greater understanding by activities. The project principally focuses investigations into track worker safety operators surrounding track on verifying field operations by under- occurrences that exhibit the common worker safety risks and; taking track work safety related safety factors associated with worksite inspection/audit activities to sample occurrences. This will allow ONRSR • operators’ implementation of systems/ and test the in-the-field application of to become better informed as to how procedures/processes to deliver appropriate safe working systems and operators are addressing track worker effective and adequate management to confirm whether workers hold the safety related occurrences and, where of track worker safety risks. appropriate competencies both on necessary, facilitate more appropriate track and at network control. investigative or corrective outcomes. The outcomes and learnings from these activities will be summarised and used as an input into a safety improvement project that is currently in development.
36 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Rolling Stock Maintenance
Rolling stock maintenance was selected ONRSR’s focus during scheduled To date ONRSR has undertaken as a national priority after a significant inspections, audits and interactions audit and compliance inspections number of rolling stock component with operators and maintainers includes: on accredited RTOs and organisations failures had been reported during undertaking maintenance services on • Effectiveness of operators’ defects 2014–2015. Furthermore, an audit of rolling stock safety critical equipment management system with a focus on maintainers (both accredited operators for accredited RTOs. The project has the contractual agreement between and third party organisations) yielded provided the rolling stock maintenance the operator and maintainer and the poor results across all sectors. service providers with an improved records of the maintainer; understanding of their obligations under There is also an increasing trend of • Operators’ internal trend Section 53 of the RSNL (general Duties), contractors performing maintenance monitoring and post occurrence/ and the requirements to comply with the activities, which warrants monitoring. defect engineering investigations; RTO’s Safety Management System, In particular, ensuring that the accredited whilst also developing communication operators’ systems for maintenance and • Auditing/monitoring of non-accredited channels between ONRSR and the safety management are fully applied by rolling stock maintainers — typically, maintainers. So far the key issues it’s contractors, some of which are not there is a low level of auditing by some identified by ONRSR inspections being accredited. Poor maintenance has the operators of the process control followed-up with the rolling stock potential to lead to safety critical records of the maintainer. Therefore, maintenance service providers are: rolling stock component failures. the operator’s audits must include the process control aspects which, in turn, • Failure to establish standards for The intended safety outcomes must reflect the standards defined in performing maintenance services. from the program include: contracts between the operator and • Lack of adequate processes for • A reduction in specific rolling the maintainer; the review and amendment of stock related irregularities; • Data analysis of out of course/ technical documents. • An aligned understanding gained in-service faults and failures; and • Lack of internal monitoring, with by ONRSR, operators and third • Follow up of Notification of Change maintenance practices differing from party maintainers surrounding submissions which involve the the requirements contained in the risks associated with rolling stock introduction of new rolling stock or technical documentation. maintenance practices and defect revised rolling stock maintenance management systems; and • Insufficient/ineffective monitoring of practices, including those submissions a contractor’s performance by the • A more detailed understanding of implemented by a maintainer on behalf accredited railway organisations. operators’ implementation of systems/ of an operator. procedures/processes surrounding ONRSR is working with these effective and adequate management rolling stock maintenance of rolling stock including contractor service providers maintenance. to correct these issues.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 37 Current Regulatory & Safety Improvement Focus
Road Rail Vehicle Safety
RRV Safety has been a focus for Following confirmation last year that • A high percentage of pre operational ONRSR for some time. When identifying RRV safety would remain a national checklists sampled during the its national priorities last year, ONRSR priority, ONRSR assembled a multi- inspections had missing data/ noted that whilst some improvements disciplinary team to undertake further information (required to be had been made across industry in work in this area. This team consisted completed by the RRV Operator); regard to RRV safety, the overall level of staff with knowledge of the RSNL • A large number of RRV Operator of improvement was disappointing and requirements for RRV safety, technical competencies and health assessment more work was needed to improve knowledge of rolling stock and in verification processes are not industry wide performance in this particular experience of RRVs. adequately conducted at work sites area. It was determined that RRV During the 2015–2016 financial