Chadian special forces soldier receives basic rifle marksmanship training at live-fire range in Massaguet, Chad, as part of exercise Flintlock 17, March 6, 2017 (U.S. Army/Derek Hamilton)

The Revival of Al Qaeda

By Jami T. Forbes

Today’s terrorist threats have changed, and terrorist groups are now more geographically dispersed and their tactics more diversified.

—National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the of America, October 2018

Time and territory allow jihadist terrorists to plot, so we will act against sanctuaries, and prevent their reemergence before they can threaten the U.S. homeland.

—National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017

n March 2, 2018, militants end of the day, 16 people were dead conducted near-simultaneous and more than 80 injured.1 The attack O assaults on the French embassy on the military headquarters was likely and the military headquarters of aimed at targeting a gathering of senior Jami T. Forbes is a Senior Intelligence Analyst for Special Operations Command Africa in Burkina Faso in Ouagadougou, the officers, and Burkinabe officials stated Stuttgart, Germany. West African nation’s capital. By the the attack could have “decapitated”

84 Features / The Revival of Al Qaeda JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 their military had the meeting not been as al Qaeda continue to present the most country and is reportedly garnering moved to a different location at the dangerous terrorist threat to the United revenue from the extortion of state- last minute.2 Al Qaeda’s West Africa States, and they draw from networks owned firms and oil companies.9 In affiliate Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al- around the globe to “radicalize isolated Africa, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Muslimin (JNIM) claimed credit for individuals, exploit vulnerable popula- (AQIM) oversees an arc of instabil- the attack, stating it was a message to tions, and inspire and direct plots.”3 As ity that flows from the Maghreb into France and its partners in the Sahel such, it is imperative that we challenge the Sahel. In February 2017, AQIM that the group was advancing “with the narrative that al Qaeda has all but oversaw the merger of several armed a resolve unhindered by wounds and been defeated, seek to gain a better un- groups in Mali, creating JNIM, which pains” inflicted by French-led counter- derstanding of how al Qaeda is rebuilding now controls a large portion of north- terrorism (CT) pressure in the region. its movement, and utilize diverse inter- ern Mali and is expanding attacks into The events served as an ominous agency resources to degrade the ability Burkina Faso and western Niger (an reminder of an ascendant al Qaeda that for a potential resurgence of the group. area roughly equivalent to the geo- targeted the U.S. Embassies in Kenya graphic size of Mexico).10 and Tanzania more than 20 years ago. Global Resurgence On occasion, these affiliates are will- Since its emergence in 2013, the Despite the broad focus on IS, al ing and able to conduct high-profile so-called Islamic State (IS) has been Qaeda and its affiliated networks likely operations, including external attacks. at the forefront of the U.S. CT effort. hold the largest swaths of territory This suggests that al Qaeda’s slow and The brash and often shocking tactics under jihadist control, including areas patient strategy does not equate to a of IS largely overshadowed al Qaeda, of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. lack of operational activity. For example, which was weakened due to internal fis- Over the past few years, the group has in addition to the embassy attack in sures, robust CT pressure, the death of enhanced its footprint by cultivating Ouagadougou, AQAP was responsible , and battlefield losses local support and by forging alliances for the January 7, 2015, assault on the in and the Middle East. with local armed groups. In 2014, offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Al Qaeda ceded its prominence in the al Qaeda announced the creation of France, which resulted in the death of 12 Salafist jihadist world to a faster, flashier, a new affiliate called al Qaeda in the people and the injury of at least 11.11 In and more aggressive movement and be- Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), its first addition, in October 2017, al-Shabaab came a seemingly peripheral actor in the official network in Asia.4 AQIS operates detonated an explosives-laden vehicle global . in Afghanistan and but also in Mogadishu, causing 500 casualties— However, while IS was promoting its has ambitions for India, Burma, and Somalia’s largest terror attack to date.12 use of terror as a means to become a state, Bangladesh. The group is responsible al Qaeda was quietly laying the founda- for several small attacks in Pakistan and Adaptive Yet Consistent tion for its resurrection. This article reportedly attempted to hijack a Paki- Leadership argues that al Qaeda is resurgent due in stani vessel off the port of Karachi in One key factor that has likely enabled part to its ability to exercise strategic pa- 2014.5 In Afghanistan, al Qaeda senior al Qaeda to withstand CT pressure tience. While the high-profile tactics of IS leaders appear to continue to benefit and usher in a potential resurgence is made it easy to understand IS strategy and from -provided haven and are its leadership cadre, which appears to intent, al Qaeda pursued a more discreet reportedly facing a “resurgence” in have embraced traditional leadership path, making it more difficult to judge its areas of Afghanistan stymied by limited while also implementing evolutionary actions. It diffused its leadership cadre out governance.6 In Somalia, al-Shabaab changes. Al Qaeda senior leaders have to a variety of geographic locations, em- reportedly controls up to 30 percent of long benefited from haven in , powered leaders, created cohesion among the country (a region with a coastline where they have largely been inoculated its global affiliates, and developed more comparable in size to the Eastern Sea- from CT pressure.13 Shortly following durable havens by gaining inroads with board of the United States) and is oper- the attacks on September 11, 2001, vulnerable populations and exploiting ating with an estimated 7,000 to 9,000 some al Qaeda senior leaders sought fragile states. Al Qaeda’s slower and more fighters.7 In , despite some opera- shelter in Iran, where they likely rec- long-term strategy was much less salient tional setbacks and a lack of cohesion, al ognized that the region would provide than the one pursued by the Islamic State, Qaeda helped to broker the early 2018 a sanctuary from U.S. drone strikes. but it is likely to be more dangerous in creation of Hurras al-Din—a merger of Although the relationship between al the long term, particularly if it helps the smaller armed groups that has bolstered Qaeda and Iran was at times conten- group to expand its support base and en- its ranks by attracting members who tious (with some al Qaeda leaders even hance local control through cooperation fought alongside al Qaeda in Afghani- being placed under occasional house rather than coercion. stan and .8 In Yemen, al Qaeda in arrest), the common enemies of the According to the December 2017 the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls United States and the Islamic State National Security Strategy, groups such wide swaths of the southern part of the likely drove a sense of collaboration.14

JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Forbes 85 Since at least 2009, Iran has allowed Cohesion Among calling for attacks on the United States, al Qaeda to “operate a core facilitation Global Affiliates suggesting the long-term aspirations of pipeline through the country,” enabling Al Qaeda appears to be increasing the group to target the U.S. homeland the group to “move funds and fighters cohesion among its disparate affiliates, have not diminished. In a March 20, to South Asia and Syria,” according to with several issuing joint statements 2018, statement, al-Zawahiri called for the State Department.15 In addition, al regarding external issues. This cohe- the worldwide Muslim community to Qaeda officials indicated that Iran was a sion is likely being driven in part by the unite, stating, “Let us fight America “main artery for funds, personnel, and increased access to senior leaders. For everywhere the same way it attacks us ev- communication” for the group, accord- example, in February 2017, AQAP and erywhere. Let us unite in confronting it, ing to documents recovered during AQIM issued a joint statement eulogiz- and never divide. Let us unify and never the raid against Osama bin ing Omar Abdel Rahman, also known disperse. Let us gather and never become Laden.16 as the “Blind Sheikh,” who died while shattered.”21 Starting in 2015, al Qaeda emir in U.S. Federal custody. The statement The ambitions to develop more Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has likely largely called for fighters to conduct attacks global visions and operational capabilities been confined to the remote tribal re- against U.S. interests to avenge his are likely being adopted by al Qaeda’s gions of Pakistan, appeared to empower death. Also, in September 2017, both affiliates as well. For example, in May some Iran-based leaders such as Saif al-Shabaab and AQAP issued nearly 2017, al-Shabaab issued a 55-minute al-Adel to make decisions and command identical statements calling for support video featuring statements from several operations on his behalf. Al-Adel, a for- of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. al Qaeda senior leaders. The narration mer colonel and special forces soldier in Furthermore, when AQIM announced called the United States the “Satan of our the Egyptian army, is a founding member the merger of several armed groups time” and stated that al-Shabaab’s jihad of al Qaeda who helped mastermind the in Mali in March 2017, the groups is a global one that is not restricted to U.S. Embassy attacks in Nairobi and Dar pledged loyalty to both al Qaeda and geographical boundaries. es Salaam.17 He almost certainly has the the Taliban, underscoring that even in a Al Qaeda is also endeavoring to experience and capabilities that could be remote area such as Timbuktu, al Qaeda reabsorb fighters from the Islamic State, central to any efforts to regenerate opera- affiliates are in line with the movements’ calling for the unification of jihadist tional activities.18 This has likely helped strategic messaging. ranks and advocating for a common fight to reverse the previous isolation (and Al Qaeda is also attempting to resume against the United States. This outreach pressure) faced by al Qaeda officials who its public role as the vanguard of global has probably enabled the potential for op- were reliant on haven in Pakistan and jihad, an effort underpinned by more erational cooperation between elements Afghanistan and is probably an enabler robust and diverse media outreach. Al of IS and al Qaeda. For instance, in the of al Qaeda’s efforts to raise its public Qaeda media statements portray the Sahel region of Africa, al Qaeda and IS profile operational tempo. In addition to group as the only force capable of fight- fighters are reportedly conducting joint diffusing decisionmaking capabilities, al ing against tyrannical regimes in North operations against the Sahel G5 security Qaeda has also expanded perceptions of Africa and against the United States, forces there.22 According to the United its leadership cadre by drawing on images which was referred to as the “first enemy Nations mission in Mali, al Qaeda’s af- and statements from Hamza bin Laden of Islam” in March and May 2018 state- filiate JNIM and the IS branch in the (now deceased), using his lineage as the ments.20 Starting in late 2017, al Qaeda Sahel (known as the Islamic State in the son of Osama bin Ladin and the al Qaeda began to quicken the pace at which it Greater Sahara) are reportedly cooperat- heir apparent to inspire a new generation disseminated media statements. For ing and conducting “more sophisticated of fighters. example, between mid-January and mid- and deadly attacks.”23 Although a formal Furthermore, in early 2015, several October 2018, al Qaeda published 13 unification of IS and al Qaeda is unlikely members of the al Qaeda military council statements attributed to al-Zawahiri. This in the near term, any potential coop- in Iran were relocated to Damascus, pace reflects a significant change from eration between the two groups could where they were credited with helping previous years when guidance and out- expand operational capabilities, and the lead the fight against IS, and began com- reach from al Qaeda leaders were much recruitment of former IS fighters could manding “an unprecedented number of more elusive (al Qaeda only issued nine help bolster al Qaeda ranks with seasoned veteran” fighters.19 This infusion of lead- statements attributed to al-Zawahiri in all and experienced operatives. ership helped al Qaeda weather the loss of 2017). of several senior leaders to airstrikes and Al Qaeda’s deliberate reintroduction Developing More mitigate the loss of some commanders of its external vision is also reinforced Durable Havens to IS. It also helped al Qaeda develop a by several statements advocating for at- In addition to the leadership changes, broader and more adaptive identity rather tacks on the “far enemy” in the West. al Qaeda has made efforts to cultivate than just being an Afghanistan/Pakistan- Since 2017, al Qaeda affiliates have durable havens by slowly integrating based organization. issued at least 12 public statements with local groups. Nowhere is there a

