ISSN 2229 - 3361

South Asian Journal of Diplomacy 2015

K.P.S.MENON CHAIR FOR DIPLOMATIC STUDIES South Asian Journal of Diplomacy 2015 Issn 2229-3361

Vice Chancellor Babu Sebastian

Editor K.M. Seethi

Board of Associate Editors Raju K. Thadikkaran A.M. Thomas R. Girish Kumar C. Vinodan M.V. Bijulal Lirar P.

Board of International Advisory Editors

James Petras (Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology At Binghamton University, New York) Mark Phythian (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester, UK) Kanti Bajpai (National University of Singapore) Achin Vanaik (Department of Political Science, Delhi University, India) V. Suryanarayan (Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai, India) Zheng Yongnian (East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore) Itty Abraham (National University of Singapore) Moonis Ahmar (Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Pakistan) Ambassador Geetha De Silva (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka) Delwar Hossain (Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh) Matthew Craven (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London)

Editorial Office K.P.S. Menon Chair for Diplomatic Studies School of International Relations and Politics Mahatma Gandhi University Priyadarshini Hills P.O., Kottayam, Kerala India Pin- 686560 E-mail: [email protected]

Printed in India at Print Solutions, Kottayam, Kerala, India. Phone: 91-9447051734 

Contents

The Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Shadow of the Atomic Plague 05 Henry A. Giroux

Whispers, Voices and Visuals: Democracy and Dissent in Saudi Arabia 19 Gulshan Dietl

The Continuing Conspiracy against Syria 29 John Cherian

The Ukraine Conflict, Fear of Russian Aggression and Security 39 K. B. Usha

The Changing Geo-Political landscape and Security of the Indian Ocean Region 57 Vice Admiral P. J. Jacob

South- South Cooperation and Spices Trade 71 Girish Kumar R. & Aswathy Rachel Varughese

Role of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka 85 Tulika Gaur

India’s Strategy in Central Asia: Challenges Ahead 105 Vinay Kaura

India’s Public Diplomacy towards South Asia 119 Gazala Fareedi

Engaging Smaller States in South Asia: India’s Relations with Maldives 133 Jocelyn Jose

About the Authors 149

The Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Shadow of the Atomic Plague Henry A. Giroux

Seventy years after the horror of Hiroshima, intellectuals negotiate a vastly changed cultural, political and moral geography. Pondering what Hiroshima means for American history and consciousness proves as fraught an intellectual exercise as taking up this critical issue in the years and the decades that followed this staggering inhumanity, albeit for vastly different reasons. Now that we are living in a 24/7 screen culture hawking incessant apocalypse, how we understand Foucault’s pregnant observation that history is always a history of the present takes on a greater significance, especially in light of the fact that historical memory is not simply being rewritten but is disappearing Foucault (1989 and 1996). Once an emancipatory pedagogical and political project predicated on the right to study, and engage the past critically, history has receded into a depoliticising culture of consumerism, a wholesale attack on science, the glorification of military ideals, an embrace of the punishing state, and a nostalgic invocation of the greatest generation. Inscribed in insipid patriotic platitudes and decontextualised isolated facts, history under the reign of neoliberalism has been either cleansed of its most critical impulses and dangerous memories, or it has been reduced to a contrived narrative that sustains the fictions and ideologies of the rich and powerful. History has not only become a site of collective amnesia but has also been appropriated so as to transform “the past into a container full of colorful or colorless, appetizing or insipid bits, all floating with the same specific gravity” (Bauman and Donskis 2013: 33). Consequently, what intellectuals now have to say about Hiroshima and history in general is not of the slightest interest to nine tenths of the American population. While writers of fiction might find such a generalized, public indifference to their craft, freeing, even “inebriating” as Philip Roth has recently written, for the chroniclers of history it is a cry in the wilderness (Roth 2014). At same time the legacy of Hiroshima is present but grasped, as the existential anxieties and dread of nuclear annihilation that racked the early 1950s

5 SAJD 2015 to a contemporary fundamentalist fatalism embodied in collective uncertainty, a predilection for apocalyptic violence, a political economy of disposability, and an expanding culture of cruelty that has fused with the entertainment industry. We’ve not produced a generation of war protestors or government agitators to be sure, but rather a generation of youth who no longer believe they have a future that will be any different from the present (Graeber 2013; Giroux 2014). That such connections tying the past to the present are lost signal not merely the emergence of a disimagination machine that wages an assault on historical memory, civic literacy, and civic agency. It also points to a historical shift in which the perpetual disappearance of that atomic moment signals a further deepening in our own national psychosis. If, as Edward Glover once observed, “Hiroshima and Nagasaki had rendered actual the most extreme fantasies of world destruction encountered in the insane or in the nightmares of ordinary people,” the neoliberal disimagination machine has rendered such horrific reality a collective fantasy driven by the spectacle of violence, nourished by sensationalism, and reinforced by scourge of commodified and trivialized entertainment(Ibid). The disimagination machine threatens democratic public life by devaluing social agency, historical memory, and critical consciousness and in doing so it creates the conditions for people to be ethically compromised and politically infantilized. Returning to Hiroshima is not only necessary to break out of the moral cocoon that puts reason and memory to sleep but also to rediscover both our imaginative capacities for civic literacy on behalf of the public good, especially if such action demands that we remember as Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell remark “Every small act of violence, then, has some connection with, if not sanction from, the violence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (Lifton and Mitchell 1996: 345). On Monday 6 August, 1945 the United States unleashed an atomic bomb on Hiroshima killing 70,000 people instantly and another 70,000 within five years—an opening volley in a nuclear campaign visited on Nagasaki in the days that followed. In the immediate aftermath, the incineration of mostly innocent civilians was buried in official government pronouncements about the victory of the bombings of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The atomic bomb was celebrated by those who argued that its use was responsible for concluding the war with Japan. Also applauded was the power of the bomb and the wonder of science in creating it, especially “the atmosphere of technological fanaticism” in which scientists worked to create the most powerful weapon of destruction then known to the world. Conventional justification for dropping the atomic bombs held that “it was the most expedient measure to securing Japan’s surrender [and] that the bomb was used to shorten the agony of war and to save American lives” (Jung 2002). Left out of that succinct legitimating narrative were the growing objections

6 The Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Shadow of the Atomic Plague to the use of atomic weaponry put forth by a number of top military leaders and politicians, including General Dwight Eisenhower, who was then the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, former President Herbert Hoover, and General Douglas MacArthur, all of whom argued it was not necessary to end the war (Takaki 2014). A position later proven to be correct. For a brief time, the Atom Bomb was celebrated as a kind of magic talisman entwining salvation and scientific inventiveness and in doing so functioned to “simultaneously domesticate the unimaginable while charging the mundane surroundings of our everyday lives with a weight and sense of importance unmatched in modern times” (Hales 2014). In spite of the initial celebration of the effects of the bomb and the orthodox defense that accompanied it, whatever positive value the bomb may have had among the American public, intellectuals, and popular media began to dissipate as more and more people became aware of the massive deaths along with suffering and misery it caused (Ham 2011). Kenzaburo Oe, the Nobel Prize winner for Literature, noted that in spite of attempts to justify the bombing “from the instant the atomic bomb exploded, it [soon] became the symbol of human evil, [embodying] the absolute evil of war” (Oe 1965:114). What particularly troubled Oe was the scientific and intellectual complicity in the creation of and in the lobbying for its use, with acute awareness that it would turn Hiroshima into a “vast ugly death chamber”(Ibid: 117). More pointedly, it revealed a new stage in the merging of military actions and scientific methods, indeed a new era in which the technology of destruction could destroy the earth in roughly the time it takes to boil an egg. The bombing of Hiroshima extended a new industrially enabled kind of violence and warfare in which the distinction between soldiers and civilians disappeared and the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was normalized. But more than this, the American government exhibited a “total embrace of the atom bomb,” that signalled support for the first time of a “notion of unbounded annihilation [and] “the totality of destruction” (Lifton and Mitchell 1965: 314-15). Hiroshima designated the beginning of the nuclear era in which as Oh Jung points out “Combatants were engaged on a path toward total war in which technological advances, coupled with the increasing effectiveness of an air strategy, began to undermine the ethical view that civilians should not be targeted… This pattern of wholesale destruction blurred the distinction between military and civilian casualties” (Oh 2002). The destructive power of the bomb and its use on civilians also marked a turning point in American self-identity in which the United States began to think of itself as a superpower, which as Robert Jay Lifton points out refers to “a national mindset–put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership group–that takes on a sense of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that

7 SAJD 2015 grants it the right to hold sway over all other nations” (Lifton 2003:22). The power of the scientific imagination and its murderous deployment gave birth simultaneously to the American disimagination machine with its capacity to rewrite history in order to render it an irrelevant relic best forgotten. What remains particularly ghastly about the rationale for dropping two atomic bombs was the attempt on the part of its defenders to construct a redemptive narrative through a perversion of humanistic commitment, of mass slaughter justified in the name of saving lives and winning the war (Rothman 1997). This was a humanism under siege, transformed into its terrifying opposite and placed on the side of what Edmund Wilson called the Faustian possibility of a grotesque “plague and annihilation” (Lifton and Mitchell 1965: 309). In part, Hiroshima represented the achieved transcendence of military metaphysics now a defining feature of national identity, its more poisonous and powerful investment in the cult of scientism, instrumental rationality, and technological fanaticism—and the simultaneous marginalization of scientific evidence and intellectual rigour, even reason itself. That Hiroshima was used to redefine America’s “national mission and its utopian possibilities” (Hales 2014:8) was nothing short of what the late historian Howard Zinn called a “devastating commentary on our moral culture” (Zinn 2010:26). More pointedly it serves as a grim commentary on our national sanity. In most of these cases, matters of morality and justice were dissolved into technical questions and reductive chauvinism relating matters of governmentally massaged efficiency, scientific “expertise,” and American exceptionalism. As Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell stated, the atom bomb was symbolic of the power of post-war America rather than a “ruthless weapon of indiscriminate destruction” which conveniently put to rest painful questions concerning justice, morality, and ethical responsibility. They write:

Our official narrative precluded anything suggesting atonement. rather the bomb itself had to be “redeemed”: as “a frightening manifestation of technological evil … it needed to be reformed, transformed, managed, or turned into the vehicle of a promising fu- ture,” [as historian m. susan] lindee argued. “it was necessary, somehow, to redeem the bomb.” In other words, to avoid historical and moral responsibility, we acted immorally and claimed virtue. we sank deeper, that is, into moral inversion (Lifton and Mitchell 1965).

This narrative of redemption was soon challenged by a number of historians who argued that the dropping of the atom bomb had less to do with winning the war than with an attempt to put pressure on the Soviet Union to not expand their empire into territory deemed essential to American interests (Wilson 2013). Protecting America’s superiority in a potential Soviet-American conflict was a decisive factor in dropping the bomb. In addition, the Truman administration needed to provide legitimation to Congress for the staggering sums of money spent on the Manhattan

8 The Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Shadow of the Atomic Plague

Project in developing the atomic weapons program and for procuring future funding necessary to continue military appropriations for ongoing research long after the war ended (Takaki 2014: 39). Howard Zinn goes even further asserting that the government’s weak defense for the bombing of Hiroshima was not only false but was complicitous with an act of terrorism. Refusing to relinquish his role as a public intellectual willing to hold power accountable, he writes “Can we … comprehend the killing of 200,000 people to make a point about American power?” (Zinn 2010:45). A number of historians, including Gar Alperowitz and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, also attempted to deflate this official defense of Hiroshima by providing counter-evidence that the Japanese were ready to surrender as a result of a number of factors including the nonstop bombing of 26 cities before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the success of the naval and military blockade of Japan, and the Soviet’s entrance into the war on 9 August (Ibid). The narrative of redemption and the criticism it provoked are important for understanding the role that intellectuals assumed at this historical moment to address what would be the beginning of the nuclear weapons era and how that role for critics of the nuclear arms race has faded somewhat at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Historical reflection on this tragic foray into the nuclear age reveals the decades long dismantling of a culture’s infrastructure of ideas, its growing intolerance for critical thought in light of the pressures placed on media, on universities and increasingly isolated intellectuals to support comforting mythologies and official narratives and thus cede the responsibility to give effective voice to unpopular realities. Within a short time after the dropping of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, John Hersey wrote a devastating description of the misery and suffering caused by the bomb. Removing the bomb from abstract arguments endorsing matters of technique, efficiency, and national honor, Hersey first published in The New Yorker and later in a widely read book an exhausting and terrifying description of the bombs effects on the people of Hiroshima, portraying in detail the horror of the suffering caused by the bomb. There is one haunting passage that not only illustrates the horror of the pain and suffering, but also offers a powerful metaphor for the blindness that overtook both the victims and the perpetrators. He writes:

On his way back with the water, [father kleinsorge] got lost on a detour around a fallen tree, and as he looked for his way through the woods, he heard a voice ask from the underbrush, ‘have you anything to drink?’ he saw a uniform. Thinking there was just one soldier, he approached with the water. When he had penetrated the bushes, he saw there were about twenty men, they were all in exactly the same nightmarish state: their faces were wholly burned, their eye sockets were hollow, the fluid from their melted eyes had run down their cheeks. Their mouths were mere swollen, pus-covered wounds, which they could not bear to stretch enough to admit the spout of the teapot (Hersey 1946:68).

9 SAJD 2015

The nightmarish image of fallen soldiers staring with hollow sockets, eyes liquidated on cheeks and mouths swollen and pus-filled stands as a warning to those who would refuse blindly the moral witnessing necessary to keep alive for future generations the memory of the horror of nuclear weapons and the need to eliminate them. Hersey’s literal depiction of mass violence against civilians serves as a kind of mirrored doubling, referring at one level to nations blindly driven by militarism and hyper-nationalism. At another level, perpetrators become victims who soon mimic their perpetrators, seizing upon their own victimization as a rationale to become blind to their own injustices. Pearl Harbor enabled Americans to view themselves as the victims but then assumed the identity of the perpetrators and became willfully blind to the United States’ own escalation of violence and injustice. Employing both a poisonous racism and a weapon of mad violence against the Japanese people, the US government imagined Japan as the ultimate enemy, and then pursued tactics that blinded the American public to its own humanity and in doing so became its own worst enemy by turning against its most cherished democratic principles. In a sense, this self-imposed sightlessness functioned as part of what Jacques Derrida once called a societal auto immune response, one in which the body’s immune system attacked its own bodily defences (Borradori 2004: 85-136). Fortunately, this state of political and moral blindness did not extend to a number of critics for the next fifty years who railed aggressively against the dropping of the atomic bombs and the beginning of the nuclear age. Responding to Hersey’s article on the bombing of Hiroshima published in The New Yorker, Mary McCarthy argued that he had reduced the bombing to the same level of journalism used to report natural catastrophes such as “fires, floods, and earthquakes” and in doing so had reduced a grotesque act of barbarism to “a human interest story” that had failed to grasp the bomb’s nihilism, and the role that “bombers, the scientists, the government” and others played in producing this monstrous act (McCarthy 1946). McCarthy was alarmed that article provided one of the few detailed reports at the time of the horrors the bomb inflicted, stoking a sense of trepidation about nuclear weapons along with a modicum of moral outrage over the decision to drop the bomb—dispositions that most Americans had not considered at the time. Hersey was not alone. Wilfred Burchett, writing for the London Daily Express, was the first journalist to provide an independent account of the suffering, misery, and death that engulfed Hiroshima after the bomb was dropped on the city. For Burchett, the cataclysm and horror he witnessed first-hand resembled a vision of hell that he aptly termed “the Atomic Plague.” He writes:

Hiroshima does not look like a bombed city. It looks as if a monster steamroller had passed over it and squashed it out of existence. I write these facts as dispassionately as I

10 The Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Shadow of the Atomic Plague

can in the hope that they will act as a warning to the world. In this first testing ground of the atomic bomb I have seen the most terrible and frightening desolation in four years of war. It makes a blitzed pacific island seem like an eden. the damage is far greater than photographs can show (Burchett & Shimmin 2005: 229).

In the end in spite of such accounts, fear and moral outrage did little to put an end to the nuclear arms race, but it did prompt a number of intellectuals to enter into the public realm to denounce the bombing and the ongoing advance of a nuclear weapons program and the ever-present threat of annihilation it posed. In the end, fear and moral outrage did little to put an end to the nuclear arms race, but it did prompt a number of intellectuals to enter into the public realm to denounce the bombing and the ongoing advance of a nuclear weapons program and the ever- present threat of annihilation it posed. A number of important questions emerge from the above analysis, but two issues in particular stand out for me in light of the role that academics and public intellectuals have played in addressing the bombing of Hiroshima and the emergence of a nuclear weapons on a global scale, and the imminent threat of human annihilation posed by the continuing existence and danger posed by the potential use of such weapons. The first question focuses on what has been learned from the bombing of Hiroshima and the second question concerns the disturbing issue of how violence and hence Hiroshima itself have become normalized in the collective American psyche. In the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima, there was a major debate not just about how the emergence of the atomic age and the moral, economic, scientific, military, and political forced that gave rise to it. There was also a heated debate about the ways in which the embrace of the atomic age altered the emerging nature of state power, gave rise to new forms of militarism, put American lives at risk, created environmental hazards, produced an emergent surveillance state, furthered the politics of state secrecy, and put into play a series of deadly diplomatic crisis, reinforced by the logic of brinkmanship and a belief in the totality of war (Blunden 2014). Hiroshima not only unleashed immense misery, unimaginable suffering, and wanton death on Japanese civilians, it also gave rise to anti-democratic tendencies in the United States government that put the health, safety, and liberty of the American people at risk. Shrouded in secrecy, the government machinery of death that produced the bomb did everything possible to cover up the most grotesque effects of the bomb on the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also the dangerous hazards it posed to the American people. Lifton and Mitchell argue convincingly that if the development of the bomb and its immediate effects were shrouded in concealment by the government that before long concealment developed into a

11 SAJD 2015 cover up marked by government lies and the falsification of information (Lifton and Mitchell 1965; Zinn 2010). With respect to the horrors visited upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, films taken by Japanese and American photographers were hidden for years from the American public for fear that they would create both a moral panic and a backlash against the funding for nuclear weapons (Mitchell 2011: Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3). For example, the Atomic Energy Commission lied about the extent and danger of radiation fallout going so far as to mount a campaign claiming that “fallout does not constitute a serious hazard to any living thing outside the test site” (Lifton and Mitchell 1965: 321). This act of falsification took place in spite of the fact that thousands of military personal were exposed to high levels of radiation within and outside of the test sites. In addition, the Atomic Energy Commission in conjunction with the Departments of Defence, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other government departments engaged in a series of medical experiments designed to test the effects of different levels radiation exposure on military personal, medical patients, prisoners, and others in various sites. According to Lifton and Mitchell, these experiments took the shape of exposing people intentionally to “radiation releases or by placing military personnel at or near ground zero of bomb tests”(Ibid: 322). It gets worse. They also note that “from 1945 through 1947, bomb-grade plutonium injections were given to thirty-one patients [in a variety of hospitals and medical centres] and that all of these “experiments were shrouded in secrecy and, when deemed necessary, in lies….the experiments were intended to show what type or amount of exposure would cause damage to normal, healthy people in a nuclear war” (Ibid: 322-23). Some of the long lasting legacies of the birth of the atomic bomb also included the rise of plutonium dumps, environmental and health risks, the cult of expertise, and the subordination of the peaceful development technology to a large scale interest in using technology for the organized production of violence. Another notable development raised by many critics in the years following the launch of the atomic age was the rise of a government mired in secrecy, the repression of dissent, and the legitimation for a type of civic illiteracy in which Americans were told to leave “the gravest problems, military and social, completely in the hands of experts and political leaders who claimed to have them under control” (Ibid: 336). All of these anti-democratic tendencies unleashed by the atomic age came under scrutiny during the latter half of the twentieth century. The terror of a nuclear holocaust, an intense sense of alienation from the commanding institutions of power, and deep anxiety about the demise of the future spawned growing unrest, ideological dissent, and massive outbursts of resistance among students and intellectuals all over the globe from the sixties until the beginning of the twenty-first

12 The Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Shadow of the Atomic Plague century calling for the outlawing of militarism, nuclear production and stockpiling, and the nuclear propaganda machine. Literary writers extending from James Agee to Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. condemned the death-saturated machinery launched by the atomic age. Moreover, public intellectuals from Dwight Macdonald and Bertrand Russell to Helen Caldicott, Ronald Takaki, Noam Chomsky, and Howard Zinn, fanned the flames of resistance to both the nuclear arms race and weapons as well as the development of nuclear technologies. Others such as George Monbiot, an environmental activist, have supported the nuclear industry but denounced the nuclear arms race. In doing so, he has argued that “The anti-nuclear movement … has misled the world about the impacts of radiation on human health [producing] claims … ungrounded in science, unsupportable when challenged and wildly wrong [and] have done other people, and ourselves, a terrible disservice” (Monbiot 2011). In addition, in light of the nuclear crises that extend from the Three Mile accident in 1979, the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 and the more recent Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, a myriad of social movements along with a number of mass demonstrations against nuclear power have developed and taken place all over the world (Allitt 2015; Herring 2006; Touraine 1983; Croall 1979; Jenkins 2008). While deep moral and political concerns over the legacy of Hiroshima seemed to be fading in the United States, the tragedy of 9/11 and the endlessly replayed images of the two planes crashing into the twin towers of the World Trade Center resurrected once again the frightening image of what Colonel Paul Tibbetts, Jr., the Enola Gay’s pilot, referred to as “that awful cloud… boiling up, mushrooming, terrible and incredibly tall” after “Little Boy,” a 700-pound uranium bomb was released over Hiroshima. Though this time, collective anxieties were focused not on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and its implications for a nuclear Armageddon but on the fear of terrorists using a nuclear weapon to wreak havoc on Americans. But a decade later even that fear, however parochially framed, seems to have been diminished if not entirely, erased even though it has produced an aggressive attack on civil liberties and given even more power to an egregious and dangerous surveillance state. Atomic anxiety confronts a world in which 9 states have nuclear weapons and a number of them such as North Korea, Pakistan, and India have threatened to use them. James McCluskey points out that “there are over 20,0000 nuclear weapons in existence, sufficient destructive power to incinerate every human being on the planet three times over [and] there are more than 2000 held on hair trigger alert, already mounted on board their missiles and ready to be launched at a moment’s notice” (McCluskey 2014). These weapons are far more powerful and deadly than the atomic bomb and the possibility that they might be used, even inadvertently, is high. This threat becomes all the more real in light of the fact that the world has

13 SAJD 2015 seen a history of miscommunications and technological malfunctions, suggesting both the fragility of such weapons and the dire stupidity of positions defending their safety and value as a nuclear deterrent (Chomsky 2014). The 2014 report, To Close for Comfort—Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy not only outlines a history of such near misses in great detail, it also makes terrifyingly clear that “the risk associated with nuclear weapons is high” (Lewis 2014). It is also worth noting that an enormous amount of money is wasted to maintain these weapons and missiles, develop more sophisticated nuclear weaponries, and invest in ever more weapons laboratories. McCluskey estimates world funding for such weapons at $1trillion per decade while Arms Control Today reported in 2012 that yearly funding for U.S. nuclear weapons activity was $31 billion (McCluskey 2012). In the United States, the mushroom cloud connected to Hiroshima is now connected to much larger forces of destruction, including a turn to instrumental reason over moral considerations, the normalization of violence in America, the militarization of local police forces, an attack on civil liberties, the rise of the surveillance state, a dangerous turn towards state secrecy under President Obama, the rise of the carceral state, and the elevation of war as a central organizing principle of society. Rather than stand in opposition to preventing a nuclear mishap or the expansion of the arms industry, the United States places high up on the list of those nations that could trigger what Amy Goodman calls that “horrible moment when hubris, accident or inhumanity triggers the next nuclear attack” (Goodman 2014). Given the history of lies, deceptions, falsifications, and retreat into secrecy that characterizes the American government’s strangulating hold by the military-industrial-surveillance complex, it would be naïve to assume that the U.S. government can be trusted to act with good intentions when it comes to matters of domestic and foreign policy. State terrorism has increasingly become the DNA of American governance and politics and is evident in government cover ups, corruption, and numerous acts of bad faith. Secrecy, lies, and deception have a long history in the United States and the issue is not merely to uncover such instances of state deception but to connect the dots over time and to map the connections, for instance, between the actions of the NSA in the early aftermath of the attempts to cover up the inhumane destruction unleashed by the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the role the NSA and other intelligence agencies play today in distorting the truth about government policies while embracing an all-compassing notion of surveillance and squelching of civil liberties, privacy, and freedom. Hiroshima symbolizes the fact that the United States commits unspeakable acts making it easier to refuse to rely on politicians, academics, and alleged experts who refuse to support a politics of transparency and serve mostly to legitimate anti- democratic, if not totalitarian policies. Questioning a monstrous war machine whose

14 The Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Shadow of the Atomic Plague roots lie in Hiroshima is the first step in declaring nuclear weapons unacceptable ethically and politically. This suggests a further mode of inquiry that focuses on how the rise of the military-industrial complex contributes to the escalation of nuclear weapons and what can we learn by tracing its roots to the development and use of the atom bomb. Moreover, it raises questions about the role played by intellectuals both in an out of the academy in conspiring to build the bomb and hide its effects from the American people. These are only some of the questions that need to be made visible, interrogated, and pursued in a variety of sites and public forums. One crucial issue today is what role might intellectuals and matters of civic courage, engaged citizenship, and the educative nature of politics play as part of a sustained effort to resurrect the memory of Hiroshima as both a warning and a signpost for rethinking the nature of collective struggle, reclaiming the radical imagination, and producing a sustained politics aimed at abolishing nuclear weapons forever. One issue would be to revisit the conditions that made Hiroshima and Nagasaki possible, to explore how militarism and a kind of technological fanaticism merged under the star of scientific rationality. Another step forward would be to make clear what the effects of such weapons are, to disclose the manufactured lie that such weapons make us safe. Indeed, this suggests the need for intellectuals, artists, and other cultural workers to use their skills, resources, and connections to develop massive educational campaigns. Such campaigns not only make education, consciousness, and collective struggle the center of politics, but also systemically work to both inform the public about the history of such weapons, the misery and suffering they have caused, and how they benefit the financial, government, and corporate elite who make huge amounts of money off the arms race and the promotion of nuclear deterrence and the need for a permanent warfare state. Intellectuals today appear numbed by ever developing disasters, statistics of suffering and death, the Hollywood disimagination machine with its investment in the celluloid Apocalypse for which only superheroes can respond, and a consumer culture that thrives on self-interests and deplores collective political and ethical responsibility. There are no rationales or escapes from the responsibility of preventing mass destruction due to nuclear annihilation; the appeal to military necessity is no excuse for the indiscriminate bombing of civilians whether in Hiroshima or Afghanistan. The sense of horror, fear, doubt, anxiety, and powerless that followed Hiroshima and Nagasaki up until the beginning of the 21st century seems to have faded in light of both the Hollywood apocalypse machine, the mindlessness of celebrity and consumer cultures, the growing spectacles of violence, and a militarism that is now celebrated as one of the highest ideals of American life. In a society governed by militarism, consumerism, and neoliberal savagery, it has become more difficult

15 SAJD 2015 to assume a position of moral, social, and political responsibility, to believe that politics matters, to imagine a future in which responding to the suffering of others is a central element of democratic life. When historical memory fades and people turn inward, remove themselves from politics, and embrace cynicism over educated hope, a culture of evil, suffering, and existential despair. Americans now life amid a culture of indifference sustained by an endless series of manufactured catastrophes that offer a source of entertainment, sensation, and instant pleasure. We live in a neoliberal culture that subordinates human needs to the demand for unchecked profits, trumps exchange values over the public good, and embraces commerce as the only viable model of social relations to shape the entirety of social life. Under such circumstances, violence becomes a form of entertainment rather than a source of alarm, individuals no longer question society and become incapable of translating private troubles into larger public considerations. In the age following the use of the atom bomb on civilians, talk about evil, militarism, and the end of the world once stirred public debate and diverse resistance movements, now it promotes a culture of fear, moral panics, and a retreat into the black hole of the disimagination machine. The good news is that neoliberalism now makes clear that it cannot provide a vision to sustain society and works largely to destroy it. It is a metaphor for the atom bomb, a social, political, and moral embodiment of global destruction that needs to be stopped before it is too late. The future will look much brighter without the glow of atomic energy and the recognition that the legacy of death and destruction that extends from Hiroshima to Fukushima makes clear that no one can be a bystander if democracy is to survive.

References Allitt, Patrick (2015): A Climate of Crisis: America in the Age of Environmentalism, New York: Penguin. Alperowitz, Gar (1994): Atomic Diplomacy Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power, London: Pluto Press. Alperowitz, Gar (1996): The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, New York: Vintage. Bauman, Zygmunt and Leonidas Donskis (2013): Moral Blindness: The loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Blunden, Bill (2014): “The Zero-Sum Game of Perpetual War,” Counterpunch , 2 September. Borradori, Giovanna (2004): “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides–a dialogue with Jacques Derrida,” in Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Burchett, George & Nick Shimmin, (eds.) (2005): Memoirs of a Rebel Journalist: The Autobiography of Wilfred Burchett, UNSW Press. Chomsky, Noam (2014): “How Many Minutes to Midnight? Hiroshima Day 2014,” Truthout, 5 August.

16 The Responsibility of Intellectuals in the Shadow of the Atomic Plague

Croall, Stephen (1979): The Anti-Nuclear Handbook, New York: Random House. Foucault, M. (1989 and 1996): “What our present is?,” Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961–1984, ed. Sylvere Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston, New York: Semiotext(e). Giroux, Henry A. (2014): Neoliberalism’s War Against Higher Education, Chicago: Haymarket. Goodman, Amy (2014): “Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 69 Year Later,” TruthDig (6 August). Graeber, David (2013): The Democracy Project: A History, A Crisis, A Movement, New York: NY: The Random House Publishing Group. Hales, Peter Bacon (2014): Outside the Gates of Eden: The Dream of America From Hiroshima To Now, Chicago. IL.: University of Chicago Press. Ham, Paul (2011): Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, New York: Doubleday. Herring, Horace (2006): From Energy Dreams to Nuclear Nightmares: Lessons from the Anti-nuclear Power Movement in the 1970s, Chipping Norton, UK: Jon Carpenter Publishing, Hersey, John (1946):Hiroshima, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Jenkins, Philip (2008): Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America, New York: Oxford University Press. Jung, Oh (2002): “Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Decision to Drop the Bomb,” Michigan Journal of History, Vol 1. No. 2 (Winter). Lewis, Patricia, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas and Sasan Aghlani(2014): To Close for Comfort —Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, London: Chatham House. Lifton, Robert J. Greg Mitchell (1996): Hiroshima in America, New York: Harper Perennial. Lifton, Robert Jay and Greg Mitchell (1965): Hiroshima in America, New York. Lifton, Robert Jay (2003): “American Apocalypse,” The Nation, 22 December. McCarthy, Mary (1946): “The Hiroshima “New Yorker,” The New Yorker, November. McCluskey, James (2014): “Nuclear Crisis: Can the Sane Prevail in Time?,” Truthout, 10 June. McCluskey, Jim (2012): “Nuclear Deterrence: The Lie to End All Lies,” Truthout, 29 October. Mitchell, Greg (2011): “The Great Hiroshima Cover-up,” The Nation, 3 August; Online: http://www.thenation.com/blog/162543/great-hiroshima-cover#. Also see, Greg Mitchell, “Part 1: Atomic Devastation Hidden For Decades,” WhoWhatWhy (26 March 2014). Online:http://whowhatwhy.com/2014/03/26/atomic-devastation-hidden-decades; Greg Mitchell, “Part 2: How They Hid the Worst Horrors of Hiroshima,” Who What Why, 28 (March 2014). Online: http://whowhatwhy.com/2014/03/28/part-2-how- they-hid-the-worst-horrors-of-hiroshima/; Greg Mitchell, “Part 3: Death and Suffering, in Living Color,” WhoWhatWhy (31March). Monbiot, George (2011): “Evidence Meltdown,” The Guardian, 5 April. Oe, Kensaburo (1965): Hiroshima Notes, New York: Grove Press. Rhodes, Richard (2012): The Making of the Atomic Bomb, New York: Simon & Schuster. Rosenberg, Jennifer (2014): “Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Part 2),” About.com –20th Century History (accessed 28 March Online: http://history1900s.about.com/od/worldwarii/a/ hiroshima_2.htm.

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Roth, Philip (2014): Interviewed by Daniel Sandstrom, “My Life as a Writer,” New York Times, 2 March. Rothman, Steve (1997): “The Publication of “Hiroshima,” The New Yorker,” Herseyheroshima.com, 8 January. Takaki, Ronald (2014): Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb, Boston: Back Bay Book http://michiganjournalhistory.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/oh_jung.pdf. Touraine, Alain (1983): Anti-Nuclear Protest: The Opposition to Nuclear Energy in France Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Wilson, Ward (2013): Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons , New York: Mariner Books. Zinn, Howard (2010): The Bomb, New York: City Lights.

(c) Henry A. Giroux Courtesy: The b2o Review and b2o:

18 Whispers, Voices and Visuals: Democracy and Dissent in Saudi Arabia Gulshan Dietl

So for the foreseeable future, the royal Saudi 747, richly appointed but mechanically flawed, flies on, its cockpit crowded with geriatric pilots. The plane is losing altitude and gradually running out of fuel. On board, first class is crowded with princely passen- gers, while frustrated Saudi citizens sit crammed in economy. Among them are Islamic fundamentalists who want to turn the plane around, as well as terrorists who aim to hijack it to a destination unknown. Somewhere on board there may be a competent new flight team that could land the plane safely, but the prospects of a capable pilot getting a chance at the controls seem slim. And so the 747 remains in the sky, perhaps to be hijacked or ultimately to crash (House 2012).

Samuel Huntington’s thesis on democracy envisaged its progression in waves. The third wave was frozen after its initial advances in the seventies. In fact, it never washed the shores of the Arab World, according to this thesis. Hence the Arab exceptionalism. Today, the term has been reinvented in the context of the Arab Spring. The Spring is nearly five years old, and not a single crowned head has rolled so far. Hence the monarchical exceptionalism. The institution of monarchy does provide a buffer between the monarch and his subjects in the form of a government structure. The king has the privilege of sacking a besieged government and still remaining in power. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the oil-wealth, a small population, huge government patronage, welfare economy, etc., provide additional immunity. On the other hand, an aging leadership, an internet-savvy and educated youth, assertive women, sectarian divisions, and a contagious “Arab Spring” all around in the neighbourhood indicate a partial and potential vulnerability of the Saudi King. And space for democratic expressions and aspirations. The paper proposes to pick up some of the whispers, voices and visuals of the “Spring” in Saudi Arabia and make sense of them.

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The Pre-Spring Stirrings: Peaceful and Violent The Saudi stirrings of democracy precede the Arab Spring by roughly two decades. In October 1990, the exiled Kuwaiti ruler held a mega event in Jeddah. Called the Kuwaiti People’s Conference, it brought the Kuwaiti ruler and some 1,200 Kuwaiti citizens together for two days’ deliberations centred on the strategy to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and to resurrect parliamentary democracy in the liberated Kuwait. If the Kuwaitis could demand democracy from their rulers in the very heart of the Saudi Kingdom, so could surely the Saudis themselves! Their whispers for political participation found a voice in the form of petitions to the King. It was in December 1990, when the first petition was sent to the King; or more precisely, when the King acknowledged the first petition that was sent to him. The reformers and the Islamists articulated their own visions of the future. There was a spurt in the petitions with the war on Iraq in 2003. The women and the Shias formulated their own grievances and sought redressal. Petition, a unique tool of political engineering in the country, did not go far enough to accommodate the popular surge for change. The voices of dissent spilled out of petitions and went beyond seeking grievance redressal. Protest demonstrations in Jeddah and Riyadh, signature campaign calling for a constitutional monarchy, formation of the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights, attempts at forming a short-lived political party – unheard of in the Kingdom till then followed. Technology was harnessed to enhance the voice and visibility of democratic urge. The political dissidents graduated from the fax machines, audio and videocassettes, and cell phones to the cyber space, where they set up their web- sites. In mid-nineties, the protests took a violent turn. In November 1995, a car bomb exploded outside the offices of Saudi National Guard killing seven, most of them American security personnel training the National Guard. In June the next year, there was a powerful explosion outside a military housing complex in al- Khobar near Dhahran. It killed 19 American security personnel and injured nearly 400. A second wave of violent incidents followed a few years later. In May 2003, there was a series of suicide bombings in Riyadh, killing at least thirty-five. The employees of US security firms training the Saudi National Guard were targeted. The intermittent government claims of having unearthed and destroyed the terrorist cells were followed by more explosions to prove the government wrong.

