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British troops raise on Falkland

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1982 AND BRITISH JOINT FORCES OPERATIONS

By Raymond E. Bell, Jr.

he year 2012 marks 30th A review of this campaign merits a its civilian counterparts were able on short anniversary of the 1982 British retrospective because of many factors—geo- notice to reoccupy a tiny British dependency joint forces operations to recover graphic, political, military, and even eco- the Falklands Islands in the nomic. But it is particularly salient from the T Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell, Jr., USA (Ret.), South from their Argentinean perspective of how a successful joint military served in the New York Army National Guard and occupiers. Beginning as principally limited operation was conducted by the United King- commanded the 5th Psychological Operations Group single-service operations by British air, naval, dom’s armed forces over a vast distance with and 220th Military Police Brigade in the U.S. Army and marine elements, the campaign ended limited resources. This article revisits, in light Reserve. He was on the staff and was a faculty up as a major joint air-sea-land endeavor that of problems encountered and lessons learned, member at the National Defense University from turned out to be a “close run thing.” how the country’s military establishment and 1982 to 1985.

101 JFQ / issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu RECALL | The Falkland Islands Campaign of 1982 in a time-constrained, oncoming-winter vided picket boat service, aerial coverage of sorely try all combatants. Just as winter was operation. The focus must be on joint ground the logistic support area, and gun support setting in, the expeditionary force overcame force combat while recognizing that the aerial to the ground battle. The RAF, having sent Argentine resistance and the Falkland - and sea elements also played significant roles long-range bombers against the islands’ prin- ers were able to assert their British affiliation in obtaining the campaign’s overall success. cipal airfield, flew the Chinook helicopters once again. transporting troops about the battle zone. The Falkland Islands (also known as Joint Participation The ground forces were staunchly backed the Malvinas) lay off the southeastern coast Combat began on 25 with Royal by a joint combat and service support force. of within a relatively short distance Marine , Special Air Service, and In addition to interservice aviation, artil- of and southern , Special Boat Squadron forces retaking Argen- lery, and engineer participation, the service where winter begins in . Although ocean tine-occupied Island, located support establishment consisted of all manner effects preclude much snow, other elements to the east of the Falkland Islands. This of army, , and marine logistic elements such as cold, fog, mist, and sleet are prevalent action was followed by the May 1 Royal Air to include Chinese-manned, contractor- during winter. Any military operation involv- Force (RAF) Vulcan bomber attack on Port operated logistics vessels. Backing the whole ing combat on the islands requires a force ’s airfield; then on May 2, the British enterprise was the myriad of and habituated to fighting in harsh weather and nuclear HMS Conqueror sank the commercially contracted , which often on unforgiving terrain. British Royal Marine Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. Battle went in harm’s way. , around which the escalated as a British fleet consisting of some Falklands ground expeditionary task force hundred ships to include frigates, destroyers, The Core Force was originally organized, frequently deployed and two aircraft carriers sailed south and Initially led by Royal Marine Brigadier to Norway on exercises and practiced in established a 200-mile Total Exclusion Zone Julian Thompson commanding the Royal desolate regions in the . It around the Falkland Islands. The zone’s Marine commando brigade, and followed was, of all British combat formations, the best purpose was to prevent further reinforcement by the army brigade’s commander Brigadier suited for an expedition to the barren and of the Argentine force occupying East Falk- Anthony Wilson, the ground contingent had inhospitable islands thousands of miles from land Island and to protect the British combat its task to oust the Argentineans occupying the British Isles. and logistics ships supporting the campaign. Island cut out for it. The joint The primary elements of the commando The carriers with their helicopters and force slogged its way across bogs, flew brigade were three Royal Marine - Harrier aircraft took up position well to the over fields of rock, traversed craggy hills, size formations, 40, 42, and 45 Royal east of the islands to avoid attack by land- and skirted the island by watercraft under Marine . In support of these based Argentine naval and air force aircraft. abysmal weather conditions to confront a infantry organizations were commando- British picket ships stood off the islands tenacious opponent entrenched around the trained and -qualified personnel of the Royal themselves both to shield the carriers and to island’s capital and airfield at Port Stanley. , Royal Navy, and . The intercept any Argentine aircraft that might The terrain combined with weather charac- contributed the brigade head- try to interfere with ground operations on terized by blowing snow, constant drizzle, quarters, signal squadron, and air squadron. East Falkland Island where the bulk of Argen- squalls of freezing rain, and gusting wind to Royal Navy doctors and medical technicians, tine forces were located.

