APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER on PHILOSOPHY and COMPUTERS
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTERS Volume 08, Number 2 Spring 2009 FROM THE EDITOR, PETER BOLTUC FROM THE CHAIR, MICHAEL BYRON PHENOMENAL MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS IGOR ALEKSANDER “Essential Phenomenology for Conscious Machines: A Note on Franklin, Baars and Ramamurthy: ‘A Phenomenally Conscious Robot’” PENTTI O. A. HAIKONEN “Slippery Steps Towards Phenomenally Conscious Robots” FLORIDI ON FLORIDI LUCIANO FLORIDI “Understanding Information Ethics: Replies to Comments” PRÉCIS OF PHILOSOPHY OF COMPUTER ART: A BLOC CO-ORGANIZED WITH THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR AESTHETICS (ASA) DOMINIC MCIVER LOPES “Précis of A Philosophy of Computer Art” DEREK MATRAVERS “Sorting Out the Value of New Art Forms” PRÉCIS OF PHILOSOPHY OF COMPUTING AND IT PHILIP BREY AND JOHNNY HARTZ SØRAKER “A Précis of Philosophy of Computing and Information Technology” © 2009 by The American Philosophical Association GORDANA DODIG-CRNKOVIC “Comments on ‘Philosophy of Computing and Information Technology’ in Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9 Technology and Engineering Science, Part 6 Philosophical Issues of Engineering Disciplines” ARTICLES ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS J. P. SULLINS “Telerobotic Weapons Systems and the Ethical Conduct of War” WILLIAM L. DYER “Keep Autonomous Systems Under Manual Control (for now): A Veteran’s Reflection” DON BERKICH “Autonomous Robots” DISCUSSION PAPERS ROXANNE KURTZ “Ontologically Tough Artifacts and Non-Spooky Intentions – Comments on Baker” E. DIAZ-LEON “How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There?” BOOK REVIEWS Christian Fuchs: Internet and Society. Social Theory in the Information Age REVIEWED BY EVELINE LUBBERS CHRISTIAN FUCHS “A Response to Lubbers” Clayton M. Christenson et al.: Deconstructing the Oracle: A Review of Disrupting Class REVIEWED BY TOM P. ABELES Samir Chopra and Scott Dexter: Decoding Liberation: The Promise of Free and Open Souce Software REVIEWED BY MATT BUTCHER Andy Clark: Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension REVIEWED BY AMY E. WHITE CALLS FOR PAPERS “Dialogue and Universalism Informs of a Special Issue Vol. XIX, No. 1–2/2009 Related to the Focus of this Newsletter” “The Philosophy of Computer Science” “Last Call on the Ontological Status” APA NEWSLETTER ON Philosophy and Computers Piotr Bołtuć, Editor Spring 2009 Volume 08, Number 2 similarities and dissimilarities in their objectives, focus, even in ROM THE DITOR their organization details. Dodig-Crnkovich also expresses her F E disagreement with Brey’s and Søraker’s somewhat reserved, if not dismissive, attitude towards the computational turn. I hope for more discussion of the structure and scope of philosophy of Piotr Bołtuć computing and information, especially after the main version University of Illinois at Springfield of Søraker’s and Brey’s chapter is out this Fall. In the previous issue of this Newsletter I suggested that Phenomenal consciousness is looming large in the current we should devote a little more time to applied philosophy. We issue, as a follow up on the article by S. Franklin, B. Baars, and are glad to have three papers on robotic weapons in a section U. Ramamurthy [Vol. 08, No. 1]. In his paper, I. Aleksander built around J. P. Sullins’s article. Sullins discusses primarily discusses phenomenal systems and recalls his criteria of the ethical issues of the use of autonomous robots in warfare. phenomenal states. He argues (following Gamez) that It is followed by a piece by W. L. Dyer clarifying some related ‘phenomenology’ is a sine qua non condition of consciousness. practical topics. An article by D. Berkich closes this bloc with In a brief, sharp note P. O. Haikonen criticizes the main thesis analytical reflections on the various notions of autonomy, of Baars/Franklin/Ramamurthy’s article, by pointing out that the and how they apply to robots. Berkich chooses the notion of “loss of stable perception does not lead to the loss of any kind autonomous agency as the right framework for robotics. The of phenomenal consciousness”; hence, phenomenal nature of issue of autonomous robotic weapons, and the responsibility consciousness is a distinct issue from perceptual stability.1 for their actions, is a timely one since this seems the direction in We are proud that two major computer ethicists associated which the military is going. But robot-autonomy, its criteria and with this Newsletter received the Barwize prizes for 2008 and moral ramifications, is a broader topic. We invite our readers 2009; please see M. Byron’s note “From the Chair” for details. to follow up on this debate with submissions. L. Floridi’s article (in Vol. 07, No. 1) resulted in much discussion In our discussion section R. Kurtz refers back to L. Baker’s that lasted throughout both issues of 2008; eight philosophers article (Vol. 07, No. 2). Kurtz constructs