The Falkland Islands Campaign of 1982 and British Joint Forces Operations

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The Falkland Islands Campaign of 1982 and British Joint Forces Operations Imperial War Museum Imperial War British troops raise Union Jack on Falkland Islands THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN OF 1982 AND BRITISH JOINT FORCES OPERATIONS By RAYMOND E. BELL, JR. he year 2012 marks the 30th A review of this campaign merits a its civilian counterparts were able on short anniversary of the 1982 British retrospective because of many factors—geo- notice to reoccupy a tiny British dependency joint forces operations to recover graphic, political, military, and even eco- the Falklands Islands in the nomic. But it is particularly salient from the T Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell, Jr., USA (Ret.), South Atlantic Ocean from their Argentinean perspective of how a successful joint military served in the New York Army National Guard and occupiers. Beginning as principally limited operation was conducted by the United King- commanded the 5th Psychological Operations Group single-service operations by British air, naval, dom’s armed forces over a vast distance with and 220th Military Police Brigade in the U.S. Army and marine elements, the campaign ended limited resources. This article revisits, in light Reserve. He was on the staff and was a faculty up as a major joint air-sea-land endeavor that of problems encountered and lessons learned, member at the National Defense University from turned out to be a “close run thing.” how the country’s military establishment and 1982 to 1985. 101 JFQ / issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu RECALL | The Falkland Islands Campaign of 1982 in a time-constrained, oncoming-winter vided picket boat service, aerial coverage of sorely try all combatants. Just as winter was operation. The focus must be on joint ground the logistic support area, and gun support setting in, the expeditionary force overcame force combat while recognizing that the aerial to the ground battle. The RAF, having sent Argentine resistance and the Falkland Island- and sea elements also played significant roles long-range bombers against the islands’ prin- ers were able to assert their British affiliation in obtaining the campaign’s overall success. cipal airfield, flew the Chinook helicopters once again. transporting troops about the battle zone. The Falkland Islands (also known as Joint Participation The ground forces were staunchly backed the Malvinas) lay off the southeastern coast Combat began on April 25 with Royal by a joint combat and service support force. of Argentina within a relatively short distance Marine commando, Special Air Service, and In addition to interservice aviation, artil- of Antarctica and southern South America, Special Boat Squadron forces retaking Argen- lery, and engineer participation, the service where winter begins in June. Although ocean tine-occupied South Georgia Island, located support establishment consisted of all manner effects preclude much snow, other elements to the east of the Falkland Islands. This of army, navy, and marine logistic elements such as cold, fog, mist, and sleet are prevalent action was followed by the May 1 Royal Air to include Chinese-manned, contractor- during winter. Any military operation involv- Force (RAF) Vulcan bomber attack on Port operated logistics vessels. Backing the whole ing combat on the islands requires a force Stanley’s airfield; then on May 2, the British enterprise was the myriad of Royal Navy and habituated to fighting in harsh weather and nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror sank the commercially contracted ships, which often on unforgiving terrain. British Royal Marine Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. Battle went in harm’s way. 3 Commando Brigade, around which the escalated as a British fleet consisting of some Falklands ground expeditionary task force hundred ships to include frigates, destroyers, The Core Force was originally organized, frequently deployed and two aircraft carriers sailed south and Initially led by Royal Marine Brigadier to Norway on exercises and practiced in established a 200-mile Total Exclusion Zone Julian Thompson commanding the Royal desolate regions in the United Kingdom. It around the Falkland Islands. The zone’s Marine commando brigade, and followed was, of all British combat formations, the best purpose was to prevent further reinforcement by the army brigade’s commander Brigadier suited for an expedition to the barren and of the Argentine force occupying East Falk- Anthony Wilson, the ground contingent had inhospitable islands thousands of miles from land Island and to protect the British combat its task to oust the Argentineans occupying the British Isles. and logistics ships supporting the campaign. East Falkland Island cut out for it. The joint The primary elements of the commando The carriers with their helicopters and force slogged its way across peat bogs, flew brigade were three Royal Marine battalion- Harrier aircraft took up position well to the over fields of rock, traversed craggy hills, size infantry formations, 40, 42, and 45 Royal east of the islands to avoid attack by land- and skirted the island by watercraft under