Nuclear Power Joint Fact-Finding

June 2007

Headquarters Washington, D.C Office Denver, Colorado Office

1628 Sts. John Road 1730 Rhode Island 1580 Lincoln Avenue Keystone, Colorado 80435 Avenue, N.W., Suite 509 Suite 1080 Phone: 970.513.5800 Washington, D.C. 20036 Denver, Colorado 80203 Fax: 970.262.0152 Phone: 202.452.1590 Phone:303.468.8860 www.keystone.org Fax: 202.452.1138 Fax: 303.468-8866 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING

About The Keystone Center

The Keystone Center is an independent, nonprofit, public policy and education organization with a distinguished history of convening diverse stakeholders, brokering productive information exchanges, building consensus and creating applied solutions to seemingly intractable policy problems. Through a method of “Dialogue by Design,” stakeholders, technical information and high-quality social and political processes are joined in a way that produces smarter and more durable solutions. We focus on three substantive areas: energy, environment and public health. More information about The Keystone Center can be found at www.keystone.org.

The Keystone Center Project Team

Catherine Morris Director, Keystone Energy Practice Jeremy Kranowitz Senior Associate Meg Kelly Associate Beth Fascitelli Program Coordinator Mike Hughes Vice President, Center for Science and Public Policy

2 The Keystone Center NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Acknowledgements

The Keystone Center would like to thank the following organizations for their generous financial support of this project: American Electric Power General Electric Constellation Energy National Commission on Energy Policy Duke Energy Nuclear Energy Institute Entergy Pew Charitable Trusts Exelon Southern Company Florida Power & Light

We would also like to thank the following individuals for their expert contribution to the Joint Fact-Finding:

John Ahearne, Ph.D. Alan Hanson, Ph.D. Director, Ethics Program Executive Vice President Sigma Xi Center AREVA

James K. Asselstine, J.D. Scott Hempling Managing Director Director Lehman Brothers Inc. National Regulatory Research Institute

Robert J. Budnitz, Ph.D. Revis James Group Leader for Nuclear and Risk Sciences Director, Energy Technology Assessment Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Electric Power Research Institute

James C. Bresee, Sc.D., J.D. Paul L. Joskow, Ph.D. Senior Technology Specialist Director, Center for Energy and Environmental U.S. Department of Energy Policy Research, MIT Martin J. Coveney Vice President, Business Operations Richard K. Lester, Ph.D. Exelon Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology Harold Feiveson, Ph.D. Senior Research Policy Scientist Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D. Princeton University President Institute for Energy and Environmental Research Steve Gehl, Ph.D. Director of Strategic Technology Per F. Peterson, Ph.D. Electric Power Research Institute Department of Nuclear Engineering University of California, Berkeley Michael W. Golay, Ph.D. Professor, Nuclear Science and Engineering Michael J. Wallace Massachusetts Institute of Technology President Constellation Energy Generation Group

Photos courtesy of NEI and GE

The Keystone Center 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS page 67 page 85 page 93 page 95 page 97 page 99 page 103 page 105 page 7 page 9 page 19 page 21 page 29 page 47

5

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

New Licensing Process OverviewFuel Cycle Existing Nuclear Facilities Existing Nuclear Facilities Description of Cost Analysis Model Life-Cycle Three Mile Island Process Oversight Enforcement and Reactor Program Economics of Nuclear Power Safety and Security of Nuclear Power and Reprocessing Waste Proliferation Risks ofThe Role in Mitigating Climate Nuclear Power Change

UMMARY

S D E F B C A III IV V I II

XECUTIVE NDORSEMENT HAPTER HAPTER HAPTER HAPTER HAPTER PPENDIX PPENDIX PPENDIX PPENDIX PPENDIX PPENDIX PPENDICES NTRODUCTION A A A A A A A C C C C C I E Table ofTable Contents E The Keystone Center

ENDORSEMENT 7

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Vice Chair, Board of Directors Vice Chair, Board Former NRC Commissioner Union of Concerned Scientists Policy and Science Affairs Commissioners Public Utility and

Protection Protection

Name Title Organization Organization Title Associates Brook Bradford President Bradford Name *Peter David Brown Commissioner Mark Brownstein Cochran *Thomas Cohen *Armond Partnerships Managing Director, Business NRC VP for Federal Affairs Director, Nuclear Program *Paul Genoa Victor Gilinsky Defense Environmental Executive Director Former Solutions Mike Godfrey Director, Policy Development Energy consultant Judi Greenwald Commission Forecasting Consulting James Harding Climate Manager Affairs Environmental Director Director, Innovative Solutions Corporation and Marston Natural Resources Defense Council Principal Exelon Consultant Randy Hutchinson Research Lanouette William Marston Kansas Environmental Nuclear Energy Institute Sr. Vice President, Business Development Allison Macfarlane Chairman Writer and public-policy analyst Clean Air Task Force Mazza Southern Nuclear Associate Professor, Environmental Entergy Corporation *Ted of Moline Pew Center on Change Global Climate Chris Maslak Supply Former Director of Power *Patrick Department *Brian George Mason University *Mano Nazar Manager Program Marketing Brian O’Connell Maine Seattle City Light Pettit Timothy Chief Nuclear Officer Director, Nuclear Waste Program advisor *Sonny Popowsky Advocate Director of Regional Communications RGGI Nuclear GE Energy – Consumer Advocate Vito Stagliano Ward Policy National Association of Regulatory Jonathan Temple Duke Energy Steve Director of Research Analyst Energy Policy Electric Power American Greg White Michael Wilson Kurt Zwally Office of Consumer Pennsylvania Affairs Vice President, Government *Steering Committee Director Legislative Solutions Global Warming Manager, Energy National Commission on British Embassy Former Public Advocate FPL Group National Wildlife Federation Michigan Public Service Commission Maine’s Public Advocate Endorsement Endorsement joint findings. discussions and NJFF group’s portrayal of the be an accurate is designed to This report findings and the the package of support” that they “generally participants agree this report, By endorsing their presented dialogue, participants an open and candid To ensure issues are described. way the of their positions necessarily the official not and in the Dialogue deliberations personal opinions or organizational not represent official government the recommendations do organizations. Therefore, positions. The Keystone Center

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

9 efforts to interpret uncertainties. efforts to interpret uncertainties. in areas where uncertainty persists. Participants represent Participants persists. in areas where uncertainty NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Executive Summary Executive about climatein the face of concerns option as a power generation technology is reemerging Nuclear than a decade technologies. cost of competing and the relative growth, After more energy demand change, power is now the focus of in the U.S., nuclear nuclear power plantsin which no new were completed the debate has long been controversial; consequently, and debate. Nuclear power considerable attention and its economics of the facts about the technology, assessment requires a fresh about its reemergence the Keystone Center its expansion. In the past year, and the risks and benefits of regulatory oversight, extensive of Participants) with for a list page (see the Endorsement a group of 27 individuals assembled the “facts” and for an objective understanding of joint perspectives to develop a experience and unique information credible of the most interpretation diverse backgrounds and points of view—environmental and consumer advocates, the utility and nuclear utility and nuclear advocates, the consumer and points of view—environmental and diverse backgrounds public federal regulators, and former organizations, state regulators non-governmental power industry, and academics. policy analysts, analyses to answer number of respected experts and conducted original The participants consulted with a develop a reasonable range of debate: important Can we to an informed questions they believe to be most to can nuclear power be expanded alternatives? How quickly with other to compare expected costs the best way to manage is (GHG) emissions? greenhouse gas What contribute to reducing worldwide facilities, as well as the next generation of nuclear nuclear waste? nuclear Can existing commercial and with adequate security safeguards in place?reactors, be expected to operate safely Should additional derived from of nuclear weapons prevent the proliferation to be put in place institutions or safeguards commercial fuel cycle activities? and deliberations of this broadWe trust that the research, expertise, range of individuals lend strong role are intended to lay the foundation for continued discussions of the credibility to the findings, which expect, nonetheless, that readers will draw their own abroad. We of nuclear power in the U.S. and are best of the findings conclusions, since many The Keystone Center EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 10 Science 1 coalplantsbytheendof 50years(a“carbonstabilizationwedge.”) by new,efficient that wouldberequiredtodisplace1gigatonneofcarbonannuallyfrom anequivalentamountofgeneration require anambitiousnuclearreactorbuildingprogram. We atthenumber looked ofnuclearpowerplants will beretiredoverthenext 50yearsandtoexpand To maintain thelow-carbonbenefitsofcurrent435nuclearplants(370GWe) aroundtheworldthat Nuclear Power andClimateChangeMitigation Pacala andSocolow,“Stabilization Wedges: Solving theClimate Problem forthe Next 50 Years withCurrent Technologies,” stabilization “wedge”duringthenext50years. nuclear industrycouldexpandrapidlyenoughtofillasubstantialportionofcarbon- expand appreciably aboveitscurrent levels andcould decline;othersthoughtthatthe years. Somegroup membersthoughtitwasunlikely thatoverallnuclearcapacitywould likely rateofexpansionfornuclearpowerin the worldor intheU.S.overnext50 Members of the Nuclear Power Joint FactFinding(NJFF)reachedMembers oftheNuclearPower noconsensusaboutthe , 13 August 2004, Vol. 305, No. 5686. pp 968-972. 968-972. pp 5686. No. 305, Vol. 2004, August 13 , Source: Mycle Schneid er Consulting. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The nuclear power’s shareofelectricity generationwould 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ent

0.5 11.1 High Case 6.2 1.7 2.7 (Cents/kWh)

0.5 8.3 Low Case 4.6 1.3 1.9

We also relied on our own on our relied also We 2 11 Summary of Levelized Cost of Levelized Summary Total (Levelized Cents/kWh) Cost Category Capital Costs Fuel O&M Fixed Variable O&M tion to retirement and decommissioning, expressed in pres expressed decommissioning, and retirement tion to Economics of Nuclear Power Power of Nuclear Economics recent construction We agreed that the most future costs. We experience is the best indicator of on the considered a likely range of assumptions of material as escalation critical cost factors, such and capacity costs, length of construction period, significantly higher than this value is factor. While that estimates, vendor or government current many recent on are based estimates our is because material costs, escalation in construction and raw in the future by which can be compounded of large (availability in the supply chain tightness crews, etc.). forgings, skilled contractors and on an acute impact Factors other than cost can have regulators the outlook of investors, CEOs, and of a nuclear about the potential risks and benefits structure, market including the investment, public perception, certainty of regulatory oversight, waste. and the disposition of nuclear The NJFF participants reviewed a reviewed participants The NJFF life- evaluated the of studies that number nuclear cost of future cycle levelized power. spreadsheet model to analyze the model spreadsheet costs and price to certain sensitivity of range that a reasonable found factors. We levelized cost of nuclearfor the expected cents per 8 and 11 power is between to the grid. (kWh) delivered kilowatt-hour

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR ul output (kWh) of the product. product. the of output (kWh) ul We know that in a carbon-constrained know that in a carbon-constrained We a substantial world, in which either (GHG) tax or cap and gas greenhouse is implemented, the relative trade program compared (as economics of nuclear power to fossil-fueled power) will improve. The NJFF participants agree that to build agree participants The NJFF the to achieve nuclear capacity enough of a Pacala/Socolow reductions carbon net GWe or 700 GtC/year (1 wedge would 1,070 total GWe) nuclear power; immediately industry to return the require rapid period of growth to the most and the past (1981-90) experienced in for 50 years. of growth sustain this rate Levelized life-cycle cost is the total cost of a project from construc from of a project total cost cost is the Levelized life-cycle of all low- the position policies enhance Climate GHG sources of power, including: renewables, coal with carbon capture and sequestration, and energy A broadly applied GHG tax efficiency investments. or cap and trade program would create GHG saving the stringent The more alternatives in all sectors. policy (the greater the reduction target or climate greater the relative the higher the carbon tax), the advantage of nuclear and other low-GHG economic technologies. indicated by than optimistic more This projection is of proposed plant the current announcements Nuclear construction reported by the World the average historical than is higher Association, first 40 years, and growth rate during the industry’s than forecast growth industry rapid more represents for the Administration by the Energy Information U.S for the next 30 years. 2 value and then spread evenly over the usef the over evenly spread then value and The Keystone Center EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 12 12 assessment.of theNRC’s disagreement abouttheadequacyand reliability probability catastrophicaccidents ledto perceptions aboutthecapacitytoquantifylow- used ateachpowerplant,anddifferent in thequalityofdata,models,andassumptions Probabilistic RiskAssessment (PRA).Variations quantitative riskassessment knownas the safetyof anuclear power plantisa The method thattheNRCcurrentlyusestoassess Safety andSecurity investments. to consider newcapital-intensivegeneration that createsamore rigorousenvironment inwhich traditional cost-of-service regulatoryframework 1980s haveledtoanumberofchangesinthe The powerplantcostoverrunsofthe1970sand may makeitdifficulttobuildplantsinsome states. regulatory hurdlesincost-of-service states,which We alsorecognizethat developersmay face NRC safetygoalisbeingmet. cannot adequatelydemonstratethatthe Others believethatthemethodologyused participants agree withthisassessment. meet theNRC’s safetygoal.Some NJFF assessment, U.S.nuclearpowerplants Regulatory Commission(NRC) According totheU.S.Nuclear regulated return onequity. costs are includedintheratebasewitha finance nuclearpowerinstateswhere the power plants,itwilllikelybeeasierto intentions tobuild“merchant” nuclear some companieshaveannouncedtheir The NJFFgroup concludesthatwhile NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The current nuclearpowerplants. effective inensuringthesafeoperationof Commissioners havebeenconsistently not agreeonwhetherortheNRC Davis-Besse event).Theparticipantsalsodid U.S. powerplantsisstrongenough(e.g.,the everyone agreedthatthesafetycultureatall protection ofpublichealthandsafety;not strong safetyculture isnecessaryto ensurethe safety oversight. Allparticipants agree thata and components, andinstitutional changes in experience, theimplications ofagingmaterials organizational andriskinsightsgainedthrough equipment andhuman performance, factors, includingimprovements inplant The NJFFparticipants reviewedanumber of adequate. The DBT profilesthetype, about whethertheDBTand itsoversightare (DBT) andcurrentsecurity measures, disagree who haveanalyzedtheDesign BasisThreat NJFF participants,some withsecurity clearances 1979 accidentatThree MileIsland. today thantheywere before the power plantsinthe U.S.are safer On balance,commercial nuclear their implementationandoversight. assess securitymeasures, as well as security clearancestoadequately difficult foroutsideentitieslacking current classificationenvironment, itis reactors are sufficientlyrobust. Inthe and procedures toprotect existing demonstrated thatthesecuritysystems is notagreement onwhetherithasbeen was before September11, 2001.There plant securityisgreater todaythanit Island accident, publicconcernover have gottensafersincetheThree Mile There isagreement that,whileplants EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 Substantial changes have been made to Substantial changes have process the nuclear power plant licensing moving in the last 15 years. These include the consideration of public input toward significant before of the process front made. They also are capital expenditures modifications in include new procedural as raising contentions, cross- such areas Some examination and discovery. members of the NJFF believe that the modifications limit effective procedural public involvement and could have a deleterious effect on safety and security. On balance, this group has concerns this group On balance, plant expansion in certain about nuclear have that currently other countries in legal structure significant weaknesses practice; of law); construction (rule and security cultures; operating, safety, oversight. and regulatory process in the licensing Public involvement that will the opportunity to raise issues permits the safety of nuclear power plants and improve

safe is critical to any safety culture A reliable but the current commercial nuclear program, countries. safety culture varies greatly among of non-U.S. safety and assessments Systematic impossible security preparedness proved nearly no international for the NJFF group, as there are with commercial countries require that standards safety security minimum nuclear power to meet are generally standards, and current practices kept classified. primary attention for improved safety and improved attention for primary to receive license as they are likely security, 30 years will and for the next extensions reactors. new outnumber NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR The public ought to be able to trust both ought to be able The public industry and the federal the nuclear security agency conducting its is a key oversight. Transparency cornerstone for public trust-building. when it comes to the security However, disclosure of nuclear power plants, full may be counter-productive. Over the next two or three decades, the Over the next two or three safety and security of the U.S. nuclear be determined by industry will largely the safety and security of existing Principal concerns for the U.S. reactors. power plants will continue to be those and to aging equipment related materials, as well as potential terrorist threats. advanced to include New reactors are expected safety and security; features that enhance both however, existing reactors should be the focus of security the details of that There is agreement and location of number (e.g., the measures should be kept guards, barriers, and alarms) effectiveness. Debate classified to ensure their should be information continues about how much and on related measures public on security made instill public oversight by the NRC in order to confidence. composition, and capabilities of an adversary as a of an adversary and capabilities composition, and security designing safeguards basis for acts of radiological protect against to systems special the theft of to prevent and sabotage details of the post- The nuclear material. longer available to 11th DBT are no September remains debate, even among the public; and there staff, about how and Commissioners NRC some should be. prescriptive a DBT The Keystone Center EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 14 14 specific basis. characteristics thatmust bejudgedonasite- each provides differentcombinations ofdesirable throughout theworld,includinginU.S.,but Suitable geologicalenvironments fordisposalexist properties thatallowforeaseofconstruction. or hydrochemical conditions,andgoodengineering groundwater contentandflow,stablegeochemical a nuclearwasterepository:geologicstability,low Energy Agencyastothedesirable characteristics of group convenedbytheInternationalAtomic The NJFFparticipants agreedwiththetechnical repositories.complete these nations haveyettoactuallysiteand geologic repositories. However, thusfar, regarding thesuitableenvironments for repository. A consensusalsoexists is adeepunderground geologic facilities, andthatthebestdisposaloption ultimately beplacedinlong-termdisposal group thatspentnuclearfuelmust There consensusamongtheNJFF is Waste andReprocessing public involvement. participation processhaveoverlyconstrained whether ornot thechanges in the public but theNJFF participantscouldnotagreeon the onlyfederal forum forraisingthese issues, decision-making. TheNRClicensingprocessis levels oftransparencyandtrustingovernmental analysis ofotheralternatives.Italsoenhancesthe NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The from adifferent approach. site oranalternativewouldbenefit this experience,thesearch forasecond requirements forinterimstorage.Given fuel, andadditionalphysicalfinancial nuclear plantownerstomanagespent open-ended obligationsonthepartof added liabilityforthefederalgovernment, the commissioningofarepository mean schedules willbemet.Projected delaysin confidence thatcurrently establishedDOE meet itsownschedule.There islittle Mountain project hasrepeatedly failedto The NJFFgroup observesthattheYucca by DOEinconsideration ofYuccaMountain. alternative decision-making processes tothoseused participants consideredbutdidnotanalyze transportation addtotheuncertainty.TheNJFF and changesinrequirements forspent fuel uncertain, andcontinueddelays,changesindesign, operating YuccaMountainconsequently remains EPA standard.Thecostofcompleting and demonstrate convincinglythatitwillmeet thefinal issued. Toget anNRClicense,DOEwillhaveto which may alsofacelegal challenges, hasnotbeen Court ofAppealsin2004.Arevisedfinalstandard, of thelicensing process,wasrejected bytheDC dose limit standard,whichisacriticalcomponent likely itwillbebeyond2020.TheEPA-proposed emplacement ofwastewillbe 2017,butmore projected, the most optimistic dateforfirst submitted to NRCinJune2008ascurrently the YuccaMountainlicenseapplication is ongoing political,technical,andlegalchallenges.If currently adecade behind scheduledue topast and The availabilityofarepository inthe U.S.is

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2055 ~130,000 ~130,000 MTHM total ~110,000 ~110,000 MTHM total ~ 9,500 MTHM~ 9,500 in 5/14/07)storage of (as dry Year ~ 3,800 MTHM from 14 shutdown reactors 15 Current Inventory: Current Inventory: ~ 55,700 MTHM from 12/06)reactors of (as 118 The statutory capacity of Yucca Mountain is is Mountain Yucca of capacity statutory The increase the Congress may tons. 70,000 metric to begin the search authorize DOE or may capacity Waste Under the National repository. for a second Congress a to DOE must submit Policy Act, states no laterproposal to do so than 2010. Some expansion of nuclear power legally restrict the is for waste management solution until a long-term in place. ~ 61,000 MTHM** as of May 14, 2007 Current pool capacity capacity pool Current NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Actual shutdown onlydischarges, reactors ActualMTHM dry in storage, all reactors Actual Discharges*, all reactors (operating & shutdown) & shutdown) (operating all reactors Actual Discharges*, all48 license renewalsProjectedreactors, discharges, 104 license all renewalsProjected reactors, discharges*, There are 104 operating reactors and 14 shutdown reactors reactors shutdown 14 and reactors operating 104 are There Nuclear Waste Nuclear Policy of 1982 Act 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 0

90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000

140000 130000 120000 110000 100000

Sources: Sources: in discharges, projected and 12/31/02, through RW-859’s on reported as data discharge actual on * Based based on 104 license case, renewals. this the aggregate ** pool industry Represents based capacity on pool provided 2002 RW-859 capacities in one big pool is not industry storage storageHowever, utility plans. and by the and supplemented (less FCR) pools. specific into versus discharges capacities pool differ based on individual at sites situations Cumulative Discharged Spent Fuel (MTHM) Fuel Spent Discharged Cumulative Any net expansion of U.S. of U.S. Any net expansion . Historical and Projected Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Discharges Historical and Projected Commercial Yucca Mountain has a statutory capacity has a statutory Mountain Yucca of spent the amount is less than limit that by currently to be produced fuel expected licensed over their reactors operating lifetimes nuclear power generation would require generation would require nuclear power capacity repository greater significantly for established by law than currently Mountain. Yucca

The Keystone Center EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 16 16 been more than2,700relatively small shipments of to take24yearscomplete. Since 1965there have transported. Totalshipments ofwasteareexpected interim storageispermitted, thespent fuel must be If YuccaMountainislicensed orcentralized land atdecommissionedplants. and oversightofthespentfuelallowreuse because itwould allowmoreefficient management decommissioned plantsitesmay make sense, dry caskstorageforspent fuelcurrently at cask storage incursadditional costs. Centralized dry storageoptiongenerallyisnot;however, storage capacityisconstrainedatsomesites,the centralized storageindrycasks.Althoughpool fuel pools,on-sitedrycaskstoragesystems, and Three options existforspentfuelstorage: on-site regulatory oversight. complete, andwillrequire ongoing repository willtakemanyyearsto vigilance. Transport ofspentfueltoany transport securitywillrequire continued enhanced inresponse to9/11; however, requirements duringtransporthavebeen been safelyshippedinthepast.Security waste ishighlyregulated, andthatithas fuel andotherhigh-levelradioactive group participantsthattransportofspent There is wideagreement amongtheNJFF operating reactors inthefuture. and couldbecomecost-effectivefor waste from decommissionedplantsites reasonable alternativeformanaging centralized interimstorageisa site. TheNJFFgroup alsoagrees that either spentfuelpoolsordry casks,on- fuel canbestored safelyandsecurely in NJFF participantsbelievethatthisspent operating repository isavailable,the be stored onaninterimbasisuntil With regard toolderspentfuelthatmust NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The by, among otherthings,reducingthenumber of help expandnuclearpower intheU.S.andabroad reprocessing component, was proposedin2006to Partnership (GNEP),which includesanadvanced TheGlobalNuclearEnergy management. facilities thatrequiresitingandlong-term radioactive wastestreams need tobedisposedofin substantially increaseswith reprocessing,andthese volume oflow-andintermediate-level wastes geologic repositoryisstillneeded.Inaddition,the decreases thevolume of high-levelwaste, a reprocessing isuneconomic. Whilereprocessing changed ourfundamental conclusionthat dramatically overthepast 10 years,but thishas not system. Uranium priceshaveincreased more expensivethanaonce-throughfuelcycle Reprocessing ascurrentlypracticedisseveraltimes been inplaceforseveraldecades. modes. Interstatetransportationprotocolshave federal regulationsforrail,highway,andwater conduct spentfuelshipments underextensive DOE andcommercialcarrierswillplan radioactivity. UndertheNWPA disposalprogram, breach ofthe containers, andnoreleaseof accidents inthattime, therewerenoinjuries, 1.6 million miles. Although therehave been spent nuclearfuelintheU.S.,coveringmore than management ofwastestreams. geologic repository forlong-term separations program will stillrequire a closed fuelcyclewithanytypeof effective intheforeseeable future. A reprocessing ofspentfuelwillnotbecost- reasonable costsuggests that the long-termavailabilityofuraniumat “once-through” fuelcycle.Furthermore, not supportedachangeintheU.S.from a Europe, overallfuelcycleeconomicshave been pursuedforseveraldecadesin reprocessing ofcommercial spentfuelhas The NJFFgroup agrees thatwhile fuel iscurrently undertakenintheU.S. No commercial reprocessing ofnuclear EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

17 The NJFF participants agree that a agree The NJFF participants concern is the principal proliferation bulk from diversion or theft of material reprocessing, (e.g., fuel handling facilities enrichment, mixed-oxide fuel fabrication, facilities) to and plutonium storage develop weapons capability. While efforts have been made in the past to While efforts have been made acquiring preclude non-weapons states from technologies, they have reprocessing or enrichment states not always been successful. Non-weapons particularly can operate civilian fuel cycle facilities, fuel fabrication plants, mixed-oxide enrichment It is relatively reprocessing facilities. facilities, and to use these technologies to produce simple weapons-grade material.

institution responsible for safeguarding civil nuclear safeguarding civil responsible for institution states. The IAEA in non-weapons activities to provide insufficient are currently safeguards of HEU quantities when weapon detection timely the time This is because are diverted. and plutonium of nuclear different forms required to convert of a nuclear components to the metallic material to the IAEA device are short compared explosive the goals used to define detection timeliness Also, significant frequency of inspections. defined by of nuclear material, quantities (SQ) inventories and of monitoring IAEA for the purpose are of materials, or theft detecting diversion of material than the amount significantly greater a nuclear weapon without needed to make detection. The

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

n can occur by the actions n can occur by the actions Expansion of nuclear power in ways that nuclear power in ways that Expansion of the likelihood of the substantially increase weapons is not of nuclear spread acceptable. The NJFF participants agree that there that there The NJFF participants agree critical shortcomings in the current are and that the safeguards IAEA international community has not demonstrated that the enforcement effective. mechanisms are agreements, of treaties, Today there is a collection peaceful uses that are applied to and commitments of nuclear energy; they are designed to reduce the likelihood that special fissionable and other and facilities, services, equipment, materials, purposes. for military will be used information of either national governments (state actors) or non- (state of either national governments Weapons- state, possibly terrorist organizations. non- states or from obtained can be grade materials non- or they can be developed by the state actors, dedicated nuclear weapons states using either civilian weapons facilities or IAEA-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle facilities. (IAEA) is the Energy Agency Atomic International can occur without Proliferation of nuclear weapons nuclear power an expansion of the commercial as the industry industry, but the challenges increase commercial grows. In particular, if growth in in the construction nuclear power plants also results that do not now of fuel cycle facilities in countries of proliferation possess nuclear weapons, the risk Proliferatio will increase. Proliferation Proliferation geologic repositories thatgeologic be would eventually a waste from waste. But sequester nuclear needed to potential many there are perspective, management cost, including the GNEP concept, with problems streams. choice, and waste technology The Keystone Center EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 18 18 criticality. for permanent undergroundstoragewithlowriskof “diluted” byaddingittomaterials thatwouldallow to spentfuel.Finally,theplutonium canbe mixed-oxide fuel,burnedin reactors, andconverted Second, theplutonium canbefabricatedinto plutonium. storedindefinitely. First,itcanbe for dealingwiththerisk posedbycivilianseparated enriched naturaluranium. Therearethreeoptions oxide fueliscurrentlymore expensivethanusing in light-waterreactors,mainlybecausesuchmixed- fuel, fewhaveusedtheseparatedplutonium asfuel While anumberofcountrieshavereprocessedspent from countrytocountry. physical protection andriskvarywidely national terrorist organizations. Levelsof a riskofweaponsdevelopmentbysub- Diversion ortheftofthesestocksrepresents protection andinternationalattention. proliferation riskandrequire extraordinary of 10tons/yr)poseasignificant plutonium (250 tonsandgrowing atarate Growing stocksofcivilianseparated    that GNEPaddress:to attempts following proliferation concerns NJFF group agrees withthe weapons proliferation problem. The radioactive wasteproblem orthe not astrategyforresolving eitherthe premises oftheGNEP, theprogram is While theNJFFagrees several with forms suchasmixed-oxide fuel. of plutoniuminseparated oreasilyseparated protected, andoneshould notincreasestocks Even intheweaponsstates, plutoniummust be similarly troublesome. both weaponsstatesandnon-weaponsis states. Widespread use ofmixed-oxide fuelby Reprocessing posesaproblem innon-weapons explosives andmust becontrolled. source, couldbeusedtomake nuclear All gradesofplutonium, regardlessofthe NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING

The Keystone Center The pose agraveproliferationrisk. plutonium chemistry andmetallurgy, allofwhich as wellthetrainingof cadresofexpertsin reprocessing R&Dcentersinnon-weaponsstates, encourage thedevelopment ofhotcellsand Although itisnotitsaim, theGNEPprogram could Total UK Switzerland Russia Japan India Germany France Belgium Country by Country Estimated Plutonium Quantities of Civilian Separated to succeedbecause: critical elementsoftheGNEP are unlikely The NJFFparticipantsbelievethat    reactors. and lessreliablethan conventional light-water Fast reactorshaveproventobeuneconomical reprocessing plantshasprovenuneconomical. To date,deployment ofcommercial fleets wouldhavetobefast reactors. of theU.S.andglobalcommercialreactor scale reprocessing plants,andalarge fraction GNEP requiresthedeployment ofcommercial-

250.0 105.0 <2.0 (inFranceandUK) 41.0 (plus38 inFrance5.9 and UK) 5.4 12.5 (plus15 inFrance and UK) 81.0 (30foreign-owned) (plus0.43.3 inFrance) Civilian PuStock atEndof 2005 (Tonnes)

(27 foreignowned plus 0.9abroad)

INTRODUCTION

The final outcome is a common is a common The final outcome understanding of what is known, what is still uncertain, and what research to help needs more resolve the conflict or to support good policy. In the process, the may parties to a joint fact finding also build greater trust and understanding in learning how others rely on and interpret information. A joint fact finding allows A joint fact finding allows stakeholders with different together interests to uncover to that is helpful information a conflict. They identify resolving experts credible mutually trusted, or, in and sources of information analysis cases, conduct new some to answer questions. What is a Joint What is a Joint Fact-Finding? 19 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Introduction Introduction concerns in the face of attention and debate of considerable as the focus is reemerging power Nuclear fossil fuel prices. Existing persistently high the growth and change, energy demand about climate while world-wide electricity demand to meeting capacity currently contributes nuclear generating change. Expanding that contribute to climate reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) simultaneously than a decade in After more do so in the future. that might many is one option among nuclear capacity are reengaging— in the U.S., stakeholders power plants were completed which no new nuclear interest and public analysts evaluating costs, considering building new plants, including companies at safety and risks. advocates looking controversial. Thus, the been has always Nuclear power facts— an assessment of the be must foundation for reengagement what is generally agreed to, what do we know, what is uncertain, are for and what the implications where there are disagreements, of uncertainties and unresolved public policy. A number be costs of expected range a reasonable Can challenges remain: alternatives? with other in order to enable comparisons determined be expanded to help mitigate How quickly can nuclear power the nuclear best way to manage is the change? What climate nuclear facilities, as waste? commercial Can we expect existing reactors, to operate safely well as the next generation of nuclear in place?and with adequate security safeguards additional Should the to prevent be put in place institutions or safeguards proliferation of nuclear weapons commercial fuel from derived cycle activities? process, fact-finding a joint By answering these questions through the foundation for an to begin to lay this report is an attempt debate a carbon- future of nuclear power in of the informed constrained world. Who participated? play, The To better understand what role nuclear power might a group of 27 individuals (see the Endorsement page for a list of Keystone Center assembled over the perspectives on these topics. They met experience and different with extensive Participants) interpretation of the most past year to develop a joint understanding of the “facts” and a common and consumer The group included environmental remains. where uncertainty credible information organizations, state regulators and non-governmental industry, nuclear power advocates, the utility and and their knowledge They brought and academics. analysts, public policy federal regulators, former others. They open to learning from with minds room entered the but they also experience to the table, of these findings rests in the debate. The strength the on all sides of of experts consulted with a number led to different information Where the same their different perspectives. they found despite agreement different perspectives are presented. was not reached, and clear agreement interpretations The Keystone Center INTRODUCTION 20 20 operation ofplantsinthe future.We evaluated recommendations onhowtoassurethesafe it wasinthepast,butwedidnotprovide the operationofnuclearreactorsissafertodaythan We askedandansweredthequestionsofwhether should question ofhowmuch nuclearpowercapacity GHG emissions. We didnottrytoanswerthe wide tomake asignificantcontributiontoreducing nuclear powercapacitymight beneededworld- storage. We tookonthequestionofhowmuch new coal-fired generationwithcarboncaptureand such asenergyefficiency,renewableenergy,and power againstotherlow-GHGenergyresources do acomparative analysisofthecostnuclear the next10-15yearswillbe.We didnotattempt to likely costof buildingadvanced nuclearreactors in nuclear power.We tackledthequestionofwhat not intendedtobeacomprehensive treatiseon felt werethe most important toanswer,butthisis The participantsdevelopedthequestionsthatthey What issuesdidtheNJFFcover? bebuilt. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The government policymakers, andthepublic. executives andboards,statefederalregulators, and abroadwillrestonchoicesmade byindustry surrounding thefutureof nuclearpowerintheU.S. in theU.S.andabroad.Ultimately thedecisions continued discussionsoftherolenuclearpower findings inthisreportshouldlaythefoundationfor best effortstointerprettheuncertainties. The conclusions, because many ofthefindingsarestill nonetheless, thatreadersmay drawtheirown lend strongcredibilitytothefindings.We expect deliberations ofthisbroad rangeofindividualswill We hopethattheresearch,expertise,and How shouldthisreportbeused? and treatiesareneeded toaddressthose risks. answer thequestionofwhatadditionalsafeguards commercial nuclearfacilities.We didnottryto risks associatedwithcurrentandexpanded mostFinally, weidentifiedthe urgentproliferation ones. should bepursuedinthefutureor,ifso,which about whetheradvancedreprocessingtechniques techniques, butdidnotmake recommendations The groupevaluatedcurrentreprocessing site fornuclearwastefrom existingpowerplants. Yucca Mountainisanacceptable long-term storage we chosenottoanswerthequestionofwhether desirable characteristics of sucharepository,but repositories arethebestoption.We agreedonthe waste management andagreedthatgeological We evaluatedthecurrentandproposedoptionsfor cycle activities. uranium mining andmilling, andother nuclearfuel host ofotherenvironmental issuesrelatedto real needforconfidentiality.We didnotexamine a between thepublicdesirefortransparency andthe recommendations onhowtosolvethetension terrorist attacks,butwechosenottomake existing andfuturenuclear facilitiesagainst available information onthesecurity ofthe I. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE , 13 ruction not the ). industrial Science Figure 1. Pacala/Socolow Stabilization Stabilization Figure 1. Pacala/Socolow Wedge Concept 21

2 emissions path for emissions 2 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR (see Figure 1). One 3 akin to the Wigley, Richels, and and Richels, Wigley, to the akin from fossil fuel combustion and and fossil fuel combustion from 2 Each wedge represents a 2 Next 50 Years with Current , Aug. 2004. , Aug. concentrations is Business As Usual CO As Usual is Business 2 we did consider potential scenarios for nuclear expansion in order to better understand in order potential scenarios for nuclear expansion we did consider 1 BAU Science emissions path consistent with atmospheric CO atmospheric with consistent path emissions 2

is a CO

of their wedges represented global expansion of represented of their wedges nuclear capacity. potential reduction of one gigatonne of carbon per potential reduction of one gigatonne 50 years; or a total of 25 of at the end year (GtC/yr) period. Pacala/Socolow the 50-year gigatonnes over wedges, not all presented 15 possible technology that independent of each other, and argued completely of a larger number at least seven of these wedges, or to stabilize global partial wedges, would be necessary CO atmospheric what role nuclear power might play in mitigating global climate change. global climate play in mitigating power might what role nuclear Pacala/Socolow Wedge Wedge Pacala/Socolow of any effort the breadth and scope To demonstrate over the emissions required to stabilize world carbon Pacala Stephen next 50 years, Princeton professors concept they called and Robert Socolow developed a wedges.” “stabilization Members of the NJFF reached nuclear likely rate of expansion for no consensus about the NJFF reached Members of the