86 Features / The Revival of Al Qaeda JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 MQ-9 Reaper flies training mission over Nevada Test and Training Range, July 15, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/William Rio Rosado)

better example of al Qaeda’s strategic relationship with groups so that it could that killed 18 civilians.27 In March 2016, patience than its efforts in Mali and combine the groups’ regional efforts with al Qaeda elements also targeted hotels Sub-Saharan Africa. Al Qaeda’s strategy al Qaeda’s “global jihadi project.”26 This and tourist venues in the Ivory Coast, in the Sahel reflects a shrewd long-term effort came to fruition in February 2017, resulting in the deaths of 22 civilians.28 vision, with the group calling its efforts when AQIM announced the merger of The group is also responsible for several there similar to caring for “a baby” that several Salafist armed groups under the al attacks in Bamako, the capital of Mali. needs to mature and grow.24 According Qaeda umbrella. This merger represented Following a June 19, 2017, attack against to documents recovered in Timbuktu, a variety of ethnic and tribal backgrounds, a Western-affiliated hotel, JNIM stated al Qaeda saw the 2012 Tuareg rebel- including Arab, Fulani/Peuhl, and that it was sending a “message dripping lions in Mali as a “historic” opportunity Tuareg identities. with blood and body parts” that Western to exploit vulnerable populations and The creation of JNIM has helped to “crusaders” would never be secure in develop a haven for its fighters. Since advance operations in the Sahel, where Mali. Furthermore, the group is likely then, al Qaeda has methodologically since 2015 al Qaeda–affiliated attacks holding at least six Westerners hostage, integrated with disenfranchised tribal have expanded not only in number including one U.S. citizen.29 and ethnic groups via endeavors such but also in geographic scope, shifting The development of a haven in the as intermarrying with them, fighting further into Burkina Faso and por- Sahel represents a dangerous precedent alongside them in support of local tions of Western Niger. In addition to that, if left unabated, could help enable grievances, and providing rule of law.25 the March 2, 2018, attack, al Qaeda is future global aspirations of al Qaeda. Central to al Qaeda’s strategy for the responsible for two other high-profile For instance, the recovered guidance Sahel is the co-option of several ethnic external attacks that specifically tar- indicated that al Qaeda leaders saw the and Salafist armed groups. In 2012, al geted Western-affiliated locations in opportunity to shape Mali and the Sahel Qaeda stated that it needed to put aside Ouagadougou, including a January 2016 into a base from which it could conduct rivalries and “win allies” and “be flexible” assault on a hotel that killed 29 civilians training and eventually launch global enough to establish an organizational and a February 2017 assault on a café jihadist operations against the West.30

JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Forbes 87 Nigerien soldiers receive counter-IED class as part of exercise Flintlock 17 in Diffa, Niger, February 28, 2017 (U.S. Army/Kulani Lakanaria)

In line with its patient and calculated baskets to locals who are in need, accord- does not equate to the degradation of strategy for establishing a caliphate, al ing to Twitter users. global Salafist jihadist movements. Al Qaeda’s guidance directed developing Qaeda will almost certainly continue to strong ties to locals, while hiding broader Outlook evolve and may emerge from behind the jihadist ambitions until favorable condi- Al Qaeda has likely laid the founda- shadows of IS with a renewed vision, tions are sufficiently set. Al Qaeda stated tion for its movement to present a empowered leaders, a more cohesive it was better for fighters in the Sahel to more durable threat. As outlined in the global network, and a perceived moral currently “be silent and pretend to be 2018 National Security Strategy, both high ground among fighters. Moreover, a ‘domestic’ movement” in the short time and territory help enable terrorist we must recognize the potential bias we term, hiding the fact that al Qaeda had groups to threaten the U.S. homeland. have placed on IS. Saliency bias describes “expansionary, jihadi” aspirations for the As such, it is imperative to gain a better the phenomenon in which humans focus region.31 understanding of how groups such as al on items or information that are more This strategy is not limited to the Qaeda are using “quieter” methods such noticeable or prominent and dismiss Sahel. It mirrors AQAP’s approach in as exploiting sociopolitical and ethnic those that are less obvious. Undoubtedly, Yemen, where the group also forged al- grievances to develop havens. This will the actions of the Islamic State were liances with tribal militias to help expand require a strategy underpinned on initia- salient—the brash and often shocking its presence.32 In addition, AQAP has tives outside of military force, including tactics of the group have made it dif- been able to implement development diplomatic engagement, humanitarian ficult for the United States to ignore. As projects, including providing access to aid to vulnerable populations, enhanced such, IS has been at the forefront of our water and electricity, and has established collaboration with law enforcement, and counterterrorism focus. While al Qaeda governance bodies to help provide goods international partnerships. was not completely dismissed, its longer and services to locals. The group also To reverse the positive trend for term approach made it more difficult to reportedly provides rule of law through al Qaeda, it will be important for the understand the impact and pattern of its shariah courts and has promoted humani- United States and our partners to actions, possibly enabling the group to tarian efforts such as handing out food understand that the degradation of IS adapt and evolve.

