Hap Arnold’s unique B-29 force brought to its knees and helped make the case for an independent Air Force. The Twentieth Against Japan

IXTY years ago, Gen. Henry H. strategic whose range, speed, By Herman S. Wolk Arnold, Commanding and bomb load would be far superior of the Army Air Forces, formed to the B-17 and B-24. He initiated and began to lead a new num- development of the B-29 Super- bered air force, created to con- fortress in November 1939, two months Sduct B-29 operations against Japan’s after Nazi ’s invasion of home islands. Hap Arnold’s creation Poland. of to spearhead a offensive in the The Essential B-29 Pacific not only led to Japan’s defeat After Japan’s sneak attack on Pearl but also proved to be a landmark in the Harbor, Arnold was determined to long struggle of airmen to organize show that Japan could be driven out and operate an independent air force. of World War II without a land inva- Numerous studies have documented sion of the home islands. He be- the technical and engineering prob- lieved the B-29 was essential to that lems that had to be overcome in de- outcome. Once the veloping the B-29. Less has been entered the war, Arnold came under written about the critical decision of increasing pressure from President how to command this long-range Franklin D. Roosevelt and Gen. George bomber force. The answer was fun- C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, to damental to prosecuting the strategic have the AAF’s long-range bomber bombing offensive against Japan. forces show results. B-29s of Twentieth Air Force crowd The final decision, reached April The B-29 was a greatly advanced the flight line on ’s . 4, 1944, placed Twentieth Air Force bombing airplane, with a pressur- directly under Arnold. It was an un- ized cabin, intricate fire-control sys- precedented arrangement that would tem, and powerful new Wright R-3350 lead, in the era, to place- engines. However, the B-29 devel- ment of the newly formed Strategic oped critical problems, which brought Air Command directly under the Joint the entire program into question. If Chiefs of Staff as a specified com- the nation had not been at war, the mand. extent of B-29 development diffi- It was “one of the most important culties would have forced Arnold to events in the history of the United stretch out testing and production or States Air Force,” said retired Maj. even to halt it temporarily. Instead, Gen. Haywood S. Hansell Jr., a former Arnold cut corners and ordered the air planner and first chief of staff for bomber into production before it had the Twentieth, in his memoirs. completed a rigorous testing pro- Arnold was a visionary and, as gram. Europe headed into World War II, The Allies’ primary objective in he saw the need for a four-engine World War II was the defeat of Nazi

68 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2004 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2004 69 Germany. Early AAF planning had outlined potential B-29 operations in the European Theater, but the bomber’s development problems and the pace of Allied operations in Eu- rope made those plans moot. By May 1943, the Allies decided to shift more attention to defeating Japan. According to a 1943 study on the conduct of the war, the Allies agreed to “main- tain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.” Roosevelt and high-level Admin- istration officials, outraged at Japan’s offensive against China, increasingly emphasized the need to bomb Japan’s Pictured above are the Superfortresses under production. The B-29 brought a home islands. At high-level Allied revolutionary capability. The long-range bomber featured a pressurized cabin, conferences in 1943 at Casablanca intricate fire-control system, and powerful new engines. and Quebec, Roosevelt advocated deploying B-29s to the ChinaÐBurmaÐ pan, the surprise element will be in Sumatra and Borneo, not industrial India Theater. lost.” Arnold maintained that Japan centers in Japan. At Quebec in 1943, Arnold pre- would “take the necessary actions to In a cable to Arnold, Kenney said: sented the “Air Plan for the Defeat neutralize potential useable bases.” “If you want the B-29 used effi- of Japan,” which called for deploy- ciently and effectively where it will ment of Superfortresses to central Challenging Arnold do the most good in the shortest time, China. This plan, prepared by Brig. In the summer of 1943, Lt. Gen. the Southwest Pacific area is the place Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe, empha- George C. Kenney, commander of the and the Fifth Air Force can do the sized that the 1,500-mile range of Allied Air Forces in the Southwest job. Japan may easily collapse back the B-29 would allow it to strike Pacific and Fifth Air Force, challenged to her original empire by that time Japan’s industrial centers. the plan put forth by Arnold and his (1944), due to her oil shortage alone.” Arnold wanted to ensure the B-29s Air Staff. Kenney had been informed Kenney, however, had no real were used first against Japan. In a by his Washington sources that many chance to get the B-29s. Arnold never May 1943 memo to Marshall, Arnold viewed the B-29 as the airplane that wavered in his conviction that the wrote: “If B-29s are first employed would “win the war.” Kenney’s idea, Superfortresses should be used to against targets other than against Ja- however, was to attack oil refineries strike at the heart of Japan. At the Cairo conference in late 1943, Roosevelt approved the plan to base B-29s in India and China. Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, assistant chief of Air Staff for plans, informed Kenney in March 1944 that Roosevelt wanted the B-29s in place by May 1944. The plan was to base B-29s in India and stage them through China for initial B-29 attacks against Japan, then, once the Allies had taken the Marianas, launch B-29 raids from there. Kenney did not take this news well. He described attacks against Japan from the Marianas as “nuisance raids.” Before deploying the B-29s, Arnold moved to make sure that he had op- erational control over them. The of- ficial history of the Army Air Forces in World War II speculates that Arnold wanted to command Twenti- Gen. Hap Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and Gen. George eth because he had not previously Kenney, commander of Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, sparred over commanded combat units. In his initial use of the B-29. Arnold’s plan to strike Japan’s home islands prevailed. memoirs, Arnold said that he was