Climate ChangeClimate low-emission of nuclear power to alternative the costs and benefits explicitly compare While we did not technologies, I. The Role ofI. The Role Mitigating in Power Nuclear power in the world or in the United States over the next 50 years. Some group members Some group over the next 50 years. or in the United States power in the world above its capacity would expand appreciably unlikely that overall nuclear thought it was could expand thought that the nuclear industry and could decline; others levels current the portion of a carbon-stabilization “wedge” during rapidly enough to fill a substantial next 50 years. Pacala and Socolow,Wedges: “Stabilization for Solving the Climate Problem the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies,” Pacala/Socolow’s definition of“stabilization” concentrations is a reduction of atmospheric of pre- carbon dioxide to two times All generation technologies, including nuclear power, emit some GHG when the full life cycle (uranium const enrichment, mining, (uranium when the full life cycle All generation GHG some technologies, including nuclear power, emit The Keystone Center global carbon emissions as CO emissions global carbon cement manufacture: 1.5% per year growth starting from 7.0 GtC/ 7.0 from starting growth year per 1.5% manufacture: cement 2004. year in WRE stabilization at 500 ppm by 2125 ppm 500 stabilization at curves. of stabilization family (WRE) Edmonds Source: Pacala the “Stabilization Wedges: Solving and Socolow, for the Problem Climate Technologies,” Notes, Figure 1: Figure Notes, 2 3 1 materials, and materials, waste management) analysis is included is in the analysis.limited to GHG Our emissions from nuclear generation, life-cycle emissions. life-cycle emissions. August 2004, Vol. 305, No. 5686, pp. 968-972. Some of these wedges are interrelated (e.g., other electric sector are interrelated (e.g., carbon savings of these wedges pp. 968-972. Some August 2004, Vol. 305, No. 5686, I. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE Climate Change: Arlington,VA. Availableat Change: Climate at andTrends.Available Emissions Chapter2GHG DC. Resources Institute:Washington, World nuclear capacity needed to displace a wedge ofcarbon wouldbegreater. neededtodisplaceawedge nuclear capacity naturalgasorotherlower carbonemitting resources, theamount ofcarbonwouldbeless;ifnucleardisplaces awedge displace efficientcoal or capacity theamount thermally ofnucleargeneration other high-emitting resources, less that nuclearreplaces mix. and thecurrentgenerating T growthrates, costs, a functionofother resourceoptions, is relativeoperating displacement 7 navigating_numbers_chapter2.pdf 6 5 4 operating in the U.S. but smaller than many proposed new reactors. many reactors. U.S. butsmaller than proposednew operating inthe 22 22 While Pacala and Socolow assume that nuclear displaces a highly efficient coal plant (50% thermal efficiency), actualcarbon efficientcoal ahighly efficiency), plant(50%thermal displaces thatnuclear PacalaandSocolowassume While Morgan, G.,Apt, J.andLave, L. “The U.S. PewCenteronGloba Electric June2005. PowerSectorMitigation.” Change andClimate 2005. Policy.” Climate International Data and Gas Baumert, K.Herzog,T.,andPershing, Greenhouse theNumbers: J.“Navigating megawatts, whichis cu isequalto1,000 A gigawattofelectricity greaterthantheaveragesizeofnuclearplants slightly over that50-yearperiod,then1,070GWe (about assume thattheexistingnuclearfleetisreplaced reactors eachyearoverthenext50years.Ifwe 370 GWe) ortoconstructanother 7.4 (1,000-MWe) replace retiringnuclearcapacity(approximately Before 2050,however,itwillalsobenecessaryto electric (GWe) In theiranalysis,approximately 700gigawatts- new, highly-efficientcoalgeneration. wedge, assuming thatthiscapacitywould displace be neededgloballybythemid-2050s toachievea plants eachyear. average, fourteen1,000-megawatt-electric (MWe) the next50yearswouldrequirecompleting,on GWe tocurrentnuclearcapacityworld-wide over highest beingaddedfirst.FiguresexcludeCO added inorder oftheirabsoluteemissions, withthe Notes, Figure2:Moving from lefttoright,countries are national bunkerfuels.Source:WRI,CAIT. land-use changeandforestryemissions from inter- 4 ofnew net . nuclearcapacitywould http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Electricity%5FFinal%2Epdf NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING 5 Toadd700 2 from The Keystone Center The Aggregate Contribution of Major GHG-Emitting Countries Figure 2. 12.5 GtCoverthenexthalfcentury. negative half-wedgeorincreasetotalemissions by createa efficiency improvements wouldeffectively low-carbon electricgenerationfacilities,orenergy existing nuclear-plantfleetwithnewunits,other existing nucleargeneration.Failuretoreplacethe while maintaining thelow-carbon benefitsof order toyieldasingleclimate-stabilization wedge 21.4 GWe ayear)must bebuiltworld-widein emissions todayfrom allsectors(Figure2). U.S. emissions areabout20%ofglobalGHG U.S. shareofonenuclearwedgecouldrepresent single sourceoftheseemissions. of allU.S.GHGemissions. Thissectoristhe largest generation ofelectricityisresponsibleforone-third http://pdf.wri.org/ 7 Therefore,the . rrently o theextent neededto 6 of

The The l I. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE . ntrifuge Plant ntrifuge in current nuclear in current nuclear proposed American American Ce proposed . Extending the life of current capacity Extending the life of current capacity expansion scenarios for nuclear power. scenarios for expansion 11 likely 23 delays but does not eliminate the need to replace delays but does not eliminate the capacity more than about 370 GWe of generating the greenhouse gas offsets provided by to maintain the current 435 nuclear power plants. different sources The NJFF participants looked at of of data on planned or proposed construction perspective on nuclear power plants to gain greater a significant of effort required to achieve the level through expansion of reduction in carbon emissions are useful, but it nuclear power. Modeling forecasts underlying reasons is often difficult to reconcile the give us a that forecasts differ. Historical trends in the past. Trade sense of what has been achieved insight into near-term journal reports provide some constraints, but they give little guidance over a 50- this was the best year horizon. Nonetheless, considering different available for information climate and their potential levels of expansion After reviewing a variety of change implications. projects, we relied on plans for new world-wide Nuclear additions compiled by the World Association (WNA) and forecasts by the U.S. Expansion Scenarios Scenarios Expansion about different opinions of the NJFF had Members the it will take substantial believe that members Some world- the existing the size of effort to maintain and the greenhouse gas benefits wide nuclear plants while others believe that retirements, in the face of can be added. significant new capacity capacity of nuclear the current maintaining Simply of new number a significant power will require years. Figure 3 shows next 50 reactors over the capacity, with and without current U.S. nuclear It lifetime. to a 60-year renewal license the decline demonstrates renewals. The capacity after 2030 even with license scenario world-wide looks very retirement similar. 10 http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/ NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

rifuge enrichment plants are generally smaller. The The smaller. generally plants are enrichment rifuge

annual capacity of 3.8 million kg SWU/y. annual capacity of 3.8 million kg SWU/y.

8 (compared to 17 existing to 17 existing (compared 9

plants); 10 nuclear waste repositories the size of capacity of Yucca the statutory Mountain—713,000 tons of spent fuel. 18 fuel fabrication plants, each 18 fuel fabrication plants, year producing 1,000 tons of fuel per to 24 existing facilities (compared world-wide); and 11-22 large enrichment plants, each enrichment 11-22 large “kilogram million 4-8 yielding units per year” (kg separative work SWU/y)       If all fuel were reprocessed, it would take approximately 36 reprocessing plants, each handling 800 tons of spent fuel per year fuel 800 tons of spent plants, each handling reprocessing 36 approximately it would take were reprocessed, If all fuel Power Reactor Information System, IAEA,

Even if nuclear power does not expand beyond its would be facilities capacity, additional current needed to support the continued operation of nuclear power plants. Appendix A lists the existing nuclear facilities around the world. our perspective, figures are not these From designed calculations merely goals but forecasts or and risks level-of-effort, credibility, to test the cost, in global and U.S. nuclear be encountered that may expansion. plus world-wide wedge 700-GWe the To meet would capacity of existing GWe replace the 370 of fuel-cycle also require substantial expansion and mills, mines, uranium facilities (e.g., plants, and plants, fuel fabrication enrichment rough estimated nuclear waste repositories). The fresh and spent to meet capacity increase needed 370 from for a 50-year ramp-up fuel requirements are: to 1,070 GWe GWe 140 new GWe, plus replacement of current of current GWe, plus replacement 140 new That level of or 238 GWe. (98 GWe), capacity of about five completion require would expansion the average. Given plants per year, on 1,000-MWe there however, of carbon emissions, global nature for a retiring nuclear is no particular requirement nation. by another in the same plant to be replaced More modern and energy-efficient cent and energy-efficient More modern Tom Cochran, director, NRDC Nuclear Program. Nuclear Program. NRDC director, Cochran, Tom in Piketon, Ohio, has an estimated Ohio, in Piketon, 10 11 8 9 The Keystone Center I. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE 24 24 long-range nuclear plans, long-range nuclear 12 vanced but suspended indefinitely.” The“Proposed” categ cycle. on theimplications ofnuclearscale-upforthefuel finally, reviewedindustrytradejournalcomments looked athistoricalexpansionexperienceand, Administration (EIA),forU.S.additions.We Department ofEnergy(DOE),Information In WNA’s projections, the “On Order or Planned” category includes Figure 3.U.S. Nuclear Capacity, 1960-2055 wide asoftheEnd of 2006 wide http://www.world-nuclear.o Source: “World Nuclear PowerReactorsand Uranium Requirements,” 4 January 2007, Plants,Curren NuclearPower Table 1.Commercial

World U.S.

but are “still without fundingbut and/orare “still approvals.” Without NewInvestments U.S.NuclearCapacity 103 435 No. Operating

98.3 1 369 28 GWe Declines Quicklyafter 2030 rg/info/reactors.html

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING No. Construction Under

ory includes reactors that are partofacountry’s or national agency’s 1.2 2 23 64 GWe The Keystone Center The .

World NuclearAssociationProjections 216 GWe showninTable1below. as currently operating capacityinthese categories is additional world-wide nuclearcapacityover Planned,” and“Proposed.”Thetotalamount of “Operating,” “UnderConstruction,”“OnOrderor The WNA maintains adatabaseofreactors thatare are expectedtobebuilt,butindicatesthatatleast determine whentheseplannedandproposedunits not provideinformation thatallowsusto t andProjected,intheU.S.World- completion of reactors in which “construction [is] wellad- No. Planned On Orderor

2.7 21 69 158 GWe

Proposed No.

24 124 GWe

12 WNA does

I. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE

12 GWe/year.

of nuclear power . 4 GWe/year. 20 GWe/year 1 GWe/year operating capacity (after retirements) operating capacity (after retirements) net During its most rapid world-wide growth During its most (1981-1990), was added. to 2006, 1991 During the 17-year period from the rate of new capacity at slowed significantly of an average rate During the initial start-up phase (1956-1970) zero to from nuclear capacity slowly increased of operable capacity 17 GWe approximately or about During the decade 1971-1981, nuclear capacityGWe or 123 increased     25 nuclear power’s potential Another way of estimating the historical expansion is to extrapolate from of the industry. Figure 4 shows the performance historical plants world-wide. and the number of nuclear power gross Table 2 and Figure 5 display historical by country over capacity additions by decade and the past 55 years. As is evident in both figures, the nuclear industry went through several different phases of growth: Historical Growth in Global Nuclear Capacity Historical Growth in Global Nuclear in the World, 1956 to 31 March 20051956 to 31 World, in the (GWe) NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR . Because most long- Because most 13 Figure 4. Nuclear Reactors 4. Nuclear Figure Capacity Net Operating and term planning does not extend beyond 30 years, we planning does not extend beyond term be that the proposed plants could assumed within the next 30 years. completed nuclear construction all long-term If as we assumed, by WNA are fully implemented plans identified within 30 years, the equivalent average construction 7.2 rate of nuclear capacity would be approximately at this rate continued expansion Assuming GWe/yr. for another 20 years brings the total to 360 MWe, or to replace what is needed less than just slightly retiring capacity over the next 50 years. Again, this growth rate would not result in new reductions in and would not correspond global carbon emissions of a Pacala/Socolow “stabilization to any portion wedge.” 60 new reactors (in addition to approximately 30 60 new reactors (in addition to approximately to be built in the under construction) are expected total nuclear next 15 years which would bring 2020. in capacity to 430 GWe www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf17.html The Keystone Center 13 I. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE 26 26 14 MW Table 2.World NuclearCapaci Figure 5. Historical Capacity AdditionsFigure 5.Historical Capacity by Country, 1951-2006 year period endingin1990(approximately era andextendingthroughtherapidconstruction capacity expansion rateexperienced from theinitial be sustained. Therefore,wealsolooked ataverage achieve thisrateofconstructionorhowlongitcan increase ourindustrialandlaborforcecapacityto However, itisnotclear howquicklywecan and haveamorecompetent globalsupplybase. toprovide moreefficientdatasharing, management advances ininformation labor constraints,relyon greater useofmodularization toreduceon-site advanced on-siteconstructionmethods, make have largeroutputperplant(10-50%),bebuiltwith future. Forinstance,future reactors areexpectedto GWe/year) couldbeachieved orexceededinthe aggressive levelofhistoriccapacitygrowth(20 A number offactorssuggest that the most For anoverview of NEMS, see 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 - ). Projectedoverthenext50years,thisgrowth eid MW Period Source: International AtomicEnergy Agency 2001-Now 19,268 1991-2000 44,739 1981-1990 202,804 1971-1980 123,386 1961-1970 15,739 1951-1960 929 91-16 91-17 91-18 91-19 91-20 2001- Present - 1991 2000 - 1981 1990 - 1971 1980 1961- 1970 -1951 1960

ty Additionsty Each Decadeby http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo Historical Capacity Additions byCountry (MW) NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING 8.5 GWe/

The Keystone Center The /overview/index.html National EnergyModelingSystem (NEMS). generating capacitytothe year2030,basedonthe series offorecastsforadditions toU.S. electricity Annual EnergyOutlook2007 look atpotentialgrowthintheU.S.TheEIA’s the NJFFgroupalsothoughtitwasimportantto capacity isexpectedtotakeplaceinAsiaandIndia, Although mostofthefuturegrowthinnuclear U.S. Forecast Energy InformationAdministration a carbonwedge. GWe to rate wouldadd430GWe toglobalcapacityor60 period. Despitethegrowthinnewcapacity, that totalelectricitysales increaseby41%overthe cents perkilowatthour(kWh) isimplemented, and (EPACT 2005)productiontaxincentiveof1.8 indefinitely, thattheEnergyPolicyActof2005 current environmental policiesaremaintained older units.TheAEOreferencecaseassumes that plant capacity,and2.6gigawattsofretirements of expansion atexistingplants,12.5gigawattsofnew This changeincludes2.7gigawattsofcapacity from 100GWein2005to112.6by2030. estimates an increaseinU.S.netnuclearcapacity EIA referencecaseforecastofelectricitysupply net nuclearcapacity—equaltoabout9%of . (AEO)presentsa United States Russia Other Japan Germany France 14 The I. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE

. reference case reference low fuel price high fuel price high econ growth growth econ low Source: EIA, AEO AEO Source: EIA, (2007) 27 The NJFF participants agree that to build agree The NJFF participants capacity to achieve the enough nuclear a Pacala/Socolow of carbon reductions total GWe) 1,070 GWe; wedge (700 net to return the industry would require the most rapid period of immediately to past (1981-90) experienced in the growth for 50 years rate of growth and sustain this ly and Supporting Data. Data. Supporting ly and This is more optimistic than indicated by the than optimistic This is more for new reported by WNA current announcements growth historical than the average plants, higher rapid more rate during the first 40 years, and the U.S. growth than forecast by EIA for capacity might be as high as 53 GWe by 2056. as high as 53 GWe be might capacity to replace new capacity not be enough This would is that capacity existing nuclear of the 99 GWe to be retiredexpected period. over the same Year

15 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Capacity, 2004-2030 (Gigawatts) . Electricity Demand and Supp and Demand Electricity . AEO 2007 Nuclear Capacity Forecast Capacity Nuclear 2007 AEO 2004 2009 2014 2019 2024 2029 90.0 80.0 70.0

140.0 130.0 120.0 110.0 100.0 Annual Energy Outlook 2007 Figure 6. U.S. Nuclear PowerNuclear Figure 6. U.S. Net gigawatts EIA,

EIA also analyzed several additional scenarios, additional scenarios, several analyzed EIA also growth scenarios low and high economic including and high(resulting in low and demand) electricity fuel cost scenarios. As shown low and high fossil results in range of assumptions in Figure 6, this no in nuclear capacity between forecasts of growth 27 gigawatts. In the low fuel price new growth and lower are 10 percent gas prices scenario, natural case and new nuclear plants than in the reference In the high fuel economical. are not considered growth cases, price and high economic of new nuclear respectively, 24 and 27 gigawatts capacity are projected. capacity Under the reference case, new nuclear per year through 2030. additions average 0.5 GWe 2050, total If this growth rate continued through or 25.5 GW new capacity in the U.S. could be 2056. Under the high by about 25 new reactors scenario, total new nuclear growth economic nuclear share of total generation falls from 19 falls from of total generation nuclear share in 2030. 2005 to 15 percent percent in 15 The Keystone Center I. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE 19 18 17 16 Fourth Assessment Report;Summary for Policy Makers,May 2007. developed by life cycleanalysisremai 9, Power” (June 2005). (CSIA) on Nuclear 28 28 This projection isalsobased on generatin Intergovernmental Panel on Clean Air Task Force,“Fact Sheet: Impacts of the Climate Stewardship Climate Stewardship Act (CSA) andthe Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act (CSIA). Expansion ofNuclear Power Impact ofClimateChangePolicyon higher thetax),greaterrelative advantage policy (thegreaterthereductions requiredorthe receives. Most importantly, the more stringent the exactly howmuchofanadvantagenuclear power The specificsoftheclimate policywill affect reduction options. sectorGHG sources includingnon-electric compete withotherlow-GHGandzero-GHG Consequently, nuclearpowerstillwillneedto alternatives inallsectors,notjustelectricity. cap andtradeprogram createsGHGsaving important toaddthatabroadlyappliedGHGtaxor and sequestration,energyefficiency.Itisalso including renewables,coalwithcarboncapture position ofalllow-GHGsourcespower, Climate change mitigation policiesenhancethe start” subsidies/incentivesinEPACT2005. likely tobesustainedovertime thanthe“jump- to fossilgeneration, andeachalternative ismore economic advantagestonuclearpowercompared approach, andacarbontax.Eachconfersdifferent emissions, asector-specificcapandtrade economy-wide capandtradeprogramforGHG debated orproposedintheU.S.,includingan A number ofdifferentapproacheshavebeen to fossil-fueledpower)willimprove. economics ofnuclearpower(as compared trade program isimplemented,therelative greenhouse gas(GHG)taxorcapand asubstantial world, inwhicheither We knowthatinacarbon-constrained Climate Change, Working Group III Change, Working Climate n controversial. IPCCC Fourth Assessment g costs between 25-75 US$/MWh (section 4.4. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The contribution tothe national capandtrade legislation Task Forceanalyzedtheimpacts ofproposed TheCleanAir bestowed onlow-GHGgeneration. and wasteremain asconstraints[4.2,4.3,4.4].” US$/tCO electricity supplyin2030atcarbonpricesupto50 supply in2005,canhavean18%shareofthetotal power, whichaccountedfor16%oftheelectricity costs relative toothersupplyoptions,nuclear types ofpowergenerationthatdonotemit CO existing andnewnuclearplantsmanyother would increasetheeconomic viabilityofboth increases drivenbytheGHGcapandtradesystem power andconcludedthatelectricity market price fired generationwillseereducedprofit margins. relatively betterpositionbecauseowners offossil- allowances, ownersofnuclearpowerwillbe ina existing GHGemitters mustpaythefullpriceof carbon dioxideallowancesareauctioned,sothat the magnitude ofthisadvantage.Forexample, if allowances aredistributedcouldhaveanimpact on certainly be atanadvantage. HowGHG GHG emitting power(andenergyefficiency) will decisions. Therefore, nuclearpowerandotherlow- allowances intheirdispatchandinvestment (market price)ofgreenhousegasemission sources willhavetofactorinthe marginal costs If acapandtradesystem isenacted,allemitting According totherecentIPCCreport, Act (CSA)&theClimate Stewardsh 2 -eq, butsafety,weaponsproliferation Report, Chapter 4, pg. 66. ChapterReport, 4,pg. 66. Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange 2), noting that the relatively lowcosts 16 for nuclear ip and Innovation Act 18 “Given 2 . 19 17

II. ECONOMICS 29 Graphic courtesy GE courtesy Graphic NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

industry could up quickly. A rapidly growing nuclear the industry can scale also ask whether We must vessels and pressure reactor chain, including: acquiring the supply throughout of challenges face a number supplies, personnel, uranium unskilled labor, reactor availability of skilled and other heavy components; and licensing; public acceptability of streamlined capacity; waste management services, and enrichment if any, of these issues Which, assistance for first-of-a-kind reactors. the likely disappearance of financial further discussions will lay the groundwork for questions to affect cost? Answering these likely are most to be an important robust of new nuclear power plants are sufficiently of whether the economics change. contributor to alleviating climate of nuclear energy vary substantially across the These questions are not easy to answer. The economics and structured electricity markets U.S. and between the U.S. and other countries, based on differently also varies. Public acceptability technologies. of access to alternative different levels

Introduction Introduction for low- U.S. and global demand expected meeting one option that can contribute to Nuclear power is to U.S. and global energy a significant contribution If new nuclear reactors are to carbon electricity. make entirely cannot be gauged But competitiveness other alternatives. with be competitive must supply, they community, regulators, and the public the investment Utilities, vendors, financial numbers. by comparing public acceptance, other factors—such as on many and public policy decisions investment base long-term to either easy or not amenable are impact—that change, and environmental risk, technological and abroad. factors varies both within the U.S. The influence of these sophisticated quantification. the balance between competing In the near term, of various forms energy resources can be shifted by or private financial support; concerns government environmental about supply reliability and diversity; ease of licensing and siting; or the impacts; consumers, of utilities, vendors, willingness share risks. All investors, or regulators to take or in an environment these issues need to be evaluated the U.S. last than when competitive that is more in the nuclear building program on a major embarked least in 1970s, with the electric utility industry—at electricity market competitive the U.S.—facing more however, in regulated markets, pressures. Even competitive, remain utilities must shift production to lest industrial customers other locations or adopt self-generation. II. Economics ofII. Economics Power Nuclear The Keystone Center II. ECONOMICS 30 30 documented in Appendix B. externalities, suchas future carboncont 24 23 22 21 20 value and then spread evenly over the The biggest share of that differential iscapital recovery and laborcostsformaintaining the “wires.” Several spreadsheet models were used to calculate nuclearcapital cost, fuel-cycle cost, and lifetime cost. levelized The detai Levelized life-cyclecostis the totalcost ofa project from constructionto “Supply Chain Could Slow thePath Based 1996 EIA data,the average price differential bet Life-cycle costisthetotal of costs canbe significant. the comparison on“delivered”cost. AvoidedT&D improvements), itisimportant butdifficulttobase (T&D) costs(e.g.,cogenerationorefficiency avoid some oralltransmissionanddistribution To compare nuclearpowerwithresourcesthat comparability. cash flowsandlevelizationtoachieveadegreeof can varysubstantially,economists usediscounted and operatingcostprofilesofenergytechnologies including energy efficiency. Becausethecapital nuclear powerplantswithotherenergychoices, cost that utilitiesandtheirregulatorsdo.Life-cycle risks ofothergenerating technologies, itisclear While wedidnotattempt toestimate thecostsand grid expansion,newmetering technologies, etc.). internal demands forcapital (e.g.,fordistribution, lead tobondderatings,andtheyfacecompeting acutely sensitive toinvestment decisions thatcan impacts areveryhardto assess.Utilitiesarealso in competing generationsources,wherespecific (FERC), orbreakthrougheconomic improvements by theFederalEnergyRegulatory Commission as retailcompetition,market restructuringdriven probability areuncertain;andparadigm risks,such can beestimated,butmagnitude, timing, and risks, suchasnewcarbontaxes,wherenumbers demand andspot-market electricity prices;scenario statistically quantifiable (i.e.,stochastic),suchas approach toriskanalysis,examining issuesthatare investment decisions.Manytakeafairlyformal factor utilitiesmust considerbeforemaking major screening tool.Riskmay bethemost important While useful,thissortofanalysisismainly a T&D costs. but theyarelikelytobehigherthanembedded capacity varysubstantiallybyresourceandregion, 20 perkWhisthebestwaytocomparenew 21 ThecostsofnewT&D construction andoperati to Construction, Officials Say,” useful output(kWh) of the product. rols, inestimating these costs. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING ween wholesale power prices and average retail rateswas 2.75cents/kWh. on over the operating life of thlife of the operating on over The Keystone Center The and buildthe plantitself.” transmission lineforanewplantasto site,license, take aslongtosite,permit, andbuildanew Klein reportedthathewassurprised“itmay Commission (NRC)officials,NRCChairman Dale between FERCandU.S.NuclearRegulatory generating plant. Afterarecent joint meeting larger andlonger thanthe costandleadtime forthe the costandleadtime transmission for canbe important factors. Deliverability andsystemintegration arealso Power intheNext10 Years CostofNuclear Life-Cycle Levelized quantified andsome ofwhichcannot. (i.e., transmission), some ofwhichcanbe numerous risks,uncertainties,anddeliverycosts demand andsupplyismost robustinthefaceof resource, butinsteadtoassesswhatportfolioof is notnecessarilytofindthelowestcostnew The goalofevaluatingthecosts,benefits,andrisks

levelized cost of studiesthatevaluatedthe life-cycle The NJFFparticipantsreviewed anumber following section. and distributioncosts,asexplainedinthe delivered tothegrid,before transmission power isbetween8and11 centsperkWh for theexpectedlevelizedcostofnuclear factors. We foundthatareasonable range analyze thesensitivityofcoststocertain We alsorelied onourownmodel Nucleonics Week retirement anddecommissioning, expressed in pres 23 (February 15, 2007). 2007). 15, (February

For many largenewresources, offuture nuclearpower. e unit. Utilities increasingly con increasingly e unit.Utilities

22

24 sider to ls are ent ent

II. ECONOMICS , 1986; Martin Martin , 1986; At the same time, time, At the same 25 Environmental Science and Energy Journal (accepted, conditional conditional (accepted, Comanche Peak 2 Comanche Copyright Jonathan G. Koomey 2007 Koomey G. Jonathan Copyright Comanche Peak 1 Comanche Energy Policy Energy Nine Mile Point 2 Watts Bar 1 Shoreham nathan, and Nate Hultman. 2007. “A Hultman. Nate and nathan, 31 the U.S. also experienced a decline in the electricity a decline experienced the U.S. also interest and inflation rates, and growth rate, high to new nuclear capacity. These growing opposition and management factors, coupled with poor project from learned regulatory changes to address lessons standards that experience (e.g., new fire protection Browns Ferry fire and a variety from the emerged the TMI accident), from of changes that resulted plants to increase caused costs for many dramatically. rely on recent U.S. nuclear construction experience, construction U.S. nuclear rely on recent plant a nuclear since been over a decade but it has The chart below, in the U.S. completed has been period experience in the describes U.S. Figure 7, the reactors. In nuclear last built many when we licensing a streamlined before either early years, plants entered design, many process or standardized cost. service at low up its building rate and the As the industry scaled increased. costs size of plants, Date of first operationofDate first reactors built between 1970 and 2000 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR , Van NostrandReinhold, (EIA), , Hewlett 1982; James , 1982. Hultman, Koomey, Kammen paper, forthcoming in forthcoming paper, Kammen Koomey, Hultman, 1982. , analysis documented in Koomey, Jo in Koomey, analysis documented during construction. Bell Journal of Economics Bell Journal of 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Power Plant Cost Escalation Cost Plant Power 0 , 2006.

8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000

14,000 12,000 10,000

Installed capital costs in 2004 $/k 2004 in costs capital Installed W Note: Costs include real interest include Note: Costs Source: Data for graph taken from from graph taken Data for Source: 1970-2005.” U.S nuclear plants, for of Busbar Costs Analysis Reactor-Level Figure 7: Installed capital costs of U.S. Figure 7: Installed capital costs of U.S. on revisions). on revisions). It is difficult to generalize about the cost of future about the cost to generalize It is difficult the built around will be that plants nuclear power and the ultimate the cost of building world. But power are nuclear electricity from price of that individual questions CEOs, investors, utility with in order grappling are already and regulators new nuclear capacity should whether to determine generation portfolio to be added to the existing in a demands growing regional energy meet world. The NJFF used a carbon-constrained at the range of costs for model to look simplified operating new nuclear plants in constructing and of a range of implications the U.S. and the the cost of nuclear power going for assumptions forward. Construction Cost important factor influencing the lifetime The most is capital or construction cost of a nuclear reactor it would be best to costs, future cost. To project Komanoff, Komanoff, The Keystone Center Zimmerman, Zimmerman, Technology 25 II. ECONOMICS 32 32 29 28 27 26 are not comparable to building an advanced reactor from the groundup. estimates a final yield cost as high as $3,750/kW. Neither number includes owner’s costs. Delays atOlkiluoto-3, Regulators Say,” Sept. 13, 2006, pp 3- construction. studies withforecastsforthecostofnuclear The NJFFparticipantslookedatanumber of initial commercialoperation. construction, areshowninFigure7,bydateof 2004 dollarsperkW, includingrealinterestduring Capital costsfortheU.S.fleet,inthousands of [kW]) thanNineMilePoint2($10,769/kW). will lookalotmore likeZion($1,108 perkilowatt inflation andastreamlined process NRCapproval standardized designsbuiltinanenvironment oflow answer tothequestionofwhethernew,more Stated differently,wecannot provideananalytic thesefactors. There isnoeasywaytoseparate experience inAsiaandFinland. Therefore, welookedatrecent construction along thesupplychain. commodity costsorpotential “pinchpoints”all estimates alsomay notreflect recentrun-ups in transmission integration.Studiesandvendor construction, possibleconstructiondelays,or costs, suchasland,contingencies,interestduring generic anddonotreflect site-specific owner’s achieved intheU.S.Manyvendorestimates are construction time achievedinAsiacanalsobe that theimprovements inproductivityand vendor estimates andcomputer models andassume project costinformation, becausedelaysin Ultimately, wechosenottorelyontheFinnish or boiling-water reactorslicensable intheU.S. underway inFinland.Allareadvancedpressurized- publication reportsonthe Olkiluoto-3project Joskow (aco-authorofthatreport)andfrom trade also consideredmore recentinformation from Paul MIT study,“TheFutureofNuclearPower.”We Some ofthatinformation comes fromthe2003 units recently completed inSouthKoreaandJapan. we havereasonablyaccurateinformationonseven Areva,“First Half2006FinancialResu didWe not look atthe refurbishments un See the references for the mostrecent studies reviewed. Koomey and Hultman, toEnergy submitted 27 Thesestudiesgenerallyrelyon 26 28 We believethat lts,” Press ReleaseSe lts,” Press on derway atBrowns Ferry or NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING Policy. Data isin The Keystone Center The 8. The original contract costwas $2,350/kW, and current overrun real 2004 dollars. pt. 27, 2006 and pt. 27,2006 May 2006. US Perspective,” Presentation at University ofParis, Dauphine, construction. therefore does not include escalation orinterest costs during of constructionasifthe plant Note: July1997 $1,790/kW Yonggwang March1994 $2,020/kW (overnight) $2,288/kW 1997 (overnight) KK7 (overnight) $2,818/kW 1996 (overnight) KK6 $2,409/kW Onagawa Genkai 4 Genkai 3 (overnight) Name ofReactor January (2002 U.S.Dollars) Table 3.RecentConstruc 2002 increase. delay andpossible30-to60-percentcost construction that,todate,haveledan18-month suffered fromseveralmistakes earlyin which nowappearsfrom pressreportstohave successful experienceatOlkiluoto-3inFinland, same time, wearealsofollowingthe less able tolearnfrom thisongoingexperience.Atthe batch concreteplants).The U.S.industrymay be during construction,andtheuseoflargecranes standardized design,leaving thecontainment open and reducedleadtime (e.g.,more advancedand improvedinnovations thathaveclearly productivity construction costs.Therehavebeensome from whichtodrawinferencesaboutfutureU.S. found thistobethebestpubliclyavailabledata and fewfinancialuncertainties.Nevertheless,we have experiencedstreamlined approvalprocesses andutilitiesgenerally those intheU.S.andEurope, markets inbothcountriesarelesscompetitive than involvement, among otherthings.Electricity practices andthedegreeofgovernment altogether comparable givenvaryingaccounting This isanotlargedatabase,anditalso likely tobe. difficult todetermine whatthefinalcostis construction andchangingcostestimates made it completed atFortCalhoun and Turkey Point because they “Overnight costs” isa convention for expressing the cost 5 & 6 $1,800/kW (overnight) 2004-2005 2004-2005 (overnight) $1,800/kW 6 5& 29

Source:

Nucleonics Week osrcinCs Completion Date Construction Cost Joskow, Paul, “Prospects for Nuclear: A tion CostExperience could bebuiltovernightand , “Host of Problems Caused“Host ofProblems,

II. ECONOMICS asal&SitEupetCs Index Cost Equipment Swift & Marshall e 1,350 1,300 1,250 1,200 1,150 1,100 1,050 1,000 950

30

Atwell, Principal Vic Atwell, Principal 31 , 2006.

