N. 38 - DECEMBER 2010

Futenma and the Abstract

Mobilisation of Bias: From September 2009 to May 2010, Japan-US relations were dominated by a controversy regarding a 2006 base re- An Alternative location agreement – the so-called “Futenma issue”. Whereas Japan’s newly-elected government led by the Perspective on the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) requested a re-negotiation of the agreement, Washington wanted to keep Japan–US Alliance the current accord unchanged. After months of US pressure and US policymakers and scholars presenting the controversy as a “life-or-death” issue for the Japan-US alliance, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama resigned. As it turned out, the media coverage in Axel Berkofsky and Linus Hagström both the international and Japanese press was very biased, almost exclusively presenting the Futenma case from a US perspective. This article seeks to offer an alternative and arguably more non-US biased interpretation of the Futenma base controversy.

Axel Berkofsky (PhD, Hamburg University) is Senior Associate Research Fellow, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) Milan, Italy and Gianni Mazzocchi Fellow at the University of Pavia, Italy.

Linus Hagström (PhD, Stockholm University) is Associate Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of

International Affairs. He is also Research Fellow at the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities supported by a grant from the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation.

Project on China and East Asia

* The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI. La ricerca ISPI analizza le dinamiche politiche, strategiche ed economiche del sistema internazionale con il duplice obiettivo di informare e di orientare le scelte di policy. I risultati della ricerca vengono divulgati attraverso pubblicazioni ed eventi. 2 ISPI - Working Paper

Introduction This article sets out by demonstrating how a distinctively US bias has been mobilised in the media coverage of the “Futenma issue” in Japanese politics and Japan-US relations over the past year – not only in Japan, but also in the international press, such as in the Financial Times which intensively covered the base re-location. The Futenma issue, in short, refers to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government‟s much contested attempt in 2009-10 to re-negotiate the accord for the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station in Okinawa that was struck between the USA and Japan with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) at the helm in 2006, after 13 years of cumbersome and controversial negotiations between Tokyo and Washington1. The way that bias has been mobilised around this issue is arguably consistent with the way that Japanese foreign and security policies are customarily analyzed in the media and academia, where “implications for the US-Japan alliance” – meaning “implications for the USA” are all too often being emphasised. The aim of the article is to challenge the predominant way of representing Japanese foreign and security policies, and to offer an alternative and arguably less US biased perspective on the Japan-US alliance relationship.

Futenma and the Mobilisation of US Bias

In 1960 Elmer E. Schattschneider coined the term «the mobilization of bias» in reference to the well-known phenomenon that «[s]ome issues are organized into politics while other are organized out»2. We say “well-known”, because according to an estimate in 2004 more than 400 empirical studies have been conducted world-wide on the topic of “agenda-setting power”3. Although agenda-setting power is thus a rather thoroughly researched phenomenon, it nonetheless continues to operate with vast consequences in many different contexts. One recent example is highlighted in Yoshisuke Iimura‟s analysis in The Oriental Economist of the Japanese news media‟s treatment of the Futenma issue in 2009-10. Iimura concludes that the Japanese news media handled this issue in an utterly uniform manner: «From start to finish», it «spoke of [then Prime Minister Yukio] Hatoyama as having gone astray». What is more, «Judging from the results, the Japanese media fell hook, line and sinker for the White House‟s media strategy»4. Iimura notes that Japan‟s major newspapers dealt with the issue as if it were detrimental to Japan-US relations, often using interviews with US pundits and articles in US media as “evidence” supporting the assessment that the Hatoyama government