In the meantime, diplomatic efforts Imperial War Museum to provide a peaceful solution to the crisis having failed, a British ground force had embarked in and begun the 8,000-mile trek south to retake the islands. It was to be a major undertaking for a military establishment that was in the process of downsizing its expeditionary forces to con- centrate on its North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation responsibilities. Despite the turmoil engendered by the revamping of the , in just over 3 weeks, from May 21 to , a force of Royal , Army parachute troops, Nepalese infan- try, Special Air Service , and guardsmen from Her Majesty’s Coldstream of Foot Guards, as components of Royal Marine commandos departing Royal Marine 3 Commando and 5 Infantry Teal Inlet on last leg of advance on Brigade, “put boots on the ground” and foot to mountains retook the Falklands. The Royal Navy pro-

102 JFQ / issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu BELL much as the U.S. Navy does for the Marine however, armor, in this case what amounted Once established on shore on May Corps, provided medical support as members to light tanks, proved its value when deployed 21 and encountering minimum resistance, of the Commando Logistic Regiment’s to the Falklands. There was no tank-versus- however, the British government quickly Medical Squadron. The British army made a tank action in the islands, but the effective decided to launch an offensive against their major contribution to the commando brigade firepower and cross-country mobility foe, which was emplaced in great strength in the form of 29 Commando Regiment, provided by the light armored vehicles estab- around Port Stanley on the east coast of East , with three firing batteries of lished that the supported infantry could easily Falkland Island. For almost a week, Brigadier light 105mm cannon, 59 Independent Com- have employed additional armor. Thompson sought to build up an adequate mando Squadron (), Also included in the task force was an logistical base to support anticipated ground and the bulk of the Commando Logistic enhanced “T” Battery (Shah Shiyah’s Troop) operations. But in the meantime, the Royal Regiment with transport, maintenance, and 12 Air Defense Regiment, Royal Artillery, Navy was suffering significant combat supply elements. with and antiaircraft mis- losses to Argentine air attacks, which made Royal Marine 3 Commando Brigade, siles. Rapier were placed in the first for bad press in the United Kingdom. All a self-sufficient combat element, thus had the ability to operate as a separate entity. The brigade, however, was not large enough ’s capture caused a serious drawndown on the by itself to engage and defeat a numerically already limited supplies at the beachhead superior force such as Argentina had in the Falklands. It was, nevertheless, the ideal base landing waves to quickly protect the beach- the while, the British Ministry of Defence upon which to forge an appropriate expedi- heads on the western shores of East Falkland (MOD), not aware of the logistical difficulties tionary force for the campaign. Island against Argentine air activity. The Thompson was facing, wanted the reinforced task force leadership anticipated that the commando brigade to move swiftly against Initial Force Augmentation major threat to the initial landing would be the final objective of Port Stanley. It was recognized early, therefore, that by aircraft of the capable Argentine naval The decision and prodding produced the commando brigade would have to be and air forces. The selected beachheads a dilemma for Brigadier Thompson because augmented if it was to accomplish an involved lay on the shores of , Ajaz his brigade did not have sufficient logistical mission conducted so far from the United Bay, and , which were sur- support or manpower to conduct the desired Kingdom. The initial infantry augmentation rounded by low-lying mountains. The mis- operation to invest Port Stanley. Neverthe- came from the British Parachute Regiment’s siles were emplaced on these heights so as less, pressure for a quick solution and rapid 2nd and 3rd Parachute (2 and 3 Paras) Battal- to best engage any attacking enemy aircraft. action from the commander of the naval ions. The airborne-qualified troops were also Rapier effectiveness, however, was limited, task force and the British government in well conditioned to operate independently or although the gunners claimed 20 confirmed London made it imperative that some kind as a component of a large force and had little and probable Argentine aircraft kills. Argen- of attack be made. The MOD also soon trouble being integrated into the expedition- tine pilots attempted to bomb British ships realized that additional troops would be ary commando brigade. The parachute unit and ground installations in the beachhead required to drive the Argentineans from the leaders were resourceful and experienced, area from low altitudes, which meant the Falklands. As a result, the MOD dispatched which made them a good match for their Rapiers launched from the mountaintops an army infantry brigade, put together on commando counterparts. had to be fired down toward the water’s an ad hoc basis. In support of the equivalent of five surface. The Rapiers, designed to fire up into Meanwhile, the Argentine air landing infantry , the reinforced commando the sky, had to fire at negative elevations and facility at the small community of Goose brigade included 3 and 4 Troops (platoons) had the tendency to fall off their pedestal Green, a few kilometers southeast of the of “B” Squadron, The Blues and Royals, with mounts. British beachhead, presented what appeared their light tracked-armored fighting vehicles. on the surface to be an easy objective to take. Each armored troop consisted of two Scimi- First Battle The capture of the installation could thus tars and two Scorpions, the former’s principal The initial intent of the joint British ease the pressure on Thompson to take the armament being the 30mm high-velocity ground effort was to establish a major pres- action demanded by the MOD and provide Rarden gun and the latter’s a medium- ence in the form of a base of operations on breathing space until the army brigade velocity 76mm cannon. The armored troops East Falkland Island. Then through diplo- arrived. Two Para, with a minimum backup came from one of Queen Elizabeth II’s two matic efforts, the British government would of fire and logistic support, was to perform royal household cavalry , which are try to persuade the large Argentine contin- the mission on May 27. also charged with ceremonial horse-mounted gent on the island to return to the mainland. The army parachute battalion was led duties in London. It was initially felt that the It quickly became evident that the Argentine by Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, who had terrain on East Falkland Island would be force was going to stay on the Falklands prepared his men well for battle. For example, inappropriate for tracked fighting vehicles as because insistently claimed he doubled the number of light machineguns they would have to contend with rocky river- over the islands, which were so assigned to each section (squad), thereby beds, marshy ground, and jagged heights. As much closer to mainland Argentina than to greatly increasing his battalion’s organic the U.S. Army discovered in South Vietnam, Great Britain. firepower. He also recognized that excellent ndupress.ndu.edu issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 / JFQ 103 RECALL | The Falkland Islands Campaign of 1982