1

, February 15, 2007. (Comments by Ray (Comments 2007. 15, , February ent, Sfarsteel; and John in the MIT study. in the MIT 33 Nucleonics Week Nucleonics Chemical Engineering Plant Cost Index Cost Plant Engineering Chemical Index Cost Equipment & Swift Marshall Chemical Engineering Magazine Chemical Engineering Jun-98 Jun-99 Jun-00 Jun-01 Jun-02 Jun-03 Jun-04 Jun-05 Jun-06

Source: Figure 8. Construction Cost Indices Figure 8. Construction Escalation is not always straightforward, especially when always straightforward, especially Escalation is not The and construction industry costs diverge. overall inflation several Institute provided us with Electric Power Research of those are industry cost indices. Two different construction cost trivial of 8 below. After several years shown in Figure remarkably real), the period 2002-2006 was escalation (0.3% probable real escalation). The most different (2.2-4.4% steel, (e.g., rising prices for key materials explanation involves these for competition copper), international concrete, and in China and India), and (driven heavily by growth materials chain. tight capacity up and down the supply

The arithmetic average for the first seven units above is the first seven average for The arithmetic we used as a dollars, which in 2002 $2,150/kW approximately cost of construction range a point for developing starting future plants. for estimates dollars. to escalate 2002 dollars to 2007 The first step was 520 500 480 460 440 420 400 380 360 Construction Cost Indices Source: Chemical Engineering Magazine, August 2006 Index Cost Plant Engineering Chemical 002 dollars) developed 002 dollars) © 2006 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR to Construction, Officials Say,” Officials to Construction, t, Areva; Phillippe Tollini, Commercial Vice Presid Tollini, Areva; Phillippe t, There is obviously a large range in obviously a large There is is no easy and there these numbers, out the underlying way to sort earliest differences. The causes for and completed in 1994, plant was in completed the last unit was and materials 2005. Changes in rates, exchange commodities costs, labor costs are and differences in in cost factors all important have projects may variation. Some costs, or first-of-a-kind design may leaders; some instead be loss incentives benefit from government and subsidies. and market There are also many regulatory differences between the U.S., Finland, South Korea, and to Japan, and it is important analyze in detail how those differences would affect U.S. costs. requirements, Siting and permitting public construction lead times, and and acceptability, involvement country to other factors vary from country. However, quantifying is extremely these differences data difficult, because the available the different countries are not from points, always transparent on these (e.g., public assumptions and some do not lend acceptability) to easy quantification. themselves “Supply Chain Could Slow the Path the Path Slow Could “Supply Chain This is very close to the estimate of $2,000/kW(2 of very close to the estimate This is Ganthner, Senior Vice Presiden Vice Senior Ganthner, 30 31 President, Bechtel.) The Keystone Center II. ECONOMICS 34 34 escalated costs at3.3% real. ($2,130/kW) from 2002to2007dollars,we To escalatetheaverage costoftheeightunits expect tofindsimilar costincreases,although the construction foracoalorwindplant,wewould widely fromsitetosite.Ifweexamined thecostof which canbequitesignificantbutwillalsovary value includesacostfortransmission expansion, believe itmay beachievable,othersdonot. Neither evaluated, andwhilesome vendorsandutilities escalation isnotbasedonanyinformation we The optimistic assumption ofnofurtherrealcost possibility of4-yearconstructionschedules, some studiesandJapaneseexperiencesupportthe ground-breaking tocommercial operation.While on a5-to6-yearconstructionschedulefrom or futurerealescalation.Ourassumptions arebased dollars, construction costestimate of$2,950/kW in2007 assumptions fallintherangeof: interest duringconstruction)basedonthese nearest hundred,inreal2007dollars,including the MITstudy.Constructioncosts(roundedto parameters (e.g.,debtandequitycostsratios)of case. We alsoreliedonthebasicfinancial and continuedescalationatthesamerateinourhigh assumed nofurtherrealescalationin ourlowcase To developarangeoffinalconstructioncosts,we years. more realisticconstructiontime overthenext10 that5to6yearsisa construction proposals,agreed representatives currentlyevaluating nuclear NJFF participants,includingindustry 35 34 33 32 lifetime levelized cost. A 7-year construction period increases the higher cost caseto $4,200/kW. high case. theassumptionWith of no realescalation during Joskow, Paul, Conference Call withKeystone also consideredthepo We Our estimate isreasonably consistent withthe $2,500/k This isconsistentwiththe Chemical EngineeringPlant Cost   33 construction period) $4,000/kW (3.3% realescalation,6-year construction period) $3,600/kW (0% realescalation,5-year

not includinginterestduringconstruction ssibility ofa 4-year construction period inth 32 Thisyieldsa . to NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING NJFF Economics Workgroup, Oct. 2006. 34 the W valueusedJoskow byPaul construction, using 4years has very littleeffect on capital cost The Keystone Center The Index for2002- First UnitCostsandScale-UpIssues financing, andotherfactors. substantially, basedoncapacityfactor,leadtime, effects onfinalcostofproductionvary were notstandardized. regulatory changesduringconstruction;anddesigns experience andtheThreeMileIslandaccidentledto they hadcompletedplantdesign;operating increases: utilitiesoftenstartedconstructionbefore Many factorswereresponsible forthe cost than thecostsforplantsstartedinlate1960s. ofmagnitude higher early 1980s—nearlyanorder nuclear plantshadhighercostsinthelate1970sand time ratherthandecline.AsshowninFigure7,U.S. It isalsopossiblethatcostscouldactuallyriseover of follow-onunits. must recouptheircostsandlossesthroughthesale take risksandlossesononeortwoearlyplants,they costs. Likewise,whilevendorsmay bewillingto Nth unitswillhavetobecompetitive onactual incentives arelimited, however,andwhentheyend, help overcome thesefirst-of-a-kindcosts.The specifies limited incentives forthefirstplants to instance, intheU.S.EPACT2005legislation below-market financingto“prime thepump.” For loss leadersorbygovernments willing toprovide subsidized, eitherbyvendorswillingtosellafew design andengineeringcosts,buttheycanalsobe distinction. Firstunitsmay includefirst-of-a-kind experience. Wehavechosennottodrawasharp unit, andcostsarereducedthroughlearning theory thatvendorsneedtochargemoreforafirst “first-of-a-kind” unitand the“Nth”unit, onthe Some analysesdistinguishbetweenthecostofa e low caseanda 7-year cons 2006, as shown in in recent presentations. the Figure8. truction periodin the

or 35 II. ECONOMICS 37 identified a lack 7. Comments of Ray 7. Comments 39 One can argue that these One can argue 40 , February 15, 200 Expansion of domestic production production Expansion of domestic

38 .

35 Nucleonics Week Nucleonics of craft labor availability within a 400-mile radius, radius, within a 400-mile availability of craft labor construction which forced the adoption of a longer to the schedule. Other sources have pointed if nuclear potential for skilled labor shortages construction expands. are good problems to have, as they stimulate are good problems and jobs new business development, investment, workers. for the next generation of construction focused are already The fact that industry meetings supply chain on addressing this work force and pinch points these that, in time, indicates limitation for an can clear; but they can also be daunting industry that hopes to grow quickly. is also a question. A Availability of skilled labor study prepared for TVA recent capacity in all these areas is possible but will is possible areas capacity in all these take time. to actual are sensitive costs Finally, construction earlier, and how and perceived risks, as discussed taxpayers, ratepayers, they are allocated among utilities, investors, and vendors. The greater the uncertainty of construction costs, rate recovery, and the higher the cost of capital and performance, cost of overall construction costs will be. The About 6 years is needed to procure and years is needed About 6 components, long lead-time other manufacture cooling pumps,including reactor diesel generators, NRC instrumentation equipment. and control and noted that heavy reliance on Dale Klein Chairman for time could require more foreign suppliers sure to make quality control inspections, are not incorporated in substandard materials U.S. plants heavy forgings, above 500 tons; the company’s tons; the company’s above 500 heavy forgings, 12% in 6 by about reportedly increased prices have requirement. payment with a 30% down months, http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/2007/04/26/

36 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR , January 18, 2007. 2007. 18, , January to Construction, Officials Say,” Officials to Construction, Nucleonics Week Nucleonics . 2 and 4.1-23. 2 and . . NPR Marketplace, “A Missing Generation of Nuclear Energy Workers,” April 26, 2007. “Vendors Relative Risk Rising in New New Risk Rising in Relative 2007. “Vendors 26, April Workers,” of Nuclear Energy Generation Missing “A NPR Marketplace, Ibid Site,” Aug. Bellefonte at TVA’s COL Cost, Schedule, ABWR Fuel America, “GE, Toshiba, USEC, Bechtel, Global Nuclear “Supply Chain Could Slow the Path the Path Slow Could “Supply Chain Ibid world-wide forging supply for There is also limited including pressure vessels, steam key components, are only two generators, and pressurizers. There that can supply qualified companies in the world and France’s Steel Works (Japan heavy forgings Creusot Forge), and the nuclear industry will be for forging demands with simultaneous competing Japan Steel Works Only new refinery equipment. ultra- to manufacture has the capability currently On these three points, the environment may have may environment three points, the On these may reactors Advanced light-water improved. and completion standard designs, benefit from design before certification of regulatory that of safety features incorporation construction, retrofits in the past, and a would have required construction and operating shorter combined are also outcomes Other future license process. experienced contractors by more possible, driven suppliers, among competition and crews, more and greaterstandard contracts, of public and levels and regulatory support. financial acceptance lower units does not necessarily more But building and material the cost. Initially, it can lead to labor sites, shortages, the need to find “greenfield” heightened public attention and controversy, uncertainty. Supply-chain litigation, and regulatory materials pinch points (e.g., labor issues and cost shortages) can also account for significant increases. key some conference, nuclear industry At a recent decades ago, the pinch points were described. Two 900 nuclear or N- U.S. had about 400 suppliers and licensed (sub-suppliers) certificate holders stamp of Mechanical Engineers. Society by the American are 80 and 200. Today those numbers Ganthner, Areva. Areva. Ganthner, PM200704265.html 38 39 40 36 37 Nuclear Power Markets,” Power Markets,” Nuclear 2005, pp. 4.1- The Keystone Center II. ECONOMICS 36 36 44 43 42 41 allocated totaxpayers. from theInvestment Community,” NAR loan authorityinitsfiscal in current rates following anannual pr construction workintheratebase. allowing utilities torecover some orall welcome nuclearconstruction,for new example, by states andstateregulatorycommissions may U.S. thataffectcostandregulatoryissues.Some substantial “cultural”differencesthroughoutthe It isalsoimportant topoint outthatthereare among investors,customers,andtaxpayers. in coststosociety.They areessentiallytransfers materials used risks taxpayers. However,suchshiftingofcostsand shifts more to electricity consumers and/or capital willbeloweriftheriskofcost recovery decision-making process.Othershaveelectedto these incentivesassignificant drivers inthe the 2020deadline. operation ofthefirstfewnuclearunitsbuiltbefore some oftherisksassociatedwithconstructionand provisions ofEPACT2005may servetoreduce insurance andproductiontaxcredits)includedin incentives/subsidies (e.g.,NRClicensingdelay Federal loanguaranteesandotherfinancial production taxcredits)canaffectoverallprice. EPACT 2005(NRClicensingdelayinsuranceand Federal loanguaranteesandotherprovisionsof with currentlaw. into servicewouldnotbeacceptable orconsistent charging coststocustomersbeforethe plantcomes We distinguish We here between price and cost toemphasize that g “House Panel GrillsBodman Caren Byrd, “Myth orReality:IsNew Nuclear PoweraCost-Effective The Florida Public Service Commission, forexample, recently adopted a rulethat — unlike reductions in construction timeunlike reductionsin or — does notrepresent true reductions 42 Someintheindustryview 2008 budget request. 2008 budget on NuclearLoanGuarantees,” udence review. Similar proposals are under UC Winter Meeting, Feb.2007. UC Winter 41 Inotherstates, NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The Nucleonics Week overnment subsidies do notchange costs; thedifference is so bylargerregulatedutilities. by some (typically,merchant generators)butless Loan guaranteesareconsideredhighlyimportant and regulatorytreatment. persistence, ultimate allocation amounts, the uncertaintiessurroundingtiming, exclude themfrom theiranalysesdue to         consider assumptions for: construction coststolife-cyclecosts, weneedto are notthewholestory.Toconvertcapital While capitalcostsareextremely important, they cases to6-7.5 cents/kWh. reduced from8-11cents/kWh inourlowandhigh cycle priceofpowerfromsuchaplantcouldbe project cost),overitsfullcommerciallife,thelife- for anewnuclearpowerplant(80percentoftotal full faithand creditpledge forallthedebtissued not final.Ifloanguaranteesultimately resultina operating life. fuel costs long-term wastemanagement decommissioning costs operations andmaintenance costs capacity factor steam generatorreplacement) net capitaladditionsduringoperation(e.g., depreciation, etc.) capital costrecovery(debtandequity, www.naruc.org Option forMeetingAnticip , March 8, 2007. DOE isaskin

consideration inNorth and South Carolina. permits recoveryannu permits of

. 44

ated Future Load? ated Future Load? A View

43 DOE’s rulesare al construction costs g for$9 billion in II. ECONOMICS

There are a number of issues There are a number 46

The high end of the O&M cost 47 37 that are tough to disentangle. Some early plants disentangle. Some that are tough to costs had higher than average built at low capital safety after the Browns to improve capital additions accident, and other experiences. Ferry fire, TMI-2 range is based on historical cost trends. Increased also be considered if security costs might about expected security standards and information costs can be found. implementation Decommissioning costs are based on the cost of a Decommissioning million in 2007 sinking fund to recover about $500 As expense. dollars and are treated as an O&M this of capital additions, with the treatment but does not seriously change our results. simplifies Operations and Maintenance Vendors have suggested that advanced-design and reactors will have lower operations than historically, (O&M) costs maintenance because there are fewer moving parts and smaller plant staffing levels. One report suggests that O&M be aboutcost savings may 15%, which is reflected of O&M costs in the in the low end of the range NJFF model. Low End, 25%; High End, 50% 25%; High End, Low End, additions for capital U.S. fleet average The current 50% of original about life of the unit is over the construction costs. that new advanced designs be fair to assume It may safety and greater inherent with fewer components than the additions capital lifetime will have fewer fleet current U.S. fleet. If we use the current the fleet average in the high case and one-half cost of the effect on average in the low case, treated 2% to 5%. We have generation ranges from costs, as operating these costs as being “expensed” life for the remaining capitalized rather than being of the plant. Total Construction Costs for Capital Additions: for Capital Additions: Costs Total Construction ture Prospects for Nuclear-A US Perspective,”US Nuclear-A Prospects Presentationture for at

This

45 45 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR ne NJFF Economics Workgroup, Oct. 2006. Oct. Workgroup, Economics NJFF ne

Dauphine, May 2006. increase in capacity factor has a significant effect increase in capacity factor has a significant For the most costs of a nuclear plant. on the kWh that a range of estimates part, we have assumed current plants at the reflects best experience with but far high end and possible start-up problems, better than the 1980s experience at the low end. this range of Depending on other assumptions, the cost to 10% effect on capacity factors has a 5% point of generation. of nuclear power at the Average annual U.S. nuclear capacity factors have U.S. nuclear capacity Average annual below 60% during most of the increased from 1980s to nearly 90% in the post-2000 period.

assumptions Our high case retains the MIT study 15%) as a (50% debt at 8%, 50% equity at in both reasonable average for utilities building markets. wholesale and unrestructured restructured premium risk equity no includes Our low case return) for a nuclear investment. (12% nominal wholesale competitive in highly Reactors financed likely to cost builders 10% to 15% are markets finance, because some more than traditional utility in the short run—from risks are shifted—at least to investors. Federal loan utility customers significant difference, but a guarantees can make of decision to sort are taking this utilities that both with and boards of directors do the arithmetic without federal subsidies. High End, 90% Capacity Factor: Low End, 75%; (i.e., developer a merchant study assumed The MIT in a fairly new plants operator) building non-utility it was At the time, structure. market competitive a builder could use 50% debt that such assumed financed at 8% interest at a and 50% equity past few years, Wall 15% return. In the premium less comfortable significantly Street has become and even very plant model, with the merchant generators building plants in strong non-utility 65% to now need wholesale markets competitive the bond market. 70% equity to access Capital Cost Recovery Capital Cost Joskow, Paul, Conference Call with Keysto Call Conference Paul, Joskow, U.S. DOE, “Studyof Construction Technologies andStaffingDecommissioning Schedules, andO&M Cost, Costs and Funding MIT, “Theof FutureNuclear Power,” 2003;Joskow, and “Fu The Keystone Center Requirements for Advanced Reactor Designs,” May 2004. Designs,” Reactor for Advanced Requirements University of Paris, of University 46 47 45 II. ECONOMICS 38 38 Fuel Costs Enrichment pricesareestimated tobe$250/kg lb), whichistheMay2007spotmarket price. costs arebasedon$265/kguranium (about$120/ $200/kg SWU.Inthehighcase,nuclearfuelcycle below currentspotprices,andenrichment pricesof uranium (about$72/lb),whichissignificantly cycle costsinthelowcasearebasedon$160/kg enrichment prices.Inour analysis,nuclear fuel components ofdeliveredfuelpriceareuranium and Figure 9,below.)Thetwomost important approximately 25%ofthe variablecosts. (See of producingelectricityfrom anuclearreactoror these costs adduptoless than10%of thetotalcost fuel management anddisposition.Historically, all costs, interest costsonfuelininventory,andspent enrichment, reconversion,fuelfabrication,shipping uranium mining andmilling, conversiontoUF6, Nuclear fuelcostshavemany components—

Fuel as aPercentage ofElectric Power Production Costs, 2005 Figure 9. Fuel as a Percentage of Electric Power ProductionCosts,Figure 9. 2005 Fuel ofElectricPower as aPercentage Source: GlobalEnergy Decisions 22% O&M 78% Coal Gas Nuclear Nuclear Fuel Cost Fuel Nuclear Nuclear Gas Coal Fuel NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING 94% Fuel 6% The Keystone Center The 74% O&M 26% are probable. substantial furtherincreases 40% inthepast2years,andsome that believe fleet. Enrichment priceshaveincreasedbyabout substantial expansionoftheworld-wide nuclear appear probableinthenearterm, evenwithout terms (seeFigure10).Further priceincreases years, priceshaveincreasedbyafactorof9inreal sharp spikeinpricestheearly70s.Inpast7 by 74%between1970and2000,thisincludeda years. Althoughrealuranium spotpricesdeclined Uranium priceshavebeenvolatileoverthepast30 future uranium fuelcosts. below, thereisconsiderableuncertaintyabout those levelsovertime; however,asdiscussed equivalent inbothcases.Neitherescalatesbeyond fabrication, andwastestorage anddisposal)are SWU. Otherassumptions (e.g.,forconversion,fuel Fuel Components 52% 26% 11% 7% 4% Source: Global Energy Decisions Energy Global Source: Uranium Enrichment Waste Fund Fabrication Conversion II. ECONOMICS

Nuclear fuel costs (cents/kWh) 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0

Nuclear Fuel Costs Fuel Nuclear tween Uranium and SWU Prices: A New A Prices: and SWU Uranium tween Uranium SpotUranium Price 39 Real valuesReal expressed 2006 in dollars 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 0 80 60 40 20

160 140 120 100

8 3 ) O Uranium spot price ($/lb U ($/lb price spot Uranium Opportunities.” nges and Nuclear Prices and Uranium Spot Fuel Costs Nuclear plant owners have been buffered from these recent rising these recent rising from been buffered plant owners have Nuclear dampen in new investment ultimately this may prices, but under long-term acquire uranium Utilities typically production. ceilings low and price when prices were and they did so contracts, enrichment applies to practice same negotiated. The could be not track spot reported nuclear fuel costs do services. As a result, (3 to 5 years) between lag a substantial prices. There is also market the and services and enrichment for uranium utilities pay the time contracts can Long-term rates. in current costs they recover the time Most current long-term price fluctuations. moderate short-term decline rapidly by 2012, and secondary supplies contracts expire also contracts The price ceilings in long-term during that period. or enrichment mines pursue new might that those parties that mean price signals in the substantially from plants have not benefited spot market. Note: In 2006, most U.S. utility had long-term contracts in place and there- contracts in place U.S. utilitylong-term Note: In 2006, most had Consequently,fore did not pay fuel prices prices for uranium. spot market prices in 2002 ($15/lb). in 2006 reflect uranium Sources: TradeTech, Utility Data Institute, FERC/ElectricityCost Utility EnergyDecisions. Group, and Global Figure 10. Nuclear Fuel Costs and Uranium Spot Prices Figure 10. Nuclear Fuel Costs and Uranium NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Studies, MIT, “Dynamic Relationships Be Relationships “Dynamic MIT, Studies,

the Nuclear Future: Challe the Nuclear Future: 48 Dr Thomas Neff, Center for International Neff, Center Dr Thomas

There is plenty of uranium in the plenty of uranium There is is mining the problem ground; capacity. and enrichment most part for the fuel is Uranium but the market, traded a thinly been steady price rise has also 10)—to $120/ and rapid (Figure in May lb on the spot market for rising 2007. The reasons prices are complex, spot-market by Neff but recent analyses (UX) suggest (MIT) and Combs dampened that low production, related to long-term investment contracts, and lagging expansion are likely capacity of enrichment to lead to continued higher prices future. into the For at least the past 20 years, from production natural uranium by been supplemented has mines “secondary supplies”—first, by surplus inventories from cancelled or shut-down units (1980s-1990s), then by purchase of cheap surplus Russian and privatization of uranium capacity and U.S. enrichment stockpiles associated uranium and finally by the (mid-1990s), use of highly enriched uranium surplus Russian nuclear from weapons (1998-2013). As a consequence, non-Russian production is now uranium about 60 % of current demand. uranium Equilibrium, Building Equilibrium, 48 The Keystone Center II. ECONOMICS 40 40 Demand and Price Outlook;” Source: ThomasL.Neff,Center forInternationalStudies,MIT,“Uranium andEnrichmentSupply: Supply, Figure 11.UraniumProduction demand, anduranium priceswillstabilize. fuel capacity willcatchupwithexistingorfuture however, itisverydifficulttoguesswhennew uranium production,whichreducescosts; Ultimately, higherpricesstimulate furtherprimary completed andwhenproductionoccurs. historically betweenwhendevelopment is Figure 11below,therehasbeenatime lag supplies orgrowingdemand.Asindicatedin capacity cankeepupwithdecliningsecondary is beingadded.Thequestionwhethernew Nonetheless, newmining andenrichment capacity

Presentation Winter2006.

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The

they getbetter. capacity, theseproblems may before getworse levels. With substantialgrowthinnuclear increase byafactorofroughly2.5from current both newreactorsandthe existingfleetwould At currenturanium prices,nuclearfuelcostsfor production ofenricheduranium—perhaps by25%. assay.” Thatcanbedone,butitdecreasesthe enrichment plantstooperateatalower“tails more efficiently,meaning thatutilities may prefer higher prices,thereispressuretouseuranium pressure onenrichment capacityalsoincreases.At Finally, withhigherfutureuranium prices, II. ECONOMICS

46 83 -90 -90 294 684 488 50 -894 1,373 5,534 3,353 3,540 1,040 13,330

Indirect $

49 108 906 300 400 400 51 4161 9,790 2,448 7,890 2,104 1,500 -2,104 Direct $

4.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 2.75 4.25 3.25 3.25 -2.25 -2.25 Tons/yr

natural uranium in order to create a order to create in uranium natural

same approach used in MIT study. in MIT used approach same 11 250 140 300 400 400 400 $/kg -400 Once-Through and Closed Fuel Cycles Closed Fuel Cycles Once-Through and SWU 1,500 1,500

Kg 5.26 9.79 9.79 6.47 1.00 1.00 5.26 5.26 1.00 1.00

SWU*

richer in U-235 atoms. atoms. in U-235 richer $0.034/ kWh $0.014/ kWh 41

SF credit Total ProcessStep Ore UF6 Enrichment Fabrication Storage Total Reprocess Storage MOX fabrication MOX storage Source: NJFF calculations based on the on the calculations based Source: NJFF effort needed of the measurement of unit work unit (SWU) is a *A separative in U-238 atoms and U-235 the to separate is that product final Table 4. Comparison of Costs With Table 4 compares the cost of a once-through fuel cycle at spot market fuel cycle Table 4 compares the cost of a once-through with a closed cycle. prices of about $250/kg (or $113/lb) The conservative, based on is probably cost estimate reprocessing than $20 billion) for the Rokkasho costs (more completion estimated tons per year.(Japan) facility with a capacitymetric of 800 itself highly reprocessing is It is also important to emphasize that capital intensive, and it would therefore not be easy to finance or be a supply- appears to justifywhat construction on the basis of rather than a true physical shortage. imbalance demand lower much with these options, The 2003 MIT study compared Their or $13.60/lb). see today than we prices ($30/kg uranium for a for an open cycle were $0.005/kWh $0.022/kWh and estimates simple than 4. We have used the same closed cycle—a of more factor fuel-cycle report but with updated in that found prices. methodology expensive more At today’s to be still appears prices, reprocessing although the fuel cycle, in a once-through uranium than using natural A MIT report was released in 2003. has shrunk since the margin market services at today’sutilityspot and enrichment buying uranium for fuel, including disposal. prices would pay 1.4 cents/kWh about In the past, price increases for nuclear fuel have triggered discussions triggered discussions fuel have for nuclear price increases In the past, and of the U-235 advantage to take of reprocessing wisdom about the fuel is a blend Mixed oxide (MOX) in spent fuel. remaining Pu-239 to supplement can be used that uranium and depleted of plutonium fuel in light-water reactors. (LEU) low-enriched uranium Costs ofCosts Once-Through Cycles Fuel Closed and NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

the Nuclear Future: the Nuclear Future: 80+ pressurized-water 80+ pressurized-water

cost cases. cases. cost Dr Neff, Thomas Centerfor International This value is between our low and high high and our low between is This value Most U.S. reactors were not designed to to designed not were Most reactors U.S. currently government The U.S. fee of 1 fuel disposal a spent collects power sold. per kWh of nuclear mill not analyze whether Although we did of revenue collection the current level to cover a second will be sufficient of waste estimates repository, higher affect nuclear disposal costs would costs by less than power production of spent fuel 1%. (See discussion and disposal in management Chapter III.) Externalities Although external costs and benefits for all fuels and can be calculated not generating technologies, we have included external costs in this analysis. uranium Key external costs include and accident risk. remediation mine Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposal Costs Fuel Disposal Nuclear Spent Challenges and Opportunities.” Studies, MIT, “Dynamic Relationships Be- Relationships “Dynamic MIT, Studies, New Prices: A and SWU Uranium tween Building Equilibrium, future handle more than 25% MOX; Combustion Combustion MOX; 25% than handle more System Engineering handle to reactors were designed full cores. 51 50 49 The Keystone Center II. ECONOMICS 42 42 52 inventory. O&M expenditures. Fuelcosts include all fuel cyclesteps,including payments forspent fuel disposal andinterest on uranium i growing industry should facefewerchallengesinthese areas. materials, uranium andenrichment services,andpossiblypublicregulatorysupport.Amore slowly A rapidlygrowingnuclearindustrycanbeexpected toencountermore costchallengesinskilledlaborand line depreciationfordetermining rates. from theperspectiveofutilityfinance.Forratemaking purposes,however,most commissionsusestraight- In bothcases,wehaveusedaccelerateddepreciation forcalculatingfederalincome taxes,whichisproper (Cents/kWh) Table 6.Summary ofLevelized Cost Table 5.Summary ofCostAssumptions 8 centsperkWhto11 inrealdollars(Table5). considered above,thedifference inlevelizedcostperkWh atthepoint ofgenerationgrowsfrom roughly There isa30% difference incapital cost betweenourlowandhighestimates.When weaddthefactors Summary ofConstruction Cost Estimates

For calculationalease, administ ul . et/W 1.7cent/kWh $20/kW/year 5mill/kWh $120/kW/year 1.2cents/kWh 75% 15-year accelerated 30years $20/kW/year 5mills/kWh $100/kW/year 8%debt, 15% equity,50/50ratio $2,950/kW 15-year accelerated 8%debt,12%equity,50/50ratio $4,000/kW Grid Integration Fuel 90% 40years Variable O&M Fixed O&M Depreciation $2,950/kW Financial $3,600/kW Capacity Factor Capital Cost, Including Interest Plant Life Overnight Cost (2007$) Main Assumptions Cost Category Total (Levelized Cents/kWh) Variable O&M Fixed O&M Fuel Capital Costs

rative and general (A&G)costs,decommissioning

Low CaseLow Low CaseLow NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING

8.3 11.1 0.5 1.9 2.7 1.3 1.7 4.6 6.2 The Keystone Center The 52

High Case High Case , and net capitaladditions aretreated as

n II. ECONOMICS

fault or which the initial two plants f plants the initial two ated Future Load? A View A Load?ated Future on related delays—that are no . This has two implications for the cost 55 coverage is available for is coverage Option for Meeting Anticip www.naruc.org 43 The NJFF group concludes that while some concludes The NJFF group announced their intentions companies have nuclear power plants, to build “merchant” power in it will be easier to finance nuclear included in the the costs are states where on equity. return rate base with a regulated and risks of building new nuclear power plants. Market Structure and Market Structure Regulatory Oversight and regulatory structure The type of market recovery, the oversight will have an effect on cost price and economic risks, and the allocation of Electricity outlook for new nuclear power plants. oversight have evolved and regulatory markets continue to decades and over several substantially have more do so. All regions of the country late the than they did during markets competitive existing most 1970s, when the construction of nature and reactors was started; however, the regions, In some vary. degree of competition of their generation to utilities have sold much rate regulation; and in subject to state entities not to are also open states, retail sales some regions (including the However, many competition. retained a have of the West) Southeast and most utility integrated cost-of-service more traditional model. that In the 2003 MIT study, the authors assumed most new nuclear generation would be built as electricity plants in fully competitive “merchant” markets. construction of a new reactor, particularly at a at a particularly a new reactor, of construction West, both or site in the Northeast “greenfield” cultural The same and unpredictable. challenging regard to spent into play with come issues would Yucca status of the given the current fuel storage, limit. and its statutory volume Mountain project with federal regulatory or litigati or with federal regulatory for the next four plants. next four for the can mitigate can mitigate 54 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR In addition to In addition UC Winter UC Winter Meeting, Feb. 2007. of these plants. Up to $500 million in $500 million Up to of these plants. , 2003, p. 37. , 2003, in 2006 covers costs associated to $250 million is available to $250 million stated that the major issues of concern stated that the major 53 The Future of Nuclear Power of Nuclear The Future assurance that costs will be passed on to assurance that costs when incurred. customers public perception public perception and disposal spent fuel storage untested NRC licensing process and untested NRC licensing regulatory requirements     the risk of clearly NRC-driven delays, the coverage to six reactors, provided in EPACT 2005 is limited not be easily attributable and potential delays may to either the NRC or the utility. Public perception of nuclear power varies U.S. and could make across the substantially and possible risk to investors were: and possible risk or accident add the risk of a serious Others might in the sabotage of a nuclear facility anywhere weapons world, or diversion of materials for production. discussed earlier, In addition to the regulatory risks the regulatory risk from of unmitigated the threat to utilities NRC licensing process is also a concern process is and investors. The new licensing and therefore untested and hence unpredictable, doubt about developers’ ability to there is some This concern is and cost estimates. timelines meet were often based on past experience, when plants given and even delayed after approval had been after construction had begun. Significant caused costs to unanticipated delays and challenges Street Wall escalate and projects to be abandoned. environment agrees that an uncertain regulatory in new plant private investment will hamper delay insurance While development.

Other Factors Affecting Risk Affecting Other Factors an acute impact than cost can have other Factors but of a nuclear investment, risk on the potential be easily quantified. they cannot capital cost uncertainties, an analyst from Morgan Morgan an analyst from capital cost uncertainties, Stanley The risk insurance authorized The risk insurance MIT, Caren Byrd, “Myth or Reality: Is New Nuclear Power a Cost-Effective Nuclear Power a Cost-Effective “Myth or Reality: Is New Caren Byrd, The Keystone Center from the Investment Community,” NAR Community,” the Investment from 55 53 54 of the company—that stall the startup of the company—that up started, and construction is II. ECONOMICS 59 newsinfo/releases/2007/20070510.pdf 58 57 56 44 44 These approaches are common throughout the United States, inbo Power Georgia on Hearings Hold to GA PSC “NewStatus,”NEI NuclearPlant Energy Daily,“Unistar Nuclear Identifies Constellation’s Calvert Cliffsas of Maryland. intention tobeginsiteplanningforoneinthestate “merchant” nuclearplantsandhasannouncedits that thecompanyisseriouslyconsideringbuilding Constellation EnergyPresident, Michael Wallace, During theJointFactFinding,weheardfrom traditional ratebase recovery couldbe difficult. however, financinganuclearpowerplantwithout of theincreasedinvestorrisks.Onbalance, government loanguaranteescouldalleviatesome sold inthewholesalespotmarket. Federal uncertain, particularlywhere some orallpoweris cost recoveryincompetitive markets ismore purchase ofpower.Finally,thelevelandtiming of are making shortercommitments forthesaleand utilities inmore traditional regulated environments contracts much longerthan3to5years,andeven generators arerarely,ifever,able to negotiate competitive market structures,independent obligation to meet jurisdictionalload. Incurrent power throughalong-termcontractoran some assurancethattherewillbeamarket forthe Second, financialinstitutionstypicallyrequire will reflectthishigherriskprofile. capital coststructureand costofdebtandequity plants squarelyontheinvestors.Asaresult, permitting, andperformance uncertaintiesofnew risk ofconstructioncosts,lengthconstruction, authors, acompetitive generationmarket placesthe overall costofcapital.As notedbytheMIT First, higher investor risk willtranslate into higher cost-of service regulatory oversight prevails. to buildintheSoutheast,wheremore traditional Construction andOperatingLicensesareplanning have soughtearlysiteapprovalorCombined merchant units.Nevertheless,most companies that applications fornuclearplants inTexas as to developandsubmit combined operating Exelon, NRG,andTXUhavealsoannouncedplans outside atraditional cost-of-service regulatory more difficulttofinance new nuclearpowerplants a number ofreasons,weconcludedthatitmay be 56 Inaddition, Amarillo Power, http://www.nei.org/index . NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING & Light’s Integrated Resource Plan, May 10, 2007. May ResourcePlan, 10, &Light’s 2007. Integrated 57 For For .asp?catnum=2&catid=344 The Keystone Center The th restructured and party. whether builtbytheutilityoranindependent the costofnewsupplyanddemand resources, periodic biddingprocesses,orboth,todetermine utilities tocomplete integrated resourceplans,run prudently incurred.Now,many statesrequire provided thatsubsequentinvestments were utility hadsome expectationofcostrecovery, regulators. Oncesuchacertificatewasissued,the public convenienceandnecessity”from state began whentheutilitysoughta“certificateof In the1970s,procurement decisionstypically of-service states. developers may faceregulatory challengesincost- framework. Wealsorecognize,however,that shareholders. how therisks will be borne byratepayersand complete theproject.Another important factoris and theability ofthe project ownertofinanceand impact oftheresourceonratesorcustomers’ bills, diversity, maintaining reliability, minimizing the value onachievingothergoals,suchasfuel consider; however,theyhaveincreasinglyplaced typically the most important factorthat regulators Achieving thelowestlong-term costforpoweris and investmentsinenergy efficiency. (encouraged bystaterenewableportfoliostandards) particular resources,particularlyrenewableenergy developed, suchasbiddingsystems targetedto other typesofcompetitive procurementhavebeen project. Inadditiontoall-sourceprocurements, customers from costoverrunsonanyparticular for recoveringcostsinrates,therebyprotecting Such aprocurement processcanalsoform thebasis for new capital-intensive generation. for newcapital-intensive that makeitamore rigorous environment the traditionalcost-of-serviceframework and 80shaveledtoanumberofchangesin The powerplantcostoverrunsofthe1970s 58 the Site for First Potential New NPP,”May02, 2007

