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The Revival of Al Qaeda Chadian special forces soldier receives basic rifle marksmanship training at live-fire range in Massaguet, Chad, as part of exercise Flintlock 17, March 6, 2017 (U.S. Army/Derek Hamilton) The Revival of Al Qaeda By Jami T. Forbes Today’s terrorist threats have changed, and terrorist groups are now more geographically dispersed and their tactics more diversified. —NATIONAL STRATEgy FOR COUNTERTErrORISM OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OCTOBER 2018 Time and territory allow jihadist terrorists to plot, so we will act against sanctuaries, and prevent their reemergence before they can threaten the U.S. homeland. —NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEgy OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DECEMBER 2017 n March 2, 2018, militants end of the day, 16 people were dead conducted near-simultaneous and more than 80 injured.1 The attack O assaults on the French embassy on the military headquarters was likely and the military headquarters of aimed at targeting a gathering of senior Jami T. Forbes is a Senior Intelligence Analyst for Special Operations Command Africa in Burkina Faso in Ouagadougou, the officers, and Burkinabe officials stated Stuttgart, Germany. West African nation’s capital. By the the attack could have “decapitated” 84 Features / The Revival of Al Qaeda JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 their military had the meeting not been as al Qaeda continue to present the most country and is reportedly garnering moved to a different location at the dangerous terrorist threat to the United revenue from the extortion of state- last minute.2 Al Qaeda’s West Africa States, and they draw from networks owned firms and oil companies.9 In affiliate Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al- around the globe to “radicalize isolated Africa, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Muslimin (JNIM) claimed credit for individuals, exploit vulnerable popula- (AQIM) oversees an arc of instabil- the attack, stating it was a message to tions, and inspire and direct plots.”3 As ity that flows from the Maghreb into France and its partners in the Sahel such, it is imperative that we challenge the Sahel. In February 2017, AQIM that the group was advancing “with the narrative that al Qaeda has all but oversaw the merger of several armed a resolve unhindered by wounds and been defeated, seek to gain a better un- groups in Mali, creating JNIM, which pains” inflicted by French-led counter- derstanding of how al Qaeda is rebuilding now controls a large portion of north- terrorism (CT) pressure in the region. its movement, and utilize diverse inter- ern Mali and is expanding attacks into The events served as an ominous agency resources to degrade the ability Burkina Faso and western Niger (an reminder of an ascendant al Qaeda that for a potential resurgence of the group. area roughly equivalent to the geo- targeted the U.S. Embassies in Kenya graphic size of Mexico).10 and Tanzania more than 20 years ago. Global Resurgence On occasion, these affiliates are will- Since its emergence in 2013, the Despite the broad focus on IS, al ing and able to conduct high-profile so-called Islamic State (IS) has been Qaeda and its affiliated networks likely operations, including external attacks. at the forefront of the U.S. CT effort. hold the largest swaths of territory This suggests that al Qaeda’s slow and The brash and often shocking tactics under jihadist control, including areas patient strategy does not equate to a of IS largely overshadowed al Qaeda, of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. lack of operational activity. For example, which was weakened due to internal fis- Over the past few years, the group has in addition to the embassy attack in sures, robust CT pressure, the death of enhanced its footprint by cultivating Ouagadougou, AQAP was responsible Osama bin Laden, and battlefield losses local support and by forging alliances for the January 7, 2015, assault on the in Afghanistan and the Middle East. with local armed groups. In 2014, offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Al Qaeda ceded its prominence in the al Qaeda announced the creation of France, which resulted in the death of 12 Salafist jihadist world to a faster, flashier, a new affiliate called al Qaeda in the people and the injury of at least 11.11 In and more aggressive movement and be- Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), its first addition, in October 2017, al-Shabaab came a seemingly peripheral actor in the official network in Asia.4 AQIS operates detonated an explosives-laden vehicle global war on terror. in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in Mogadishu, causing 500 casualties— However, while IS was promoting its has ambitions for India, Burma, and Somalia’s largest terror attack to date.12 use of terror as a means to become a state, Bangladesh. The group