1 The bilateral agreement foresaw the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from the residential area of Ginowan (in the densely populated southern part of Okinawa) to (the far less densely populated) Henoko, in northern Okinawa by 2014. As part of the agreement, Washington also agreed to reduce the number of US troops stationed in Japan (47,000 in total) by relocating 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by the same year. 2 E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America, Dryden Press, Hinsdale 1975, p. 69. 3 M. MCCOMBS, Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion, Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden 2004, p. 37. 4 Y. IIMURA, Seeking Deep Analysis, in «The Oriental Economist», vol. 78, no. 7, 2010, p. 10. ISPI - Working Paper 3

was mishandling the base re-location issue. The Washington Post columnist Al Kamen, for example, called Hatoyama‟s handling of the base re-location issue as «increasingly loopy» and «hastening his retirement»5. Our own reading of Japanese news sources, including the liberal daily newspaper Asahi Shimbun, which covered the Futenma issue through a large number of editorials in 2009 and 2010, confirms Iimura‟s analysis. In the press coverage screened for this article, we have found consistent criticism of Prime Minister Hatoyama‟s decision to review the base agreement and a strong tendency to play up and exaggerate tensions in the bilateral relationship, allegedly caused by the Hatoyama government‟s attempt to re-negotiate the base re-location agreement with the US, often quoting US newspapers or experts close to the administration6. This tendency and sort of coverage seemed even stronger in the Japanese press than in parts of the US press such as The New York Times whose reporting on the Futenma issue has ranged from comparative value- neutrality to displays of respect for Hatoyama‟s dilemma of having to «accommodate the competing desires of the Americans and local residents»7 in Okinawa, and of understanding that «Washington‟s insistence on the original agreement appeared to many Japanese to be an attempt to bully their inexperienced government»8. In most newspapers on the other side of the Atlantic, it is probably fair to say that the Futenma issue garnered just as little interest as most things Japanese nowadays9. Still, what is particularly noteworthy for the purpose of this article is that the one European newspaper that covered this issue in some detail – Financial Times – differed a great deal from The New York Times in the way that it mobilised largely the same biases as the Japanese media. It did so, overall, 1. by playing up the idea that “this crucial alliance relationship” could be detrimentally affected by the Japanese government‟s handling of the Futenma issue, for example by using value-laden words and expressions in headlines, implying the existence of “tension”, a “friction”, “strained” ties, a “growing” “policy discord” and a “crisis”10; and

5 Ivi, p. 11. 6 See e.g. M. YAMAGUCHI, Futenma shift puts Hatoyama, U.S. ties to test, in «Japan Times Online», 4 September 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090904f1.html; T. KAJITA, U.S. Concerned by Japan’s Changes in Foreign Policy, in «Japan Times Online», 28 October 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091028a5.html; U.S. Warns Japan against Reneging on Okinawa Base Relocation Deal, in «Japan Today», 4 November 2009, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/us-warns-japan-against-reneging-on-okinawa-base- relocation-deal; U.S. Calls Futenma Delay “Unfortunate”, in «Japan Times Online», 17 December 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091217a2.html; Base Delay Could Harm Ties, Campbell Warns, in «Japan Times Online», 7 March 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100307a4.html; Few Futenma Choices Left for Hatoyama, in «Asahi Shimbun», 26 April, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201004250169.html; Camp Schwab Floated in Futenma Plan, in «Asahi Shimbun», 20 February 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201002190435.html. 7 M. FALCKER - H. TABUCHI, Japanese Leader Backtracks on Revising Base Agreement, in «The New York Times», 4 May 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/world/asia/05japan.html. 8 M. FALCKER, Deal Seems Near on U.S. Base in Japan, in «The New York Times», 20 May 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/world/asia/21japan.html. 9 See e.g. the discussion in S. APPELGREN - M. FLYXE - L. HAGSTRÖM - P. MOBERG, (eds), Does Japan Matter?, in «NIASnytt-Asia Insights» (Special issue), No. 1, 2005, http://nias.ku.dk/nytt/2005_1/20051eALL.pdf. 10 M. DICKIE, Friction over Marines’ Base Clouds Obama Visit, in «Financial Times», 26 October 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9990768a-c1ce-11de-b86b-00144feab49a.html; M. DICKIE, Marine Base 4 ISPI - Working Paper