Lifeboats carry British naval crew and to shore escaping RFA Sir Galahad, damaged by Argentine air strike Imperial War Museum Imperial War

troop physical condition would be necessary gunner. The foe’s garrison with more than army infantry brigade was under way from in the islands’ bleak environment, and on the 1,400 men proved to be much larger than Great Britain, Brigadier Thompson gave up trip south he saw to it that there was a great expected and was well dug in to resist an ground command of the operation to Royal deal of conditioning in spite of cramped space attack. Jones’s death thus deprived the British Marine Major General . On on the ships. of one of their most effective commanders. May 27, Thompson had dispatched 45 Royal Jones also stressed first-aid self-help for An unforeseen challenge presented itself Marine Commando and 3 Para east on foot the wounded. In addition to the commando in the form of the large numbers of enemy over the tortuous terrain on what became brigade’s standard operating procedure of prisoners taken at the objective. They became known as the “.” Forty-two Royal first-aid self-help, he issued a “puncture repair a major burden because they had to be taken Marine Commando was to be transported kit” made up of several elastic crepe field care of properly according to the Geneva by Chinook helicopter, but the sinking of the dressings used to put pressure on wounds to Convention. A large number of British per- modified container ship Atlantic Conveyor stop bleeding from exiting projectiles. With sonnel therefore had to be assigned prisoner- and the loss of three RAF heavy lift aircraft limited manpower he and other unit com- of-war duty, which tended to degrade overall initially prevented the move. On May 31, manders did not want to detail men to carry operational effectiveness. There was also no however, a commando was airlifted litters or divert his to assist their place to keep the prisoners out of harm’s way to in the center of East Falkland comrades when the troops could take limited in the limited beach logistics area. As a result, Island. On June 1, the remainder of the com- care of themselves. they had to be evacuated to ships, which in mando unit was flown by helicopter to nearby The May 28–29 attack on Goose Green turn were subject to Argentine bombing. , both mountains being was a success—but a costly one—and had In the final analysis, the Argentine gar- unoccupied by the Argentineans. an unfortunate impact on upcoming opera- rison at Goose Green represented no appre- The Blues and Royals armored fighting tions. Probably most importantly, Goose ciable offensive threat to the British beach- vehicles and the commando brigade’s few Green’s capture exacerbated the logistic head since the garrison’s primary function light tracked vehicles accompanied the infan- situation. It caused a serious drawndown was to service Argentine helicopters and light try in its trek across East Falkland Island. The on the already limited supplies at the fixed-wing aircraft, not be a base for offensive armor proved fully capable of operating in beachhead. A special shortage was of larger operations. the unfavorable terrain and greatly assisted caliber ammunition. in moving unit equipment, supplies, and Lieutenant Colonel Jones, while person- The “Yomp” East and Reinforcements weapons with their ammunition as well as ally leading a stalled attack to get it moving Once the Goose Green garrison sur- personnel. The weather did not cooperate again, was killed by an Argentine machine- rendered on May 29 and the additional British as the season advanced toward winter, but