Arab Spring Makes a Momentary Appearance Following the successful conclusion of the Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, the groups advocating greater political freedom in Saudi Arabia planned to hold

20 Whispers, Voices and Visuals a “day of rage” in the Kingdom. Friday 11 March 2011 was the designated day. On 6 March, the Council of Senior Scholars issued a statement calling for unity, declaring that this concept is fundamental to Islam and strongly supported by Prophet Muhammad. The Ulama also noted that Saudi Arabia is blessed with wise leadership, that the government is legitimate, and that the Kingdom should never allow foreign notions to distort its Islamic identity or wreak havoc. They drove the latter point home by warning against anything that might cause sedition. The next day, the government’s unelected advisory body -- the Consultative Council, or Majlis al-Shura -- endorsed the Ulama’s position and noted that Islamic law prohibits demonstrations in the Kingdom. It instructed the public not to pay attention to “misleading calls for demonstrations, sit-ins, and marches” and warned against “deviant intellectual and partisan links.” “Deviant” is Saudi code for al-Qaeda, while “partisan” usually refers to Saudi Shias, who are suspected of treacherous links to their coreligionists in Iran (Henderson 2011). In addition, Majlis Speaker Sheikh Abdullah bin Muhammad Al al-Sheikh reminded citizens of the Kingdom’s “unique, open-door” approach to satisfying demands and settling grievances by “writing directly to the leadership or any official.” The same day, the Council of Ministers – meeting under the chairmanship of King Abdullah, who is also the prime minister – added its own endorsement. Two distinct threads of protest were likely to emerge on Friday’s “day of rage.” Sunnis were expected to demonstrate in Riyadh and other cities. At the same time, Shias were planning demonstrations in the eastern province complaining about their disadvantaged status in Saudi society. Sunni dissenters themselves fell into two categories: those who wanted greater freedoms, and those who regarded the royal family as illegitimate and unwilling to administer a sufficiently religious state. The latter are often perceived as being sympathetic to al-Qaeda. At present, however, the former are the most vocal. Inspired by political change in Egypt and Tunisia, they are calling on the House of Saud to be more accountable. On that day, massive numbers of forces were deployed on the streets. The “day of rage” did not materialise – except in the Shia-populated east of the country. Within a few days of the failed day of rage, the Ministry of Interior announced that there were five thousand and eighty people charged with terrorism - related crimes and one thousand six hundred and twelve out of them were sentenced to several years in prison by a Saudi court (Ali Khan 2011). A few months later, the Amnesty International leaked a proposed draft law against terrorism that the country was poised to approve and implement. The Amnesty criticised the law for “vague and broad” definition of terrorism ranging from “destabilising society” to “harming the reputation of the state.” 1 The political activities were severely threatened as a result.

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Youth, Women and Minorities The condition of the youth, the women and the minorities is the barometer of a country’s socio-political health. A closer scrutiny of these three segments of Saudi society is necessary to understand the general ethos in the country. A critical assessment of the government responses is equally necessary to gauge the deeper undercurrents and possible outcomes.

Youth Takes to the Cyberspace The cyberspace provided an alternative space to mark the popular protests. The internet activists resorted to it in a big way. The Saudi flag that carries two crossed swords over a palm tree was reinvented to carry two mops over a stack of buckets. The reference was to the floods in Jeddah that the authorities failed to tackle. The garbage cans holding the dictators were depicted. There were many other signs of derision. Blogs appeared to express the anger; documentaries were made to expose poverty that has never been acknowledged. One hundred and nineteen Saudi citizens signed a petition asking for a constitutional monarchy. More petitions followed. There was an attempt at forming a political party named Hizbe Umma al-Islam or the Islamic National Party. The founders were arrested almost immediately. Today, the internet activists have resorted to the cyber space in a big way. Twitter and Facebook have come to serve as a virtual parliament and a vibrant civil society with 2.9 million Twitter users and 4 million on the Facebook. “I think we are so thirsty for freedom of expression that you see the Saudis particularly are far more involved [in social media] than their neighbours,” says Aiyah Saihati, a political activist and a popular Saudi blogger. According to her the Twitter and the Facebook are filling a void created by a lack of civil society in Saudi Arabia, where organised gatherings remain restricted to the religious meetings and government- sponsored events (Templin 2012). The most flagrant criticism of the royal family by far has come from a single mysterious person named Mujtahid (the word means “studious”). Starting late- 2011, Mujtahid began posting sensational and richly detailed accusations about corrupt arms deals, construction boondoggles and back-room power plays involving numerous royals, including King Abdullah. He often wrote directly to the Twitter accounts of the alleged malefactors. His most damaging tweets related to the health of the King and the possible heirs from among his sons and grandsons which could lead to the game of the thrones. When Prince Muqrin was appointed the crown prince, Mujtahid said, “the King jumped the line of his brothers to the youngest and weakest. He will first remove Salman (the current crown prince) because he has Alzheimer’s and appoint

22 Whispers, Voices and Visuals

Muqrin crown prince and appoint his own son as Second-Deputy Premier. He will then remove Muqrin, promoting his son to crown prince” (Bauer 2013). “Is it true that your house in Jeddah cost $1 billion but you charged $6 billion and pocketed the rest?” he wrote early-2012 to Prince Abdul Aziz bin Fahd, one of his favorite targets. There is no way to verify any of his claims, but the royal family clearly takes him seriously, writing heated denials. Within a year, he had more than 660,000 followers. The royal family is said to have made strenuous efforts to uncover Mujtahidd’s identity, to no avail. He is widely rumored to be an alienated member of the royal family, or someone relaying information from such insiders (Worth 2012). A positive perception of his activity holds that he probably hopes to push the Kingdom towards a more institutionalised, non-personality-centric system of government, in the form of a constitutional monarchy (Field 2013). The cyber space, in the situation, has become a keenly contested territory as the dissident web-sites are hijacked and sabotaged; and they reappear intermittently to disappear again. At times, they surface at different addresses. Many have had to face strict punishment for their cyber activities. Raif Badawi is a prominent name among the cyber dissenters, who has been given a prison sentence for ten years for co-founding the “Liberal Saudi Network” website.

Women Take to Driving The Saudi women live under the guardianship of their male relatives. Their decisions to get education, to work, to travel or to receive health care must be endorsed by their guardians. Hussein Shobokshi, a popular Saudi columnist, was banned from writing after he published an article that looked forward to the day when his daughter would drive him to a polling booth. The piece ruffled a few feathers as the Saudi women could not drive and the men could not vote. That was some years ago. Since then the Saudis have voted for municipal councils, an experiment that remained in hibernation till very recently. As for the women driving in the country, there was a flurry of expectations a few years back. Soon after inheriting the Saudi monarchy, King Abdullah said that the Saudi women would “one day be able to drive.” Young girls, since then, have taken to simulated driving lessons readying for that day. Some have gone further. Coinciding with the Arab Spring, women activists got behind the wheel and posted the videos of themselves on the YouTube and other social networks. Their cases are pending before the courts and they will not go unpunished. Defiance is not tolerated, even though there is increasing support on the issue at the popular level.

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The 26 October 2013 was the day that the women activists designated to be the day that they would drive. Even as tight scrutiny and security arrangements were made to stop them, some fifty women were reported to have taken to the wheel in a show of defiance. Twelve films of them driving were posted on the YouTube. Men were seen giving them thumbs up signs in support. A Saudi comedian posted a video in which he parodied the Bob Marley song “No Women, No Cry” as “No Women, No Drive.” Some of the women drivers were pulled over and detained; some were made to sign a pledge never to repeat the act. The women insisted on political participation as well. With the announcement of voter registration for the election to the municipal council to be held in September 2011, they formed queues outside the registration offices in Jeddah, Riyadh and Dammam. Though they did not get their names on the voter lists, the signals they sent proved powerful enough. On 25 September 2011, King Abdullah announced in a five-minute speech televised live that he was granting women the right to vote in future municipal elections, the right to run as candidates, and that they would be appointed to the Shura Council, the 150-member body that advises the king on legislation and policy. In socio-cultural sphere, Saudi Arabia is building its first stadium especially designed to allow women who are currently barred from attending soccer matches because of the Kingdom’s strict public gender segregation to watch games. The stadium in Jeddah is scheduled to be completed in 2014 and will have private cabins and balconies to accommodate female spectators, according to Al Sharq, a state- owned newspaper (Dorsey 2012). Under tremendous pressure from the Olympic Committee, the country has also had to allow two of its athletes to participate in the London Olympics (Ibid: 25 June 2012).

Shias Take to the Streets The Shias are the largest minority in the country, constituting anywhere between four and fifteen per cent of the population and numbering anywhere between one and four million. What makes the Shia situation crucial is the fact that the oil wealth is located under their soil and in the water around their land. Left to themselves, theirs could be the richest state in the entire region. King Abdullah met the Shia leaders early in his rule, sending a signal of greater inclusiveness to the community in the religious domain of the country. The meeting did not lead to action. Protests erupted in Eastern Province on the day of rage. Since then, the town of al-Awamiya in the Qateef region has become the epicentre of Shia resistance. Twenty persons are reported killed and hundreds jailed, according to various estimates. The author Nazir al-Majid, the human rights activist Fadil al-Munasif

24 Whispers, Voices and Visuals and Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr are prominent detainees. The arrest and injuring of the harshest of Shia critics, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr led to violent protests as the pictures of his bloodied white robe circulated on the social websites. Two of the protesters were shot dead and many more wounded in clashes with the police.2 The trial of Sheikh Nimr is still going on in private as protests continue on the streets. The Saudi government has continued to apply stringent measures to contain the Shia anger. The only healing touch to the Shia anger has been the shutting down of an anti-Shia satellite channel, so far. The Awtan was shut down after it hosted a cleric who made statements that the leaders of the Ismaili tribe of Yam considered offending. The Shias have asked for the closing down of two more channels – Safa and Wesal- that they accuse of airing ant-Shia programmes.3

Shielding the Spring King Abdullah has issued a series of decrees to protect the internal security of the Kingdom involving the disbursement of hundreds of billions of dollars, the promise of expanding the political arena to women and resumption of the stalled electoral process. To name a few: A. Generous aid packages, provision of low-income housing, increasing unemployment benefits, higher education allowances to the students, and a bonus worth two months of salaries to public servants.4 B. Creation of more than 60,000 new officer level positions, offering promotions for military officers whose promotions had been on hold due to the lack of vacancies and the creation of a new committee to solve the problems of members of the army and police. C. A series of decrees providing more funding and powers to strengthen the authority of the Wahhabi religious establishment. To that end, an order directed to the media to refrain from criticizing or challenging the religious establishment and to support the Commission for the Enforcement of Religious Law (O’Leary and Heras 2011). D. On 25 September 2011, King Abdullah announced in a speech televised live that he was granting women the right to vote in future municipal elections, the right to run as candidates, and that they would be appointed to the Shura Council, the 150-member body that advises the king on legislation and policy. E. On 29 September that year, elections to the municipal councils were held. That was the second experiment in voting after 2005. Half the seats were contested; the other half were to be the royal appointees. The women would have to wait for the next round to participate in the same. F. In January 2013, King Abdullah issued a royal decree that granted women thirty seats in the Shura Council and they were sworn in the next month.

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Along with the bounties, came enormously heightened internal security measures; mainly in the form of a mega deal amounting to $60 billion for purchase of arms from the US. A “Facilities Security Force” expected to grow to at least 35,000 members would be trained and equipped by the US personnel to be overseen by the US Central Command. The Force’s mission would be to protect Saudi energy production facilities, desalination plants and future civil nuclear reactors. The equipment and the personnel indicate not just the external attack, but also the domestic sabotage as their mission. The Saudi oil assets have repeatedly come under terrorist attacks for the past few years, and the security cordon around them has progressively thickened to foil them. A previously secret State Department cable released by the Wikileaks described the Force’s mission as protecting “Saudi energy production facilities, desalination plants and future civil nuclear reactors.”5

Voices and Visuals: Diminishing and Disappearing? Till recently, articulating political issues was taboo in Saudi Arabia. The political debate and demands, as a result, originated either from across the state borders or anonymously from underground. The ones who chose to speak out openly either lost their freedoms or their jobs. The onset of the Arab Spring did lead to hushed voices of dissent and a call for a day of rage that did not happen. There is no popular mobilization and no wide-spread protests so far. The Saudis have sought to manage discontent among youth and women by appeasement and punishment in equal measure. The two track policy involves a delicate tight-rope walking and may be directed at wrong recipients. The ones to be appeased probably are politically correct anyway, and ones to be punished may not opt for course correction. The strategy of appeasement requires a further tactful balancing between a conservative society and a restive youth. It also accords the King a comfortable position of a reform-minded ruler and a social mediator. The Shia discontent has been met by harsh punishment, and no appeasement todate. There are two serious problems with the sectarian politics. One, more the Saudis proclaim their salafi puritanism, more vulnerable they become to an even harsher version of salafism. The jihadi version of salafi movement is as violently anti-Saudi as it is anti-Shia. The Saudi leadership believes that it has the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) threat under control, but their current actions could be providing them a safety net and a fertile ground to recruit new members (Gause lll 2011). Two, the Saudis have sought to exclude the Arab Shias from an all-Arab phenomenon. The approach alienates the Arab Shia and opens the door to the Iranian influence.

26 Whispers, Voices and Visuals

Will the whispers, voices and visuals gradually diminish and eventually disappear? Or will the dissent acquire greater visibility and yield perceptible results? Questions remain.

Notes 1 Aljazeera (Doha), “Draft Saudi Security Law Faces Criticism,” 1 December. http://www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/12/201112145253953361.html 2 “Violence against Shia clerics troubles Saudi Arabia and Bahrain,” The Economist (London), 14 July 2012. 3 “Government to Shut Down Channels Threatening National Unity,” 29 December 2012. http://riyadhbureau.com/blog/2012/12/chennels-shut-down 4 In February King Abdullah introduced a domestic aid program worth $37 billion. The King rolled out an even more comprehensive $97 billion aid package on March 18. He provided $70 billion alone for five hundred thousand units of low-income housing and sent $200 million as a reward to the religious establishment. Additionally, the King upped unemployment benefits, paid a bonus worth two months’ salary to public servants, and increased the education allowance for all students (Danin 2011). 5 Associated Press, “US Quietly Expanding Ties with Saudis,” 19 May 2011.

References

Ali Khan, Ghazanfar(2011): “5,080 People Charged with Terrorism,” Arab News (Jeddah), 3 April. Bauer, William (2013): “Exclusive Interview with Mujtahid: Saudi Arabia’s Most Controversial Voice,” Your Middle East, 4 November. http://www.yourmiddleeast. com/columns/article/exclusive-interview-with-mujtahid-saudi-arabias-most- controversial-voice_12874 Danin, Robert M. (2011): “Is Saudi Arabia Next?,” Council on Foreign Relations, 5 December. Dorsey, James M. (2012): “Government Builds Stadium to Accommodate Women,” 29 June mideastsoccer.blogspot.sg Field, Nathan(2013): “Judging Anonymous Tweets: The Case of @Mujtahid,” The Arabist Net, 27 February http://arabist.net/blog/2013/2/27/judging-anonymous-tweets-the- case-of-mujtahidd.html Gause lll, Gregory(2011): “Is Saudi Arabia Really Counter-revolutionary?,” http://mideast. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/09/is_saudi_arabia_really_counter_revolutionary, 9 August. Henderson, Simon (2011): “Saudi Arabia’s Planned ‘Day of Rage,” Washington Institute, Policy Watch, No.1774, 9 March. House, Karen Elliot(2012): “Next Up in the Middle East Mess? Saudi Arabia’s Succession Fight,” Washington Post, 14 September. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ next-up-in-the-middle-east-mess-saudi-arabias-succession-fight/2012/09/14/ b316e7ec-fd44-11e1-a31e-804fccb658f9_story.html

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O’Leary, Carol A., Nicholas A. Heras(2011): “Saudi Arabia’s “Iran Initiative” and Arab Tribalism: Emerging Forces Converge in the Arab World,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 9, Issue 38, 21 October. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_ news%5D=38555&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=80812bf625d6ca0316fc6 1874cab6961 Templin, Jacob (2012): “In Saudi Arabia, Dissent is Alive and Well, but only Online and in Private,” Time, 12 July. Worth, Robert F. (2012): “Twitter Gives Saudi Arabia a Revolution of Its Own,” New York Times, 20 October, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/world/middleeast/twitter- gives-saudi-arabia-a-revolution-of-its-own.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

28 The Continuing Conspiracy against Syria: Destabilization Strategy of the West John Cherian

Syria, unlike neighbouring Iraq, may not be very rich in hydrocarbon resources, but its strategic location makes it a prized target. It is situated in the heart of the Levant and since the late fifties has been following an independent foreign policy. One of the country’s geo-strategic advantages is the access it has to the Mediterranean Sea. Syria has been a strategic prize the West has been seeking since the days of the cold war. Henry Kissinger once said that there cannot be any war in West Asia without Egypt and any lasting peace without Syria.

Historical Background Since the Late Forties Washington has been trying for regime change in Syria since the country attained formal independence. The US had a role in ensuring Syria’s independence in 1946 after it thwarted France’s move to reclaim its colonial legacy in the region after World War Two. But relations between Damascus and Washington started deteriorating almost immediately after the Syrian parliament vetoed the passage rights for the Arabian American Oil Company Pipeline. The Americans had wanted oil from Saudi Arabia to be transported to the Mediterranean through Syria. Syrian lawmakers were angry with Washington for its prompt recognition of the state of Israel. The US President, Harry Truman, immediately retaliated by authorizing the staging of a military coup in Syria by the CIA, the very first in the region in March 1949. The Syrian Prime Minster, Shukri al-Quwaitli was overthrown by the army chief of staff, Gen Husni al-Zaim. Another coup followed in the same year, resulting in the assassination of Gen. Zaim. Civilian rule was restored in 1955 with al Quwaitli again heading the government. The Syrian nationalists had ensured that the coveted American pipeline did not materialise. They instead steered the country to a very close relationship with Egypt. President Gamel Nasser of Egypt had already emerged as

29 SAJD 2015 the hero of pan-Arabism by then. The Eisenhower administration in Washington once again got busy plotting against Syria. A destabilisation plan code named “Operation Straggle.” The plan involved the staging of armed incidents along the border with Turkey and the arming of tribes to fight along side right wing groups opposed to the nationalistic goals espoused by Arab socialists. The second attempt at regime change also failed as the British, French and the Israelis, who were supposed to help in the efforts to overthrow the Syrian government, were too pre-occupied by the 1957 Suez Canal crisis. However, the most important reason, as the US President Dwight Eisenhower noted in 1958, was the high level suspicion the Syrian public had exhibited towards the US and the West. “The trouble is that we have a campaign of hatred against us, not by the government but by the people,” Eisenhower is quoted as saying in recently unclassified official papers. According to the unclassified reports there isa “consensus narrative” that is widely held among the Syrian people that “foreign conspiracies have sought to undermine Syria in the past.” Documents discovered in 2004 reveal a joint CIA-M16 plan approved by the American President, Dwight Eisenhower and Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan to overthrow the Syrian government in 1957. The documents were unearthed by a British academic, Mathew Jones, who teaches international history at the University of London. The details of the plan were found in the private papers of Duncan Sandys, who had served as Defence Secretary under Macmillan. The plan included staging border incidents and the assassination of three key leaders. A coalition of government consisting of Communists and Baathists had come to power in Damascus overthrowing a pro western military dictatorship. The plan had called for the setting up of a “Free Syria Committee” and the “arming of political factions with paramilitary or other actionist capabilities.” The “preferred plan” to overthrow the Syrian government at the time was specific in its details. “In order to facilitate the action of the liberative forces, reduce the capabilities of the Syrian regime to organise and direct its military actions, to hold losses and destruction to the minimum, and to bring about desired results in the shortest possible time, a special effort should be made to eliminate certain key individuals. Their removal should be accomplished early n the course of the uprising and intervention and in the light of the circumstances existing at the time,” the Sandys papers revealed. The three leaders officially targeted for assassination by Washington and London were Abd al Hamid Sirraj, the head of Syrian military intelligence, Afif al Bizri, chief of the Syrian general staff and Khalid Bakhdash, the leader of the Syrian Communist Party. The “preferred plan” spelt out other covert actions that had to be undertaken to achieve the goal of regime change in Syria. “Once a political decision is taken to proceed with internal disturbances in Syria,

30 The Continuing Conspiracy against Syria

CIA is prepared and SIS (MI6) will attempt to mount more sabotage and ‘coup de main’ incidents within Syria working through contacts and individuals.” The Report went on to add that if the coup plotters were successful in carrying out their mission and the necessary degree of chaos and destruction achieved, then frontier incidents and border skirmishes would be staged with the help of friendly governments like neighbouring Jordan and Iraq. Syria had to be made to “appear as the sponsor of plots, sabotage and violence directed against neighbouring governments.” The blueprint for action against Syrian prepared in Washington and London called on the CIA and the SIS “to use their capabilities in both the psychological and action fields to augment tension.” The document spelt out what this meant in actual terms. The territories of Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq would be used as staging posts to mount “sabotage, national conspiracies and various strong arm activities” inside Syria. Interestingly the plan also called for the formation a “Free Syria Committee” along with the arming of “political factions with paramilitary and other actionable capabilities” within Syria. The CIA and MI6 would coordinate to instigate internal uprisings, focussing on the minorities like the Druze and the Kurds and stir up the Muslim Brotherhood in the rest of the country. The Report conceded that the plan to replace the Communist/Ba’ath government would not be welcomed domestically in Syria and any pro western government that would replace it “would probably need to rely first upon repressive measures and arbitrary exercise of power.” It is another matter that the plan hatched in Washington and London could not fructify. The Jordanian and Iraqi governments had refused to come fully on board, fearing domestic repercussions. In the thick of the action to overthrow the progressive government in Syria was the notorious CIA operative, Kermit Roosevelt. He was a leading player in the successful move to remove the government led by Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and reinstall the pro-western Shah back to power. The West feared that a pro- Soviet government in Syria would de-stabilize the neighbourhood that had friendly regimes having very close relations with the West. The important pipeline which delivered oil from Iraq to Turkey passed only through Syria in the fifties and the sixties. It was one of the main arteries controlling the flow of oil in those days.

The US Role in the Current Scenario in Syria ­The ongoing war on Syria was also imposed at a time when a new oil and gas pipeline project to transport fuel from Iran was on the verge of being implemented. The plans are to pipe gas from Iran’s South Pars via Iraq and Syria to Lebanon where it will be connected to the European network in Greece. The Deputy Director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), David Shedd has said that the war

31 SAJD 2015 in Syria may last “multiple years.” That is enough time to scuttle the ambitious pipeline project being envisaged by the countries in the region that are not in the orbit of Washington. The West is trying to implement a blueprint eerily similar to the one they had tried sixty years ago in Syria. The Americans have set up a front organization – the Syrian National Council (SNC) that purports to speak for the Syrian people. Border and terror incidents have been manipulated to put the blame on the Syrian government. American planes have moved in fighters and arms from neighbouring countries to be trained in Turkey. The only difference is that they have a differing set of allies openly supporting them. The government in Turkey has remained true to form, standing shoulder to shoulder with its NATO allies in their efforts to effect regime change in Damascus. The oil rich Gulf monarchies, which were either absent or minor players on the political scene in the fifties and the sixties, are now in the forefront, financing and supplying the opposition groups and tribal militias. The West had envisaged a short term scenario for regime change but as the conflict enters its third year, the military situation on the ground seems from all available indications to have turned in favour of the Syrian government. In the first year of the conflict, the West did successfully implement many of the tactics they had envisaged in the 1957 plan. Many top decision makers in the government, including the Syrian Defence Minister, were assassinated. Tribal militias and the Muslim Brotherhood were strengthened. However, as they had envisaged in the fifties, the move to impose regime change has not been a popular one. The majority of the Syrian people, especially now after the carnage they have witnessed, seem to have rallied behind the government. The presence of al Qaeda and assorted Salafist, Takfiri and Wahhabi groups, that have been doing most of the fighting and have imposed strict Islamic rule in areas they control, have not enthused the Syrian masses. Besides, as events have shown, Syria is not all that isolated in the region or internationally. The long sought goal of the West to enforce regime change in Syria got a fillip after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath government in Iraq. After the invasion of Iraq, senior American officials had used a horticultural metaphor to describe Syria as “a low hanging fruit” ripe for the picking. The US Secretary of Defence, Colin Powell, had gone to Damascus soon after the invasion to give the Syrian leadership an ultimatum – fall in line with the US or meet a fate similar to that of Iraq. According to the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Muallem, he had presented the Syrian President with six demands. Washington had given an ultimatum to Damascus to cut links with Iran and Hezbollah. The Syrian government, according to the foreign minister, refused to countenance the demands made by the Bush administration.

32 The Continuing Conspiracy against Syria

In 2003, the US Congress passed the Syrian Accountability Act which gave the American President a free hand to punish Syria diplomatically and financially. In 2004, the Bush administration implemented sanctions against Syria. Senior Bush administration officials were already saying that “Syria was climbing up the agenda” for regime change. President George W. Bush said that Syria “is out of step”. His Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, added Syria to list of countries featuring under the State Department’s ‘outposts of tyranny.”

The US Game Plan for the Region Delinking Syria from Iran and breaking the arc of resistance to Israel was and continues to be Washington’s priority in the region. Syria’s geographical location in the region is also very important. Washington has already succeeded in one of its goals—that of delinking the militant Hamas movement from Syria. The ultimate aim is to either completely destabilize Syria or install a regime that would renege on the Syria-Iran defence agreement and prevent the construction of an ambitious gas pipeline project connecting Syria to Iran via Iraq. Syria stood its ground in the precarious years after the fall of Baghdad. Syria played host to more than a million Iraqi refugees when the neighbouring country was in turmoil. The Syrian economy was growing. The tourism sector was booming. Before the recent troubles erupted, more than a million tourists were visiting Syria annually. The first serious attempt to destabilize Syria in the last decade was following the assassination of the pro western Prime Minster of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri in 2005. Western governments and media immediately rushed to judgement claiming that the Syrian government was behind the assassination. The international machinations to pin the blame directly on the Syrian President however failed. The day after the Hariri assassination, the US had withdrawn its ambassador to Damascus. But the Hariri incident did help achieve one of its strategic objectives--- the removal of Syrian troops from Lebanon which had helped keep the peace there since the end of the civil war in the seventies. The sectarian nature of the civil war in Syria could lead to the balkanisation of the country into small statelets. This is the kind of outcome that would be welcomed by Syria’s neighbour, Israel and the West. “They want Syria and the neighbouring states to be divided into smaller states to implement their blueprint for the region,” Muallem told the author. Condoleezza Rice had spoken about creating a “new middle east” in June 2006, comprising of manageable smaller states. Division of Syria into several sectarian states has been a strategic objective of Israel too. If Syria is out of the military and strategic equation, Israel will then only have to deal with Iran and to an extent the Hezbollah, as a serious challenger from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.

33 SAJD 2015

An US State Department cable assessed by Wikileaks which was sent from Damascus by William Roebuck, Director of the Office of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in 2006 bemoans the fact that Assad has emerged stronger. In the cable, the official suggested that Washington should however exploit the “vulnerabilities” and opportunities to “disrupt his decision making, keep him off balance-and make him pay a premium on his mistakes.” Successive US administrations have been trying to coax Syria into signing a peace agreement with Israel. The Assads, father and son, have refused a peace deal which did not include the return of the Golan Heights to Syria. Seymour Hersh, in an article published in 2007, had predicted the scenario currently infolding in Syria. He wrote in the article published in the New Yorker titled “The Redirection” about the US planning rebel enclaves around Syria and building up the Muslim Brotherhood inside Syria.

The Other Key Players The struggle in Syria is also being viewed as one between the so called Shia and Sunni crescents. The “Shia crescent” unlike its rival, is based more on ideological compatibility than on shared religious beliefs. The Sunni crescent is being led by Saudi Arabia and is openly backed by the West. Bruce Reidel, a doyen of the US foreign policy community and an adviser to four US Presidents, including Barack Obama has in a recent memorandum urged the administration to forge even closer relations with the Saudi monarchy. While describing Saudi Arabia as the world’s “last absolute monarchy,” Reidel emphasized the kingdom’s vital role in preserving American interests in the region. “They have helped ensure that the (Arab) revolution does not spread.” He goes on to add that the Sunni regimes in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE “would not be able to defend themselves against a Saudi revolutionary regime, despite all their money.” He also noted that Saudi Arabia has played an important role in containing Iran on America’s behalf for decades and has backed the revolutions in Libya and Syria. President Obama seems to have taken Riedel’s advice seriously. Soon after his inauguration he hosted the Saudi Interior Minister at the Oval Office, a privilege normally accorded to Heads of State. Israel has also been focussing on the Shia crescent and Syria for a variety of reasons but now a days mostly to deflect international attention from the Palestinian issue. Israel’s deployment of its air force at the end of January inside Syria is an illustration. Israel’ Vice Prime Minister Silan Shalom speaking just before the latest Israeli attack said that Israel was part of the international coalition seeking to prevent Syrian “chemical weapons” from spilling over its borders.. The Syrian army confirmed the Israeli strikes saying that a military research centre near Damascus

34 The Continuing Conspiracy against Syria was targeted. The statement from the Syrian army said that the facility was earlier targeted by the militant groups seeking to overthrow the government. Israel had launched a bombing raid on Syria in 2007. American officials have confirmed that the CIA is closely cooperating with Mossad in operations inside Syria. The foreign supported Syrian opposition fighters and the jihadi elements from outside fighting alongside them have already made it clear that if they succeed, the country’s foreign policy will be radically overhauled. The jihadi group—al Nusra, affiliated to the al Qaeda, is said to be in the forefront of the fighting against government forces. Most of the fighters, according to a recent report, hail from Iraq. The ultimate aim of al Nusra is to create an Islamic state in Syria and the Levant. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are the major non-western backers of rebels. As the war in Syria grinds on inconclusively, Turkey may not be averse to a negotiated settlement. It is Saudi Arabia and Qatar which have been intransigent about talks between the Syrian government and the opposition. The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud said that a negotiated settlement to the civil strife in Syria was inconceivable for the kingdom. The Saudis are reportedly mainly backing the Salafist groups while Qatar’s funding mainly goes to the fighters aligned with Muslim Brotherhood. The “military coup” in Egypt and the brutal suppression of the Muslim Brothers there could have an impact on the situation in Syria. Just weeks before his ouster, President Muhammad Mursi had urged all Egyptians to go and freely wage “jihad” in Syria. Within weeks after his ouster, the Syrian opposition had to shift its headquarters from Cairo and move to the more salubrious climes of Turkey. The Brotherhood is acknowledged to be the strongest political opposition to the government in Damascus though most of the fighting is being done by Salafist and Takfiri groups like the al Nusra front. These groups of course have a strong working relationship with the Muslim Brothers. American commentators have been saying for some time that in the changed scenario in West Asia, a US military attack against Iran will only evince a muted response at best as Teheran’s allies. Hezbollah, the powerful Lebanese militia, is being further targeted by the West. The European Union has put additional sanctions on the group labelling it with the “terrorist label.” Hamas already has been further weakened with the departure of the Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi. The Qatari Emir is now its sole benefactor. Hamas had burnt its bridges with its original benefactors—Syria and Iran. The new power brokers in Egypt have virtually declared Hamas as an enemy grouping. The Hamas is an off-shoot of the Muslim Brothers. Saudi Arabia has emerged as the strongest backer of the Egyptian military. The new relationship may have an impact on Egypt’s foreign policy. President Mursi was the first Egyptian head of State to invite his Iranian

35 SAJD 2015 counterpart for a visit after the I979 Islamic Revolution. That move had not gone down well in Saudi Arabia. In case of the remote possibility of regime change materialising, Syria will no doubt move closer to the Sunni Gulf monarchies and the West. The foreign policy thrust will be against Iran. Palestine and related issues will be reverted to the backburner. Iran has on many occasions made it clear that it will not countenance outside military interference in Syria to facilitate regime change. “If the Syrian President Bashar al Assad is toppled, the line of resistance in the face of Israel will be broken,” said Ali Akbar Velayati, a close aide of the Supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Velayati emphasized that any change in Syria should emanate from the will of the people not through “obtaining assistance from the US.” In an earlier interview, Velayati had described Syria as “the golden ring of the resistance chain”. He said that the West does not want to establish democracy in Syria but “wants to break the resistance chain.” The new President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, has been quick to reiterate that Iran’s support for Syria is unwavering. “The Islamic Republic of Iran aims to strengthen relationship with Syria and will stand by it in facing all challenges. The deep, strategic and historic relations between the people of Iran and Syria will not be shaken by any force in the world,” President Rouhani told the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) soon after he was sworn in as President in the first week of August. Regime change in Syria would also be viewed as a diplomatic and strategic setback for Moscow and Beijing. Russia especially and China too a lesser extent, have been traditional allies of Syria. Russia has been providing the bulk of military supplies to Syria. Russia is trying to mediate a peaceful transition and at the same time taken a principled stand against foreign military intervention. Moscow’s perseverance seems to be paying dividends. At a meeting in Geneva in early 2013, both the US and Russia together ruled out foreign military intervention in Syria. The Obama administration has since then once again moved the goal posts. Washington’s new “red lines” for military intervention include the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian state in the conflict. The Americans have said that there is “credible evidence” that chemical weapons have been used in the conflict and they are putting the blame on the Syrian government. All “credible evidence” including that collected by UN agencies so far, implicates the opposition forces. The government in Damascus is so confident that it will be vindicated on the issue that it has allowed an UN team permission to conduct investigations inside Syria. In 2012, all the five UN Permanent Members had agreed to the plans that would lead to internationally supervised elections. But the US reneged on that and instead started sending more aid and arms to the rebels. Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, who was tasked by the UN

36 The Continuing Conspiracy against Syria and the Arab League to find a solution, has implicitly criticized the US role. “Further militarization of the conflict, I’m mot sure that is the way to help the Syrian people. They are waiting for the killing to stop. You find some people far away from Syria are the ones who seem to be putting in the weapons. My own view is that we should find ways of pouring water over the fire rather than the other way around,” Annan said in a speech delivered in Geneva on 27 March 2013. Even as Kofi Annan was launching his “Peace Plan for Syria” in April, 2012, the US and its allies were busy hosting a so called “Friends of Syria” meeting to drum up political and financial support for the armed groups spreading terror inside the country. This showed that the US and its allies were never serious about bringing peace to Syria or ending the bloodshed which has already cost more than 100,000 lives and shattered the economy. Moscow basically views the situation in Syria as a “war against terror.” Many Islamists from the Caucasus are fighting in Syria. “The fight against terror in Syria is one of the most acute global issues,” said a statement form the Russian foreign ministry in 2012. The BRICS summit in March also issued a statement saying that the dialogue process was the only way to resolve the Syrian crisis. President Assad wrote a letter to the BRICS leaders before the May 2013 Durban summit, asking them to use their influence to being a speedy end to the Syrian conflict The Syrian President described the BRICS grouping as a “just force that seeks to spread peace, security and cooperation among countries away from hegemony, its dictates and oppression which have lasted for decades among our peoples and nation.” The BRICS nations have endorsed the proposed talks in Geneva between the Syrian government and the opposition and have repeatedly been stating that dialogue is the only way to end the crisis in the country.

37

The Ukraine Conflict, Fear of Russian Aggression and Security Dilemma of Baltic States K. B. Usha

The Ukraine conflict that began in November 2013 is one of the most complex and gravest crises emerged in the unipolar global order established after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. This conflict, which looks like a US- Russia proxy war has become the most dangerous confrontation the world has witnessed ever since Cuban missile crisis in 1962. If the conflict escalates into real war situation at any point of time it will have catastrophic effect on the three Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia which were former Soviet republics and share direct borders with Russia. The anti-Russian ruling Baltic political elite, and the media propagates that Russia will invade “First Ukraine, next the Baltic.” United States and European Union which took Baltic question as their “litmus test” are the key security and economic allies of Baltic states. Since the Baltic states joined NATO and EU in 2004, it was considered that their security question lost its urgency and the character of “litmus test.” But after the Georgia-Russia war in 2008, the security question of Baltic states has got resumed. Now, the Ukraine crisis further evokes the Baltic security dilemma. In a postmodern security environment perspective, the Baltic perception of their security includes dimensions of integration and identity, and a security discourse centred on “danger” from Russia and “protection” from EU, NATO and the US. Therefore, this paper tries to analyse the current geopolitical behaviour of Baltic states in relation to Ukraine crisis demonstrably put them into a situation of cooperative security dilemma closely linked to integration and identity.

Security Dilemma: A Framework of Analysis The search for a comprehensive understanding of security dilemma has been expanding since the 1950s across many regions in the world.1 In the traditional realist perspective scholars like Herbert Butterfield (1951), John Herz (1951), and Robert Jervis (1976) conceptualised security dilemma to describe a situation where

39 SAJD 2015 security concerns and perceptions of two or more states may cause a potential for conflict. Robert Jurgen (1978: 169) further defined security dilemma as a situation where “an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others.” Such a situation reflects the uncertainty and fears existing in international relations, especially in the relation between big and small states with asymmetric distribution of powers as in the case of Russia and Baltic states. In an anarchic international system in which great powers’ competition for influence threatens the security and sovereignty of small states, it creates a security dilemma for the latter. Anarchy, uncertainty and fears, conflict of interest, security seeking motives, distrust, lack of appropriate security architecture, power competition, fear of betrayal, defensive policies such as deployment of armaments to defend state against potential aggression without malign intensions, etc are identified as causal factors that generate security dilemma (Posen 1993; Holsti 1996). This, in short, means when the states’ behaviour is driven by security interests, there is potential for security dilemma. Tang argues that “anarchy (which leads to uncertainty, fear, and the need for self-help for survival or security), a lack of malign intentions on both sides, and some accumulation of power (including offensive capabilities)” are the three essential aspects that make a situation a genuine security dilemma (Tang 2009: 595). A situation of deep security dilemma can be potentially destructive/self- destructive. According to Tang (2009), “whenever one or both sides within a security dilemma decide that their security now requires them to pursue aggression, the security dilemma ceases to exist.” That is, the dynamics of security dilemma leads to war and self-destruction. While the material factors such as geography, polarity, military technology, asymmetric power, external actors (allies) and concentration or mixing of ethnic groups may act as regulatory factors, the psychological factors such as ethnocentrism, doctrinal realism, ideological fundamentalism, worst-case forecasting, implicit enemy imaging etc can potentially aggravate the security dilemma (Tang 2009: 622-623; Booth and Wheeler 2008). In such a situation war will be the result. Viewing the current European security architecture in Baltic Sea region as post-modern, Molder describes two types of dilemmas present in the region characteristic to the post-modern security environment: integration and identity dilemmas. According to Molder (2011) “An integration dilemma arises when countries in the same security environment share similar values, norms, and identities but belong to different security institutions. An identity dilemma occurs when the countries in the same security environment share different values, norms and identities.” The dilemma causes obstacle in developing cooperation leading to what can be called a cooperative security dilemma (Molder 1998: 10). The case

40 The Ukraine Conflict, Fear of Russian Aggression of Baltic states fit into this category of cooperative security dilemma as Grazina Miniotaite puts it. The author argues that the Baltic security dilemma as “an expression of the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it” as evident in two competing discourses: the discourse of sovereignty and the discourse of integration (Miniotaite 1999). While the sovereignty discourse is related to nation state identity and to the politics of exclusion, the integration with West is associated with security. According to Miniotaite “the way security is conceptualized and institutionalized is the fixing point in the process of constituting political identity” (Ibid). Hence, identity and security are closely interlinked in the Baltic case.