70 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2004 reluctant to make this decision, but a lack of unity of command in the Pacific forced him to command the B-29 force himself. As was the case in the European Theater, long-range bombing opera- tions raised unique organizational and command and control problems. Arnold did not want the B-29s under the control of theater commanders— Gen. Douglas MacArthur (Kenney’s boss), Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, or Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell—who would employ them as they saw fit. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, who com- manded the B-29 force in the Pacific Theater, explained Arnold’s deci- sion this way: “Arnold did this so we would have a command in the Pa- cific where we were free to fly over anybody’s theater, to do an overall Above, a B-29 on is framed by the wreckage of a Japanese blockhouse. job. Naturally, Admiral Nimitz wanted The capture of the Marianas was critical to the American war effort, as it everything he could get his hands brought the B-29s within range of Japan. on; General MacArthur wanted ev- erything he could get his hands on; to retain US control over the long- footing with the Army and Navy in and General Stilwell wasn’t behind- range bomber force. The problem the Pacific. hand in wanting everything as well. was how to convince Marshall and The new organization reflected And we were flying over all three of the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Arnold’s strategic concept: The great their theaters. We simply had to have Ernest J. King. range of the air arm makes it pos- central coordination on this deal.” Historically, unity of command sible to strike far from the battlefield over Army forces resided with a the- and attack the sources of enemy mili- The Control Issue ater commander, who held opera- tary power. The AAF commander During 1943, Arnold and his Air tional authority within a geographic wanted to demonstrate the indepen- Staff in Washington had weighed area. Fleet units of the US Navy dent power of the air arm. The im- the advantages and disadvantages of ultimately were commanded by the portance of airpower’s role in the organizing strategic air forces out- Chief of Naval Operations, who was war already had been reflected in side the control of a theater com- commander of the US fleet and who Arnold’s position on the JCS and the mander. Arnold saw more advan- reported to the JCS. CCS. “The Army Air Forces,” he tages than disadvantages. According Britain proposed that Twentieth noted in a memo, “are being directly to the official US Army history, the Air Force—and, subsequently, a Brit- controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Staff developed a concept that ish bomber force—should report to and the was a “radical departure from the the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as in more and more each day. Conse- [existing] chain of command.” Un- the European Theater. The US Joint quently, AAF representation in the der the new concept, Arnold would Chiefs opposed this concept, which joint and combined planning staffs command Twentieth as executive Britain quickly dropped. Marshall has become a position of paramount agent of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. and King, according to Hansell, had importance to me.” In January 1944, a somewhat simi- been persuaded that the B-29 cam- In addition to naming Arnold to lar arrangement emerged with the paign required unity of command head Twentieth, the Joint Chiefs also creation of the US Strategic Air from Washington—free from the directed theater commanders to “co- Forces (USSTAF) in Europe. It was control of theater commanders. ordinate B-29 operations with other commanded by Gen. Carl A. “Tooey” Marshall accepted Arnold’s position air operations in their theaters, to Spaatz, who directed Eighth Air almost immediately, but why King construct and defend B-29 bases, and Force’s long-range bombing offen- acceded so readily remains unclear. to provide logistical support and sive from the United Kingdom and On April 4, 1944, the Joint Chiefs common administrative control of ’s strategic bomb- activated Twentieth Air Force. The B-29 forces.” The Chiefs said that, ing strikes from Italy. The Combined War Department directive to Arnold “should strategic or tactical emer- Chiefs of Staff (CCS) exercised con- authorized him “to implement and gencies arise requiring the use of trol over USSTAF through their ex- execute major decisions of the Joint B-29 forces for purposes other than ecutive agent, Air Chief Marshal Chiefs of Staff relative to deploy- the missions assigned to them by the Charles “Peter” Portal, Royal Air ment and missions, including objec- Joint Chiefs, theater commanders are Force Chief of Air Staff. tives of the Twentieth Air Force.” authorized to use the B-29 forces, The conflict in the Pacific, how- The unprecedented command ar- immediately informing the Joint Chiefs ever, was primarily in the hands of rangement had the effect of placing of such action.” the Americans, and Arnold wanted the Army Air Forces on an equal Acting upon decisions made at the

AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2004 71 Cairo conference, Arnold in Novem- ber 1943 had established XX to oversee B-29 training in the US. He placed Wolfe in com- mand. In December 1943, advance AAF personnel arrived in India to oversee construction of airfields in India and China. By April 1944, there were eight fields ready to receive the B-29s.

Striking Japan Arnold designated XX Bomber Command to be an operational unit under Twentieth Air Force, and Wolfe led the unit to India. Under the plan known as Operation Matterhorn, Wolfe, on June 5, 1944, began B-29 operations against Japanese railroad facilities in Thailand. The first di- rect strike on Japan’s home islands Pictured shortly before the peak of the 1945 bomber offensive against Japan are came on June 15, when B-29s struck then-Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay (left) and Brig. Gen. Roger Ramey. LeMay com- the Imperial Iron and Steel Works manded XXI Bomber Command. Ramey later led XX Bomber Command. on Kyushu. Of the 68 in the strike force, only 47 bombed the pri- LeMay improved XX Bomber Twentieth activated in August 1944) mary target. Ten had mechanical Command’s record, but the opera- was getting set up in the newly cap- problems, four crashed, and seven tion still suffered from supply diffi- tured , which lay bombed secondary targets. culties. Supplies had to “fly the 1,500 miles from Tokyo. Use of the The operation suffered from main- Hump”—they had to come in over Marianas not only put most of Japan tenance and logistical problems, which the Himalayas, the world’s highest within the B-29’s striking range but delayed the next strike by almost a mountain range. Distance from China also made it possible to supply and month—by which time, Arnold had to targets in Japan proved a major sustain hundreds of B-29s at once. decided to replace Wolfe with Le- obstacle, too. Tokyo was more than Arnold named Hansell commander May, who had led ’s 2,000 miles from the B-29 staging of XXI Bomber Command. On Nov. 305th Bomb Group, and achieved bases in China. That exceeded the 24, Hansell launched his first strike success testing new concepts and tac- range of the bombers. against the home islands. tics. At the time, Arnold said, “With Arnold never expected to deal Ja- Dubbed San Antonio I, the mis- all due respect to Wolfe, ... LeMay’s pan a crushing blow using bases in sion sent 111 B-29s, led by Brig. operations make Wolfe’s very ama- China. In October 1944, XXI Bomber Gen. Emmett O’Donnell Jr., to bomb teurish.” Command (a second subunit of the an aircraft engine plant on the out- skirts of Tokyo. Flying in bad weather, only 24 B-29s struck the plant. Bombs from 64 others fell on docks and urban areas. Some 125 Japanese fighters managed to down one B-29. Though the bombing results were not particularly good, the psycho- logical impact was significant. Between October 1944 and Janu- ary 1945, the Superforts struck Japan’s aircraft engine, component, and as- sembly plants. However, bad weather and mechanical difficulties contin- ued to limit their success. Arnold, under enormous pressure in Wash- ington and determined to show re- sults with the B-29 force, once again called on LeMay. In January 1945, LeMay replaced Hansell, who had been LeMay’s commander in . In Arnold’s mind, he was racing Heavy B-29 attacks devastated Japan even before the atomic bombs were against time. The Joint Chiefs had dropped. Here, Superfortresses unload fire bombs on in May acceded to his desire to command 1945. the very long-range force from Wash-

72 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2004 ington. Roosevelt and Marshall ex- pected significant results. Arnold realized that, if B-29 operations failed to accomplish something decisive, Allied forces would have to launch a ground invasion of Japan.

