~s:kthe ' By the same author

Jewish Prayer A Guide to Rosh Ha-Shanah A Guide to ut Have Reason to Believe Jewish Values Studies in Talmudic Logic and Methodology The Palm Tree qf Deborah (Translated from the Hebrew of Cordovero, with Introduction and Notes) Tract on Ecstasy (Translated from the Hebrew of Dobh Baer of Lubavitch, with Introduction and Notes) Seeker qf Uniry Faith Principles qf the Jewish Faith: An Ana!Jtical Study A Jewish Theology Helping with Inquiries: An Autobiography The Talmudic Argument Hasidic Prayer God, , Israel Religion and the Individual A Tree qf Life The Jewish Religion: A Companion Beyond Reasonable Doubt ~sk the Rabbi'

LOUIS JACOBS

VALLENTINE MITCHELL LONDON • PORTLAND, OR First published in 19 9 9 in Great Britain by VALLENTINE l'vJITCHELL Newbury House, 900 Eastern Avenue London IG2 7HH

and in the qf America by VALLENTINE l'vJITCHELL c/o ISBS, 5804 N.E. Hassalo Street Portland, Oregon 97213-3644

Hlebsite http:/ /www.vmbooks.com

Copyright© 1999 LouisJacobs

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Jacobs, Louis 'Ask the Rabbi' l.- Miscellanea 2. Sociology, Jewish- Miscellanea I. Title 296.3

ISBN 0-85303-352-8 (cloth)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jacobs, Louis. Ask the rabbi I LouisJacobs. p. cm. ISBN 0-85303-352-8. 1. Judaism-Miscellanea. I. Title. BM5l.J33 1999 296--dc21 98-41119 CIP

All rights reserved. No part qf this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval ~stem, or transmitted, in a'!JI form or by a'!JI means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission qf the publisher qf this book.

Typeset by Vitaset, Paddock Wood, Kent Printed in Great Britain by Creative Print and Design (Wales), Ebbw Vale For my grandson Daniel and my new granddaughter, his wjft, Samantha Contents

Introduction X1

1 Bible 1 2 Theology 36 3 Ethics 59

4 77 5 Sabbath 98 6 Festivals 112 7 Ceremonies 142 8 Marriage and Divorce 173 9 Death and Burial 198 10 Miscellaneous 224 Publishers' Note

These letters were written over the course of 20 years, between 1964 and 1985. Many refer to personalities and holders of specific public office. These references, of course, reflect the time in which they were written, as they have obviously changed over the years. The Publishers have preserved the letters without modification, as they first appeared. Introduction

The 'Ask the Rabbi' column was a weekly feature in the Jewish Chronicle for some twenty-five years during which time thousands of replies were given to questions sent in by readers. The Editor of the JC, for a number of reasons, thought it best if the identity of the Rabbi was not disclosed. Now that the column has been discontinued, it was agreed that the cloak of anonymity was no longer necessary and that this book be published under my name containing typical replies by 'The Rabbi'. The replies were published haphazardly as the questions came in so that a reply to a question on, say, dietary law, was printed side by side with a reply or replies to questions on totally different subjects. Some of the questions required only a brief reply, others a fuller statement. In this book the questions and the replies to them are arranged under various headings - Ethics, Theology, Marriage and Divorce and so forth but, faithful to the spontaneous nature of the originals, no attempt has been made to arrange the replies under the headings in any kind of order. With the exception of a few questions on the festivals (made up at the request of the Editor and none of which are included in this volume) all the questions were actually sent in by readers eager to know what the Jewish view is on this or that topic. The difference between this book and my books, f11hat Does]udaism Sl!)' About ... ?1 and the much more comprehensive work, The Jewish Religion: a Companion, 2 lies precisely in my attempt here to reply to particular readers sufficiently concerned to write to the JC for information. Although there is bound to be an occasional overlapping between this and the other two books, I have tried to keep this to a minimum by selecting replies to questions not treated in the other works. A few remarks are in order now that my cover has been blown. It was not my main task, as conceived by the JC, to state my own view, though I did so frequently. Rather I was called upon to state the Orthodox view while pointing to Reform, Liberal and Conservative views where these differed from Orthodoxy. The replies are given in this book as I originally stated them and I have not felt it necessary to adapt them to changed circumstances, for example, by calling attention to the development of the Masorti movement in Anglo-:Jewry or to the controversies in which I have, for my sins, been involved. Even when the new circumstances had already come about when I gave the original replies, I was not able to record them in my previous incarnation as the anonymous 'Rabbi' without giving the game away. Since, however, I had xii • 14sk the Rabbi' tried to be fair and accurate in my replies, I hope that my theological opponents, whether of the right or the left, will not be deterred from reading the book, supplying their own reservations to my conclusions. The Editor often received irate letters, which he published, from readers who thought that my replies were too Jewish or not Jewish enough, too Orthodox or too Reform, too rationalistic or too mystical. In this connection I take the liberty of quoting my reply to my neighbouring columnist, in the JC, Ben Azai:

My colleague 'Ben Azai' has gently chided me for the habit I have of qualifying almost every opinion given by an inevitable 'but'. He may be right but (there we go again), it must be appreciated that this column is intended to convey as many of the facts as possible, including opinions which differ from those of 'The Rabbi'. In the case he mentioned, for example, it is my opinion that it is all right to answer the telephone on , but surely I have a duty to Orthodox readers to inform them that very many Orthodox do not permit it. Similarly, where the Reform or Liberal view is different from my own, I am duty-bound to record this fact. Furthermore, many of the questions submitted do not lend themselves to a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer. Simple, uncomplicated solutions to involved questions are generally bogus solutions. Rabbinic training accustoms one to the gentle art of qualifications and I make no apology for practising it. I sincerely hope that 'Ben Azai' and other readers will believe me when I say that I am not engaged in hedging my bets or, to vary the metaphor, in trying to have my cake and eat it.