a couple of clever participated. In the current issue we gladly host Floridi’s reductios that may turn out to present a challenge to the extensive response to all those commentaries, which may opponents of Baker’s thesis. We are still open to entertaining enhance the general understanding of Floridi’s “metaphysical commentaries on Baker’s eye-opening piece; the author foundation of information ethics,” as T. Bynum has worded it intends to respond to all commentaries in 2010. We also have in his commentary (Vol. 08, No. 1). a discussion piece by E. Diaz-Leon, still referring to Harman’s It is a good idea for a newsletter to publish précis of paper (Vol. 06, No. 2). She recalls Chalmers’s point that we can important works soon to come. In the current issue we have explain intentionality in physical-functional terms, which seems two of those. We are glad to feature the paper by D. M. Lopes, to explain Harman’s main example without an explanatory gap; which is the capstone of the block on the relatively new domain it seems to me that Harman’s response would involve his older of computer art, co-organized with the American Society for notion of functionalism of concepts, missing from the 2007 paper. Aesthetics (ASA). It is a précis of his upcoming book in which Diaz-Leon goes on to argue that there are two explanatory gaps: the author tries to define computer art within the context of she finds the Nagel/Jackson-style explanatory gap to be ‘easy’ analytical aesthetics. It is followed by D. Matravers, who analyzes while the Stoljar-style gap between a phenomenal experience some ontological problems with computer art highlighted (even if familiar) and its description to be the hard one. by D. Lopes’s definition. More discussion on this topic, also After discussion papers the book reviews come, all four of co-organized with ASA, shall appear in the next issue of this them. The topic of war is raised, from a very different perspective Newsletter. We are grateful to Sondra Bacharach and all others than that adopted by Sullins and Dyer, in the review of C. Fuchs’s involved in this project. book by E. Lubbers, and is followed by the author’s response. We happen to have another précis in the current issue—a Book reviews may and should be somewhat opinionated and version of a long chapter by P. Brey and J. H. Søraker on controversial as is also visible in the piece by T. Abeles, quite Philosophy of Computing and Information in a broader critical of C. M. Christensen’s view of online education as a anthology. The authors aim at organizing the subject area disruptive technology. Abeles’s article is the only piece in this of philosophy and computing, list its main topics, concepts, issue devoted directly to online learning but at least we do not developments, contributors—the précis gives us a glimpse come empty-handed on this. of all this. In her commentary, G. Dodig-Crnkovic situates The two remaining book reviews pertain to the main this work in a number of contexts: we learn more about areas of philosophy and computers. In a review of S. Dexter the anthology that the Brey/Søraker chapter belongs to; we and S. Chopra’s book Decoding Liberation: The Promise of learn about the two projects that have had somewhat similar Free and Open Source Software, M. Butcher situates the book objectives in the past (Floridi’s and Moor’s/Bynum’s), the — APA Newsletter, Spring 2009, Volume 08, Number 2 — in a broader historical context and provides an overview of its our own Harriet Baber and Pat Hurley from University of San main ideas. Last but not least, A. White reviews A. Clark’s new Diego, and Wilfrid Sieg from Carnegie Mellon. defense of the extended mind hypothesis in his “Supersizing At the Pacific Meeting in April, in addition to Terry Bynum’s the Mind.” White points out that, while the gist of the argument Barwise Prize address, our own Amy White from Ohio University remains unchanged since Clark and Chalmers came up with chaired a session on gender and technology. The speakers the extended mind argument in 1998, the book does contain included Harriet Baber and Lori Watson from University some helpful responses to critics of this approach. Most of San Diego, and Margaret Crouch from Eastern Michigan philosophers around the world must have heard D. Chalmers’s University. multiple presentations of his introduction to the book, which Congratulations to our award winners, and I look forward brings to the forefront the philosophical meaning of his iPod; to seeing you at our future sessions. those include his keynote speech at the World Congress in Seoul last August and his Barwise Lecture organized by this committee at the Pacific APA. This no doubt enhanced the interest in Clark’s book. Last but not least, I want to thank all those who made it PHENOMENAL MACHINE possible for me to work on this issue: the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at UIS, my colleagues at the CONSCIOUSNESS Department of Philosophy there, as well as the Chair and Members of this Committee.