Understanding Baltic Security Dilemma What led to current Ukraine crisis and how the Russia-EU/US diplomatic tussle related to the conflict pose a danger or destabilizing implications for Baltic states are the two important questions concerning the deepening of Baltic dilemma in the region. In the post-Soviet era, the desire of Baltic states to return to European security politics generated dilemma, as the consolidation of their independence was assessed in terms of the balance of power between the West and Russia. The Baltic independence was viewed by the West as their victory and by Russia as loss and decline of great power status. The West treats Russia’s conduct towards these states as a measure of Russia’s commitment to international norms and laws. The conflicting security orientations and threat perceptions on Baltic dimension in the European security debate created Baltic security dilemma, the regulation of which was depicted as “litmus test” for Russia and West by Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt (1994). Baltic issue was a test for measuring the direction of development of Russia as either a true democratic state or a threat to international community, and for west it is capability to handling the Baltic issue in connection with NATO enlargement. Since, as Carl Bildt asserted, “the Baltic region provides the critical test of the relationship between Russia and the West,” the west must not fail (Bildt 1994).2 Therefore, Baltic security dilemma could be seen as the product of tensions in the relationship between the West and Russia. The Baltic trepidation over the Ukraine conflict is due to the fact that the Baltics and Ukraine play important roles in the geopolitics of NATO enlargement in the region. US always use the Baltic states to counterbalance Russian pressure on EU. The Baltic states have to be loyal to both the US, the main guarantor of their national security and EU, the guarantor of their economic development because of the past obligations during cold war. Let’s visit here the factors that explain the Baltic danger related to Ukraine crisis due to the security and “dual loyalty dilemmas”.

41 SAJD 2015 a) Approach of Baltic States on Ukraine Crisis The Baltic states are the strongest promoters of bringing Ukraine under EU orbit. The present political crisis in Ukraine is triggered by aggressive pursuance of Eastern Partnership Policy under Lithuania’s EU presidency in 2013 for bringing post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus under the fold of EU and NATO. Consequent upon the postponement of the signing of the Association and Free Trade Agreement with EU at the Eastern Partnership summit held in Vilnius on 28-29 November 2013 and Ukraine President Victor Yanukovych’s acceptance of Russia’s offer of 15 billion dollars assistance, discount in energy and increased access to Russian market, Euromaidan protests emerged in Ukraine in the late November 2013.3 Subsequently, Victor Yanukovych, the democratically elected President was ousted on 23 February 2014 through a coup by Euromaidans led by leaders like Arseniy Yatseniuk, a close associate of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (the Fatherland party), Vitaly Klitschko, world-champion boxer (UDAR- Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform) and Oleh Tyahnybok, neo-Nazi follower of Stepan Bandera (Svoboda party).4 The ultranationalist Euromaidans had the support of EU and the US and thus a puppet government of Neo-Nazis and ultranationalists captured power through violent “regime change” and undemocratic means in Ukraine. Lithuania and other Baltic states immediately legitimized the Euromaidans and their post-coup government in Ukraine ignoring the presence of neo- Nazi elements in it. They view Euromaidan Ukrainians are fighting not only for themselves but for the whole Europe. They provided humanitarian and military (Lithuania) support to Ukraine. They extended full support for Ukrainians as they were also victims of Soviet repression and now fighting for freedom, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Eastern Ukraine and Crimea refused to recognize the new leadership in the country as legitimate. Crimea re-joined Russia through a referendum in March 2014. Anti-Euromaidan protests erupted in eastern Ukraine and Donetsk and Lugansk republics declared autonomy. The neo-Nazi Kiev government declared rebels fighting in cities like Mariupol, Odessa, Lugansk, Kharkov, Donetsk, Debaltsevo, etc as “terrorists” and began anti-terrorist military operations. Ukrainian troops fired residential areas and even on refugees. Odessa massacre on 2 May 2014 by government forces was equivalent to a genocide incident. Neo-Nazis torched trade union building with Molotov cocktails. Nearly 50 people were burnt to death, some were beaten to death by sticks, and some who got into roofs were shot down with rifles and pistols. Police didn’t do anything. Fire fighters were stopped andnot allowed to help. Petro Poroshenko was elected as President in May 2014. Yatyenuk was elected as Prime Minister in October 2014 parliamentary elections. Under Poroshenko,

42 The Ukraine Conflict, Fear of Russian Aggression

Government forces intensified shelling in residential areas. Even elderly women and children have been killed. Bus stop in Donetsk, eastern Ukraine, hit by shelling on 21 January 2015 shows how they targeted civilians. Refugees were forced to flee to Russia. A high level of civilian casualties and material destruction are reported. Ukraine fell into a civil war. According to UN estimates around 6000 people died and 6 million became internally displaced and refugees. Ukraine is in the brink of an economic collapse and humanitarian catastrophe. Despite the Misk II peace agreements brokered by Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia on 12 February 2015, the conflict is escalating. Struggle for power is going on among the ruling elites. Prime Minister Yatsenyuk resigned in April 2016. A struggle for power is on- going. Economy is on the brink of collapse. The people of Ukraine are suffering from high rate of poverty, unemployment, disease and hunger. Taye-Brook Zerhoun, UN Assistant Secretary General of Political Affairs, the conflict related civilian casualties as of now in 2016 has reached to 30729, including 9333 were killed and 21396 injured. Humanitarian situation is grave and more than three million people still need assistance (Zerhoun 2016). The Baltic and Euro-Atlantic political class and corporate media blamed Russia and her President Vladimir Putin for Ukraine conflict,5 while the truth is the opposite. From the very beginning the Baltic states were unanimous in their approach to Ukraine crisis that it is Russia’s armed invasion against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and undermines basic principles of international law. They alleged Russia’s action in eastern Ukraine is a challenge the security of the whole Europe. Russia should be punished with tougher sanctions. Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves stated: “Armed forces of the Russian Federation are attacking Ukraine. This is an act of military aggression that should leave no question about the disparity between Russia’s words and actions” (Sabet-Parry 2014). Baltic states, especially Lithuania were the most harsh among the EU members in depicting the Ukraine crisis as “Russian aggression” and “expansionist policy” of Putin. They argued in favour of severe punitive actions against Russia from the US and EU and apply NATO collective security principle for security of Baltic states. Because of confrontational approach towards Russia in the process becoming part of west the Baltic states have become objects of Euro-Atlantic geopolitics. b) Ukraine and Baltic States: Objects of Euro-Atlantic Geopolitics The main objective of post-cold war Euro-Atlantic geopolitical great game is to focus on the Eurasian landmass, encirclement and containment of Russia. This objective has been testified by Robert Gates, former US Defence Secretary in his memoirs, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. He wrote referring to Dick

43 SAJD 2015

Cheney, former US Defence Secretary and Vice President, “When the Soviet Union was collapsing in late 1991, Dick wanted to see the dismantlement not only of the Soviet Union and the Russian empire but of Russia itself, so it could never again be a threat to the rest of the world” (Gates 2014). The existence of Russia itself is a threat according to US neo-con thinking, therefore, has to be contained. The Euro-American imperialist roadmap of dividing and destabilizing Ukraine for trapping and containment of Russia for attaining American global primacy was crafted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US National Security Advisor, way back in 1997. He targeted Ukraine as an object of American geopolitics to make Russia militarily weakened and intimidated. He states:

Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. With- out Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state ... if Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia (Brzezinski 1997: 46).

Therefore, it is clearly necessary for US to prevent developing cordial relation between Russia and Ukraine, as reflected in the current crisis in Ukraine. The significance of Baltic states for the US was expressed by former US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott:

For Americans, the fate of Baltic States is nothing less than a litmus test for this entire continent where the United States has such deep and abiding interests. It is not just a test for you to pass but for us to pass together. We will do so when three distinctive and deserving nations - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - are secure, stable, prosperous democracies integrated into all the broader structures of the Euro-Atlantic community (Quoted in Miniotaite 2003: 262).

In the American strategy the role of Baltic states is to act as obedient servants in preventing Russia becomes a powerful sovereign state, which allegedly poses great threat to America and the rest of the world. Throughout the cold war period the powerful lobby of Baltic-Americans succeeded in keeping the fate of Baltic states remained as an international issue. The west considered the ‘Baltic rhetoric’ of self- determination and non-recognition of illegal annexation as a useful propaganda against Soviet Union. Bush warned Gorbachev at the Soviet-American Summit at Malta on 2-3 December 1989 that ‘using force in the [Baltic states] … would create a firestorm and that the US would have to respond to any use of force by the Soviets there” (Readman 2006: 12). The Baltic saw the US and west as a counterweight to Soviet Union, and source of freedom and democracy which they ultimately gained in 1991.

44 The Ukraine Conflict, Fear of Russian Aggression

Today, US sees as in the past that these states are useful to create obstacles to stop Russia from regaining influence over Ukraine. Therefore, the main US strategy is to use Baltic states to counterbalance Russian pressure on EU. NATO expansion to Russia’s borders was planned by the west by giving Baltic states membership in NATO and EU in 2004 although it was expected that the status and security of Ukraine and Baltic states would remain as a complicated problem, and generate security dilemma and geopolitical vulnerability. c) Geopolitical Vulnerability History testifies that the location of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as sandwiched between Asia and Europe or Silk Route and Amber Road, between two great powers Russia and Germany, and between Black Sea and Baltic Sea determine their destiny. The geopolitical order of different periods of history testifies the vulnerable position of Baltic states. Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these nations were a battleground of different competing powers like Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Russia, Poland, etc. During the First World War the strategically significant location made the Baltic states the victims of rivalry and competition of clearly twogreat powers: Russia and Germany. The Second World War further confirmed this competition for spheres of influence between Germany and Soviet Union. Now, as scholars observed in the past, arguably, the fundamental Baltic problem is “the struggle for dominance, latent or active between Russia and Germany” (Roucek 1949: 171). Due to the specificity of the region as connecting link between Europe and Russia Baltic states do not provide a secure environment for them and therefore, have a permanent insecurity. The historical events in Baltic states have a cyclical nature. The historical cycle means that during the past nearly 100 years’ time Baltic states lost their home more than once and such loss may occur in future as the events in the neighbourhood unfolding dangerous. They had to get rid of foreign rule at end of First World War and during Second World War. They were caught between the German and Soviet invasions and occupations. In the current situation if Russia retaliates to NATO’s provocation over Ukraine crisis, the Baltic states would understandably fear for their own continued independence. They can be victims of their own history. d) The Baltic Threat Perception and Security Orientation The threat perception of Baltic states can be understood from their post-Soviet danger discourse. The Baltic discourse of insecurity and danger, equate Russia with the USSR and everything Russian as a threat denotes the values of Europe/Russia binary opposition (self/other dichotomy). In this construct the values associated

45 SAJD 2015 with “Russia” are “instability,” “Asia,” “invasion,” “chaos,” “incitement of ethnic minorities,” “unpredictability,” “imperialism,” “slander campaign,” “migration,” and so forth. The new value addition for Russia in Baltic perception in the context of Ukraine crisis is depiction of Russia as “open aggressor” and “terrorist state” (Sabet-Parry 2014).6 The core values of Europe are “stability,” “prosperity,’ “freedom,” “defence,” “democracy,” human rights,” “rule of law,” “order,” etc. This self/other dichotomy is treated as a question of political existence, sovereignty, and survival in regard to security. As evident in the official perception of security and identity, the elements of distrust and animosity on Russia and trust and confidence on EU and the US constitute the basis of security orientation of Baltic states. In the list of referent objects in the security concept of Baltic states, language has been given great emphasis as a special security concern. While defining the identity and the relation between inside (self) and outside (other), the Russian speakers and Russia are categorized as the “other” as constituting internal and external threats for the inside, i.e., the national identity and the sovereignty of the nation. Central and East European states, West Europe and the US, sharing common values as security providers for the inside, are characterized as the external “self.” Positing Europe/US as “self” and Russia and Russian speakers are “other” seems to be a psychological means of enhancing their security. While the relation with “self” is based on integration and cooperation, the relation with the “other” is on the basis of confrontation and conciliation (Miniotaite 2003). The elements emphasised in the security concepts of Baltic states clearly link the security-identity connection in the definitions of primary threats and referent objects. Prevention of primary threat, attempt of creating privileged sphere of influence, de-Sovietization, external pressure, aggressive imperial ambitions, etc seemed important elements of foreign policy concepts of Baltic states. Thus, security and identity fears define the referent objects. Demilitarization of Kaliningrad region and effective border control, dissemination of Lithuanian culture and secure a place for the Lithuanian language in the global world, strengthening the military capability of the European Union in close cooperation with NATO etc and activities of other states against the Republic of Lithuania are the concerns of Lithuania (Seimas Lithuania 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania 2004). State sovereignty, territorial integrity, language, national identity, human rights, and parliamentary democracy are referent objects in Latvia (Saema Latvia 2005). Independence and state sovereignty, constitutional order, territorial integrity, waters and airspace, national welfare, preservation of language, identity and culture became part of Estonia’s security policy (Riigikogu 2010). As Mole (2012: 146) points out, this generated a new dilemma for these states: “increasing my

46 The Ukraine Conflict, Fear of Russian Aggression external security reduces my internal security.” Societal security in this sense depends on the level of social cohesion these states achieve in the multi-ethnic and cultural context. Given the situation, the present crisis in Ukraine invokes multiple implications for Baltic states. e) Russophobia and Revival of Nazism The dominant narratives on Ukraine crisis by US, NATO, EU, Ukraine and Baltic states officials and the media reflected Putin bashing, Russian aggression and Russophobia, although no substantial evidence is available on the west’s claim of Russian armed aggression. The US-EU political elites such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Micheal Fallon, John Biden, John Kerry, Barack Obama and others propagated Russobhobia by projecting Baltic states as the next potential victims of Russian aggression after the re-joining of Crimea with Russia. Barack Obama even warned Russia against any muscle flexing on Baltic states. The Crimea re- unification by Russia instilled fears in Estonia that a similar scenario could occur in Narva, the third largest city in Estonia with majority of Russian speakers (Baltic Review 2014).7 The same fear in Latvia and Lithuania is visible. These countries are highly involved in hysteric anti-Russian propaganda, demonising Putin, provoking Russia, projecting Russia as an aggressor country and blindly supporting the interests of the US in the new cold war. Lithuania by making provocative comment has become unprofessional and even gone beyond diplomatic ethics as President Dalia Grybauskaite stating Russia as a “terrorist state,” “Lithuania is already under Russian attack,” etc. She called Russia a “predatory neighbour whose hands are stained with blood” and said Ukraine is “fighting not only for its own independence, but also for peace in Europe” (Ukraine Today 2014). She stated: “The danger of Russia’s behavior today is not smaller than what we have with ISIS in Iraq and Syria” (Weymouth 2014). Baltic states blamed Russia for the downing of MH17 civilian aircraft. Since the incident happened in July 2014, the Baltic and western media were unanimous in alleging Russia’s involvement without producing believable evidence. In short, they are highly obsessed with Russian threat (Russophobia). The Baltic hatred against Russia also related to Holocaust revisionism. They had a dark spot in their history as almost 95 per cent of Jews were exterminated with local collaboration with German Nazis. They considered Jews as associates of Russian communists. Today, there are attempts of glorification of Nazism and trivialization of Holocaust in the Baltics as a mark of de-Sovietization. The official “double genocide” politics in Baltic states trivialize or deny the Holocaust that took place due to Baltic collaboration with Germans. The Waffen-SS, one of the most brutal legions in the past, has conducted commemoration ceremonies without

47 SAJD 2015 state opposition in Latvia. In Lithuania also neo-Nazis celebrate commemoration ceremonies on Independence Day with state support. This glorification of Nazism and rewriting history in Baltic states is part of conflicting memory politics and distancing from Russia (Usha 2015). As Cohen says, “It’s true as Baltic complain, that they suffered around Soviet occupation. But it’s also true, as Moscow points out, that the Baltic countries when they were under German occupation, collaborated with the Germans against Russians. So who can say whose truth is truer?” The Baltic leaders reiterate that “Russians are coming” to attack against which they need NATO’s protection. Obama visited Estonia in September 2014 to reassure the Baltic defence. He said: “As NATO allies, we have Article 5 duties to our collective defense. That is a commitment that is unbreakable. It is unwavering. It is eternal.” He further emphasised, “Article 5 is crystal clear. An attack on one is an attack on all. So if, in such a moment, you ever ask again, ‘who will come to help,’ you’ll know the answer—the NATO Alliance, including the Armed Forces of the United States of America, ‘right here, present, now!’ We’ll [also] be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania…”(quoted in Miller and Rockwell 2015). The west is spreading Russophobia as part of their strategy. As Ukraine crisis is escalating, Brzezinski and western political leaders are propagating that Russia will invade Baltic states after Ukraine as Soviet Union did in the past. After NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014 President Obama stated that the U.S. will maintain a permanent military presence in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia on Russia’s flat, exposed northwest border8 (Miller and Rockwell 2015). This means NATO and US is ready to risk confrontation with nuclear Russia, for the tiny Baltic states which was avoided during cold war period. f) Defensive Policies: NATO Military Build Up and Drills on Russia’s Borders The paranoiac Baltic states asserted that Russia has “malicious plans” against them. They believe that their security depends on the NATO’s military presence in their states. Estonian President Toomas Ilves said in Warsaw: “Ultimately, I think this, once again, a serious crisis in Europe has shown that the presence of the United States in Europe - and especially in our region, the Baltic area - is absolutely vital. It is what allows us to give credibility to NATO” (Office of Vice President, White House 2014). Lithuanian President stated that membership in NATO and the EU is their indisputable strength. It gives their people not only military, political and economic security guarantees, but also signifies a relationship with other nations based on democratic values, mutual trust and respect (Grybauskaite 2014). They are doing everything possible to ensure the relevance of NATO in the 21st century. They decided to increase their defence spending after the Crimea issue. Latvia and

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Lithuania became the first European countries to announce big increases in their military spending following the Crimean crisis, in response to pressure from the US for its allies to boost their defence budgets. Baltic security chiefs now demand permanent NATO presence and military drills on Russia’s borders as deterrent against Russia. The US and Europe began to build NATO’s military near the borders of Russia, in black sea, Poland and Baltic states. Since April 2014, a rotating presence of 150 US troops is in each of the Baltic States and Poland (Sytas 2015). NATO troops are patrolling Baltic territories and conducting military drills in the region in order to reassure security under NATO collective security guarantee. However, the Baltic cynical behaviour simply based on their fear may put them in a risky situation even if their move is defensive without any malign intensions. But as the western intension is containment of Russia and establishing the legitimacy of NATO in the 21st century, its drawing a red line in the three Baltic allies, with a message to Moscow: “Don’t cause trouble here and don’t try to invade!” (Neely 2015). The US is moving heavy military equipment and weapons to Baltic states and certain East European countries.Former NATO Supreme Commander Philip Breedlove said Russia presents an “existential threat” to the United States and its allies (Radio free Europe 2016). The new NATO commander Curtis Scaparrotti also sees Russia is NATO’s main challenge (Sputnik 2016). Baltic states are preparing to resist Russian invasion. Lithuania published a 98 page Russian invasion survival manual entitled “How to Act in Extreme Situations or Instances of War” advising Lithuanian people about contingency plans in case of evacuation (Kuncina and Sindelar 2015). Lithuanian parliament passed a bill for compulsory military conscription. Estonia is installing mobile bomb shelter that can withstand NATO calibre shelling (Hill 2015). Latvia installs NATO’s air defence radar system. In this context, Russia also has genuine security concerns and will respond appropriately. If the crisis in Ukraine escalates into war the NATO build up in these states make them a battleground and they may become the victims of their own irrational behaviour and mistakes. g) Conflicting Narratives of History, Memory and Identity After the restoration of independence in 1991, the three Baltic states used politics of memory and historical justice as important nation building instruments. There are differences in interpretation of Soviet history between Russophone and titular ethnic majority. Russian speakers view Soviet occupation as a positive thing in terms of jobs, social welfare and industrialization. But ethnic Balts view Soviet past as occupation and show themselves as victims of Soviet occupation and oppression. They defined the nationhood on ethnic lines. This led to exclusionary

49 SAJD 2015 policies of citizenship and language laws depriving the Russian speakers of political, economic and social rights. Foreign policies are also based on historical narrative of occupation, collective memory and ethno-national identity in order to distance from Russia and be more close to Europe. The differing identity and memory narratives were perceived as hostile and antagonistic acts. Since Russian immigrants are viewed as instruments of Soviet oppression and a potential fifth column to be used by revanchist Russia, especially in Latvia and Estonia where nearly 30 per cent of population are Russian speakers (Norgaard and Johannsen 1999: 157) there is fear that Russophone may be used by Russia against Balts. The human rights violations and discrimination in the Baltic states against Russophone stateless people and non-citizens, especially in Estonia and Latvia give space to Russia to protect compatriots. The Human Rights Commissioner in January 2010 accepted the presence of 304000 non-citizens in Latvia and 92000 aliens or “persons of undetermined citizenship” in Estonia (Muznieks 2013). Russia could also use cultural and political ties to destabilize the Baltics. All the three Baltic countries have prominent political parties that are rather pro-Russian. Moscow is sympathetic to some of these parties, but it could more fundamentally affect the political and social stability in the Baltics with the sizeable ethnic Russian populations. The three countries fear being culturally dominated by their larger neighbour, and hence their policies to protect their national characteristics and alienate ethnic Russians, such as limiting the use of the Russian language at public schools and creating difficult processes for ethnic Russians to obtain citizenship. Such policies have long drawn criticism from Moscow. Balts view the Georgia - Russia military confrontation in 2008 and re-joining of Crimea with Russia in 2014 happened under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians. Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev recently said Russia would simplify procedures for native Russian speakers from former Soviet States to gain Russian citizenship. Thus, Russia could take the current battle over Ukraine to other former Soviet countries. Russian majority areas like Narva in Estonia, Latgale, Daugavpils and Riga in Latvia and Visaginas in Lithuania particularly watch the situation in Ukraine with caution. h) Baltic Energy Dependency on Russia Baltic states are termed as “energy islands” of the European Union. They are less integrated in EU infrastructure and still in the old Soviet energy system now under Russian control. They are heavily dependent on Russia for their domestic energy requirements. The EU imports nearly a third of its oil and almost half of its natural gas from Russia. Russian pipelines deliver major chunk of oil and gas supply to EU. The Baltic States rely on Russia for 100 per cent of their natural gas deliveries.

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Additionally, the majority of natural gas and oil originating from the energy-rich Caspian states must pass through Russian pipelines to reach European customers including Baltic states (Buchanan 2011). The Baltic states fear that Putin might use energy resources as a weapon for geopolitical purposes and political or economic blackmail. Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite at 67th UN General Assembly said “Limited access to energy allows some countries to abuse their monopolistic position. … Energy dependence for small, resource-free countries like Lithuania means a threat to national security and wellbeing” (Vaida 2012). The President underlined that the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s aggression had clearly shown that countries dependent on single energy supplier are vulnerable (Lithuania Tribune 2014). The Nord Stream 2 pipeline according to Baltic states is a “killer project.” Baltic states view Nord Stream 2 “risks for energy security in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, which is still highly dependent on a single source of energy,” i.e., Russia (Beckman 2016). i) Economic Relations and Trade with Russia The Ukraine crisis is a risk factor for the economic prospects of Baltic states. Since 1991 they have a strained relation with Russia. However, economically Russia is an important trade partner of Baltic states. Russia is the second most important destination for EU’s agricultural products. Russia imposed retaliatory sanctions on agricultural and dairy products and meat from EU, US, Norway, Canada and Australia on 6 August 2014 for a period of one year. According to a European Parliament report the Baltic states are the potentially worst affected from the Russian embargo. Lithuania is the worst affected by a value of EUR 927 million (Kraats 2014). The Russian sanctions against the EU countries and their allies are valid until August 2016. As a result of sanctions, Mauricas (2015) says, the overall export of dairy products declined by 23% in Lithuania, 32% in Latvia and 36% in Estonia during from August 2014 to April 2015 (RC Views 2015). j) Russia’s Perception on Ukraine Crisis The response on Ukraine crisis from Vladimir Putin is that US support neo-Nazis and they were “trained in Poland and Lithuania” (Army Air Corps 2014).9 Russia has denied any involvement in Ukraine crisis. When sanctions are imposed on them they stated it would have boomerang effect. Russia suggested federalization of Ukraine as solution to the crisis. However, when NATO began to escalate military steps Russia tried to keep vigil on her security situation. Russia views permanent NATO presence in Baltic states as violation of alliance’s agreement with her (Sputnik International 2015). Russian parliament sanctioned President to use military in case of escalation of threat to Russia. However, Russia denied any

51 SAJD 2015 intention of war with Ukraine or Baltic states. Dmitry Peskov says “We’ve repeatedly said that Russia doesn’t present a threat to anyone. Russia is consistently in favor of mutually beneficial cooperation while taking into account the interests of all of its partners… But at the same time, Russia obviously cannot ignore any actions that directly or potentially could present a threat to its national interests”(Sputnik International 2016). The reflection is if Russia’s national interests are threatened there will be reaction. Such a scenario is dangerous for international security itself.

Conclusion The Baltic states are entering into geopolitical environment in which there is potential to be entrapped in at least two streams of security dilemma: national security dilemma and energy security dilemma. Baltic states feel vulnerable about their national security and development after the so-called “Revolution of Dignity” staged by the neo-Nazi Svoboda and other ultranationalist groups called Euromaidans with western support and won the coup in Ukraine and the consequent reunification of Crimea with Russia. Lithuania and other Baltic states legitimized the Euromaidans and their post-coup government in Ukraine are highly sceptical about Russia’s response to the Ukrainian issue. These countries have a strong dislike to Putin and hold highly adversarial attitude towards Russia. Their main concern is about the possibility of Russia using nationalist and energy politics against them. They fear Russia might mobilise Russian minority in these states against them. They have expressed concern that they will be the next target of Russia after Ukraine. Therefore, they demand more protection and security assistance from US and the EU. As an immediate reaction to Crimea’s reunification with Russia, the US deployed NATO-American troops in Baltic states. It caused arms race in the region and increase in military spending when Europe is facing an economic crisis. Although it is defensive move, if the Baltic states fail to understand the ground reality of Ukraine conflict, and continue their overconfidence in NATO andin being protégés of the US in search of security and identity, can pose dangerous implications for them. Given the geopolitical vulnerability of these states, the dynamics of security dilemma in the region, civil war, political crisis and economic decline, Ukraine and Baltic states may turn as victims of Euro-American policy rather than of Russian aggression or annexation. In case the US provokes a war between Russia and the west, the Baltic states become the battleground and may face catastrophic consequences. Considering the geopolitically precarious position, it is of prime importance for Baltic states to follow a neutral foreign policy approach and cultivate normal relations with Russia based on mutual self-respect rather than beating the war drums in tune with American political rhetoric and strategic calculus.

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Notes 1 A critical analysis of security dilemma is beyond the scope of this paper. This only intends to cover the arguments relevant to analyze the situation leading to security dilemma of Baltic states. 2 Bildt’s theory is that “Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia should be watched closely as barometers of Russia’s progress toward better relations with the West. Besides their strategic borders with Russia, these nations have been the historical harbingers of Moscow’s intentions abroad, as their early revolts presaged the collapse of the Soviet empire. The Baltic states are still subject to a “demographic occupation” by post war Russian immigrants, even if Russian soldiers have finally left. For those in Moscow who still harbor designs on the “near abroad,” a greedy eye will focus on these newly independent nations first. Western nations, particularly the United States, must steel their resolve and preserve the place of the Baltic states in the new Europe” (Bildt 1994). 3 The present Ukraine crisis is related to the frustrations of failure of EU’s Eastern Partnership policy under Lithuanian presidency in the second half of 2013. Eastern partnership is about exporting European norms and rules in the strategic backyard of Russia. It was the product of a threat/risk narrative resulting from events such as Georgia-Russia war in August 2008, the violence in the Moldavian election in 2009 and the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis in 2009. The purpose of this policy is to strengthen EU’s relations with six states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus in the geopolitical backyard of Russia. 4 Stepan Bandera was a close associate of Hitler. European Parliament resolution in 2012 cautioned about the radical activities of Svoboda. The resolution reads: European Parliament “is concerned about the rising nationalistic sentiment in Ukraine, expressed in support for the Svoboda Party, which, as a result, is one of the two new parties to enter the Verkhovna Rada; recalls that racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic views go against the EU’s fundamental values and principles and therefore appeals to pro-democratic parties in the Verkhovna Rada not to associate with, endorse or form coalitions with this party” (European Parliament 2012);Some of the slogans of neo-Nazis during the protestinclude“ ‘Moskals on knives, Moskals on knives’; ‘Heros of Ukraine Hail, Hail, Hai’l; ‘Hail the Nation, Death to enemies’; ‘Hail Ukraine, Hail to heroes; Bandera, Shukhevych are heroes of Ukraine’; ‘One fatherland, and that is Ukraine’; ‘One language, one nation’; ‘Hang the Communists’; ‘Jewry get out of here’; ‘Moskals get out of here’; ‘Ukraine above all else’ ” etc. “Ukraine Crisis Today: Banderschtadt/Бандерштат - Unmasking Ukrainian Fascism [Stoppt die Nazis]” documentary, 29 May 2014, accessed in June 2014 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrG_UZibwbU The slogan Ukraine above all resembles Hitler’s slogan “Deutschland überalles– Germany above all”. “Moskals” is a derogatory name in Ukrainian for ethnic Russians. 5 Even during the cold war period no Soviet leader was subjected to humiliation and public insult by west as they do to Putin in the 21stcentury. 6 Despite the Russian officials made it clear that there is no Russian force in Ukraine, President Grybauskaite said: “Lithuania, as other European countries, understands that peace has to be fought for, peace has to be defended, and independence and sovereignty are untouchable. Every nation has a right to have its own state and no one can dictate how it should live, regardless of whether a country is big or small. Hence we must clearly tell the current Kremlin and the current Russian leadership that such actions will never be tolerated” (Sabet-Parry 2014). 7 The population of Narva is 65 708 people (as of 1 January 2010). The uniqueness of Narva lies in its location on the border between the East and the West, between the

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European Union/Estonia and Russia, lying 210 kilometres from Tallinn and 130 kilometres from St. Petersburg (Baltic Review 2014). 8 This route was used by French troops in the 19th century and German troops in the 20th century, to invade Russia (Miller and Rockwell 2015). 9 Putin told: “They [Euromiadans] underwent preparation in bases in Lithuanian and Polish border areas, and [of course] in Ukraine itself. Their instructors were ready for a lengthy time, you saw how they were prepared, like special forces, they were even divided up into squads” (Army Air Corps 2014).

References Army Air Corps, US (2014): “Kiev agitators ‘trained in Poland’ claims Putin,” Free Republic, 4 March, at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3129486/posts?page=92and Radio Poland, 4 March, at http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/164084,Kiev-agitators- trained-in-Poland-claims-Putin (2016): “Baltic States condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” 5 May, at http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/legislation/?doc=95697 Beckman, Karel (2016): “Can Nord Stream 2 be stopped?,” The Baltic-Course, 19 April, at http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/direct_speech/?doc=119647 Bildt, Carl (1994): “The Baltic Litmus Test: Revealing Russia’s True Colours,” Foreign Affairs, September/October, at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50330/carl- bildt/the-baltic-litmus-test-revealing-russias-true-colors Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997): The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books. Buchanan, Elizabeth (2011): “The new geopolitics of energy: conflict or cooperation?,” Quarterly Access, Spring 3(3) at http://www.aiia.asn.au/qa/678-the-new-geopolitics- of-energy-conflict-or-cooperation Butterfield, Herbert (1951): History and Human Relations, London: Collins. Documentary on “Ukraine Crisis Today: Banderschtadt/Бандерштат - Unmasking Ukrainian Fascism [Stoppt die Nazis],” 29 May 2014, at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mrG_UZibwbU The slogan Ukraine above all resembles Hitler’s slogan “Deutschland überalles– Germany above all”. “Estonia: Developments in Crimea have roused fears that a similar scenario could occur in Narva,” Baltic Review, 20 March 2014, athttp://baltic-review.com/2014/03/estonia- the-developments-in-crimea-have-roused-fears-that-a-similar-scenario-could-occur- in-narva/. European Parliament (2012): “European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 on the situation in Ukraine 2012/2889(RSP),” at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0507+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN Gates, Robert, M. (2014): Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War., New York: Knopf, Borzoi Books. Herz, John (1951): Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hill, Joanna (2015): “Estonian mobile bomb shelter can withstand NATO calibre shelling,” Euronews, 27 May 2015, at http://www.euronews.com/2015/05/27/estonian-mobile- bomb-shelter-can-withstand-nato-calibre-shelling/ Holsti, K. J. (1996): The State, War and the State of War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: “Increased attention to Lithuania’s security from the United States,” Lithuania Tribune, 28 March 2014, at http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/65966/increased- attention-to-lithuanias-security-from-the-united-states-201465966/

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Jervis, Robert (1976): Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jurgen, Robert (1978): “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 30(2), 167-214. Kraatz, Susanne (2014): “The Russian Embargo: Impact on the Economic and Employment Situation in the EU,” European Parliament Briefing, October, at http://www.europarl. europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/536291/IPOL_BRI(2014)536291_EN.pdf Kuncina, AndriusAnd Daisy Sindelar (2015): “How to Survive a Russian Invasion,” The Atlantic, 23 January 2015, at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2015/01/how-to-survive-a-russian-invasion/384692/ Read more: http://sputniknews.com/politics/20160505/1039110291/kremlin-scaparrotti- threat.html#ixzz47nV1jNf2 (2014): “Lithuanian president calls Russia ‘predatory neighbour’,” Ukraine Today, 29 November, at http://uatoday.tv/geopolitics/ lithuanian-president-calls-russia-predatory-neighbour-394549.html Miller, Donald W. Jr. MD and Lew Rockwell (2015): “Strauss-Howe Generational Theory: ‘The Fourth Turning’ Reality,” 28 April, at http://newsl.org/2015/04/strauss-howe- generational-theory-the-fourth-turning-reality/ Miniotaite, Garzina (1999): “The Security Policy of Lithuania and the “Integration Dilemma,” at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/miniotaite.pdf Miniotaite, Garzina (2000): “The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity,” at edvardas.home.mruni.eu/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/balt-vals-saugumas.doc Miniotaite, Garzina(2003): “The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity” in Charles Krupnick ed., Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and East European securityMaryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, inc., 261-281. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (2004): “Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on Directions in Foreign Policy, May 1 2004,” at http:// www.urm.lt/default/en/foreign-policy/key-foreign-policy-documents/resolution-of- the-seimas-of-the-republic-of-lithuania-on-directions-in-foreign-policy-may-1-2004. Mölder, Holger (1998):The Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region and Its Impact on the Regional Security and Defense Cooperation (Thesis), Monterey California: US Naval Postgraduate School, at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a359142.pdf Mölder, Holger (2011): “The Cooperative Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region,” Journal of Baltic Studies, 42(2),143-168. Mole, Richard (2012): The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union: Identity, Discourse and Power in the Post-Communist Transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Oxon: Routledge. Muižnieks, Nils, European Commissioner for Human Rights (2013): “Stateless Europeans: Nils Muižnieks warns of “significant” problem in Russia, Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia,” 15 January 2013 at http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2013/01/stateless-europeans- nils-muiznieks-warns-of-significant-problem-in-russia-ukraine-estonia-and-latvia/. Neely, Bill (2015): “NATO Uses Baltic States to Draw Red Line, Send Message to Putin in Russia,” 4 March, athttp://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/nato-uses-baltic-states- draw-red-line-send-message-putin-n317216. Norgaard, Ole and Johannsen, Lars (1999): The Baltic States after Independence, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Office of Vice President, White House (2014): “Remarks to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden and President ToomasIlves of Estonia,” 18 March, at https://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2014/03/18/remarks-press-vice-president-joe-biden-and- president-toomas-ilves-estoni

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Posen, B. R. (1993): “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival, 35(1), Spring, 27–47. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (2016): “NATO Commander: Russia Poses ‘Existential Threat’ To West,” 25 February, at http://www.rferl.org/content/nato-breedlove-russia- existential-threat/27574037.html Readman, Kristina Spohr (2006): “Between Political Rhetoric and Realpolitic Calculations: Western Diplomacy and the Baltic Independence Struggle in the Cold War Endgame,” Cold War History, February, 6(1), 1-42. Riga Conference (RC) Views (2015): “The economic ties between Russia and the Baltic countries in 2004-2015: the bust, the boom and the sanctions in mutual trade relations,” 5 September, at https://www.rigaconference.lv/rc-views/20/the-economic- ties-between-russia-and-the-baltic-countries-in-2004-2015-the-bust-the-boom-and- the-sanctions-in-mutual-trade-relations Riigikogu (2010): “National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia,” 12 May 2010, athttp://vm.ee/sites/default/files/contenteditors/National_Security_Concept_of_ Estonia_2010.pdf Roucek, Joseph S. (1949): “The Geopolitics of the Baltic States,” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, January, 8(2), 171-175. Sabet-Parry, Rayyan (2014): “Estonia supports tougher sanctions against Russia amid Ukraine conflict,” The Baltic Times, 29 August, at http://www.baltictimes.com/news/ articles/35437/ Sabet-Parry, Rayyan (2014): “Lithuania President calls Russia ’terrorist state’,” The Baltic Times, 20 November, athttp://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/35799/. Saeima, “The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia,” 2 February 2005, at http://www.mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Plani,%20koncepcijas/ 2005_nd_en.ashx Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (2012): “Lithuania: National Security Strategy 2012,” at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=156893. Sputnik International, (2016): “Kremlin Responds to NATO Commander: Russia Not a Threat to Anyone,” 5 May, at http://sputniknews.com/politics/20160505/1039110291/ kremlin-scaparrotti-threat.html Sytas, Andrius (2015): “Baltic military chiefs want NATO to call for permanent troops amid Russian aggression,” 14 May 2015, at http://www.businessinsider.com/r-baltic- military-chiefs-to-call-for-permanent-nato-presence-2015-5#ixzz3awdmMaY5 Tang Shiping (2009): “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, vol. 18(3), 587-623. Usha, K. B (2015): “Rise of Anti-Semitism and Holocaust Denial in Contemporary Baltic States,” Country Specific Studies on Israel, 5, New Delhi: Foreign Policy Research Centre (FRCC), 72-98. Vaida, Petras (2012): “Grybauskaite at UN debate: energy conflict preventions is international duty,” Baltic Course, 26 September, at http://www.baltic-course.com/ eng/energy/?doc=63444 Weymouth, Lally (2014): “Why Are We So Busy Trying Not to Offend Putin?: An interview with Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite,” Slate, 24 September, at http://www. slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/09/russia_and_ukraine_ lithuanian_president_dalia_grybauskaite_says_vladimir.html Zerhoun,Taye-Brook (2016): “Briefing Security Council on the Situation in Ukraine, 28 April 2016, athttp://www.un.org/undpa/speeches-statements/28042016/ukraine

56 The Changing Geopolitical Landscape and Security of the Indian Ocean Region in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring Movement Vice Admiral P J Jacob

Indian Ocean has emerged a key strategic arena in the 21st century. One reason has been the growth of the Asian economies and their increased need for raw materials, including energy from the Middle East, to provide for their economic growth. In addition, the end of the Cold War and ongoing crises in Iraq and Afghanistan have diminished the importance of the Atlantic Ocean and boosted the importance of the Indian Ocean as a conduit for Western military supplies. As a result, traditional maritime security concerns have become more important. The security of chokepoints in the region – the Straits of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Indonesian Straits – has become a matter of great strategic importance for all maritime powers. Conflict in the Persian Gulf and piracy near Bab-el-Mandeb, due in part to the failed state of Somalia, are two primary issues of concern. Maritime security issues, including the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), are paralleled by increasing importance of the broadband communication connections between Asia, Europe, and the United States that are linked by undersea cables traversing the Indian Ocean. Ensuring the future security of the sea lines and cable routes has now become an issue for all the Asian powers. For many decades Britain, and more recently the United States had taken responsibility for Indian Ocean sea line protection. Now India, Japan, China will have to assess their own growing roles in future protection. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring Movement, it is of colossal importance that the primary players of the Indian Ocean region as well as the littoral states focus more upon the security of the region. The political as well as the social upheavals of the Middle East and North Africa have left the region vulnerable not only to non state actors such as terrorist groups and pirates, but also with regard to new players in the region who have much at stake. This paper wishes to illustrate the geopolitical landscape and security factors of the Indian Ocean region in the

57 SAJD 2015 aftermath of the Arab Spring, which has not only altered the political dynamics of the region, but has also had a major effect worldwide. In consonance with the unfolding of events in West Asia, it would be prudent to look into certain major countries as well as change of regimes in the same, in order to be acquainted with their geopolitical significance. Would a change in government from autocracy to democracy have a significant impact on the country’s security perception? Have all such changes been truly democratic in nature? Can we safely assume that regime changes in the aftermath of the Arab Spring Movement have been beneficial to the cause of democracy? This paper would not only like to focus on the change of regimes in Egypt and Libya, but also take note of civil wars prevalent in countries such as Syria. Further, the paper would encapsulate the importance of the Suez Canal with regard to the aforementioned events as well as its importance in future geo-political calculations. It would be of immense importance to discuss at this juncture the impact of the Arab Uprisings both in terms of geo-politics as well as in terms of security vis-à-vis the Indian Ocean countries. Have the recent volatile events of West Asia had an impact on the security concerns as well as the foreign policy stance of the Indian Ocean countries including India? Is there a scope for improvement of relations between the Indian Ocean littoral states as well as the states of West Asia in the aftermath of regime changes? Would the uprisings ever affect other authoritarian regimes of the IOR? These and many more other questions of significance would be deliberated upon during the course of this paper. In a nutshell, it would be pertinent to state that the impact of the Arab Uprisings on both West Asian politics as well as on the Indian Ocean Region is of immense magnitude keeping in mind the future of the international geopolitical scenario.