The transliteration of the Hebrew follows the house style of the JC: 'eh' for the letter ~et and Cabala not , as I would normally have spelled it. This book is not a ShulchanAruch (here, too, I follow the system of transliteration followed in the original replies). For one thing it covers many non-Halachic topics and even when considering questions of Halachah the replies are in general terms. Where a particular decision was required I always directed the reader to his or her own Rabbi. Debates and discussions, often vehement, have long been the life-blood ofJudaism. If this book generates a few more of these, all to the good.

LouisJacobs London, 1998

NOTES

I. : Keter, 1973. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 1 Bible

A Christian clergytnan recently spoke slightingly of the principle of an 'eye for an eye' as typical of Old Testa.Dlent justice. What is your opinion?

We are not limited to the literal meaning of the Biblical texts but to the way the texts are interpreted in the Jewish tradition. It is well known that an 'eye for an eye' was understood long ago by the rabbis to mean that payment for the loss of an eye must be made. Like many other Biblical injunctions it gives expression to the demand for justice. Would the clergyman concerned wish to see the victims of violence receive no compensation and would he wish to abolish the law courts? Dr Hertz, Pentateuch and Haftorahs (p. 527), remarks in this connection: 'On the one hand, Judaism, the so-called religion of "strict justice", rejected the literal application of the law of retaliation, and knew neither torture in legal procedure nor mutilation as a legal punishment. In the Christian lands, on the other hand, mutilation and torture were well-nigh indispensable accom­ paniments of justice from the middle of the thirteenth century down to the end of the eighteenth, and in some countries to the middle of the nineteenth century and beyond.'

An Anglican priest recently referred to South Africa as 'that haven of Old Testunent ethics'. Do you agree with this libel on the Old Testunent?

Jews, let it first be said, do not call the Tenach the 'Old Testament'. It is only when the 'Old' Testament is contrasted unfavourably with the 'New' that its ethics are said to be inferior. Jews have the Torah, which means the Bible as interpreted by Jews, not by the adherents of rival religions to Judaism. In the Jewish interpretation all the harsh passages, such as those dealing with the extermination of the Canaanites, are made a dead letter while the injunctions to pursue justice and to love the neighbour are read as permanently binding obligations of the divine law. The priest to whom you refer ought to have been aware, in any event, in this context, of the marvellous eleventh chapter of the , in which all the nations of the earth are described as members of one great family, and of Amos, chapter nine, verse seven: 1\.re ye not as the children of the Ethiopians unto Me, 0 Children of Israel? saith the Lord. Have I not brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt, and the Philistines from Caphtor, and Aram from Kir?' 2 • 54sk the Rabbi' AJewish interpretation of the 'Old Testament' story of Adam and Eve has it that the whole world is descended from a single couple so that no man may say to his neighbour: 'My father was greater than your father', since all men have the same father (Mishna 4:5).

Is it correct that Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canter­ bury in the twelfth century, divided the books of the Pentateuch into chapters?

Langton did indeed make a new arrangement of the chapter divisions, but it goes back ultimately to the Vulgate. Jews used the divisions chiefly for the purpose of reference in their disputations with Christians. Eventually the divisions were adopted and have long been the norm in Jewish life. There is, however, something extremely odd about this, since these chapter divisions are not only un:Jewish but, in many instances, are Christological. To give just one or two examples: Genesis, Chapter 2, is not really a different chapter at all and is merely an attempt to detach the account of the Sabbath from the creation narrative. Similarly, Genesis, Chapter 3, begins, entirely artificially, with 'Now the serpent', solely because it is made to introduce the story of the 'Fall' so significant for Christian theology. From time to time, attempts have been made by Jewish scholars to encourage the giving up of these chapter divisions, but so deeply rooted have they become that all efforts in this direction have proved futile.

Why were som.e books excluded from. the canon of the Bible and placed in the Apocrypha?

The term 'canon' is not used in the Jewish sources. Nor is it correct to depict the process as one of 'excluding' certain books. It is rather that in the course of time some books were selected by the Jewish teachers as being inspired literature and therefore sacred literature. The books of the Apocrypha simply did not qualify. It is in this sense that Professor Leibovitz's epigram is correct: 'The determines what is the Written Torah.' It is interesting that the sceptical but honest book of Ecclesiastes and the collection of love poems that is the Song of Songs were eventually held to be sacred literature while the book of To bit with its naive and simplistic piety was not. The rabbis quote occasionally from the book of Ben Sira in the belief that it contains wise sayings but they refused to allow it to be read publicly in the as the Torah and the prophets are read because they did not consider it to be an inspired work in the religious sense. Bible • 3 Could you say something about the Jewish interpretation of 'the suffering servant' to counter the Christian claim that it refers to Jesus.

