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November, 1983 A. Ross Johnson, 'Political Leadership in Yugoslavia: Evolution of the League of Communists' [Abridged Version; Approved for Release, February 6, 2019]

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November, 1983 A. Ross Johnson, 'Political Leadership in Yugoslavia: Evolution of the League of Communists' [Abridged Version; Approved for Release, February 6, 2019] Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified November, 1983 A. Ross Johnson, 'Political Leadership in Yugoslavia: Evolution of the League of Communists' [Abridged Version; Approved for Release, February 6, 2019] Citation: “A. Ross Johnson, 'Political Leadership in Yugoslavia: Evolution of the League of Communists' [Abridged Version; Approved for Release, February 6, 2019],” November, 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RAND Report R-3049/1, November 1983. Mandatory Declassification Review #C00226670. Approved for release, February 6, 2019. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208960 Summary: This November 1983 RAND Report examines the dynamics of political leadership and prospects for leadership stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia. It analyzes the evolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) since the late 1960s and the enhanced role of its constituent republican and provincial LCY organizations. It traces the devolution of power within the LCY that resulted in decentralized leadership authority and decision-making based on interregional consensus. It recommends shifting appraisals of the Yugoslav leadership from the federal to the republican/provincial level. (The full May 2013 version of the Report and a first declassified release of the abridged version are referenced as Related Documents.) Credits: This document was made possible with support from the MacArthur Foundation. Original Language: English Contents: Scan of Original Document :00226670 Approved for Release: 2019/02/06 C00226670___________ 11 J )) [/ Copy No. 2~(,, R-3049/1 Political Leadership in Yugoslavia: Evolution of the League of Communists (U) A Ross Johnson November 1983 Intelligence Information Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals limited to U.S. Government Agencies Only No DTIC Distribution Do Not Quote or Reproduce Without Permission from Rand. coo22667o pproved fQr Release: 2019/02/06 C00226670 ·;. The Rand Publications Series: The Report is the principal publication doc­ umenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not neces­ sarily reflect the opinions or policies of thP. sponsors of Rand research. Published by The Rand Corporation C00226670 R-3049/1 Political Leadership in Yugosl,avia: Evolution of the League of Communists (U) A Ross Johnson November 1983 Intelligence Information Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals limited to U.S. Government Agencies Only No DTIC Distribution Classified by 00254 form dated 11/3/80 for Contract MOA903-8l·C·0096 and multiple sources Declassify on OAOR J_')th Rand Year SANTA MONICA. CA. '!040& ~::,,~~~--"· pproved for Release: 2"ol9/02/05 C00226670 Approved for Release: 2019/02/06 C00226670 UNCLASSllf*I ED INTEWGENCE INFORMATION NOTICE This material contains INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, as indicate d below: Rand Control No. R-3049/1 Intelligence Information obtained by Author's Name) A. Ross Johnson under the authority of (Client from (Source Agency(sJ) Da te(s) of source material(s) CIA, Department of State 1972-83 Nature of Intelligence Information and location in publication or other item: Intelligence concerning the Yugoslav politica1 leadership contained on all classified pages. Neither foreign nationals nor immigrant aliens, regardless of clearan ce, may have access to intel- ligence information without proper authority. Limitations on use by Rand staff: This Rand material contains intelligence information releas ed to support the wntract under which this material was prepared. Su.ch information may not be discussed with or revealed by Rand to any outside individual or agency (except the client or source agency) without permission of the client. Questions regarding the proper use of intelligence information in Rand generated material should be referred to the Rand Intelligence Center. UNCLASSD'IED C00226670 pproved for Release: 2019/02/06 C0022667o•••••••••••••• (Th~ntial) - iii - PREFACE (U) This report examines the dynamics of political leadership and the prospects for leadership stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia. It appraises the importance of the republican vs. the federal political base of the Yugoslav leadership. It is focused on the evolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) since the late 1960s and especially on the issue of the importance and role of the LCY's constituent republican and provincial organizations. It attempts to illuminate the sources and mechanisms of political leadership and decisionmaking in Yugoslavia