by referring to unnamed Japanese “backers of the alliance” allegedly stating that «the longer the issue goes unresolved, the more dangerous it becomes»11; 2. by quoting many extremely one-sided characterisations of DPJ policy and Prime Minister Hatoyama, while quoting very little in defence of them. Examples of the former include Kamen‟s characterisation of Hatoyama above12; unnamed US analysts stating that «the dispute could weaken a 50-year-old military alliance»13, and that Tokyo is experiencing «amateur hour»14; references to other unnamed Americans who believe that the initiative to revisit the Futenma relocation agreement is «a sign of weakening commitment to an alliance that has been a pillar of regional security for half a century»15; and critical remarks by Japanese politicians implying that Hatoyama would have to resign if he fails to “resolve” the Futenma issue;16 3. by quoting US policymakers and pundits who strongly and resolutely criticized the Japanese government‟s handling of the Futenma issue, e.g. Lt General Edward Rice, Commander of the US Forces in Japan and of the US Fifth Air Force17; Jeff Kingston, professor of Asian Studies at Temple University18; Richard Armitage, US deputy secretary of state 2001–200519; Michael Green, Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former senior Asia adviser to President George W. Bush20; and Gerald Curtis, Japan specialist and professor of political science at Columbia University21; 4. by repeatedly quoting US Defence Secretary Robert Gates‟ annoyed remarks during his visit to Tokyo in October 2009, in particular Gates calling the 2006 base re-

Strains Japan Ties, in «Financial Times», 11 November 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76db4296-ce62- 11de-a1ea-00144feabdc0.html; M. DICKIE, Japan’s Leaders Dither as Policy Discord Grows, in «Financial Times», 13 November 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/00f718fe-cff5-11de-a36d-00144feabdc0.html; M. DICKIE, Japanese PM Suffers as Good Intentions Fail to Resolve Crises, in «Financial Times», 14 May 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3121167c-5eef-11df-af86-00144feab49a.html. 11 D. PILLING, Tokyo Wobbles on the American Alliance, in «Financial Times», 22 April 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/612b0a4a-4da5-11df-9560-00144feab49a.html. 12 Ibidem. 13 M. DICKIE, Marine Base …, cit. 14 M. DICKIE, The Spectre of Stasis, in «Financial Times», 21 December 2009, p. 6. 15 M. DICKIE, Pressure Grows on DPJ over Okinawa Base Plans, in «Financial Times», 25 March 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ce1fc742-37ae-11df-88c6-00144feabdc0.html. 16 M. DICKIE, Japan Ignores US Pressure over Air Base, in «Financial Times», 15 December 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9ab7e70c-e945-11de-be51-00144feab49a.html; and Japan PM Warned on Futenma Base, in «Financial Times», 7 April 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e6f51a5c-425c-11df-8c60- 00144feabdc0.html; J. SOBLE - M. DICKIE, Tokyo Accepts Defeat over Okinawa Marine Base, in «Financial Times», 5 May 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/30ba85d8-57dd-11df-855b-00144feab49a.html. 17 A. RUSSELL - M. DICKIE, Japan Urges Talks on US Military Base, in «Financial Times», 17 September 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2955eab6-a3a7-11de-9fed-00144feabdc0.html. 18 M. NAKAMOTO, US Seeks Clarity on Japan Alliance, in «Financial Times», 19 October 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8ca77c32-bcf8-11de-a7ec-00144feab49a.html. 19 J. SOBLE - M. DICKIE, Tokyo Accepts Defeat ..., cit. 20 Ibidem. 21 M. DICKIE, Hatoyama Written off as Lame Duck Premier, in «Financial Times», 13 May 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/878b1d72-5eaa-11df-af86-00144feab49a.html. It is quite telling that the previous article even quotes Chalmers Johnson as seemingly in support of the bias, although the late professor in reality had very different views on the Futenma issue. See C. JOHNSON, Another Battle for Okinawa, in «Los Angeles Times», 6 May 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/06/opinion/la-oe- johnson-20100506. ISPI - Working Paper 5