The greatJewish commentators hold that the 'suffering servant' of the second part of the book of Isaiah refers either to the prophet himself i.e., he was speaking about his own prophetic career, with all its agonies, or to the people of Israel (the people who suffer for God's sake), or to the Messiah. It was his last idea that was adopted by early Christianity, which then identified Jesus with the Messiah. It should be appreciated that very few Christian biblical scholars nowadays would accept the older notion of a prophet foretelling in detail the life of a man who lived centuries after the prophet. This kind of 'foretelling' is now seen, in fact, as a reading back of later events into early sources. In the book of Isaiah itself and, for that matter, in the Jewish tradition as a whole very little is made of the 'suffering servant' andJewish concern with the question was chiefly in reaction to Christian claims. It has been suggested, for example, that none of the 'suffering servant' passages was chosen for a haftara reading because the Jewish teachers did not wish to give undue prominence to the idea. The distinguishedJewish biblical scholar, Harry Orlinksy, has gone so far as to deny that the notion of a 'suffering servant' exists at all in the Bible, that is, as a theological concept. Early Christianity simply used these and other passages anachronistically to serve its own ideas. I would recommend the Soncino 'Isaiah' on chapter 42ff and Solomon B. Freehof's 'Commentary to Isaiah', New York, 1972, introduction and commentary to Isaiah 42ff. Of some relevance, too, is the chapter, 'Forgiveness and Reconciliation with God', in Solomon Schechter's 'Aspects of Rabbinic Theology'.

In my studies of the Bible I find that the nation of Israel was perpetuated by the male seed, as for example: 'Jesse begat David, David begat Solomon'. The onry reference to the 'seed' of a woman is in Genesis 3:15 -the woman who bears the Messiah. Why, then, do rabbis say that one is Jewish only if one's mother is Jewish? This is standard Christian exegesis and has nothing to do with Judaism, containing as it does a veiled reference to the virgin birth. From this point of view, all I have to say is thatJudaism rejects such interpretations entirely. But your basic question requires an answer on the status of the mother: where the father is a Cohen and the mother an Israelite, the child is a Cohen. TheJewish answer is that withinJudaism it is the status of the father that it imparted to the child, based on the many references to the 'families according to their father's house', e.g., at the beginning of the Book of Numbers. 4 • fuk the Rabbi' On the question of the 'suffering servant' in Isaiah, it occurred to 01e that this D1ight be none other than Job. Is this possible?

To be sure, the description of the 'suffering servant' fits in with a good deal of what we are told of Job, but if Isaiah (according to most modern scholars, Deutero-Isaiah) is actually referring to Job, why did he not say so explicitly? In any event, it is extremely unlikely that the great prophet knew of the Book ofJob, which, according to the majority of scholars, is a much later book.

What was the point of the Blinding of Isaac? The idea of 'tests' generally see01s difficult. What is their exact purpose?

Much has been written on this subject, as you will see if you consult the standard Jewish encyclopaedias on the subject. , for example, understands the word 'test' not in the sense of conveying to God some information about which He did not previously have, but as a 'test-case' of the extent to which a man is prepared to go in his love of God. Others put it rather differently. God does know how a man will behave, but what He knows is what man will actually do in the future. It should not be understood as if God knew that Abraham would be prepared to make the great sacrifice, but rather that when Abraham was prepared to make it, God knew of his readiness beforehand, i.e., God's knowledge was of Abraham's real 'test', not of his readiness in a potential 'test' of his faith. There is a further idea regarding 'testing' that the quality of a man is seen in adversity. As a well-known remarks in connection with the testing of Abraham, the potter knocks with his hammer on the sound casks he has made to make sure that they are really sound. He does not bother to knock with his hammer on the inferior casks, because he knows that they are bad and will crack.

As the Abnighty created the world and all its contents fro01 nothing, why did He need Ada01's rib to create WOD1an?

You might have asked why He needed the dust of the earth from which to create Adam. The answer is that God did not create 'all its contents' from nothing, only the basic materials of the world. Mterwards, He created Adam from the dust, according to the biblical narrative, and then He created Eve from Adam's rib. One idea that has been put forward by the Jewish teachers as to why this gradual process of creation was engaged in by the Almighty is to teach us Bible • 5 humans that God did not create a ready-made, perfect world, but an imperfect one, the task of man being to bring the world to greater perfection and so become, in the words of the rabbis, a co-partner with God in the work of creation.

FroJD when doesjudaisJD date the year 5738? The library reference book starts with AbrahaJD in 2000 BCE: this plus the year 1978 adds up to 3,978.

Our present method of dating was introduced during the Middle Ages and is not found, for instance, during the Talmudic period. The date is from 'the creation of the world'. This is arrived at by an examination of the biblical chronologies, beginning with Adam. The date is seen by many Jews today as poetic and it does not commit contemporary Jews to a view that the world is really only less than 6,000 years old. It is fascinating, in a way, that the Jewish method of dating does not begin with a particularly :Jewish' event, not even with Abraham's call, but with the beginning of the whole universe. God is the Creator of all and it is to the act of divine creation that Jews turn whenever they think of a year and hence of time and eternity.

AdaJD and Eve had three sons and they were the first people on earth. Yet when 'enrlgrated' to the Land of Nod, east of Eden (Genesis 4:16), he took a wife who bore hiiD a son. Where did his wife coJDe fro~n?

On the critical view, the story of Cain taking a wife is derived from a different source than the account of Adam and Eve having only three sons. Consequently, on this view, there is, indeed, a contradiction between the two passages, but that is because they represent two different traditions. Such a solution was obviously not open to the rabbis, who held fast to the belief that the whole Torah is in the form of a single unit from God. How, then, did the rabbis cope with the difficulty? The rabbinic Midrash postulates that Cain had a sister, a twin born at the same time, whom he married. In this connection, there is an interesting rabbinic comment on the passage in Leviticus (20: 17) containing the prohibition of brother marrying sister. The word used in this connection is chesed, generally translated as 'lovingkindness'. The English versions, translated it here as 'shameful thing' -it is a shameful thing for brother to marry sister. But in the midrashic comment, chesed is under­ stood in its usual sense. The Torah, when prohibiting incest, knows, as it were, that the reader will ask why, in that case, did Cain marry his sister. To this the answer is provided: 6 • 51sk the Rabbi' it was chesed, a special dispensation by God who, in His lovingkindness, wished the world He had created to be populated.