prior to commencing works (numerous safety would remain a national year, ONRSR has adjusted its approach RRV RTOs were unable to identify that priority focus for ONRSR towards improving RRV safety. Building they were competent to the relevant during 2016. on the work to date, ONRSR has training requirements); In reviewing the outcomes of the designed the current project with a focus • Mechanical condition of all RRV’s 2014–2015 focus on RRV safety, it on RIMs, with particular attention given sampled varied moderately; became apparent there was a clear — but not limited to — procurement, need for further guidance for parts of network access (acceptance of RRVs • Maintenance plans and procedures industry on key issues such as roles, on to the relevant network), Rail Safety for RRVs have generally been responsibilities and expectations of Worker competency, general engineering compliant, however, contractor designers, manufacturers/modifiers, and operational systems safety maintenance plans appear to suppliers (vehicles and componentry), requirements. be maintained to a lesser standard; certifiers, contractors, operators and During 2015–2016, ONRSR conducted RIMs. As a result, the continued focus • Identification of various RRVs inspections aligned to the above scope on RRV safety throughout 2016 saw not possessing a risk assessment and objectives. The inspections were ONRSR publish and disseminate located within the machine; and conducted in order to ensure compliance guidance material to industry with both the RSNL and the operator’s • Numerous site risk assessments entitled; ‘A guide to Road Rail Safety Management System, whilst failed to identify certain controls Vehicles and the Law’. focusing on RRV operations and unique to the relevant sites. ensuring operators had considered and Whilst deficiencies were identified addressed risks associated with RRV throughout the RRV inspection operations. Throughout the inspections, phase, it was evident that operators ONRSR initiated various enforcement had responded positively to guidance options such as further education, material circulated by ONRSR. the issuing of non-conformances, Furthermore, the contribution from Improvement Notices and industry when developing guidance Prohibition Notices. material, namely; ‘A guide to Road Rail Vehicles and the Law’, resulted in a better product, and has been The inspections conducted thus far have beneficial to the industry as a whole. indicated the following common themes amongst RIMs and contractors: What has been refreshing to see throughout the campaign was the • RRVs owned by contractors considerable effort and contribution appear to be generally maintained from industry to work with ONRSR to to a lesser standard than those improve RRV safety and better manage owned by the RIMs; the risks associated with operating RRVs. This highlights what can be • Pre-operational checklists sampled achieved when ONRSR and industry during inspections do not allow the collaborate with the sole objective RRV Operator to identify whether the of enhancing rail safety. RRV is fit for purpose (i.e. It is difficult to identify pass/fail requirements due to the way the checklists are compiled);
38 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Safety Improvement
The investigation reports project is developing materials to assist the rail industry when undertaking investigations within their organisation. These materials will outline ONRSR’s expectations of internal investigation reports, which the regulator can request to see or direct to be prepared. Some anticipated benefits of this project include; • encouraging a consistent standard of investigations and the resulting reports; • improving safety learnings from investigation reports; and • supporting interactions with ONRSR when an operator investigation is requested. The track worker safety project will use causal factors, identified during ONRSR works with the rail industry • Investigation reports compliance activities undertaken with to drive national improvements in safety working with industry to achieve individual operators during 2015–2016, through a series of safety improvement a consistent high standard in to develop an industry-wide safety and education initiatives. These initiatives their investigation reports. improvement initiative in 2017. complement the compliance and RTO investigation reports are an Work is continuing on both these enforcement activities and measures, opportunity to better understand projects in the 2016–2017 financial which are focussed towards how an incident occurred, prevent year, with work to also commence individual operators. a reoccurrence and act upon in 2017 on the safety improvement safety lessons; project targeting risk management. • Track worker safety During 2015–2016, three priority Other ongoing projects include human supporting industry to work together safety areas were identified for safety factors integration and fatigue risk in a targeted way to reduce worksite improvement. These areas continue management, which initially focussed incursions, which are an area of to be the focus moving forward, on improving understanding and shared concern for ONRSR and all and are as follows: practice with industry participants. stakeholders due to the continued These projects are now developing high number of incidents; and materials to assist Rail Safety Officers • Risk management to better support industry. supporting industry to improve risk management through a better understanding, and application, of risk management approaches.