is responsible al Qaeda was quietly laying the founda- for several small attacks in Pakistan and Adaptive Yet Consistent tion for its resurrection. This article reportedly attempted to hijack a Paki- Leadership argues that al Qaeda is resurgent due in stani vessel off the port of Karachi in One key factor that has likely enabled part to its ability to exercise strategic pa- 2014.5 In Afghanistan, al Qaeda senior al Qaeda to withstand CT pressure tience. While the high-profile tactics of IS leaders appear to continue to benefit and usher in a potential resurgence is made it easy to understand IS strategy and from Taliban-provided haven and are its leadership cadre, which appears to intent, al Qaeda pursued a more discreet reportedly facing a “resurgence” in have embraced traditional leadership path, making it more difficult to judge its areas of Afghanistan stymied by limited while also implementing evolutionary actions. It diffused its leadership cadre out governance.6 In Somalia, al-Shabaab changes. Al Qaeda senior leaders have to a variety of geographic locations, em- reportedly controls up to 30 percent of long benefited from haven in Iran, powered leaders, created cohesion among the country (a region with a coastline where they have largely been inoculated its global affiliates, and developed more comparable in size to the Eastern Sea- from CT pressure.13 Shortly following durable havens by gaining inroads with board of the United States) and is oper- the attacks on September 11, 2001, vulnerable populations and exploiting ating with an estimated 7,000 to 9,000 some al Qaeda senior leaders sought fragile states. Al Qaeda’s slower and more fighters.7 In Syria, despite some opera- shelter in Iran, where they likely rec- long-term strategy was much less salient tional setbacks and a lack of cohesion, al ognized that the region would provide than the one pursued by the Islamic State, Qaeda helped to broker the early 2018 a sanctuary from U.S. drone strikes. but it is likely to be more dangerous in creation of Hurras al-Din—a merger of Although the relationship between al the long term, particularly if it helps the smaller armed groups that has bolstered Qaeda and Iran was at times conten- group to expand its support base and en- its ranks by attracting members who tious (with some al Qaeda leaders even hance local control through cooperation fought alongside al Qaeda in Afghani- being placed under occasional house rather than coercion. stan and Iraq.8 In Yemen, al Qaeda in arrest), the common enemies of the According to the December 2017 the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls United States and the Islamic State National Security Strategy, groups such wide swaths of the southern part of the likely drove a sense of collaboration.14 JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Forbes 85 Since at least 2009, Iran has allowed Cohesion Among calling for attacks on the United States, al Qaeda to “operate a core facilitation Global Affiliates suggesting the long-term aspirations of pipeline through the country,” enabling Al Qaeda appears to be increasing the group to target the U.S. homeland the group to “move funds and fighters cohesion among its disparate affiliates, have not diminished. In a March 20, to South Asia and Syria,” according to with several issuing joint statements 2018, statement, al-Zawahiri called for the State Department.15 In addition, al regarding external issues. This cohe- the worldwide Muslim community to Qaeda officials indicated that Iran was a sion is likely being driven in part by the unite, stating, “Let us fight America “main artery for funds, personnel, and increased access to senior leaders. For everywhere the same way it attacks us ev- communication” for the group, accord- example, in February 2017, AQAP and erywhere. Let us unite in confronting it, ing to documents recovered during AQIM issued a joint statement eulogiz- and never divide. Let us unify and never the Abbottabad raid against Osama bin ing Omar Abdel Rahman, also known disperse. Let us gather and never become Laden.16 as the “Blind Sheikh,” who died while shattered.”21 Starting in 2015, al Qaeda emir in U.S. Federal custody. The statement The ambitions to develop more Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has likely largely called for fighters to conduct attacks global visions and operational capabilities been confined to the remote tribal re- against U.S. interests to avenge his are likely being adopted by al Qaeda’s gions of Pakistan, appeared to empower death. Also, in September 2017, both affiliates as well. For example, in May some Iran-based leaders such as Saif al-Shabaab and AQAP issued nearly 2017, al-Shabaab issued a 55-minute al-Adel to make decisions and command identical statements calling for support video featuring statements from several operations on his behalf. Al-Adel, a for- of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.
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