Indian Ocean in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities There is no doubt that the Indian Ocean has become a significant area, when measured by the share of the world’s energy and commerce that traverses it. Roughly one third of the world’s population resides in states that have a coast with the Indian Ocean. One fifth of the world’s energy supplies travel across it, largely in a west (Persian Gulf) to east (India, China, Japan) direction. In reverse direction, gigantic ships carry manufactured goods from Asia to Middle Eastern and European destinations.1 The sea itself is an economic resource. With regard to the issues of fisheries; in some cases, overfishing in the sea has been replaced with inland fishing, or, in the dramatic case of Somalia, a displacement of fishermen to illicit activities, including piracy. In other cases, fisheries provide a small portion of national income, but a significant portion of the economy for coastal communities, and their interests

58 The Changing Geopolitical Landscape sometimes conflict with national development plans and the larger scale fishing activity of outside powers. Environmental concerns include the degradation of coastal mangroves, erosion of coral reefs, and the disappearance of a 70% of biomass, across the entire Indian Ocean region.2 In recent years, this compelling economic and ecological story has been complicated by other trends from the dark side of globalization: human trafficking, smuggling of illicit goods and materials, movement of proliferated weapons and weapons components, and piracy.3 The prosperity of the Indian Ocean rim states and the economic value of the cargo that plies the seas have stimulated various forms of predatory and exploitative behavior that risks lives and livelihoods, and adds cost and risk for those that use these vital trade and commercial sea lanes.4 It should also be noted that the Indian Ocean and its adjacent bodies of water (the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf) play a role in conflicts: the Sri Lankan struggle with Tamil separatists; India and Pakistan have had maritime disputes as part of their long-standing rivalry, and Gulf Arab states share the narrow and strategic Gulf waters with the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and with Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces, to name a few of the clashes prevalent in the region.5 It is an intimidating task to balance economic, environmental and security interests at the national level. Maritime policy can be seen as the purview of coastal defense, so that a navy or coast guard would have the lead or sole role in determining policy. Maritime policy can also be deeply domestic, directed by those responsible for tourism, or fisheries, or other basic economic interests. Few countries have addressed the challenge of integrating complex and diverse national interests into a coherent maritime policy. Even large countries with long coastlines concede that their border with the Indian Ocean is often considered the hinterland, not the heartland, of the nation, and policy-making reflects a passive or underdeveloped approach to maritime governance. Archipelagic states like Indonesia or small countries with strong seafaring traditions like Oman are important exceptions.6 At the regional level, there are many encouraging examples of cooperation and ad hoc regional organisations created to manage a distinct maritime issue, such as:

• the Gulf organisation on port security and control (Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding (2004), headquartered in Oman),7 • an anti-pollution institution of eight Persian Gulf states based in Kuwait (Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (1981) - ROPME),8 • a fisheries management initiative based in Kenya (the 2004 South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission9), or • an anti-piracy coalition to guarantee free movement in the Strait of Malacca (MALSINDO (2004) - the Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia organization).10

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These efforts have narrow mandates and often well-intended actions in one sphere can unintentionally have adverse effects on another: destruction of mangroves, coastal tourism and other activities to promote development, for example, exacerbated the effects of the tsunami in Sri Lanka and in other Indian Ocean islands. Today the region has generated many well-intended but incomplete forms of governance - national, regional and global regimes and mechanisms are not as robust as need be for the tasks of maintaining the Indian Ocean as a sustainable zone of commerce, energy security and peace.11

The Arab Spring Movement: Genesis and Consequences The awakening of the Arab States is widely believed to have been instigated by disappointment with the rule of local governments, though some have conjectured that wide gaps in income levels may have had an impact upon the movement. Copious factors led to the protests, including issues such as dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights violations, government corruption, economic decline, unemployment, extreme poverty, and a number of demographic structural factors, such as a large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth within the population. The catalysts for the revolts in all Northern African and Persian Gulf countries have been the concentration of wealth in the hands of autocrats in power for decades, insufficient transparency of its redistribution, corruption, and especially the refusal of the youth to accept the status quo. Increasing food prices and global famine rates have also been a significant factor, as they involve threats to food security worldwide and prices that approach levels of the 2007–2008 world food price crises.12 Revolts have been occurring in the Arab area since the 1800s but only recently have these revolts been redirected from foreign rulers to the Arab states themselves. The revolution in the summer of 2011 mark the end of the old phase national liberation from colonial rule, rather they are inwardly directed at the problems of Arab society. Tunisia and Egypt, the first to witness major uprisings, differ from other North African and Middle Eastern nations such as Algeria and Libya in that they lack significant oil revenue, and were thus unable to make concessions tocalm the masses. The relative success of the democratic Republic of Turkey, with its substantially free and vigorously contested but peaceful elections, fast-growing but liberal economy, secular constitution but Islamist government, created a model (the Turkish model) if not a motivation for protestors in neighboring states.13 Tunisia experienced a series of conflicts over the past three years, the most notable occurring in the mining area of Gafsa in 2008, where protests continued for many months. These protests included rallies, sit-ins, and strikes, during which there were two fatalities, an unspecified number of wounded, and dozens of arrests. The

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Egyptian labor movement had been strong for years, with more than 3,000 labor actions since 2004. One important demonstration was an attempted workers’ strike on 6 April 2008 at the state-run textile factories of al-Mahalla al-Kubra, just outside Cairo. The government mobilized to break the strike through infiltration and riot police, and while the regime was somewhat successful in forestalling a strike, dissidents formed the “6 April Committee” of youths and labor activists, which became one of the major forces calling for the anti-Mubarak demonstration on 25 January in Tahrir Square.14 In Algeria, discontent had been building for years over a number of issues. In February 2008, United States Ambassador Robert Ford wrote in a leaked diplomatic cable that Algeria is ‘unhappy’ with long-standing political alienation; that social discontent persisted throughout the country, with food strikes occurring almost every week; that there were demonstrations every day somewhere in the country; and that the Algerian government was corrupt and fragile.15 Some have claimed that during 2010 there were as many as ‘9,700 riots and unrests’ throughout the country.16 Many protests focused on issues such as education and health care, while others cited rampant corruption.17 In Western Sahara, the Gdeim Izik protest camp was erected 12 km south-east of El Aaiún by a group of young Sahrawis on 9 October 2010. The camp contained between 12,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, but on 8 November 2010 it was destroyed and its inhabitants evicted by Moroccan security forces.18 The security forces faced strong opposition from some young Sahrawi civilians, and rioting soon spread to El Aaiún and other towns within the territory, resulting in an unknown number of injuries and deaths. Violence against Sahrawis in the aftermath of the protests was cited as a reason for renewed protests months later, after the start of the Arab Spring.19 The catalyst for the current escalation of protests was the self-immolation of Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi. Unable to find work and selling fruit at a roadside stand, on 17 December 2010, a municipal inspector confiscated his merchandise. An hour later he doused himself with petrol and set himself on fire. His death brought together various groups dissatisfied with the existing system, including many unemployed, political and human rights activists, labour, trade unionists, students, professors, lawyers, and others to begin the Tunisian revolution.20 The Arab Spring had serious consequences not only for the Middle East, but also for the world at large. The protests have shared techniques of mostly civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches, and rallies, as well as the effective use of social media in order to organise, correspond, and raise awareness in the face of state attempts at repression and Internet censorship. Many Arab Spring demonstrations met violent responses from authorities, as well

61 SAJD 2015 as from pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators. Some observers have drawn comparisons between the Arab Spring movements and the Revolutions of 1989 (also known as the “Autumn of Nations”) that swept through Eastern Europe in terms of their scale and significance.

The Indian Ocean in the aftermath of the Arab Spring Movement Despite continued growth and investment, border and maritime security continues to present challenges to governments around the world. Over the last decade the Indian Ocean Region has yielded priority to what have been perceived as higher threat domains such as airport security, safe cities and most recently cyber security. Border and maritime security has, of course, not been fully neglected. The rise of piracy, especially in the Indian Ocean, as well as sophisticated and well executed cross border attacks have provided stark reminders of the importance of this domain. However, threats that are unrelated to terrorist organisations continue to rise, but have not received as much attention in recent years. Escalation of these threats will cause countries more problems in the future and will become their greatest challenge if they are not addressed now.

Maritime Security - The High Seas There is a range of high profile border and maritime threats that state security institutions have to engage with on a daily basis. Links between global waters, oceans and seas are vital to the global economy. It is estimated that around 80% of the world’s trade is delivered by sea and remains the primary way to deliver goods including energy exports which are of principal importance to governments. Reliance on safe and secure passage of cargo is a priority for governments, uniting them in the common goal of security at sea. Piracy is a threat that countries have faced for hundreds of years, however awareness has increased with the growing number of incidents in the Indian Ocean, elevating media scrutiny over the last few years. A range of studies have concluded piracy costs the global economy around $8-12 billion a year through insurance claims, ransoms, re-routing ships, security equipment and cost to regional economies.21 Several approaches to combat this threat have so far not been successful. The International Maritime Bureau reported 157 attacks worldwide with 18 hijackings between January and May 2012. Somali pirates currently hold 12 vessels and 157 hostages.22 These types of attack produce worldwide condemnation and have forced governments to place naval assets in high threat areas. Merchant ship owners have been forced to provide their own security measures to protect their crew and vessels creating a strong growth in the maritime security market.

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Border Security While piracy remains a high profile issue that must be addressed, states face greater threats along their own borders. It is easy for focus to be drawn on terrorist related incidents that create immediate public danger and attention, such as the attacks in Mumbai in 2008 which saw gunmen enter the city via a fishing boat from Pakistan. In Africa, Boko Haram23 militants continue to use illegal entry and exit points along the border shared by Nigeria and Cameroon helping to avoid authorities before and after an attack. Although these incidents have high impact, the physical consequences are usually short term. Piracy and terrorist incidents will remain in the foreseeable future, however longer-term threats are emerging and security authorities must address these issues with equal importance.

Constant and Mounting Threats Serious consideration must be given to threats that are not so acute in nature or apparent to the public. Many of these do not have an easily tangible impact, but if they continue to grow, could threaten the economic and social prosperity of the state. These can be broken down into two categories: movement of people and movement of illicit goods over both land and maritime borders. Global events continue to catalyze the drive of global movements. The rising of the Arab spring in 2011, the continued growth of India and China and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan have all driven the global movement of people, as many have been forced to find safer areas.24 The UNHCR currently estimates that there were 43.7 million forcibly displaced people in 2011, the highest number in 15 years and migration rates are continuing to grow.25 The key challenge for border and maritime security authorities is at illegal entry points. Legal entry points such as ports and border crossings are usually well equipped with a certain level of security personnel and technology to detect and contain threats. However, it is threats that gain access to the country through restricted or unmonitored areas that create the greatest problems.26

Movement of People Although governments have put in place a number of methods to monitor entry and exit of countries, illegal movement of people through borders remains high. This has a number of implications. An influx of either displaced peoples following conflict or famines can put real strain on government resources. This is a global issue affecting countries on all continents. Iran and Pakistan have taken millions of Afghan refugees trying to escape the ongoing conflict at home. Movement of people in Africa remains a serious issue, as people suffering extreme famine attempt to find help or better conditions in neighboring countries. These situations can put

63 SAJD 2015 serious strain on already scarce local resources and result in lack of access of these to indigenous people.27 Countries that are not in high risk conflict areas may not face an influx of people over a short period, but face growing illegal immigration issues. Continued growth of illegal migration can equally place strain on local government resources and if this is not monitored overcrowding will be a problem in the coming decades. This is not an immediate threat to states, but the scenario is gradually building and will become one of the greatest challenges over the next twenty years unless it is properly addressed. A further complication is the spread of disease. Uncontrolled movement of people can bring disease to new communities creating more challenges to containment. Access to natural resources will further become a major area of contention for countries. Water is becoming a scarce resource and could lead to conflict in the future. With no access to water, people will be forced to move to areas with greater basic needs. If there are not proper border controls in place, monitoring population size as well as goods coming in and out of the country is problematic.28

Movement of Illicit Goods Movement of illicit goods across borders and via seas can both damage the economy of countries as well as pose serious threats to the population itself. Smuggling of goods across the border to avoid import or export taxes can cost local economies serious loss of revenues. It is estimated that this kind of activity costs the EU economy around €285 billion every year, amounting to nearly 2% of the EU’s total GDP.29 The movement of illegal narcotics feeds drug abuse within countries. The 2012 United Nations World Drug Report30 shows that this global problem is not being contained. South Asia, especially Afghanistan, remains the main producer of heroin, with the largest quantities flowing towards the European markets. South America is the strongest cocaine producer with the greatest quantities flowing towards North America. The continued supply bolsters drug addiction in countries and puts strain on government and health resources.31 Although governments have had little success in combating the continued drug production, they can do more to prevent less getting into their home markets. Finally, the movement of weaponry and dangerous materials is of real concern for governments. Porous borders allow the facilitation of terrorist organization growth and movement. Mexico and Colombia provide strong case studies, where escalation of weaponry in the country has facilitated an increase in organized crime which security authorities now find difficult to control.32

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The Arab Spring in the Indian Ocean? A Case Study of the Maldives Indeed, while the status of democratic process in the Maldives more closely resembles other South Asian nations than nations involved in the Arab uprising, economic and social strains in the Maldives are akin to those that preceded the Arab Spring.33 Economically and socially, there are three Maldives: • ‘Maldives I’ is that of the luminous tourist resorts isolated from the rest of the country on coral islands. Tourism is the Maldives’ largest industry and resort leasers represent a substantial and powerful economic interest group. The other Maldives are local economies. • ‘Maldives II’ is made up of 1,192 islands dispersed across 90,000 square kilometers, where 205,000 Maldivians make a living from coastal fishing and related occupations. • ‘Maldives III’ is the capital island of Malé, home to 103 thousand and one of the most densely populated places in the world.34 Under the autocratic Gayoom regime, the Maldives made considerable progress in education and health, despite the high costs of delivering services to widely-scattered islands. By 2000, the country had achieved universal primary and lower-secondary education and had almost eliminated communicable diseases.35 In 2008, the central challenge for the newly-democratic government under President Nasheed was to maintain good performance on social services despite a high fiscal budget debt. At the same time, the global financial crisis affected the tourism sector as well as domestic prices of food and energy. In response, Nasheed’s government focused on expanding inter-island transport, universalizing health insurance, protecting the social sectors (health, education, child and family welfare) while trimming the public sector bill. It sought investment through a programme of public-private partnerships. The financial strategy revolved around monetizing the deficit, seeking grants and loans from donors, and rescheduling medium and long term debt obligations. Combined with rising food and fuel prices, this strategy fuelled inflation. Political opposition and low capacity restricted other reforms.36 Are there parallels between the Maldives and the Arab Spring? Uprisings in the Middle East have protested against absolute monarchy and autocracy, concentration of wealth and power, government corruption and inefficiency, and economic decline, and unemployment. Compared to the Arab world, democracy has had far more traction in South Asia. Yet, as everywhere democracy brokered by coalitions tends to be fragile. Like its South Asian neighbors, Maldives is tangled in the politics of pluralist coalition politics.37 In 2008, the newly introduced multi-party system in the Maldives enabled free opinion and constructive dissent in Parliament and in the media. Imprisonment and torture of political opponents were said to have been abolished, although the recent violence suggests a different picture. The Nasheed presidency also ushered

65 SAJD 2015 in a separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government and heralded the promise of decentralized government. However, these promises teetered within a year, and the coalition collapsed in 2009. At the same time food price, fuel price and economic crises ravaged the economy. In June 2010, all cabinet ministers resigned, citing the fact that the opposition-dominated parliament had ‘hijacked’ executive powers.38 However, on hindsight, the factors that contributed to the Maldives coup and the Arab uprisings are similar:39 • The Maldives, like the Gulf States, has a split economy with highly segmented labor markets. Locals are banned, for example, from lucrative work as staff in resorts, and shun other activities such as construction. • The Maldives face drastically rising food and energy price costs, which especially hit the poor, women, children and those living on remote islands. • The rise of fundamentalist Islam.

After the 2004 Tsunami which devastated the Maldives, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States offered reconstruction funds and support to educate imams and teachers. This was coupled with the introduction of conservative Wahabi and Salafist interpretations of Islam. Since then, public flogging of women for alleged offenses has re-occurred, and more conservative dress and practices are on the rise. The Islamic political party tabled a law banning massage and alcohol on the tourist islands; although this decision was quickly repealed, since it was not in the interest of tourism industry elites. Economic fissures, inflation, and political tensions, juxtaposed with efforts to establish democratic practice, mean there is no easy solution for the Maldives. Yet although political parties are divided, many proposals on economic reform and democratic practice have been tabled.40

Conclusion Very recently, India has proposed a five point plan to strengthen international cooperation, including tracking the trail of ransom money, to tackle the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia.41 The measures proposed by India are: • Reinforcement of tracking the trail of ransom money to different parts of the world, as was entrusted to the Interpol; • Prosecution of the beneficiaries of ransom money for abetting piracy; • Consideration of the conduct of the naval operations under the UN as the preferred option; • Sanitisation of the Somali coast line through identified corridors and buffer zones and tracking of fishing vessels around the Somali coast; • Enactment of national laws on priority to criminalise piracy as defined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment

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of convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia as required under resolution 1918 (2010).42

It must be kept in mind that the changing regimes in the Arab World as well as the altering nature of the Indian Ocean may not complement each other in the long run. The geopolitical dynamics of the region needs to be studied intricately in order to understand the impact of the Arab Spring on the Indian Ocean Region. Although India and several other littoral states have attempted to create frameworks for a safer Indian Ocean region, international bodies and organizations must understand the importance of transnational deliberations regarding the safety of the area as well as its security in the distant future. The Arab Spring changed the political scenario of the Middle East. The regimes that have come into power face immense political as well as security problems especially from non state actors as well as rival groups within their respective countries. A spill-over effect may happen in the Indian Ocean region, though it is too early to state with complete surety the course of the same. Therefore, it would be prudent to state at this juncture that the Arab Spring movement may have had a short-term impact upon the Indian Ocean region with regard to the altered constitution of geopolitics, but whether it will have a long term impact on the area or not depends not only upon the internal politics of the Indian Ocean littoral states, but also upon the power of endurance of the regimes that have sprung up in the aftermath of the awakening of the Arab world. Acknowledgement: Assistance of Lopamundra Bandyopadhyay Research fellow Global India Foundation for research and other help rendered.

Notes 1 Laipson (2009). 2 Ibid; Kaplan (2010:366). 3 Michel and Sticklor (2012:1-130). 4 Laipson (2009). 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 For details refer to the website of the Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control at http://www.riyadhmou.org. In June 2005 The Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Gulf Region, known as the Riyadh MoU, was signed at meeting in Riyadh by 6 countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE). The Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is an agreement to achieve safe, secure and efficient shipping in the maritime jurisdictions in the Gulf region. 8 The Regional Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Areas of Bahrain, I.R. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was convened in Kuwait from 15-23 April 1978. The Conference adopted on 23 April 1978 the Action Plan for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Areas, the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine

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Environment from Pollution, and the Protocol concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency.) Since its establishment, ROPME has provided technical coordination to the Kuwait Action Plan (KAP) and assisted its eight Member States in the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols, as well as a number of projects, covering environmental assessment and environmental management, including public awareness and training. ROPME Sea Area (referred to as the Kuwait Action Plan Region in the past) is the sea area surrounded by the eight Member States of ROPME: Bahrain, I.R. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The term “ROPME Sea Area” was coined by Plenipotentiaries of the Member States to achieve unanimity in denoting the area covered by the Kuwait Regional Convention of 1978. It in fact reflects the goodwill of the Member States to cooperate in protecting their common marine environment in spite of the existing geopolitical boundaries. According to Article II of the Kuwait Regional Convention, the ROPME Sea Area (RSA) is defined as extending between the following geographic latitudes and longitudes, respectively: 16°39’N, 53°3’30’’E; 16°00’N, 53°25’E; 17°00’N, 56°30’E; 20°30’N, 60°00’E; 25°04’N, 61°25’E. Refer to: http://ropme.org 9 SWIOFP is an ambitious multinational research project with an overall goal that will see the West Indian Ocean’s marine resources ecologically managed for sustainable use and benefit by the region’s riparian countries. The project forms part of the Large Marine Ecosystem Programme approach (LME) and is supported by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as a contribution to its international waters programme and implemented by the World Bank. Over the next five years, nine countries of the Western Indian Ocean will work together to understand and management better their fisheries through an LME and Ecosystem Based Approach. Refer to http://www.swiofp.net 10 Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Launch Coordinated Patrol of Malacca Strait, The Jakarta Post, 20 July 2004, accessed electronically at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/ content/indonesia-malaysia-singapore-launch-coordinated-patrol-malacca-strait on January 25, 2013 11 Laipson (2009). 12 For a more detailed anaylsis of the Arab Spring Movement refer to a collection of articles by The Economist accessed electronically at http://www.economist.com/ topics/arab-spring, also, Fouad Ajami, “The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2012, accessed electronically at http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137053/fouad-ajami/the-arab-spring-at-one on 28 January 2013. 13 Arab uprisings: 10 key moments, BBC News, December 10, 2012, accessed electronically at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20626645 on January 30, 2013. 14 Ibid. 15 Viewing cable 07ALGIERS1806, AN AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO, Wikileaks, accessed electronically at http://www.webcitation. org/5vWKgd8OS on January 30, 2013. 16 Chikhi (2011). 17 Belhimer (2010). 18 “Mass exodus” from Western Sahara cities, Afrol News, October 21, 2010, accessed electronically at http://www.afrol.com/articles/36808 on January 15, 2013. 19 Ibid. 20 Tunisia suicide protester Mohammed Bouazizi dies, BBC News, January 5, 2011, accessed electronically at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12120228 on January 20, 2013.

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21 Michel and Sticklor (2012). 22 Ibid. 23 Walker (2013). 24 Potgieter (2013). 25 Refer to the UNHCR website at http://www.unhcr.org 26 Michel and Sticklor (2012). 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Refer to Europa, the website of the European Union for details at europa.eu 30 World Drug Report 2012, UNODC, accessed electronically at http://www.unodc.org/ documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2012/WDR_2012_web_small.pdf on January 20, 2013. 31 Ibid 32 Small Arms, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, refer to http://www. un.org/disarmament/convarms/SALW 33 Koehler and Bonnerjee (2012). 34 Ibid. 35 Like the Arab Spring, Male Spring ousts Nasheed, The Sunday Times, February 12, 2012, accessed electronically at http://www.sundaytimes.lk/120212/Columns/political.html on 23 January 2013. 36 Koehler and Bonnerjee (2012). 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Roychowdhury (2012). 40 Koehler and Bonnerjee, op. cit. 41 ANTI PIRACY – Securing the Sea Lanes of Communications, Defence and Security of India, December 1, 2012, accessed electronically at http://defencesecurityindia.com/ securing-the-sea-lanes-of-communications on January 28, 2012. 42 Ibid.

References Ajami, Fouad (2012): “The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2012, accessed electronically at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/137053/fouad-ajami/the-arab-spring-at-one on 28 January 2013. Belhimer, Mahmoud (2010): “Political Crises but Few Alternatives in Algeria,” Arab Reform Bulletin, 17 March, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed electronically at http://web.archive.org/web/20110807055145/http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/ 03/17/political-crises-but-few-alternatives-in-algeria/1sy on 25 January 2013. Chikhi, Lamine (2011): “Algeria army should quit politics: opposition,” Reuters Africa, 21 January accessed electronically at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE70 K02X20110121?sp=true on 28 January 2013. Kaplan, Robert D.(2010): The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, New York: Random House. Koehler, Gabriele and Aniruddha Bonnerjee(2012): “Arab Spring undone in the Indian Ocean? Political economy and the coup in the Maldives,” Institute of Development

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Studies, 29 February 2012, accessed electronically at http://www.ids.ac.uk/news/arab- spring-undone-in-the-indian-ocean-political-economy-and-the-coup-in-the-maldives on 23 January 2013. Laipson, Ellen(2009): “The Indian Ocean: A Critical Arena for 21st Century Threats and Challenges,” Stimson Centre, Washington, DC, 12 January, accessed electronically at http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/the-indian-ocean-a-critical-arena-for-21st- century-threats-and-challenges/ on 20 January 2013. Michel, David and Russell Sticklor(2012): Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges, Stimson Centre, Washington, DC,. 1 – 130, accessed electronically at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Book_IOR_2.pdf on 22 January 2013. Potgieter, Thean (2012): “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Strategic Setting and Features,” Africa Portal, 2012, accessed electronically at http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/ jspui/bitstream/123456789/33169/1/Paper236.pdf?1 on18 January 2013. Roychowdhury, Gen. Shankar(2012): “Perilous ripples can come from Maldives,” The Asian Age, 3 April accessed electronically at http://archive.asianage.com/columnists/ perilous-ripples-can-come-maldives-721 on 21 January 2013. Walker, Andrew (2012): “What is Boko Haram? Special Report,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2012, accessed electronically at http://www.usip.org/publications/what- boko-haram on 22 January 2013. World Drug Report 2012, UNODC, accessed electronically at http://www.unodc.org/ documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2012/WDR_2012_web_small.pdf on 20 January 2013.

70 South- South Cooperation and Spices trade: Indian Scramble for African - LAC Trade Girish Kumar R. Aswathy Rachel Varughese

This paper attempts to analyse South- South (S-S) Cooperation in spices trade in the era of globalization and economic integration of the world economies, considering India, Africa as well as Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) Region. The paradigm shift in economic cooperation gained momentum under the S-S arrangement by the Developing Countries (DCs). Economist Arthur Lewis pioneered in explaining the strategy of trade among DCs and it is popularly known as S-S trade relationship. The main objective was to promote trade and development in Third World Countries (TWC). Academia is of the view that it has greater potential than trade between North and South (N-S).1 Variety of reasons are attributed to the emergence of S-S dialogues deviating from N- S relations. Enhanced protectionism from the industrially advanced nations posed challenges to the unfruitful and traditional N-S relationship. Adoption of Non- Tariff Barriers was another set of nightmare for the DCs and they feared losing out on market access. Formation of regional blocs too served as a hurdle for N-S trade relationships (Parsan 1993).

South - South Trade Strategy: Background Deliberations over the establishment of New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1970s paved the way for the concept of South- South Cooperation. There was a felt need among DCs to strengthen trade ties within themselves. At the meeting held in 1976 at Mexico, the Group of 77 countries decided to go ahead with cooperation amongst developing nations. This turned out as Economic Cooperation among Developing Nations (ECDC). In 1964 during the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), S-S cooperation was a serious matter of discussion. Through the landmark deliberations, S-S dialogues got a turning point and a road map too. Followed by this in 1978 UN created the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) to promote South-South trade

71 SAJD 2015 and collaboration within its agencies (Alex, et. al, 2014). S-S trade discussions took centre stage in the ECDC programme. The subsequent meeting held at Caracas in 1981 outlined the details of S-S trade strategies. During the 1960s itself DCs started entering into economic cooperation to strengthen trade ties and enhance trade cooperation. Latin American Free Trade Association pioneered in establishing such a kind of cooperation in 1960. It consisted of Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay and later on Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia and Colombia joined the league. They aimed at dismantling all kinds of trade barriers like tariffs and NTBs. Thereafter Latin America, Africa and Asia witnessed many such economic arrangements. During 1960, a tripartite was formed between India, Yugoslavia and Egypt. As a part of increased cooperation China, Cuba and India launched technical assistance and financial cooperation programmes. The brand new face of the cooperation proved much effective than the traditional ones as they covered almost all DCs. Third world countries started mulling over an enhanced cooperation in order to increase the pace of their development. Three significant factors fuelled the concept of S-S. The failure of effective implementation of New International Economic Order (NIEO) and snail pace of North- South Dialogue prompted DCs to look for other way outs in terms of economic development. Decelerating growth in the developed countries led to sluggish demand for imports from DCs resulted negative multiplier effects on the DCs’ growth trajectory. These factors aggravated the so called ‘dependency syndrome’2 (Tadas 1992). The main focus of S-S cooperation was to attain self- reliance by the DCs whereas Singer (1983) was of the view that north was also interested in the development. Nevertheless S-S arrangement was to protect the national and collective self-interest of developing nations. Many of the policy makers aimed at such a cooperation under the presumption that the common problems of the DCs can be resolved and complementary resources can be utilized for mutual benefits (Bobiash 1992) Jacob Viner (1950) pioneered in bringing about a theory on the formation of economic blocs and regional integration. Later Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1960) enhanced it by providing more insights into trade creating and diverting effects of Customs Union. There were not significant attempts till 1970s to develop a theoretical back up for the concept of S-S approach. The S-S approach covers the concepts of economies of scale and trade in differentiated products. The theory points out to the gains from Intra- industry Trade that may augur well for ‘Southern countries’ than inter- industry trade among them and developed world (Kowalski & Shepherd 2006). If the S-S arrangement yields positive results then DCs can utilize the opportunity through learning by doing in comparatively less competitive markets and then expand it to the competitive market once it attains self-sufficiency

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(Otsubo 1998). However Krueger (1978), Deardorff (1979, 1985) and Stewart (1976, 1984) had given a theoretical basis for S-S approach (Parsan 1993).

South - South Trade Pattern Unlike the trend in the previous decade, S-S trade pattern underwent a shift and has seen stagnating since 2011. During the year 2013, S-S trade in goods was around $ 5 trillion. South-South trade is largely linked to East Asian economies. In 2013 more than 75 per cent of South-South trade was shipped to or from countries in the East Asian region. Whereas almost 50 per cent of East Asian trade occurs within the region, intra-regional trade is of much lower significance for Latin America and the Transition Economies (about 20 per cent), as well as remaining developing regions where this percentage falls to around 10 per cent or less. The increase in world trade between 2003 and 2013 has largely been driven by the rise of trade between developing countries (South–South). Trade between developed and developing countries (North-South and South-North) also increased substantially over the period, and represented a share of about 40 per cent of world trade in 2013, mainly comprising exports from developing nations towards the developed world (UNCTAD 2014).3 The growth of agriculture trade is relatively low among S-S trade. In merchandise exports the share of agriculture products stood at 11% in 2001. The growth rate of agriculture exports hovered between 3-7% during 1990 and 2001. Declining trend in terms of trade and trade barriers are attributed to the lower growth rate of trade in agriculture sector amongst S-S region (UNIDO 2009).4

South- South Trade in Spices In the case of spices specifically, the trade with developing market economy is robust. India exported spices worth of $ 89.8 million and $113.8 million during 2013 and 2014 respectively to the developing market economies. In 2014 the rate of growth of spices exports to developing market amounted to 27%. Pepper and capsicum were the major products exported to the developing market. However spices exported to the developed market economy stood at only $39.6 million and 43.5 million respectively for the same period (ITC Geneva, Trade Statistics) US, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, Australia and so on are the major export destinations of India for spices. India’s export to developed country market is showing a fluctuating trend. In the year 2011 the rate of growth of spices export to developed country market stood at 66%. However the next year and the subsequent year witnessed a negative growth rate of 12% and 3% respectively. The year 2010 witnessed a growth rate of 10% in spices export. Hence it is evident that in Spices trade there is a strong inclination to the DCs as destinations for India’s spices exports.

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Table: 1: India’s export of spices to Developed and Developing Market Economies in 2014 (In US $ thousands) Exports to developing Exports ped market Product label market economies economies Value in 2014 Value in 2014 Pepper, peppers and capsicum 499777 235574 Seeds of anise, badian, fennel, 319183 111355 coriander, cumin, etc. Ginger,saffron,turmeric, thyme, 214456 69152 bay leaves & curry Nutmeg, mace and cardamons 99806 12567 Cloves 4039 2510 Cinnamon and cinnamon-tree 559 2329 flowers Vanilla 286 1894 Total 1138106 435381 Source: ITC Geneva

Indo Africa Trade in Spices India and Africa shares a good track record in spices trade. African countries have been importing major chunk of spices from the Indian sub-continent which has got half of the market share in spice trade internationally. During the year 2014 India exported spices worth of $9.6 million to African region as against the previous year, $8.9 million. African countries like Algeria, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia have considerable spices trade with India. The following table gives a picture about spices trade between India and African countries.