88 Features / The Revival of Al Qaeda JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 12 Finally, the United States and its Jason Burke, “Mogadishu Truck Bomb: 500 Casualties in Somalia’s Worst Terrorist At- partners must carefully monitor the tack,” , October 16, 2017. New from NDU progression of al Qaeda affiliates, par- 13 Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, ticularly JNIM in Mali, where al Qaeda The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama Press is expanding its geographic footprint Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight (: Center for the Study of Chinese and has momentum. As outlined in the Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017); see also “Iran Military Affairs Denies Saudi Allegations of Harboring bin National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Laden’s Son,” Reuters, March 20, 2018. Strategic Forum 303 “veteran Al-Qa’ida leaders are working 14 Scott-Clark and Levy, The Exile. The PLA Beyond Asia: China’s to consolidate and expand the group’s 15 Country Reports on Terrorism 2017, Growing Military Presence in the Red presence in several regions . . . from “Chapter 2: State Sponsors of Terrorism,” Sea Region which it aspires to launch new attacks on Department of State, September 19, 2018. By Joel Wuthnow 16 Callum Paton, “Iran’s Secret Funding for the United States and our allies.” Should China has Al-Qaeda in Exchange for Attacks on U.S. Tar- al Qaeda successfully build a haven and gets Exposed in Bin Laden Files,” Newsweek, gradually establish a state built on its own brand of November 2, 2017. expanded shariah law, it could serve as the flagship 17 Most Wanted Terrorists, Saif Al-Adel, its military enterprise that will regenerate confidence Federal Bureau of Investigation. footprint in 18 Scott-Clark and Levy, The Exile. in al Qaeda as a movement, and possibly the Red Sea 19 Charles Lister, “Al Qaeda Is About to Es- enable the group to shift from developing tablish an Emirate in Northern Syria,” Foreign region, an sanctuary to expanding its ability to con- Policy, May 4, 2016. area of critical duct external attacks against the United 20 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “America Is the First importance States and Western interests. JFQ Enemy of the Muslims,” Eng. trans., As-Sahab for global maritime commerce and Media, March 20, 2018; see also Ayman al-Za- energy production. Key aspects wahiri, “ Is also the Land of Muslims,” Eng. trans., As-Sahab Media, May 13, 2018. include a People’s Liberation Army Notes 21 Al-Zawahiri, “America Is the First Enemy role in United Nations peacekeep- of the Muslims.” ing, anti-piracy patrols, and a new 1 “Al Qaeda Affiliate Claims Responsibility 22 Olivier Monnier, “Islamic State, Al- base in Djibouti. China’s military for Burkina Faso Attacks,” Reuters, March 3, Qaeda Support Fuels Attacks in West Africa,” presence—its largest outside the 2018. Bloomberg.com, February 5, 2018. 2 Richard Perez-Pena and Jamie Yayha Berry, 23 Ibid. Indo-Pacific—supports Beijing’s “Militants Carry Out Deadly Attack in Burkina 24 Rukmini Callimachi, “In Timbuktu, diplomatic relations in the region, Faso,” New York Times, March 2, 2018. Al-Qaida Left Behind a Manifesto,” Associated contributes to China’s maritime 3 National Security Strategy of the United Press, February 14, 2013. security interests, and provides useful States of America (Washington, DC: The White 25 Jami Forbes, “Revisiting the Mali al- lessons in building an expedition- House, December 2017). Qa’ida Playbook: How the Group Is Advancing 4 “Al-Qa’ida Chief Launches Al-Qa’ida in on Its Goals in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel 11, ary capability. U.S. officials need to South Asia,” BBC News, September 4, 2014. no. 9 (October 2018). address operational safety and coun- 5 Tim Craig, “An Offshoot of Al-Qa’ida Is 26 Callimachi, “In Timbuktu, Al-Qaida Left terintelligence issues and determine Regrouping in Pakistan,” Washington Post, June Behind a Manifesto.” whether China’s presence—which 3, 2016. 27 Nadia Khomami, “Burkina Faso Hotel also includes military diplomacy and 6 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan’s Attack, at Least 18 Nationalities among Dead,” Terrorism Resurgence: Al-Qaida, ISIS and Be- The Guardian, January 16, 2016. arms sales—is eroding traditional yond,” Brookings Institution, April 28, 2017; 28 Michael E. Miller, “Horror at the Beach: U.S. advantages as a security partner. see also Dan Lamothe, “‘Probably the Largest’ 22 Dead in Terrorist Attack on Ivory Coast Opportunities for military coop- Al-Qaeda Camp Ever Destroyed in Afghani- Resorts,” Washington Post, March 14, 2016. eration should be explored in areas stan,” Washington Post, October 30, 2015. 29 “Hostages Shown in Al-Qaeda Mali where U.S. and Chinese interests 7 Global Conflict Tracker, “Al-Shabab in Video as Macron Flies In,” BBC News, July 2, Somalia,” Council on Foreign Relations Web 2017. align, such as disaster management site, updated daily. 30 Callimachi, “In Timbuktu, Al-Qaida Left and maritime safety. 8 Mohanad Hage Ali, “Guarding the Al- Behind a Manifesto.” Qa’eda Flame,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 31 Ibid. June 6, 2018. 32 Yemen’s Al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base, 9 Eric Schmitt and Saeed Al-Batati, “The Report No. 174 (Brussels: International Crisis U.S. Has Pummeled Al Qaeda in Yemen. But Group, February 2, 2017). the Threat Is Barely Dented,” New York Times, December 30, 2017. 10 Rinaldo Depagne, “Burkina Faso’s Alarming Escalation of Jihadist Violence,” International Crisis Group, March 5, 2018. 11 Alan Yuhas, “How Yemen Spawned the Visit the NDU Press Web site for Charlie Hebdo Attacks,” The Guardian, January more information on publications 14, 2015. at ndupress.ndu.edu

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