How do you justify the proposed killing of lsaac by his father, AbrahaJD, when the sixth conunancbn.ent says '?'

Abraham did not want to kill his son, but he was commanded to take him up on the mount as a sacrifice by God. But how could God order a man to sacrifice his son? This question has bothered all the commentators, who do not fail to point out, however, that God ordered Abraham to desist at the last moment and the life of Isaac was spared. Some biblical scholars tend to see the whole narrative as a protest against child sacrifice so rife in ancient religion. On this view, the Akedah story is really telling us that God never wants us to kill for His sake, but to live and foster life for His sake. If the angel had not been told to order Abraham to stay his hand, the Almighty would have allowed something which, as God, He could not do. In the Middle Ages, especially, the Akedah was interpreted as a paradigm for the readiness of the Jewish martyrs to offer up their lives for their God.

Christians ask: 'How could Moses have written Deuter­ onoDly when he describes his own death?' What is the Jewish reply?

It is not only Christians who ask this question. It was asked in Talmudic times as early as the second century (Baba Batra l5a). Rabbi Simeon said that Moses, knowing that he was to die, wrote the last eight verses of Deuteronomy, describing his death, with tears in his eyes. But RabbiJudah (others say Rabbi Nehemiah) argued that these last eight verses were not, in fact, written by Moses, but by his disciple, Joshua, after Moses' death. The famous medieval Jewish exegete, Abraham lbn Ezra, goes further and argues that the last twelve verses could not have been written by Moses since they tell of how Moses went up on the mount to die, i.e., so that he did not come down again to write this account. Bible • 7

'Honour thy father and thy ~nother that thy days ~nay be long upon the earth.' Clearly, the second part of this is literally untrue. How is it to be interpreted?

I suppose that the plain meaning of the verse is that long life is promised as a reward for honouring parents but that naturally other factors may interfere with the carrying out of the promise. It can perhaps be compared to a doctor who gives his patient a tonic to keep him in good health. This cannot prevent him being knocked down by a motor car. It is interesting that the Torah also promises long life to one who sends away the mother bird before taking the young to himself (Deuteronomy 22:6-7). This may mean that length of days is promised in the two instances in which reverence for life is expressed. But the rabbis were bothered by your question. They tell of the young man whose father sent him to bring down the young chicks from a lofty tree. The boy carried out both precepts, he honoured his father and sent away the mother bird, and yet he was killed on the way down. Where is the long life promised to him? ask the rabbis. They reply that length of days in the verse refers not to this world at all but to the world to come ( 39b).

How Jnany years have elapsed since the Creation? When God created Ada~n and Eve, was there ~narriage? Fro1n where did Cain find a wife, and what was herna~ne? Ada~n lived for 930 years: how is it that no one today lives so long?

How many years? The traditional answer is 5739. Was there marriage? In this way, God instituted marriage. Who was Cain's wife? There is a Midrash according to which twin daughters were born to Adam and Eve together with . What was Cain's wife's name? We are not told. How is it that no one lives today for so many years? Human nature was different then and, in any event, it was only a few who lived that long. According to another Midrash, Adam and Eve were buried in the Cave of Machpela together with Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebeccah,Jacob and Leah. All your questions are the old biblical difficulties regarding which funda­ mentalist Christians were bothered, but which never botheredJews over-much for the simple reason that the Adam and Eve stories have little significance for Jewish doctrine. A literalist interpretation was required by Christianity in order to safeguard the doctrine of the Fall, a doctrine which occupies comparatively little space inJewish theological thinking. Many prefer to understand the story of Adam and Eve as a kind of parable regarding human existence. Adam is mankind, created by God, disobeying his commands and then fmding reconciliation with Him. In the Jewish tradition, the whole of the early chapters of Genesis belong 8 • J.lsk the Rabbi' to what the tradition calls 'the secrets of the Torah', which is only another way of saying what many modems would say-that it is not the plain meaning that is important, but the inner meaning, that man is tempted to disobey God, that hatred and murder are wrong (Cain and Abel), that marriage is a divinely ordained institution, and that the world can be a paradise if man can learn to order his affairs in the light of God's will. We need not be afraid of the term 'myth' to describe some of these stories. A 'myth' in this context is not a fairy tale, but rather truth expressed in non­ historical and non-literal form. The stories belong more to poetry than to prose and are no less effective - quite the contrary - for that.

Which is the more authoritative and authentic, the Penta­ teuch or the Tahnud? And do the books of the Apocrypha make up an integral part in our Jewish religion?