Table: 2: India’s export of spices to Africa (In US $ thousands) India’s export to Africa Product label Value in 2013 Value in 2014 Seeds of anise, badian, fennel, 31989 39573 coriander, cumin, etc. Ginger, saffron, turmeric, 40735 35809 thyme, bay leaves & curry Pepper, peppers and capsicum 12871 15410 Nutmeg, mace and cardamons 2987 4232 Cloves 373 848

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Cinnamon and cinnamon-tree 176 208 fl owers Vanilla 3 191 Total 89134 96271 Source: ITC Geneva Figure 1

India’s spices exports to Africa

Source: Author’s computation using data from ITC Geneva

From the fi gure it is quite clear that India’s export of spices to African region shows an upward trend. However spices trade balance between few African nations and India came out negative. Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda are the countries that have negative trade balance with India in spices trade. Morocco, Algeria, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Cameron and Zimbabwe impose comparatively high rate of tariff for Indian exports of spices that hovers around 25- 30%. Major spices exporters to African countries are India, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and United States. The table given below includes export details of major exporters of spices to African continent.

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Table: 3: Africa’s Spices trade between major competitors of India (In US dollar 1000) Countries 2012 2013 China 22273 26511 Pakistan 1118 1528 Vietnam 67132 Not available Indonesia 5078 6192 Thailand 325 303 Malaysia 1551 1120 US 2013 2001

Source: ITC Geneva5

Issues and Challenges in Spices Trade with Africa Dwindling share of spices imports from India stands a matter of concern. Share of spices import from India by African nations shows a decline. On the other hand import of spices from some major players has gone up. Spices imports from China, Pakistan and Indonesia by African countries have shown an increase. Hence it is necessary to figure out the reasons behind such a trend in spices trade. The economic integration is being facilitated by the formation of three main regional trading blocs namely the Southern African Development Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the East African Community. These new trading blocs have been playing a defining role in jump- starting trade within the continent. China is planning to combine these regional economic communities to form the Africa Free Trade Zone, spanning the entire length of the continent from Cape Town to Cairo. In India all such talks on regional integration is at a nascent stage. There is a felt need for India to expedite the implementation of preferential trade agreement with SACU. In the trade meets at the ministers ‘level, African and Indian trade ministers reached a consensus on implementing a preferential trade agreement between South African Customs Union and India. A preferential trade agreement will allow goods to move duty free between India and five SACU countries namely Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. Several rounds of discussions have been held so far on implementing this effectively. But still it’s not on. Hence it is high time to fast track the procedures for getting it done. Once it is in place it will enhance the spices trade between India and Africa. Establishment of food processing clusters for enhancing trade on food and processed stuffs were in agenda for the previous trade meets. It has not been

76 South- South Cooperation and Spices trade implemented effectively to strengthen the trade ties. Reviewing the status of establishing food processing clusters would help spices trade to grow to the next level. It is necessary to review the running of India – Africa business council which was set up in 2012 trade meet. The main objective behind such a council was to strengthen trade ties with India and promote trade events in African countries. To enhance trade relationship with African continent, it is inevitable to deliberate upon the proposed free trade pact with 19 nations Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

India – LAC in Spices Trade India has been consistently keen on building up trade ties with Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region. Trade statistics reflects the overall Indian exports to this region have been growing considerably compared to other trading partners. Focus LAC under the focus area initiatives has fuelled trade growth between India and LAC.India’s trade with Latin America stood at $ 42 billion in 2013 in which the total export to this region is worth $ 14 billion. India has been engaged in considerable spices trade with LAC. Data suggests that spices trade between both the regions stood at $ 6.7 million in 2013 as against $ 5.4 million in the previous calendar year. Apart from India other major exporters of spices to LAC are China, Sri Lanka, Brazil and United States. Major commodity wise exports to LAC from India include seeds of anise, badian, fennel, coriander and cumin.

Table: 4: Spice trade between India and LAC(In US $ thousands) Product label Value in 2013 Value in 2014 Seeds of anise, badian, fennel, 30403 29362 coriander, cumin, etc. Pepper, peppers and capsicum 14260 28597 Ginger, saffron, turmeric, thyme, 6306 4976 bay leaves & curry Nutmeg, mace and cardamons 3048 3670 Cloves 93 225 Vanilla 9 19 Cinnamon and cinnamon-tree 19 19 flowers Total 54138 66868 Source: ITC Geneva

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Figure 2

India’s Exports to LAC

Source: Computation by author based on data from ITC Geneva

Colombia and Peru are third and fourth largest export destinations to Latin American countries from India. The two major Latin American countries have already kick started talks on forming a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the country. But the talks on agreement are still at a nascent stage and time frame has not been set.India’s export of spices to Colombia and Peru stands at $ 2.826 million and $ 5.253 million in 2013 respectively. Peru’s 25% and 17% of Colombia’s spices import are from India. The total import of spices for Peru and Colombia amounts to $ 20.559 million and $ 15.736 million respectively. There is an on-going talk on FTA between India and Peru started early this year to deepen the bilateral ties in commerce and trade fi elds. The Peruvian government has free-trade deals currently in force with China, one of its largest trading partners, the United States and Japan.FTA talks are on between India and Colombia along with Peru. Spices trade between both the countries have been consistently growing. In 2013 spice trade stood at $ 28.26 million and the growth of trade is at a negligible rate. Currently Colombia has free trade agreements with United States, European Union and Canada. Colombia has already signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) with India in the fi eld of agriculture. Colombia has considerable spice trade with Sri Lanka especially in Cinnamon. Sri Lankan export of Cinnamon to Colombia stands at $ 63.36 million. India currently has signed only one Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with MERCOSUR which is a trading bloc in Latin America comprising Brazil,

78 South- South Cooperation and Spices trade

Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Talks on FTA between India and Latin American countries like Mexico, Colombia and Peru are going on. India is mulling on setting up export warehouses in LAC on lease. It is learnt that the regulations for establishing warehouses are not so stringent in the LAC area. India already has these arrangements in the area. Spices trade would benefit more from such arrangements. LAC has better warehousing technologies and India should try to utilize those advanced technologies for warehousing spices and other agro items. Develop more transport links like air and sea links, direct shipping route and national carriers would favour trade especially agro and spices trade. The existing tariff regime in Colombia and Peru is stringent and India can have better trade links if it negotiates for eased tariff regimes.

The Chinese Threat It is noteworthy that trade between China and African region is bourgeoning particularly in agriculture and food processing segment. Africa now is the 3rd biggest trade partner of China. Bilateral trade volume in 2013 reached at $210.2 billion. Under the economic agreements and trade tie ups both are focusing on food processing sector. As far as spices trade is concerned Chinese spices export to Africa is growing at a significant rate. As we compare the growth rate of Chinese and Indian export of spices, it’s understood that China is making its presence felt in spices trade with African region. Under the spices category, trade in pepper between these two regions shows a consistent increase. Pepper trade between both the regions amounts to $1.34 crore in 2013 as against $4.3 million in 2011. Trade in cinnamon and cinnamon trade leaves shows as an uptick, with $8.7 million in 2013 as compared to $5.7 million in the previous calendar year. With the provision of capacity building and technology by China to African nations the Asian giant is establishing a strong presence in the region. During the year 2014 India’s growth rate of spices stood at only 8% when Chinese export of the product grew at 22%, which is an alarming growth rate compared to India. The table shows that China has been consistently growing in spices exports while India even registered a negative export growth rate during 2013.

Table 4 : Export growth of spices from China and India to Africa Year China’s Export growth (%) India’s Export growth (%) 2011 15% 35% 2012 21% 13% 2013 19% -7% 2014 22% 8% Source: Author’s calculation Figure 3 79 SAJD 2015

China’s Export of Spices to Africa

Source: Computed by author from ITC Geneva database

Table 5: Export growth rate of spices from India and China to LAC Year India’s Export growth (%) China’s Export growth (%) 2011 35% 41% 2012 27% -65% 2013 -25% 25% 2014 24% -27% Source: Author’s computation

China is trying out its best to grab higher market share for spices trade. Though trade with LAC region is not consistent, LAC markets are important destinations for China. In 2011 China’s export to LAC surpassed India’s and it grew at 35% and 41% from India and China. Similarly in the year 2013 when India posted a negative 25% growth China’s export of spices grew at 25%, though she suffered a setback in 2014. China’s growing trade ties is mainly due to the improved infrastructure and better transport links. Even with all Developing markets China is extending its wings in terms of spices trade. Though the rate of growth of exports is fl uctuating, there is no doubt that China is emerging as a competitor in spices trade with India.

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Table 6 : China’s export growth of spices to the developing markets Year China’s Export growth (%) India’s Export growth (%) 2011 20% 49% 2012 -27% 3% 2013 9% -9% 2014 8% 27% Source: Author’s computation

Conclusion Developing countries are involved in spices trade that amounts to half of the world trade but they are not maintaining their market share. Spices suppliers are constantly getting displaced by the emerging giants from the south like China (Ventura-Dias 1989). Stiff competition from China is turning out a threat for Indian spices exporters. The socio political and geographical conditions prevailing in these nations also decide the trajectory of spices trade. India need to find a rational way out to deal with threats from countries like China. Another major inherent challenge in the S-S approach is the trade barriers followed by DCs as a part of their international trade policies. Tariff and Non – Tariff Barriers erected by DCs for protecting the domestic industries in turn affect smooth trade relationship amongst the so called southern countries. According to Balassa (1971) and Krueger (1978) the level of trade protectionism maintained by DCs are very high. There has been significant trade flows amongst DCs in primary products. Processed food products are significant part of the trade composition. Among DCs regions like Middle East are economically well performing and has well defined trade pattern. Commodities trade flow of South Asian nations is also very robust. There have been significant intra-regional trade ties among Latin American region. Evaluation of tariffs and NTBs prevailing in particular to spices is the need of the hour. There are ample arguments regarding S- S arrangements. Some are of the view that it is technically difficult for the southern countries to compete with North as they are well equipped with high end technologies. The only way out is to provide preferential treatments in terms of tariff concessions. Structuralists argue that while indulging in trade with North by southern nations, the latter tend to lose out due to the deteriorating terms of trade and less bargaining capacity with the advanced nations. Hence there is greater possibility of gains from S-S arrangement and it seems more equitable than North – South trade. According to Arthur Lewis, through S-S trade there will be a long stable equilibrium in the growth and development among developing nations. As growth in Developed nations slow down, S-S arrangement will augur well for Southern nations to fill

81 SAJD 2015 in the gap. This realigned trade arrangement helps to come out of the challenges posed by increased protectionism from the north. For spices trade south region is a fertile land for India and so far the country has been successful in establishing a significant trade tie. If India is able to contain the undue competitions from China, Guatemala, etc and other nations who have graduated6 and waiting for graduation from these regions, there is high potential in spices trade. Besides, India there should be considerable academic attention given to remove the unnecessary trade barriers erected by these nations.

Notes 1. North – South trade refers to trade among Developed and Developing worlds. 2 See Centre-Periphery theory by Raul Prebisch. 3 “Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade- 2014.” 4 See “South-South Cooperation, Economic and Industrial Development of Developing Countries: Dynamics, Opportunities and Challenges” 2009) 5 http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-import-country-product/ 6 The concept refers to countries that are LDCs making significant improvement in standard of living, health care and other basic requirements dealing with the quality of life. These are measured by various indices.

References Alex, U., Kelechi, U., Nwachukwu, O., & Bruno, I. (2014): “South - South Cooperation and the Prospects of a New International Economic Order: An Insight into the India Brazil- South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum,” International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education (IJHSSE), 1(8). Retrieved from https://www.arcjournals.org/ pdfs/ijhsse/v1-i8/20.pdf Balassa, B. (1971): The structure of protection in developing countries, Baltimore: Published for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank by the Johns Hopkins Press. Balassa, B., De Melo, J., & Sapir, A. (1991): Trade theory and economic reform--North, South, and East, Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell. Bobiash, D. (1992): South-south aid, Basingstoke.: Macmillan. “Empirical evidence on the direction of developing countries’ trade (1984). In Olin Havrylyshn (ed.), South- South or North- South Trade, 62-107. ICTSD (2013): South-South cooperation: A new glow in international cooperation?: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Retrieved 29 December 2015, from http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/south-south- cooperation-a-new-glow-in-international-cooperation IJHSSE (20014): “South - South Cooperation and the Prospects of a New International Economic Order: An Insight into the India Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum,” International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education (IJHSSE), 1(8), 171-182. Retrieved from https://www.arcjournals.org/pdfs/ijhsse/v1-i8/20.pdf

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Kowalski, P., & Shepherd, B. (2006): “ South-South Trade In Goods,” ECD Trade Policy Papers. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/314103237622 Kowalski, P., & Shepherd, B. (2006): “South-South Trade in Goods,” in Organisation For Economic Co-Operation And Development, TRADE DIRECTORATE TRADE COMMITTEE, Working Paper, (40). Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/ officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=td/tc(2006)8/ final Krueger, A. (1978): Liberalization attempts and consequences, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co. Otsubo, S. (1998): ”New Regionalism and South-South Trade: Could it be an Entry Point for the South toward global integration?,” APEC Discussion Paper No. 18. Parsan, E. (1993): South-south trade in global development, Aldershot: Avebury. Singer, Hand W. (1983): “North-South Multipliers,” World Development, 11 May, 451-484. Tadas, G. A.. (1992): Review of Challenges of South-South Cooperation (Parts 1 & 2)]. Indian Economic Review, 27(2), 243–246. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/ Singer, Hans W. (1983): North-South stable/29793585 Multipliers World Development, (May), UNCTAD (2014): Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade- 2014. Retrieved from 451-484. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2014d2_en.pdf UNIDO (2009): “South-South Cooperation, Economic and Industrial Development of Developing Countries: Dynamics, Opportunities and Challenges,” Working Paper- Research And Statistics Branch - UNIDO. Retrieved from http://www.unido.org// fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Research_and_statistics/Branch_publications/ Research_and_Policy/Files/Working_Papers/2009/WP%2002%20South-South%20 Cooperation.pdf Ventura-Dias, V. (1989): South-South trade, New York: Praeger. Viner, Jacob (1950): The Customs Union Issues, New York: Carnegic Endowment for International Peace.

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Role of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka Tulika Gaur

The field of International Studies has for long emphasised the primary or ‘State’ as it has been under influence of the Realist school of thought. However, recent trends have shown that there have been inclusions of various non-state entities as well. The growing complexities of the field of International Politics in the wake of globalization have resulted in blurring the boundaries of ‘State’ and making politics a concept beyond territorial limits. With the advent of globalization, politics has become unbounded and de-territorialized, and since then every non-state actor as well as institution could be a part of the political affair. Diasporas have increasingly become an important non-state entity in national as well as international politics for a variety of reasons (Sheffer 2003). The activities of the diaspora communities have involved social networks and new power relations involving their homeland and host country in such a manner that it has profoundly changed the dynamics of the political setting in both homeland as well as host country (Cheran and Vimalarajah 2011). The diasporas might contribute to development in their homeland in many other ways than by sending remittances alone. For instance, they might contribute to economic growth by setting up enterprises themselves or helping relatives to do so. This is not only a function of remittances, but it also potentially implies a beneficial transfer of know-how and competencies, generally known as “brain gain” (Fair 2005). Besides contributing to economic development, the diasporas can also play an important role in stimulation of political debate, the strengthening of the civil society, the enabling and encouraging of education for the people living in their homeland and, in turn, working for their emancipation. They raise fundamental questions of how their homeland has handled mobility and the political, economic and cultural issues that they have seen to be of crucial importance (Nandakumar 2011). In the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, we see that its formation as a ‘transnational factor’ in homeland politics was fuelled by political uncertainties

85 SAJD 2015 and violence against the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The main origin of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora can be traced to the North-Eastern part of the Sri Lankan territory. Earlier it was sought to be a choice, in search of better life and income which was basically the choice of the elite class of Sri Lanka. They opted for a sort of temporary emigration which was basically aimed at higher and better education and employment. Britain and North America were the most preferred locations to settle. However, later the trends got changed and the continuous policies made by the Sinhalese majoritatian governments left the Tamils feel neglected. Hence, there emerged a demand for an exclusive homeland from the Sri Lankan Tamils that got continuous support from their diaspora communities. It has resulted in various clashes and wars that we can find in the history of Sri Lanka.

Emergence of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora as a Transnational Actor The first three decades after independence of Sri Lanka were the years that had introduced the Sri Lankan Tamils to various discriminatory policies of the Sri Lankan government. Despite the formation of the constitution which under its Article 29(2) prohibited legislation that discriminated against any individual on the basis of religion or community (DeSilva 1998), the discrimination against the Tamils kept occurring. The 1956 Official Language Act prevented the Tamils from undertaking or even continuing with their employment (Ibid). The standardization policy aggravated the grievances of the Tamils by making them devoid to take up the higher education in the country. The feeling of being a ‘victim diaspora’ further gained strength and resulted in another section of diasporas wanting to get education wherever they could afford to. This led to a serious ‘brain drain’ within the Sri Lankan society (Suntha 2011: 14-15). The increasing volume of displacements was further borne out of prevailing increasing tensions and inter-communal violence, such as the burning of Jaffna Library in 1981 and the riots of 1983 (Wilson 2000: 160). The events of 1983 had a great role in making the Tamil diaspora such big community that became inevitable for the world to keep ignoring them anymore. The anti-Tamils violence made the Tamils feel scared to stay in the country and motivated more to settle abroad. Moreover, the social elite class that used to go to West for temporary engagements like education and employment started getting reluctant to move back to their homeland as they perceived the environment prevailing there hostile to them (Sriskandarajah 2004). As a result, across Europe and North America, thousands of Tamil students and guest workers lodged asylum claims. Also the emigration flows of the professional and middle-class Tamils started gaining strength. The events of 1983 marked the start of the widespread conflict-related flows of Tamils seeking asylum overseas and later through family reunion programmes (Cheran and Vimalarajah 2011). 1

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The most recent influx of these migrants have 65been basically due tothe fourth Eelam war in mid-2006 that had paralyzed the whole north-eastern part of Sri Lanka till the mid of 2009. Majority of these migrants wanted to avoid the ugly consequences of the ethnic war. Hence, they chose to migrate to places that they considered to be safe for them. The Sri Lankan Tamil community has developed multi-dimensional linkages that strengthened the nexus between the diaspora and erstwhile homeland, as well as between different diaspora settlements across the world. “The settlement led to founding of numerous community groups that had become a key source of funds for aiding the development of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka, while also being linked to militant groups as fund-raisers” (International Crisis Group 2010). Advocacy groups have also emerged which seek to alleviate the plight of the Tamils by bringing it to the attention of their host governments. Hence, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora has been instrumental in shaping the Sri Lankan political landscape, particularly through its support and sponsorship for the Tamil nationalist project.

Nature of Diasporic Role in Conflict: 2006-2009 By the time the fourth eelam war started, some western countries had banned the LTTE and the support to it was seen as an act of terrorism. Hence the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora were not able to support the insurgent movement. There was also an ideological factor with a shift among the second generation of the diaspora (International Crisis Group 2010). According to Nandakumar (2011:9), during the fourth eelam war, it was the second generation who had taken charge of the diaspora in a different manner. This newer generation of Tamils came forward in support of their people but in a different way than their parents and grandparents. “Instead of giving an unconditional financial aid to the LTTE, they wanted a peaceful negotiation with the government of Sri Lanka” (International Crisis Group 2010). “This generation had grown up during the many years of war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. They had access to reports throughout the years of key battles, as well as almost daily reports of human rights abuses” (Nandakumar 2011: 9). They considered themselves a native of their host country and they remain aware of their rights and duties towards their host country as well. However, this didn’t make them forget about their Tamil origin. According to Orjuela (2008), the major objectives of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora during the fourth eelam war were:

• Lobbying their host governments. • Raising awareness among their host country’s non-Tamil population as well.

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• Mobilizing the Tamil diaspora towards the formation of an opinion about their homeland. • Shaping the views of their host government as well as host country’s population about matters and issues in Sri Lanka. • Investing in Sri Lanka with a view to shaping the political structure and help maintaining the Tamil demand justified.

To fulfil these objectives the diaspora had to opt for a much focussed strategy that would lead them to attain their stated goals. The strategies of the diasporic acts included various actions that supported their objectives.

● Lobbying the host governments The diasporas had been indirectly involved in the war. And since 9/11, their support to the LTTE, direct or indirect, was always considered illegal as their host countries had banned LTTE by tagging it as a ‘terrorist organization.’ Hence, in order to gain the identity of an insurgent movement back, it was necessary for them to pressurize the host government to lift the ban as well as ask the Sri Lankan government to stop the war and save the innocent Tamils in Sri Lanka (International Crisis Group 2010). In order to lobby their host government they had to make their positions strong enough in their host societies.

Increased Participation in Host Land’s Electoral Politics Since the fourth eelam war broke out in the post-9/11 scenario and by the end of 2006, approximately every other country had banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Hence, the diasporas main objective was to get the ban lifted and show the world that the LTTE was misunderstood to be a terrorist organization. It realized that mere protesting against the host land laws would land them in trouble as well. Thus, their main strategy to act towards it was by participating in the politics of their host land and then influence its policies towards both the LTTE as well as the Sri Lankan state (International Crisis Group 2010: 15; Nandakumar 2011: 8). They understood that if they had something to be done by their host state, they would not be able to do it if they stood against the host government. Hence, the only way to influence the host government was to create an influential position of themselves by participating in their politics as well. Their main agenda remained getting Tamils elected to office and using electoral clout and money to influence policy makers.2

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Creation of Organizations: British Tamil Forum (BTF) Formed in 2006, this organization was an initiation of the British Tamils. It aims at the political mobilization of both the Tamil diasporas and the British political establishment, both politicians and officials. Since they have a huge membership (around 10,000), they have managed to organise mass movements at a grand level that could draw the attention of the British government as well as British people towards their cause. On 16 July 2008, the BTF displayed a photo exhibition, sponsored by the All Party Parliamentary Group for Tamils (APPG), which was held in the British Houses of Parliament premises on the anniversary of the Black July pogrom, and marked 50 years since the 1958 riots on the island. “Photos depicted political figures,” according to BTF, “responsible for structural and physical violence in the North-East since Ceylon’s independence from Britain as well as victims of the Sri Lankan civil war.” The event was attended by MPs of all parties, Members of the House of Lords, former Cabinet Ministers, Mayors, Councillors, University students, and representatives of international & UK organisations. Attendees included three MPs of the Tamil National Alliance - Ms Padmini Sithamparanathan, Jayananthamoorthi and Gagendran, a representative of the Sri Lankan High Commissioner in London, Labour Party MPs Joan Ryan, Virendra Sharma, Keith Vaz, Andy Love and Lord Waddington QC of the Conservative Party. Keith Vaz stated that “in his 21 year career in politics, he had never seen a protest as large as it in London.” Addressing the crowd, he challenged “the Indian High Commission to pressurize Colombo to give peace a chance” (Tamilnet 2008). According to the International Crisis Group Report (2010: 15), for the past several years, the Tamil diaspora organizations like the British Tamil Forum (BTF) and Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) have organised Tamil votes for parliamentary candidates sympathetic to their cause. Moreover, the population of the Tamil diaspora in some countries has been so dense that it becomes almost impossible for politicians seeking election to ignore the Tamil issues in Sri Lanka.

● Raising awareness among the host country’s non-Tamil population Through the several protests3 and demonstrations the diasporas got an opportunity to get connected with both Tamils as well as non-Tamil populations in their host society and understand their viewpoints. Hence, civilian suffering was the main cause for the youth joining the protests.

Holding Processions and Road Blocks During the last phase of the fourth eelam war, there were reports that the government of Sri Lanka, in the name of war, had actually been carrying out genocide of the Tamils. The sense of injustice and brutality provided a momentum

89 SAJD 2015 to the Tamils abroad and they started getting mobilized to protest in their respective homelands through blocking the roads and making their presence felt by the people of their host country as well as the host government. Many scholars have termed this way of protest as ‘non-violent civil disobedience’ as the diasporas remained calm and their main motive remained to be a peaceful protest demonstration (Tamilnet 2009). However, a remarkable thing about these road blocks was that being under the new leadership of the younger generation of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, these protests showed their concerns for their host country’s people as well. During these road blocks, the protestors appealed to the people in their host country and the host government for support. They also kept apologizing for causing traffic jams and disrupting the regular routine of their host society. This showed that the younger generation was very tactful in handling these protests as they wanted to assert themselves without bothering their host governments. And eventually, they did succeed in grabbing the attention of the national as well as international media by these kinds of lawful protests where nobody was harmed and people just tried to present their viewpoint and appeal for help. The whole world took note of it and there were talks at international organizations on this issue. This young generation did make a difference in the level of protests as it captured the headlines of the news everywhere around the globe.

Acts of Self-immolation One of the most critical ways of reaction from the diasporas to the last phase of war in their homeland occurred in form of self-immolation acts.4 In India, at least eight people self-immolated, including a family man and a worker of ruling Congress party. In Malaysia, a Tamil man of Sri Lankan origin also self-immolated himself, calling on US President Barack Obama to stop Colombo’s war (Tamilnet 2010). These acts demonstrated the desperation of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora suffering from the helplessness and inability to stop killings.

Hunger Strikes Across the globe, the diaspora Tamils conducted hunger strikes to draw attention to the situation in Sri Lanka and to call for an immediate ceasefire in order to save the civilian population that remained the target of the Sri Lankan government onslaught. The initiative was once again taken by the British-Tamil community when two men5 began a hunger strike in London in April 2009, wowing not to take food or water until their demands were met. The hunger strikers demanded that food and medical aid should be allowed to reach the civilians immediately. This made the British MPs promise to arrange meetings with the UN,

90 Role of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Conflict the US and the EU. However, both wowed to return to their fast with no food or liquids if the meetings proved unfruitful. David Parajasingham, a spokesman for the British Tamils’ Forum, said that he was concerned that the hunger strike would spread. “If our demands for the cessation of the genocide in Sri Lanka are not met, I fear this protest will escalate by others joining them,” he said. “In our culture, when people do this, they follow it through. They are not afraid to die” (Tamil Guardian 2009). His words turned into reality soon when the Tamil diasporas all over the world eventually joined in this effort of the diaspora Tamil students in various countries, who sat on hunger strikes to pressurize the international community and governments to open their eyes and look at the genocide that was happening to innocent people.

● Mobilizing the Tamil Diaspora for Creating an Opinion about Their Homeland The main aspect of the diaspora activities remained to keep mobilizing the Tamil diaspora all around the world so as to have a firm ground against the Sri Lankan state. It was realized that until and unless the diaspora Tamils were in a significant number, the international community would not pay heedto their demands. Hence, mobilizing and encouraging the diaspora Tamils was an important thing.

Use of Cyber Space for Gathering Support for an Independent Eelam Equipped with recent advances in technology, the use of cyber space by the newer generation of Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora was used as a powerful tool to gain a firm ground against the Sri Lankan state. The internet became a primary source of information and communication and provided a connection between the diasporas and the Tamils of Sri Lanka. This wave of nationalism was more evident in those Tamils who had never been to their homeland but still their connections remained as strong as the first generation Tamil diaspora. A website known as ‘Thesamnet’ was formed in 2007 to highlight the instances of oppresiion in Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Army. The Tamil diaspora felt that there was insufficient coverage by the media of the incidents that involved brutal killings of the innocent people. This site also began to function later on as a rallying point where Tamils with different political opinion could share their views on issues such as recognition of a historic Tamil homeland, the Tamil nation etc. (Cheran and Vimalarajah 2011).

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Use of Facebook Facebook has been a major source of “information and ground of activity for many second generation activists. As a social networking site with over 350 million active users, it was very popular among many of the second generation Tamils” (Nandakumar 2011: 12). They posted news updates as they updated their status, which alerted their friends to current events.

● Shaping the views of their host government as well as host country’s population about matters and issues in Sri Lanka Apart from mobilizing the Tamils, it was equally important that the entire international community was mobilized in order to make the Sri Lankan government stop the war which was claiming several innocent lives each day. Several organizations were formed which had the main agenda to propagate the Tamil idea about a separate nation and convey it to the entire international community.

Establishing Political Organizations Again, at the initiative of the British-Tamils, the ‘Tamil Youth Organisation (TYO)’ was created. It focussed on mobilizing and raising awareness among the British population, especially those between the ages of 16 and 30 (Sarvendra 2011: 21). The ‘Tamil Information Centre (TIC)’ as well as ‘Tamil National Council (TNC)’ was formed with a motive to initiate advocacy and public campaigns on the Tamil issue to promote just policies and procedures by governments and international institutions; disseminate information and works of creative imagination in order to increase public knowledge on Tamil history, culture and contemporary politics; provide facilities for research, consultation, advice and community activities (http://www.tamilinfo.org). The ‘Sri Lankan Democracy Forum (SLDF)’ is another organization that became active during the fourth eelam war in the UK and other 12 countries.6 It stands for global network of human rights and democracy activists committed to promote democratisation and inter-ethnic co-existence in Sri Lanka. Formed in 2002, it has been continuously campaigning for a permanent political solution that would meet the aspirations of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Hence, they have been really important in achieving the objective of the Tamil diaspora to shape the views of the international community (http://www.tamilinfo.org).

Welfare Services There have been organizations focussing on the development and welfare needs of the Tamils in Sri Lanka since the time the diaspora community was

92 Role of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Conflict formed. ‘White Pigeon’ was set up to fund the provision of artificial limbs for those affected by the conflict, the organization was also engaged in fundraising for humanitarian needs that led them to have a say in the policy-making process and in raising awareness about the humanitarian needs of the Tamil people among the non-Tamil population” (Tamilnet 2010). “The Medical Institute of Tamils (MIOT) worked to bring together Tamil medical professionals, who could contribute their skills in their homeland during the fourth eelam war” (Bergh of Peace Report 2011). Thus, to conclude we can say that during the Eelam war IV, while the pro- LTTE elements in the diaspora remained reluctant to support the armed struggle, there was a shift in their strategy to support the Tamil Eelam, rather than a change in the objective itself. The new strategy attempted to carry forward the struggle in a more transparent and democratic way.

Impact of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora Activities The Tamil diaspora’s campaign in the UK has grabbed the attention of the international community successfully. “Through their boycott campaigns, the diaspora Tamils explained to the companies as well as the buyers to refrain from buying clothing with ‘Made-in-Sri Lanka label’. Many young shoppers were horrified to learn that part of the money earned from garments sale fundsthe military that has been committing atrocities against the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Many shoppers did not know that Sri Lanka exported over 50% of its garments to US, and that Sri Lanka was forcibly holding 300,000 Tamils in concentration camps. “The response from the public was very encouraging. Garment exports to U.S. declined by 19.5 per cent contributing to overall Sri Lanka’s export earnings from garments and textiles to decline by 4.9 per cent to US dollars 241 million by the mid of 2009” (Tamilnet 2009). There was also impact on their host governments which made them question the activities of the Sri Lankan government. Regional and international powers (notably India, Japan, the U.S., Britain and Germany) who initially upheld the view that the LTTE had to be controlled in light of its unwillingness to explore a negotiated settlement, began to demand the Government of Sri Lanka to address the root cause of the conflict due to which the world had to witness the emergence of a terrorist organization. There were continuous attempts from various government officials of the Western states7 to convince Rajapaksa to consider an autonomy solution. “A special session of the U.N. human Rights Council (UNHRC) was also held immediately after the war was over where the Sri Lankan government was asked to reply to the criticism posed by the Western states. A group of Western states, including Britain, France, Canada, Germany and Switzerland, had called

93 SAJD 2015 this session of the UNHRC specifically to discuss allegations of civilian killings” (Sunday Times: 24 May, 2009).

Role of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in the Post-war Era The post-war era is marked by an ideological shift within the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora community. Even the pro-Tiger elements have now realized that militancy is not an option if they have to save their ethnic kin groups. Hence, their new agenda has been to get involved in political deals with the Sri Lankan state and continue with their struggle for an independent Tamil state through peaceful means. However, it remains unclear as to what these peaceful methods will consist of, but the decision of continuing with their struggle remains intact even after the defeat of the LTTE. The remobilization of the diaspora group is still an ongoing process, but the foundation has been laid out in the past two years through three major initiatives in the diaspora community: the Global Tamil Forum (GTF); the referendum on the Vaddukodai Resolution of 1976; and the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE). “These initiatives were born out of the belief that Tamil politicians in Sri Lanka cannot express their real political views- including continued support for a separate state- and that is up to the diaspora to push the ideas they cannot safely espouse. The immediate aim has been to convince the Western governments to pressure Colombo to negotiate a political deal with Tamils” (International Crisis Group 2010).

Global Tamil Forum (GTF) Global Tamil Forum (GTF) was established in 2009 by a number of grass- roots Tamil groups following the end of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. It is the largest Tamil diaspora organisation with members drawn from fifteen countries in five continents. GTF is absolutely committed to a non-violent agenda and it seeks a lasting peace in Sri Lanka, based on justice, reconciliation and a negotiated political settlement. According to the official website of the GTF, it is “an independent, international organization adhering to the principles of democracy and non-violence and deriving its strength from grassroots organizations of the Tamil Diaspora that is willing to work in solidarity with Tamils in Eelam and other communities in Sri Lanka to restore Tamils’ right to self-determination and democratic self-rule in their traditional homeland in the island of Sri Lanka that would lead to self- sufficiency, sustainability and equal opportunity to its people, through its political and economic success by engaging the international community” (http://www. globaltamilforum.org).

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The Global Tamil Forum lays its foundation on the principles of emancipation promoted by Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King to oppose the entire edifice of oppression and discrimination through peaceful means and to champion the rights of Tamil and other communities who have been unjustly deprived of their rights and silenced” (http://www.globaltamilforum.org). Through this initiative the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora was quick enough to declare that its stand was essentially non-violent in nature and it didn’t have any intention to follow the footsteps of the LTTE. However, the Sri Lankan government kept on arguing that the GTF was just a ‘cover-up’ for what used to be the LTTE. Even though there were allegations, the international community welcomed the initiative and on the inauguration several British MPs addressed the diaspora community acknowledging their effort towards a non-violent method of making their demands.

Referendum Just after the war ended in 2009, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora sought to lead the movement. Hence, “between late 2009 and early 2010, a series of privately funded referenda were held in the Tamil diaspora communities of Norway, France, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in order to gauge support for an independent Tamil Eelam” (International Crisis Group 2010: 13). Voting was done on the issue of support for the Vaddukodai Resolution of 1976 which clearly aimed at creation of a separate nationhood for the Sri Lankan Tamils. These referenda were organized by independent elections professionals, but were sponsored by both pro-LTTE as well a independent organizations (International Crisis Group 2010). “In a full turn out of the diaspora community, 99 per cent of votes favoured the resolution and stood by the decision of continuing the struggle of their Tamil people in their homeland. Almost entire diaspora participated in holding the referenda and later on in other countries also it was held. This was the most significant political development in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora community since the LTTE’s defeat. The results underscored the vast support for an independent state in the diaspora and the fact that the polls were held when the LTTE’s grip on Tamils was at its weakest since the start of the war adds greater legitimacy to them. These polls have proved that, at least in the short-term, pro-LTTE elements in the diaspora will use non-violent political methods to continue the struggle for Tamil Eelam. The polls were expensive, which clearly proves the potential of the diapora community to raise funds for a separatist cause even without the LTTE. And the relatively high

95 SAJD 2015 turnout reiterates the fact that they still are willing to come together for their ethnic kin groups and stand as one with them” (International Crisis Group 2010: 14). This form of self-organised democracy received much attention from the media and the international community as well. This referendum8 indicated that with the end of LTTE, the idea of self-determination hasn’t ended. And eventually this action paved the way for the formation of another democratic initiative: the transnational government.

Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) is a political formation to win the freedom of the Tamil people on the basis of their fundamental political principles of Nationhood, Homeland and Right of self-determination.9 Established in the early 2010, the TGTE is supposed to be an ambitious attempt to rebrand the LTTE as a non-violent democratic political body in the diaspora community. “There were mixed reactions to the TGTE from both the Tamil diaspora community as well as the Tamils residing in Sri Lanka. In the diaspora community, the hardcore supporters of the LTTE, who still believed in the continuation of a military struggle against the Sri Lankan state, remained unsatisfied with the TGTE. They criticized it by saying that it was merely a remote controlled transnational corporation under the control of the leaders who betrayed the entire Sri Lankan Tamil community by adopting a belligerent attitude towards the Sri Lankan state. The Tamils residing in Sri Lanka also saw the TGTE as a dangerous organization because it remained at a distance and no Tamils from the country were part of its decision making authority. Hence, they argued that unless they suffered the pain of a war, they might not understand the real need of the Tamils and might not take a just decision on their behalf (International Crisis Group 2010). Even the host countries of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora maintained a distance from the TGTE as controversy and confusion plagued it. Frustrated by the TGTE’s vacillation on separatism, one diplomat called it “just another LTTE front and just another example of LTTE double-speak.” The United States government has publicly declared that it does not recognise the transnational government despite its democratic overtures. Nobody as such within the entire Tamil community profess to understand what really the TGTE is. Even the executive and advisory committee members have expressed confusion and scepticism (International Crisis Group 2010). However, these initiatives have now shifted their focus from the right to self- determination to other important issue i.e. human rights violations in Sri Lanka. There have been various activities apart from these initiatives on the part of the

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Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora community to bring the real picture of the Sri Lankan Tamils in front of the whole world and get support for their demands.