unrestructured markets. . http://www.psc.state.ga.us/

59

. II. ECONOMICS ed er, Nov. 29, 2006. 45 the level and structure of required capital structure of required capital and the level investment the record of experience of the industry specific generally, and an applicant developer’s of nuclear history on the cost and performance power energy of alternative the cost and performance resources and the the expectations about energy demand availability of long-term contracts for the power decisions, policies and regulatory government that place high decisions such as government fixed costs at risk through policy changes (such restructuring) as electricity risk. supports that help mitigate government       analyst, briefing by a Fitch According to a recent considered spent nuclear fuel is not of the storage financial risk factor: “Although a to be a major spent nuclear of solution for the storage permanent States can take further action to facilitate new new to facilitate action further can take States can allow they example, For nuclear investment. in work in progress to recover construction utilities plant than waiting for rather rates, current The advantages prudence review. and completion are considerable, easing to utilities and investors and capital recovery, cash flow, accelerating that thereducing the risk owner cannot complete challenge is that this approach The the plant. and term in the short rates generally increases (e.g., in the in the long term could increase rates during construction). cancelled case of a project receive funding from Nuclear power developers lower the risks both equity and credit markets. The the cost of for investors and creditors, the lower order to look favorably (and return to) capital. In on financing new nuclear construction, investors perceive that the return expected must and creditors risk. with the is commensurate and regulatory structure In addition to market of other factors influence a number environment, plant the real and perceived risks for nuclear investors, including: the Special Committee on Nuclear Pow on Nuclear Special Committee the NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Environmental Environmental 60 Utilities operating under such caps may Utilities operating under such caps 61 considerations, such as the impact of a reactor’s as the impact such considerations, by state or be considered discharges, may thermal are but typically regulators federal environmental review. regulators’ economic not factors in the predict how regulators will Although we cannot for cost recovery of new utility- treat requests that they will it is likely owned nuclear generation, risks of utility ways to balance the be looking for better than and electricity ratepayers shareholders was done in the past. A number of circumstances in the initial regulatory approvals have undermined changes in past and could do so again, including in mistakes design and safety requirements, management of the construction or operation of the or changes in plant, longer-than-expected outages, to factors have led these for electricity. All demand estimates initial exceeded actual costs that have higher costs and prices for cases, and, in some ratepayers. state of the past, the lessons To internalize of steps, such as take a number regulators may cost caps as a condition of approval, imposing more rigorous rate recovery, or performance-based before analysis of the portfolio of alternatives approval. try to impose them on vendors through contract them try to impose caps are unlikely to apply to all clauses. The have labor categories of cost or risk (e.g., they may exclusions for events that escalators or and material are beyond vendor or utility control, such as strikes or weather). Efforts to impose cost caps on vendors often lead to protracted litigation (and additional costs) over whether the owner or the vendor was responsible for delays or cost escalation. In short, and control risk to manage regulators can attempt fall at the beginning of a project, but the risks may quite differently in the end. In California, legislation prohibits construction of of construction prohibits legislation In California, to the there is a solution plants until new nuclear waste. storage of nuclear long-term of problem conditions adopted similar states have Eleven other construction. on nuclear Memo to: Wisconsin Legislative Memo of Council, Members to: Wisconsin Legislative cap impos faced a cost Unit 2 also Limerick regulators. subject to a cost cap by was reactor 2 Mile Point Nine York, the New In The Keystone Center by Pennsylvania regulators. regulators. by Pennsylvania 60 61 II. ECONOMICS and WorldReport JFF participants, 2007. 65 64 63 62 46 46 forward, whileothershavenot. described thesemeasures asessentialformoving be implemented. Some potentialbuildershave because ofuncertainty abouthowthepolicieswill with andwithoutfederalfinancialsupports,inpart relative economics ofbuildingnewnuclearplants Most utilitiesandinvestorsareconsideringthe incentives. more expeditiouslytotakeadvantageofthe option ofconstructing new reactors tomove forward encourage thosealready seriouslyconsidering the and accelerateddepreciation.Thesepoliciescould includes Price-Anderson limited liabilityinsurance costs. Continuationofkeypastfinancial assistance NRC licensingdelays;andsharingofapplication for upto6,000MW (for8years);insuranceagainst with carbonsequestration);aproductiontaxcredit including renewablegenerationandcoalfacilities guarantees areforallemission-free resources, 2005 includefederalloanguarantees(loan from particularrisks.Current incentives inEPACT to theextent that Investors willlookmore favorablyonnuclearpower to Fitch. primary creditriskofnuclearownership,”according potential foranextendedunplannedoutageisa Performance risk an interim solutionatamanageable cost.” fuel remains unresolved,onsitestoragehasprovided than companies withoutnuclear power. liquidity andusemore conservativefinancialcriteria requiring nuclearplantownerstohavegreater financial consequencescouldbequitesevere, extended shutdownislowtoday,itarguesthatthe While Fitchbelieves thatthe probability ofan potential foranextended outage worriesinvestors. reactor, althoughithasrarelydoneso.Still,the of theeconomics nuclearpower,we ofexpanding factor inany decisiontobuildanewnuclearunit. has beennotedbycompanies suchasExelona other hand,theabsenceoflong-term wastestorage The YuccaMountain Project is the “linchpin” to solving the wasteproblem and building new plants, JohnRowe, Exelon CEO told Michael Wallace,Constellation President,Presentation atNJFF, November 2007. StatementsofSouthern Company and Florida Power Fitch, 2006. Fitch, “U.S.NuclearPower:Credit Implications,” Nov. 2006. 64 The NRChastheauthoritytoshutdown a foran Oct. 22, 2006,article, “Mired in Yucca Muck.” government policies isalsoveryimportant. “The 65 Inour examination NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING protectthem 62 Onthe 63 The Keystone Center The

substantially. costs ofthefirstfewU.S.nuclearreactors guarantees inEPACT2005couldreduceratepayer incentives/subsidies suchastheproposedloan it overthelongterm. However,asnotedearlier, their intentistokick-starttheindustry,notmaintain did nottakeintoaccountthecurrentsubsidiessince liability. unwilling tooffer,insurancewithoutlimitations on unwilling toaccept,or insurance companiesare for productionofnuclearpower,becauseutilitiesare subsequently) itwasevidently considered necessary public. Atthetime oftheAct’spassage(and still ensuring compensation coverage forthegeneral liability claims arisingfrom nuclearincidents,while constructed intheU.S.before2026againstoff-site It coversallnon-military nuclearfacilities costs wouldbecoveredbythefederalgovernment. would becoveredbytheindustry,andremaining of system, whichthefirst$10billionofdamage in Price-Anderson establishesano-faultinsurancetype 1957 andhassincebeenrenewedseveraltimes. Industries Indemnity Act,whichwasfirstpassedin large part because ofthePrice-AndersonNuclear byinvestorstoday,in not seenasasignificantrisk The nuclear powerrelativetofossilfuelgeneration. change policycouldenhancethecompetitiveness of the risksforinvestors. Asdiscussedearlier,climate Environmental policies the priceofnucleargeneration totheconsumer. taxpayers, buttheymay affectthecost ofcapitaland allocation amonginvestors,consumers,and We agreedthattheseissuesaremostly about risk advantageous. investment innuclearpower lesseconomically alternative fuels Finally, investorsareconcerned thatthe risk ofamajoraccident couldfall, potentiallymaking the alsocanmitigate or increase atanuclear facility is price of U.S. News & Light, III. SAFETY & SECURITY I in have been made to plant safety equipment, to plant safety equipment, have been made 68 47 . during power-plant operations, and to mitigate the the operations, and to mitigate during power-plant s relate to the probability and potential consequences and potential consequences s relate to the probability could result in substantial radiological releases. Whether these releases. Whether could result in substantial radiological NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR In the U.S. 67 67 www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html there have been two major there have been two major

66

procedures, and training in U.S. reactor operations. Still, a severe accident at a nuclear power plant is both accident Still, a severe procedures, and training in U.S. reactor operations. under consideration for physically and statistically possible for existing plants, for plant designs Generation IV reactors. and for advanced designs—the in the near term, construction there have been no immediate been there have radiological injuries or deaths among to accidents the public attributable involving commercial nuclear power of public reactors, and the number cancers latent injuries or deaths from such accidents is at resulting from most a few. improvements accident in 1979, numerous Since the TMI-2 accidents involving nuclear-power involving accidents reactors—at Three Mile Island (TMI- 2) in the U.S. (1979) and at Chernobyl as in the U.S.S.R. (1986)—as well events. smaller several consequences from a possible—but very low probability—event. Security measures are intended to intended are measures Security very low probability—event. a possible—but consequences from and sabotage that attacks prevent on-site have been the and practice in both theory are sufficient design features and regulatory requirements for decades. subject of debate and controversy Accident Plant Power Nuclear of a Severe The Probability than 10,000 cumulative In more world- of operations reactor-years wide,

associated with release of substantial quantities of radioactivity from a nuclear power reactor or from a nuclear radioactivity from of release of substantial quantities associated with and safety equipment required features, including at the reactor site. Reactor design spent nuclear fuel are intended to prevent other regulatory requirements, as well as numerous measures, emergency-response occurring accidentally from releases radiological III. Safety and Security of Security Safety and III. Power Nuclear power nuclear and proposed commercial of existing safety and security addresses the This chapter It does not power situation. on the U.S. nuclear with emphasis cycle facilities, and related fuel reactors including fuel cycle, of the nuclear other elements with issues associated security address safety or reprocessing. nuclear fuel fabrication or and transportation, and milling, mining uranium question the central security, For both safety and See NUREG 06600737 for examples. See NUREG and NUREG IAEA PRIS Data Base, PRIS IAEA NRC industry and both with (USA, 2002), revealing problems near miss Davis-Besse was a major recent example, As a The Keystone Center Michigan and Browns Ferry in Alabama. Alabama. in Ferry Browns Michigan and inspections and oversight (see Davis-Besse side-bar). Other nuclear power plants that suffered serious accidents include Fermi Fermi accidents include serious suffered plants that nuclear power Other side-bar). Davis-Besse (see oversight inspections and 68 66 67 III. SAFETY & SECURITY individual will die from allforms ofcancer. tenth ofonepercent(0.1%)thelikelihoodthatan operations, includingaccidents,bymore thanone- will diefromcancerrelatedtonuclear plant (living within 10miles of anuclearpowerplant) increase thelikelihoodthatamember ofthepublic of commercial nuclearpowerplantsshouldnot The NRC’ssafetygoalstipulatesthattheoperation for theU.S.commercialnuclearpowerindustry. The NRCistheprimary federalregulatoryagency How Safe Are Today’s Reactors? quantitative estimates suggest that the commercial reactor containment failure.While thePRAs’ likelihood ofprompt and latentfatalities,givena given acore-damage event;and,finally,the likelihood of reactorcontainment-building failure, the nuclearcoreofapowerplant; the that estimates thelikelihoodofeventsthat damage Assessment (PRA).ThePRAisastatisticalmodel risk assessment technique calledProbabilistic Risk the safetyof anuclearpowerplantisquantitative The method thattheNRCcurrentlyusestoassess impact oflandcontamination. other countries,theNRCdoesnotconsider with nuclearpowerprograms; unlikesome however, goal issimilar tothoseofseveralothercountries within the 10-mile radius. TheU.S.healthsafety cancer deaths perreactor permillion peopleliving goal translatesintoanannuallevelofabout2.2 data from theU.S.BureauofLaborStatistics, According totheU.S.NuclearRegulatory 71 70 69 Safety Culture, June 18, 2001. June 18, 2001. Safety Culture, 48 48 safety goalisbeingmet. adequately demonstratethattheNRC’s believe thatthemethodologyusedcannot agree withthisassessment.Others safety goal.SomeNJFFparticipants nuclear powerplantsmeettheNRC’s Commission (NRC)assessment,U.S. “Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment ofFive U. John Gaertner etal.,“Safety Benefits of Risk Assessment at U.S. PowerNuclear Plants.” Meserve, R.A., “The Evolution of Safety Goals andTheir Connection http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/speeches/2001/s01-013.html NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING 69 S. NuclearPowerPlants,” NUREG 1150,1990. Using 70 this The Keystone Center The rigorous andquantitativeassessment of(1) accident conditions. PRA modeling permits amore safety systems duringnormal, abnormal, and to simulate performance forthekeyoperatingand and continuestobe,appliednuclearpowerplants low-probability events.ThePRAprocesshasbeen, useful whenassessingthenuclearpowerindustry’s modeling toolforprovidinginformation thatis within andoutside theNRC, asaneffective human reliability,andisconsideredbymany, both analyzes dataforequipmentperformance andfor based on“eventtrees”and“faulttrees.”PRAalso probabilistic toolstomake statisticalcalculations meaningful ornonexistent.PRAincorporates accidents, actuarialdataareeithertoo limited tobe probability events,suchasmajor nuclear-plant using actuarialdata.Inthecaseofverylow- accidents orcanceroccurrences, canbeanalyzedby High-probability events, such asautomobile limitations. NRC’s safetygoal,thePRAs haveinherent U.S. nuclearpowerplantsmeet andexceedthe plants in1990. damaging) accidents atfiveoperating nuclearpower assessment ofthelikelihoodsevere(core- using PRAmodeling,theNRCconductedan insights andimprovements tolight.For example, model. Thesemodels havebroughtsome major Every U.S.nuclearpowerplanthasitsownPRA and (3)the go wrong,(2)the quantifying human responses.Therearevariations are arguablyuncertainduetothedifficultyof assumptions onwhichthey arebased. Thescenarios PRAs areonlyasgoodthedata,models,and Goal. factors of100and10,000—belowtheNRCSafety severe accidents weresubstantially—between estimated that annualmortalityratesresultingfrom to Safety Culture.”U.S. NRC Meeting on Safety GoalsAnd consequence 71 Basedonthisstudy,theNRC likelihood ifitdoesgowrong. thatitcangowrong, what . can III. SAFETY & SECURITY NRC docketed in-

74 Based upon Based in 1992 was 4.7E-5/year, showing an 4.7E-5/year, in 1992 was . Many new technologies that There are individual power plants individual power There are 73 g. Today, many existing U.S. plants are existing g. Today, many 49 Risk Assessment at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants.” Power Nuclear at U.S. Assessment Risk Factors Equipment-Related Agin end of their original 40-year approaching the of indicated, about one-half licenses. As previously nuclear power plants have been the existing U.S. license extensions, and about one- granted 20-year plants have announced plans half of the remaining to file renewal applications. are unique of many U.S. plants Because elements materials in design and construction, effective facility. are required at each programs management for key systems, Failure to maintain these programs power of a nuclear structures, and components plant throughout its entire life could result in to due serious safety and reliability issues wear, embrittlement, corrosion, erosion, material and fatigue. New Technologies safer operations provide safety benefits, both for have and mitigation, and for accident prevention nuclear power been developed and deployed at all example, reactors over the past 30 years. For to their specific reactor simulators plants now have own design and operations to enhance training allowed for have capabilities. Digital technologies and control systems. instrumentation improved for inspection have also been made Improvements and surveillance technologies to help assess the Improved and equipment. condition of materials have been developed for materials replacement in components generators, piping, and other steam durable and reliable. more them order to make for which the estimated risk reductions have risk reductions the estimated for which the estimated EPRI more dramatically. increased been one plant to have frequency at core-damage a over 23 years through by a factor of 5 reduced plant upgrades. series of focused

1992 to 2000. 1992 to had dropped to 3.2E-5/year. to 3.2E-5/year. had dropped

essment at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants.” at U.S. Nuclear Power essment 72 plants that had substantial vulnerabilities early in life. substantial vulnerabilities that had plants ncy was 9.1E-5/year in 1992. The median median 1992. The in ncy was 9.1E-5/year NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR 00, the mean core damage frequency damage core mean 00, the This type of improvement is typical for those This type of improvement On balance, commercial nuclear power On balance, commercial safer today than they plants in the U.S. are Mile at Three the 1979 accident before were Island. As a result of these insights and actions, the Research Institute (EPRI) has Electric Power frequency for power the average that estimated heat- to their radioactive, damage reactors to suffer producing cores has declined by a factor of 3 from of factors lend support to the view that A number U.S. are in the commercial nuclear power reactors 1970s. These safer today than they were in the organizational and risk insights and factors include and human in plant equipment improvements of these factors are also Some performance. reactors abroad. power to commercial relevant Risk Assessment Insights agreed that a the NJFF participants As noted above, of safety insights have been developed in number the conduct of the nuclear plant PRA analyses. Are U.S. Nuclear Plants Becoming Safer? Nuclear U.S. Are in PRA quality from one reactor to the next. For next. For to the one reactor quality from in PRA of the members some other reasons, these and are too optimistic. the assessments group believe risk that quantitative believe These participants the absolute measure cannot reliably calculations but catastrophic accidents risk of low-probability to compare relative measure can be used in a is, while the ratio of two risks relative safety. That of measure neither is a reliable be meaningful, may absolute risk. group did not agree as the NJFF For these reasons, overall safety of nuclear plants can a whole that the be adequately demonstrated. Ibid. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) study “Safety Benefits of Benefits study “Safety Institute (EPRI) Electric Power Research Ass of Risk “Safety Benefits study, the EPRI Taken from The Keystone Center asymmetric distribution. In 20 In distribution. asymmetric formation, the mean (average) core damage freque damage core (average) mean the formation, 74 72 73 III. SAFETY & SECURITY 78 77 76 75 when they are discharged from serv active be utilized toenable fewer skilled workerstoaccomplish tasksthat once required significant manual labor. velop specializedcurriculum for us 50 50 National Academy for Nuclear Training, Suite100, 70 http://www.nei.org/index.asp The industry is working with the Department http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1358 barriers. maintenance candegradeoneofthemain safety example ofhowthelack of properinspectionand Davis-Besse incident(seesidebardiscussion)is an managed enoughtomaintain well safety.The agree withthecriticism that material agingisnot plant equipment aging,some NJFFparticipants In spiteoftheindustry’s efforts tomanage nuclear ultimately extendtheirlicensedoperation. industry expect that virtually allofthese plants will renewal applications.TheNRCandthenuclear and 25more plantshaveannouncedplanstofile plants. Inaddition,8applicationsareunderreview, renewals for48ofAmerica’s 103nuclearpower to 60years.Todate,theNRChasapprovedlicense renewal applications toallow plantstooperateup must beinplace whenplants submit license systems, structures,andcomponents. Thesystems assess theconditionandreliabilityofkeysafety and surveillancetechniques arebeing usedto and reliabilityoftheplants.Improved inspection problems most important tomaintaining thesafety from PRAstudiesthathighlightissuesand nuclear plantsbyincorporatinginsights gained been developedanddemonstratedforcommercial Life-cycle equipment management programs have licensees and bytheNRConmaintenance efforts. power plants,andithasledtogreaterfocusby proper maintenance inthesafeoperationofnuclear requirement. Itmade explicittheimportance of (10 CFR50.65)tomake thisindustryactiona July 1996,theNRCupdateditsmaintenance rule and totakecorrectiveactionsinatimely way.In industry istoidentifyissuesassociatedwithaging weakness anddamage. Thechallengefacingthe becomes necessarytoidentify andcorrect effective life-cycleequipment management system Upgrades .

As nuclearpower plantsage,an ?catnum=2&catid=345 e by community collegesin partnership ice. Oneinnovative program NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING of Defense’s “helmets to hardhats” program . 0 Galleria Parkway,SE,Atlan

The Keystone Center The . reduction of25sincethe1970s. operating nuclearpowerplantsintheU.S.,a utilities andenergy-generatingcompanies Utility Consolidation experienced significantstaffreductions. Staffing Human-Related Factors independent safetyboard. These improvements havebeenaccreditedbyan radiation protection,chemistry, andengineering. operations, maintenance,training toenhanceplant Training maintenance. have dedicatedresourcestoimprove operationand many yearsofexperienceinoperation,andthey largest 12companies.Today’scompanies have today’s nuclearpowerplantsareoperatedbythe simulators arebeingusedextensivelytotrain this looming workforceissue. launched severalinitiativesinanattempt toaddress replace anagingworkforce,theindustryhas talented andskilledemployees willbenecessaryto personnel haveretired.Recognizing thatattracting as older,experiencedoperatorandmaintenance industry hasalsosufferedfrom alossofexpertise fleet operationsandmaintenance protocols.The to supportmultiple plantsandbystandardizing consolidation, achievedbyenablingcorporatestaff reduce operationsandmanagement coststhrough these reductionshavebeentheresultofeffortsto culture” atnuclearpowerplants. operators hasimproved the“safety centralization amongutilitiesandplant the broader debatethatincreased among the NJFFparticipantsandwithin Thus, there isgeneralagreement both leverages Departmentof with local nuclearutilities. . Manynuclearpowerplantshave . Therehavebeensignificantadvancesin ta, GA 30339. toemploy our militarymen and women . Currently,thereare26 Labor grants touniversities to de 78 The plant-specific In some cases technolog 76 77

Almost70%of 75 Some of y can y can - III. SAFETY & SECURITY In 81

80 October 30, 1979. 1979. 30, October 51 1982, the IAEA initiated Operational Safety initiated Operational 1982, the IAEA OSART visits Review Team (OSART) missions. operational safety at are intended to improve team of nuclear power plants by using a performance international experts to assess safety objectively, to provide useful information on to make opportunities for improvement, and to encourage and enable recommendations, teams do not exchange. OSART information nuclear power among to rank performance attempt plants; rather, they seek to provide an independent safety of operational international assessment that might as a “snapshot in time” performance By 2003, 117 identify areas for improvement. Energy Agency (IAEA) The International Atomic in nuclear is an organization engaged globally and technology verification; security, safety, of nuclear energy. transfer and promotion Network (SEE-IN), Significant Operating Operating (SEE-IN), Significant Network and Significant Reports (SOERs), Experience these of details (SERs). The Event Reports public; to the general are not available programs us participants assure nuclear industry however, valuable sharing of “best enable that the programs learned.” practices” and “lessons Association the World INPO’s global counterpart, (WANO), wasof Nuclear Operators established accident to provide after the Chernobyl to “feedback” and shared-experience assessments community. power nuclear the international is to increase the safety and WANO’s mission by plant operations nuclear power reliability of and friendly rivalry among exchange information utilities world-wide. The WANO member at improving aims program experience-feedback by member utilities among capabilities operational operating-experience and sharing accumulating and reports, peer reviews, and professional data, and by exchanging technical development technical support. . NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR . Within the . Within . . . Since TMI, the NRC . Since TMI, INPO functions to promote INPO functions to promote lish/scsympo.pdf 79 http://www.pddoc.com/tmi2/kemeny/index.html safety in a number of ways, including peer safety in a number evaluations, self-policing, and advising on INPO also facilitates internal insurance premiums. including the programs, information-sharing Significant Event Evaluation and Information reactor operators. There have been many have been many There reactor operators. standards human-performance in improvements being that are of professionalism and principles work and seminars. through course reinforced and managers for supervisors seminars Required standard. have also become Evaluation and Inspection has made some improvements in implementing its in implementing improvements some has made responsibilities. There is broad regulatory many trust in the regulators and the that public agreement of public is a necessary element regulatory process (ROP) Reactor Oversight Process acceptance. The of two examples are Program and the Enforcement oversight. The ROP applies in NRC enhancement indicators to reactor operations performance and the Nuclear Energy Institute developed by provides further adopted by the NRC. Appendix C on these programs. information has developed The nuclear power industry itself by the indicators, approved new safety performance and 5-year goal- NRC, along with both annual involving peers setting procedures. Inspections, other power plants, are conducted at each site from inspections use 2 years. These at least every to evaluate operator performance. simulators Information-Sharing and Oversight have been nuclear power industry, new institutions and information- oversight created to administer of in terms significant example sharing. The most of the Institute is the U.S. reactor experience Operations (INPO), established Nuclear Power to address several after the TMI-2 accident identified in the Kemeny shortcomings report. Commission http://www.nsc.go.jp/eng http://www.iaea.org/About/history.html Report of The President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. at Three Mile on Accident Commission the of The President’s Report The Keystone Center See 80 81 79 III. SAFETY & SECURITY 84     83 82  nomic and promotional interestsover Conference, SessionT13, 52 52 Beattie, Jeff. “NRC To CallNukeCEOsonCarpet,” Examples interpreted by someNJFFmembers asindicating atendency by the NRC to emphasizeinappropriately industryeco- Lipar, Miroslav. “Operational SafetyReview Team Historyand countries. hadbeencarriedoutin31 OSART missions of 2,000inspectionhours eachyear. and evaluationatthoseplantsabovethebaselevel of theNRCistoincreaseamount ofinspection plants withpoorerscoresintheROP.Theresponse Much ofNRC’sfocusisontheidentification primarily toorganizational andleadershipissues. Again, Davis-Besseiscitedastheexample, due “outlier” plantsthatlackastrongsafetyculture. nuclear plants. Thereissome concernthatthereare all believethatitisstrongenoughattheU.S. protection ofthehealthandsafetypublic,not that astrong “safetyculture”isnecessary toensure among NJFFparticipantsandinthebroaderdebate Safety Culture enhanced qualitycontrol. for problems,andshared“lessonslearned”; Review Boards(CARBs),root-causeidentification such aspersonnelscreening,CorrectiveAction safety reviewboards;corrective-actionprograms initiatives. These includeindependentnuclear power plantlicenseesalsoconductself-oversight In additiontotheseindependentagencyefforts, Soviet Union. Union andstatesoperatingreactorssuppliedbythe among reactorsincountries oftheformer Soviet efforts, awiderangestillexistsinthe safetyculture national orinternationallaw.DespitetheOSART inspection, however,andlacksthepowerof “The top U.S. nuclear regulator vouched for th of the NRC. Dale Kleinappearedin paid industryads attesting to the safety ofYucca Mountain before his 2006appointment asChairman before itwas discovered to have a hole inthe pressure vessel head. The NRC adopted a new owner/operator rating system under which Davis-Besse thereceived top rating inall18categories just bers view as a weakening of oversi meeting withthechair, he successfullypersuaded the NRC to In his book, nuclear-enthusiast Senator Pete Domen Energy (Rowman andLittlefield When the NRC assessedits own safetycu at theNRC,animprovement from a similar survey done 4 years earlier. world — in asalespitchto supply 82 AnOSARTmission isnotaregulatory . While thereisagreement both International Experience.International April 17,2003,Washington, DC. , 1998,pp.74-75). public healthandsafetyinclude: China’s growing power industry.” AssociatedPr ght. Senator Pete V. Domenici,ght. SenatorPete NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING lture in 2002, more e safety of a newWes safety of e Energy Daily Energy

ici claimed that, by threateningto cut The Keystone Center The Evolution.” Presented atthe than half of itsemployees did no make changes toitsregulatory in relationtopublicprotection. economic andpromotional interestsinappropriately have emphasized industry Congressional oversight, Commissioners, respondinginpartto concerns, some NJFFmembers believethatmost and theseniormanagement staff.Astothe no suchagreement withregardtotheCommission dedication oftheNRCworking-levelstaff,thereis agreement withinthisgroupastothecapabilityand responded tosafetyissues.While thereisbroad how appropriatelyandeffectively theNRChas disagreement among theNJFFparticipantsasto In terms ofoversight,there isahighdegreeof recent examples ofNRCregulatorystringency. stewardship ofthenuclearindustry.Theypointto policy, thusensuringareasonablybalanced of otherCommissionersindecidingmatters of any givenCommissioner aretempered bytheviews industry. Thesemembers believethattheviewsof nuclear safetywiththeoperational interests ofthe appropriately balancing the publicinterestin Commission hasmade significantstridesin Other members oftheNJFFbelievethat safety. willing torelyonNRCassurances matters of undermines theextenttowhichthesemembers are of nuclearindustryoversight. operational failure atTMI-2atteststotheprudence experienced sincetheserious accidentshavebeen Further, fortheseNJFFmembers, thefactthatno , May 14,2007. , A BrighterTomorrow;FulfillingthePromise of Nuclear

tinghousereactor nuclear

ess, October 19,2004. its budgetby one-third during a 1998 15th AnnualRegulatoryInformation approach that some NJFF mem- — t thinkit was “safe tospeakup” yet to be built anywhere inthe 83 Thisconcern

84

III. SAFETY & SECURITY

86 . 53 There is agreement that, while plants have plants have that, while is agreement There Mile Island since the Three become safer concern over plant accident, public today than it was security is greater is not 2001. There 11, September before about among participants agreement been demonstrated that the whether it has to protect and procedures security systems In robust. sufficiently are existing reactors it classification environment, the current lackingis difficult for outside entities assess security clearances to adequately their as well as security measures, implementation and oversight. Safety and security are interconnected, because the because Safety and security are interconnected, processes, and procedures that protect a systems, accidents during normal public from plant and the that are used to systems operations are the same in the event of a prevent a release of radiation possible that terrorist attack or sabotage. It is be successful in overtaking terrorists who might and systems plant security could disable safety and the release of trigger a fuel meltdown would have a major that materials radioactive health and safety and on the on public impact environment. power plants is a serious Security at nuclear the terrorist attacks of concern in the context against targets in New York City and Washington, 11, 2001. Soon thereafter, it DC, on September Point the Indian that was reported in the press north of New York City, Nuclear Station, 35 miles confiscated in documents had been mentioned terrorism suspects. And in 2003, Energy from said there was Abraham Secretary Spencer evidence that terrorists may have specifically power station in nuclear Verde Palo targeted the Arizona, the largest nuclear plant in the country. The Current State of Nuclear Reactor Reactor of Nuclear State The Current in the U.S. Security NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Factors 85 . U.S. Congressional Budget Office. (December 2004). See especially Chapter 2, 2004). See especially (December Office. Budget . U.S. Congressional affecting nuclear facility management and the affecting nuclear facility management of personnel, such as organizational performance goals, and personnel structure, management In addition, WANO qualification, are reviewed. operations to provides peer assistance in nuclear However, neither WANO nor SCART members. over the nuclear has direct supervisory authority plants; their role is purely advisory. Other entities also play a role in supporting and role in supporting also play a Other entities INPO’s For example, safety culture. improving to identify outliers help programs plant-evaluation learned” and “best “lesson and incorporate cited by plants. The issue other from practices” that their processes and about INPO is some of This lack confidential. results are strictly of the the credibility challenges transparency of the outsiders. results to some all government not a global perspective, From consistent vision of the role of regulators have a nuclear plant operation. There is safety culture in the ultimate responsibility for safe that agreement the plants’ nuclear plant operation rests with an IAEA administers owners and operators. The states, directed for its member array of services safety and improving specifically at monitoring it recently began offering a For example, culture. called SCART (Safety service safety review which Review Team), Culture Assessment characteristics provides an evaluation of the main and assists in of safety culture in nuclear facilities of safety culture. the enhancement http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/publications/s_culture_leaflet.pdf Private Sector and the Homeland Security The Keystone Center “Civilian Nuclear Power.” 85 86 III. SAFETY & SECURITY http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part073/part073-0001.html 90 89 88 87 fairs, Subcommittee onEne Protection Requirem retary paper SECY-76-242A ture 20% U235, the element’s most Process Should Be Improved. 54 54 See J. Samuel Walker. “Regulating TheDomeAgainst Nuclear Terrorism: Ibid. The DBT is described indetail inTitle 10, Section 73.1(a), special nuclearmaterial. radiological sabotage,andtoprevent thetheftof and securitysystems toprotectagainstactsof of anadversaryasabasisfordesigningsafeguards that profilesthetype,composition, andcapabilities and itslicensees useaDesign BasisThreat(DBT) regulated andmonitored bytheNRC.TheNRC In theU.S.,nuclearplantsecurity,likesafety,is The DesignBasisThreat NRC historian,J.Samuel Walker. historical reviewofnuclearplantsecuritybythe 1970s been explicitinNRC’sregulationssincethe World TradeCenterandthePentagonin2001had The DBTinforcebeforethe9/11attackson facility todefendagainst“enemies ofthestate.” military resources areresponsibleforassistingthe state, andfederallawenforcement andU.S. of defendingagainst.Beyondthiscapability,local, types ofthreatitsfacilityisexpectedtobecapable clearly identify foreachlicensee the leveland equipment: with thefollowingattributes,assistance,and stealth, ordeceptive actions,byseveralpersons determined violent externalassault, attackby The current DBTdefinesradiologicalsabotageasa information aboutthecurrentDBTisavailable. those withasecurityclearance.Some general and, therefore,canbethoroughlyassessedonlyby post-9/11 DBT arenolongeravailable tothepublic increased, atleast marginally. Thedetails ofthe targets on9/11.Subsequently,theDBThasbeen smaller than the19adversarieswhoattacked four considers apostulatedthreatgroupsignificantly , January 2001, Vol. 42; pp. 107-132, especially p. 128. For mo For 128. p. especially pp. 107-132, Vol. 42; , January 2001, Nuclear Power Plants:NuclearMade ToUpgrade Power Efforts Sec

 88 skills) anddedicatedindividuals well-trained (includingmilitary trainingand andwasdescribedpubliclyina1998 ents Adopted,” rgy andthe Environment, (26 April 1976),“NRC StiffensSecurityRules,” GAO-06-388. March 2006. 2006. March GAO-06-388. common explosive isotope. 87 TheDBTservesto Nuclear News, Nuclear 89 TheDBT NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING April 1977, pp. 39-40; and U.S.AprilHo 1977,pp.39-40; and Safeguards in the Domestic Nuclear Industry http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06388.pdf urity, But the Nuclear Regula ofthe Code of FederalRegulations [10CFR73.1(a)], The Keystone Center The re information on how the NRC re information howthe set on DBT,seethe NRC Sec- the DBT shouldbe. commissioners andstaff,abouthowprescriptivea There remains debate,evenamong NRC some national policeormilitary providethisdefense. such postulatedterrorist attacks.Rather,the the individualplantoperatorstodefendagainst with largenuclear powerprograms donotrelyon Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD)countries U.S. practices,some forEconomic Organization operators willaugment asnecessary.Incontrastto say thatitisa stic Safeguards stic      equipment totheproximity ofvitalareas transport personnelandtheirhand-carried a four-wheeldrivelandvehicleusedto system integrity orfeaturesofthesafeguards reactor, facility,transporter,orcontainer as toolsofentryorforotherwisedestroying incapacitating agentsand explosives foruse hand-carried equipment, including range accuracy with silencersandhavingeffectivelong- held semi-automatic weaponsequipped suitable weapons,uptoandincludinghand- both communications, joininviolentattack),or entrance and exit, disable alarms and information), anactiverole(e.g.,facilitate participate inapassiverole(e.g.,provide knowledgeable individualwhoattemptsto inside assistance,whichmay includea bomb. a four-wheeldrivelandvehiclewith . Special Nuclear Material isuranium enriched above Nuclear Industry, minimum 90 use Committee on Interior and Insular Af- Issue, 1970-1979.” DefendersoftheDBTconcept tory Commission’s Design Basis Threat standardthatprudentplant March 1977, p. 30; “New Physical “NewPhysical p. 30; March 1977, , pp. 144-146 and 253-258. 253-258. and 144-146 , pp. . TechnologyCul- and III. SAFETY & SECURITY This 91 It 92

, Final Report. Electric Power Research concluded that terrorists could 93 Plants Potentially at Risk From Terrorist From Potentially at Risk Plants

It further determined that, in the long run, dry It further determined

55 study showed that the reinforced concrete structure the reinforced concrete structure study showed that the energy of the pool absorbed of the spent fuel stainless steel liner prevented crash, and the ductile coolant loss. of the by a committee conducted A classified study in 2004 was Council of the NAS National Research to the public in 2005. released, in part, underscored the pools’ vulnerability to terrorist underscored the pools’ vulnerability aircraft or attacks that engage commercial Spent failure. structural to cause charges explosive shortly after the vulnerable fuel pools are most refueling of a reactor has been refueled. During power plant, typically, on the large U.S. nuclear the from order of 20 tons of fuel are removed recently removed reactor and replaced. Because the of short- concentration a higher spent fuel contains fuel kept in to lived radioactive isotopes, relative it is still generating the pool for several years, is sufficient to considerable heat. Indeed, this heat absent the cooling quickly, fuel to melt cause the or from provided by the water in the pool supplies. emergency The NAS study successfully attack the pools, but the likelihood of successfully attack the pools, but attack or a severe a terrorist from widespread harm fuel is nuclear spent commercial involving accident low. casks are inherently more secure than pools. casks are inherently more by of the points raised The NRC agreed with many indications that the NAS report, including some are safe and secure and spent fuel storage systems actions to improve that the NRC is taking further their safety and security. However, in testimony recognized in the early 2000s from preliminary preliminary from in the early 2000s recognized the the NRC and out by carried assessments the industry For example, nuclear industry. a direct study in 2003 using a simulation conducted (a commercial airliner a large from side impact traveling at 350 mph). fully loaded 757-400 . 2005. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR ed To Reduce Vulnerabilities Spent Fuel Stored in Pools at Some U.S. Nuclear Power Nuclear U.S. Some at Pools Stored in Fuel Spent

NJFF participants, some of whom on some of whom participants, NJFF have security of the debate both sides DBT analyzed the and have clearances disagree measures, current and assessed and its oversight the DBT about whether adequate. are Spent Fuel Pools plant the are located within Spent fuel pools security protected by the same grounds and are as the equipment surveillance force and electronic Since 9/11, the National Academy rest of the plant. of Science (NAS), EPRI, the NRC, the Accountability Office (GAO), and Government of spent others have conducted safety assessments fuel pools. a spent by which scenarios There are hypothetical fuel pool could lose its cooling water, resulting in a material. Some release of radioactive catastrophic do not believe these of the NJFF members others do. catastrophic scenarios are credible; are complicated, of these findings Assessments are classified and of the details because many However, unavailable for general public review. been published. summaries of these studies have Mark 1 (BWRs) using reactors At boiling-water about which account for and Mark 2 containments, spent fuel pools 30 percent of all U.S. plants, the fuel are containing highly radioactive spent nuclear elevated about five floors above the ground. These structures are designed to withstand earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornado-generated debris, but they hardened against attack. are not specifically The potential vulnerability of BWR reactor buildings and their elevated spent fuel pools was National Research Council, Ibid. Resistance of Nuclear Power Plant Structures Housing Nuclear to Aircraft Fuel Crash Impact The Keystone Center Attacks; Prompt Measures Need

93 91 92 Institute, Palo Alto, CA, prepared by ANATECH Corp, ABS Consulting, ERIN Engineering, FebruaryInstitute, Palo Alto, CA, prepared by 2003. ANATECH Corp, III. SAFETY & SECURITY 100 99 98 97 96 95 reading-rm/doc-collections/congress-docs/correspondence/2005/domenici-03142005.pdf 94 Jan. 29, 2007. 2007. 29, Jan. September 2006. Electric PowerResearch Institute byANATECH 56 56 See http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ht-060401-nrc.html GAO-06-388, pages 12 and 21. NRC Aircraft ImpactatNuclear Power Plants- Analyses for Diaz, Nils. Testimony before Senate Water, before theSenate SubcommitteeonEnergyand NRC usedtoobtainfeedbackfrom stakeholders, agree withtheGAO’sassessment thatthe process with theNRCCommissioner’s exclusion.Others aircraft attacks. Administration—to protectnuclearplantsfrom including the military and theFederalAviation is activelyinvolvedwithotherfederalagencies— explosions nomatter whatthecause;andNRC manage theconsequencesoflargefiresor crash. Plant operators arerequiredtobeable provide adequateprotectionagainstanairplane structures thatotherstudieshaveshownwould believed thatnuclearplantsareinherentlyrobust airplane attacks inthe revised DBT,becausethey aircraft. NRCCommissioners didnotinclude The current DBTdoesnotconsider attacks by the aircrafthits,among otherparameters. spent fuelpool’svulnerabilitydependsonwhere drywell structure. Thesestudiesindicatedthatthe robust connectionstothe MarkIandII combination ofredundantstructuralsupportand pool waterinventorywaspostulated,owingtoa collapse ofthespentfuelpooloccur,andnoloss support structure.Innoneofthecasesanalyzeddid caused significantdamage totheunderlying beneath thepools,andnotattheirsides,crashes commercial aircraftimpact at buildingfloorlevels fuel pools. assessments ofthreedifferentBWR buildingspent 2005 conductedmore detailedvulnerability After theNASreport,nuclearindustryin2004- unreasonable andquestioneditstechnical basis. found some scenariosidentified bythereporttobe Council’s conclusions,indicating thattheNRC several areasofdisagreement withtheNAS http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06388.pdf Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Has Improved, But Refinements Are Needed. pressreleaseNo. 07-013, “Statement from Chairman Dale Klein on 94 thenNRCChairman NilsDiazalsonoted http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-c 95 Assuming thesame reference GAO-06-1029. 96 Some NJFFparticipantsagree Subcommittee onEnergy and Water NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING

Corporation. July2005. . ollections/news/20 Impact intoImpact BWRSpentFuel The Keystone Center The characteristics ofanattack. influence on thethreat assessment regardingthe opportunity for,andappearanceof,industry including thenuclearindustry,created perform betterthantheyotherwisewould have. security officersknowledgethatallowedthem to attack GAOobservedmay have giventheplant’s information abouttheplannedscenarioforamock attention. Forexample, alapseintheprotectionof inspections thatwarrantNRC’scontinued noted potentialissuesinthe GAO NRC, three inspectionsanddiscussingtheprogram with frequently ateachsite.Nevertheless, inobserving example, byconductinginspectionsmore has improved itsforce-on-forceinspections—for theNRC According toaMarch2006GAOreport, be commontootherplants. disseminating security-inspectionfindingsthatmay centralized processforcollecting,analyzing,and measures atcommercialnuclearpowerplants. questions abouttheNRC’soversightofsecurity In particular,theGAOhasalsoposedbroader ofsecuritymeasures. raised aboutNRCoversight The NJFFparticipants alsoconsidered concerns NRC OversightofSecurityMeasures fuel pools. decrease theriskbyreducinginventoryinspent agree thatincreased use of drycaskstoragewill problems. may haveminimized licenseeattentiontosecurity used aprocessinvolving“non-citedviolations”that particular, GAOfoundthatNRCinspectorsoften

07/07-013.html Development. March 14, 2005. Commission’s Affirmation ofthe Final DBT Rule.” 99 Also,theNRChasnoroutine, Pool Support Structures .