LeMay Changes Tactics LeMay had Arnold’s confidence, but he realized he was on the spot. “The turkey was around my neck,” he recalled. “We were still going in too high, still running into those big jet-stream winds upstairs. Weather was almost always bad.” LeMay fig- ured he had only five or six good bombing days per month. Brig. Gen. , who had replaced Hansell as Twentieth Air Force chief of staff, informed LeMay that Arnold wanted an incendiary campaign. Time Five Twentieth Air Force B-29s fly over the coast of Japan. In the late stages was running out. of the Pacific campaign, raids by up to 800 bombers helped bring Japan’s In his memoirs, LeMay wrote that military and industrial capabilities to a standstill. Arnold, “fully committed to the B-29 program all along, had crawled out that were a major part of the war Japan to the other.” Thus, he ordered on a dozen limbs about a thousand economy. employment of the atomic bomb. times, in order to achieve physical Thus began five months of strategic After the war, Arnold emphasized resources and sufficient funds to bombing that decimated Japan’s ur- that Japan surrendered “because air build those airplanes and get them ban areas. In July 1945, Arnold trans- attacks, both actual and potential, had into combat. ... So he finds they’re ferred the headquarters for Twentieth made possible the destruction of their not doing too well. ... General Air Force from Washington to Guam. capability and will for further resis- Arnold was absolutely determined Spaatz took command of the US Army tance.” These air attacks, he contin- to get results out of this weapons Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, ued, “had as a primary objective the system.” which encompassed the Twentieth. defeat of Japan without invasion.” LeMay, after discussions with his However, strategic control of the Arnold did not believe that the atomic wing commanders, decided to scrap B-29s remained with Arnold and the bombs, by themselves, brought about high-altitude daylight bombing mis- Joint Chiefs. The campaign culminated the defeat of Japan but were only one sions and shift to low-level night in with the atomic bomb- factor in Japan’s decision to surren- incendiary attacks, as advocated by ings of and , which der. The atomic bomb, Arnold said, Arnold and Norstad. LeMay’s XXI ended the war in the Pacific. allowed the emperor “a way out to Bomber Command would launch a It would be difficult to overesti- save face.” Arnold’s view is, to say maximum effort in preparation for mate the importance of Twentieth the least, debatable. the Allied assault on Okinawa. Air Force. In June 1945, Marshall The B-29 campaign in the Pacific On the night of March 9-10, 1945, had advised President Truman: “Air- fulfilled President Roosevelt’s di- LeMay sent 334 B-29s to strike To- power alone was not sufficient to rective to Marshall and the Joint kyo. They dropped 2,000 tons of put the Japanese out of the war. It Chiefs to end the war as quickly as bombs—perhaps the most destruc- was unable alone to put the Germans possible with the least loss of Ameri- tive raid in history, to that point— out.” In June, Truman directed that can lives. Placing control of Twenti- and burned out a significant portion planning proceed for a two-stage eth Air Force under Arnold was cen- of the city. The raid resulted in more invasion of Japan—the invasion of tral to that achievement. than 80,000 deaths and left one mil- Kyushu in November 1945 (Opera- The official US Army history of lion homeless. tion Olympic) and an invasion of World War II stated that the com- Air planners had for some time Honshu in March 1946 (Operation mand arrangement in the Pacific emphasized the vulnerability of Coronet). helped US leaders arrive “at a clear- Japan’s cities to fire. Moreover, Truman, however, was gravely cut definition of the functions and they considered urban areas im- concerned about the potential loss of status of the Air Forces in relation to portant military targets as they con- American lives. He wanted to pre- both the Navy and the rest of the tained heavy, dispersed industries vent “an Okinawa from one end of Army.” The experience of Twentieth Air Herman S. Wolk is senior historian in the Air Force Historical Research Force in World War II proved to be a Agency’s Washington, D.C., operating location. He is the author of The landmark in demonstrating the inde- Struggle for Air Force Independence, 1943–1947 (1997) and Fulcrum of pendent use of airpower. It made the Power (2003). His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, “The ‘New case for the postwar establishment of Look,’ ” appeared in the August 2003 issue. the . ■

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