The question is formulated as if there were a conflict between the Pentateuch and the , so that one can ask which enjoys greater authority and which is the more authentic. But the Talmud is an interpretation of the Pentateuch, not a rival work. If you mean which does one follow, the plain meaning of the Pentateuchal laws or the form given to these in the Talmud, the answer is that in Jewish tradition it is the interpretations given by the Talmud that are accepted. It was only the Karaites, and, it would seem, the Sadducees who relied on the plain meanmg. Jews are not biblicists. The Torah is far more than the basic text of the Bible. The Torah is, the sum total of Jewish teaching and it embraces, as the rabbis say, both the written Torah (the biblical text) and the Oral Torah, the substance of which is contained in the Talmudic debates and discussions and is best conceived of as an ongoing process. If you mean, which is the more sacred, it is difficult to know what exactly this implies, but there are rules against, for example, placing a book containing a lesser degree of sanctity on top of a book containing a greater degree, e.g., a copy of Psalms on a copy of the Pentateuch. In this sense the din treats the Pentateuch-and, for that matter, every other book of the Bible-as possessing a greater degree of sanctity than the Talmud. The former is sacred text, the latter interpretation of the text. The actual text, as the source, is the more sacred, but the interpretation is the more authoritative precisely because it is an interpretation. The Talmudic saying (Shabbat 14a), 'One who grasps the naked sefer Torah will be buried naked of the mitzvot', has been homilitically used to convey the thought that if one wishes to follow only the bare text of Scripture, without the traditional interpretation, that text is so unclear that the result will be a failure to observe any of the mitzvot adequately. The books of the Apocrypha do not belong to the sacred Scriptures and Bible • 9 form no integral part in our Jewish religion. Some of the wise sayings found in these books are, however, occasionally quoted in the Talmud and with approval but that is because of their 'wisdom', not because they were ever considered to be 'inspired' texts.

Can you explain the meaning of the episode about Moses and the Burning Bush in Exodus, Chapter 3?

A passage of this nature is richly and variously interpreted in Jewish thought. The most popular interpretation is to see the bush as a symbol of Israel's miraculous survival in spite of persecution. The bush burns with fire but the bush is not consumed. Another interpretation is that God appeared to Moses out of the bush to teach the lesson of humility, that God chooses lowly things like the bush to be His instruments. Some add that it was to give encouragement to Moses who thought little of his capacities for leadership. The mystics sees the burning bush as the symbol of God's manifestation in the universe: 'Earth's crammed with heaven, and every common bush afire with God; but only he who sees takes off his shoes'. Some rather more prosaic commentators, however, see the bush as representing Pharaoh who, in spite of all the dire warnings, was too stubborn to let God's people go.

What is the meaning of the phrase in Exodus Chapter 33, verse 20, 'for man shall not see Me and live'?

According to a philosophical understanding of the verse, the intention is to convey the thought that fmite man cannot endure a complete confrontation with the Infmite. Nachmanides, in his commentary to the verse, understands it to mean that man cannot attain to the 'beatific vision' in this life. Only when his has left the body can it 'see' God. The rabbis contrast this verse with Isaiah's claim to have seen God (Isaiah 6: 1). They solve the contradiction by saying that Moses saw through a clear glass while Isaiah saw through an unclear glass. 's remarkable comment is that only one whose vision is dim can imagine that he has seen God. Moses, whose vision was clear, knew the truth that man cannot see God. In man's approach to God there is the paradox that the more he knows the less he knows, the more he sees the more he appreciates how little it is possible to see.

What sanctity has 'Megillat Chanucah' as it is not part of the Holy Writings ()?

Although the Scroll of Antiochus is quite ancient and is printed in a number of prayerbooks, it enjoys no sanctity whatever and is treated simply as an 10 • .?tsk the Rabbi' account of the events leading to the festival of Chanucah. There is a good article on the history of this unusual work in the 'EncyclopaediaJudaica', Vol. 14, pp. 1045-7.

In the Torah scrolls there are open and closed para­ graphs. What is the principle behind this and what is the 01eaning?

They are ancient divisions into longer and shorter paragraphs. It is important to realise that our present division of the Bible into chapters (e.g., Genesis, chapter 3; Numbers, chapter 1, verse six; II Kings, chapter 3) are not Jewish at all, but were adopted by Jews in the Middle Ages for the purpose of convenience when engaging in disputations with Christians. They are really Christian divisions.

I have been reading PsalDl 137, which I find intensely stiDlulating, apart fron1 the last paragraph, which appar­ endy underlines a barbaric type of vengeance. Does the PsalDlist envisage the destruction of innocent children in the context of vengeance and, if so, is this not contrary to our Dloral teachings?

Psalm 137, 'By the rivers of Babylon', is, as you remark, stimulating; it has inspired exiles everywhere to long for a return to their beloved country. But, indeed, the last paragraph seems strange: 'Happy shall be he that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the rock', following on the verse, '0 daughter of Babylon, that art to be destroyed; happy shall be he that repayeth thee as thou hast served us.' These verses, especially the one about dashing the infants against the rock, have been criticised by hostile students of the book of Psalms throughout the ages. What can be said in mitigation? First, the Psalmist, who had witnessed the Babylonians dashing Jewish infants against rocks, is not saying that he himself will do the same to Babylonian children. There is no question of that at all; according to Jewish law and, as you rightly say, all our moral teachings, to kill innocent children in vengeance is a horrible, unpardonable crime. The Psalmist, in a moment of intense anguish, is crying out to God against the sufferings of his people. He would be less than human if he failed to hurl such a terrible imprecation against the enemies of his people who had committed such atrocities. In the bitterness of his anguish, he allows himself to hope that a similar fate will befall the Babylonians. It is important to realise that this is a religious poem, not anything like a theological statement. If our objection is that even under the weight of his Bible • 11 pain and torture the Psalmist should not even have thought of such a thing, here are the remarks of a distinguished non-Jewish commentator, Alexander Maclaren (quoted in the Soncino edition of Psalms): 'Perhaps, if some of their modern critics had been under the yoke from which the Psalmist had been delivered, they would have understood a little better how a good man of that age could rejoice that Babylon was fallen and all its race extirpated.'

Why does the Tetragranunaton consist of just the four lettersyod, hey, vav, hey, or of the four num.bers 10, 5, 6, 5?Whynotanyotherfour (or more or less) letters? And why is this sequence of letters accorded such extra­ ordinary veneration in our faith?