location agreement “non-negotiable” saying that «it is time to move on», and keep the original Futenma relocation agreement intact22. The way that Futenma was organised on Japan‟s domestic political agenda and as an item in the context of Japan-US relations had consequences. The sheer number of articles on the matter in the Japanese press communicated a sense of urgency, and placed it at the very forefront of Japan‟s political agenda during Hatoyama‟s short tenure as prime minister from September 2009 to June 2010. The issue was moreover organised in such a way that the Japan-US alliance and – consequently – Japanese security seemed to be at stake should Tokyo continue to pursue its ambition to renegotiate the base relocation agreement. Since such arguments were meant to dissuade the Hatoyama Cabinet from pursuing the matter any further – either directly or indirectly through the mobilisation of public dissent – they were in line with the interests of the US government. As it turned out, they proved to be very effective. In May 2010, Hatoyama gave in to US pressure, acknowledging that the base could not “realistically” be moved due to the necessity to «maintain the Japan–US alliance as a deterrent force»23. Even if one would agree that Hatoyama was clumsy and indeed very indecisive and incoherent in handling this issue – admittedly rather in accordance with dominant descriptions in the Japanese and international media – there is no doubt that the way it was organised on the political agenda eventually contributed to his resignation in June 2010. The fact that similar biases were reproduced in the Financial Times primarily served to acknowledge and reinforce the widespread notion that Japan is located squarely in the US sphere of influence and that Japanese foreign and security policies cannot be understood outside the alliance with the USA. Narratives without a basis in this idea were almost non-existent and nearly all comments quoted in the paper originated in circles, mainly in the USA, that were highly critical of Hatoyama‟s plan to revisit the Futenma relocation deal. Furthermore, the US experts and scholars quoted by the Financial Times (and, admittedly, other newspapers) were limited to a small number consistently presenting the same arguments in favour of leaving the existing Japan-US relocation agreement intact. Quite tellingly, not even once did Financial Times quote a European expert in regard to this issue, de-facto depriving its readers from an alternative and non-American perspective on the base re-location issue24. This article does not attempt to investigate why a major European newspaper limited its reporting and analysis to reproducing essentially the same biases as its Japanese

22 E.g. D. PILLING, Okinawa Hovers at the Negotiating Table, «Financial Times», 12 November 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/6df59cd4-cf2b-11de-8a4b-00144feabdc0.html; M. DICKIE - E. LUCE, Pledges Fail to Mask Divisions over Okinawa, in «Financial Times», 14 November 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/7505edaa-d0be-11de-af9c-00144feabdc0.html; M. DICKIE, Japan Ignores US Pressure …, cit.; cf. United States Department of Defense, Joint Press Conference with Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 21 October 2009, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4501; D. DOMBEY - M. DICKIE, US-Japan Relations Clouded by Okinawa, in «Financial Times», 19 January 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4266b212-04c1-11df-9a4f-00144feabdc0.html. 23 M. FALCKER - H. TABUCHI, Japanese Leader Backtracks on Revising Base Agreement, in «The New York Times», 4 May 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/world/asia/05japan.html. 24 As reflected, for example, by several quotes in A. BERKOFSKY, Okinawa call to shape new US-Japan era, in «Asia Times Online», 6 February 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LB06Dh01.html. 6 ISPI - Working Paper

counterpart without considering alternative – less US-biased – ways of interpreting the events25. Instead, in the following sections it will attempt to offer one such account.