. 97 Ineither case,all http://www.nrc.gov/ . Prepared for the the for Prepared . 98 100 In

III. SAFETY & SECURITY n

Some NJFF Some 102 nsion is projected in China and India. and in China projected nsion is This section explores safety and . 104 Other participants agree with the NRC Other participants agree with the 103 57 participants concur with the June 2006 ruling by concur with the June 2006 participants in San of Appeals Court the U.S. Ninth Circuit concluded that the environmental Francisco, which be of potential terrorist attacks must impacts of the assessed as part and should be applied EIS 2007, the U.S. Supreme nation-wide. In January the Ninth Circuit’s Court declined to consider to support the decision, a refusal that seems ruling. security issues associated with further construction of the U.S. nuclear fleet and elsewhere in the to safety and security in non- happens world. What U.S. reactors anywhere in the world could have and cost significant impacts on the extent, timing, of any U.S. nuclear expansion, and vice versa. and the utility involved in the case, which together and the utility involved in the case, appealed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, contending that effect of a terrorist the potential environmental and “too attack is both too speculative to quantify the natural or expected from far removed require a study consequences of agency action to under NEPA.” Safety and Security Implications of a Safety and Security Implications Power Global Expansion of Nuclear Plant Capacity of a global The safety and security implications at least in nuclear expansion will likely depend, As of today, part, on where the expansion occurs. projected nuclear plant construction during some the next decade is expected to occur in developing countries. Consideration of the Terrorist Threat in Threat in of the Terrorist Consideration Statements Impact Environmental the NRC of whether is the issue Still unsettled attack of a terrorist the possibility should consider when reviewing the on a nuclear plant for (EIS) required Statement Impact Environmental relicensing. plant licensing and .

101 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR . akia (2), and Ukraine (4). The greatest expa The (4). Ukraine and (2), akia mmittee on Government Reform, 2005. Reform, on Government mmittee eland/ht-040601-nuclear.html m/id/16666978/ http://www.pogo.org/p/hom The public ought to be able to trust both able to trust ought to be The public federal and the industry the nuclear security oversight. conducting its agency for is a key cornerstone Transparency when it However, public trust-building. security of nuclear power comes to the may be counter- plants, full disclosure productive. According to IAEA data, as of 2002, new reactors were under construction in Argentina in Argentina (1), construction under (4), Korea (1), reactors were data, China India of 2002, new According as IAEA (7), Ira to Testimony of Danielle Brian, House Co House Brian, of Danielle Testimony http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-IMPACT/2001/February/Day-15/i3823.htm http://www.msnbc.msn.co Other participants believe that the motivation Other participants believe behind the classification is purely security-related. All participants agree, however, that it is difficult of the adequacy for outside entities to assess the current within today’s security measures environment. classification There is universal agreement that the details of the that agreement There is universal and location of (e.g., the number security measures should be kept guards, barriers, and alarms) effectiveness. Debate classified to ensure their should be information continues about how much the nuclear public on the security measures made its federal industry takes and the oversight regulator provides. terrorist attacks, the DBT was Before the 9/11 including specific published without Under current classification, countermeasures. a security there is no way for anyone without now systems clearance to assess whether protective NRC set for the the standards in place are meeting or sabotage. baseline protection against attack charges that in find merit NJFF participants Some to publish the DBT stems the NRC’s unwillingness a reluctance to reveal the relative more from to from a need leniency of the requirements than potential terrorists. secrets from keep security Classification of Security Measures of Security Classification The Keystone Center (2), Japan (3), Romania Slov Russia (1), (3), Romania (3), (2), Japan 104 102 103 101 See III. SAFETY & SECURITY See 105 58 58 The UtilityRequirement Document, using theUtilitiesRequirements process. construction, andoperationsincethe1960sby materials,“lessons learned”about fuels,design, Additionally, thedesigns haveincorporated within thereactorcontainment building. reliability, andlargerquantities ofcoolingwater temperatures, simpler systems designedtoincrease stronger containment structures, loweroperating core-powerdensities, design featuresincludelower features aspartoftheirdesigns.Somethenew and haveincorporatedcertaincore-melt-mitigation hypothetically byprobablecore-damage frequency, evolved toincreasesafetylevels,asestimated safety andsecurity.Thenewerdesignshave reactors, incorporatingfeaturesthatimproveboth newer designs. Thesearelikelytobe light-water some willberetiredandreplacedbyplantswith While existing reactorswill dominate thefleet, concern arelikelytopersist. Thus, theissuesofcentralsafetyandsecurity expected toreceiveoperating-license extensions. designs, becausemost existingreactorsare reactors, notbynewreactorswithimproved of U.S.reactorswillbe dominated by existing At leastoverthenexttwotothreedecades, fleet Expansion WithintheU.S. anywhere canaffectnuclearfleetseverywhere. world-wide illustrateshow reactor accidents Chernobyl’s impact inslowingnuclearconstruction since theymakeacore-melt lesslikely. new safetyfeatureswillalsoenhance security, materials, andpotentialterrorist threats. be thoserelated toagingequipmentand concerns fortheU.S.fleetwillcontinueto security ofexistingreactors. Principal largely bedeterminedbythesafetyand plantfleetwill security oftheU.S.nuclear two orthree decades,thesafetyand safety andsecurityfeatures, overthenext While newreactor designshaveimproved http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/10185524-7WNCbE/webviewable/10185524.PDF The Electric Power Research Institute. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING 105 These The Keystone Center The Expansion OutsidetheU.S. significantly saferthanexistingones. because thenewdesignsarebelieved tobe event peryearwouldnotchangeappreciably, plants weredoubled,theriskofacore-damage maintain, however,thatevenifthenumber ofU.S. malicious inorigin.Some NJFFparticipants significant core-damage event,eitheraccidental or run, thegreaterstatistical chanceofa more plantsthatareoperating,andthelongerthey Secondly, thereisthesheerlawofnumbers. The section. detail inthePublicInvolvement inPlantLicensing intervention. Thisissueisdiscussedinfurther any newgenerationofreactorsbyreducingpublic (COL) processwillreduce safetyand securityof combined construction and operatinglicense participants raisedconcernsthatthenewNRC ultimately built. Forthisreason,some NJFF has resulted inincreasedsafetyofreactors intervenor participation inU.S.nuclearlicensing process. Some wouldarguethatrobustpublic is relatedtopublicengagement inthelicensing benefits oftheimproved designfeatures.Thefirst Two factorsmay servetocounteractthepotential from frontal-accesspoints, suchasrivers. blasts, andlocatingspent fuelstorage areasaway on-site, hardeningfirewallstobe abletowithstand at aminimum, separatingback-updieselgenerators September 11,2001.Thesefeaturesmight include, totheattackson hardening featuresinresponse U.S. designswilllikelyincorporatespecifictarget- modifications totheexisting reactorfleet, thenew While itwillbedifficulttomake major oversight. and securitycultures; and regulatory construction practice;operating,safety, inlegalstructureweaknesses (ruleoflaw); countries thatcurrently havesignificant nuclear plantexpansionincertainother On balance, thisgroup hasconcernsabout . III. SAFETY & SECURITY

nt nt OECD OECD

some some uclear be of reactors in

construction Number of Countries Operating this Reactor Type

about nuclear plant construction about nuclear plant construction clear material, known as the National Nuclear known as the material, clear 106 rdingly, in the remainder of this section, this section, of remainder in the rdingly, A similar concern was voiced about concern A similar 107 onitoring plant operations, and conducting joi and conducting operations, plant onitoring which perhaps as many as 5 may eventually be eventually as 5 may many as which perhaps 59 Under Construction*** practices in China—including lax workplace workplace practices in China—including lax that deviates conduct and critical piping installation plans. from some countries. At the core of the problem is a laxer is At the core of the problem countries. some which infuses construction “safety culture,” operations in many practices as well as plant how well a plant is operated, countries. No matter its will forever limit flaws basic construction protection its new design safety and the ultimate affords against sabotage. of the NJFF heard members In this regard, some expert concern Plant Construction near- substantial express NJFF participants Some concern about the term modules may be practically suited for countries practically suited be may modules or where systems transmission with less-developed than 1,000 MWe more to assimilate it is difficult On the other system. electric distribution into the the PBMR reliability of and economics hand, the to be demonstrated, and so it is design have yet experience will match conclude that to premature aspirations. ganizational system nuclear safety in China, and is for ganizational system

ring by licensees or their overseas contractors. overseas by licensees or their ring Operational NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR counted separately. counted separately. nuclear regulatory authority overseeing civilian nu nuclear d not wish to have their remarks attributed. Acco attributed. remarks their to have wish not d construction has been stalled or suspended, of suspended, or stalled has been construction ulations, construction permits/operating licenses, m permits/operating ulations, construction

Taiwan and China were Taiwan and China

power plant with a fundamentally different power plant with a fundamentally

China does have an independent China does Unfortunately, as noted below, there is very little public information available about the state of security and safety in non- security and safety of state the available about information little public is very below, there noted Unfortunately, as Reactor Type Light Water Reactors Heavy Water Moderated Reactors Light Water-Cooled Graphite- Moderated Gas- Cooled Reactors 16 Liquid Metal Fast-Neutron Reactors 43 3** 358 2 10 19* 19 2 2 7 26**** 2** 2* As in the U.S., the current fleet of commercial current fleet of commercial As in the U.S., the by the U.S. is dominated power reactors outside expansion (see Table 7). While light-water reactors world will continue to of the in the U.S. and much reactors, one by advanced light-water be dominated nuclear design—the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor in South Africa (PBMR)—is under development high- to the and China. The PBMR is similar but it uses a gas-cooled reactor, temperature enriched different fuel design (graphite-coated are reactor units modular spheres), and the uranium than today’s water- smaller each 165 MWe, much unit size and cooled reactors. The PBMR’s smaller have safety its fuel and cooling characteristics the smaller advantages over other designs. Also, Reactor Design Safety and security issues associated with overseas associated with security issues Safety and parts: divided into three can be nuclear expansion and plant plant construction, reactor design, there terms, safety. In broad and oversight operation and construction, operation, concern about is more which vary widely among regulatory oversight, basic reactor design. countries, than about The Keystone Center Safety Administration (NNSA). Established in 1984, it leads the or in 1984, it leads the Established (NNSA). Safety Administration responsible for standards/reg research on nuclear safety with other countries. It is also responsible for regulating and licensing nuclear power plants and n power plants nuclear licensing for regulating and responsible countries. It is also other with nuclear safety on research likely would most China, they place in initiatives take safety culture explicit that To the extent facilities for civilian use. through self-monito and NNSA through administered 107 106 expert opinions are noted without opinions attribution. expert countries, due the to ground rules ofother IAEA and involvement. Accordingly,working the groupon this section spoke with and reactor safety on non-OECD countries in advising involved currently who are experts European-based U.S.- and several di experts these However, security. *Includes Beijing Tsinghua HTR-10, a 10-MWe high-temperature gas-cooled demonstration reactor in China. reactor in demonstration gas-cooled high-temperature 10-MWe HTR-10, a Tsinghua *Includes Beijing in Russia. and BOR-60 in France reactors: Phenix fast breeder liquid metal **Includes two research/demonstration 14 plants whose ***Excludes completed. ****Total of 27 if Table 7. Status of Various Reactor Types III. SAFETY & SECURITY http://www.bloomberg.com/apps 12 itfailedto report an emergency shutdown of a reactor thatoccurred nine yearsago.” after the company saiditcoveredupan accident eight years ago. Tohoku Electric PowerCo.,the No.4 power onM utility, said a nuclearchain reaction. Hokuriku Electric Power Co. was ordered to halt operationsat itsShika No. 1 reactor onMarch 15, 20 utes. Some expertshave suggested that apotentially catastrophic reactor meltdown was narrowly avoided attheplant, located o 1 reactor after two of four backup generators, whichsupply power tothe reactor’s cooling system,malfunctioned for about 20 m 110 109 108 See said ithas asked prosecutors to investigate whether th electrical wires,fallsinthe workplace, and employees sent home for failing sobriety tests.The Swedish Nuclear PowerInspect said thatlax security has ledto“potentially fatal accidents.” It citedamong other things a nitrogen gas leak, employees han Sweden’s east authoritiescoast. But have Swedish 60 60 “Tokyo Electric said 2007 anon March accident 22, that likely occurred atitsFukushima Daiichiplant in 1978 could have cause According to one news report: “An electricity failureatthe plant on Plant OperationandOversight:Safety experience. global designimprovements andconstruction As aresult,Indiamay notbeabletobenefitfrom otherwise beenthecase. practices thanwouldhave greater isolationfrom world-widestandardsand military program. Thiscollaboration hasresulted in carried outinclosecoordination withitsnuclear advanced reactordevelopment program hasbeen in-country engineeringandconstruction,its lacking externalcapital, India hasdonesubstantial were alsoexpressed about practicesinIndia; despite generallygooddesigns.Someconcerns reactors builtbyRussiabothinandabroad, agreement onperformance indicators. Itiseasier to challenging giventhelackofinternational regime. However,analysisofsafetyculturecanbe A solidsafetyculture iscriticaltoany safenuclear and othersafetyevents. connection withmishandling ofnuclearfuelrods incidents of“nearmisses” anddatafalsificationin Japan, therehavebeenseveraldocumented culture overalongperiodoftime. citing degradationofthecompany’s security an internaltechnician’sreportearlierthisyear, Sweden’s Forsmark reactorwasalsocriticizedby concerns eveninadvancedOECDcountries. regulatory oversightare poor safetycultureand that U.S.demonstrates Davis-Besse incidentinthe built andoperated. Asnotedelsewhere,the 2002 countries wherenewnuclearpowerplantswillbe wide arrayof“safetyculture”inplaceamong the An equalconcern inany expansionscenarioisthe http://www.nsc.go.jp/english/scsympo.pdf http://www.abcmoney.co.uk/news/30200714337.htm 109 /news?pid=20601101&sid=agdcx26jItOo

108 . NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING Similarly, in

classed it alevel-two incident on e Forsmark operator, FKA, broke the lawinitsresponsetothe malfuncti . The Keystone Center The reduction. requirements ofhighqualityassurance versuscost seasonal workloadimbalance; andthecompeting collaboration betweenoperators and contractors; information-sharing among operators;lowlevelsof capabilities, andknowledgelevels;lowlevelsof the downgradingoffieldexperience,technical define thecharacteristicsofabadsafetyculture: Plant OperationandOversight:Security operation restswiththeownersandoperators. since, ultimately, responsibilityforsafeplant wide lackaclearroleforassuringsafetyculture, previously described,government regulatorsworld- weak attitudes andpractices.Moreover, as greatly among countries,withsome exhibitingvery we interviewed indicatedthatsafety culture varies national culturesthemselves. Forexample,experts legal, andfinancialstructuresaswellthe among countriesasafunctionoftheireconomic, The current statusofsafety culturevaries greatly situation canchangerapidly. same expertnoted,however,thatanycountry-level with substantial civic unrestandterrorism. The may posefewerreasonsforworrythancountries that countries likeChina, withtight social controls, situation ontheground.Oneexpertunderscored reactors thereis,ofcourse,alargersecurity security implications ofdesignandoperationfor nations’ nuclearsecuritycultures.Beyondthe implicationsbeen raisedaboutsecurity fordifferent thatsimilarrelated, itisnotsurprising issueshave Because plantsecurityandsafetyaresoclosely July 25, 2006, ledtothe . 110 a scalefrom zerotoseven.” Theinternal immediate shutdown of theForsm

dling live live dling report on. orate 07 07 n arch arch in- ark d III. SAFETY & SECURITY ar on Strengthening ar on Strengthening 113

. 115 ral Conference, “Measures to Improve the the Improve to “Measures Conference, ral

114 ere?” Presentation to IAEA Semin ere?” Presentation to China publishes little information about the little information China publishes of its nuclear facilities…Informal security with Chinese by the authors discussions a experts indicate and nuclear diplomats of the Chinese appreciation growing It is nuclear terrorism dangers posed by that practical not yet evident, however, by China to address steps will be taken these threats. The NEA provides advice on reactor design to through a ensure best security design features, called the Multinational Design program Evaluation Process. states, the IAEA Upon request of member The IAEA has issued extensive written Security (NSNS) The IAEA Office of Nuclear observes and comments on plant construction. observes and comments on plant guidance on engineering practices to enhance plant security. provides frequent and thorough on-site reviews states of plant security in operation in member upon a state’s recommendations and makes request. 61 associations As with safety, the IAEA and other to countries provide substantial assistance to security. For example: support nuclear reactor     of non-U.S. security assessments Systematic for the nearly impossible preparedness proved no binding international NJFF, as there are with commercial countries require that standards security standards. minimum nuclear power to meet available information no publicly Furthermore, be standards might exists indicating how well those IAEA statement a recent followed. For example, for the establishment, notes that “the responsibility of a physical and maintenance implementation with within a State rests entirely protection regime that State.” Monterey Institute (2004). p. 246. ø 112 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR International Atomic Energy Agency Gene Agency Energy International Atomic

111 http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1271_web.pdf

For cultural reasons Japan employs very For cultural reasons Japan employs used than those different security measures In particular, in the United States or Europe. its guard forces tend to be unarmed. Japan Concerns have also been raised that has not adopted a design-basis threat that reflects today’s terrorist threat. regular reviews and adaptations to ensure that regular reviews and adaptations and adapt to changing threats security systems opportunities. inspections and enforcement conducted conducted inspections and enforcement efficiently culture, to ensure that all a strong security and their relevant staff understand threats and for security, and police implications capabilities and efforts focused on intelligence be will ensuring that nuclear conspiracies detected a design basis threat (DBT) reflecting today’s a design basis threat potentials terrorist all facilities with requiring effective regulation a or posing material nuclear potential special sabotage risk to have security significant DBT the capable of defeating , p. 246. Arguably, the task will become more challenging challenging more Arguably, the task will become be in developing nations, and progress may difficult to gauge due to a lack of transparency. For 2004 survey cited above noted: the same example, analysts have questioned whether these Some within the OECD, whose are even met elements experience in managing countries share decades of one recent survey nuclear power. For example, observed that:      According to one expert, at least five elements at least five elements to one expert, According protect to regime an effective security support reactor to initial addition sabotage—in against These are: construction. design and IEA. “Engineering Safety Aspects of the Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against Sabotage.” STI/PUB/1271. IAEA Nuclear IAEA STI/PUB/1271. Sabotage.” Power Plants against Nuclear of Protection of the Aspects IEA. “Engineering Safety C. Ferguson and W. Potter. “Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. of Nuclear “Four Faces W. Potter. and C. Ferguson Ibid. 2001. September GC(45)/INF/14 IAEA, Matthew Bunn. in 2015: How Do We Get Security Vision for Nuclear “A Th The Keystone Center Security of Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Materials.” Radioactive Materials.” Other Nuclear Materials and Security of 115 112 113 114 111 Security Series No. 4. No. Security Series Nuclear Security in Asian Countries, Tokyo, Japan, 7-10 November 2006. 2006. November 7-10 Japan, Tokyo, Countries, in Asian Security Nuclear III. SAFETY & SECURITY http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections 117 116 chemicals manufacture. 62 62 U.S. NRC. “Backgrounder on NuclearPowerPlantLicensing Process.” It should noted thatthis lack of tran Public InvolvementinPlantLicensing extremely difficult. outside effortsliketheKeystone NJFF Project prevailing nuclear security andsafety practiceby transparency make informed assessment of national sovereigntyandconsequentlackof confidentiality areunderstandable, issuesof member states.While thesecurityreasonsforthis happens, evenonaconfidentialbasiswithother state assents totheir inspection reportsareconfidential unless amember rendered bytheIAEAisnon-binding.Moreover, As withsafety,however,anysecurityadvice among IAEAmembers. disagreements onthedesirabilityofsucharegime is notcurrentlybeingconsideredseriouslydueto would, buttheyalsoindicatedthatsuch aprotocol expansion outside theU.S. Theyagreed thatit reduce securityriskscreatedbyanuclear with suchtoolsasunannounced inspections,would regime forfuelenrichmentandmaterials diversion, security, similartothe current IAEAinspection whether astrengthenedprotocolforreactor The groupquestionedexpertsinthisareaabout deleterious effectonsafetyandsecurity. public involvementandcouldhave a procedural modificationslimiteffective members oftheNJFFbelievethat examination anddiscovery. Some such areas asraisingcontentions,cross- include newprocedural modificationsin capital expenditures are made.Theyalso front oftheprocess before significant consideration ofpublicinputtoward the in thelast15years.Theseincludemoving the nuclearpowerplantlicensingprocess Substantial changeshavebeenmadeto 116 disclosure,whichrarely

sparency regarding securityprep NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING /fact-sheets/licensing-process-bg.html The Keystone Center The process.” efficiency andaddgreaterpredictability tothe its ownwords,“inaneffort toimprove regulatory thealternativelicensingprocess,in NRC proposed 1992 aspartoftheEnergyPolicyAct1992.The Congress affirmed thisnewlicensingprocessin license withconditionsforplantoperation. proposed acombined constructionandoperating Combined OperatingLicense (COL),which licensing process(10CFR Part52),calledthe In 1989,theNRCestablishedanalternative prior toobtainingaCP. permitting limited non-safety-related sitework could seekaLimited Work Authorization(LWA) plant couldbestartedup.Inaddition,theapplicant subsequently anOperatingLicense(OL)beforethe the concretefoundationforplant,and related constructioncouldtakeplace, e.g.,pouring required aConstruction Permit (CP)beforesafety- Federal Regulations(10CFRPart50).Thisprocess step processdescribed inTitle10oftheCode power plantswerelicensedtooperateunderatwo- power plantsintheU.S.Before1989,nuclear regulating theoperationofcommercial nuclear The NRCisresponsibleforlicensingand licensing hearingsaccordingtoproceduresthat old protocol, theNRCconductedallreactor involvement haschangedconsiderably.Underthe power plant.However,thedegreeof public public involvement inthelicensingofanuclear previous two-stepCP/OLlicensingprocesspermit Both theCOLlicensingregulationsand proceedings. would havebeenaddressedinCPandOL many ofthereactorsafetyissuesthatpreviously certification processtheNRCattempts toaddress certifications forgeneric designs.Inthedesign proceedings, reactorsuppliers canseekdesign related totheplantsite.Inaddition,inseparate resolve environmental andalternative sitingissues before theCOL process.TheESP is designedto to doso,canseekanEarlySitePermit(ESP)well aredness alsocharacterizes 117 Inaddition,theapplicant,ifitchooses .

other global industries,such as III. SAFETY & SECURITY 118 . Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientists, of Concerned . Union 63 watchdog groups have also been Stakeholder and and that safety, environmental, critical of the fact “resolved” be alternative siting issues can also to construct a is made years before a commitment that issues it less likely nuclear plant, thus making An ESP, for example, of concern will be addressed. for is good for 20 years and can be renewed it difficult, if not another 20 years, making and to raise substantive environmental impossible, to a commitment alternative issues years later when Similarly,construct a new plant is made. safety design certification generic in issues are addressed prior to a commitment can occur years reviews that to construct a plant. contentions intervenor NRC proceedings, In many sustained by or were either accepted by the agency included reviewing courts. These proceedings the system; core cooling review of the emergency on mixed impact statement generic environmental oxide fuels; and license hearings Allen’s Creek, for to name but a few. Seabrook, and Calvert Cliffs, In the view of various stakeholder and watchdog and watchdog of various stakeholder In the view of public form change in the groups, the has been licensing process in the involvement The Union of public safety. to detrimental has closely monitored Scientists, which Concerned reactor safety issues since the commercial power in 2004 that “public early 1970s, stated proceedings led to intervention in licensing changes but recent improvements, safety numerous role to the public’s limit to the licensing process a casual observer.” essentially that of NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR U.S. Nuclear Plants in the 21st Century: The Risk of a Lifetime a Risk of The the 21st Century: U.S. Nuclear Plants in

David Lochbaum. David Lochbaum. resembled those associated with judicial those associated resembled for opportunity included They proceedings. requests for document (e.g., discovery traditional and depositions); interrogatories, production, at evidentiary hearing practice; and an motions was presented through direct and which testimony of witnesses by the parties. cross-examination and generic design Under the new COL public and intervener certification processes, of to the submission is restricted participation The comments. cases public written and in some to public and intervener groups opportunity for the discovery and cross-examination engage in formal The NRC staff is of witnesses has been eliminated. available a hearing file required to create and make file discovery. The hearing in lieu of traditional to the public for its available must be made is inspection and copying. While cross-examination in past practice, a not available as a right, as it was to conduct cross- request permission party may to ensure the “necessary that it deems examination decision.” adequate record for of an development of the licensing Appendix E provides an overview intervention process with the points for public CFR Part 50, or under the two-step process of 10 under the COL the points for public comment process of 10 CFR Part 52. Stakeholder Concerns has two basic functions: it Public involvement the the raising of issues that will improve permits safety of nuclear power plants, and it enhances the transparency and the level of confidence and trust that the public can have in nuclear regulation and public participation is When decision-making. overly constrained, both of these functions are the only Due to federal preemption, undermined. to oppose available to those who want forum nuclear plant construction and operation is the one authorized to consider radiological health and the NRC. safety issues, namely, The Keystone Center May 2004, p 1. 118 III. SAFETY & SECURITY impact on safety insome instances—sometimes asacatalystinthe prehearing stage of proceedings, sometimes byforcing more analysis ofthe Three MileIsland nuclear accident commissioned courages alot of robberies.” many robberies a policeman onthe beat has prevented bychecking how many arrests he’s made. Just his presence on the beat dis- that publicinvolvement improves agency reviewthorough ofan Plants 120 119 64 64 the NRCpublichearingprocessasfollows: and LicensingBoardhasdescribedthebenefitsof One former chairman oftheNRC’sAtomic Safety follows: safety significanceofpublic participation as One NRCAppealsBoarddecisiondescribed the Memorandum ofB.PaulCotter in quoted Company, Gulf StatesUtility (IndianaUniv any givenlicensingapplication. technical judgments must that bemadein decisions on thealmost limitless number of from ofhearingsandBoard twodecades examination indetail...;and(4)staffwork in writingandthenpermits oral which requiresexpertstostatetheirviews judgment isimproved byahearingprocess questions presented;(3)thequalityofstaff reexamine orrethinksome orallofthe new perspectiveandcausesthepartiesto examination ofissuesfrequentlycreatesa greater care;(2)preparationforpublic public examinationareperformed with (1) Staffandapplicantreportssubjectto intervenor. raised inthe firstinstance byan licensing boardsandappealwere which havereceivedthescrutinyof substantial safetyandenvironmental issues the regulatorystafftonotethatmany ofthe diligence ofeitherapplicantsgenerallyor done so.Itdoesnodisservicetothe on frequentoccasionsdemonstrably has assistance to theadjudicatory process, but proceedings notonlycan providevaluable Public participationinlicensing ersity Press, 1987). issue orimproved review procedures on 119 Safety Second , May 8, 1981, quotedin Union ofConcerned Scientists, conduct even when the improvement cannot , p. 59. 59. , p. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING 120

Safety Second The Keystone Center The a reluctant agency.” AnotherLicensing Board member suggested by the NRC, which stated, “Intervenors have made an important this assessment; othersdonot. acceptable). Someparticipants agreewith NJFF degree” (and theCourtfound thedegree under thenewrules,“thedifferenceisoneof information isavailable tocitizen-intervenors disclosure.” Thecourtfoundthat,evenifless parties intheform ofasystem ofmandatory meaningful accesstoinformation fromadverse Circuit ruledthatthenewrules“provide parties, theU.S.CourtofAppealsforFirst eliminated allaccesstoinformation from opposing When facedwiththeargument thatthenewrules , p. 58. This conclusion was echoed in the independent independent in the was echoed conclusion , 58. This p. Safety Second: TheNRC and America’s Nuclear Power be documented: “You can’t decide how III. SAFETY & SECURITY 121

The fact that (the licensee) sought and the The fact that (the to operate Davis-Besse [NRC] staff allowed 31, 2001, without past December driven in these inspections was performing desire to lessen the large part by the on (the licensee) that would financial impact shutdown. result in an early NRC Inspector General. “NRC’s Regulation of Davis of General. “NRC’s Regulation NRC Inspector 65 121 the NRC In the wake of these discoveries, of the conducted a “lessons learned” review event. The published report has several put as well as action plans to recommendations, practice. These into the recommendations technical corrections for from range actions changes programmatic dealing with corrosion to in the regulatory process itself. Substantive in the NRC’s Reactor changes were made agency’s internal Oversight Process and the members of the procedures. However, some that these “lessons learned” group maintain weakness in have not addressed a fundamental itself—the disposition of process the regulatory NRC staff to favor and Commissioners some power the financial interests of the nuclear at the expense of public industry, sometimes health and safety. Besse Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head.” Head.” Vessel Reactor to the Damage Besse Regarding Dec. 30, 2002. p. 23. Process, with “green” ratings in all 17 in all 17 with “green” ratings Process, the reviewing indicators. After performance NRC Inspector incident, the Davis-Besse that: General found NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

that have regulatory changes Despite the many TMI accident, the Davis- the since been made Besse incident also exposed a failure by the NRC to assure that plants are operated in a way that protects public health and safety. Just prior reactor-vessel the damaged of to the discovery head, the Davis-Besse plant received the highest Oversight ratings possible in the NRC’s Reactor a significant The Davis-Besse event represents several levels. breakdown in safety standards at nuclear The safe operation of commercial responsibility of the power plants is primarily by the the owner/operator, which is licensed NRC. In this case, First Energy Nuclear failed to (FENOC) Operating Company level of safety the appropriate maintain telltale or minimizing required, by missing warning signs during years of routine inspections. As a result of the pressure-vessel and FENOC has made substantial damage, structure, management changes to its significant the reform hired well-regarded executives to in the changes operation, and instituted major way the company operates all of its nuclear units, not just Davis-Besse. The Davis-Besse and research a proactive event stimulated to study the aging of program development used in nuclear power critical materials and plants—by both reactor manufacturers nuclear utilities. some In 2002, during a refueling shutdown at the shutdown at the during a refueling In 2002, Ohio, near Toledo, Nuclear Plant Davis-Besse in cavity discovered a football-sized workers pressure vessel that had the head of the reactor the nearly penetrated entire pressure boundary. from erosion-corrosion of The cavity resulted head from leaks in the housing the carbon steel the control-rod drive that surrounded rate of nuclear used to regulate the mechanisms reactor is operating and to fission when the Fortunately, the assure its safe shutdown. steel3/16th-inch stainless the liner surrounding the reactor pressure vessel contained/held not designed to pressure—a function it was serve. The Event Davis-Besse The Keystone Center III. SAFETY & SECURITY 66 66 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING 122 67 The heat rate drops after a year to about 10 watts; after 5 The heat rate drops after a year 123 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

fission products (e.g., isotopes of cesium and strontium) and strontium) cesium fission products (e.g., isotopes of actinides (e.g., plutonium, also known as and neptunium) americium, transuranic elements, and xenon, trapped within used fuel rods and pellets fission product gases, such as krypton spent fuel assembly metals, such as cobalt, nickel, and niobium, which became radioactive in the which became and niobium, cobalt, nickel, such as metals, spent fuel assembly neutron flux of an operating reactor.