Marine Commandos. In support of these based Argentine naval and air force aircraft. abysmal weather conditions to confront a infantry organizations were commando- British picket ships stood off the islands tenacious opponent entrenched around the trained and -qualified personnel of the Royal themselves both to shield the carriers and to island’s capital and airfield at Port Stanley. Marines, Royal Navy, and British army. The intercept any Argentine aircraft that might The terrain combined with weather charac- Royal Marines contributed the brigade head- try to interfere with ground operations on terized by blowing snow, constant drizzle, quarters, signal squadron, and air squadron. East Falkland Island where the bulk of Argen- squalls of freezing rain, and gusting wind to Royal Navy doctors and medical technicians, tine forces were located. In the meantime, diplomatic efforts Imperial War Museum to provide a peaceful solution to the crisis having failed, a British ground force had embarked in Great Britain and begun the 8,000-mile trek south to retake the islands. It was to be a major undertaking for a military establishment that was in the process of downsizing its expeditionary forces to con- centrate on its North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation responsibilities. Despite the turmoil engendered by the revamping of the British armed forces, in just over 3 weeks, from May 21 to June 14, a force of Royal Marine commandos, Army parachute troops, Nepalese Gurkha infan- try, Special Air Service special forces, and guardsmen from Her Majesty’s Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards, as components of Royal Marine commandos departing Royal Marine 3 Commando and 5 Infantry Teal Inlet on last leg of advance on Brigade, “put boots on the ground” and foot to mountains retook the Falklands. The Royal Navy pro- 102 JFQ / issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu BELL much as the U.S. Navy does for the Marine however, armor, in this case what amounted Once established on shore on May Corps, provided medical support as members to light tanks, proved its value when deployed 21 and encountering minimum resistance, of the Commando Logistic Regiment’s to the Falklands. There was no tank-versus- however, the British government quickly Medical Squadron. The British army made a tank action in the islands, but the effective decided to launch an offensive against their major contribution to the commando brigade firepower and cross-country mobility foe, which was emplaced in great strength in the form of 29 Commando Regiment, provided by the light armored vehicles estab- around Port Stanley on the east coast of East Royal Artillery, with three firing batteries of lished that the supported infantry could easily Falkland Island. For almost a week, Brigadier light 105mm cannon, 59 Independent Com- have employed additional armor. Thompson sought to build up an adequate mando Squadron Royal Engineers (sappers), Also included in the task force was an logistical base to support anticipated ground and the bulk of the Commando Logistic enhanced “T” Battery (Shah Shiyah’s Troop) operations. But in the meantime, the Royal Regiment with transport, maintenance, and 12 Air Defense Regiment, Royal Artillery, Navy was suffering significant combat ship supply elements. with Rapier and Blowpipe antiaircraft mis- losses to Argentine air attacks, which made Royal Marine 3 Commando Brigade, siles. Rapier missiles were placed in the first for bad press in the United Kingdom. All a self-sufficient combat element, thus had the ability to operate as a separate entity. The brigade, however, was not large enough Goose Green’s capture caused a serious drawndown on the by itself to engage and defeat a numerically already limited supplies at the beachhead superior force such as Argentina had in the Falklands. It was, nevertheless, the ideal base landing waves to quickly protect the beach- the while, the British Ministry of Defence upon which to forge an appropriate expedi- heads on the western shores of East Falkland (MOD), not aware of the logistical difficulties tionary force for the campaign. Island against Argentine air activity. The Thompson was facing, wanted the reinforced task force leadership anticipated that the commando brigade to move swiftly against Initial Force Augmentation major threat to the initial landing would be the final objective of Port Stanley. It was recognized early, therefore, that by aircraft of the capable Argentine naval The decision and prodding produced the commando brigade would have to be and air forces. The selected beachheads a dilemma for Brigadier Thompson because augmented if it was to accomplish an involved lay on the shores of Port San Carlos, Ajaz his brigade did not have sufficient logistical mission conducted so far from the United Bay, and San Carlos Water, which were sur- support or manpower to conduct the desired Kingdom. The initial infantry augmentation rounded by low-lying mountains. The mis- operation to invest Port Stanley. Neverthe- came from the British Parachute Regiment’s siles were emplaced on these heights so as less, pressure for a quick solution and rapid 2nd and 3rd Parachute (2 and 3 Paras) Battal- to best engage any attacking enemy aircraft.
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