An Alternative Interpretation of the Futenma issue

When Yukio Hatoyama made a revision of the 2006 base re-location deal one of the central items on the election campaign agenda in 2009 – if not the central one – Washington immediately made it clear that it would categorically resist any substantial (or indeed any at all) changes to the existing base re-location agreement. As discussed above, moreover, numerous US scholars wrote and spoke often on the associated “dangers” of the Japanese government seeking to revise parts of the 2006 base re- location agreement26. The “danger”, which was typically referred to in this context, was the alleged end or break-up of the Japan-US alliance should Tokyo insist on revisiting the existing agreement. In contrast, the notion that a revised agreement would not have prompted Washington to question the very rationale of its security alliance with Japan, did not get mentioned in the press coverage. In order to offer an alternative interpretation of the Futenma base controversy, it is necessary to try to put US concerns into perspective and ask what would have happened to the Japan-US alliance, had parts of the 2006 base re-location agreement actually been changed. There seems to be consensus amongst analysts and Japan watchers that US military presence in Japan (roughly 50,000 troops in total), and particularly in Okinawa, is of great importance to US security policy strategies for East Asia27. The purpose of US forward-stationed forces in Japan is to project military power capabilities in East Asia in case of regional military contingencies involving North Korea, China or Taiwan (for example in the case of a Chinese-Taiwanese military conflict)28. Given Okinawa‟s geographical vicinity to the Chinese mainland and the Taiwan Straits, the island is of particular strategic importance to the US as it enables Washington to deploy a

25 One rare exception – Tobias Harris‟ observation that the Hatoyama Cabinet‟s handling of Futenma is «normal government» – also originated in the US, M. DICKIE, Japan’s Leaders Dither as Policy Discord Grows, Financial in «Financial Times», 13 November 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/00f718fe-cff5-11de- a36d-00144feabdc0.html. 26 See e.g. M.J. GREEN‟s contribution posted on «Foreign Policy» magazine‟s “Shadow Government” section: Tokyo Smackdown, in «Foreign Policy», 23 October. 2009, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/tokyo_smackdown; see also G. CURTIS, Japan’s Leader Must Show Leadership, in «East Asia Forum», 27 April, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/27/japans-leaders-must-show-leadership/#more-11670. 27 See e.g. G.D. HOOK - J. GILSON - C.W. HUGHES - H. DOBSON, Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, Routledge, London and New York 2001, pp.123-146; for an American perspective on Japan-US security relations and the role of US military presence in Japan for US security policies in East Asia see e.g. R. SAMUELS, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 2007, pp.185–209. 28 See e.g. M.M. MOCHIZUKI, Dealing with a Rising China, in M.M. MOCHIZUKI - T.U. BERGER - J. TSUCHIYAMA, Japan in International Relations: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State, Lynne Rienner, London 2007, pp. 246–50. ISPI - Working Paper 7

significant number of forward-stationed armed forces and marines to regional military crisis29. Consequently, it is very likely that Washington would eventually have had to accommodate Japanese requests to revise the agreement, or parts of it – especially a desire to assign additional time and resources to identify alternative base sites inside and possibly outside of Japan. In other words: leaving aside whether one does or does not agree that identifying an alternative location for the US base in Okinawa or elsewhere was “realistic”, Washington would have had to accept changes to the re- location plan had the Japanese government chosen to insist on promises made during the election campaign. A revised base realignment agreement would clearly not have “pleased” US policymakers – particularly the Pentagon – but due to the strategic importance of military presence in Japan for the US, a revised base agreement would not have had «a devastating effect», as suggested by scholars such as Michael Green30. This alternative conclusion of what a revised base realignment plan would and more importantly would not have “done” to the Japan-US alliance leads us to an alternative interpretation of what the Futenma base controversy stood for in the context of the alliance, namely a clash of interests in the context of an asymmetrical “junior-senior partner”-style alliance dominated by the USA – inevitable perhaps given the seemingly more defiant US policy of the Hatoyama Cabinet. This policy also included putting a halt to Japan‟s refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean (2001-2007 and 2008-2010), criticism of US-led globalisation31, and a review of secret Japan-US security agreements during the Cold War, which allowed US navy ships equipped with nuclear weapons to call Japanese ports in violation of Japan‟s so-called “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”. Numerous Japanese opinion polls in 2009 and 2010 confirm that a solid majority of the Japanese electorate initially supported Prime Minister Hatoyama‟s plan to review and revise the 2006 base re-location agreement and to reduce the US military presence and burden in Okinawa. At the same time, however, polls indicated a widespread disapproval with how the prime minister handled the base issue during the first months of his incumbency32. If one agrees that the DPJ‟s landslide victory in the general elections on 31 August 2009 could at least partly be explained by Hatoyama‟s promise to revisit apparent and consistent asymmetries of the Japan-US alliance33, attempts by the DPJ-led government to do just that in September 2009 onwards must be interpreted as a