First, the simple answer to your question, why just these letters, is that the name is connected with the Hebrew verb, hcryah, 'to be'. The Tetragrammaton, then, is the reference to God as Being, as He who Is, as the source of everything. That the letters also represent numbers is not found in the Bible. It is only in laterJewish teaching that significance is found in the numbers, as well as in the letters, of the divine name. Especially in the Cabala, there is a wealth of teaching on the Tetra­ grammaton. Here the special divine name is the means God uses in His creative activity, so that everything there is has come into being by one or other of the combinations, without number, of this name.

In the sidra (Leviticus 11 :42) the letter vav in the word gachon is written large because (we are told in the margin) it is the middle letter of the Pentateuch. How many letters does the Chum.ash contain?

The source for this subject is a passage in tractate Kiddushin (30a) of the Babylonian Talmud. Here it is stated that the ancients were called 'counters' (a pun on sojerim, scribes) because they counted all the letters of the Torah, in the process of which they discovered that the letter vav in the word gachon is the middle letter of the Torah. The continuation of the passage is germane to your question. The question is raised: Does this letter vav belong to the first half or to the second half of the Torah, i.e., perhaps the Torah has an even number of letters, so that the 'middle' letter really belongs either to the end of the first half or to the beginning of the second half? To this, in typical talmudic fashion, the question is put: Why not take a sefer Torah and count, as we know the earlier teachers did? The reply is that we do not know which words are to be written in full and which without the vowel 12 • .l4sk the Rabbi' letters, so that the letters in our sefer Torah may not be exactly the same as those in the original sefer Torah. It would seem from this passage that, for the reason given, we cannot any longer establish the exact number of letters, but we have to rely on the ancient tradition and that in the tradition it was known that the number was even, not odd. Nevertheless, the Masoretic note (the marginal note to which you refer) at the end of the Torah states that the number of letters in our sefer Torah is 600,805. Presumably, then, the letter vav is the middle letter, neither on this side nor on the other, since the number given is an odd number. Incidentally, the Jewish mystics say that there are some 600,000 letters in the sefer Torah (obviously giving a round number, not an exact one) and these correspond to the 600,000 who went out of Egypt. Each person is, as it were, a letter in the great sefer Torah that each generation writes for the glory of God.

What is the correct exegesis of Daniel 9:21-7 as an authentic prediction in view of the use JDade of this passage by Jews for Jesus to date the Messiah around 30CE?

The meaning of the passage and the date to which it refers are so vague that one cannot speak at all of a 'correct exegesis'. In the past, some Christian interpreters used a tortuous reckoning to make the supposed prophecy refer to Jesus as the Messiah, and the Jews for Jesus having naively followed in their wake. Nowadays, most educated Christians have given up entirely the whole attempt at discovering in Old Testament prophecy references to detailed events in the remote future. They hold that the Book of Daniel was compiled at a much later date than the historical Daniel, so that, when the book was written, the events referred to in the 'prophecy' had already taken place. To quote Peake's 'Commentary' (page 526d): 'It is usually held that the reckoning begins from the fall of Jerusalem; that the Prince Anointed is Zerubbabel, or more probablyJoshua the high priest, known from Haggai and Zechariah; and that the second Anointed One who is cut off is Onias the high priest, who was ousted from his position by his brother Jason soon after 17 5 and was killed three years later at the instigation of Menelaus, another pretender ... 'In any case, the total number of years, 490, does not fit in with the chronology now known to us; but this is not a reason for extending the period down into post-Maccabean times. The ending of the period is the most certain thing about it.' It is important for Jews to realise that the Jews for Jesus are simply repeat­ ing old Christian arguments which Christians themselves (with a few Bible • 13 fundamentalist exceptions) have abandoned. Modern Bible scholars no longer view biblical prophecy as a kind of Old Moore's Almanac, telling of things yet to happen. Jews for Jesus are living in a world of superstition and ignorance when they pathetically try to buttress their beliefs by appealing to the ancient :Jewish' sources.

How can capital punishm.ent be accepted as part of the Torah if the sixth commancbnent states quite categori­ cally 'Thou shalt not kill'? When God gave Moses the Ten CoDUDancbnents, there were no words added in brackets, such as 'Thou shalt not kill, but in the case of so and so it is permissible'.

The are in the nature of great general principles, but they require further elaboration if they are to serve - as they were intended - as guides to life. The second commandment, for example, forbids the making of a graven image, but the question arises as to the definition of this term. Would it include all sculpture or painting or photography? The eighth commandment is 'Thou shalt not steal', but what if the only way a man can regain something that is his is by 'stealing' it from the one who had taken it from him? The fourth commandment enjoins us to keep the Sabbath, but how does one 'keep' it and which types of work are permitted and which forbidden? This is why the term 'Torah' embraces the whole range ofJewish teaching, in which determined efforts are made by the sages of Israel to provide a detailed spelling out of the implications of the Ten Commandments and how these are to be applied. Seen in this way, the only way that makes sense is to turn not to the Ten Commandments when confronted with difficult ethical choices, but to their expansion in Jewish life and thought- in a word, to the Torah. There have beenJewish teachers who wished to abolish capital punishment entirely and it has, in fact, been abolished in the State of Israel. At the same time, there are other Jewish teachers who have argued that to abolish capital punishment for murder is to encourage the would-be murderer. The point is that while there are cogent arguments on both sides, each side believes that it is following the sixth commandment. Those who favour capital punishment argue, rightly or wrongly, that the sixth commandment is an injunction to stop murder, and if the exercise of capital punishment does deter murders, there are cases when the killing of the murderer is not only permitted, but is enjoined as part of the sixth commandment. An obvious illustration that the sixth commandment cannot be applied in all circumstances is the matter of self-defence. Surely it would be an intolerable teaching that we must allow ourselves to be slaughtered by men with designs 14 • 54sk the Rabbi' on our lives if the only way we can save ourselves is by slaying our would-be murderers. Even though there are no 'brackets' to this effect, most of us would not hold that the sixth commandment forbids the killing of animals for food or that artificial methods of contraception, by preventing life coming into existence, are acts of murder forbidden by the sixth commandment. This is why Judaism has resisted the notion that all God revealed to Moses was the Decalogue. There is even the account of the Talmud that the rabbis refused to countenance the practice of reciting the Ten Commandments daily together with the Shema because this might lead to the conclusion that only these were revealed by God. The Ten Commandments are, indeed, the basis of Judaism, but they are not the whole of Judaism. The rest of Judaism can be seen as a kind of commentary to them, but, in a way, commentary is more important than the text, since a text cannot be understood without commentary.