Nuclear power plants produce spent fuel that is radioactive and thermally hot. The hot. The and thermally is radioactive spent fuel that produce power plants Nuclear managed, people if not properly wastes could potentially endanger these radiation from of the Radiotoxicity in shielded environments. must be sequestered and so the waste to reaction and time, and by the body’s varies by isotope constituents spent fuel’s individual elements. Alpha, beta, gamma or neutron. or neutron. beta, gamma Alpha, heat. of watts 2,000 nearly put out can dryer hair powerful a For comparison, years to about 3 watts; and after 100 years to about 0.5 watts. After 1,000 years, the thermal output of the 1,000 years to about 3 watts; and after 100 years to about 0.5 watts. After years, the thermal spent fuel is negligible. Radioactive decay of the waste is dominated for a few hundred years by highly radioactive fission fission for a few hundred years by highly radioactive Radioactive decay of the waste is dominated radioactive (i.e., take a in the actinide series, which are less products and after that by heavy elements to decay). long time a reactor from Spent fuel that has just been removed fission products also produces heat. The decay of generates about 2,000 watts per kilogram.    to living tissue. Radiotoxicity of its potential to cause damage measure The radiotoxicity of an isotope is a by the isotope. in the body and on the type of radiation emitted time depends on the residence by: Spent fuel radioactivity is generated  fission process, fuel Through the nuclear intensely radioactive and become assemblies that must be safely stored in environments sequester and contain the radioactivity. nuclear from Essentially all used nuclear fuel A typical form. power plants is in ceramic produces nuclear power plant 1,000-megawatt tons of spent uranium fuel per about 20 metric nuclear year. The country’s 103 commercial metric reactors together produce about 2,000 tons of used fuel annually. Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Basics The Basics Fuel: Spent Nuclear IV. Waste & Reprocessing Reprocessing & Waste IV. The Keystone Center 122 123 IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING Waste Conundrum,” waste. It did not drawanyconclusions northern Germany, and a bit ofthe southas well, is geologically International AtomicEnergy Agency,2003, p.v. Vienna, 2002. Reposito Strategies forStaged Repository construction is dependent on outcomes ofthe stage 129 128 127 126 125 124 various host-rocktypes, including granite, gneiss, conso 68 68 understanding.” which issupportedbygoodscientific community thatthisisasoundtechnicalsolution gives assurancetothewastemanagement aspects ofgeological disposaloverrecentdecades yet closed on theissue...the scientificandtechnical Agency (IAEA)statesthat“whilethedebateisnot of nuclearwaste. TheInternationalAtomic Energy repository isthebestoptionforlong-term disposal NJFF groupthatadeepundergroundgeologic There isinternationalconsensusandamong the Necessary Long-Term DisposalofNuclear Waste Is repository. be ontracktobuildthefirstgeologic the world.Finland hasselectedasiteandappearsto been builtforhigh-levelwaste,todate,anywherein New Mexico. formation attheWaste IsolationPilot Projectin lived transuranic radioactivewastein asalt operating, adeepgeologicalrepositoryforlong- The exactnature of the host rockis The wasteinthe WIPP site is notheat-producing. See Further, the Federal Institute The “decisioninprinciple” to bu The Finnish program has only fouroperating reactors, twounderconstruction and one under consideration. “Scientific andTechnical Basis forthe Geological Disposal ofRadioactive Wastes.” Technical Reports Series No. 413. complete these repositories.complete these nations haveyettoactuallysiteand geologic repositories. However, thusfar, regarding thesuitableenvironments for repository. A consensusalsoexists is adeepunderground geologic facilities, andthatthebestdisposaloption ultimately placedinlong-termdisposal group thatspentnuclearfuelmustbe There isconsensusamongtheNJFF http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10329&page=18 125,126,127

128 Der Spiegel 124 Nospentfuelrepository has The U.S.haspermitted, andis ry Systems ProgressReport,” for Geosciences and Natural Resourcesin . Apr. 19,2007 ild the repository atthe Olkiluoto not acontrolling factorin the choice abouttheappropriateness of

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING http://www.spiegel.d lidated clays, plastic clays,saltdomes, bedded salt, andother forma http://www.wipp.energy.gov/ Board on Radioactive Waste Management, National Academies Press, The Keystone Center The of ongoing laboratoryresearch. suitablefor theindefinite different sites, however. Hawley, Charles, “Europe’s Nuclea deep disposalwoulddisplaypropertiessuchas: found that,typically,asuitableenvironment for technical groupconvenedbytheIAEA, which geologic disposal.TheNJFFgroupagreeswiththe environment tobeconsideredforlong-term There areseveralmain features oftherepository Suitable Environments forGeologicRepositories

site was ratified by theFinnish parliament inMay2001. e/international/germany/ .     Germany releasedareport flow and deformation, faulting,seismicity, andheat stability, interms ofmajorearthmovements long-term (millions ofyears)geological of asite.Countries aroundthe world areconsideri thousands ofyears have beenstableforperiodsofatleasttens repository depths,whichcanbeshownto low groundwatercontentandflowat decades. operation forperiodsthatmay bemeasured in allow constructionofarepository aswell good engineeringproperties,whichreadily rock-forming minerals controlled byequilibriumbetweenwaterand reducing environment andacomposition conditions atdepth,mainly describedbya stable geochemical orhydrochemical 129 . storage ofhighlyradioactivenuc 0,1518,47 See “Principles and Operational indicating that a large chunk 8309,00.html . lear tions. ng r of IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING 134 134 enna, 2003, p. 6. Statement for Management of Management for Statement

Radioactive-Waste Repository—A Wastes.” TRS Wastes.”No. 413. IAEA, Vi 69 selecting a site based on the The process for was initially well conceived; however, NWPA by Congress amendments subsequent legislative processes by DOE altered and related regulatory process and changed the the site evaluation DOE developed repository selection guidelines. a site selection process guidelines and conducted selected nine In 1983, DOE through the mid-1980s. locations in six states for consideration as potential the repository sites, and in 1984 it established by the required geologic site selection guidelines Reagan approved three In 1986, President NWPA. sites for further scientific site characterization— County, Texas; Smith Hanford, Washington; Deaf Subsequently, and Yucca Mountain, Nevada. determined analysis” utility DOE’s “multi-attribute favorable site. Yucca Mountain to be the most Congress then limited site characterization to one Congress then limited In the 1987 candidate site—Yucca Mountain. DOE was directed NWPA, to the Act Amendments Yucca sites until the to discontinue work at other completed or until Mountain licensing process was by DOE. Yucca was found to be unsuitable decision by of the NJFF group agree that the Some alternative sites from Congress to dismiss They feel that it led ill-advised. was consideration would find to concerns that the federal government to meet even if it failed Yucca Mountain suitable acceptable criteria. by Congressional Action by Congressional protection standards to be developed by the developed by standards to be protection for the Agency (EPA) Protection Environmental site. Yucca Mountain Altered Was Process Site Selection The Repository of Energy Environmental Impact Environmental of Energy r Characterization for the 1st r Characterization Options 132 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Waste (DOE/EIS-0046F, October 1980). Waste (DOE/EIS-0046F, October The group also agrees The group 130 dology (DOE/RW-0074, May 1986), pp. 5-16. pp. May 1986), dology (DOE/RW-0074,

131 133

“A Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis of Sites Nominated fo Utility of Sites Nominated “A Multi-Attribute Analysis “Scientific and Technical Basis for the Geological Disposal of Radioactive Wastes.” IAEA, 2003. IAEA, Wastes.” of Radioactive Disposal Geological for the Basis Technical “Scientific and Ibid. Department in documented was options of these The evaluation “Scientific and Technical Basis for the Geological Disposal of Radioactive of Radioactive Disposal Geological for the Basis Technical “Scientific and other than geologic storage have been considered, other than geologic storage have and disposal including launching waste into space judged too risky in deep sea beds. These have been or infeasible, or they violate international treaties. with the IAEA report’s observation that “suitable observation that “suitable with the IAEA report’s of long lived for disposal geological environments exist widely throughout the radioactive wastes vary considerably in their nature world. They can the desirable features mentioned and thus, provide and to different combinations above in different extents.” U.S. Policy Act of 1982 In the U.S., the Nuclear Waste Policy for set the national policy framework (NWPA) spent nuclear disposition of commercial ultimate from waste (HLW) radioactive fuel and high-level government defense nuclear activities and other that the establishes The NWPA programs. is responsible for of Energy (DOE) Department developing the repository under license to be obtained from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC regulations for licensing are required by law to be consistent with the radiation finding alternate approaches have explored Some example, disposal to deep geological disposal. For depth) drilled from in deep boreholes (over 2 km study, but on the received some the surface has research and whole would require substantial be impracticable. and may development The report states that “a well chosen geological well chosen geological states that “a The report cocoon for the repository will act as a environment protecting it System], Barrier EBS [Engineered water in physical stress, fluctuations gross from hydrochemistry.” flow and The Keystone Center 133 134 131 132 130 Decision-Aiding Metho Decision-Aiding Commercially Generated Radioactive Commercially Generated IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov licensing process. A similar proposal (S approved by voice vote,the decision to approve YuccaMountain asthe site fora national used nuclear fuelrepository. 139 138 137 136 135 28, 2007). ResolutionPresid 87,whichJoint his authorityunder NWPA torejectthe siting with 70 70 DOE repository programdirector On March 6,2007, DOE proposed legisla When PresidentBush made a2002recommendation tobuildthe repository at Yucca Mountain, the Governor of Nevada exercised U.S. Department ofEnergy, 10 960. 10 CFR earlier toDOE promulgated replacethe CFR 963 10 even inadvanceofitsinitial licensing. Yucca Mountainrepositoryaspartof thisprocess, may alsoconsidertheoptionofexpanding on theneedforasecond repository.TheSecretary January 1,2007,butnolaterthan2010, to reportthePresidentandCongressonorafter NWPA Section161directstheSecretaryofEnergy Mountain. would evaluate the sitesuitability ofYucca In 2001,DOEadoptednewregulationsonhowit closure period.” activities, that thesiteissuitable forthepost- may determine, onthebasisofsitecharacterization applicable radiationprotectionstandard,thenDOE repository atYuccaMountainislikelytomeet the system performance assessment] resultsindicate a site. Congress togoforwardwiththeYucca Mountain Secretary’s recommendation tothe President and basis forthesuitability determination andforthe meeting theEPAradiationstandard.Thiswas review, that YuccaMountainwouldbecapableof DOE scientificstudiesandinternationalpeer In 2002,theDOESecretaryconcluded,basedon meet EPA’sradiationstandard. to evaluatetherepository’sprojectedability replaced bya“performance-based guidelines” test determination forYuccaMountain.They were guidelines nolongerapplied to thesitesuitability unless authorizedbyCongress. examining otherspecificpotentialdisposalsites Secretary ofEnergyisprecludedbylawfrom 137

135 Thenewrulestatedthat“ifthe[total 136 Theoriginal1984geologic /info_library/newsroom/doc CFR Parts 960and963. ent Bush signed on July 23, 2002. The House Ward Sproat,testimonyWard tothe House Energy an . 2589)wasintroduced

tion that would remove thestatutory limit andhave thecapacity bedetermined inthe NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING 138 a notification to Congress on April8,2 a notification Congress to The uments/10cfr960_frn.pdf The Keystone Center The in the 109th Congre different approach. alternative sitewouldbenefitfrom a experience, thesearch forasecondoran requirements forinterimstorage.Giventhis and additionalphysicalfinancial nuclear plantownerstomanagespentfuel, open-ended obligationsonthepartof added liabilityforthefederalgovernment, the commissioningofarepository mean schedules willbemet.Projected delaysin confidence thatcurrently DOE established meet itsownschedule.There islittle Mountain project hasrepeatedly failedto The NJFFgroup observesthattheYucca Congress inJuly2006byDOE,isasfollows: The latestschedule,whichwaspresentedto Mountain repositoryhasslippedbyabout20years. The originalschedulefor building the Yucca likely bein2020or2021. initial undergroundwasteemplacement might more achievable” scheduleand hasconcededthatthe DOE hascautionedthatthisisthe“best place until 2041. final shipment ofspent fueltoYuccawillnottake per year.Thus,evenonanoptimistic schedule, the for another24years,attherateof3,000MTHM metric tonsofheavymetal (MTHM)willcontinue reception toitscurrent statutory capacityof70,000 has beencompleted,wastetransportationand Licensing Support Network Certification Certification Licensing SupportNetwork (3-year review) September 2011 September 2011 March2017. wasteInitial receiptandemplacementof June2008 review) (3-year authorization NRC issuesconstruction Submit licenseapplication toNRC of Representatives voted 306-117, and the Senate . ss but notenacted. d Water Appropriati d Water 002. Congress overrode the veto by H

139 After therepository ons Subcommittee (March December 2007 December 2007

ouse ouse IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING L). tly meas- . dose obtained www.epa.gov/radiation/

radium 226/228 (5 pico- 226/228 (5 radium

mean micrograms per liter - μg/ micrograms dose obtained in its s, and Drinking Water Standards” at Standards” Water s, and Drinking median and EPA, “Radionuclides in Drinking Water,” at at Water,” Drinking in “Radionuclides EPA, and , the equivalent standards could be 3 or , the equivalent standards could be mean 71 d (15 pCi/L); and uranium d (15 pCi/L); (30 and uranium radioactive contaminants -- combined -- contaminants radioactive Technical Issues Yucca Mountain has an oxidizing environment, available to that there is free oxygen meaning In and waste forms. metals with container combine spent fuel, which is an oxidizing environment, not stable in the dioxide, is essentially uranium essential presence of water. Therefore, it becomes more times higher. If this proposal is included in higher. If this proposal is more times about questions by some raise the final rule, it may rule, because the the validity of the proposed final If mean. that EPA use the NAS recommended to foster further the change is likely promulgated, rule legal challenges to the EPA proposed dose, the better the site, given identical modeling given identical modeling better the site, dose, the rigor. and regulatory assumptions EPA has decision, court’s with the In accordance the standard that extends a new proposed published 10,000 years to period from radiological exposure projected any likely years, thus covering 1 million to the 10,000-year EPA dose peak dose. In addition 350 of standard adds a limit this proposed limit, 10,000 to 1 year per for the period from mrem to be years. The final rule is expected million the final await The NRC must released in 2007. revising its licensing regulation EPA rule before (10 CFR Part 63). change in the way In addition, there is an important was DOE the standard would be applied. Whereas to the the standard to compare over the 10,000-year simulations in its computer the compare period, EPA has proposed that DOE standard to the the post-10,000-year period. runs for computer of the NJFF believe that, in terms members Some of the radiation is in the water. A pCi is a unit that can be direc that can be pCi is a unit A water. radiation is in the

. , National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1995. Washington, Press, Academy National , eet on Tritium, Radiation Protection Limit Tritium, on eet NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR ons/fact-sheets/tritium-radiation-fs.html nuclides/index.html . This standard includes no more than 4 mrem per year from drinking water. drinking per year from 4 mrem than no more standard includes . This It should be noted that these cca Mountain Standards Mountain cca 141 and 15 mrem of whole-body and 15 mrem indicating at the time that the peak time indicating at the 140 142 /402-f-05-026.pdf yucca EPA’s Proposed Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Standards Radiation Protection Environmental and Health Public EPA’s Proposed Yu for Technical Basis EPA has established drinking water standards for several types of several for standards water drinking has established EPA standards are measured against results of computer of computer against results are measured standards used for licensing purposes and are simulations, only. of Appeals for In 1995, however, the U.S. Court found that the 10,000-year the District of Columbia violated Section 801 of the limit compliance 1992). Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT promulgate Congress had directed the EPA to that were to be for Yucca Mountain standards “based on and consistent with” recommendations (NAS). The of the National Academy of Sciences be based at that the standard NAS recommended after waste the point of peak dose, which occurs packages fail, dose might occur several hundred thousand to a occur several hundred dose might of the context In the years in the future. million dose is thus the the peak U.S. licensing system, of the site’s ability to protect the biosphere measure the peak lower the radioactive leakage—i.e., from radiation per year to a “reasonably maximally maximally radiation per year to a “reasonably south of exposed individual” living 18 kilometers to 10,000 years after the Yucca Mountain, for up repository closes. Political and Legal Issues Legal Issues and Political Yucca of objected to the designation Nevada on the for a repository, as the sole site Mountain chosen for political that the site was grounds In the state’s merit. than scientific reasons rather it the site make of view the characteristics a waste repository. The State of unacceptable as stakeholders have successfully Nevada and other radiation protection over the sued the EPA to Yucca Mountain. applicable standards the radiological standards for EPA established in (mrem) millirem as 4 acceptable exposure drinking water The Keystone Center http://www.epa.gov/safewater/radio 141 docs/ 142 140 Picocurie (pCi) is a term that scientists use to describe how much much how describe that scientists use to Picocurie (pCi) is a term Curies per liter - pCi/L); beta emitters (4 mrems); gross alpha standar (4 mrems); emitters pCi/L); beta per liter - Curies NRC, “Fact Sh tests. From by laboratory ured http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collecti IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING Electric PowerResearch Institute (2006). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2006). MA: MITPress(2006). Cambridge, Macfarlane and R.C.Ewing, Eds., Ewing, Eds., 146 145 144 143 such time asasecondrepository is in operation.” (2006). 72 72 Apted, Mick,etal.“Preliminary Analysis oftheMaximum DisposalCapacity for CSNF ina Yucca Mountain Repository,” While 70,000MTHM is often referred toas Fabryka-Martin,J.,Meijer,Bussod, Flint,A., A.,andG.“Wat infiltration rateintothemountain. future changes inclimate, whichcouldaffectthe that getstotherepositoryisdependentfirston the lifetime oftherepository.Theamountwater to understandhowmuch water might infiltrateover technical adequacy ofDOE’sanalysis. then make alicensingdecisionbasedonthe permissible doselevelatthebiosphere.NRCmust Nevada’s Amargosa Valleytoexceedthe through themountaintowatertableandon waste willnottransport enough radioactivitydown repository, DOEmustshowthatwaterreaching the In ordertoobtain anNRC licenseforthe year period. exceeds thelevelsetforthatpre- or post-10,000- must thencalculatewhetherthedosereceived to NRCregulationsandDOEguidelines, ingested byanindividual onthesurface. According and howiteventuallyisdrawntothesurfacebe repository, mix withwhatvolume ofgroundwater, and geologicbarrierstothewatertablebelow then transportradionuclidesthroughtheengineered reaches thewastedepositedinrepositorymay The burdenwillbeonDOE toshowhowwaterthat will affectthe system. carried, andhoweventslikethousand-yearstorms repository cancarrywater,whatvolume ofwateris consequently remain astowhichfracturesinthe associated with fastwaterpathways,andquestions 1996 suggeststhatsome fracturesandfaultsare some 200to300meters below.Evidencefrom travels from thesurfacetorepositorylevel, set ofimplications hastodowithhowfastwater package material, includingthecanister.Another to dowiththepotentialfor corrosionofthewaste direct implication oftheoxidizingenvironment has Mugrove, M.L. and Schrag, D. “Climate Change atYuccaMountain: Lessons from Earth History,” in A. Macfarlane and R.C. Uncertainty Underground: Yucca Mountain and theNation’s High-LevelNuclear Waste 144

Uncertainty Underground: Yucca Mountain and the Nation’s High-Level Nuclear Waste

143 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING Asecond a statutory limit,Sec.114 (d)of NWPA setsitasalimit The Keystone Center The er andRadionuclid the NRClicensingprocess. events forthe repositorywillalsobeevaluatedin potential consequencesofvolcanicandseismic radionuclides intotheaccessibleenvironment. The the site,whichcouldresultinrapidreleaseof problematic isthepotential forfuturevolcanism at geochemistry oftherepositorylevel.More water pathwaysandaffectindirectly the Mountain. Seismic activitycouldcreatenewfast an unexposedfaultabout20km southeastofYucca earthquake wasamagnitude5.6eventin1992on seismically andvolcanically active. Thelastmajor The areaaround YuccaMountainisalso Yucca Mountainsite. than currently establishedby lawforthe significantly greater repository capacity power generationwould require lifetimes. AnynetexpansionofU.S.nuclear operating reactors overtheirlicensed fuel expectedtobeproduced from currently limit thatislessthantheamountofspent Yucca Mountainhasastatutory capacity Capacity Constraints   The The analytical consensusforthehigherestimates. above 200,000metric tons,butthereisno indicate that thetotal geologic capacitycouldbe government high-levelwaste. Some estimates is 119,000metric tons ofcommercial and Mountain Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) MTHM ismilitarywaste. which 63,000MTHMiscivilianwasteand7,000 established bytheNWPA is70,000MTHM,of capacity analyzed statutory capacity e Transportinthe in theDOEYucca limit atYuccaMountain 145 . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Unsaturated Zone,” in A. Unsaturated Zone,” for the firstrepository

. 146 , “until , “until

IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING , Fall 2006, pp. 148 148 barriers, with Innovations 147 redundant radioactivity. terrestrial 73 safety rules for repositories. Both countries have similar quantitative dose limit—a Finland has a two-part radiation for several thousand years and a less standard of 10 mrem which per year thereafter, stringent standard of about 40 mrem against is benchmarked the Finns require Most importantly, targets for each barrier—and that the overall performance even if any single target shall be achievable performance barrier fails. the previously cited 2003 It is also instructive to examine “Scientific and Technical Basis for IAEA document, Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste.” It lists including criteria for national programs, radiological levels of radiological protection to future “providing similar generations as are provided at present.” The Finnish program to that criterion. closely conforms Finland and Sweden provide alternative examples to the U.S. U.S. to the examples alternative and Sweden provide Finland smaller nuclear have They with Yucca Mountain. experience their nuclear set up by and companies than the U.S., industries waste repository projects. Finland the nuclear utilities manage two sites and site. Sweden is characterizing has selected a final and begin construction by 2011. plans to choose one waste sites will be mostly reactor sites to the from Shipments are sites repository reactors and potential by ship, because the coast. located along crystalline geology (mostly have similar The two countries to dispose of fuel in a reducing rock), and both plan will use copper below the water table. Both environment ancient at numerous canisters that, based on natural analogs deposits in reducing copper elemental years old) (>100 million encased will remain that spent fuel will ensure environments, canister and Overall, the repository environment for millennia. in repository behavior. design will reduce uncertainties positive experiences Sweden and Finland have had relatively allowed waste disposal. Finland nuclear over with their publics absolute veto power over citizens of the affected municipality affected in contrast, allows their site. Sweden, the repository municipality’s veto to be overridden. a Nuclear WasteNuclear Facility a in Eurajoki, Finland,” Other National Repository National Other Programs NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR include the include may ultimately ultimately may on capacity include on capacity include determine the capacity. DOE has yet the capacity. determine with compliance to demonstrate radiation dose standards at the design capacity, to be defined in the license application. Dose limitations

the locations of faults and fractures, the locations of faults as avoided as much which should be of the repository possible; the extent the location of rock in all directions; in the rock; “holes” the crystal-filled and the location of the water table, west, the north and especially to higher in to be where it appears elevation. Geologic limits Thermal limitations Thermal thermal output of the waste and the of the waste output thermal repository. of the design temperature the design limits The current walls drift (tunnel) of the temperature and the to 200 degrees Celsius of the rock between temperature boiling point of drifts to below the water. Juhani Vira, “Winning Citizen Trust: The Siting of “WinningSiting Citizen Trust: The Juhani Vira, (23 8.4 May 2001). YVL Guide in STUK is defined standard The Finnish    147 148 67-82. 67-82. The Keystone Center IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING 74 74 Department of Energy, May 2001). 151 150 149 was $57.5billion. program (inconstant2000dollars) Yucca Mountainrepository cost (TSLCC)estimate forthe 2002, thetotalsystem lifecycle Yucca Mountainwasapproved in repository isuncertain.When Yucca Mountainasalong-term The costofbuildingandoperating Cost ofLong-termRepository with $10.9billionininvestment received $15.1billioninfeesalong that theNWFsince1983has all nucleargeneration.DOE reports approved feeof1mill perkWh for collected from utilitiesthrough an around $750 million peryear,are owners tothe NWF, whichtotal Annual payments byspentfuel programs andotherDOEactivities. radioactive wastefromweapons provide fordisposalofhigh-level balance fromtheDefensebudgetto nuclear fuel(73%),withthe to disposalof commercial spent portion ofrepositorycostsrelated Waste Fund(NWF) tofinancethe The NWPA established theNuclear date. has beenspentontherepository to later in2007.Atotalof$6.7billion promised toCongressbyDOEfor projections beyond2023was estimate thatwouldextendcost estimate outdated.Arevised fuel transportation,make this design andrequirements forspent repository, includingchangesin completing andlicensing the changes intheschedulefor According to Brian Cosgrove, Entergy’s California actuallyhasthreeseparate statutesth Analysis ofthe Total System LifeCycle Cost of 149 However, State Government representative. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING State Restrictions onNuclearPower Expansion theCivilianRadioac In addition,eightstates—California, Existing staterestrictionsinclude:      Two states, Minnesota and Vermont, alsolimit drystorage: for disposalofhigh-levelnuclearwaste. and thatthereexistsademonstrablerepository, or means technology through itsauthorizedhas identified agency, andapproveda empowers to make asinglestateentity afindingthattheU.S., Eachofthesestatesestablishment of(atleast)afederal repository. construction of newnuclearplantswithin thestateabsent identical inlanguageand statutes thatarevirtually intent, preventing Maine, Oregon,WestVirginia,Kentucky, andWisconsin—have at deal at re withthe needfora the proposed facility willpromotegeneral welfare. the proposedfacility of thegeneral assembly and itsdeterminationthatconstructionof Construction ofanuclear fission plant is dependent on approval Vermont (Vermont Statutes,Department ofPublic Service): operations overtheperiodforwhichapprovalissought. license extensionshalladdresstheimpacts ofcontinued seeking a for additionalstorageofspentnuclearfuelafacility certificatenuclear-powered electricgeneratingplant.Any ofneed may notissuea“certificateofneed”fortheconstructionnew Minnesota (MinnesotaStatutes): ThePublicUtilitiesCommission legislature. Hawaiidoes not haveanynuclearpowerplants. atwo-thirdsprior approvalby votein each houseofthe constructed or radioactivematerial disposed of in the statewithout Article XI,Section8.No nuclear fission powerplantshallbe outright nuclearban Hawaii: Hawaii’s is foundinits Constitution, action is required for additional storage capacity beyond that. action isrequiredforadditionalstoragecapacity Vermont Yankee nuclearpowerplantthrough 2012.Legislative In Vermont, thelegislaturehasauthorized storage dry atthe containers foritsMonticello plant,beginningin2008. Commission grantedXcel permission tostoreup 30 storage Minnesota PublicUtilitiesCommission. In September 2006,the thislimit to grantstoragerequestsbeyond tothe the authority containers untilanewlawwas passed in2003.The newlawgave to17 storage The Minnesotalegislaturelimitedcompanies The Keystone Center The tive Waste ManagementProgram tive pository beforecan bebuilt. plants 150 Connecticut,Illinois, , DOE/RW-0533 (U.S. 151

IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING as ed to , which

156 m a Comparative Cost Analysis,” a Comparative m rities and to credit interest earned http://www.nei.org/doc.asp? this would increase to more than 80,000 this would increase to more 155 The NJFF group also agrees that that also agrees The NJFF group 154 75 balance of the Fund in secu balance of the Fund centralized interim storage is a storage is a interim centralized alternative for managing reasonable decommissioned plant sites waste from for and could become cost-effective in the future. operating reactors With regard to older spent fuel that must to older spent fuel that regard With until an on an interim basis be stored is available, the operating repository that this spent NJFF participants believe in safely and securely fuel can be stored dry casks, on- either spent fuel pools or site.

metric tons by the end of the existing licenses and metric tons) would expand even further (>120,000 metric given 100% license renewals. sites as an interim fuel at reactor Storing spent for is today the only waste storage mode measure are currently about commercial reactors. There tons of spent fuel in on-site 56,000 metric storage; Facility Is Licensed Until a Permanent Is Necessary Storage and Built, Interim included a number of recommendations on of recommendations included a number to increase confidence in procedures likely on nuclear waste decision-making government disposal. and management inappropriate or unsafe. Adaptive staging seeks to Adaptive staging or unsafe. inappropriate of best available on utilization focus attention future options for without foreclosing knowledge nuclear decide manage to who may generations the Nuclear Similarly, means. other waste by in 2004 published a report titled Energy Agency to Decision Making Stepwise Approach ssons for Interim Solutions ssons for Interim fro lion from the NWF for the repository program. The balance is used is used The balance program. repository for the the NWF lion from Environmental Benefits,” Environmental

The

insufficient, the Fund can also borrow. also the Fund can insufficient, NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR One Step at a Time. te, “Quantifying Nuclear Energy’s Nuclear Energy’s te, “Quantifying . As of the end of 2006, that leaves a net end of 2006, that As of the , Vol. 29 (2001),pp. 1379-1389. 153 152 Nuclear Energy Institu Nuclear Energy The NWPA authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to invest the invest of the Treasury to Secretary NWPA authorizes the The mil $99 appropriated 2007, Congress in FY example, As an See Macfarlane, Allison, “The Problem of Used Nuclear Fuel: Le Problem Allison, “The See Macfarlane, With respect to the safety and security of spent fuel at operating reactors, see Chapter III, “Safety and Security Issues Relat and Security III, “Safety see Chapter reactors, fuel at operating of spent security safety and to the With respect balance after disbursements to date of $19.3 billion. to date of $19.3 after disbursements balance alternative decision- The NJFF did not analyze processes to those used by DOE in the making Mountain. Other of Yucca consideration organizations have assessed such alternatives, including the National Research Council of the NAS in a report titled Alternative Approaches Council recommends a so-called “adaptive staging a Council recommends at ensuring that early decisions do approach” aimed the project to a path that later proves not commit states legally restrict the expansion of Some existing or new nuclear capacity until a long-term is in place. The solution for waste management the statutes make NJFF group concludes that these or impossible expansion of nuclear power difficult them. By law, in those states that have adopted disposal is a federal fuel nuclear however, spent New nuclear plant rather than a state responsibility. an investment construction is fundamentally exist among decision, and widely varying views political and states and utilities as to how the affect facing Yucca Mountain technical challenges and prospects for new plant design, construction, licensing. Waste Repository a Permanent Failure to Site Expansion in Some States May Affect Nuclear as a intended to serve was the NWF Although investment available for trust fund, it is dedicated when only development in Yucca Mountain it. To date, congressionally Congress appropriates for the repository has been appropriated funding substantially below budget consistently and requests. returns. The Keystone Center for other, unrelated government activities, while crediting the amount borrowed to the NWF balance. balance. NWF the to borrowed amount the activities, while crediting government unrelated other, for catnum=2&catid=43 156 154 155 152 153 “investment returns” to the Fund. If funds are funds are If Fund. the returns” to “investment Energy Policy Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors.” IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING 158 157 76 76 the needfornewlegislativeauthority.” permanent disposalofspent nuclearfuel...including recommendations astofuture action,toassuresafe, Energy toreportCongressand“make licensed, theNWPA callsfortheSecretaryof U.S. IftheYuccaMountainproject cannotbe amounts fuelfrom ofspent existingreactors inthe Figure 12,below,showsthecurrentandprojected centralized storageinpoolsordrycasks. pools, on-sitedrycaskstoragesystems or options thenexistforusedfuelstorage:on-site NWPA, Sec. 113(c)(3)(F). 113(c)(3)(F). Sec. NWPA, See http://www.nrc.gov/waste/sp Figure 12:HistoricalandProjected Commercial SpentNuclear Fuel

Cumulative Discharged Spent Fuel (MTHM) situations sites at individual differbasedon pool capacities discharges versus into specificpools. FCR) (less andsupplemented the by and plans. utilityHowever, storage storage industry isnotone bigpool in capacities 2002RW-859 provided onpool capacity based Represents industry pool ** the aggregate this renewals. case, license basedon 104 *Based on actual discharge data as reported on RW-859’sthrough 12/31/02, and projected discharges, in Sources: 100000 110000 120000 130000 140000 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 0 9018 9020 0022 0024 2050 2040 2030 2020 2010 2000 1990 1980 1970 There are 104 operating reactors and 14 shutdown reactors reactors and14 shutdown reactors operating 104 are There Policy Act 1982 of Policy Nuclear Waste ent-fuel-storage/pools.html Discharges asofMay14,2007 Actual MTHM in dry storage, all reactors all storage, in dry MTHM Actual reactors discharges, only shutdown Actual discharges*, reactors,Projected renewals all license 104 discharges, reactors,Projected renewals 48 license all Discharges*,Actual reactors all (operating &shutdown) Current pool capacity NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING ~ 61,000 MTHM** MTHM** ~ 61,000 157 Three The Keystone Center The .