29 C.W. HUGHES, Japan’s Re-emergence as a “Normal” Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368-9, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 2004, pp. 97–116. 30 J. SOBLE - M. DICKIE, Tokyo Accepts Defeat ..., cit.. 31 Y. HATOYAMA, Watashi no seiji tetsugaku (My Political Philosophy), in «Voice», September 2009, pp. 132-141. 32 A list of opinion polls conducted by Japanese daily newspapers, including amongst others the Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Nikkei Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun confirming that a majority of the Japanese electorate wanted Hatoyama to re-negotiate the base re-location agreement can be found at the Mansfield Asian Opinion Poll Database at http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/index.htm.

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democratically-elected government seeking to implement the policies that it was elected to implement by its electorate. Consequently, Gates‟ “decision” in November 2009 that a newly-elected Japanese government does not have the right to review a bilateral agreement negotiated and adopted by a predecessor government could even be interpreted as US “interference” in Japan‟s political decision-making process and its democratic practices. That newly-elected governments reserve the right and indeed choose to re-negotiate bilateral agreements or to re-define policies, however, is nothing unusual in international relations. Just to mention two examples, in 2001 the US administration led by George W. Bush decided – essentially immediately after taking office in January 2001 – to review and indeed redefine US policies towards North Korea, which led to an almost complete interruption of official US-North Korean ties and escalation of regional tension. Furthermore, in July the same year Bush justified his decision to seek to develop and deploy a US missile defence system with global reach with the argument that the US-Soviet Union Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty from 1972 was “outmoded”, knowingly accepting the violation of the ABM Treaty34. Leaving aside that the European Union or individual European states do not have security relations with Japan in any way comparable with the US, it is still hardly conceivable that a European foreign minister, minister of defence, prime minister or president would travel to Tokyo – or anywhere else for that matter – to tell a new democratically-elected government that an agreement the new government wishes to review is “non-negotiable”, as US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates did during his visit to Tokyo in November 200935. That is not only highly unusual in international diplomacy between alliance partners, but must indeed also be interpreted as almost complete disregard for the fact that a DPJ-led government‟s alliance policies may not be identical with the previous LDP alliance policies. For decades, Washington had been able to contain Japanese requests to reduce the US military footprint in Okinawa36, and it was indeed the first time that a Japanese government made the reduction of US military presence the central item of an election and policy agenda.

Implications for the Japan-US Alliance: Futenma and Beyond

We concluded that the Futenma base controversy can be interpreted in various ways, leading to different and indeed contradictory implications for the Japan-US alliance relationship. A first narrative suggests that the US refusal to accommodate essentially

34 See e.g. D. STOUT, U.S. Sets Missile Defense Plan, Threatening 1972 ABM Pact, in «The New York Times», 12 July 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/12/politics/12CND-MISS.html. 35 The Gates statement is exceptionally undiplomatic and harsh, and in fairness it did not reflect the rhetoric and arguments employed by several other US policymakers (such as Kurt Campbell) involved in bilateral negotiations on Futenma. 36 We refer to “timid requests” (at least judging by absence of results until 2006). The reduction of US military presence in “far-away” Okinawa was never a priority for the central government in Tokyo, regardless of the fact the US military bases occupy almost 20% of Okinawa‟s territory; for a very critical assessment of the controversy and impact US military presence in Okinawa see e.g. G.D. HOOK - G. MCCORMACK, Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis, Routledge, London and New York 2001, pp. 23–26. ISPI - Working Paper 9