Maurice Sinlon's introduction to the Soncino Chwnash, edited by the late Rev. Dr A. Cohen, tells us that the 1nedieval Jewish coiDDlentators took soJDe of their JDaterial froJD non-:Jewish sources, yet I have known very Orthodox Jews today who will not even handle Chief Rabbi Hertz's Pentateuch and Haftorahs because he included non-Jewish coJDDlentaries. Why should they adopt this attitude?

Dr Hertz himself remarks, in his introduction, that he follows the advice of a distinguished medieval Jewish thinker who said: 'Accept the truth from whichever source it comes'. The truth is that, without modern non:Jewish scholarship on matters of archaeology and linguistics, it is not possible to appreciate to the full the meaning of the Bible. Dr Hertz did not, of course, swallow whole everything that non:Jewish scholars wrote. He was fully aware of anti:Jewish bias on the part of some of them, of what Schechter calls 'the Higher Antisemitism', and he certainly enjoys having a go at . He remarks that the Jewish character of his work is not affected by his use of non:Jewish writers and scholars. Very often, in his excellent commentary and notes, a comment from a learned non:Jewish scholar removes with ease a difficulty in the text. The Orthodox people to whom you refer, so far as I know, do not object to Hertz only because he quotes from non:Jewish sources, but also because his is a modern commentary in the best sense of the word, taking into account, for instance, that the theory of evolution might be correct and that the second part of the Book of Isaiah might not have been written by Isaiah. Bible • 15 The people to whom you refer share the prevalent attitude today (it was this attitude which objected so vehemently to Mendelssohn's 'Biur') that for a biblical exegete to be kosher, he must be an Orthodox rabbi and also with a mind closed to any new ideas and with no notion of historical development. Even when Hertz attacks the Higher Criticism and defends staunchly the Mosaic authorship of the whole of the Pentateuch, they fmd fault with him on the grounds that merely to raise the question is to put doubts in people's minds. I happen to fault Hertz for the opposite reason - that he is not sufficiently critical- but the fact remains that it is an excellent modern commentary and it is tragic that in some circles of heresy hunters it is in danger of being banned. One has only to compare Hertz with the beautifully produced, but very fundamentalistic, ArtScroll series to see how superior Hertz is. And note how traditional it is compared with the recently published Reform Commentary entitled 'The Torah'. Of the virtual ban on Hertz, one can only repeat the saying: where learning is equated with heresy, orthodoxy becomes equated with obscurantism.

In the sidra we are told that the Lord appeared to Moses and the seventy elders of Israel (Exodus 24:9-11). What are the rabbis' views of this incident and what legends have grown up around the event?

Most of the rabbinic comments are on the meaning of the verse which states that the elders 'beheld God, and did eat and drink' (verse 11 ). According to one line of interpretation, the elders sinned by satisfying their hunger and thirst at that awesome time. According to another interpretation, the meaning is that they were able to eat and drink, i.e., they were still alive even though a vision of God would normally have brought about their death: 'No man can see Me and live' (Exodus 33:20). Among the medieval mystics, the verse is quoted to convey the thought that it is possible for man to engage in the physical pursuits of the world and yet be so holy that his mind is on God even while 'eating and drinking'. Among the legends on the passage is one on the reference to 'the paved work of sapphire stone' (livnat hasappir, verse 10). This takes the word livnat as connected with levenah, 'a brick'. God saved His people and allowed the elders later to see the vision because He recalled all the hard bondage of the Israelites in Egypt when they had to toil in the brickfields. 16 • i4sk the Rabbi' This year, since there is no Shabbat chol ha.Jnoed, the book of Ecclesiastes (KoheDet) is read on SheminiAtzeret. There is a wealth of interpretations of this book, but could you refer to soDle less fanUiiar coDlDlents?