118 reactors (as of 12/06) 118 (as of reactors 12/06) from MTHM ~ 55,700 Inventory:Current dry storage (as of 5/14/07) dry (as of storage 5/14/07) in ~ 9,500 MTHM Storage Pools the radiationforanyonenearpool.Spentfuel of water,whichprovidesadequateshieldingfrom spent fuelrodsareimmersed underatleast20feet 18 to24months andreplaced withfreshfuel.The is removed tostoragepoolsfrom thereactorevery About one-fourthtoone-thirdofthetotalfuelload hottest spentfuel. operational, itrequiresacoolingpoolforthe radioactive contents.Aslongasanuclearreactoris storage pools whereactivecirculationcoolsthe radioactively andthermally hot.Itisstoredin When removed from areactor, spentfuelis Year 14 shutdown reactors reactors 14 shutdown from MTHM ~ 3,800 158

MTHM total total MTHM ~110,000 MTHM total total MTHM ~130,000 2055 IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING DOE 163 dditional 50-55 years of dditional 162 llections/cfr/part072/part072- mmercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: A option, up to an a up to an option, me required by NRC regulation 10 CFR 50.82(a) NRC regulation by required me rmation Conference, March 14, 2007. 14, Conference, March rmation . gy and Water Development Appropriations Development gy Water and terim Storage of Co terim 77 has made no recommendations for alternatives to no recommendations has made with on-site storage, other than to continue Because the costs are for repository development. are borne by either utility storage extended on-site be considered or taxpayers, they cannot customers considered as transfer net costs but rather are payments. that the estimates Physical Society The American fuel to dry cask storage at all 103 cost of moving reactors will be in active reactors and 14 shut-down per year. This is of $400 million the range per of $500 million to DOE estimates comparable year and within the “range of uncertainties.” dry cask storage, which are absorbed by either are absorbed by storage, which dry cask or customers. taxpayers Spent Fuel for Government Liability Current Management under reactors are responsible Owners of nuclear until DOE fuel storage for on-site spent the NWPA it for removes fuel or the spent takes title to acceptance was to have begun disposal. Initial waste Utilities that operate nuclear by January 31, 1998. of sued DOE to recover the cost power plants have statutory date of 1998, and storage beyond the found DOE liable for damages. federal courts have is processing the The U.S. Federal Court of Claims has reached cases. DOE various individual damage at the in a few cases for costs incurred settlements total and has estimated the of the settlements time the Yucca storage liability to be $7 billion if acceptance by Mountain repository can begin waste for each year $500 million 2017 and approximately of further delay past that date.

storage) decommissioning http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/upload/Energy-2007- 161 160 160 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-co /spent-fuel-storage/designs.html NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR cooling compared compared cooling Energy testimony to the Senate Ener Senate to the testimony Energy Institute, Presentation at NRC Regulatory Info Institute, Presentation at passive and still themeet 60-year decommissioning timefra

A discussion of the security of the security A discussion . 159 http://www.nrc.gov/waste cooling of storage pools and are . Also see see . Also active NRC (10 CFR Part 72.214) as of 11/3/06.72.214)of NRC (10 Part CFR as Available at American Physical Society, Panel on Public Affairs, “Consolidated In Affairs, “Consolidated Public on Physical Society, Panel American Steven Kraft, Nuclear Energy Kraft, Steven of Department III, Sproat F. Edward For power reactor that select licensees (safe the SAFSTOR Spent fuel may be kept in casks for up to 60 years Spent fuel may be kept in casks the Surry plant in under current licenses (e.g., recertified dry cask systems its original Virginia had the original 20- for an extra/added 40 years beyond year certification). risk of spent fuel pools is provided in Section III, provided in Section fuel pools is risk of spent “Safety and Security.” therefore considered safer than spent fuel pools. associated with However there are additional costs to the the dry Although fuel pool storage is constrained, by capacity. storage option generally is not limited As noted in the Safety and Security chapter of this report, dry casks provide There are currently 9,600 metric tons (MT) of spent tons (MT) of spent There are currently 9,600 metric Nuclear The fuel in dry cask storage at 41 sites. by 2017 there Energy Institute (NEI) projects that sites. MT stored in dry casks at 66 will be 22,300 Dry Casks of dry casks. The NRC has authorized 14 models

When a power plant’s pool storage capacity is storage capacity pool When a power plant’s of existing approve replacement may NRC limited, higher density racks racks with fuel storage materials. neutron-absorbing constructed with high- employ all nuclear power plants Almost additional limited now, but only density racks is available through continued re- storage capacity discharged spent racking. To allow for more newly cooler fuel can fuel to be added to pools, older and to dry cask storage. be moved

pools have been managed safely in the U.S. and in the U.S. safely been managed pools have spent They can hold the past 56 years. abroad for unless (40-60 years) life of the plant fuel for the is limited. capacity The Keystone Center wet storage could be utilized be wet storage could Nuclear Power Reactors.” of RG 1.184, “Decommissioning NRC See (3). 163 Report-InterimStorage.pdf 0214.html 161 162 160 159 Subcommittee, March 7, 2007. March 7, Subcommittee, Technical and Programmatic Assessment” (February 2007). Programmatic Technical and Assessment” IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING government’s failure toremo than what the courts have approved, alt produced by 40 reactors over $60million a40-yearlifetime. per year for 40 reactors isonly$1.5million per reactor, which i 165 164 78 78 Cost ofCentralizedStorage that itmay beleftatthecentral storage sitesindefinitely. spent fuelcurrentlystoredatoperating reactorsand allayconcerns centralized surfacestorage facilities may makeeconomic sensefor foranother40or50years, geologic repositoryisnotconstructed sites tobereclaimed anddeveloped.Inaddition,ifapermanent facility andwouldalsoallowthelandatdecommissioned reactor efficient oversightofthespent fuel ataconsolidatedcentral currently stored atdecommissioned reactors.Itwouldallow more Centralized interim storagemakes particularsenseforwaste and siting. but itsdevelopment wouldfacechallenges,including cost quostorage, storage facilitymay providebenefitsbeyondstatus operating anddecommissioned reactors.Acentralizedinterim Current drycasksystemsexistalmost entirelyatthesitesof Centralized Storage opening” in2017. beyond itscurrentlyplanned Mountain isnotdelayedwell Society notedthattherewouldbenosavings“solongasYucca cost savingstothefederalgovernment. TheAmerican Physical A recentstudy ofcentralizedinterim storagefound nocompelling opposition toprevious sitingeffortsandrecent adverse land-use decisionsbytheDepartment ofthe Storage”facilitynearOakRidge. Giventhestrengthof the 1980stoaproposed“MonitoredRetrievable opposition from thestateofUtah.Similar oppositionwasraisedbythestategovernment inTennessee in “permanent” ifYuccaMountaindoesnotbecome areality. Efforts tositethe PFSprojectmet withstrong Centralized storagemay difficulttosite,givenconcernsthatsuchsitescouldbecome bepolitically instead ofbuildingadditionalstorage atindividual sites. on itsbeingcheaperformembers andotherutilities tosendtheirmaterial tothesiteandpayastorage fee, centralized sitebelongingtotheSkullValleyBandof theGoshuteIndiansinUtah.Storagewaspremised Private FuelStorageLLC (PFS)hasreceivedalicensetostoreup40,000tonsofspentfuelat the faceofsignificant delaysinopening therepository.” showing whetherorwhenconsolidatedinterim storagemight become aneconomically attractiveoptionin Siting CentralizedStorage build the facility. have approved aspayments to utilities, theproposalfacedsiting opposition, andtheutilitieshaveyetto 40,000 tonsfor$60million peryear.Althoughthisprojectedcostwasless expensive than whatthecourts Energy andNaturalResourcesCommittee inDecember 2005andlatertoDOE,PFS offeredtostoreup If a reactor produces approximately 25tonsof waste per year,the 40,000 tons of storage is approximately equalto the waste Ibid.

164 Thestudyfurthernotedthatthepanel“isawareofnorigorouscostestimates ve thespentfuel.

hough the courtawarded damages forpastadded storage costs stemming from the NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The 165 In aproposalsubmitted totheU.S.Senate’s Spent Fuel FacilitiesCentralized Storage for NWPA wasenactedin1982. facilities havebeenbuiltsincethe from-reactor centralstorage not beenbuilt.Nootheraway- from theNRCin2006,butithas consortium, receivedalicense Fuel Storage LLC,autility various researchreactors.Private and Shippingportreactors decommissioned PeachBottom spent fuelfrom the fuel debris,andtheotherholds for storageof ThreeMileIsland Idaho NationalLaboratory.Oneis storage sitesintheU.S.,at licensed centralized interim Germany. TherearetwoNRC- CLAB inSwedenandGorleben Notable centralized facilitiesare s far less s far IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING

m a Comparative Cost Analysis,” a Comparative m mmercial Spent Nuclear Fuel: A For example, if waste must be if waste must For example, 168 terim Storage of Co terim 79 ssons for Interim Solutions ssons for Interim fro plant at 14 shut-down currently is stored Spent fuel is either in wet spent fuel the choice, sites. By cases, all or both. In most storage, dry storage, and support structures other reactor components the sites during the from were removed leaving the spent fuel process, decommissioning of previous the sole remnant storage facility as locations. The facilities are no operations at the staff is revenue, and a small longer generating for oversight of the at the sites solely maintained spent fuel. the spent fuel A centralized facility that took all would reduce the reactors decommissioned from installations, provide for of spent fuel number efficient oversight of the consolidated and more sites to be waste, and allow the decommissioned for other purposes. Furthermore, reclaimed of the waste would centralizing the management liability for relieve plant owners of the ongoing revenue and would facilities that no longer generate for DOE’s assumption of provide a framework of spent fuel. direct responsibility for management regional storage facilities Establishing small-scale “orphan” waste at could address the concerns about plant sites. Indeed, the American decommissioned consolidated Physical Society study found that storage could facilitate the interim that have of sites with reactors decommissioning been shut down. in Yucca be emplaced before it can repackaged Mountain, a centralized facility could provide the need at consolidated fuel handling, eliminating Yucca final Further, if the reactor. each shut-down Mountain design requires a buffer storage area so heat load to meet of wastes can be used that a mix done at a this could also be requirements, centralized facility. Decommissioned Reactors Decommissioned Centralized Storage for Waste from from Storage for Waste Centralized er 16, 2006. er http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/upload/Energy-2007- As 167 167

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR rnor Edward G. Rendell, Octob . repository. To minimize repository. To minimize No further legislative action has been No further legislative action has , Vol. 29 (2001), pp. 1379-1389. de facto 166 American Physical Society, Panel on Public Affairs, “Consolidated In Affairs, “Consolidated Public on Physical Society, Panel American Letter from Gove Pennsylvania Letter from of Used Nuclear Fuel: Le Problem Allison, “The See Macfarlane, indicated in Figure 12, 3,800 MT of spent fuel is indicated in Figure 12, 3,800 MT A small reactors. in storage at shut-down currently that it might facility would reduce the concern a become be sited a facility might costs, such transportation highest in the East or Midwest, near the is of reactors. However, this concept concentration also untested. taken on the proposal. centralized A suggested different approach for facility. be to create a small storage would Interior, it is unlikely that the PFS facility will be the PFS facility it is unlikely that Interior, license has granted a though the NRC built, even for it. how the indicative of be experience might The PFS would be received at storage prospect of interim of governors A number other potential sites. included in to a proposal that was reacted strongly markup Committee the U.S. Senate Appropriations budget (Sec. 313 and Water of the FY 2007 Energy would have authorized DOE of H.R.5427), which and Preparation” to establish “Consolidation has a commercial state that facilities in each storage of spent fuel from nuclear reactor and years. After that, reactors in the state for up to 25 either to the repository be moved the waste would to the or to a reprocessing facility. In objecting proposal, one governor wrote, “Such a strategy is political and security riddled with economic, insurmountable challenges, which are likely to be if not will result in years, certainly and most this critical national decades, of delay in solving problem.” The Keystone Center 168 Report-InterimStorage.pdf 166 167 Energy Policy Technical and Programmatic Assessment” (February 2007). Programmatic Technical and Assessment” IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING 80 80 are alsoDOT regulations by the various modal 169 Along withMonitoredRetrievableStorage NWPA HadProvisionsfor Some Interim Storage Mountain. would haveprovidedinterim storageatYucca when PresidentClintonvetoed abill(S.1287)that recent congressionalinitiative tookplacein2000, licensed; allbutonedied inCongress.Themost facility atYucca Mountainbeforethe repositoryis authorize DOE toestablishaninterim storage legislative proposalstoamend theNWPAto mind oninterim storage.Therehavebeenvarious Department officialssaytheyarekeepinganopen management ofinterim storage,although DOE hassofarrejectedresponsibilityfordirect be constructedinthestateofNevada. that nomonitored retrievablestoragefacilitymay or spentnuclearfuel.Section145ofNWPA states centralized storageofhigh-level radioactive waste retrievable storagefacilitiestoprovidelong-term to allowDOEestablishoneormore monitored authority haslapsed.In1987,NWPA wasamended action resulted,andDOEnowconsidersthatits fuel. Operationwastohavebegunby1990.No more than1,900MTofcommercial spentnuclear a limited scaleandoperatedbyDOE,storingno for aninterimstorageprogram tobedevelopedon has beenestablished.NWPASubtitleBprovided interim storageforcommercialspent fuel,butnone The NWPA envisioned aneedforsome centralized The DOEregulationsareThe 49USC5101-5127. The NRCradioactive mate NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING agencies (and theCoast Guard, whic

The Keystone Center The shipped spentfuelbyrail radioactivity. Sincethe 1970s,theNavyhas breach ofthe containers, andnorelease of four highwayaccidents. Therewerenoinjuries, that time, therehavebeen fourrailaccidentsand the U.S.,coveringmore than1.6million miles. In relatively small shipments ofspentnuclearfuelin Since 1965,therehavebeenmore than2,700 Transportation modes. federal regulationsforrail,highway,andwater and conductspentfuelshipments underextensive program, DOEandcommercial carrierswillplan individual states.UndertheNWPA disposal are regulatedbythefederalgovernment andthe In theU.S.,allshipments ofspentfuelandHLW agreements andNWPA mandates, such as expected tofollowexistingstate-federal materials transportationresponsibilities.DOEis organizations ofstateagencieswithradioactive reactors toaDOEfacilityinIdaho including passagethroughthePanamaCanal. France forreprocessing,usingvariousroutes shipped itsspentfueltotheUnitedKingdom and densely populatedareas.Formany years,Japan Europe, overshorterdistancesbutthroughmore 70,000 MTofspentfuelhasbeenshippedin regulatory oversight. complete, andwillrequire ongoing repository willtakemanyyearsto vigilance. Transport ofspentfueltoany transport securitywillrequire continued enhanced inresponse to9/11; however, requirements duringtransporthavebeen been safelyshippedinthepast.Security waste ishighlyregulated, andthatithas fuel andotherhigh-levelradioactive group participantsthattransportofspent There iswideagreement amongtheNJFF 169 rials transportation regulation is 10 CFR Part 71. There DOEhasbeenworkingwithregional h is nowpartof HomelandSecurity).h

from shipandsubmarine . Morethan IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING e e of es to 03/secy2003-0002/2003- ipment number assumes very littl number ipment and funds (from the Nuclear Waste the Nuclear and funds (from re, Maryland. NRC staff concluded that there NRC staff concluded that re, Maryland. at existing programs provide reasonable assuranc reasonable provide at programs existing (If trucks are used predominantly, the (If trucks are used predominantly, tions/commission/secys/20 ncy response preparedness along transportation rout transportation along preparedness ncy response 173 81 of spent fuel. Thus, the sh of number of vehicles and shipments involved will, of of vehicles and shipments number will be rail” approach, rail Under DOE’s “mostly all 77 sites that have from materials used to move short heavy-haul or, perhaps, direct rail access highway or barge distances to a railhead. Otherwise, by legal-limit trucks. made will be shipments ship spent fuel Further, DOE has stated that it will freight in dedicated trains rather than mixed tracked will be All shipments shipments. escorts. Special armed electronically and will have Association will meet fuel shipments cars for spent standards, including Railroads of American brake performance. improved point for each originating plans Detailed shipment been selected. have not been set yet, nor have routes with consultation DOE will develop those plans in rates will Shipment utilities, states, and carriers. building to a begin with 900 MT the first year, 5 years. Total steady rate of 3,000 MT/year after to take 24 for 70,000 MT are expected shipments on years, starting in 2017 or later, depending repository licensing and construction schedules. that there rail scenario, DOE estimates In the mostly at the repository arriving shipments will be 4,300 each over 24 years or an average of 175 shipments year. DOE is planning to build a new rail line from from rail line a new to build is planning DOE a rather taking NV, to Yucca Mountain, Caliente, a and Air Force Range to avoid Nellis long route Test Site. Preliminary of the Nevada large portion rail a of for the construction cost estimates repository site over different connection to the than more to ranged from $880 million routes have is preparing an EIS for the Nevada $2 billion. DOE Caliente route and the that will address rail line It is be less expensive. may another route that in 2008. scheduled for completion

172 The es that DOE will provide technical assistance technical assistance provide DOE will es that the Howard Street tunnel in Baltimo Street tunnel in Howard the 170 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR rials from this postulated event, and th and event, this postulated rials from would carry about 16 metric tons metric 16 would carry about http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collec and local governments for training in emerge training for governments and local . Spent fuel transport casks are heavily Spent fuel transport casks are heavily 171 Per Yucca Mountain Draft EIS, Table J-2. EIS, Table Draft Mountain Per Yucca average cask that the This implies The NRC conducted a simulation of a fire in fire of a The NRC conducted a simulation See also Sec. 180(c) of NWPA, which provid See also Sec. 180(c) containers provide necessary shielding for the containers provide and accident both routine radiation under NRC certification for their conditions. To gain that the casks demonstrate containers, vendors must including a 30-foot drop onto specified tests, meet exposure to a surface, a puncture test, an unyielding at 1,475° F, and fully engulfing fire for 30 minutes 8 hours—in that in water for submersion sequence. shielded, with walls that are between 5 and 15 with walls that shielded, inches thick, depending on Truck casks materials. weigh about 25 contain 1 to 2 tons of spent fuel and tons of spent fuel tons. Rail casks contain 15 to 20 casks have a and weigh about 100 tons. Truck and rail casks capacity of about 2 MTHM per cask, have a capacity of 6 to 12 MTHM each. may licensed, becomes If the Yucca Mountain repository various from transported to be spent fuel will have The repository. commercial and DOE sites to the cost of transporting the fuel is covered by the NWF in the Congressional appropriations process. up to the For Yucca Mountain repository shipments, that it ton level, DOE has indicated 70,000 metric method. rail” shipment intends to use a “mostly Repository Shipment Planning will be shipments and HLW All spent fuel the NRC has certified to in containers transported accident conditions. withstand severe notifying the governors’ offices when shipments are shipments when offices governors’ the notifying state. Interstate each through move to scheduled place for the been in have protocols transportation has been material that nuclear several decades this of management across the U.S. The shipped by will be complicated shipping campaign ultimate of the associated government interests the multiple stakeholders. agencies and The Keystone Center transport by truck. transport Fund) to States, Indian tribes, tribes, Indian States, Fund) to the repository. 0002scy.html#conclusion 172 173 171 170 would be no release of radioactive mate radioactive of release no would be adequateprotection to the public. IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING overruns. formAction=297&contentId=532 178 177 176 175 174 Spent Fuel Reprocessing by Nuclear FuelServices at West Valley,New York.” York StateEnergyResearch and Development negotiations with stateand fede 82 82 process, plutonium isextractedseparatelyfrom uranium, bothofwhichcanbereusedinnuclearfuel. The onlyexistingcommercialmethod toreprocessspentnuclearfuelisknownasPUREX.Inthis Carter duetoconcernsovercosts andnuclearweaponsproliferation. Commercial reprocessing inthiscountry deferredbyPresidentsGeraldFordandJimmy wasindefinitely actinides. Existing reprocessingtechnology wasoriginallydevelopedtoobtainplutonium forweapons. Current spentfuelreprocessingtechniquesseparateuranium andplutoniumfrom fissionproductsand Disposal DecisionsIsReprocessing One Waste ManagementOptionwith toImpact thePotential Waste Storage and conservative. AfterSeptember11,2001,theNRCissuedorderstolicensees Assessments” in2000.Thatstudyfoundthatthe1977riskassessments (NUREG/CR-6672) were various transportationscenarios,concluding with “Reexamination ofSpentFuelRisk studiesweredonepertainingto shipments (10CFRPart71)are“adequatetoprotectthepublic.”Other materials ofalltypesandmodes (NUREG-0710), concludingthatexistingregulationsforsuch In 1977,theNRCcompletedaFinal Environmental Impact Statement ontransportofradioactive radioactive materials that donotrequireaccident-resistantpackaging. in theU.S.,ofwhich3million areshipments of course, besubstantiallylarger.)Thiscompares toover300million hazardous material shipments peryear transportation of specific typesofradi technology attheirLaHague facility,whichoperatesat800tons/year(capacityis1,700tons/year).Also, capable ofprocessing1ton/day,orabout300tons/year, ofspentfuel. PUREX separationprocessatWest Valley,NY,from 1966to1972.OperationsatWest Valley were and higher),claddinghullscontaminated equipment. IntheU.S.,acommercial plant used the The wastesfrom PUREXincludefissionproducts,actinides (elements ontheperiodictablefrom thorium While this istrue in While principl The West Valley plant was shut downdueto was plant The WestValley The immediate issue before President Ford was whether to subsidize plant, theBarnwell which faced delaysand likelycost http://www.nrc.gov/security/faq http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-co the foreseeable future. A closedfuelcycle with anytypeofseparationsprogram willstill uranium atreasonable costsuggestsreprocessing ofspentfuel willnotbecost-effective in the U.S.from a“oncethrough” fuelcycle.Furthermore, thelong-termavailabilityof several decadesinEurope, overallfuelcycleeconomicshavenotsupportedachangein group agrees thatwhilereprocessing ofcommercial spentfuelhasbeenpursuedfor No commercial reprocessing ofnuclearfuel is currently undertakenintheU.S.TheNJFF require ageologicrepository forlong-termmanagementofwastestreams. e, uranium isnotreused. ral regulatorsral could not beresolved.The that pl . -911.html#2 llections/enforcement/security/2 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING Authority(NYSERDA). See Federation of American Scientists,“Recovery from . difficulties in retrofitting the plantto m oactive materials, including spentfuel shipments. various typesofradioactive The Keystone Center The 002/fr10102002.pdf ant transferred management andstorage tothe http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp? 176 178 eet new regulatory requ The Frenchcurrentlyusethis 174 . materials—mostly, low-level toincreasesecurityinthe 175

irements and diffi 177 New

cult cult IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING because the because

http://www.nea.fr/html/ at Yucca Mountain,

n, and Demand” (June 2006). (June Demand” n, and 83 unlimited supply of uranium could theoretically be could theoretically supply of uranium unlimited ores and very low grade from sea water extracted (e.g., granite). Management and Waste Reprocessing spent nuclear fuel does not Reprocessing of geologic repository, need for a the eliminate the from high-level waste residual because there is be sequestered in that needs to reprocessing stream Reprocessing as currently a geologic repository. capacity reduce not significantly practiced does requirements repository capacity is ultimately dependent on heat dependent is ultimately repository capacity While reprocessing than volume. loading rather the of high-level waste, decreases the volume wastes of low-, and intermediate-level volume additional increases. These substantially need to be disposed of in waste streams radioactive be managed. siting and must facilities that require Research of the the members among There is disagreement on NJFF as to the desirability of research agreement reprocessing technologies but general as proposed that reprocessing technology research is unlikely to secure in the GNEP program and industry congressional support and public that research acceptance. There is agreement should continue on waste management technologies related to geologic disposal, on waste of methods reduction technologies, on other stream of the once- dry storage, and on optimization through fuel cycle, including the once-through fuel cycle. thorium

179 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR nium 2005—Resources, Productio 2005—Resources, nium This is enough to 180 . OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, “Ura Energy OECD Nuclear Deutch, Moniz. “Future of Nuclear Power,” MIT. Power,” MIT. Nuclear of Deutch, Moniz. “Future This is unlikely to change as long as the supply of to change as long as the supply of This is unlikely processing and costs of mining and the uranium projections. within current remain uranium future conditions in the market However, fuel cycle economics. of these drive a reassessment may meet current world requirements for 80 to 90 years, current world requirements meet lower than current and both prices are substantially prices in the future prices. Uranium spot market quickly uranium will depend heavily on how capacity can be expanded and enrichment mining expands. and how quickly the nuclear industry are sufficient to resources Currently identified of 20% to 40% support growth in nuclear capacity over next two decades. that an additional 22 MMTU The NEA estimates deposits. The could be recovered from phosphate is stored in equivalent of about another 0.6 MMTU would require inventories but depleted uranium At to “mine.” capacity considerable enrichment uncertain cost, an almost high and somewhat Organization for Economic According to the Energy Cooperation and Development-Nuclear 4 Agency (OECD-NEA), there are approximately (MMTU) that can tons of uranium metric million from conventional sources at prices less be mined approximately 5 MMTU than $80/kg, and a total of at prices less than $130/kg. the THORP facility in the UK and operations in UK and operations facility in the the THORP or used the use Russia all India, and Japan, China, process. PUREX is many cycle system fuel A reprocessing-based a once-through fuel than expensive more times documented in other studies. cycle system, as The Keystone Center 179 180 general/press/2006/redbook/ IV. WASTE & REPROCESSING 84 84 182 181   Global NuclearEnergyPartnership(GNEP) In 2006,theBushAdministration proposeda Global Nuclear EnergyPartnership the GNEPconcept: perspective, therearemany potentialproblems with nuclear waste.From awastemanagement capacity requirements forgeologicdisposalof reduce thenumber ofgeologicrepositoriesor by attempting toreduceproliferation risksand help expandnuclearpowerintheU.S.andabroad http://www.id.doe.gov/GNEP/06-GA50506-04.pdf For more fromthe Department ofEnergy on GNEP, see left abovegroundforhundredsofyears. challenges overall,andfissionproductsmay be will alsoadd newwastemanagement provide flexibility inrepositoryoperations,it Although storingthosefissionproductsmay strontium insurfaceorsubsurface facilities. on therepositorybystoringcesiumand products isdesignedtoreducetheheatimpact The proposaltoextract short-livedfission usable inanuclearweapon. and, unfortunately,itisthereforeentirely significantly greaterthan thatfor uranium-235 that thecriticalmass forneptunium isnot weapon. Therationaleisquestionable,given by nomeans impossible) tomake anuclear fuel cyclewill make itmore difficult(though extracting plutonium plusneptunium from the type ofreprocessingproposedbyGNEPisthat effectiveness. Furthermore, arationale forthe vague onbothtechnologicalviability andcost- reprocessing technology(UREX+)remains The proposeddevelopmentofamore advanced NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING . 181 to http://www.gnep.energy.gov The Keystone Center The  includes more discussionofGNEP. Chapter Vofthisreport, “ProliferationRisks,”   reactors. economic considerationsforinvestment innew Federal investment, andwouldcomplicate the light-water reactors, wouldrequire open-ended reactors aresubstantially more expensive than unlikely evertobeadoptedbyindustry.Fast to commit tofastreactordesignsthat are technology andthefederalgovernment’sintent with standardized reactor designofproven civilian nuclearplantoperatorstomove ahead incompatibility betweenthecommitment of problematic aspectsofGNEP.Theotheristhe reactor isbutoneofthetechnologically policymakers. Developingfuelforsucha option thathasbeenrepeatedlyrejectedbyU.S. actinides representsarevivaloftechnology consume ordestroybothplutonium andhigher The proposaltobuildafastreactorthatcan not necessaryinthefirstplace. supply. Further,some thatfuelassuranceis feel ambitions inexchangeforaU.S.-providedfuel capability would bepersuadedtogive uptheir states determined todevelopnuclearweapons is untested.Itwouldappearunlikelythatrogue their ownreprocessingorenrichment facilities, exchange fortheiragreement nottodevelop supplier statesformanufactured fuel, in The proposalthatnationsrelyonU.S.andother technologies forfastreactors, an efforttodevelopnew reprocessing DOE’s AdvancedFuelCycleInitiativeincludes fuel hasnotyetbeendecidedupon. . 182

butthekindof V. PROLIFERATION entially can be, assembled into a bare or a bare into be, assembled can entially rred to as the “international safeguards regime,” “international safeguards regime,” rred to as the 85 weapons, and facilities for their the principal plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), can (HEU), can and highly enriched uranium plutonium 184 from the commercial nuclear fuel cycle arise from fact arise from fuel cycle the commercial nuclear from 183 in an explosive disassembly. disassembly. in an explosive y fissionable material that material can be, or pot y fissionable NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

Expansion of nuclear power in ways that substantially increase the likelihood of the of the the likelihood increase that substantially power in ways of nuclear Expansion is not acceptable. nuclear weapons of spread For the purposes of this report, the NJFF group considers both state and non-state threats as proliferation concerns. concerns. as proliferation non-state threats state and both group considers NJFF the report, of this purposes For the is an (EFM) Material Fissionable Explosive be used either as a nuclear fuel or to produce nuclear fuel or to as a nuclear be used either F: Fuel Cycle purposes, or both (see Appendix used for either civil or weapons production can be broader power; the risks associated with nuclear than proliferation issue is much Overview). The in the construction of fuel cycle power plants also results in commercial nuclear however, if growth increase. the risk of proliferation will weapons, possess nuclear do not now that facilities in countries that the principal explosive fissionable materials, fissionable explosive that the principal includes: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Non- includes: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards International Atomic Treaty (NPT); the numerous Proliferation the (Tlatelolco Treaty); in Latin America Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons the Treaty on the agreements; is to limit the international safeguards regime The objective of and the Zanger Committee. Trigger List; the potential spread of nuclear weapons to non-weapon states. The State and Non-State Threat and Existing Safeguards Threat and Non-State The State by either can be facilitated Proliferation (state actors) or national governments through sub-national, terrorist organizations materials (non-state actors). Weapon-usable other states or from can be obtained from non-state actors, or they can be developed using by the non-nuclear weapons states civilian dedicated facilities or safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle facilities. of treaties, Today there is a collection that are and commitments agreements, uses of nuclear energy applied to peaceful and are designed to reduce the likelihood materials, that special fissionable and other facilities, and services, equipment, to further any will be used information often refe of agreements, purpose. This collection military

Concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation Concerns about V. Proliferation Risks Risks Proliferation V. The Keystone Center 183 184 reflected fast neutron supercritical state resulting state neutron supercritical reflected fast V. PROLIFERATION Center, September 2004), p. 22. the ProliferationDa Examination of Fresh developed such weapons. Iraq, II.World War Iran, Brazil, and Libya, Yugoslavia nuclear weapondevelopmentprograms during Wo and NorthPakistan,Africa, KoreahaveIndia, South the NPT. Israel, to 187 186 185 “With Eye on Iran, Rivals Also WantNuclearPower,”Eye onIran, “With 86 86 pursued nuclearweaponprograms, Over thepast65years,atleast22countrieshave fuel cyclefacilitiesvariesamong states. nation states.Thedegreeofphysicalsecurityat security isultimately theresponsibilityof security programs atnuclearfacilities.Physical physical securityortheadequacyof the IAEA.TheIAEAisnotresponsiblefor requirement to declareallitsnuclear activities to facilities toassesscompliance withthestate’s include inspectionofsuspectorundeclared agreements, safeguardshavebeenexpandedto Additional Protocol totheir respective IAEA More recently,instatesthathavesignedthe of declaredfacilities. inventory accountingrequirements andinspection “safeguards” system reliesprimarily onasystem of “in time todosomething aboutit.”)TheIAEA timely detectionmeansdetection.” (Inthiscontext, nuclear explosivedevicesbythethreatoftimely from peacefulusestonuclear weapons orother system is“topreventdiversion ofnuclear energy the NPT,aprimary purposeofIAEA’ssafeguards in non-weaponstates.AssetforthArticleIII.1of responsible forsafeguardingcivilnuclearactivities The IAEAistheinternational institution weapons-state partiestotheNPT,andfivemore with theIAEA.Fiveofthesewereoriginal NPT andtheirrespectivesafeguardsagreements clandestine basisandsome inviolationofboththe World NuclearWorld Association, “Emerging Nuclear This pointlight-waterinspections withregardto reactor The Unites States,the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, andChina are theoriginal nuclear weapon-state parties ngers of Light Water Reactors 185 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING many ona rld Warand Sweden, II, Switzerland, Tai Energy Countries,”Feb New YorkTimes havesecret nuclearweapon had devel is made byVictor Gilinsky, The Keystone Center The and many small other nations. Syria, Vietnam, Nigeria,Bangladesh, Indonesia, the UnitedArabEmirates, Turkey,Egypt,Yemen, power onthepartofsuchnationsasSaudiArabia, have alsoreportedgrowing interestinnuclear capacity. Boththetradepressandpopular some inthelattercategoryhavegivenupthat warheads andpossibledeliverysystems), although have developed nucleararsenals(i.e., multiple inspection frequencieslower thanthe goals. the resistanceofmember countrieskeeptheactual be notedthattheAgency’sresourcelimitations and to theIAEA’stimeliness detectiongoals,itshould frequency ofinspections(seeTable8).With regard timeliness detection goalsusedtodefine the explosive device)areshort compared totheIAEA material tothemetallic components ofa nuclear required toconvertdifferentforms ofnuclear because “conversion times” (definedasthetime of HEUandplutonium arediverted.Thisisinpart to providetimely detectionwhenweaponquantities First, theIAEA “safeguards”arecurrentlyunable (continued onpage88) enforcement mechanismsare effective. community hasnotdemonstratedthatthe safeguards andthattheinternational critical shortcomingsinthecurrent IAEA The NJFFparticipantsagree thatthere are , April15,2007. developed nuclearweapons. (Washington, DC: The Nonproliferation Policy Education Education Policy DC: The Nonproliferation (Washington, ruary 2007;andWilliam Marvin Miller,and Harmon Hubbard, wan, South Korea, and Argentina after opment programs buthave not Broad and DavidBroad Sanger, Japan andGermany had 186 187

A

V. PROLIFERATION

the 193 and safeguard 191 Inspection Goals Inspection

a ational Nuclear Verification Series ational Nuclear Verification 194 194 3 to 12 months 3 to 12 months 1 year 7 to 10 days 7 to 10 days 1 month 1 to 3 weeks Conversion Time Conversion U) frequency of inspections 233 , 2001 Edition, Intern , 87

. are the target detection times applicable to specific nuclear to specific applicable times are the target detection IAEA Safeguards Glossary Safeguards IAEA 189 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR U The conversion time estimates applicable at present are shown in Table applicable at present are shown in Table estimates The conversion time 233 188

U 20%) U and 235 235

, 2001 Edition, p. 33, No. 4.24. , 2001 Edition, p. 88, No. 11.16. , 2001 Edition, p. 21, No. 3.10. , 2001 Edition, p. 99, No. 12.25. , 2001 Edition, p. 24, No. 3.20. , 2001 Edition, p. 22, No. 3.13. , 2001 Edition, p. 24, No. 3.20. U + U + These goals are used for establishing the These goals are used for establishing 233 omic Energy Agency, Agency, Energy omic U in scrap or other miscellaneous impure com- impure miscellaneous U in scrap or other 190 is the time required to convert different forms of nuclear material to the metallic to the metallic required to convert of nuclear material is the time different forms 233 or other pure Pu compounds Pu compounds pure or other U in irradiated fuel U in irradiated 1 to 3 months 3 months 4 ) 3 233 1 month for unirradiated direct use material use material for unirradiated direct 1 month for irradiated direct use material 3 months 1 year for indirect use material has occurred. Where there is no additional protocol in force, or where the IAEA has not drawn in force, or where the IAEA has not drawn there is no additional protocol has occurred. Where U oxide, or other pure uranium compounds compounds uranium pure U oxide, or other 192    233 , Pu(NO 2 IAEA timeliness detection goals IAEA timeliness detection IAEA Safeguards Glossary IAEA Safeguards Glossary IAEA Safeguards IAEA Safeguards Glossary IAEA Safeguards Glossary IAEA Safeguards Glossary IAEA Safeguards IAEA Safeguards Glossary IAEA Safeguards Glossary IAEA Safeguards Pu, HEU, or Pu, HEU, and/or Thorium Thorium Uranium containing <20% containing Uranium metal PuO Mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) or other non-irradiated pure mixtures contain- mixtures pure other non-irradiated or fuel (MOX) Mixed-oxide ( ing Pu and uranium pounds pounds HEU, Beginning Material Form Material Beginning Plutonium (Pu), highly enriched uranium (HEU), or uranium-233 ( (HEU), or uranium-233 uranium highly enriched (Pu), Plutonium This range is not determined by any single factor; however, the pure Pu and uranium compounds will tend to be at the lower end end lower at the be will tend to compounds uranium and pure Pu the however, factor; single by any determined not is This range detection goals are as follows: activities at a facility or a location outside facilities during a calendar year, in order to verify that no abrupt a calendar year, in order during facilities a location outside at a facility or activities diversion material categories. material 8. The and maintained a conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a state, of undeclared nuclear material a conclusion of the absence and maintained 193 194 190 191 192 188 189 a drawn and maintained be applied in a state for which the IAEA has detection goals may Longer timeliness activities. and conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material

Conversion time required to transport the time does not include of a nuclear explosive device. Conversion time components the device, or any subsequent period. The or to assemble to the conversion facility diverted material of of a planned sequence of actions chosen to give a high probability to be part diversion activity is assumed risk of discovery until at least nuclear explosive devices with minimal more success in manufacturing one or one such device is manufactured. a Table 8: Estimated Material Material 8: Estimated Table Goals and Inspection Times Conversion No. 3 (Austria, 2003), Table I, p. 22. p. I, 2003), Table 3 (Austria, No. of the range and the mixtures and scrap at the higher end. end. higher the at and scrap mixtures the range and of the At Source: International The Keystone Center IAEA Safeguards Terminology V. PROLIFERATION 88 88 http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/fissio Nuclear Weapons NuclearResourcesFission Weapons,” Natural 198 197 196 195 develop anuclearweaponcouldacquireweapons- Non-weapons statesobligatedbytreatynotto weapons capability. to develop and plutoniumstoragefacilities) fabrication, oxidefuel mixed enrichment, handling facilities(e.g., reprocessing, diversion ortheftofmaterialfrom bulkfuel principal proliferation concernisthe The NJFFparticipantsagree thata IAEA safeguardsagreement andtheNPT. inviolationofIran’s fact thatitsdevelopment was consistent with NPTtreatyobligations, despitethe that itsclandestine centrifugeenrichment facility is always beensuccessful.Iran,forexample,asserts safeguards agreements), thoseeffortshavenot themselves (e.g.,byamending theNPT andIAEA reprocessing orenrichment technologies preclude non-weaponsstatesfrom acquiring While therehavebeenefforts inthe past to needed tomake anuclearweapon. significantly largerthantheamount ofmaterial Second, thesignificantquantities(SQ) limits are (continued frompage86) explosive devicecannotbeexcluded. which thepossibilityofmanufacturing anuclear as theapproximate amount ofnuclearmaterial for nuclear explosive. ofmaterialminimum necessaryfora amount processes andshouldnotbeconfusedwiththe andmanufacturinglosses duetoconversion Significant quantitiestakeintoaccountunavoidable for”) ofsomematerials inliquidorpowderform. “inventory differences,”or“material unaccounted commonly uncertaintyintheinventories (called detecting divertedmaterials, because thereis handling facilitiesconstituteaspecialproblem in Thomas B.Cochranand Christopher E. Paine, Brazil, China,France, Germany, India,Japan, Net The SQ for plutonium is8 kg; the SQ for HEU is 25 kg. Thomas B.CochranandChristopher E. (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, revised April 13, Council, 1995), revised DC: Natural (Washington, Resources Defense

nw/fissionweapons.pdf 195 Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium and Hi NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING SQisdefined 196 Defense Council, Revised 13 April 1995. Bulk The Amount of PlutoniumThe Amount of andHighly herlands,Russia, Pakistan, United . The Keystone Center The including: grade material throughanumber ofmeans, plant. enrichment facilities,some withmore thanone Currently, thereare11countrieswithoperating kilograms ofplutonium. highly enricheduranium oraslittle1to3 design. Itcanbeasmuch as5to10kilograms of nuclear weapondependsheavilyonweapons The amount offissilematerial necessarytomake a electric powerrequirements. detect because oftheirsmall footprintand low operated, areconsideredtobeverydifficult Small gascentrifugefacilities,ifclandestinely produce eitherlight-waterreactorfuelorHEU. simple matter touseenrichment technologyto and Iranisconstructingaplant.Itrelatively have operatinggascentrifugeenrichment plants, Brazil, Japan,Germany, andtheNetherlands— construction orplanned.Fournon-weaponstates—

     fabrication plant. purposes fromamixed-oxide fuel(MOX) divert separatedplutonium forweapons commercial fuel weapons-usable plutonium from spent clandestine reprocessing facility forseparating build andoperate eitheradeclaredor of theNPTandIAEAsafeguards the productionofHEUforweaponsinviolation reconfigure acommercial enrichment plant for equipment foraclandestineenrichmentfacility plant totrain operators andasacovertoimport use anexclusively commercial enrichment production ofHEU production ofenricheduranium, usablefor commercial ordedicatedenrichment plantfor construct andoperateeitheranostensibly 197 Anadditionalseveralplantsareunder ghly-Enriched UraniumNeeded forPure Kingdom andthe United States. Enriched Uranium Needed forPure Fission 198

V. PROLIFERATION as a 201

arative Cost Analysis,” arative Cost

Thus, if fuel grade material is used material grade fuel if Thus,

tions from a Comp from tions Illogic of Reprocessing, International Panel Panel International of Reprocessing, Illogic 89 risk options for dealing with the There are three First, it can posed by civilian separated plutonium. be stored indefinitely. Doing so requires a very to prevent high level of physical protection which do not diversion or theft. IAEA safeguards, little value. Some provide physical security, are of of is in non-weapons states, most of the material weapons program; which are unlikely to use it for a this option. however, several have considered plants. The result of this reprocessing is large reprocessing result of this plants. The or awaiting use plutonium separated of stockpiles (see Table 9). disposal have reprocessed number of countries While a used the separated plutonium spent fuel, few have because such reactors, mainly as fuel in light-water expensive oxide” fuel is currently more “mixed and in some natural uranium, than using enriched resistance. with public met cases its use has have, therefore, grown to stockpiles Plutonium to the IAEA, or 250 tonnes declared approximately separated plutonium in the about the level of states. sectors of declared weapons military enrichment plant, as much as 80% of the work required to enrich work required of the 80% as much as plant, enrichment 199

ch to weapons grade is lower than one might otherwise imagine imagine otherwise one might is lower than grade weapons to ch Civilian Pu Stock at End of 2005 (Tonnes) at End of Pu Stock Civilian 250.0 done in going to fuel grade (4 percent). (4 grade fuel to going in done

Nuclear Fuel: Solu Lessons for Interim Civilian Separated Plutonium by Country by Separated Plutonium Civilian NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Japan is 200 Managing spent fuel in the United States: The States: United the fuel in spent Managing cess. Depending on operation of cess. Depending (January 2007). (January

, Vol. 29 (2001),pp. 1379-1389. Belgium France Germany India 5.4 Japan Russia 41.0 Switzerland France) 0.4 in (plus 3.3 UK 81.0 (30 foreign-owned) Total France15 in 12.5 (plus and UK) 38 in France (plus and UK) 5.9 (in France and UK) <2.0 105.0 (27 foreign owned plus 0.9 abroad) Country Source: F. von Hippel, on Fissile Materials Table 9: Estimated Quantities of Table 9: Estimated Quantities Macfarlane, Allison, “The Problem of Used of Problem “The Allison, Macfarlane, France, Russia, India, Japan.and the United Kingdom. the United Kingdom. France, Russia, India, Japan.and Enrichment is not a linear pro is not a linear Enrichment Growing stocks of civilian separated stocks of civilian Growing at a growing tonnes and (250 plutonium pose a significant rate of 10 tonnes/yr) extraordinary risk and require proliferation international attention. and protection of these stocks represents Diversion or theft development by sub- a risk of weapons Levels of organizations. national terrorist and risk vary widely physical protection to country. country from constructing a new large reprocessing plant, and constructing a new large reprocessing reprocessing operations in other there are small have sent of countries countries. A larger number of these spent fuel to be reprocessed in some commercial Five countries currently operate nuclear fuel reprocessing plants.