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 39 Current Regulatory & Safety Improvement Focus
Murwillumbah Railway line (disused), New South Wales
Major Projects
Throughout 2015–2016, ONRSR ONRSR has introduced its guideline to all In 2015–2016, ONRSR engaged with continued to see a growing number major project entities in the participating a number of major projects, including: of major rail projects under development jurisdictions. It welcomes the proactive • Sydney Metro with TfNSW; or construction across Australia. manner in which the majority of projects A common driver behind most is an have embraced its concepts. ONRSR • Sydney Metro Northwest increase in rail capacity, particularly believes that a consistent, robust and with Metro Trains Sydney; for passenger travel in major cities. The visible approach to safety assurance for challenge of meeting this task sees novel Australia’s major rail projects underpins • Sydney CBD & South East Light technology being deployed on increasing safe outcomes and enables safety Rail with the ALTRAC Partnership; numbers of projects. ONRSR remains assurance activity to be delivered • Automatic Train Protection committed to supporting the safe effectively and efficiently. with TfNSW; introduction of new practices and One area that has seen notable technologies while ensuring that • New Intercity Fleet with TfNSW improvement is the willingness of major industry manages the new safety and NSW Trains; projects to appoint an independent issues these may introduce. safety assessor to support their safety • Canberra Light Rail with Canberra The delivery of major projects not only assurance activities. Aligned with Metro Operations; and brings operational benefits across the ONRSR’s co-regulatory approach, • Melbourne Metro Rail Project with rail industry but also opportunities for the major project guideline sets an the Melbourne Metro Rail Link safety improvement. The introduction of expectation that independent safety Authority and Metro Trains Melbourne. new technology (for example, automatic assessment is performed by train protection) can provide a step major projects. change improvement in the control Done well, independent safety Significant regulatory activity with major of a railway’s existing safety risks. assessment can challenge projects projects during the year included: Additionally, the enhanced rigour to question their own approaches to required for the safety assurance of • Working with Metro Trains Sydney to safety and provide a catalyst for safety such systems can improve the safety support their ongoing construction improvement. There is widespread capability of the rail industry as a whole. activity on the Sydney Metro recognition of the value in assessing Northwest project; Complex major projects require safety during the design stages of a systematic management of safety project where benefits can readily be • Working with the ALTRAC Partnership risks. Safety requirements must be achieved prior to potentially expensive to support their ongoing construction clearly understood, assurance activity changes during construction. activity on the Sydney CBD & South must be planned, and verification and East Light Rail project; validation delivered. Bringing it all • Working with Canberra Metro together safely is a key part of ONRSR welcomes the acceptance and Operations to progress their effective systems integration across use of independent safety assessment application for accreditation to multi-disciplinary projects. ONRSR’s by major projects across Australia. On commence construction activity on minimum expectations for safety many projects, it is encouraging to see the Canberra Light Rail project; and assurance and accreditation activity the rigour of safety assessment being for major projects are described in its applied and the resulting safety benefits. • Working with the Melbourne Metro Major Project Guideline. First published Rail Authority as they progress their in 2014, ONRSR is encouraged by the preparations to deliver Melbourne’s broad adoption of this guideline by metro rail tunnel. the majority of Australia’s significant projects.
40 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 41 Appendix A
Appendix A DatA tables
Appendix A1 Passenger SA NSW NT TAS VIC ACT WA Total Rail accident (incl. strike) 2011–12 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 1 Railway fatal injury, 2012–13 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 1 2011–2012 to 2015–2016 2013–14 0 1 0 0 0 0 n/a 1 (Figure 2) 2014–15 0 1 0 0 1 0 n/a 2 2015–16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Level crossing 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2013–14 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fall, assault, other 2011–12 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 1 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2013–14 0 1 0 0 1 0 n/a 2 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Workforce SA NSW NT TAS VIC ACT WA Total Rail accident (incl. strike) 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2013–14 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Level crossing 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2013–14 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fall, assault, other 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2013–14 0 1 0 0 0 0 n/a 1 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public SA NSW NT TAS VIC ACT WA Total Rail accident (incl. strike) 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2013–14 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Level crossing 2011–12 3 1 1 1 1 0 n/a 7 2012–13 1 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 1 2013–14 0 0 0 1 4 0 n/a 5 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 Fall, assault, other 2011–12 0 2 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 2 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2013–14 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2014–15 0 1 0 0 0 0 n/a 1 2015–16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