104 JFQ / issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu BELL the trek was made without serious incident. They had many supply obstacles to overcome systems, and food might have saved many Supply of the columns, nevertheless, was a even before they came face-to-face with the hours of untangling the contents of loads on major challenge, and small watercraft from Argentine forces. Among the challenges was the various commandeered merchant ships. the British fleet skirted the island’s shore the inadequate equipment they possessed As it was, ships were loaded helter-skelter with bringing food and ammunition to forward to operate in the austere and blustering items needed first on the battlefield being logistic nodes. The first of these was estab- islands’ environment. Some nongovern- loaded first instead of last on the transports, lished at Teal Inlet Settlement. Helicopters ment cold weather gear, for example, had making supplies and equipment, much of also moved the light artillery pieces, their to be purchased from commercial sources. it being on the vessels’ bottoms, not readily crews, and ammunition to firing positions In another instance, the MOD issued the accessible. There was no organized manifest within range of the entrenched Argentineans. infantry brigade 2,000 pairs of arctic pants, system, so logisticians seldom knew what was While Thompson’s Royal Marine 3 but only 1,000 cold weather jackets. Not until on what merchant ships when they arrived Commando Brigade, minus 40 Royal Marine the unofficial intervention by a member of at the East Falkland Island beachhead for Commando left behind to protect the beach- the House of Lords whose son was a guards- unloading. There were incidents where ships head, was in motion, 5 Infantry Brigade man was the shortage rectified. The supply arriving to be unloaded had to be returned arrived in the battle zone. The brigade had situation notwithstanding, the guardsmen’s fully loaded to the logistics marshaling area a unique composition as it consisted of two physical condition was adversely influenced because there was no need for their cargo at battalions of Her Majesty’s foot guards, the 1st by duty in ceremonial events around London the time. Often complicating the situation was Battalion , and the 2nd Battalion and in a less demanding environment than that the discharge of stores had to be made at Scots Guards, as well as the 1st Battalion 7th was to be encountered in the Falklands, where night because Argentine aircraft Duke of ’s Own Gurkha Rifles. proper weather attire and good physical con- were active over the beachhead during the The foot guard battalions, however, were not dition were mandatory. Nevertheless, in the day and the ships were inadequately armed to normal components of 5 Infantry Brigade as best British army tradition, the guardsmen, protect themselves. At the same time, Rapier were the . Two and 3 Paras usually comprised the army brigade’s combat ele- the guardsmen’s physical condition was adversely influenced ments so the brigade deployed to the Falk- lands as essentially an ad hoc organization. by duty in ceremonial events around London and in a less The Gurkha riflemen were citizens of demanding environment than the Falklands Nepal, and their participation in the British campaign had to be approved by the Nepalese regardless of supply deficiencies and lack of and Blowpipe antiaircraft missiles emplaced government. Small in stature and tough in physical condition readiness, went into battle to protect the ships and logistic nodes failed to demeanor, the Nepalese had a ferocious repu- determined to excel. receive high marks because of design features, tation and were skilled with the curved native The British battle plan was relatively sensitivity to climatic conditions, and tactical knife called the kukri. Word of their coming straightforward—move as quickly and employment. As luck would have it, many of and their use of the kukri struck fear in the directly as possible to engage and defeat the attacking Argentine pilots in releasing Argentine soldiers even before the Gurkhas the Argentinean forces dug in around Port their bombs at low altitudes did not allow suf- arrived. The Gurkhas are known as world- Stanley. But a definitive logistics plan, ficient time for the bombs to arm and explode. class fighters and had fought for the British for however well conceived, could not take into The fastest way to move across the decades. In World War II, Gurkha battalions proper account the execution challenges battlefield and carry a large load was by fought on such battlefields as Burma. Over the ahead that haste and poor management above helicopter, and the best helicopter to perform postwar years, however, the number of battal- brigade level were to cause. The result was such missions was the American-built CH-47, ions serving the British government declined near-chaos, and but for the resourcefulness the Chinook, flown by RAF pilots. The Royal significantly. Interestingly, the inclusion of the and determination of logisticians, especially Air Force initially sent four CH-47 helicopters Gurkhas in the brigade added another dimen- those in direct support of the troops on the to the Falkland Islands, all on the converted sion to the organization of the expeditionary ground, the final result can best be described container ship Atlantic Conveyor. Argentine force which was now not only a “joint” entity, as a “close run thing.” The logistic operators aircraft sank the ship with a French-made but in reality a “combined” one as well. of the British merchant marine, commercial Exocet , and all but one of the heavy entities, , Royal Navy, British lift aircraft as well as many Wessex helicopters Logistic Complications army, and Royal Marines had to overcome were lost. The smaller Royal Navy Wessex The two foot guard infantry battal- significant obstacles of terrain, weather, and and Sea King helicopters ended up carry- ions were, along with the paratroopers and gross mismanagement of resources more than ing much of what turned out to be a major commandos, considered among the elite of effective and tenacious enemy opposition. load. They and the single available Chinook British troop formations. For the guardsmen, Right from the beginning of the cam- nevertheless performed incredibly well. The it seemed almost a right instead of merely a paign, haste resulted in guaranteed confu- helicopters often flew beyond their mandated duty to participate in the campaign. Unfortu- sion. Had some tracking mechanism akin to operational hours under very challenging nately, from a logistic point of view, the foot present day bar coding been employed, iden- weather conditions, and their mechanics per- guards’ participation raised complications tification of items required for combat opera- formed extraordinary feats under primitive well before they arrived in the combat zone. tions such as ammunition, critical weapons conditions. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 / JFQ 105 RECALL | The Falkland Islands Campaign of 1982