Creating Awareness Regarding War Crimes and “Genocide” Most of the activities of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora community have centred on making the world aware of the various war crimes taking place in the Tamil areas of the Sri Lankan territory. Aligned with the TGTE and the GTF, the main work of the diaspora group in the post-war era has focussed on collecting evidences on the war crimes and other abuses done by the Sri Lankan military officials on the Sri Lankan Tamils even though the war is over. However, these efforts are non-violent and remain political in nature. “Their basic motive remains to propagate their feeling of ‘being victimized’ all around the world and gather support and demand justice for their people who are facing human rights abuses in their own country” (International Crisis Group 2010: 15). A positive outcome of this has been the kind of reactions of the western countries against the Sri Lankan government. There have been initiatives in the United Nations for an investigation through an international bench over these allegations of the Tamil diaspora group which the Sri Lankan state has been avoiding. Due to this awareness there have been immense increase in the level of support for the Sri Lankan Tamils and the world has become more concerned about their safety. While there have been great impact of this on their host governments as well as rest of the world, there have been rejections also to some extent. Some countries have been claiming that the reports arranged by the Tamil diaspora groups remain biased and might have no credibility. For instance, the TAG10 and other Tamil activists organized a ‘People’s Permanent Tribunal’ which in 2010 declared that the Sri Lankan government was guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity on the basis of various evidences that included interviews of the victims and eyewitnesses. However, the credibility of this tribunal was always questioned by the western states as they claimed that there was no action or evidence on the crimes done by the LTTE.

Political Lobbying by the Younger Generation of the Tamil Diaspora The younger generation of the Tamil diaspora, being raised and educated in the West and armed with advance university degrees, seem to possess a better understanding of the political processes. For example, “Organizations like People for Equality and Relief in Lanka (PEARL), comprised of American-Tamil students from the elite universities, have been trying since 2005 to influence the U.S. policymakers by using professional advocacy techniques rather than the bullying

97 SAJD 2015 tactics of other Tamil groups” (http://www.pearlaction.org). They have also been influential enough in order to bring their host governments to pressurize the Sri Lankan government to come to a ceasefire in the early 2009. Further, their demonstrations and protests have been also attracting the attentions of their host governments towards closure of internment camps and demanding the right for Tamils in Sri Lanka to return to their lands.

Boycotts Sections of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora are also engaged in weakening the Sri Lankan economy through international boycotts of Sri Lankan goods as well as the termination of the European Union’s ‘GSP Plus’ trade concession.11 According to Apparel industry sources, the main benefactors of GSP Plus, “the withdrawal of European Union trade benefits increased the costs and eroded their competitiveness. It had an impact on the industry. Over 50 per cent of Sri Lankan apparel exports used to go to the EU. Whatever apparel qualified for GSP Plus, their costs went up by about 10 per cent making the industries to bear the extra cost”. Loss of the GSP (Generalised System of Preferences) Plus benefits meant Sri Lankan exporters lost duty free access to EU markets and their shipments were charged an import duty of about 9.6 per cent. Many factories were forced to close, resulting in large-scale lay-offs of workers. According to data just released by the Central Bank, earnings from apparel exports fell eight per cent to 343.5 million dollars in 2009 from the year before (Bandarage 2010). They opted for effective ways to send their message to the big-label companies, including Gap, Banana Republic, and Nike that ‘ethical shoppers would not tolerate companies doing business with the governments that are gross human rights violators’ (International crisis Group 2010: 16; Tamilguardian 2010; Tamilnet 2010). To conclude we can say that the diaspora network has influenced the international media, academia as well as the international human rights organizations to present their homeland politics simply centring on the ethnic conflict between a Sinhalese government oppressor and a Tamil minority victim. The diaspora had also been lobbying the international community to stop the Sri Lankan government’s military offensive against the Tamils in the island. It has continued to mount human rights violation charges against the Sri Lankan government and to demand international support to establish a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka.

Conclusion The fourth eelam war gave a new framework for the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora community to get involved in its homeland peace and conflict situations. It brought

98 Role of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Conflict the moderate and uninterested Tamil diasporas, who would have never been part of anything regarding their homeland, into the mainstream of the Tamil struggle. The feeling of isolation and helplessness made their homeland nationalist sentiments even stronger, despite the fact that the international community didn’t support them until 2009. The focus of the diaspora activities remained to be the Sri Lankan government’s actions over the period of 2006-mid 2009 and what they perceived as the international community’s apparent lack of action and mishandling of the displacement and killing of civilians from 2006 onwards. Like separatist movements in other parts of the world, the armed struggle for an independent Tamil homeland was sustained for years in large part because of support from this passionate, vocal diaspora living outside the country. For years these communities have rallied around the flag of the Tamil Tigers, officially known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Now that the Sri Lankan military’s final assault on the L.T.T.E. seems to have finished them as a military force, Tamils outside Sri Lanka are left to figure out how to continue their struggle to stop “war against Tamils” by the Sinhalese majority on the island. The Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas feel that Sri Lankan mainstream politics has been and will continue to revolve around the ethnic issue that has plagued the country since independence. The way the war was led and the way in which it ended and the destruction of the LTTE have deeply affected the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Tamil diaspora and have shattered their confidence, regardless of whether they were members, sympathisers or opponents of the LTTE. Since the Tamils in Sri Lanka still face hardships, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora community is bound to take a role for itself to continue with the struggle in a democratic manner. This means that the Tamil diaspora would continue to be an extremely vital element of their homeland politics, even if the Sri Lankan state refuses to recognize that. The active participation of the Tamil diaspora at the 2009 protests suggested that a new generation has come forward to carry on the struggle.

Notes 1. The highest number of people had applied for asylum in Europe during the 1980s. This was the period when civil war had begun to take its shape and got worse as the time passed. The report of UNHCR claims that the number of asylum seekers during this phase was around 256,307 2. For instance, Janani Jananayagam, who ran in the June 2009 European Parliamentary elections, received over 50,000 votes, which was more than the combined vote for all other independent candidates in the UK. Jananayagam, a banker and spokesperson for TAG, ran in London where thousands of Tamils saw her as a vote for Tamil Eelam (BBC news report 2009). 3. “When it was discovered, that the Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapakse was to visit the United Kingdom, just a few weeks later, a mass protest was organised. As the situation in the Tamil homeland deteriorated, the numbers attending the protests grew, with over thousands of people of all ages, from the elderly with walking sticks to babies in prams, attending the

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demonstration outside the Houses of Parliament in Westminster. The eight hour protest saw slogans chanted through megaphones and placards displayed with pictures of Tamil civilians that had been massacred and scenes from the war. Also a signed petition was handed over to the then Prime Minister Tony Blair” (Nandakumar 2011: 7-8). 4. “In Chennai in January 2009 a 26-year old Tamil activist, K Muthukumar, doused himself in petrol and set himself on fire as an act of protest against the Sri Lankan government and the failure of the Indian government to save the Eelam Tamils. He died after 90 minutes. When asked by a doctor ‘why an educated person like himself had committed self-immolation?’, he had replied that “several thousands of more intelligent and educated Tamil people were dying” in Eelam and that he “intended to save thousands of lives by sacrificing himself.” Muthukumar’s death sparked off a series of immolations, mainly in India, but also in Malaysia” (Tamilnet 2009). 5. Sivatharsan Sivakumaraval, 21, ended his protest after gaining assurances that he could travel to the United States, European Union and United Nations to discuss the plight of Tamil civilians with the authorities. Sivakumaraval said he had agreed to drink water after being promised that he would be able to take part in talks on the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils. His fellow hunger striker, 28-year-old student Prarameswaran Subramaniam, agreed to take liquids but continued his fast next to the Houses of Parliament in London, with doctors monitoring his condition (Tamilnet 2010). 6. Presently there are people connected to the network in the following countries : Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Sri Lanka, United States. 7. For example, within four days of war ending, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton telephoned Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa to personally “appeal for political reconciliation” and “speedy resettlement of nearly 300,000 displaced Tamil civilians”. Clinton also emphasized the need for “post-conflict power sharing” with Tamils Daily( Mirror 2009). 8. “The Referenda process was both inward looking, uniting and mobilizing the disparate Tamil voices, and outward looking, appealing to the international community to prevent the further erosion of the Tamil identity on the island. The tool of referenda was carefully designe and executed to give the diaspora a space to express its dissatisfaction, resistance and its political stance” (Cheran and Vimalarajah 2010: 20). 9. Today there are twelve national TGTE branches in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The TGTE Secretariat is at Rue de la Servette 1, Geneva, Switzerland. 10. Also the Tamils Against Genocide (TAG), was blamed for collecting over $500,000 to retain Bruce Fein, a former U.S. Associate Deputy Attorney General in order to get a report compiled, in which the Sri Lankan state was charged with genocide, war crimes and torture. It was reported that the TAG ignored the war crimes done by the LTTE completely and the one which were noticed were also framed against the Sri Lankan state. A U.S. official familiar with the report said, “That (political bias) makes it (TAG) hard to take seriously” (International Crisis Group 2010). 11. The GSP+ gives 16 developing countries access to EU markets with preferential conditions in return for implementing international conventions on human rights, labour standards, sustainable development and good governance. Sri Lanka used to gain about 150 million dollars annually due to preferential tariffs, according to trade estimates. The island’s clothing industry was the main beneficiary, using the tax breaks to sell to high street retailers in Europe. The member states of the European Union decided on February 16, 2010 to suspend trade concessions under the Generalised System of Preferences Plus (GSP +) for Sri Lanka because of violations of human-rights agreements (The Economic Times 17 February 2010).

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References Bandarage, Asoka (2010): “Diaspora and Post-conflict Developments in Sri Lanka,” Harvard International Review, April 19. Bandarage, Asoka (2012): “Towards Peace with Justice in Sri Lanka: An Alternative Perspective,” India Quarterly, 68(2): 103-118. Baser, Bahar and Ashok Swain (2008): “Diasporas as Peacemakers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts,” International Journal on World Peace, 25(3): 7-28. Berghof Peace Report (2011): “Diaspora Dialogues for Development and Peace Project,” Berlin: Berghof Peace Support/Luzern: Centre for Just Peace and Democracy. Cheran, R. and Vimalarajah, Luxshi (2011): Empowering Diaspora: The Dynamics of Post- war Transnational Tamil Politics, Berghof Occasional Paper No. 31. Cochrane, Feargal and Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain (2009): “Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(8): 681-704. Crisis Group Interviews (2009): TGTE Officials, September and November. DeSilva, K. M. (1998): Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka, New Delhi. DeVotta Neil (2007): “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey, 49(6): 1021-1051. Enteen, Jillana (2006): “Spatial conceptions of URLs: Tamil Eelam networks on the world wide web,” New Media, 8(2): 229-249. Fair, Christine (2005): “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 11(1). Fair, Christine (2007): “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace,” in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (eds.) Diaspora in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers?, New York: United Nations University Press. Goodhand, Jonathan (2013): “Sri Lanka in 2012: Securing the State, Enforcing the ‘Peace,” Asian Survey, 53(1): 64-72. Hariharan, R. (2009): “Defeat of the LTTE and the Future of Tamil Militancy,” World Focus, July: 267-273. Human Rights Watch (2006): Funding the “Final war”: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2006. Human Rights Watch (2009): “War on the Displaced: Sri Lankan Army and LTTE Abuses against Civilians in the Vanni,” http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ srilanka0209web_0.pdf. International Crisis Group (2010): “Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace,” ICG, Asia Briefing, No. 99. International Crisis Group (2010): “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE,” ICG, Asia Report No. 186. Kadirgamar, Ahilan (2010): “Classes, States and the Politics of the Tamil Diaspora,” Economic and Political Weekly, 49(31): 23-26. Manoharan, N. (2008): Democratic Dilemma: Ethnic Violence and Human Rights in Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Samskriti. Nandakumar, Thusiyan (2011): “Political Activism in the Tamil Diaspora,” Diaspora Dialogues for Development and Peace Project, Berlin: Berghof Peace Support.

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Orjuela, Camilla (2008): The Identity Politics of Peace building: Civil Society in War-torn Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Sage Publications. Orjuela, Camilla (2006): “Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka’s Violent Conflict,” Background paper of the High Level Expert Forum on ‘Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora’, Toronto: University for Peace, October 19-20. Ostergaard-Nielsen, E. (2006): “Diasporas and Conflict Resolution – Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?,” DIIS Brief, March. Raman, B. (2013): “Is A Neo-LTTE Emerging?,” Outlook, 20 March. Ranganathan, Maya (2002): “Nurturing a Nation on the Net: The Case of Tamil Eelam,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 8(2): 51-66. Ranganathan, Maya (2009): “Understanding Eelam through the Diaspora’s online engagement,” Continuum, 23(5): 709-721. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation (2011): URL: http://satp.org/satporgtp/countire/shrilanka/document/papers/LLRC_REPORT.pdf, accessed 15-03-2012. Report of the Representatives of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs in Sri Lanka (2007): URL: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/135/54/ PDF/G0813554.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 15-03-2012. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review- Sri Lanka, URL: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/188/71/PDF/G1218871. pdf?OpenElement, accessed 15-03-2012. Ropers, Norbert (2008): “Systemic Conflict Transformation: Reflections on the Conflict and Peace Process in Sri Lanka,” Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series 6. Sahadevan, P. and DeVotta, N. (2006): Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Manak Publications. Sathiya Moorthy, N. (2008): “Ethnic issue: India, Sri Lanka and the International Community,” World Focus, October, 371-377. Shastri, Amita, (2009): “Ending Ethnic Civil War: The Peace Process in Sri Lanka,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 47(1): 76-99. Sheffer, G. (1994): “Ethno-National Diasporas and Security,” Survival, 36(1): 60-79. Sheffer, G. (2003): Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Hazel and Stares, Paul (eds.) (2007): Diaspora in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace- Wreckers?, New York: United Nations University Press. Sriskandarajah, D. (2004): “Tamil Diaspora Politics,” in M. Ember, C. R. Ember & I. Skoggard (eds.), Encyclopedia of Diasporas, New York: Springer. Suntha, David G. (2011): “Factors Shaping Political Identity in Host Countries: The Case of the Tamil Diaspora in the UK,” Diaspora Dialogues for Development and Peace Project, Berlin: Berghof Peace Support/Luzern: Centre for Just Peace and Democracy. Uyangoda, Jayadev (2007): Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics,Washington DC: East-West Centre. Uyangoda, Jayadeva (2006): “End of Peace,” Himal, 19(4): 20-22.

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Uyangoda, Jayadeva (2007): “Sri Lanka: Back to Square One,” Economic and Political Weekly, :1800-1801. Uyangoda, Jayadeva (2008): “Sri Lanka’s Conflict at the Crossroads,” Economic and Political Weekly, : 8-9. Velamati, Manohari (2008): “Sri Lankan Diaspora Itching for a Greater Tamil Eelam: Views from the UK and India,” Journal of Peace Studies, 15 (3-4), July-December. Vertovec, Steven (2005): “The Political Importance of Diaspora,” Migration Information Source, June. Wayland, Sarah (2004): “Ethno-nationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora,” Review of International Studies. 30: 405-426. Whitaker, Mark P. (2004): “Tamilnet.com: Some Reflections on Popular Anthropology, Nationalism, and the Internet,” Anthropological Quarterly, 77(3): 469-498. Weiss, Gordon (2011): The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers, The Bodley Head: London. Wickramasinghe, Nira (2008): “Sri Lanka in 2007: Military Successes, but at Humanitarian and Economic Costs,” Asian Survey, 48(1): 191-197. Wilson, A. J. (2000): Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origin and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries, New Delhi: Penguin Books.

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India’s Strategy in Central Asia: Challenges Ahead Vinay Kaura

India aspires to be a major regional and global power in the present century. To achieve this objective, India has been building stronger ties with its ‘extended neighbourhood’ of Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Southeast Asia. During his five-nation tour of Central Asia in July 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that ties between India and Central Asia “now occupies a significant place in India’s future.” 1 In Central Asia, India has significant energy, economic and security interests. However, India’s engagement with Central Asia has been principally based on historical and cultural ties. India was intimately related to Central Asia through trade routes as well as successive waves of invasions on the Indian subcontinent from the mountain passes in the northwest. The consolidation of the British Empire, however, adversely affected the incessant flow of interactions between two regions. Furthermore, what unites South Asia with Central Asia is the popularity and prevalence of a generally more liberal and less-rigid brand of Islam, also known as Sufism. The veneration of Sufi saints has been a widespread characteristic of Islam in both South Asia and Central Asia. Once India gained independence in 1947, India’s relations with Central Asia were shaped by larger dynamics of India-Soviet ties, particularly after the India- China war of 1962. During the Cold War era, Indian foreign policy had a distinct inward-looking orientation, which confined New Delhi’s presence in Central Asia mostly to cultural exchanges, and failed to acquire any depth. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, India gradually moved away from ideological straightjacket to strategic pragmatism, which should have prompted India to revitalize its relations with the post-Soviet Central Asia. But India failed to take advantage of the situation. As C Raja Mohan, India’s leading strategic expert has said: “Delhi was well placed to cultivate lasting partnerships with the new republics. India’s struggle to reform its economy, reconstruct relations with major powers after the Cold War

105 SAJD 2015 and reconstitute ties with neighbours meant Central Asia was never high on Delhi’s foreign policy agenda” (2015). In the context of the changing geopolitical dynamics in the Central Asian region, India cannot afford to ignore the strategic importance of this vital region. New Delhi’s desire to reclaim for India the influence and cultural relations it once enjoyed with the countries of Central Asia before the dawn of colonialism can be reasonably realized through Afghanistan and Iran. Therefore, India’s primary concern and focus of engagement in the Central Asia region is war-torn Afghanistan, which reflects both historical links and the intertwining of fate with Pakistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 set in motion a major destabilisation process in the region which is yet to be reversed. Afghanistan continues to remain mired in bloody internal civil war and its spill-over has led to severe consequences in the Central Asian region, as well as in South Asia. Since the overthrow of the fundamentalist Taliban in 2001, India has pursued a ‘soft-power’ approach in Afghanistan by steering clear of a military role. India has focussed on providing developmental aid, administrative capacity building, and reviving cultural links. New Delhi, which has emerged the largest donor to Afghanistan in the region and fifth largest bilateral donor,2 has been trying to position its relationship with Kabul in the context of its energy and trade interests in Central Asia. On the other hand, India’s approach to the five Central Asian states is often considered to have been less coherent and lacking in direction.

Active Engagement India launched a new diplomatic initiative to actively engage with Central Asian countries in June 2012 with its ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy, whose framework “is based on pro-active political, economic and people-to-people engagement with Central Asian countries, both individually and collectively.”3 This has made Central Asia an increasingly important component of India’s diplomatic architecture, clearly signalling that India would seek to build stronger political relations and strengthen strategic cooperation with Central Asian states. Prime Minister Modi’s recent tour of the five Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan breathed new dynamism into the ‘Connect Central Asia’ strategy.

Economic Security India’s economic growth is critically dependent upon uninterrupted supply of energy resources. Presently India imports almost three quarters of its oil from abroad, much of it comes from the West Asian region. Thus energy security is of utmost importance for India’s national security and foreign policy. With India

106 India’s Strategy in Central Asia: Challenges Ahead projected to become ever more reliant on imported energy, reducing dependence on the West Asian sources and cultivating alternative sources of energy has become a vital concern. Central Asia contains vast hydrocarbon fields. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are endowed with enormous hydrocarbon reserves, although Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also have great energy potential. Moreover, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, being in the Caspian littoral, promise to open the door to other energy-rich Caspian states (Dash 2015). In addition, Central Asia has untapped reserves of uranium, making it attractive for India’s civilian nuclear program. India has signed a pact with Uzbekistan on the import of over 2,000 tonnes of uranium. Central Asia is thus of prime importance in India’s energy security policy. Over the past decade, OVL, the overseas arm of state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) has sought to invest in Kazakhstan. Prime Minister Modi launched maiden drilling by OVL in the Satpayev oil block of Kazakhstan in July 2015 during his visit to Kazakh capital Astana (PTI 2015). Indian company had acquired 25 per cent of stake in the Satpayev oil block of Kazakhstan 2011 during Manmohan Singh’s tour of Astana (PTI 2011). The OVL has already invested US $ 150 million in Satpayev, and is about to invest a total of US $ 400 million in exploration (PTI 2015). Although the Indian Government has begun investing in oil fields in Central Asia, its policy on how to transport this oil to the Indian market is still evolving. An equally significant step towards opening Central Asia to South Asia is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline which is being supported by the US. Turkmenistan has world’s second-largest deposit of natural gas, and the TAPI would permit it to diversify its exports by delivering energy to South Asian countries (McBride 2015). This ambitious pipeline will come from Turkmenistan to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan, bringing significant benefits to all parties involved. As this ambitious project is seemingly not directed against any country, its realization is less problematic. India has been engaged in protracted negotiations regarding this 1680 km-long pipeline, intended to transport 30 billion cubic meters of gas from natural gas fields in Turkmenistan to India. The construction, however, has stalled for various reasons. Therefore, practical implementation of the project is still at an early stage. For India, energy pipelines have always been an attractive prospect whose advantages are seemingly tangible but always just out of reach. India has felt constrained by its lack of land access to energy-rich Central Asia, hemmed in as it is by China and Pakistan. Here comes the importance of International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) in expanding India’s trade and investment links with Central Asia. The INSTC, which includes rail, road, and shipping transport from

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Mumbai in India via Bandar Abbas in Iran to Astrakhan in Russia and Baku in Azerbaijan, would be a trade corridor having immense potential helping India to develop its economic and strategic importance in Eurasia and Central Asia. Once completed, the corridor will provide astounding opportunity for high volumes of goods to be transported “not only between India and Central Asia, but also between the European Union and South Asia, as an alternative to the increasingly volatile and piracy-infested shipping routes using the Suez Canal” (IISS 2012). Moreover, the INSTC has the potential to evolve into a strategic counterweight to “the increasing regional ambitions of China through its One Belt, One Road Initiative” (Chatterjee, Singh 2015). Jointly envisaged by India, Iran and Russia in year 2000, the much- awaited Corridor got delayed for 15 years due to the challenges relating to financing and infrastructure development, unsettled conditions in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and international sanctions on Iran. With Iran nuclear deal a reality now, things seem to be brightening up as New Delhi has accorded top priority to the INSTC project. A coordination council meeting was held in August 2015 between India, Iran, Russia and 10 other participating nations – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Oman, Tajikistan, Turkey and Ukraine – in New Delhi that approved draft transit and customs agreements providing the legal framework for moving freight on the ship-rail-road corridor (Bhaumik 2015).

Security Challenges The challenges that India faces in Central Asia are substantial, but surmountable. Despite the promise of abundant natural resources and increased international attention, the socio-political stability of post-Soviet Central Asia remains fragile. The security challenges in the region include the threat from radical Islamists, foreign insurgents, the growth of organized crime networks and drug trafficking, instability from Afghanistan, as well as the potentially destabilizing effects of widespread dissatisfaction with economic policies. The last decade has been a witness on how rapidly a seemingly stable regime may collapse under pressure from the street. Almost all states have been struggling with how to balance security challenges with political and economic liberalization (Mahnovski et al. 2006). India cannot remain unaffected with what happens in this region. Central Asia is of vital importance to India not just in terms of energy security but also for reasons of national security. After the disintegration of the USSR, India was interested to see the newly independent Islamic countries to insulate themselves from the toxic ideology of radical Islam as Central Asia has been a fertile recruiting ground for Jihadist groups based in the region. During the era of fundamentalist Taliban, India formed a common front with Iran, Russia and Central Asian Republics against Taliban. Though it has been almost one and a half decade since

108 India’s Strategy in Central Asia: Challenges Ahead the overthrow of the Taliban, Afghanistan continues to face the scourge of Islamist extremism and terrorism stemming from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The Central Asian states have been witnessing serious trouble over the spill over of these destructive forces into their region and destabilising their secular polities. Of late, there are serious concerns in Russia over deteriorating security condition in Central Asia in general and Afghanistan in particular because of the emerging threat of the ISIS or ISIL. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev have expressed concerns about Tajikistan’s stability at the recent summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in Astana, in October 2015 (Blank 2015). Similarly, India also views the region as a source of religious extremism and is concerned to check the rise of radical Islamist groups which may present a terrorist threat. Given the transnational nature of these groups, including links with the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the ISIS, this engenders a high degree of uneasiness in New Delhi. The fear is that if the re-emergence of jihadist groups is not checked, they will eventually pose a serious threat to India’s security, especially in Jammu & Kashmir. This concern is exacerbated by the situation in Afghanistan. Pakistan- backed and Taliban-generated insurgency has undermined India’s efforts to rebuilding Afghanistan into a regional trade hub. There is a prospect of increasing insecurity in Afghanistan following the final American drawdown in 2016, which may spill over and destabilise fragile Central Asian states. India’s fears of Taliban’s integration into Afghan political structures post-withdrawal are not unfounded. Much of the money generated by the proliferation of drug-trafficking in Central Asia, due to state failure to stop opium production in Afghanistan, has provided a vital source of funding for jihadist groups. Tajikistan is of particular importance for India for two reasons. First it is India’s closest Central Asian neighbour; and second only a narrow 20 km stretch of Afghan territory, Wakhan corridor, separates it from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Over the past decade, India has sought to enhance its security assets in the region, especially through the acquisition of an outpost in Tajikistan. The Ayni airbase has been the key to India’s strategic footprint from where Delhi hoped to bolster its political clout in Central Asia, and to create a strategic counterweight to Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. With Russian acquiescence, India invested a lot of money over the last decade refurbishing the Ayni airbase, spending US $ 70 million as part of its aid to Tajikistan. The modernization task, including extension of the runway, construction of aircraft hangars, an air-control tower and perimeter fencing around the base, was carried out by personnel of Indian Army, Indian Air Force and the Border Roads Organisation (Pandit 2013). Though India never publicly announced its

109 SAJD 2015 intentions, there was speculation that India would station fighter jets at the airbase and make it operational. Unexpectedly, Russia appears to have thwarted Indian plans (Sharma 2012). Russia, with a large footprint in Central Asia and a geographic presence in the northeast of that continent, is still regarded as the dominant player in Central Asia. Despite Russia’s increasing importance as a major source of raw materials, it figures hardly in discussions of the military balance in Asia inthe present century (Donaldson 2014: 207). Under the leadership of Valdimir Putin, Moscow is engaged in arresting the decline in Russia’s international stature and again asserting its power as a major claimant for influence in Central Asia and Eurasia. As Russia’s energy-driven economic prosperity is coming under severe stress due to Putin’s diplomatic and military gambles, the momentum of Russia- China relationship is shifting inexorably in favour of China, with Beijing setting the tone for all major global agendas. Their leaders are speaking almost identical language and demonstrating a remarkable degree of policy coordination, taking their partnership to unprecedented heights. To mark the 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II, and China’s role in defeating Japan, President Xi Jinping presided over a massive parade of China’s military force in September 2015, with Putin standing beside him as an honoured guest (AP 2015). The geopolitical and security in­terests of New Delhi and Moscow in this part of the world are compat­ible when it comes to dealing with the threat of Islamist extremism, terrorism, organized crime, and trafficking in arms and drugs (Pant 2012: 22). Strategically, Russia has invested heavily in simultaneously engaging India and China, but it appears to have been reluctant to approve India’s efforts to establish a military foothold in the region which can be explained by Russia’s fears of encirclement by the US and NATO, and Moscow’s grievances against Washington’s lack of understanding of its security interests. Probably apprehensive that India’s foothold at Ayni airbase would ultimately open the door to American influence, Russia reportedly pressurized Tajikistan to deny the deployment of Indian fighter aircraft at the base. After a decade of negotiations between New Delhi and Dushanbe, Tajik government began negotiations with Russia in 2011 to discuss the possible deployment of Russian military, while ruling out the deployment of Indian forces at the airbase. With Russian resistance, the plans went into cold storage. Criticizing India’s “poor manoeuvring” and “lack of direction” while questioning its “capacity to maintain strategic partnerships across the region,” an observer writes that “New Delhi seems never to have developed a coherent vision of how to use the base or leverage its position with the Tajik government. Dushanbe may have simply used New Delhi to force a better deal from Moscow for Russian use of Ayni” (Tanchum 2013). But India has not completely given up hope. India’s

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External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, during her Tajikistan visit in September 2014, reportedly discussed with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon the use of Ayni airbase along with issues of counter-terror cooperation (PTI 2014). Prime Minister Modi also reportedly discussed the lease of Ayni airbase during his interaction with Emomali Rahmon during his Tajikistan visit in July 2015 (Unnithan 2015). But resolving this issue will be difficult. Even if India manages to persuade Russia to give green signal to Indian military presence at Ayni, Tajikistan is not in a position to brush aside opposition from Pakistan and China who are working hard to dissuade Tajik leadership from the airbase lease. Thus, shared concerns over security are yet to be translated into concrete security cooperation. Central Asian countries have usually relied on an array of overlapping arrangements for their individual security. The security equilibrium in the region has consisted of both formal and informal bilateral agreements linking regional states to external players. These agreements are complemented by a series of multilateral arrangements adopting a more cooperative approach to security. Bilateral ties have remained central to the regional strategic architecture. Coexisting with such bilateral links, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and its region-wide initiatives have been at the core of the overlapping multilateral security structure. Whereas Russia conducts numerous joint military exercises with Central Asian countries under the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and China does to some degree through the SCO, there is very limited direct military collaboration between the India and central Asian countries. It is to be noted that the increased level of uncertainty in Central Asia and Eurasia following the disintegration of the USSR led to a search for new security arrangements that were able to address a series of emerging challenges. The SCO emerged as major organisation linking Central Asian states with Russia and China. SCO’s model of security cooperation has relied on dialogue, consensus building, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. India did join the multilateral SCO as an Observer in 2005. After a decade of this, India, along with Pakistan, is about to become a full member.

Geopolitical Imperatives Presently, the US, Russia and China are the three major strategic players in Central Asia, whereas India is a latecomer. India’s engagement in Central Asia cannot be divorced from its relationships involving China, Russia, Pakistan and the United States. Moreover, due to historical, economic and geo-strategic reasons, India’s approach to Central Asia is intrinsically intertwined with its South Asia policy. The reason is not difficult to seek. One observer puts it this way. “Had it

111 SAJD 2015 not been for the “Great Game” where Russia and Britain created political entities by drawing boundaries, the areas of South and Central Asia may have followed different courses” (Hayes 2014: 140).

Pakistan-Afghanistan Factor India’s approach to Central Asia is conditioned by its profound tensions with Pakistan whose geographic position poses two simultaneous challenges to India. First, India’s ability to access Central Asia is vulnerable because Pakistan’s geography, and its calculated policy of obstruction, cuts India off from the region. Second, Pakistan’s geographic location astride the politically volatile regions of Central Asia gave it a natural advantage while dealing with Washington and Beijing. Jihadist and anti-India mindset has motivated Pakistan to engage repeatedly in unwanted and unwelcome intervention into the affairs of the neighbouring countries, both Islamic and non-Islamic, with disastrous consequences for all. At the end of the day, this policy may have thwarted Pakistan’s ambitions for regional leadership but has not contributed to its regional isolation. Pakistan has so far successfully avoided any strategic punishment from either the US or China, “despite the fact that few states did more to precipitate the spread of radical political Islam in Central Asia, and particularly Afghanistan, than Pakistan” (Ganguly et al 2006: 3). India’s primary concern in the wider Central Asia region is to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan without which India’s hope of having smooth linkages with the Central Asian region would hit serious roadblocks. Thus, India remains concerned about who rules in Kabul and wants to make sure that whoever does so is not antagonistic to India’s interests. If Afghanistan again falls under the Taliban’s sway, it would have a destabilising effect not only for Central Asian societies but also for Pakistan. The Taliban has consistently shown its determination to escalate the conflict. So far there has been no robust regional institutional mechanism to address this.

China Factor Very significant in geopolitical terms, India’s relationship with China has always “demanded a tightrope act, improving bilateral relations while searching for new ways to balance the rise of Beijing’s might” (Sidhu 2013: 226). In the past sixty years, relations between India and China have fluctuated wildly. Such divisive issues as future of Tibet, boundary demarcation, nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, and trade imbalances have fuelled intense debate over how India should deal with the authoritarian China. India’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has been preoccupied with securing a favourable distribution of power in Asia, further developing its relations with the US in light of a rising China.

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China’s impressive economic growth as well as geographic proximity and shared border with the Central Asian states give it substantial influence in the region. Since China established diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian states in 1992, its overall trade with the region has increased over a hundred-fold. In 2012, India’s overall trade with the five central Asian republics was a meagre US $ 500 million, whereas China with US $ 46 billion trade volume was way ahead of India. India has always been outmanoeuvred by energy-hungry China when it comes to aggressively and successfully securing lucrative energy acquisitions in Central Asia. China has emerged as the main trading partner of four of the five Central Asian countries (Pant 2015). China’s ability to compete successfully against India is also visible in its consolidation of transport networks with Central Asia that make up its own version of the Silk Road. It is pertinent to mention here that China is busy in the revival of the celebrated Silk Road trading route through the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. Silk Road refers to the historical trade routes linking Asia to Europe through a region that spans South Asia, East Asia, Central Asia and the West Asia. Projected as a network of regional infrastructure projects comprising roads, rail links, energy pipelines, and telecommunications ties, the major objective of the two highly ambitious projects, often referred to jointly as the “One Belt, One Road,” is to win over neighbouring and other countries in the region through increased trade incentives and transport connectivity (NDRC 2015). If successful, the ambitious ‘One Belt, One Road’ project would make China a principal economic and diplomatic force in the Eurasian region. In an attempt to allay Indian fears, China’s Ambassador to India, Le Yucheng, has proposed to link ‘One road, one belt’ initiatives “with India’s ‘Spice Route’ and ‘Mausam’ projects, thus forming a new starting point and a new bright spot in China-India cooperation” (News from China 2015: 29). Apprehensive of China’s real intentions, Modi government has so far remained non-committal on supporting this proposal. New Delhi has felt that a broad-based security and economic cooperation between India and China can accommodate their overlapping global aspirations. Working on this premise, India and China have made efforts aimed at cooperative approach on the political front in Central Asia because fostering a more coordinated foreign policy approach to Central Asia will benefit both the countries. India and China held a bilateral meeting in Beijing in August 2013 underscoring the possibility of cooperation to address their respective priorities in Central Asia. Issues such as India’s role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), energy security, counterterrorism cooperation, and people-to-people contacts with the Central Asian republics were discussed. This opens the possibility of further cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing. Nevertheless, it is generally believed that India’s

113 SAJD 2015 engagement in the Central Asian region will be characterised by competition with China. India and Pakistan will soon become a full member of the SCO. Since its beginning in 2001, the SCO has focused on fighting terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, areas of clear interest for India. The only impediment that India faced in its efforts to become full member in the SCO was China’s initial reluctance, but Russia was the main backer of India’s full membership. The entry of Pakistan to the SCO is China’s counterbalancing strategy. One thing is very clear: Membership of the SCO is likely to give India major strategic inroads into Central Asia. Downplaying the geopolitical rivalry between the two countries, it was publicly stated by China that “the accession of India and Pakistan will play an important role in the future development of the organization, and contribute constructively to the development and improvement of relations between the two countries” (FMPRC 2015). Security and counter-terrorism being high priority concerns for all SCO, Pakistan is likely to feel the heat over its terror links. As Indian diplomat Kanwal Sibal wites: “Within SAARC, Pakistan can join the shared rhetoric against terrorism without any pressure to clean up its act, as the only victim of its jihadi policies is India. Within the SCO, Russia, China and all the Central Asian states are concerned about terrorism and Pakistani policies and actions will be under scrutiny” (Sibal 2015). But due to China’s close links with Pakistan, India should not have much hope as Sibal reminds that “China has shown its colours in the UN Security Council on the Lakhvi case and would shield Pakistan on the issue of terrorism against India. Even Russia has been chary of naming Pakistan as a source of terrorism against India” (Sibal 2015). Despite these challenges, full membership of the SCO offers several commercial and strategic opportunities to New Delhi. India has a great interest in the projected SCO Free Trade Area, to be operational by 2020, which will economically integrate all members of the SCO.4

American Factor Last, and perhaps the most important player with regard to India’s role in Central Asia is the United States, which has had a history of mixed relations with India since independence. India-US ties have been characterized by alternating conflict and cooperation. Though, with the end of the Cold War, both countries have come closer. India’s right to a large sphere of influence in South Asia, the Indian Ocean region and Central Asia has found favour with the US. Thus, Washington has supported an expanded Indian role in Central Asia, evident in the US strategy for a ‘New Silk Road’ which would link India with Central Asia. It is perceived as

114 India’s Strategy in Central Asia: Challenges Ahead a means for the US to sustain its economic interests in the Central Asia region as “Washington is grinding her own axe by isolating Iran, and restricting China’s and Russia’s growing influence in the region” (Firdous and Dar 2014: 71). The US recognizes the benefits of broadening and deepening good relations with India, especially by developing common economic interests through trade and investment. The American involvement in Afghanistan can also be interpreted as having expanded the political, economic and military space available to India in the region. Robert Kaplan rightly says that “As the United States and China become great power rivals, the direction in which India tilts could determine the course of geopolitics in Eurasia in the 21st century. India, in other words, looms as the ultimate pivot state” (Kaplan 2010). In January 2015, India has signed a new ‘Joint Strategic Vision’ with the US during the visit of President Barack Obama. But it is rightly pointed out that America’s “geostrategic support provided to India could exacerbate Asia’s security dilemmas. These security dilemmas are nested in relationships that link China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as well as China, Japan, and South Korea” (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2012: 272). New Delhi’s reluctance to play the ‘great game’ in Central Asia has largely been dictated by its long-cherished tradition of strategic autonomy. India’s evasion of either being seen in close military embrace with the US or being identified with America’s interests in Central Asia points to the deeply ingrained Indian preference for autonomy in external relations. However, there is an urgent need to further consolidate the convergence in Indo-US strategic perceptions in Central Asia in a determined though cautious manner.