42 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Trespass SA NSW NT TAS VIC ACT WA Total Rail accident (incl. strike) 2011–12 3 23 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 26 2012–13 2 22 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 24 2013–14 3 37 0 0 33 0 n/a 73 2014–15 1 27 0 0 37 0 n/a 65 2015–16 3 25 0 0 47 0 2 77 Level crossing 2011–12 0 2 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 2 2012–13 1 1 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 2 2013–14 0 0 0 0 6 0 n/a 6 2014–15 2 1 0 0 6 0 n/a 9 2015–16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 Fall, assault, other 2011–12 0 3 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 3 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2013–14 0 3 0 0 2 0 n/a 5 2014–15 0 0 0 0 1 0 n/a 1 2015–16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Appendix A2 SA NSW NT TAS VIC ACT WA Total Heavy rail 2011–12 1 3 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 4 Passenger train 2012–13 0 1 1 0 n/a 0 n/a 2 running line derailment 2013–14 0 2 0 0 1 0 n/a 3 2011–2012 to 2015–2016 2014–15 0 2 0 0 1 0 n/a 3 2015–16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 (Figure 3) Light rail 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2013–14 0 2 0 0 0 0 n/a 2 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Tourist & Heritage 2011–12 1 0 0 2 n/a 0 n/a 3 2012–13 1 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 1 2013–14 0 0 0 2 0 0 n/a 2 2014–15 1 0 0 1 0 0 n/a 2 2015–16 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 Other 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 2013–14 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 2014–15 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2015–16 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
Appendix A3 SA NSW NT TAS VIC ACT WA Total Train 2011–12 8 24 3 2 n/a 0 n/a 37 Freight train 2012–13 4 22 2 6 n/a 0 n/a 34 running line derailment, 2013–14 7 15 2 3 11 0 n/a 38 2011–2012 to 2015–2016 2014–15 6 9 2 2 4 0 n/a 23 2015–16 3 10 0 2 7 0 6 28 (Figure 4) Light Engine 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2012–13 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 1 2013–14 0 1 0 0 1 0 n/a 2 2014–15 0 1 0 0 0 0 n/a 1 2015–16 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 Wagon 2011–12 1 1 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 2 2012–13 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 1 2013–14 0 1 0 0 0 0 n/a 1 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 43 Appendix A
Steam train near Molonglo Gorge, Australian Capital Territory
Appendix A4 SA NSW NT TAS VIC ACT WA Total Between In-Service 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 Running line collisions, Passenger Trains 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 2011–2012 to 2015–2016 2013–14 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 (Figure 5) 2014–15 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2015–16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 In-Service 2011–12 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 Passenger Train 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 & Other Train 2013–14 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 2014–15 0 0 0 0 2 0 n/a 2 2015–16 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Not Invloving 2011–12 1 3 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 4 In-Service 2012–13 1 3 0 1 n/a 0 n/a 5 Passenger Train 2013–14 0 3 0 0 4 0 n/a 7 2014–15 1 3 0 0 2 0 n/a 6 2015–16 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 4
Appendix A5 SA NSW NT TAS VIC ACT WA Total Passenger Train 2011–12 0 3 0 0 n/a 0 0 3 Railway crossing collision 2012–13 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 between train and road vehicle, 2013–14 1 0 0 0 12 0 0 13 2011–2012 to 2015–2016 2014–15 1 1 0 0 10 0 0 12 2015–16 0 2 0 0 13 0 0 15 (Figure 6) Freight Train 2011–12 3 6 1 2 n/a 0 0 12 2012–13 1 4 0 1 n/a 0 0 6 2013–14 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 6 2014–15 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 5 2015–16 1 3 0 0 2 0 2 8 Other Train 2011–12 1 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 1 2012–13 1 1 0 0 n/a 0 0 2 2013–14 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2014–15 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2015–16 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 4
44 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Appendix B
Appendix A6 Track and Train KM, July 2015 to June 2016 WA track and train km from 2 November 2015
Category SA NSW NT TAS VIC ACT WA Total Passenger Train kilometres (million km) 6.2427 46.6873 0.1869 0.0448 35.2775 0.0036 14.2951 102.7 Freight Train kilometres (million km) 7.3321 19.1547 1.2519 0.7311 3.7360 0.0013 20.3346 52.5 Total km of track managed 4716 9793 1738 909 5726 16 11305 34202
Appendix B Normalised Summary of Main Data This appendix provides the key data from the body of the report in normalised form to present a national rate for ONRSR jurisdictions of SA, NT, TAS, NSW, VIC, ACT, WA.