Heavily laden British soldiers wait to embark by helicopter Imperial War Museum Imperial War

The worst loss of personnel did not in a makeshift operating theater in the Ajax salt water, retained the residual salt crystals, occur on the battlefield but in Bluff Cove main field medical dressing station, with two which became magnets for further moisture, at a supply distribution point behind the exploded bombs lodged in the roof, managed so wet boots never dried out. The footwear frontlines. Argentine aircraft attacked the to save the lives of all the wounded who failed to give personnel adequate protection two landing ships logistic Sir Galahad and Sir reached the facility. Medical personnel led and ended up causing many casualties. Ironi- Tristam, which were carrying ammunition, by Surgeon-Commander worked cally, the Argentinean troops were equipped vehicles, supplies, and soldiers of the Welsh around the clock in the unsophisticated and with superb leather boots which became much Guards and medical personnel of 16 Field grubby environment of an abandoned meat sought after by British troops as spoils of war. Ambulance. The sudden arrival of the Argen- packing plant, as well as in rudimentary field The resourceful British and tine aircraft caught Chinese crewman, many locations. Of those initially treated ashore in marine also learned to contend with the Welsh guardsmen, and medics on board Sir the various medical field dressing stations drinking water situation. Potable water was Galahad as the troops prepared to be ferried only three died later on the hospital ship SS at a premium, and available groundwater ashore. The loss of life, supplies, vehicles, and . had to be treated before it was drinkable. The equipment was profound. As the logisticians were bringing men, fighting man soon learned that even when At the same time, the medical support supplies, and ammunition while retrieving properly treated, his coffee mug often ended provided by surgical teams of the Royal and treating the wounded, seven infantry up with a bottom full of murky sludge. British Navy, both those integral to the Commando battalions moved aggressively against their combatants quickly learned to drink only the Medical Squadron and attached, and the Argentinean foe. If their advance was hin- uppermost portion of fluid in a cup. Royal Army Medical Corps personnel to dered, it was less by Argentine resistance than The combination of circumstances, include the parachute medics, was truly by their own footwear. The government-issue physical environment, and mismanagement outstanding. For example, surgeons working direct molded sole boots, when immersed in sorely tested all those men charged with