The enrichment requirements to obtain a nuclear to obtain a nuclear requirements The enrichment feed for reduced if the can be substantially weapon uranium. is low-enriched plant the enrichment The Keystone Center 200 201 199 Energy Policy natural uranium (0.711 percent) to weapons grade weapons to (0.711 percent) natural uranium feedstock for enrichment, the time and effort to enri to and effort time the enrichment, for feedstock V. PROLIFERATION 90 90 204 203 202 require chemical removal before fuel nuclear weapons(morethan 30,000nuclear weapons). less than1year of global nuclear fuel demand. criticality. for permanent undergroundstoragewithlowriskof “diluted” byaddingittomaterials thatwouldallow transportation. Finally, the plutonium can be MOX fuelfabricationplantsorduring risks associatedwithpotential diversionfrom fuel. fuel, burnedinreactors,andconvertedtospent Second, theplutonium canbefabricatedintoMOX adding thematerial tonatural uranium inthe burn surplusHEUfrom Russianweaponsby involves theuseofcommercial U.S.reactorsto Megatons toMegawattsprogram, example, for associated with commercial nuclearpower. The proliferation risk,many ofwhich gobeyondissues programs and initiativesdesignedtolimit risks. TheU.S. governmentalso hasavarietyof envisioned couldactually furtherproliferation NJFF processbelievethattheprogram ascurrently Partnership” (GNEP),some participantsinthe the U.S.government’s “GlobalNuclearEnergy in addressingproliferationconcerns.Inthecaseof agreement astohoweffective these programs are nonproliferation objectives.Thereisalackof domestically, thatattempt toaddress IAEA safeguards,bothinternationallyand There areavarietyofinitiatives inadditionto Proliferation Programs and Initiatives Intended toLimit opposed tocommercial nuclearpowerfacilities. naval fuel,andnuclearweaponprograms, as but theyareprimarily associatedwithresearch, Large stocksofHEUpresentsimilar securityrisks, of thethreeoptions. underground storagefacilityisthe leastexpensive a rock-likeform anddisposingofitinapermanent There are also collaborative efforts to burn 34 tonnes of excess wea National Academies ofScience, “Manag Some of the separated plutonium isold, however, and muchof the plutonium-241 has decayedinto americium-241, which would 202 Thisoptionposesadditionalproliferation 203 Immobilizingseparated plutonium in fabrication. The energy value of thesep ement andDisposition NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING But 250 tonnesButseparated 250of plutoniumis The Keystone Center The of Excess Weapons Pl of Excess Weapons enrichment process. reprocessing facilitiesthroughouttheworld. more stringentcontrolsonenrichment and also calledfor strengtheningdomestic lawsand among U.S.andforeignintelligenceagencies.It of nuclearweapons throughgreatercooperation initiative waslaunchedtocombat theproliferation GNEP attemptstoaddress: following proliferation concernsthat problem. TheNJFFgroup agrees withthe radioactive waste or proliferation a credible strategyforresolving eitherthe premises oftheGNEP, theprogram isnot While theNJFFagrees with several pons plutonium inthe U.S.andRussia.    explosives andmustbecontrolled. source, couldbeusedtomakenuclear All gradesofplutonium,regardlessthe oxide fuel. or easilyseparatedformssuchasmixed- increase stocksofplutoniuminseparated must beprotected,andoneshouldnot Even intheweaponsstates,plutonium weapon statesissimilarlytroublesome. oxide fuelbybothweaponstatesand non- weapons states.Widespreaduseofmixed- Reprocessing posesaprobleminnon-

arated plutonium isnotespeciallylarge:itwould

utonium,” 1994. a huge amount of potentialmaterial fo 204 In2004,aWhiteHouse meet r V. PROLIFERATION economically viable economically building

.

GNEP requires the deployment of GNEP requires the deployment plants, and scale reprocessing commercial and global a large fraction of the U.S. reactor fleets would have to be commercial fast reactors. Deployment of commercial reprocessing be plants has been proven to date to uneconomical. to be Fast reactors have proven to date than uneconomical and much less reliable reactors. light-water conventional    91

The NJFF participants believe that believe The NJFF participants unlikely to are critical elements of GNEP succeed because: The GNEP program could encourage the The GNEP program and reprocessing R&D of hot cells development centers in non-weapon states, as well as the training and chemistry of cadres of experts in plutonium all of which pose a grave metallurgy, risk. proliferation facilities if funded, whether the reprocessing path is whether the reprocessing path facilities if funded, industry needs, and whether the consistent with fuel assurances would reduce proposed contingent also remain risk. Questions or increase proliferation the proposed technology meets about whether the protection. goals of plutonium The GNEP plan acknowledges that these programs programs that these plan acknowledges The GNEP and successfully if rapidly and facilities—even nuclear the risk of not prevent developed—would proliferation. GNEP about whether the remain Many questions by Congress, whether will be fully funded program it will succeed in NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR d to the electric grids d to the electric grids http://www.gnep.energy.gov/pdfs/06-GA50506-01.pdf 205 Provide fuel for non-weapons nations that Provide fuel for non-weapons nations developing their own agree to refrain from reprocessing, and MOX enrichment, unit fabrication facilities. Develop smaller better suite size reactors nations. of smaller Design an Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility to Design an Advanced Fuel Cycle Many the fast reactors. reprocess fuels from MOX and reprocessing plants, fast reactors, to achieve fabrication plants would be needed the long-term goals. Build a Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center Treatment Build a Consolidated Fuel of (advanced reprocessing plant), capable contained separating the usable components the reactor spent fuel from in light-water waste products. Build an Advanced Burner Reactor, a fast Reactor, Build an Advanced Burner and higher reactor fueled with both plutonium actinides. Extract short-lived fission products of spent Extract short-lived store them strontium—and fuel—cesium and years, hundred for several above the surface low-level waste meet that is, until they disposal standards. Develop a more advanced reprocessing a more advanced Develop that separates technology (UREX+) instead of pure plus neptunium plutonium plutonium.       GNEP Overview Factsheet. GNEP Overview Factsheet.

Despite these positive intentions, the proposed the proposed these positive intentions, Despite proposes GNEP has serious deficiencies. program the following: The Keystone Center 205

APPENDICES

93

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

Tokai Reprocessing Plant Tokai Reprocessing

Rokkasho Fuel Reprocessing Plant (Undergoing Hot Testing) Plant (Undergoing Reprocessing Fuel Rokkasho LaHague - UP2 LaHague LaHague - UP3 LaHague (PREFRE-1) Facility Reprocessing Fuel Reactor Power Kalpakkam Fuel Reprocessing Plant (KFRP) (PREFRE-2) Plant (KFRP) Fuel Reprocessing Kalpakkam RT-1 Plant (Tricastin Enrichment Enrichment Uranium Besse Eorodif - Georges Plant) Plant Enrichment Centrifuge Gas GmbH Deutschland URENCO Hanzhong Uranium Enrichment Facilities (Shaanxi) Facilities Uranium Enrichment Hanzhong Resende Enrichment Plant Enrichment Resende Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Plant Enrichment Uranium Diffusion Gaseous Lanzhou Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) (Shutdown following an acciden- following (Shutdown Plant (THORP) Reprocessing Oxide Thermal tal spill) Plant Fuel Reprocessing B205 Magnox Heping Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Plant Enrichment Uranium Diffusion Gaseous Heping

Existing Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities Fuel Cycle Existing Nuclear Operational

Geologic Nuclear Waste Repositories Waste Geologic Nuclear operational None Japan

Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants Reprocessing Fuel Nuclear France India Uranium Enrichment Plants Uranium Enrichment Brazil United Kingdom United Russia Germany China France

Appendix A: Existing Nuclear Facilities Facilities Nuclear A: Existing Appendix Nuclear Facilities Table A.1. Existing The Keystone Center APPENDICES 94 94 Table A.1.ExistingNuclearFacilities United Kingdom India France Belgium MOX NuclearFuelFabricationPlants Germany France China Canada Brazil Belgium Argentina NatU and LEUNuclear Fuel Fabrication Plants

Japan India States United United Kingdom Sweden Spain Russia States United United Kingdom Romania South Korea Russia Pakistan Netherlands Japan Iran India

Sellafield SMPMOXFuelFabrication Plant Tarapur Nuclear Complex, AdvancedFuel FabricationFacility MOX Breeder FuelFabrication Plant MELOX Fuel Fabrication Plant Dessel Nuclear FuelFabrication Plant,MOXFuelFabrication (Shutdown) Cadarache MOX FuelFabrication Plant Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant Port HopeNuclearFuelFacility Peterborough Nuclear Fuel Facility GE CanadaToronto Nuclear FuelFacility Resende NuclearFuel Fabrication Plant Dessel Nuclear FuelFabrication Plant,LWRFuelFabrication Romans Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant Yibin Nuclear FuelFabrication Plant Ezeiza Nuclear FuelFabrication Plant

AREVA LynchburgNuclearFuelPlant Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas Fuel Fabrication Plant Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute TokaiWorks Nuclear Fuels Complex (NFC),PHWRFuelFabrication Plant Lingen Nuclear FuelFabrication Plant Nuclear Fuels Complex (NFC),Enriched FuelFabrication Plant Columbia FuelFabricating Facility Westinghouse/BNFL Springfields Plant Vasteras Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant Juzbado Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant Elektrostal Machine Building Factory/Plant AREVA Richland Nuclear Fuel Plant Novosibirsk Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant URENCO (Capenhurst) Ltd. GasCentrifuge Enrichment Plant Electrolyzing Chemical Combine (AEKhK)(atAngarsk) Seversk (Tomsk-7) Uranium Enrichment Plant Yuseong NuclearFuel Fabrication Plant Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45,ElectrochemicalPlant)Gas Centrifuge Rokkasho UraniumEnrichment Plant Novouralsk (Sverdlovsk-44) Urals Electrochemical Combine Abdul Qader Khan Research Laboratories, Gas Centrifuge Facility URENCO -AlmeloUraniumEnrichmentPlant Natanz, Fuel Enrichment Plant Trombay Uranium Enrichment Plant Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING (continued)

The Keystone Center The

Source: NRDC. Source: NRDC. APPENDICES 95 changed (including, most importantly, uranium price, uranium importantly, (including, most changed NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Electric utility professionals (e.g., utilities themselves, ratings agencies, regulators, consultants, and academics) and academics) consultants, agencies, regulators, Electric utility ratings (e.g., utilities themselves, professionals and supply-side demand-side of alternative resource the costs and compare estimate of tools to use a variety for with simplifying assumptions spreadsheet, in a small can be handed approaches simplest alternatives. The with resources necessary for comparing are usually spreadsheets sophisticated More key variables. many characteristics. unique periods, or tax benefits, depreciation different construction start dates, varying lifetimes, are useful that screening tools these approaches are generic chapter points out, II) (Chapter As the economics differences in the consider regional calculations might average calculations. Specific plant for doing national the results. interconnection that might affect labor, and transmission cost of land, capital cost of the calculations. For the our spreadsheets for sophisticated several reasonably We have used are interest during construction as costs rates, adding overnight capital costs at differing plant, we escalate each the plant year.When sum in one lump made as if annual expenditures were is calculated incurred. Interest dollars, cost in nominal This is the total completion summed. indirect (interest) costs are direct and is complete, begins in 2007, and that utilities starting construction that have assumed generation begins. We at which point is This assumption expenses. “pre-construction” modest of relativelyyears have alreadyincurred 2 construction the spread start date (e.g., 2009) would widen realistic construction not particularlyand a more credible, cases. low and high between our taxes, In addition, federal income over the life of the debt and equityCapital costs are recovered investments. is able to handle these be collected. The model depreciation must and taxes, insurance, state taxes, property liability.of on tax well as accelerated depreciation and its effects we developed a range While factors, as values by the U.S. Treasury,with all debt guaranteed over the life of the plant these for a plant possible costs players—investors and state regulators—react. are final and other are highlyspeculative until DOE rules net capital and maintenance, also incurred with operation, including fuel, operations costs are Other operating pensions and insurance for plant and general costs, which generally means (administration additions, and A&G With these values described. no real escalation (over inflation) beyond the We have assumed employees). recover in rates (or that an owner must requirements” “revenue of annual a stream inputs, the model produces factors are calculated for for all these requirements financial needs. Annual revenue to meet wholesale sales) by By plant production (capacity dividing to 2007 dollars. the life of plant and then are discounted factor times capacity), dollars. kilowatthour by one gets cost per yearboth real and nominal in with very expenditure patterns; for different costs of technologies used to compare is primarily Discounting a facilityexample, but relatively with high upfront capital costs stable operating costs with a resource low and to existing rates or It is not particular useful for calculating cost in comparison that has the opposite profile. are dollar in earlyyearsoperation. The nominal annual revenue requirements plants or rate impacts of used in this analysis is the utility’s weighted after- appropriate for calculating those effects. The discount rate are deductible) and equity(where returns to stockholders debt (where bond interest is from tax cost of capital not). used to spreadsheet was analysesA small this report. in for economic Two additional spreadsheets were used spreadsheet was used for nuclear 2007 dollars. Another relatively small escalate Asian unit capital costs to real as was used in the is the same cyclecost analysis fuel for nuclear fuel cost calculations. The approach taken were of parameters A number MIT 2003 nuclear study. Appendix B: Description of B: Description Appendix Model Analysis Cost Life-Cycle Jim JNFF member reflect current conditions. tails assay) to cost, and probable future enrichment enrichment to requests and expertise in doing these calculations and responding contributed his time Harding generously for sensitivity analyses. by other members made The Keystone Center

APPENDICES . Berkeley: University of California Press, . Berkeley: .

3 97

2 Crisis in Historical Perspective

NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR 1 llections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Mile Island: A Nuclear Three Detailed studies of the radiological consequences of the accident have been conducted by the NRC, the been conducted by the consequences of the accident have the radiological Detailed studies of and Education and Welfare (now Health Health, the Department of Agency, Environmental Protection Several independent studies State of Pennsylvania. the DepartmentHuman Services), the of Energy, and in the area was 2 million people average are that the Estimates about dose to have also been conducted. set of chest x-rays is about 6 full exposure from a context, into millirem. To put this only about 1 per year for about 100-125 millirem dose of background millirem. Compared natural radioactive to the small. The maximum dose to a the accident was very dose to the community from collective the area, the have been less than 100 millirem. site boundary would person at the adverse effects from questions were raised about possible accident, although following the In the months be directly correlated life in the to the TMI area, none could and plant animal, human, radiation on and foodstuffs were of air, water, milk, vegetation, soil, samples accident. Thousands of environmental the area. Very low levels of collected by various groups monitoring radionuclides could be attributed to releases from the accident. However,assessments by several comprehensive investigationsand well- most of the of serious damage to the reactor, respected have concluded that in spite organizations of effects on the physical health release had negligible the actual and that radiation was contained individuals or the environment.

be addressed, as several of weaknesses a that had to multitude Three Mile Island exposed that for the oversights, lapses, and failures comprehensive clear. The blame postaccident reports made out of a drove them and the NRC. The accident industry the U.S. nuclear led to the crisis fell on both consensus that theyhad resolved the most critical reactor complacent prevailing and dangerously quantities a that released dangerous that major accident safety had never claimed Although they issues. was impossible, they regarded it as virtuallyof radiation Island made the Three Mile inconceivable. NRC adopted wide-ranging industry and the the credible. As a result, both possibility disturbingly and equipment factors in reactor safety, improve human attention on intended to focus ample reforms the emergencyplanning, and monitor upgrade communications, instrumentation, strengthen Mile Island. another three to avoid In that way sought they effectiveness of plant management. success, and the accident do from than they technological failure from Engineers often learn more which to draw lessons. provided a succession of failures from At least for the periods covered in extensive epidemiological studies, the accident did not increase studies, the accident epidemiological At least for the periods covered in extensive it did Except for the plant itself, population. the neighboring among rates of cancer or other diseases damage property the region. not destroyor in , pp. 241-242. .

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-co Walker. J. Samuel Ibid noted that: NRC historian Writing independently, the

In its Fact Sheet on the Accident at Three Mile Island, the NRC concluded that TMI “... was the most serious the that TMI “... was NRC concluded the most in Island, at Three Mile Sheet on the Accident In its Fact to plant no deaths or injuries led to it though even history..., plant operating nuclear power U.S. commercial NRC health effects, the On the found: nearby community.” of the workers or members 2004. p. 243. 2004. 2 3 1 Appendix C: ThreeAppendix Island Mile The Keystone Center

APPENDICES 99 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR Figure D.1. NRC Regulatory Framework for Reactor Oversight Oversight Reactor for Framework Figure D.1. NRC Regulatory

The NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), implemented in April 2000, integrates inspection, inspection, integrates 2000, in April (ROP), implemented Oversight Process The NRC’s Reactor in an system performance-based of nuclear in a risk-informed, power plants and assessment enforcement, appropriate level of NRC oversighteffort to ensure the on The process is designed to focus of licensees. The ROP risk significant. are most that and activities structures, components, those plant systems, performance of oversight increases as licensee loop” oversight process: the level provides a “closed conducts a NRC improves. baseline of oversight as performance decreases to a minimum it and declines, safety performance reactor per year. Licensee baselineminimum 2,000 hours per inspection of about of inspection as baseline a minimum the level of NRC oversight, which is increased above determines improves. to the baseline as performance declines and decreases back plant performance tiered in Figure D.1) is a risk-informed, (shown reactor oversight for The NRC’s regulatory framework approach to ensuring plant safety. areas: reactor safety, It includes three key strategic performance the that reflect area are cornerstones strategic performance each Within radiation safety, and safeguards. (2) mitigating The cornerstones are: (1) initiating events, facility operation. essential safety aspects of (5) occupational preparedness, emergency (4) of radioactivity, of barriers to release (3) integrity systems, licensee performance safety, and (7) physical protection. Satisfactory radiation safety, (6) public radiation safely and that the NRC’s that the facility is operating assurance reasonable provides in the cornerstones is being accomplished. safety mission Reactor Oversight Process Process Reactor Oversight and Enforcement Programand Enforcement Appendix D: Reactor Oversight Process Process Oversight Reactor D: Appendix The Keystone Center APPENDICES 100 100    three parts: significant. Thebaselineinspectionprogram has focuses onareasandsystems thatarerisk inspection program, basedonthecornerstoneareas, regional andheadquartersstaff.Thebaseline inspectors ateachnuclearpowerplant site)andby by residentinspectors(thereareatleasttwo all nuclearplants.These inspections areconducted The ROPincludesbaselineinspectionscommonto findings oftheinspectionprogram. safety. ThePIsareevaluated andintegrated withthe of performance thatarerelatedtotheir effecton Each PIismeasured againstestablished thresholds up thePIsandsubmit them totheNRCquarterly. cornerstones. Licenseesgeneratethedatathat make monitor performance withineachofthe inspection program. PIsuseobjectivedatato performance indicators(PIs)andbytheNRC measured byacombination ofobjective Nuclear plant safetyperformance outcomes are additional changesasmoreexperienceisgained. began onJuly1,2006,andmay besubjectto issues areassessedandintegratedintheprogram program. Arecent change inhowcross-cutting cutting elements playanimportant role intheROP The NRC’sreviewandassessment ofthesecross-    cornerstones. Thecross-cuttingareasinclude: three cross-cuttingareasthatcanaffecteachofthe In additiontothecornerstones, theROPfeatures in findingandresolvingproblems onitsown. a thoroughreviewofthelicensee’seffectiveness licensee’s reportsonperformance indicators inspections toverifytheaccuracyof PI doesnotfullycoverthe inspectionarea inspection inareasnotcoveredbyPIsorwherea licensee’s correctiveactionprogram). problem identificationandresolution(e.g.,the safety-conscious workenvironment (SCWE) human performance NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The surrounding moresignificantevents. (AIT), areused toreview thecircumstances conducted bytheAugmentedInspectionTeams at aplant.Special inspections,includingthose performed inresponsetoaspecificeventorproblem thresholds. Additionalinspectionsmay alsobe plants withperformance belowestablished Inspections beyondthebaselineareperformed at      modify, suspend,orrevokelicensedactivities: performance, whichmay resultinanorderto (Licensee ResponseColumn) tounacceptable requires onlybaselineinspectionandoversight action matrix, rangingfrom that performance will fallintooneofthefivecolumns oftheNRC orders forplantshutdown. Eachplantassessment from management meetings uptoandincluding inspection andpertinent regulatory actionsranging information, whichmay includesupplemental agency responsebasedontheplant assessment The NRCdetermines theappropriatelevelof increasing degreeofsafetysignificance. or redinspectionfindingsPIsrepresentan indicate verylowrisksignificance.White,yellow, significance. GreeninspectionfindingsorPIs and givenacolordesignationbasedontheirsafety Both aspectsofsafetyperformance areevaluated findings andPIs—comprise theplantassessment. thresholds. Thesetwodistinctitems—inspection compared againstprescribed risk-informed determine the risksignificance.PIdataare quantitative analysis(probabilisticriskanalysis)to Whereprocess (SDP). possible,theSDPuses significance usingadetermination identified during the inspection forsafety evaluatesinspectionfindings The NRCstaff Unacceptable Performance Column. Column Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Degraded CornerstoneColumn Regulatory ResponseColumn Licensee ResponseColumn APPENDICES 101 corrective actions taken is in accordance with the the accordance with taken is in actions corrective with findings associated Violations action matrix. low safety significance as having very evaluated licensee’s addressed in the and that are (i.e., green) cited. are not normally action program corrective with findings evaluated as Violations associated significance (i.e., greater than having a greater cited in a Notice of Violation green) are normally subject are not normally (NOV). These violations penalties. to civil consequences, in actual Violations that result process, or involve willful the regulatory impede under the traditional acts are processed since the regulatory program, enforcement to the is not limited of these issues importance of the findings. underlying technical significance level, and These violations are assigned a severity are subject to civil penalties in licensees in the NRC with the criteria described accordance Policy. Violations processed under Enforcement not may program enforcement the traditional under the action receive direct consideration matrix. and the program enforcement Both the traditional are exercised for cases in program assessment for traditional which a violation satisfies the criteria with a finding that and is associated enforcement can be has an underlying significance that Specifically, the processed under the SDP. level and would violation would be given a severity penalty. In addition, the be considered for a civil significance of the finding would be processed into and the result would be entered under the SDP, the action matrix, as appropriate. NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR The purpose of the NRC enforcement program is to program The purpose of the NRC enforcement in mission support the NRC’s overall safety protecting the public and the environment. actions with that purpose, enforcement Consistent the importance are used as a deterrent to emphasize to encourage and with requirements of compliance violations. The NRC’s of correction comprehensive in NUREG-1600, Policy is contained Enforcement below Policy,” and is outlined “NRC Enforcement oversight process. as it applies to the reactor violations Policy separates The NRC Enforcement findings into two inspection associated with groups, depending on whether the SDP can be used possible, the When their significance. to assess of the safety significance SDP is used to evaluate inspection findings. The NRC response to assess the extent of the condition and the adequacy of the Enforcement Program

Enforcement action is taken on safety-significant safety-significant on taken action is Enforcement The NRC findings, as appropriate. inspection of its performance the results communicates and other inspection plans and its assessment available actions in publicly planned on its web site, and through public correspondence, each licensee. with meetings NRC inspectors follow In conducting inspections, Inspection Manual, which guidance in the NRC and procedures for use in each contains objectives The Inspection Manual does not type of inspection. cannot be used and requirements contain regulatory or new regulatory requirements to establish any new regulatory guidance. The NRC issuesInspection Reports to document cover may inspection findings. Inspection Reports or period for the baseline inspection a specific time in a examined a particular event or problem are intended reactive inspection. Inspection Reports opinion. to be factual, not to reflect inspector inspection and The results of the ROP, including indicators, and reports, performance assessment the NRC’s public inspection findings, are posted on web site, with the exception of security-related public access. issues, which are withheld from The Keystone Center

APPENDICES

Operation

Operations

103 obtain a construction permit before applying for a before applying construction permit obtain a A 10 CFR Part 50). license (under plant operating 10 CFR Part 52 between the new comparison Part 50 Process is old 10 CFR Process and the E.1. shown in Figure Acceptance Construction Construction Public Comment Opportunity *

Application* Old 10 CFR Part 50 Licensing Process Process 50 Licensing Part Old 10 CFR Issued * NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR

Operating License Operating License plant operating

Construction Construction New NRC 10 CFR Part 52 Licensing Process Licensing Process 52 CFR Part NewNRC 10 with the

Construction Construction Limited Work Design Authorization* Authorization*

Permit * Con- License * Early Site Early Combined struction Permit Ap- struction Permit Certification * * Public Comment Opportunity Figure E.1. Comparison of Licensing Processes Licensing of Figure E.1. Comparison license; previously, a nuclear plant operator had to a nuclear previously, license;

In 1989 the NRC established the Combined the Combined the NRC established In 1989 CFR Part 52), (under 10 (COL) License Operating of construction and operation which authorizes COL combines the The nuclear power plants. construction permit Appendix E: New Licensing Process Licensing E: New Appendix The Keystone Center

APPENDICES ). 8 O 3 natural uranium by mining and a milling milling and a by mining natural uranium

105 ) that can be used in either a traditional gas gas ) that can be used in either a traditional 6 types in the world, differing in design, purpose, and power types in the world, differing in design, O] serving as moderator and coolant) O] serving as moderator 2 NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING JOINT POWER NUCLEAR reactor chemical leaching of underground ore deposits or above-ground tailing piles with tailing piles above-ground ore deposits or leaching of underground chemical of the fuel cycle refers to the preparation of uranium for use in a reactor. Uranium is mined Uranium is mined use in a reactor. for uranium of preparation the cycle refers to of the fuel in situ ) and sintered (baked) into reactor fuel, typically in the form of solid pellets, and inserted into tubes of solid pellets, and inserted fuel, typically in the form ) and sintered (baked) into reactor front end 2 R, P, L, K, and C production reactors at the Savannah River Site R, P, L, K, and at the Savannah C production reactors natural uranium, are fueled with reactors in operation today, power than 60 more including reactors, Some of (U-238), and trace quantities uranium-238 (U-235), 99.3% uranium-235 which contains 0.711% in the U.S. today, are fueled including all power reactors operating Most power reactors, uranium-234. over that in the U-235 isotope has been increased in which the concentration of with enriched uranium, the uranium than 20%, it is called low-enriched of U-235 is less concentration When natural uranium. (LEU). conversion plant, the yellowcake is sent to a chemical on natural uranium, To fuel reactors operating where it is converted to uranium hexafluoride gas (UF diffusion or centrifuge plant that increases the U-235 concentration from the natural level of 0.711% to increases the U-235 concentration from diffusion or centrifuge plant that dioxide converted back to uranium reactor (3 to 5 percent U-235). It is then levels useful in a light-water (UO Candu Reactors (Canadian design, graphite moderator, heavy water serving as coolant) as coolant) water serving heavy moderator, design, graphite Candu Reactors (Canadian MAGNOX air-cooled) Reactors (graphite moderator, to form fuel rods. The rods are combined into fuel assemblies or bundles and shipped to the reactor site. or bundles and shipped to the reactor site. assemblies into fuel fuel rods. The rods are combined to form fabrication facilities. or fuel the enrichment conversion facilities are co-located with Often the chemical that use other fuel types, e.g., HEI or, as types of research and commercial reactors There are some fuel is in metallic the reactor designs, For some and uranium. of plutonium a mixture discussed below, e.g, graphite. be coated with other materials, fuel itself may and the form, There is a wide variety of nuclear of neutron moderator type U.S. can be classified by the in the types of reactors used level. The primary and coolant used, as follows: ordinary water serving as coolant) Graphite Reactors (graphite moderator, KE and N-reactors B, D, F, H, DR, C, KW, Chernobyl-type) RMBK (Russian-made Reservation at the Hanford moderator and coolant) as water serving Reactors (ordinary Light-Water (PWR) Pressurized-water reactor (BWR) Boiling-water reactor PWR) VVER (Russian-made (heavy water [D Reactors Heavy-Water The nuclear fuel cycle can be divided into three stages: front end, reactor, and back end. end, reactor, three stages: front be divided into fuel cycle can The nuclear The Appendix F: Fuel Cycle Overview Cycle F: Fuel Appendix of the extraction deposits, requiring low-grade typically from process or by (U produces a product called “yellowcake” ores refining of crushed uranium acids. Further chemical The Keystone Center APPENDICES 106 106 Power” Chapter1Appendix. A more in-depthexplanationofthenuclearfuelcyclecanbefoundinMIT’s “TheFutureofNuclear liquid high-levelwaste. for themselves and,insome cases,forothernations. Nonethemhassolidifiedsignificantquantitiesof Russia, anduntilrecently theUnited Kingdom haveengaged inthereprocessing ofcommercial spentfuel are thendisposedofasnuclearwasteaftersolidifaction inaglass orceramic matrix. France,Japan, in nuclearreactorsafterreprocessingandmixed oxidefuelfabrication.Theradioactivefissionproducts radioactive fissionproductsinto threestreams. Theplutoniumandunuseduranium canbereusedasfuel cycle, requiresthatthespentfuelbereprocessedtoseparateplutonium, unuseduranium,andhighly have takenthisapproach tohandlingspentfuelfrom civilianreactors. Thesecondapproach, theclosed dry casksand ultimately disposingof thenuclearwaste.Todate,U.S.andanumber ofothercountries cycle. Oneofthese,theopenoronce-throughcycle,involvesstoringspentfuelon-siteinwetstorage or There aretwo approachesthatvarious countries havetakentomanaging the plutonium. elements ishighlyradioactive. Intoday’s light-waterreactors, theresultingspentfuel containsabout1% absorption ofneutronsbyisotopesthatdonotfission.Thismixture ofuranium, plutonium, andother (unfissioned) uranium, avarietyoffissionproducts,andplutonium andotherelements createdbythe After thefuelisremoved from thereactoritisreferred toas“spentfuel.”Thespentfuelcontainsleftover water) toa“steam generator”thatdrives turbines,whichinturngenerateelectricity. used inavarietyofways.Inpowerreactorstheheatis transferred viaacoolant (typically,pressurized more thanadecade.Aportion oftheU-235atoms inthefuelundergofission,releasing heatthat canbe few years;andfornavalreactorssome researchreactorsthatuseHEUfuel,theresidence time canbe the fuelin reactorcan bealittleasfewmonths; For areactorthatisoperatedprimarily fortheproductionofplutonium forweapons,theresidencetime of High-Temperature Gas-CooledReactors (graphite moderator, helium-cooled) Russian-made lead-bismuth-cooled fastreactor Liquidmetal fastbreederreactor Liquid MetalReactors (no moderator, sodium-cooled) NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-FINDING NUCLEAR POWERJOINTFACT-FINDING The Keystone Center The for powerreactorsthe residence time istypicallya back end ofthenuclearfuel

Center for Science & Public Policy

Headquarters 1628 Sts. John Road Keystone, CO 80435 Phone: 970.513.5800 Fax: 970.262.0152

Washington, D.C. Office 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Suite 509 Washington, D.C. 20036 Phone: 202.452.1590 Fax: 202.452.1138

Denver, Colorado Office 1580 Lincoln Avenue Suite 1080 Denver, Colorado 80203 Phone: 303.468.8860 Fax: 303.468.8866