any of Tokyo‟s requests for changes to the 2006 base re-location agreement indeed confirmed Hatoyama‟s contention that “asymmetries” and “inequalities” in the Japan- US alliance needed to be addressed, and, more importantly, reduced. It thus also confirmed overall the ingrained view in much research on Japanese foreign and security policies, which tends to take Japanese reactivity to and dependency on the USA more or less for granted37. The fact that Japan eventually acquiesced to US pressure could moreover support the interpretation that the “junior-senior” alliance structure survived Hatoyama‟s attempts to make the alliance more “equal”. If other Japanese requests related to the US military presence in Japan – such as the reduction of Japanese financial contributions to the maintenance of US military troops in Japan (amounting to $5 billion annually) and changes to the so-called Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement, which protects American troops from legal prosecution in Japan – could in the future be dismissed as easily and offhand as Japanese requests to re-negotiate the presence and scale of US troops in Okinawa, it might be argued in retrospect that Tokyo‟s attempt to re-negotiate the base re-location did more harm than good to its ambitions to make the alliance with the US less asymmetrical. Since the DPJ was not sustainably able to transform its alliance policies from “reactive” to “active”, the outcome of the base re-location controversy somehow confirmed that policymakers in Washington have nothing to “fear” from a DPJ government. The second narrative would instead choose to emphasise that many DPJ Diet members predicted early on that Tokyo would eventually be have to give up its attempts to re-negotiate the bilateral accord38. A rookie Diet member, but at the same time also the “brain” behind many of former Prime Minister Hatoyama‟s writings, Masaki Nakajima moreover believes that the stir caused by Hatoyama‟s promise to re- negotiate the Futenma re-location agreement could actually be meaningful even without immediate goal fulfillment, because it clearly communicated Tokyo‟s dissatisfaction with Okinawa‟s heavy burden39. Indeed, Japan requesting to review an existing base re-location agreement and not instantly yielding to US pressure, could have created an important precedence of how and to what extent Tokyo might in the future be prepared to protect its interests in the context of the bilateral security alliance (this could for example be the case when the above mentioned Japanese financial contributions to the maintenance of US military in Japan is to be addressed. In fact, the high level of “alarmism” amongst US policymakers and many scholars when Tokyo requested to review the base agreement suggests that Washington might have

37 See e.g. K. CALDER, Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State, in «World Politics», vol. 40, no. 4, 1988, pp. 517-541 and G. MCCORMACK, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, New York 2007. Other research has strived to re-interpret Japanese foreign and security policy more in terms of its own agency; see e.g. L. HAGSTRÖM, Normalizing Japan: Supporter, Nuisance, or Wielder of Power in the North Korean Nuclear Talks, in «Asian Survey», vol. 49, no. 5, 2009, pp. 831-851. 38 Interview with Yukio Hachiro, Tokyo, 26 November 2009. Similar points were made in interviews with other DPJ Diet members, such as Yoshio Tetsuka and Masaki Nakajima, Tokyo, 1 and 2 December 2009. All interviews referred to in this piece were conducted by Linus Hagström. 39 Interview with Masaki Nakajima, Tokyo, 2 December 2009. 10 ISPI - Working Paper