and thus to contribute to U.S. government assessments of Yugoslavia's likely future development and stability. This study was conducted under a contract with the Office of 3.5(c) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and was funded jointly by that Office; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Directorate of Net Assessment, Department of Defense; and the Office of European Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency. (U) This report is addressed to officers and analysts in the co-sponsoring agencies and other U.S. government officials. It reviews developments in the LCY through ~larch 1983 and thus incorporates the experience of 35 months "after Tito"--a period sufficiently long to permit assessing the functioning of the political system in the absence of its architect and former supreme arbiter. The report is based on a review of Yugoslav and Western open­ 3.5(c) source materials, intelligence reports, and discussions with Yugoslav and western officials and analysts. In the course of the research, the author spent five ~eeks in Yugoslavia in October-November 1981. He discussed Yugoslav developments with some 70 federal and republican Party and government officials, journalists, and intellectuals in Belgrade, Ljubljana, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Skopje. He held additional discussions in Yugoslavia in July 1982. Some findings from the field research that contributed to the present study were reported in Rand ~ote N-1813, Impressions of Post-Tito Yugoslavia: A Trip Report, by A. Ross Johnson, January 19o2. C00226670 C00226670 pproved for Release: 2019/02/06 C00226670•••••••••••••1!!!!!!11 ~ .i } UNCLASSIP'IED .l ~ ~ - iv - This· report is primarily concerned with the issue of how political leaders emerge in Yugoslavia and deals principally with the LCY. It does r not attempt to provide a general assessment of Yugoslavia's political ~. or economic prospects, or of Yugoslavia's international position. The ;. report traces the devolution of power within the LCY over the past 20 years and suggests how leadership authority is established on a decen­ tralized basis and how decisionmaking requires interregional consensus. Leadership changes and related political controversies are traced for some of the LCY's constituent republican and provincial organizations--in Croatia, Serbia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. Limitations on fieldwork and difficulties in obtaining regional primary materials precluded more detailed examination of policymaking at the republican/provincial and lower levels. The central thesis of this study highlights the importance of additional attention to the republican and provincial Party organizations and more systematic analysis of the careers of their leaders. UNCLASSIE'IED ~-~-=-~-~~--~--~-~--.-:.:};w~- pproved for Release: 2019/02/06 C00226670- C00226670 pproved for Release: 2019/02/06 C00226670••••••••••••••1 UNCLASSllf'IED - v - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The Yugoslav political system evolved from centralism in the initial post-World War II period to federalism in the 1960s and quasi­ confederalism in the 1970s. As the Party introduced a less doctrinaire and more participatory political system after 1950, Yugoslavia's multinational composition exerted a major influence on the Yugoslav polity. Communist leaders of the constituent regions of Yugoslavia (the six republics and two provinces) pursued regional economic, cultural­ national, and then directly political interests, and this undermined the supranational Yugoslavism that Tito and the Yugoslav Communists attempted to forge during and after the Partisan War. The Yugoslav state was reconstituted on a quasi-confederal basis by the 1974 Constitution. Federal posts were staffed on the basis of republica11/provincial parity. All-Yugoslav policy decisions required consensus among the regions. The Yugoslav Communist Party (known as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) since 1952) has also been decentralized. The ~inch Party Congress of 1969 rP.cognized the powers of the constituent republican and provincial LC organizations. The LCY Presidency (or Presidium), Central Committee, and other bodies were reconstituted on the basis of parity representation of the republican/provincial LC organizations. Earlier, the Party Secretariat had been abolished. In the early 1970s, following an upsurge of nationalism in Croatia and elsewhere, Tito attempted to reconstruct an autonomous federal Party center. He failed, because revolutionary supranational Yugoslayism had dissipated, and because newly appointed regi0nal Party leaders promoted regional interests even more vigorously than had their purged predecessors. By the late 1970s, Tito abandoned the attempt to counterpose a more centralized LCY organizational basis to the quasi­ confederal organizational principles of the Yugoslav state. Instead, he sought to institutionalize and depersonalize
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