Conclusion The shifting geopolitical landscape in Central Asia has a number of implications for India’s security and economic interests. At present, India faces many challenges in Central Asia as there is no guarantee that its interests would be protected or enhanced. India’s experiences in Central Asia over the past decade demonstrate the challenges of facing tough competition from China on energy issues and of having different views on regional security with Russia. India has managed to secure only a shaky toehold in Central Asia when compared with other important players in the region. While India is capable to forge meaningful partnership with Russia, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asian countries, China and Pakistan will continue to constrain India’s ability to project meaningful economic or military power in Central Asia. India will have to strengthen its partnership with countries like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and adopt a long-term policy towards this region.

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Despite much talk of India’s growing role in Central Asia, it remains essentially a minor player and is struggling to compete with China. It is not obvious that India is capable to invest substantial economic, military, and diplomatic capital required to turn the ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy into practice. The future role of India in this volatile region will depend on how it manages to convert the challenges into opportunities.

Notes 1 “Text of PM’s statement to media during the Joint Press Briefing with President of Uzbekistan at Tashkent,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Prime Minister’s Office, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=123027 2 India is the fifth largest bilateral donor in Afghanistan after the US, the UK, Japan and Germany (Johny 2015; Ministry of External Affairs 2012). 3 Keynote address by MOS Shri E. Ahamed at First India-Central Asia Dialogue, “India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy,” 12 June 2012, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches- Statements.htm?dtl/19791/Keynote address by MOS Shri E. Ahamed at First India- Central Asia Dialogue, “India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy,” 12 June 2012, http:// www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/19791/Keynote+address by MOS Shri E. Ahamed at First India-Central Asia Dialogue). 4 However, the creation of SCO Free Trade Area is not free from geopolitical tension. “While China has been pushing for the creation of a SCO free trade area by 2020, Russia has been keen to delay this process, since the comparative cost advantage of Chinese products may eventually jeopardize Russian exports to Central Asia” (Zaum 2013: 165).

References AP (2015): “China World War II parade: Experience of war makes people value peace more, says Xi,” Indian Express, 3 September. Bhaumik, Anirban (2015): “New Delhi moves fast on North-South transport corridor,” Deccan Herald, 29 August. Blank, Stephen (2015): “Russia’s Fourth Front: Central Asia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 191, 22 October. Chatterjee, Bipul and Surendar Singh (2015): “An Opportunity for India in Central Asia,” The Diplomat, 4 May (available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/an-opportunity- for-india-in-central-asia/. Accessed on 28 May 2015) Dash, P. L. (2015): “When Central Asia calls,” Indian Express, 27 July. Donaldson, Robert H. (2014): “Russia: A Fallen Superpower Struggles Back,” in Andrew M. Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman, Providing for National Security: A Comparative Analysis, Stanford University Press. Firdous, Tabasum and Firdous A. Dar (2014): “The New Silk Road Strategy Revisited,” The Journal of Central Asian Studies, Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir, Volume XXI. FMPRC (2015): Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on July 8 2015. (available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ s2510_665401/t1279708.shtml. Accessed on 4 September, 2015)

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Ganguly, Sumit, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell (eds.) (2006): US–Indian Strategic Cooperation Into the 21st Century: More than words, Routledge. Gilboy, George J. and Eric Heginbotham (2012): Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hayes, Louis D. (2014): The Islamic State in the Post-Modern World The Political Experience of Pakistan, Ashgate Publishing Limited. IANS (2015): “Meeting on North-South transport corridor held,” 21 August (available at http://www.newsx.com/regional/9440-meeting-on-north-south-transport-corridor- held. Accessed on 3 September, 2015). IISS (2012): “India, Central Asia and the new Silk Road” 10 July (available at http://www. iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2012-4a49/july-70c4/india-central-asia-and-the- new-silk-road-e4d1. Accessed on 3 September, 2015). Johny, Stanly (2015): “Stability tops agenda as India readies to host Afghan President,” Business Line, 26 April. Kaplan, Robert D. (2010): “South Asia’s Geography of Conflict,” August (available at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/South%20Asia’s%20Geography_ Robert%20D.%20Kaplan.pdf. Accessed on 25 May 2015). Mahnovski, Sergej and Kamil Akramov, Theodore Karasik (2006): Economic Dimensions of Security in Central Asia, Rand Corporation. McBride, James (2015): “Building the New Silk Road,” Council on Foreign Relations, 25 May. (available at www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/building-new-silk-road/p36573. Accessed on 13 September 2015) Ministry of External Affairs (2012): “India-Afghanistan Relations,” August (available at http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/afghanistan-aug-2012.pdf. Accessed on 11 April, 2015) NDRC (2015): “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st- Century Maritime Silk Road,” National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, 28 March (available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/ t20150330_669367.html. Accessed on 19 September 2015). News From China (2015): Vol. XXVII, No. 3, March. Pandit, Rajat (2013): “India airlifts military hospital to Tajikistan to strengthen geo-strategic footprint in Central Asia,” Times of India, 18 April. Pant, Harsh V. (2012): India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implications, SSI Monograph. Pant, Harsh V. (2015): “Reality Check: India Needs to Take Central Asia Seriously,” The Diplomat, 14 July. PTI (2011): “India inks pact for 25 % stake in Kazakhstan’s Satpayev oil block,” Economic Times, 16 April. PTI (2014): “India, Tajikistan to step up counter-terrorism cooperation,” Business Standard, 11 September. PTI (2015): “PM Narendra Modi launches OVL oil block project in Kazakhstan,” Economic times, 7 July. Raja Mohan, C. (2015): “A passage to inner Asia,” Indian Express, 6 July. Sharma, Rajeev (2012): “India’s Ayni military base in Tajikistan is Russia-locked,” 26 October. (available at http://in.rbth.com/articles/2012/10/26/indias_ayni_military_ base_in_tajikistan_is_russia-locked_18661. Accessed on 14 April, 2015)

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Sibal, Kanwal (2015): “India is Now In But Let’s Not Forget the ‘S’ in SCO Stands for Shanghai,” The Wire, 23 July (available at http://thewire.in/2015/07/23/india-is- now-in-but-lets-not-forget-the-s-in-sco-stands-for-shanghai-7057/. Accessed on 19 September 2015) Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Bruce D. Jones (eds.) (2013): Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order, Brookings Institution. Tanchum, Micha’el (2013): “India’s ailing strategic policy in Central Asia“, 6 September (available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/09/06/indias-ailing-strategic- policy-in-central-asia/. Accessed on 14 August 2015). Unnithan, Sandeep (2015): “India wants to expand footprint in Central Asia: Modi to ask Tajikistan for lease of ex-Soviet airbase,” 11 July (available at http://www.dailymail. co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3157670/Modi-ask-Tajikistan-lease-former- Soviet-airbase.html. Accessed on 28 July, 2015). Zaum, Dominik (2013): Legitimating International Organizations, Oxford University Press.

118 India’s Public Diplomacy towards South Asia Gazala Fareedi

It becomes necessary to look into India’s overall foreign relations with its South Asian neighbours in the context of India’s public diplomacy towards this region because there are considerable linkages between overall foreign policy and public diplomacy initiatives. But it also has to be realized that despite a positive nature of these linkages or a negative absence of it at the level of foreign policy, public diplomacy should be pursued to overcome such very hurdles. India should strive to find ‘permanent friends’ in foreign lands at all times despite the nature of relations between the governments. India shares contiguous territorial and marine geographies with the seven South Asian neighbouring countries. It also shares cultural and civilizational links with each of them. Quite logically, the region should be given a strategic priority in the conduct of India’s foreign policy. This itself is reflected in the official pronouncement with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) website stating that “India gives highest priority to her neighbours” and that “this centrality of neighbours in India’s foreign policy stems from the clear understanding that a peaceful periphery is essential for India to achieve her multifarious developmental goals” (India, MEA). The MEA also espouses that India is committed to establishing a “South Asian identity through the SAARC process, enhancing mutual confidence in multiple areas and in trying to leverage India’s rapid economic growth into win- win arrangements with her neighbours” (India, MEA). However, despite the shared interests and official acknowledgment of its necessity, India’s rhetorical commitment over its South Asian policy has not been implemented to the fullest. The relations between India and her South Asian neighbours has been analysed by Chattopadhyay (2011) under the following categories, “politics of third worldism,” “politics of domination,” “politics of inclusion,” “politics of neighbourhood” and “politics of friendship.” He writes that, immediately after India’s independence, its foreign policy towards its neighbours tended to subsume these neighbours within the larger domain of “third worldism,”

119 SAJD 2015 with India as the leader of the third world countries. The “politics of domination” began during L. B. Shastri and Indira Gandhi’s time, where there was a shift in India’s stance towards regionalism in form of domination, with the “creation of Bangladesh,” “annexation of Sikkim,” and “seeking to influence events in Sri Lanka and Nepal.” The panic thus created among India’s neighbours due to India’s big- brother attitude was sought to be assuaged under M. Desai and A.B Vajpayee. This new policy expanded under V.P Singh who tried to pursue an approach which was free of any arm twisting. This phaze has been characterised as the “politics of inclusion” by Chattopadhyay (2011). The “politics of neighbourhood” began with the coming of the United Front government at the centre under H D. Gowda and I K. Gujral. It flourished under what came to be known as the Gujral Doctrine. “In word and deed, India...since the time of Gujral has shown restraint and accommodation” with its South Asian neighbours.1 The “politics of friendship” came under the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) regime and the following UPA (United Progressive Alliance) regimes where India recognised that it simply could not make a place for itself at the global great power level unless it was in harmony with its immediate neighbours. Hence both these governments tried to create a “web of interdependencies” in South Asia at all levels of government, infrastructural and civil society. One cannot deny that India’s policy towards its neighbours has become more focused and less dominating, and moved from a “politics of third worldism” to a “politics of friendship.” However, although change has been made, a lot still needs to be done at this front. What needs to be emphasized is the fact that in the list of priorities, the South Asian region comes only next to other regions in the world for India. One can deduct this even from what Chattopadhyay (2011) has written, “Under the NDA and UPA, India has played and is playing a ‘politics of friendship’ with its South Asian neighbours, in order to have a benevolent image at the global level which is very important for India to maintain a balanced position in today’s world politics.” Hence, India would not necessarily pursue its neighbours had it not been striving to get established as a great power at the global level, which cannot be possible until and unless India has managed to harmonise its region. Chattopadhyay (2011) has also written that “the political logic of neighbourhood policy of India in South Asia is conditioned by adhocism.” This statement is not new with regard to India’s policy towards its immediate neighbours. Other words used for adhocism would be myopic, reactionary and “simply muddling through in a less dominating way than it used to” (Chaturvedy and Malone 2009). Hence, despite the government making a conscious effort towards remedying such a policy in recent years, suspicion about India’s motives continue to be the same in its neighbouring countries.

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Chaturvedy and Malone (2009) have written:

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh champions the notion of partnership with neighbours in South Asia, notably: through ‘greater connectivity, in transport, road, rail, and wa- terways links, communication, transit routes through each other’s territory transform- ing each sub-region of the subcontinent into an interconnected web of economic and commercial links...... While these ideas are widely welcomed, New Delhi’s seriousness about and ability to implement them are open to question, not so much in principle as in practice.

India’s former Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon in a speech in the Observer Research Foundation in 2007 had mentioned that “South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world.....in addition, cross border investments and the flow of ideas are at rather low levels.” One reason for this could be that the main driving force for India’s foreign policy is economic betterment and greater investments. This cannot be possible through its South Asian counterparts. Hence among India’s ever increasing ‘strategic partners’, there is no South Asian country except for Afghanistan. A considerable amount of hope has been generated with regard to India’s renewed focus on its South Asian neighbours with the coming of the new government in May 2014. The new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, sought to re-energize the relations by inviting the heads of all South Asian countries to his swearing-in ceremony. A further evidence of this focus was given when the Prime Minister choose to go to Bhutan for his first foreign visit. Such initiatives need to be a continuous feature of India’s foreign policy towards its neighbours. Some scholars have argued that the abysmal state of relations amongst the South Asian states is due to two broad factors. Firstly, except for India, all South Asian countries suffer from an identity problem. They have not been able to carve out a differentiated national identity for themselves sui generically. Indeed, the overlapping nature of ethnic identities especially with India is a major obstacle for these countries to define their nationalism. Secondly, except for Afghanistan and Pakistan, no two countries share borders amongst each other except vis-a-vis India. This peculiar scenario puts additional burden upon India to navigate relations with its South Asian counterparts. However, though India has shown willingness to travel extra mile, lack of imagination in its foreign policy basket has yielded suboptimal outcomes. Thus, it is essential for India to step its PD efforts which are best suited to address these ideational concerns of our South Asian neighbours.

Actors, Issues and Processes of India’s Public Diplomacy in South Asian Countries Public diplomacy by its nature involves a soft and elegant approach to diplomacy, embarking upon socio-cultural values and norms to create a favourable

121 SAJD 2015 image amongst the general public. Unlike conventional diplomacy which confines itself to the corridors of government and diplomatic establishments, public diplomacy involves reaching out to various non-governmental actors who have diversified interests and stakes. Thus, PD not only has to be imaginative to encompass a wide canvas of issues but also has to be deliberative and persuasive to built linkages between the societies and diverse range of peoples. India, with its rich civilizational legacy that has footprints across the world, is arguable best suited to exploit its social-cultural heritage to create a favorable image vis-à-vis its diplomatic partners. Since its establishment, the Indian PD division has evolved in its methodologies, and given the country’s financial constraints, it has reasonably performed well in its outreach activities. But in case of the South Asian region we can see that Indian PD efforts lack focus and direction. South Asian neighbours view India largely from a suspicious viewpoint. This suspicion varies with regard to different countries in the region. One can say that for Pakistan, the suspicion is the strongest and for Bhutan, the weakest. Other countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Afghanistan fall in between these two extremes. “The perceptions [about each other] are negative in South Asia because of historical baggage, internal political developments that affect each other, poor knowledge of each other, India’s size and preponderance, failure of regional integration, and most importantly, the role of media in shaping perceptions as well as discussions in social media” (Gupta 2013). Thus, India must find innovative ways to overcome this suspicious image it has. As Saran (2005), argues “The challenge for our diplomacy lies in convincing our neighbours that India is an opportunity, not a threat, that far from being besieged by India, they have a vast, productive hinterland that would give their economies far greater opportunities for growth than if they were to rely on their domestic markets alone.”

Actors and Issues The actors of public diplomacy refer to those institutions that practice public diplomacy directly and indirectly. Such institutions have evolved with evolving times, depending on the overall context and the conditions of the specific country. The main actor for India’s PD exercises is the Ministry of External Affairs, and more specifically the Public Diplomacy Division. Historically, before the establishment of PD Division, some aspects of India’s public diplomacy abroad, without that tag of ‘public diplomacy’ being attached to it, was being conducted by autonomous institutions like the ICCR (Indian Council for Cultural Relations) and ICWA (Indian Council for World Affairs), radio networks and state run television broadcasting, and the External Publicity Division in the MEA. The Annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs mention the work of

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ICCR and ICWA in separate categories. Ian Hall (2012) has regarded the work of the ICCR, ICWA, and External broadcasting by the All India Radio (AIR) as being part of India’s “traditional public diplomacy.” All the three organizations have played an important role historically to popularise India’s cultural heritage and civilization in the world abroad. What is however lacking presently are institutionalized linkages between these organizations and the PD Division of the MEA and a vast broadening and deepening of their functions. Nonetheless, their role, especially historically, has to be appreciated as important actors of India’s nascent public diplomacy enterprise post independence, even though, it was done without the tag of public diplomacy.

Role of Non-state Actors The MEA does try to rope in individuals and groups to become the vehicles of public diplomacy when it calls for entries to film documentaries and photography competitions showing the various diverse facets of India and other such competitions. These documentaries are then publicized through web 2.0 medium. The MEA also liaisons with national organizations and think tanks like the ICCR, ICWA as mentioned before and Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), Observer Research Foundation (ORF), United Service Institution of India (USI), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and others to build a linkage with the cultural artists and the academia. However the extent of these linkages cannot be said to be deeply and widely institutionalized. The same also holds true for the level of MEA linkages with other non-governmental actors such as various academic institutions and business pressure groups specifically for the purposes of public diplomacy. However, the PD MEA is making an effort towards linking up with varied actors for PD purposes. For example, according to the Annual Report 2012-13 (India, MEA), the Division “entered into an arrangement with Air India for screening of documentaries by PD Division on their flights as in-flight entertainment programmes. The screening of the film “The Treasure in the snow: A Film on Sikkim” was done successfully in Aug-Sept 2012 by Etihad Airways on their flights.”

Issues of Public Diplomacy The issues that public diplomacy of a state focuses upon have been considerably dependent upon the changing nature of the state itself. Modern nation state, as it emerged in its present form after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 has evolved both in its form and functions. Accordingly, “the issues which the government has to focus upon both at home and abroad has widened and broadened to a great extent as the role of the democratic state changing from being to a mere ‘police state’ to

123 SAJD 2015 being a ‘welfare state’” (Gregory 2011). The same kind of evolution should be ideally seen for issues of public diplomacy. The issues in fact have to be such that they connect directly to people and their everyday existence if public diplomacy needs to be successful. As Gregory (2011) writes, “The state needs to focus on issues that are not only procedural but also substantive in the broadest sense. The fundamental goal of public diplomacy is to further public interests in the context of governance and diplomatic relationships between groups.”

In South Asia With regard to the focus of the MEA on South Asian countries, most of the linkages with the academia and think tanks are those which are inside Indian territory. The only special focus on South Asian neighbours are those conferences which are held in Indian states bordering specific neighbours. The overall theme of such conferences is related to India’s relations with those neighbours. For example, a seminar on “Indo-Nepal Relations” was organized in Patna from 25- 27 February 2009 in collaboration with the Bihar state government (Annual Report 2009-2010, MEA India). Similar such conferences have been held in the year 2008. “The Division in association with the Government of Bihar, organized a seminar on ‘Emerging Trends in India-Nepal Relations’ at Patna from 26-27 April 2008. Chief Minister of Bihar and Minister for Physical Planning and Works of Nepal participated in the inaugural session of the seminar,” where a 45 member Nepalese delegation also participated a large number of “academicians, think tanks, representatives of Industry, intelligentsia, journalists and civil society from India” (Annual Report 2008-2009, MEA India). Such seminars, workshops, hosting of delegations, display of photographs have also been done for other South Asian neighbours like Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and others. For example, “A special course on ‘India-Bangladesh relations’ was organised by Jamia Milia Islamia and Manipur Central University in collaboration with University of Dhaka in September 2011” (Annual Report 2011- 12, MEA India). As for the medium of photographs for engagement, “An exhibition of rare archival photographs on evolution of Indo-Bhutan relations and some remarkable photographs taken by His Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk, The King of Bhutan was organized at the National Gallery of Modern Art, Delhi in December 2009. The exhibition was inaugurated by Dr. Karan Singh, President of ICCR in his presence” (Annual Report 2009-10, MEA India). The Public Diplomacy Division has also co-operated with the Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan to organize a meeting on ‘India-Afghan relations: A framework for Future Cooperation’ in 2008. The objective was to look at critical issues that matter to both the countries

124 India’s Public Diplomacy towards South Asia immediately and probe India’s future role in helping the Afghan people (Annual Report 2008-09 MEA India). The PD Division is supportive of the Track II dialogues between India and Pakistan, such as the ‘India-Pakistan Neemrana Initiative’ meetings held in Delhi and Islamabad (Annual Report 2012-13, MEA India). PD Division also extended logistical support to a visit of a parliamentary delegation from Pakistan to Delhi and Patna in 2012, with the support of the ‘Pakistan Institute for Legislative Development and Transparency’ (PILDAT). (Annual Report 2012-13, MEA India). In the same line, “the Division in association with Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, Chandigarh organized a workshop ‘Total Agriculture – Workshop cum field visits – Connecting India and Pakistan through knowledge sharing on Agriculture’ earlier in the year.” This included a 16 member delegation from Pakistan which exchanged marketing and research experience with Indian experts. The objective was to create awareness through dialogue between the people of the two Punjabs, which, due to their similar climate have same agricultural problems (Annual Report 2008-09 MEA India). As is evident, the main actor for India’s Public Diplomacy has been the MEA in general and the PD Division in specific. This is truer for the South Asian countries. Even when non-state actors are involved, they have been delegated or involved in the exercise by the main actor. This has had a direct impact on the nature of issues being dealt with through public diplomacy in these states, which has hardly gone beyond state level relations to look into matters that really affect the livelihood of people.

Processes The broadest way in which the processes of public diplomacy can be classified as under would be processes involving “monologue, dialogue and collaboration” (Cowan and Arsenault 2008). Monologue would mean a one way communication involving tools such as advertisements, radio broadcasting, television and news network and others. This has been referred to as ‘advocacy’ by Gregory (2011). Dialogue would include a two way communication process through tools such as student exchanges, conferences, and others. ‘Collaboration,’ according to Cowan and Arsenault (2008) are “initiatives that feature cross national participation in a joint venture or project with a clearly defined goal.” They have argued that all the three forms of public diplomacy are equally important depending on the specific context.

Nothing can match the poetry, clarity, emotional power, and memorability of a beau- tifully crafted speech or proclamation [Monologue]. Nothing helps build mutual un- derstanding as well as a thoughtful dialogue. And nothing creates a sense of trust and mutual respect as fully as a meaningful collaboration (Cowan and Arsenault 2008).

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However, they also argue that ‘collaboration’ is the most effective among them for purposes of having a long term impact and building bonds. ‘Collaboration’ can also be termed as “engagement.” “Engagement” has been described as being “grounded in networks and participation in cross boundary relationships” (Gregory 2011). Gregory (2011) further goes on to write that “...engagement is most effective when participants have roughly equal status and common goals...” Hall (2012) has made a distinction between “traditional approaches” to Public Diplomacy and “new public diplomacy”2 During the Cold War, especially the initial decades post independence, India was limited to only the ‘traditional approaches’ for the practice of public diplomacy, but since the last two decades, it has considerably shifted to the ‘new public diplomacy’ approach. Presently the various processes of public diplomacy can be said to employing both these approaches. The various processes under the ‘traditional approach’ would include “cultural and academic exchanges, intellectual and research links, and state funded media targeted at foreign audiences” (Hall 2012). With regard to Hall’s ‘traditional approaches’, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) apart from being the main actor for India’s cultural exchanges (having around 35 cultural centres abroad) is also in-charge in a substantial way for managing India’s academic exchanges. “It currently offers financial support for around 2,300 foreign students at Indian universities, 675 of whom come from Afghanistan and 500 from African states. The bulk of the remaining scholarships are targeted at South Asian countries, mainly Bangladesh, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka.” (Hall 2012). As it can be seen ICCR’s focus has been more on South Asian scholars especially with regard to the student scholarships. Suri (2011), who headed the PD Division in the MEA in 2009 has outlined the various processes through which PD is conducted in India:

• “developing a positive narrative [focusing on the ‘need to share’ approach of the positive work that India does through its development partnership in Africa, South East Asia, Latin America, Caribbean, South Asia]; • the projection of soft power [ by promoting brand India through campaigns such as ‘Incredible India’, organizing film festivals by foreign missions, commissioning documentary films on various diverse facets of India, publication of magazine ‘India Perspectives’ that reaches out to 75,000 readers around the world in 17 languages]; • hosting visitors [with an eclectic audience ranging from parliamentary delegations from UK, Cambodia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Australia to film critics and journalists];

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• digital diplomacy [with a ‘indiandiplomacy’ twitter account, a facebook page, and a YouTube channel]; image and branding [with initiatives such as ‘India Inclusive @Davos’ at the World Economic Forum in 2011 and ‘India Future of Change’]; • broadcasting [an attempt to make Doordarshan cater not only to the diaspora public in the 67 countries where it is aired but also the general foreign public in those countries]; • the domestic front [with the institutionalization of ‘Distinguished Lecture Series’ having taken place in more than 20 universities in several cities, the organization of seminars, workshops and conferences in places like Varanasi, Patna, Kolkata, Shillong and Kochi]; • coordination and strategic communications [attempt to integrate the various departments of the government needed for a active and credible public diplomacy].”

These above processes include both ‘traditional’ and ‘new public diplomacy’ initiatives. Moreover, they can be put under all the three categories of ‘monologue, dialogue and collaboration’. Branding, developing a positive narrative through films, magazine circulation, documentaries and broadcasting would come under the category of a monologue. Whereas, hosting visitors and holding conference both at home and abroad would come under ‘dialogic’ category. When holding academic conferences is institutionalized and regularized, with added measures of joint research and joint publications, then it would be included in the category of collaboration. For a successful PD, all the three levels of processes, ‘monologue, dialogue and collaboration’ need to be pursued simultaneously. It is but obvious that one cannot draw fixed categories with regard to such processes on the field, where a dialogic process can lead to a form of collaboration or a collaborative venture includes all the three processes. However, such demarcations become necessary for better analysis and further improvement in strategy for policy planners and practitioners. With regard to India’s approach towards it South Asian neighbours, public diplomacy is more active in the processes which involve a ‘monologue’ and a ‘dialogue’, rather than in processes which involve ‘collaboration’ or ‘engagement’. This is true for both traditional PD activities like educational and cultural exchanges, to new public diplomacy activities like using the new social media. There are hardly any projects in public diplomacy, both internal and external, which can be said to belong to the realm of engagement and collaboration. A reason for such a scenario could be attributed to the fact of the limited number of actors and issues being dealt with. Hence, the three, that is, the actors, issues and processes are interdependent

127 SAJD 2015 and a change in one, bring about a change in the other. Similarly, stagnation in one brings about stagnation in the other two.

Analysis of India’s PD practice based on the Theoretical dimensions of PD All these steps by the MEA and PD division in particular have not been very successful in creating a positive image of India among our neighbours. Though it might be unfair to judge the PD division only after 8 years of its establishment, we cannot allow a lack of imagination and lackadaisical bureaucratic approach to come in our way to achieve a greater integration of South Asia and a harmonious neighbourhood which will further act as a stimulus for India’s larger role at the global level. Some suggestions to re-orient India’s PD especially in South Asian region are as follows:-

Increasing the role of non-state actors There is considerable literature on the role of non-state actors in the practice of public diplomacy, but India has been unable to rope in a variety of non-state actors in its endeavour to increase its ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004) among the general public. India is still in the phase of “traditional public diplomacy” (Snow 2008) which includes government talking to global publics (G2P). MEA has not been successful in delegating work to various non-state actors. This would include a lack of linkage with vast range of NGO’s working on various issues and business groups. The objective would be to institutionalize a linkage not only with NGO’s based in India but local NGO’s in these South Asian countries. It is high time that India moved away from a G2P framework to a “P2P framework” (Snow 2008) that is public to public. This interaction between public to public has to be initiated and given support by the government. Moreover, this failure to increase the scope of actors by delegation of PD activities has a direct impact on the range of issues that are addressed in these outreach activities. Most of the seminars and conferences organized deal with inter- state relations. This level of approach has to be localized if it has to affect the people and help in building long term relationships. One exception to this was the India Pakistan meet on agriculture held in Chandigarh in 2007. Outreach activities and conferences have to deal with basic human needs, Millenium Development Goals, employment avenues, micro-finance, and other such substantive areas which has a direct impact on people’s lives if participation needs to increase and goodwill needs to be generated.

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More of ‘collaboration’ instead of ‘monologue and dialogue’ With regard to India’s PD in South Asia, an impetus has to be given to joint ventures and joint projects between different local groups among India and its neighbours. This would in fact be in line with our Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s idea of changing the borders between India and its neighbours into soft borders of trade, co-operations and collaboration. Such an approach would help us move towards a “network model of public diplomacy” [from a “state centered hierarchical model of public diplomacy”] (Hocking 2005) which envisages an active role for publics rather than as passive objects of government foreign policy strategies.

Improve overall foreign relations The linkages between public diplomacy and foreign policy have been written on by Jan Mellisen (2005). He warns of too close a relationship being public diplomacy and foreign policy because, such a close linkage defeats the purpose public diplomacy making an in-road where traditional diplomacy has failed to do so. “If it is too closely tied to foreign policy objectives, it runs the risks of becoming counterproductive and indeed a failure when foreign policy itself is perceived to be a failure.” (Mellisen 2005) This is exactly what is happening with India’s public diplomacy towards its South Asian neighbours. Public diplomacy cannot be independent of foreign policy all together but should devise innovative ways to supplement and complement traditional foreign policy in a way that it can make inroads where traditional diplomacy cannot. However, various scholars have also stressed on the argument that public diplomacy cannot mask a bad foreign policy. If it tries to do so, it will be having a negative impact, as it would be seen as being akin to propaganda. So for India’s public diplomacy to become vibrant in the South Asian region, there has to be considerable breakthroughs at the government to government level. This however does not mean that until breakthroughs happen at the traditional foreign policy level, PD can take a back-seat. It has to be all the more pro-active at all times so that the governments can get a feedback on various issues, including what would be the best way to deal with the other government. It cannot be denied that public diplomacy can in no way mask a bad foreign policy; hence, for PD to build bonds successfully, the relations at the state level have to maintain a basic minimum of goodwill between each other.

Expand public affairs to expand public diplomacy There is usually a difference between public diplomacy and public affairs. Public diplomacy is mainly meant for foreign publics whereas Public affairs and

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Public relations is mainly used in the case of domestic audiences. However, this difference gets somewhat mitigated when Jan Mellisen (2005) points out that “domestic public diplomacy can in a way be seen as the successor to public affairs during the cold war, with its objectives going beyond traditional constituency building.” Interestingly, Mellisen (2005) has also written that public diplomacy in especially federal states is two faced, facing inwards as well as outwards. “In other words, public diplomacy serves as a window into a society and as a window out. The sense of national identity of citizens, and also how they feel about their country, helps projecting a country’s identity abroad.” Hence public diplomacy at the domestic level is as important as public diplomacy at the foreign levels, especially in this age of rapid global communications and linkages information that is inside is constantly outside and vice versa. If the domestic public is well versed with the various government policies and initiatives, this augurs well for the country’s public diplomacy abroad. Ian Hall (2012) has written that “Indian public diplomacy is unusual in including what other governments term ‘public affairs’-the practice of communicating with domestic audiences-as part of its remit.” However what is proving to be a roadblock in India’s engagement with foreign public is it’s over emphasis on domestic public diplomacy. Most of India’s New PD Division’s focus and energy is spent on the domestic front, leaving little left especially for the South Asian neighbours. Most of the conferences and seminars organized are within India except for a few linkages with international think tanks such as IISS and others. Though one cannot in any way be critical of such a focus on domestic public, as it is bringing about the much needed opening up of the black box of foreign policy in India, however this cannot be done at the expense of reaching out to the foreign public which is the main objective of public diplomacy. Both PD at home and abroad especially with our neighbours has to be pursued with the same amount of interest, resources and vigour.

Conclusion India’s foray into the use Public Diplomacy has to be lauded, but one has to realize that this is only the beginning and a lot still needs to be done. What needs special focus on all sides, both domestic and foreign is perception management. This is all the more important for India’s domestic media which has a tendency to portray India’s neighbours especially Pakistan in a very bad light. India’s public diplomacy has to create opportunities to build these wider linkages with media houses of our South Asian neighbours. Moreover as to the methods in which feedback from PD’s various outreach programs is used is not clear from the PD Section of the Annual Reports of the MEA and more accountability is desirable.

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Since PD is as much about listening as about telling and showcasing, the fundamental necessity in India’s PD practice especially with its South Asian neighbours is to increase its listening function. Lack of this receptive process could be one of the main reasons why India’s negative image continues to exist in these countries. Its time India stopped imposing itself even in the realm of ideas and began to hear, listen, receive and take interests in what others are trying to say about themselves. This is the only way by which South Asian countries will be able to carve out their separate identity apart from India, which will help in easing out relations on the basis of equality even at the realm of ideas, values, norms, perceptions, and legitimacy. Since the practice of an effective and wide PD processes requires minimum level of economic resources and technicality, many of India’s neighbours do not have this very requirement. Hence it would be India’s responsibility to make an effort to listen to their stories and voices despite them not making a conscious effort to practice their public diplomacy.

Notes

1. Chattopadhyay (2011) has quoted C. R. Mohan (2003) here as referring to this phenomenon as India changing from a “regional bully” to a “benign hegemon”. 2. “New Public Diplomacy” is a phrase used by Jan Mellisen (2005). It refers to the practice of public diplomacy in a transformed context due to the international and communications revolution.

References Chattopadhyay P. (2011): “The Politics of India’s Neighbourhood Policy in South Asia,” South Asian Survey, 18(1): 93- 108. Chaturvedy R. R. and Malone D. M. (2009): “India and its South Asian Neighbours,” ISAS Working Paper, No. 100, November 26. Cowan, Geoffrey and Arsenault, Amelia (2008): “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” Annals of the American of Political and Social Science, 616: 10-30. Gilboa, Eytan (2008): “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, 616: 55-77. Gilboa, Etyan (2006): “Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel’s Foreign Policy,” Israel Affairs, 12 (4): 715-747. Gupta Arvind (2013): “India and South Asia: Exploring Regional Perceptions” speech on October 30-31 in the 7th South Asia Conference, http://idsa.in/sac/Report_SessionV. html Gregory, Bruce (2011): “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6: 351-372. Hall, Ian (2012): “India’s New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power and the Limits of Government Action,” Asian Survey, 52 (6): 1089-1110.

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Hocking, Brian (2005): “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy,” in Jan Mellisen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy-Soft Power in International Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mellisen, Jan (2005): “The new Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in Jan Mellisen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy-Soft Power in International Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Menon Shiv Shankar (2007): “The Challenges Ahead for India’s Foreign Policy” speech on April 10 at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, http://mea.gov.in/Speeches- Statements.htm?dtl/1847/The+Challenges+Ahead+for+Indias+Foreign+Policy+Spee ch+by+Foreign+Secretary+Shri+Shivshankar+Menon+at+the+Observer+Research+F oundation+New+Delhi Ministry of External Affairs India (2008): Annual Report 2008/2009: Public Diplomacy, New Delhi: Government of India. Ministry of External Affairs India (2009): Annual Report 2009/2010: Public Diplomacy, New Delhi: Government of India. Ministry of External Affairs India (2010): Annual Report 2010/2011: Public Diplomacy, New Delhi: Government of India. Ministry of External Affairs India (2011): Annual Report 2011/2012: Public Diplomacy, New Delhi: Government of India. Ministry of External Affairs India (2012): Annual Report 2012/2013: Public Diplomacy, New Delhi: Government of India. Saran, Shyam (2005): “India and its Neighbours” on February 14 speech at the India International Centre, http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/2483/Foreign +Secretary+Mr+Shyam+Sarans+speech+on+India+and+its+Neighbours+at+the+Ind ia+International+Centre+IIC Suri, Navdeep (2011): “Public Diplomacy in India’s Foreign Policy,” Strategic Analysis, 35 (2): 297-303.

132 Engaging Smaller States in South Asia: India’s Relations with Maldives Jocelyn Jose

Maldives, a Cross Section of South Asia Maldives accommodates a tiny fraction of the population of South Asia. Yet the life and politics of the country represents a cross section of South Asia with all its peculiarities. However it is unfair to treat the cluster- of- islands state in the same mould as its counterparts in South Asia. Thus paper intends to give an idea about how the country is different from its neighbours, and how these factors have influenced its foreign policy decisions.

Early History Maldives is one among the most dispersed countries in the world. It is an archipelago of 1192 coral islands grouped into a double chain of 26 atolls, along the north-south direction, spread over roughly 90,000 square kilometers. Maldives is situated at a distance of about 500 kms from the southern coast of India, sharing close proximity with Indian Union territory of Lakshadweep. Barely 253 of these islands in Maldives are inhabited. Another 84 of them have tourist resorts. Maldives is the lowest lying country in the world with a maximum of natural ground level of only 2.4 meters, with the average being only 1.5 m above sea level. More than 80 per cent of the country’s land is composed of coral islands that rise less than one metre above the sea level. This low-lying nature of the land makes the islands extremely sensitive to sea-level rise. Archaeological finds indicate that Maldives was inhabited as early as 1500 B.C. Permanent settlements were established around 500 B.C. by people from Southern and Western India. Maldives was a matriarchal society in ancient times; there were no female servants, head of the family was a woman member and a number of queens enjoyed power over the islands. Buddhism has a history of 1400 years in Maldives. In the 11th century Maldives and Minicoy islands were annexed

133 SAJD 2015 by Raja Raja Chola 1 (985-1014) making it a part of the Chola Empire. Under King Koimala (1117-1114) Maldives as we know it today were united. The 12th century was also marked by robust trade with the Arab lands of West Asia and North Africa. Maldivian traditions say that the conversion to Islam took place due to a Persian saint called Yusuf Shamsuddkin. The converted King assumed the title of Sultan (Arabic) and Maha Rudan (Dhivehi) meaning king. The Sultanate initiated a series of six Islamic dynasties consisting of 84 Sultans and Sultanas that lasted until 1953.