feared that the Futenma controversy might be the “beginning” of what a DPJ-led government could request and seek to change as regards US military presence in Japan in the years ahead (as opposed to a “one-shot” alliance management problem quickly disappearing from the bilateral agenda). Interviews with DPJ Diet members also support the assessment that there may be «more to come» as regards possible future Japanese attempts to address asymmetries within the Japan-US alliance, because amongst DPJ Diet members there seems to be a widespread consensus that the alliance suffers from deep-seated structural problems. Current DPJ Diet Affairs Chief, Yukio Hachiro, for instance, claims that Japanese foreign policy has followed the US too closely [zuijigata no gaikō]40, and DPJ Diet member Hajime Yatagawa asserts that «it cannot be one way street; it‟s not that we should say yes to anything the US demands from us; if it‟s an equal relationship the US must listen to us as well»41. Current Vice-Minister of Defense Jun Azumi also clarifies that an «equal» [taitō] relationship means treating one another as «friends» and not relating to the USA as «a boss»42. The previous secretary general of DPJ, Yukio Edano moreover stresses that Japanese politicians should «refrain from making the excuse that “we did it because the US asked us”; instead “we have to take responsibility for our own actions”»43. Several DPJ Diet members stress that since the US can be expected to pursue its own interests in international politics Japan should not become «too dependent» [ombu ni dakko] on its judgment in each and every issue44. They thus want Japan to have the same kind of “equality” which exists in the alliance relationships that the US maintains with other countries45. A newly-elected DPJ parliamentarian e.g. believes that as a reflection of public opinion the Japanese government should have been able to object to the war in Iraq without fear of being isolated, for example like France: «Especially in the realm of [Japan‟s] Asia diplomacy, or anti-terror, or Middle East diplomacy, we don‟t necessarily have to adjust our steps to the US and always believe that it is linked to the strengthening of the Japan-US alliance or to Japanese interests»46. Some DPJ Diet members even question if the USA really needs regular military presence in Japan in order to defend the country in line with the Japan–US security treaty47. The burden of US military presence in Japan in general, and Okinawa and its population in particular, has been questioned and critically discussed for decades. Japanese policymakers (and not only those within the ruling DPJ but across the political spectrum) have long argued that the main objective of US military troops on Japanese territory is the projection of US military power in East Asia and not the

40 Interview with Yukio Hachiro, Tokyo, 26 November 2009. 41 Interview with Hajime Yatagawa, Tokyo, 25 November 2009. 42 Interview with Jun Azumi, Tokyo, 27 November 2009. 43 Interview with Yukio Edano, Tokyo, 2 December 2009. 44 Interview with Ryoji Yamada, Tokyo, 26 November 2009; cf. ideas voiced in interviews with Masaki Nakajima, Tokyo, 2 December 2009 and a DPJ Diet member who wishes to be anonymous, Tokyo, 24 November 2009. 45 Interview with Masaki Nakajima, Tokyo, 2 December 2009; interview with a DPJ Diet member who wishes to be anonymous, Tokyo, 24 November 2009. 46 Interview with a DPJ Diet member who wishes to be anonymous, Tokyo, 24 November 2009. 47 Interview with Yukio Hachiro, Tokyo, 26 November 2009; interview with Masaki Nakajima, Tokyo, 2 December 2009. ISPI - Working Paper 11

protection of Japanese territory from (very unlikely) North Korean or Chinese military attacks. US military troops stationed on Hawaii or Guam, it is argued by Japanese policymakers and scholars, are “close enough” to intervene in a regional crisis contingency48. Consequently, US pressure to leave the 2006 base re-location agreement unchanged might have secured Washington a short-term victory, but also confirmed to many Japanese that in order to make Toyo less vulnerable to political pressure from Washington (in the literature also referred to as Japan‟s “entrapment” in US security and defense strategies and policies for East Asia)49, the number of US troops stationed in Japan need to be reduced to a very minimum or none at all. Put bluntly: Washington having put Tokyo under pressure over Futenma might “backfire” in the in the sense that those Japanese who do not want US military troops in Japan want them even less after the Futenma controversy and will make themselves heard again in the foreseeable future. Finally, DPJ attempts to re-negotiate the base re-location agreement is hardly “evidence” (or anything resembling that) that the DPJ is “anti-alliance” or “anti- American”, or that the party is questioning the very rationale and importance of the alliance at large. First and foremost, it should be interpreted as a democratically- elected government seeking to meet the demands its electorate. Even if one were to acknowledge that there were a certain clumsiness and incoherence in the Hatoyama Cabinet‟s way of handling the issue, that is an entirely different matter.

48 Various interviews with DPJ policymakers and independent Japanese scholars in November and December 2010 confirm this. 49 See C.W. HUGHES, Japan’s Response to China’s Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision, in «International Affairs», vol. 85, No. 4, 2009, pp 837-856, for an analysis of Japanese fears of being „“entrapped”‟ in US East Asian security and defence policies, potentially obliging Tokyo (directly or indirectly) to be part of US military conflicts in East Asia.