Figure 2 Figure 5
Passenger Fatalities (all) 0.020 per million Passenger Train kms Running Line Collision 0.010 per million between in-service Passenger Train kms Workforce Fatalities (all) 0.006 per million Train kms passenger trains
Public Fatalities (all) 0.041 per million Train kms Running Line Collision 0.006 per million between in-service Train kms Trespass Fatalities (all) 0.502 per million Train kms passenger train & other train
Running Line Collision 0.076 per million not involving in-service Freight Train kms Figure 3 passenger train
Heavy Rail Passenger train 0.010 per million running line derailment Passenger Train kms
Light Rail Passenger train 0.010 per million Figure 6 running line derailment Passenger Train kms Level crossing collision 2.576 per thousand Tourist and Heritage 0.039 per million between passenger train public road level crossings* Passenger train running Passenger Train kms and road vehicle line derailment Level crossing collision 1.374 per thousand Other Passenger train 0.020 per million between freight train public road level crossings* running line derailment Passenger Train kms and road vehicle
Level crossing collision 0.687 per thousand between other train public road level crossings* and road vehicle Figure 4
Freight train running 0.533 per million * Numbers of public road level crossings line derailment Freight Train kms sourced from the Australian Level Crossing Assessment Model (ALCAM) for SA, NT, Light engine freight train 0.038 per million TAS, NSW, VIC, ACT and WA running line derailment Freight Train kms
Rail Safety Report 2015 – 2016 45 Appendix C
Appendix C • Tasmania — ONRSR collected data • use of alternative severity criteria from 20 January 2013 onwards; the such as occupational-type injury Department of Infrastructure, Energy scales (‘lost time injury’); and Resources (DIER) data prior Scope And • confusion over concepts such • Northern Territory — ONRSR as health-related condition versus Methods collected data from 20 January 2013 energy-related damage / injury; and onwards; Department of Lands and • different conventions applied for Planning (DLP) data prior a given injury in the absence of Geographic coverage • Victoria — ONRSR collected data admission information. from 19 May 2014 onwards; Transport Serious and minor injury Descriptions and statistics in this report Safety Victoria (TSV) data prior generally apply only to railways within When these terms are used they have the states and territories regulated under • The Australian Capital Territory the same meaning as the definition in the RSNL as of 30 June 2016 — South — ONRSR collected data from the national occurrence classification Australia, New South Wales, Tasmania, 20 November 2014 onwards scheme (noting judgement is Northern Territory, Victoria, the Australian required in some cases). • Western Australia — ONRSR collected Capital Territory and Western Australia. data from 2 November 2015 onwards Strike Is a train or rolling stock Activity data (for example, train colliding with a person. Railway operations kilometres travelled) is based on monthly returns supplied by Rail Data comparability The analysis covers all railway operations transport Operators in accordance Issues of consistency are relevant in each state and territory administered with section 120(3) of the RSNL. both within the report and between this under the RSNL. Nine Victorian railways The specific information to be report and other information products, continue to be regulated under local provided is defined in clause for example, the former ATSB safety Victorian law administered by Transport 56 of the National Regulations. statistics bulletin. Safety Victoria (TSV). These comprise the metropolitan tram operator and 8 Internal consistency standalone tourist and heritage railways. Statistics for a given incident category Definitions may differ between sections of this Most of the statistics in this report because definitions and ‘top Reporting period report are based on the top event event’ conventions vary according to occurrence category definitions of need. For example, some benchmarking A minimum reporting period of 1 July the national occurrence classification statistics have different definitions to 2015 to 30 June 2016 applies to this guideline, OC-G1 2013. Data collected ONRSR and hence the scope of ONRSR report. For Western Australia, data by previous state and territory regulators incidents used in these comparisons was available from 2 November 2015 — were classified under similar but different have been aligned to the benchmarking the date that ONRSR took up regulatory classification standards. definitions. responsibility for the state. Longer term data was used when available, for Some report-specific definitions Comparability with other sources example, to examine incident are used and these are generally The data within this report may differ trends over time. described in the body of the report. to other sources that utilise the same Noteworthy cases are: data sources and coding specifications. This will be due in part to the specific Data and sources Non-fatal injury data collection and preparation methods the national occurrence guideline used for this report, which included Notifiable occurrence data is defines two categories of non-fatal injury: identification and correction of largely based on reports submitted • serious injury — requiring errors in historical data. to ONRSR by Rail Transport Operators admittance to hospital; and Past and future releases in accordance with section 121 of the The statistics presented in this RSNL and Rail Safety National Law • minor injury — requiring medical report may be subject to future National Regulations 2012 (SA) and Rail attention but not hospital admission. change as ONRSR develops and Safety National Law (WA) Regulations The quality of injury coding varies refines its systems for data capture, 2015 (National Regulations). Data markedly within and between sources validation and reporting. collected by previous state regulators for reasons including: prior to ONRSR and used in this report were collected under different legislative • absence of injury-related data items, regimes. The sources of notifiable for example, severity, description, occurrence records were: person type; • South Australia — ONRSR collected • reduction of non-fatal injury data from 20 January 2013 onwards; to presence /absence; the Department of Planning, Transport • little or no information on the nature and Infrastructure (DPTI) data prior 11 For example, whether or not the person of the injury and/or the medical was admitted to hospital which is the • New South Wales — ONRSR collected attention received; basis for defining serious injury data from 20 January 2013 onwards; 12 Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the Independent Transport Safety Australian Rail Safety Occurrence Data, 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2012, Regulator (ITSR) data prior ATSB Transport Safety Report, RR-2012-00, ATSB, Canberra, 2012
46 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Old Ghan train, Alice Springs, Northern Territory