Colonial Powers in Maldives Administering from Goa, the Portuguese established a small garrison in the Maldives in 1558. Efforts were made to propagate Christianity in the islands which the natives opposed with popular revolt. However there are scholars arguing that the Portuguese had no imperial intentions over Maldives. The British expelled Dutch rulers from Ceylon and established themselves as the rulers there in 1796. They included Maldives as a British protected area. On 16 December 1887, the Sultan of Maldives signed a contract with the British Governor of Ceylon giving latter the power to conduct Maldives’ foreign affairs, retaining their internal sovereignty with the islands. Maldives was promised of military protection and non-interference in local administration.

The Two Republics In 1953 the Sultanate was suspended to form the first republic under Muhammad Amin Didi. He introduced myriad of reforms in the field of education, industry and women’s rights. He was ousted by his Government shortly after in 1954. Sultanate was reestablished in the islands and in 1956, the British built a wartime airfield in Gan, in the southernmost atoll of Addu. The southernmost islands were economically benefited from the 100 year lease of Gan to the British. People of these islands cut ties with Maldives and declared independence to form a state United Suvadive Republic (1959-1963) (O’Shea 2006). Then Prime Minister Ibrahim Nasir was successful in eliminating the secessionist move in 1963. On 26 July 1965, Maldives gained independence from Britain. Britain retained the use of Gan. With a national referendum, Sultanate was abolished and the second republic came into force. Ibrahim Nasir became the President under the new constitution. He was in power from 1968 to 1978.

‘Pre-democracy Era’ Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, an Egypt educated teacher of Islamic studies replaced Nasir in an indirect, constitutional election. The tourism industry

134 Engaging Smaller States in South Asia flourished in Maldives and the benefits percolated to create more opportunities in Maldives. Three coup attempts took place to topple Gayoom’s Government in 1980, 1983 & 1988. Gayoon however remained in power for 30 years till 2008. Gayoom didn’t allow any legal opposition and his rule was marked by number of human rights violations by the government. There were growing Islamic fundamentalists Movements in Maldives by the 1990. Gayoon used them as a political weapon to stay in power. His government ratified a more Islamic Constitution in the country. He had to succumb to growing democratic pressure post 2005. In democratically conducted direct elections, Gayoom was defeated in the race for President.

Being a Nascent Democracy Maldives is a presidential republic. President is both the head of state and head of government. The President as the head of executive branch appoints the cabinet. These appointments have to be approved by the people’s Majlis, which is the parliament. The President is elected directly every five years and can have two terms. The Majlis is unicameral and also has a five year term. Number of seats in the Majlis is determined by the population of atolls. In the 2009 elections 77 members were elected to the Majlis, which is situated in the capital city Male. The republican constitution came into force in 1968. Under the leadership of President Gayoom it was replaced in 1997. A third constitution was ratified in 2008, which separated the judiciary from the jurisdiction of head of the state. Maldives witnessed a rare show of pro-democratic civil unrest fermenting from 2005, which resulted in the electoral victory of Mohammed Nasheed – a democracy and climate activist. Later on voices from the western media hailed him as the ‘godfather of Arab spring.’ Nasheed soon turned the spotlight to the imminent crisis of climate change in Maldives. However the bad state of economy and rise of unemployment in the country sparked off protest against him in 2011. In January 2012, Nasheed suspended Chief Judge of Crime Court Abdullah Calif on charges blocking trials of human rights violation against loyalists of Gayoom. This move was dubbed unconstitutional by both Maldives and International community. In February 2012, Nasheed resigned from his post. He accused the next day that he did it at gunpoint and the power transfer was actually a coup (Swami 2012). His Vice President Waheed Hasan Manik assumed power after Nasheed’s resignation. Nasheed had alleged it to be a coup plotted by former President Gayoom. However, an enquiry report backed by Commonwealth Commission reports asserts that Nasheed voluntarily resigned following a year long civil unrest organized by what came to be known as the 23 December Movement. Later on Nasheed took refuge in Indian High Commission in Male to avoid arrest.

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The coalition government led by Waheed Hassan turned very unpopular in the country. The 2013 presidential elections witnessed the incumbent receiving least number of votes among the contestants. The polls in Maldives generated a lot of enthusiasm among the people. They turned out in large numbers and nearly 88 per cent of eligible voters used their franchise. After three rounds of polling Yameen Abdulla of Progressive Party of Maldives, brother of Gayoom Abdulla came to power. Mohammed Nasheed secured himself a second place with less than 2.78 percentage of the votes polled. The vibrant elections however followed moments of brief uncertainties when the Supreme Court of Maldives disqualified the members of the Election Commission. It threatened the upcoming parliamentary elections to be postponed. But timely, the existing parliament unanimously filled the vacancy and steered the path clear.

Radicalisation of Religion Traditionally Maldives was characterised by a society which was tolerant and open to differences. Lately, however increasing cases of religious intolerance in Maldives have been reported. According to the Constitution of Maldives, “The judges are independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law. When deciding matters on which the Constitution or the law is silent, judges must consider Islamic Shariah.” Article 2 of the revised Constitution says that the republic “is based on the principles of Islam.” Open practice of any religion other than Islam is forbidden and liable to prosecution. Article 9 says that “a non- Muslim may not become a citizen;” Article 10 “no law contrary to any principle of Islam can be applied.” With the adoption of the new Constitution in 2008, Maldives has severely restricted religious freedom. It was during the early 1990s that Maldives was exposed to Salafi ideology. A neo-Salafist movement took roots in the country and a few Jihadi groups developed in parallel in the country. The ‘Salaf’ or the ancestors’ Islam practices were literalist, strict and took a puritanical approach to Islam. This form of Salafist ideology considers Jihad as a legitimate expression of Islam (Singh 2012). Abdul Gayoom who had kept the fundamentalists at bay throughout a long period of time, politicised religion or used religion for his political gain by the end to retain power. Gayoom was educated in Sri Lanka and Egypt and has worked as a teacher of Islamic Studies in Nigeria. Back in Maldives, when he became part of Ibrahim Nasir’s ministry, Gayoom condemned Abdul Jamal Nasser’s recognition of Israel. In 1997, Islam was declared the state religion. In 2008, constitution made under the Gayoom government, limited the religious rights of non-Sunni Muslim population. Open practice of any other religion was made illegal. Constitutional

136 Engaging Smaller States in South Asia validity for such suppression of freedom of religion was a manifestation of a deep lying problem. Mohammed Nasheed who is internationally recognised as a prize-fighter for human rights and sustainable development was accused of being of anti-Islamic while he was in power. Religious political parties were well ahead in the move to topple Nasheed’s government. The day he resigned from power, half a dozen men stormed into the National Museum of Maldives and ransacked a collection of coral and lime figures including a six faced coral statue and a one and half foot wide representation of the Buddha’s head. The Director of the museum Ali Waheed said that the whole pre-Islamic history is gone (Bajaj 2012). The incident reminds us of the demolition of Bamiyan Buddha status in Afghanistan by the Taliban. Ever since the adoption of 2008 constitution, idols are banned in Maldives. Idols cannot be brought into the country. Indian analysts fear the steady infiltration of elements collaborating with Somalian pirates and fundamentalist militant groups such as Pakistan based Laskra-e-Taiba. In 2002, Ibrahim Fauzee, a Maldivian citizen was deported to Guantanamo Bay by the US for having ties with Al Qaeda. One year later, posters praising Osama Bin Laden popped up the country on the walls of a school. In September 2007, twelve tourists were injured in a blast in Male’s Sultan Park. Two months later, the police alleged the ten men linked to the explosion were absconding in Pakistan and had links with Lashkar-e-Taiba (Singh 2012). The fact that Islamic fundamentalism has become a substantial feature of Maldivian discourse is reflected by the remark of Waheed Hassan: “They are the part of the society. You cannot ignore them.” What is more worrisome is the politicisation of religious sentiments. Mohammed Shoaib, member of ‘Journey,’ an NGO aimed at helping addicts in Maldives estimates that 5 per cent of the population is addicted to narcotics. Shoaib exclaimed that it was ‘easier to buy heroine than pizza in Male’ (Saverborn 2012). This growing threat of intoxication made a large population easily accessible to manipulation. The Progressive Party of Maldives and the Adhaalath Party accused Nasheed of placing idols in Maldives-a reference to the SAARC monuments placed by other South Asian Nations during the 2011 SAARC Summit and of ‘giving our assets to foreigners’-reference to the concession agreement to upgrade and manage INI Airport Male to Indian firm GMR. (Nazeer 2011). Over the past couple of years the Adhalath Party (AP) has been able to put together a motley group of religious NGOs and anti-Nasheed political parties in what came to be named as the Maldives National Movement(MNM). It spearheaded the ‘December 23 movement’, contributing heavily in President Nasheed leaving office on 7 February 2012. With the party possessing a share in power in the Waheed Government, too, it became

137 SAJD 2015 easier for the AP this time to spearhead the demand for the cancellation of the Male airport construction-cum-concession contract with the Indian infrastructure major, the GMR Group (Sathiyamoorthy 2013). The young population of Maldives engages in active deliberations online, supporting and opposing the influence of radical elements in Islam. A section of youth had campaigned against Gayoom’s call for a ‘nationalistic Islamic State’ as a sheer rhetoric to gain power in 2013 elections. But to write off the radical element will be foolishness in a multiparty system which often leads to coalition governments. South Asia is no alien to issues of religious intolerance and its politicization. But its entry into a small Islamic nation which was proud of its religious moderation for centuries is troublesome to reason. The mainstream parties not living up to the expectations of the electorate contribute to the growth of such elements all across South Asia. They emerge as possible alternative to the existing corrupt mediocrity. As Sathiyamoorthy (2013) notes, ‘The question is not just about politicising Islam, or ‘political Islam’. It is also about politicising ‘political Islam’ to run down one another, in electoral terms, just as religion and caste, ethnicity and culture, language and demography have all become electoral tools elsewhere in South Asia. To consider if all of it would contribute to an ideology obtaining a driver’s position in a nation’s scheme of things is one thing. To confuse it for the nation, and refusing to consider the (theoretical) possibility of pragmatic politics likewise moderating the ideology in terms of the middle-path is another… In Islamic Maldives, it would have been the equivalent or left ideology/militancy in more ‘secular’ political environs, elsewhere in South Asia and the rest.’

Pattern of Engagement: India and Maldives As a ‘micro state’, Maldives has small size, narrow resources, difficult geographical configuration and relative proximity to a big neighbour. The country also has to interact with the outside world in three concentric circles, i.e. super powers, big powers and immediate neighbours in the region. Micro states are considered vulnerable both from within and without (Singh 2012). India’s developmental co-operation with Maldives has traditionally been composed of long term health and educational sector aid projects and short bursts of emergency assistance. The two countries have acknowledged the importance of critical infrastructure development and security co-operation as well. India was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Maldives, right after the latter gained independence from Britain in 1965. The two countries settled their maritime borders in 1976. India established its mission at the level of CDA in 1972 and resident High Commissioner in 1980. Maldives opened a full-fledged High Commission in New Delhi in November 2004. At the time, it was one among the only four diplomatic missions of Maldives, worldwide (India 2007).

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The relations were however cemented well during Maumoon Gayoom’s thirty year term spanning from 1978 to 2008. Gayoom had maintained a pro-Indian approach throughout his administration. The relations between two countries were cordial at this period of time. He had made a number of visits to India at various points of times. As it has been in the case of most of the micro-states, coups were not alien to Maldives. Maldives has faced three coup attempts during Gayoom’s reign in 1980, 1983 and 1988. The most serious of the three attempts took place in 1988. India had responded to the SOS by Gayoom by launching ‘Operation Cactus.’ All three service branches of the Indian armed services participated in the Operation. The operation quickly restored the status quo in the archipelago. This Operation was dubbed as both good neighbourly and as meddling in internal affairs of the other from different quarters. The anti Gayoom section of the population of Maldives perceived India to be supporting of a dictatorial rule in the Islands. Since the success of this operation, the economic assistance from India increased in fields of health, civil society development, disaster management and telecommunication (India 2011). However, Maldives received greater geostrategic significance only past 26/11 when seaborne terrorism destroyed India’s commercial centre with terror and resentment, increasing naval presence of China in South Asia also alarmed India to take better care of relationships with Maldives. 2008 was perhaps the most significant year in the second republic of Maldives. The thirty year rule of Gayoom, being autocratic and dictatorial, from mid- 2000, demand for a more transparent and accountable democratic government strengthened as independent political parties came together. The Dhivehi - Rayyithunge Party (Maldivian People’s Party) of Gayoom had to succumb to the pressure. The Indian government recognized the new democratic government of Nasheed. The latter was quick to address the threat of climate change Maldives was facing. Nasheed’s government had made it one of its top priority tasks to seek for lands the country could acquire if forced to evacuate their country, due to loss of land in Maldives. Sri Lanka and Indiwere high on the list due to similar culture and climate (Saverborn 2012). The relatively unknown archipelago had risen to global spotlight when the cabinet of Nasheed held a meeting underwater. This strange endeavour was held to create awareness on the struggle Maldives was under. The declaration the cabinet signed sub-aqua was forwarded to UN Climatic Change Summit in Copenhagen, demanding large cuts in carbon emissions. India has supported Maldives in its request to curtail climate change in the multilateral institutions. In 2011 November, Nasheed and Manmohan Singh signed an important ‘framework Agreement on Co-operation for Development.’ The agreement recalled

139 SAJD 2015 the two parties, shared bond of history, culture and common ethos; desirous of maintaining and deepening their unique relationship based on sovereign equality, mutual respect and benefit. Convinced that co-operation at the bilateral, sub-regional and regional levels will enable the two countries to realise their developmental aspirations and contribute to peace, prosperity and security in the Indian Ocean region and South Asia.’ The agreement laid emphasis on sustainable development, food security, enhancing connectivity through shipping, links and ferry services, technical co-operation, curtailing piracy, terrorism, trafficking and promoting inclusive growth and development among others. The agreement also provided for establishment of a Joint Consultative Commission that shall meet at least once a year. India and Maldives share platform in Commonwealth, NAM and SAARC. Maldives supported India in the candidature of Kamalesh Sharma as the Commonwealth Secretary General. Maldives also co-sponsored the G4 draft resolutions on UN reforms. India has extended support to Maldives candidature for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for the term 2019-20. Maldives became a member of commonwealth nations in 1982 and was a founding member of SAARC in 1985. Despite its failure to take off, SAARC has provided for an unprecedented regional arrangement. Out of the eight members, five–Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka–have a collective colonial past. Such a common podium, despite all the similarities these nations share, took around 30 years to form. For countries like Bhutan and Maldives, SAARC provides a platform to promote their distinctive identities as independent entities and emphasize their divergence from India without inviting displeasure from India. The 17th SAARC summit was held at Addu city, the Maldives, on 10-11 November 2011. The focal theme of the summit was “Building Bridges-both in terms of physical connectivity and figurative political dialogue.” Through this regional arrangement, the South Asian countries reaffirmed their arrangement to peace, confidence building emancipation, human dignity, democracy, mutual respect, good governance and human rights. The foreign ministers of the respective member states signed four agreements; SAARC Agreement for Rapid Response to Natural Disasters, SAARC Agreement on Implementation of Regional Standards, SAARC Agreement on Multilateral Arrangement on Recognition of Conformity Assessment and SAARC Seed Bank Agreement continuing threat of terrorism in all its forms, transnational organised crimes, especially illegal trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, trafficking in persons and small arms and increased incidents of maritime piracy in the region; and reiterating their resolve to fight all such menaces. Maldives became a member of the Non-Alignment Movement on 15 August 1976 and has

140 Engaging Smaller States in South Asia kept itself away from cold war politics. Maldives is a member of Organization of Islamic Co-operation (OIC) and maintains cordial cultural relationships with other Islamic countries. However, it has distanced itself from the stances OIC has taken in the Kashmir issue. While OIC maintains a pro-Pakistan stand, Maldives has maintained that the issue has to be solved bilaterally by India and Pakistan .

The GMR Dispute The bilateral relations between India and Maldives were severely strained when the Maldives government under Waheed Hassan terminated an investment contract with the GMR group of India. In November 2010, GMR Infrastructure (India) and KLIA (Malaysia) consortium had taken over the Male International Airport (Ibrahim Nasir International Airport) on a 25-year BOT contract for renovation and expansion with the sanction of Mohamed Nasheed Government. GMR is a Bangalore based private company founded in 1978. The Grandhi Mallikarjuna Rao Group in involved in construction, related to airports, energy production, highways and urban infrastructure. The group was to invest $500 million in the modernization project. This was to be the largest foreign direct investment ever made in Maldives. The deal was that the GMR group would upgrade, maintain and operate the existing airport, and build a new terminal by 2014. The operator would earn incomes from the sale of fuel, landing/ parking fees, shops in airport and airport development charges (ADC). The ADC of $25 on each passenger came to be the heart of the controversy. GMR maintained that the Nasheed government had agreed to the arrangement. However, on 27 November 2012 the contract was terminated by the next Maldivian government of Hassan. GMR moved to Singapore Court seeking a compensation of $ 800 million for the ‘arbitrary cancellation’ of the deal. Earlier the court had rejected the High Court order preventing the cancellation. The cancellation drew sharp response from Indian foreign ministry. The decision to terminate the contract with GMR without due consultation with the company or efforts at arbitration provided for under the agreement sent a very negative signal to foreign investors and the international community. On 9 December 2012, Maldives Airport Company Limited took over the INIA administration. There were speculations that India would retaliate by cancelling the $ 25 million annual aid to Maldives, but no such steps were taken. Experts say that personal preferences, political agenda and business interests could have possibly influenced the decision. The public opinion in Maldives against the ADC was strong. Questions were raised about the manner in which the contract was awarded to GMR as well. The Maldivian government had justified the cancellation on grounds that “there were many legal, technical and economic issues” to consider.

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Political pressures from the coalition were quite obvious when the Adhaalath Party stated in a tweet that, “we would rather give airport contract to our friends in China.” This event brought relations between the India and Maldives to an all time low. India tightened free visa for Maldivians on arrival following the incident (Mishra 2012).

Restoring Long Standing Ties The long standing relationship between the two countries turned out difficult in the period from 2012 to 2013. India had an uneasy relationship with Male after the toppling of former President Mohamed Nasheed who once took refuge at the Indian high commission in Male to avoid arrest. The previous government’s decision in 2012 to prematurely terminate the contract with India’s GMR Group and expropriate the airport had sparked a diplomatic row with India which had threatened the long-standing relations between the two countries. Shortly after the termination of the GMR contract, India had tightened the free on arrival visa granted to Maldivians by warning that Maldivians travelling to India for purposes other than tourism on a tourist visa could face deportation. But India was swift to congratulate Progressive Party of Maldives’ (PPM) Yameen after he won the presidential runoff in November, and said it looks forward to cooperating with him and his government. After President Yameen’s visit to India in January 2014, India has lifted the restrictions on visa and construction aggregate import. The Maldives has special concerns relating to disasters arising out of climate change, apart from routine security issues such as aviation security and border control. At the end of the visit of Maldives Defence Minister to India in December 2013, Maldives was gifted a second twin-engine helicopter. Also, India is pushing ahead with maritime domain security awareness in the region, in which the Maldives and Sri Lanka are the other partners. The crux of the exercise is to put in place a security architecture which will be independent of individuals in positions of power. Topping the list of Maldivian concerns are the visa restrictions that India had imposed following a souring of relationship with former President Mohamed Waheed, the ban on export from India of certain types of construction material, and the lack of adequate trained health services personnel. In return, India wants a definitive set of rules that will guarantee Indian investments in the Maldives, apart from cooperation on security related matters. President Yameen’s visit, which was postponed once, has already made some headway with the signing of three agreements on 2 January, of which two relate to the health sector. Since India had announced ahead of the much-delayed presidential polls that it would do business with anyone who was elected to the post, Yameen’s Delhi visit was a win-win for

142 Engaging Smaller States in South Asia both sides. It is in the interest of both countries to amicably settle the issue relating to throwing out GMR, the Indian operator of the Ibrahim Nasir airport in Male. As a result of the meetings between the head of governments, India offered Maldives an enhanced security grid, more defence equipment as well as subsidised petroleum in return for greater investment opportunities to its companies which have had a rough time in the island nation of late. Singh offered a standby credit facility of $25 million to Maldives for imports from India and agreed to meet the island country’s requirement for petroleum products. India also agreed to step up the pace of work on some projects, and it was offered a plot for High Commission premises. However, there was no forthright word from the visiting President Abdulla Yameen on settling disputes beyond an assurance that his new government would try to amicably resolve the row over the biggest project — the $500-million investment proposal by the Indian company GMR — in a broad sense. The two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in the health sector and extended an MoU on meeting manpower requirements at the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital in Male. Indian government stressed the need for the two countries to be vigilant against terrorism and wanted them to “share the firm commitment” to be sensitive to each other’s concerns and not allow their territories to be used by “any inimical quarters” (Dikshit 2014).

Conclusion South Asia provides for a fascinating study of countries interconnected with each other in history, ethnicity and religion. These nations cherish their differences as much as they are similar. In fact, the concept of nation itself is quite problematic here. Within a state, many nations are spread. Economic and commercial pressures of globalization have not been able to obliterate the problems between these countries that pertain more in the cultural, religious and ethnic domains. This has left a considerable space for regionalism in South Asia. Globalization has not diminished the importance of regionalism in South Asia. Rather, globalization has increased the need for regionalism here. And geo economics has not surpassed geo politics either. Combinations of commercial, political and cultural reasons dictate the relations between the countries. The relations India has maintained with Maldives were, however, different from that of with its other neighbours. They share no painful legacy of partition or border disputes. In fact, the relations between the two have been largely trouble free. India and Maldives are two entirely different entities, differing geographically, politically and economically. The archipelago of Maldives is a micro-state with a

143 SAJD 2015 population less than a million dispersed into a thousand islands. It has a narrow resource base and difficult geographic configuration. India on the other hand is a regional power. Complex domestic challenges, coalition politics, ethnic-religious conflicts, and secessionist pressures combine with strategic interests. To examine the foreign policies of the countries require an analysis that incorporates systemic opportunities and constraints, and domestic pressures, while also taking into consideration, the changing relative material power capabilities and their influence on the threat perceptions. For India, Maldives holds a strategic importance due to its location in the Indian Ocean region, crucial for its maritime security. Maritime security has much wider connotations than it did in the past. It now encompasses concerns of securing sea lanes of communication, preventing piracy and countering maritime terrorism. For Maldives, on the other hand, India is a major trading partner and an aid donor. Unlike with its other neighbour, India has had no perennial issues with the island nations. However, a single incident of a termination of contract could bring the long standing ties to a halt, to an extend of restricting people from travelling between the two countries. This might indicate at the lack of a comprehensive foreign policy towards the island nations from India. India has always stood for political stability in the Maldives, but often it has taken a case to case, leader to leader basis approach. How India continued its support for an autocratic regime regardless of democratic pressures in Maldives in itself marks a lack of prudence in dealing with critical development in its strategic neighborhood. India termed the sudden ouster of the democratically elected President Nasheed as an ‘internal development’. And within 24 hours the new government under Waheed Hassan was recognized and all possible support was assured to it by the Government of India. The haste in which the recognition was made without any proper assessment could have been avoided. The winning point would be understanding Maldives’ own experience of democracy. Not to treat it in a preconceived universal mould; understanding its dynamic electorate and their ambition for a long term, sustainable alternative of political uncertainties; understanding the ongoing transition period. Despite the politicization and radicalization of religion in the country, after the 2013 presidential poll, the Maldives Democratic Party has emerged as the single largest party in the country. Now it is the opposition as against a large ‘progressive coalition’ in the ruling side. This would indicate the plural interests being played out in the infant democracy. The latest developments in the bilateral relationship seem to head in a better direction as opposed to previous years. The threat of growing extremist religious outfit must be countered. But it is a threat not only to Maldives but also to India and other South Asian countries. It is ironic to see how even the self claimed

144 Engaging Smaller States in South Asia secular political parties have used religion and secular ideas at the same time to bank in votes through rhetoric and vote bank politics. Finding common grounds in larger issues such as countering terrorism, building democratic institutions, maritime security and climate change in both bilateral and multilateral levels of cooperation would give deeper roots to the relations between India and Maldives. It is time to address the Maldivian concern about the grave threat it faces as a result of climate change. Such measures would insulate the relations from falling apart into diplomatic impasse. Maldivian citizens depend heavily on India for medical facilities and education. This actually sets the ground for diplomacy other than the conventional route. The scope for track two diplomacy is higher to be worked out in the case of India and Maldives. In fact we have seen it work out in resolving the issue although in utmost moderation Though India has emerged as a major aid donor, it has failed to bring as much soft power as it should have garnered. India’s developmental cooperation and assistance lacks a cohesive strategy and many assistance projects initiated have carried on interminably (Poplin 2013). The demand driven approach India takes towards provision of aid shall be revised. Developing long term and people- centric approach towards developmental assistance need to be adopted. This would help bridge the gaps in other areas of understanding by opening new avenues for cooperation. For Maldives in particular, India should extend a comprehensive assistance package to address its developmental and security sector needs. India’s economic growth and prosperity are increasingly being shaped by circumstances outside its borders. Most prominently, trade and access to energy are now critical components of the Indian economy. Thus the location of Maldives forms strategically important for India. By establishing a security dialogue mechanism with Maldives, the latter’s security is ensured and India’s security interests are addressed. Since the South Asian region is marked by a degree of instability, the time has come for India to explore the possibility of setting up a security dialogue mechanism at least in a sub regional level. India, Sri Lanka and Maldives have taken steps to do the same from the previous year. Success of such a mechanism would help these countries identify common security issues and build a framework for cooperative security in the region (Sreenivasan 2013). Regardless of the political party or the coalition coming into power in Maldives, India needs to adopt a proactive approach towards her strategic, small neighbour. In the political, commercial and security spheres, India has to build a prudent strategy to develop its soft power and hard power in Maldives and rest of its small neighbours. Better multilateral relations can provide improved platforms for discourses too. Deep and proactive approach from India in the Maldives is

145 SAJD 2015 the requisite and an imperative to secure a safer neighbourhood for India. In this regard the ‘non- reciprocity’ policy still seems to be relevant.

References Bajaj, Vikas (2012): “Political Turmoil Threatens Archaeological Treasures in Maldives,” http://www.nyt.2012/02/14/world/asia/political-turmoil-threatens-archaeological- treasures-in-Maldives.htm?r=0. February 14. Devotta, Neil (2010): “When Individuals, States and Systems Collide,” in Sumit Ganguly (ed.), Foreign Policy of India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dixit, Sandeep (2014): “No firm assurance from Yameen on GMR issue,” The Hindu, 2 January . India, Ministry of External Affairs (2005): Annual Report 2004-05, New Delhi: Government of India. India, Ministry of External Affairs (2007): Annual Report 2006-07, New Delhi: Government of India. India, Ministry of External Affairs (2009): Annual Report 2008-09, New Delhi: Government of India. India, Ministry of External Affairs (2011): Annual Report 2010-11, New Delhi: Government of India. India, Ministry of External Affairs (2014): Bilateral/Multilateral Documents 2014, New Delhi: Government of India. Mishra, Mihir (2012): “GMR-Maldives row: Where the dispute lies,” http://archive. indianexpress.com/news/gmrmaldives-row-where-the-dispute-lies/1041498/0, February 7. Naafiz, Ali (2014): “India to hand over tourism faculty, landing craft to Maldives,” http:// www.haveeru.com.mv/maldivesindia/53681, 16 February. Nazeer, Ahmed (2011): “SAARC Monuments Vandalized,” http://minivannews.com/ politics/sri-lankan-saarc-monument-vandalised-as-ppm-file-case-over-import-of- idols-28292, 16 November. O’Shea, M. (2006): “Selective resort boycott campaign gathers momentum in Maldives and overseas,” Maldives Culture, 12 January. Poplin, Cody, M (2013): “Developing an Indian Ocean: The State of Indian Developmental Assistance to Maldives,” http://idcrindia.orh/p/blog-page-8821.htmo, 16 May. Radhakrishnan, R.K. (2013): “In a Mess in Male,” Frontline, 30(4) March: 59-60. Radhakrishnan, R.K. (2013): “Nasheed Leaves Indian Embassy,” The Hindu, 25 February. Radhakrishnan, R.K. ( 2013): “Three Men in a Simmering Archpelago,” The Hindu, 16 May. Sathiyamoorthy, N. (2013): “Maldives: The stranglehold of coalition politics continues,” http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/ AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=59633&mmacmaid=59634 November 19. Sathiyamoorthy N. (2013): “Maldives: Islam, nationalism and ‘Islamic nationalism,” http:// www.orfonline.org/cms/sites, 11 June. Saverborn, Djan (2012): “The Archipelago State in Disarray; Internal and External Battle for Maldive,” http://www.apsa.into/wp-content/uploads/2012/12-SSA-4.pdf.p2., December 4.

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Singh , R.S.N.(2012): “The Maldivian Question,” http:www.claws.in/index.php?action=ma ster+task=1077&u_78, February 2. Sreenivasan, T.P (2013): “Why Maldives Feels It has nothing to lose by defying India, “ http://www.rediff.com/news/coloumn/coloumn/coloumn-why-maldives-feels-it-has- nothing-to-lose-by-defyimg-india/20130318.html, May 18. Swami, Praveen (2012): “Paradise is Perched on the Edge of the Hell,” http://www.thehindu. com/opinion/op-ed/paradise-is-perched-on-the-edge-of-hell/article2880064.ece, February 12.

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About the Authors

HENRY GIROUX, a US cultural critic, is one of the founding theorists of critical pedagogy in the United States, and is best known for his pioneering work in cultural studies, media and critical theory. In 2005, he accepted the Global Television Network Chair at McMaster University in Canada. He also taught at Boston University, Miami University, University of Missouri at Kansas City, Pennsylvania State University, Northeastern University, and the School of the Art Institute in Chicago. GULSHAN DIETL has been serving as Visiting Professor, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. She was earlier Professor and Director, the Gulf Studies Programme, Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. JOHN CHERIAN is Associate Editor and Foreign Correspondent of Frontline, the Hindu Group of newspapers. He has extensively written on different aspects of West Asia and North Africa. P. J. JACOB served as the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. He has held a variety of key Operational and Training assignments in a career spanning forty years. Jacob has commanded the Eastern Fleet and also been Director General of the Indian Coast Guard and was active in strategic planning and charting the future development of the Indian Navy. A former member of the National Security Advisory Board to the Prime Minister, he has also served as the Advisor on Maritime Security to the Sri Lankan Government. VINAY KAURA is Assistant Professor, Department of International Affairs and Security Studies, Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Jodhpur , Rajasthan K. B. USHA is Associate Professor in Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. ASWATHY RACHEL VARUGHESE is a researcher at the Central University of Kerala, Kasargod. TULIKA GAUR is doing PhD in the Centre for South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi GAZALA FAREEDI is a research scholar, Diplomacy and Disarmament Division, Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. JOCELYN JOSE is a research scholar, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. GIRISH KUMAR R. is Assistant Professor, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala, India. He is also the Honorary Director of KN Raj Centre, Mahatma Gandhi University. He also served in the WTO Chair, Central University of Kerala, Kasargod. ASWATHY RACHEL VARUGHESE is a researcher at the WTO Chair, Central University of Kerala, Kasargod

149 Manuscript Submission Guidelines

All manuscripts submitted for publication should be sent to: The Editor, SAJD, K.P.S.Menon Chair, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills PO., Kottayam, Kerala, India, PIN Code: 686560. Three copies of the double spaced manuscript should be provided. The author’s name, full contact details (address, telephone number and e-mail address), and biographical note should be enclosed on a separate sheet of paper. In addition, the authors should also send the manuscript as an e-mail attachment in MS Word format to the Editor ([email protected]). The title page should contain the full title, subtitle (optional), preferred abbreviated running head, abstract (100-150 words) and key words (5-10) in alphabetical order for online search. Biographical notes (50-100 words) should give current affiliation, research interests and recent publications. Research articles should be of 6000 words, including footnotes. Lengths for commentaries and review essays shall be 2,000 words. English (UK) spelling should be used for the preparation of the manuscript. Spell out numbers from one to nine and use figures for 10 and above except in tables. Indent all quotations of more than 50 words and make sure that all subheadings are clearly indicated. Dates should be in the form 10 May 2011. Use single quotation marks and double marks (inside single). Use the referencing system given below.

SAJD Reference: Format Citations to sources are arranged in the text of the essay in order to identify sources for readers and facilitate them to locate the source of the cited information in the bibliography/references. The parenthetical (in text) references include the author’s last name, the year of publication enclosed in parentheses and page number(s), wherever necessary. Citations are placed within sentences and paragraphs so that it would be clear what information is being quoted/paraphrased and whose information is being cited. The last name of the author and the year of publication are inserted in the text at the appropriate point. For example, There is a view, however, that the agreement is, in fact, a continuation of the process of the last few decades (Bajpai 2005). If the name of the author or the date appear as part of the narrative, cite only missing information in parentheses. For example, Writing on a hypothetical possibility of India threatening to proliferate, Perkovich (2005) writes, “…..China proliferated to Pakistan and Pakistan proliferated to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Nor does proliferation that occurred before the NPT was negotiated justify promiscuous proliferation behaviour today.” When a work has two authors, always cite both names every time the reference occurs in the text. In the narrative text, join the names with the word “and.” as Vanaik and Bidwai (1989)demonstrated When a work has three, four, or five authors, cite all authors the first time the reference occurs. For example, Srinivasan, Grover, and Bhardwaj (2005) found

150 In all subsequent citations per paragraph, include only the surname of the first author followed by “et al.” and the year of publication. Srinivasan et al. (2005) found The names of agencies/organisations that serve as authors (corporate authors) are usually written out first time they appear in a text reference as follows: (World Trade Organisation (WTO) 2010) When appropriate, the names of some such authors are spelled out in the first reference and abbreviated in all subsequent citations. The general rule for abbreviating in this manner is to supply enough information in the text citation for a reader to locate its source in the Bibliography/References without difficulty. (WTO 2006) Works with No Author When a work has no author, use the first two or three words of the work’s title (omitting any initial articles) as your text reference, capitalizing each word. Encyclopaedia Britannica (2010) To cite a specific part of a source (always necessary for quotations), include the page, chapter, etc. (with appropriate abbreviations) in the in-text citation. (Srinivasan, Grover & Bhardwaj 2005: 5183-88) Journal Article: where the page numbering continues from issue to issue Ram, T. T., Mohan (2009): “The Impact of the Crisis on the Indian Economy,” Economic and Political Weekly, 28 March XLIV(13): 107-14. Perkovich, George (2005): “Faulty Promises: The US-India Nuclear Deal,” Policy Outlook, 34(4), September: 18-20. Fair, C. Christine (2007), “Indo-Iranian Ties: Thicker than Oil,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 11(1), March: 41-58. Book Sen, Amartya (2009): The Idea of Justice, New Delhi: Allen Lane, Penguin Books. Article or Chapter in an edited Volume/Book Thomas, A. M. (2005): “India and Southeast Asia: The Look East Policy in Perspective,” in Rajan Harshe and K.M. Seethi (eds.), Engaging with the World: Critical Reflections on India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Orient Longman. Website “President Meets with Displaced Workers in Town Hall Meeting” at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/12/print/20011204-17.html

151 FORM IV Statement about ownership and other particulars of the South Asian Journal of Diplomacy (SAJD) under Rule 8 of the Registration of Newspapers (Central), Rules, 1956.

1. Place of Publication School of International Relations and Politics Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills P.O., Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560

2 Periodicity of Publication Annual

3. Printer’s Name K.M.Seethi Nationality Indian Address Director, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills P.O., Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560

4. Publisher’s Name K.M.Seethi Nationality Indian Address Director, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills P.O., Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560

5. Editor’s Name K.M.Seethi Nationality Indian Address School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills P.O., Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560

6. Name and Address of Owner K.M.Seethi Director, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills P.O., Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560

I, K.M.Seethi, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. (Sd.) K.M. Seethi Signature of Publisher

152 South Asian Journal of Diplomacy (SAJD)

South Asian Journal of Diplomacy (SAJD) is a refereed international affairs journal published by the K.P.S.Menon Chair for Diplomatic Studies, School of International Relations and Politics (SIRP), Mahat- ma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala, India. SAJD is committed to publishing the best of studies in Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, Politics and International Relations (IR). It seeks to bring out topical, scholarly work on significant debates in Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, Politics and IR and on all major issues affecting South Asia and other countries. SAJD will uphold values of secularism, democracy, peace and plural- ist perspectives. Editorial policy also seeks to promote variety in subject matter and methodology. Each volume will carry peer-reviewed research articles, and a mix of review essays, commentaries, interviews and debates. Special issues will also be published from time to time. SAJD is published in June every year. The articles and reviews will be sent for peer-review as soon as they are received. There will be a panel of referees who will look into various aspects of the articles/reviews received, such as topicality, contents, theoretical as well as empirical components and methodology. Copy right of the journal, alongside the articles/reviews published, shall be vested with the K.P.S. Menon Chair for Diplomatic Studies, SIRP, Ma- hatma Gandhi University.

South Asian Journal of Diplomacy is available against subscription. Rates of subscription will be as follows:

Annual Institutional Individual

India Rs. 200 Rs.150 SAARC countries US$ 15 US$ 10 Other countries US$ 25 US$ 20

Subscription can be sent to The Editor, SAJD, School of International Relations and Politics (SIRP), Ma- hatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills PO., Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560 along with a Cheque/ Demand Draft drawn in favour of the Editor SAJD and payable at Kottayam. E-mail: kmseethimgu@gmail. com

© K.P.S.Menon Chair, Mahatma Gandhi University 2014

ISSN 2229 - 3361

The views expressed in SAJD are those of the authors and not necessarily of the K.P.S. Menon Chair.

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