106 JFQ / issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu BELL providing logistical support to task force per- supplies and especially readily available severely taxing the accomplishment of the sonnel. From the most junior helicopter fuel ammunition were becoming critical com- force’s missions. replenishment technician to the most skilled modities. The Argentinean defenders had surgeon, it was their exemplary performance already begun to surrender in large numbers Lessons Learned that saved the campaign from disaster. That as the British advanced, and on June 14 the The campaign’s ground lessons learned they came from all the British armed services Argentine high command in the Falklands, were fundamental. There was a need for and civilian support personnel sources spoke with its troops hemmed in around Port a well-established, sound, and flexible volumes for ultimate success. Stanley, capitulated. command and control system as well as ade- quate logistics planning at the division level. Battlefield Success A Plethora of Problems The inadequate combat and logistical orga- The final attack consisted of a three- The British Falklands joint forces nization brought forth the realization that phase offensive. The first phase commenced campaign was a success but at a price. Salient it is logistics that drives the battle. Resource the night of June 11 when the British over- problem areas common to all aspects of the management requirements needed closer came Argentine resistance on the three combat and logistical operations were many. attention, especially in the supply and distri- mountains, Two Sisters, Mount Harriet, and For example, the loss of heavy lift rotary-wing bution of ammunition and the availability . After a stiff fight, 45 Royal aircraft, especially the three Chinooks and the of sufficient helicopters. The performance of Marine Commando took Two Sisters, 42 six Wessex utility helicopters on the Atlantic equipment—not only of adequate clothing to Royal Marine Commando captured Mount Conveyor, severely taxed all manner of deliv- include such mundane yet important items as Harriet, and 3 Para overran Mount Longdon. eries for the three armed services. The limited boots, but also the ability of weapons systems The medical field dressing stations had their availability of Royal Navy and RAF Harrier to deliver fire and traverse terrain—required hands full as overworked helicopters evacu- combatant aircraft made air superiority over more appropriate consideration. Finally, ated casualties after bringing forward ammu- the large Argentinean air contingent prob- operational procedures, to include combat nition, food, and even mail. lematical and resulted in severe loss of ships loading of ships, required refinement and inclusion in standard operating documents.

the lack of unity of command from the British MOD down to TheArgentine forces on the Falkland Islands outnumbered the British expedition- the major combatants was strongly felt ary force. But the Argentineans turned out to be no match for a joint task organization The Phase I success of Royal Marine 3 of the Royal Navy and complicated provision which, despite the challenges it faced, pre- Commando Brigade and 5 Infantry Brigade of logistical support to the ground forces. The vailed decisively. The outcome of the cam- encouraged a fast implementation of a Phase lack of unity of command from the British paign in the long run, however, was basically II, but ammunition for the supporting artil- MOD down to the major combatants was decided by the professionalism, sturdiness, lery had become scarce. General Moore strongly felt by those charged with logistically and tenacity of the British serviceman and postponed the attack for a day, allowing the supporting the troops and fighting the enemy. his international partners. As a result, the needed ammunition to be brought forward There were, however, three problem Falkland Islands remain inhabited today by JFQ while unit commanders reconnoitered the areas that impacted seriously on joint land citizens loyal to the British crown. terrain. The phase objectives were Wireless combat operations. First, there was a lack Ridge to be taken by 2 Para, Tumbledown of adequate logistic infrastructure as the Mountain by the Scots Guards, and Mount Commando Logistic Regiment, essentially William by the Gurkha Rifles. The attacks a battalion with a few British army attach- went forward under harsh weather conditions ments, carried the entire burden of support- of high winds and snow showers, which also ing eight infantry battalions, five artillery hindered the helicopter evacuation of the batteries, and a host of other units. Second, wounded and the bringing up of ammunition the inadequacy of equipment such as winter and supplies. Capture of the terrain features clothing for the army troops, to include an placed the expeditionary force in command- unsatisfactory combat boot, had a detrimental ing positions around the final Phase III objec- effect on the physical condition of all those tive of Port Stanley and its airfield. men exposed to salt water. Finally, an ad hoc The success of Phase III was assured by battle and logistic organization, equivalent in the Argentine defenders retreating into Port strength to a downsized infantry division, was Stanley and its immediate environs. The final literally assembled on the field of battle. The phase saw the British attacking from three cobbling together of a joint ground combat directions in what became a rout. The Argen- force of commandos, paratroopers, guards- tine resistance folded as the tank-supported men, Special Air Service troops, and Gurkha infantry captured the last key defensive posi- infantrymen with their supporting arms and tions around the port town. That the collapse services generated confusion and delays, thus was quick was fortuitous because British ndupress.ndu.edu issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 / JFQ 107