First, a comment by the seventeenth-century Italian rabbi, Leon de Modena. The first verse of the book reads: 'Vanity of vanity, saith Kohellet, vanity of vanity, all is vanity.' A midrashic comment has it that there are seven 'vanities' in the verse, corresponding to the seven ages of man. De Modena, on the other hand, read the verse as follows: 'Vanity of vanities' - it is true that there is much vanity and futility in human life - but 'vanity of vanities, all is vanity,' i.e., the greatest vanity of all is to say that 'all is vanity' and that all human existence is futile. In similar vein, another Midrash refers to the references in the book to the vanity of life 'under the sun'. This is read to mean that which in this world, 'under the sun', is all. But when a man can set his sights on heavenly things, on that which is 'above' the sun, that man's life is saved from futility. One version of the seven ages of man is, incidentally, very cynical, describing the infant as having the status of a king (because all his needs are anticipated) from which he deteriorates until he is like an ape in his old age. Why an ape? The Kotzker Rebbe replied: 'Because, instead of fmding new ways of serving God, he simply relies on his old habits of piety, copying, like an ape, the greater humanity that he had when he was young.' Another saying of the Kotzker on Kohellet: The preacher in the book says that he who increases knowledge, increases pain, upon which the Kotzker commented: 'Even though it does increase pain, it is still good to increase knowledge.' Again here is a psychological comment by the famous Polish rabbi, R. Joshua of Kutno. Chapter 3, verse 15 reads, in Rashi's rendering: 'And God seeks the man who is pursued', meaning that God is on the side of the persecuted. In that case, the Rabbi of Kutno observed, the verse should have said: 'And God helps the man who is pursued.' But the meaning is that it is not always clear, in complicated human situations, who is the real aggressor. It sometimes happens that an aggressor seeks to justifY his actions by claiming, incorrectly, that his intended victim has designs upon his life or his possessions. God is on the side of the persecuted, but He first 'seeks' to discover which of the two is the persecutor and which the persecuted. Finally, another midrashic comment on the verse, 'Yea also, when a fool walketh by the way, his understanding faileth him, and he saith to every one he is a fool' (chapter 10, verse 3). The Midrash understands the end of the sentence to mean that the fool thinks he is wise and everyone else is foolish - he says to every man he meets: 'You are a fool.' Bible • 17 The wise man, on the other hand, as we are told in Ethics of the Fathers, 'learns from every man' and thereby demonstrates that he is truly wise.

Does the tenth commandment- 'Thou shalt not covet' - ilnply that we m.ust never strive to better ourselves as others have done?

This is how Maimonides (Gezelah 1:9-11) formulates the rabbinic understanding of the tenth commandment. There are, in fact, two separate offences: 'Thou shalt not covet' and 'Thou shalt not desire' (Deuteronomy 5:18). To 'covet' is where person A, who takes a fancy to something owned by person B, brings pressure to bear on B so that he eventually sells it to him. To 'desire' is where A has only the intention of persuading B to sell it. In both these instances, there is no actual theft, since B has sold the desired object of his own , albeit under pressure. According to Maimonides, to covet and to desire are forbidden because they may easily lead to theft. If the Torah had permitted A to desire that which belonged to B, he would come to covet that object - that is, to take steps to acquire it. Then, since his desire for it was so strong, he would seek to obtain it by theft if he could not get it any other way. All this, of course, refers to something actually owned by B. The tenth commandment does not forbid A wishing to own something like that owned by B. As for luxuries, whether or not one should hanker after them is another matter, but that is a moral question that has nothing to do with the tenth commandment. The great nineteenth-century commentator, the Malbim (discussing Exodus 20:14), is somewhat imprecise when he understands the tenth commandment as forbidding a person to say 'I wish I were as rich as B' rather than 'I wish I had his riches'. Perhaps the Malbim means that while it is not wrong for a person to desire to be rich-provided, of course, that he intends to acquire riches by legitimate means - he should not have this desire out of envy of someone else's good fortune. Judaism, in other words, does not frown on personal ambition in itself; the scope of one's personal ambition is, however, governed not by law, but by what is seemly, decent and in accord with one's conscience. 18 • 'Ask the Rabbi' Is the Sixth Commandment correctly interpreted in English as 'Thou shalt not murder' or 'Thou shalt not kill'?

The famous twelfth-century biblical commentator, R. Samuel ben Meir, Rashbam, the grandson of Rashi, discusses this question and takes issue with the Latin translation of the Vulgate, which renders the Sixth Commandment as: Non occides ('Thou shalt not kill'), using the same Latin word when translating 'I put to death' (Deuteronomy 19:4) which it renders as Ego occidam. In fact, observes Rashbam, the Hebrew uses two different words, tirt;:;ah in the Sixth Commandment and amit in Deuteronomy. The strong term used in the Sixth Commandment denotes 'murder' not 'killing'. The difference is, of course, that while 'murder' is always and categorically forbidden there are instances when to 'kill' is not to offend against the Sixth Commandment, e.g., to kill in defence of one's life or in order to save the life of another who is being threatened by a murderer. Although capital punishment was eventually rejected injudaism, in biblical times it was practised and the court which inflicted it would not have been guilty of 'murder'. Again, if every act of killing were forbidden it would be wrong to abort a child in all circumstances, whereas the rabbis permit it in order to save the life of the mother. The Sixth Commandment does, however, embrace every form of murder. In a remarkable comment, attributed to a number of teachers, it is said that if a holy man has the power to kill another through his displeasure and he exercises it, he is as guilty of murder as the common murderer who slays another with a gun or a knife. It hardly needs saying that the Sixth Commandment includes murdering for political reasons.

lVhyistheSongofSongsreadinthesynagogueonPesach? lVhatis the connection between this book and the festival?

The earliest reference to the custom of reading the Song of Songs on Pesach is in tractate Soferim (14: 18), a post-talmudic work, but there the reference is to reading the book on the two evenings of the seder outside Eretz Yisrael. Isserles (, Orach Chaim 490:9) states that the Song of Songs is read in the synagogue on Chol Hamoed Pesach on the Sabbath, but if the Sabbath falls on the last day of Pesach it is read then. On the rare occasions when, as in this year, Sabbath falls on the seventh day of Pesach, it is read then. A number of reasons have been advanced for reading this book on Pesach. The obvious one is that Pesach is a spring festival and the book speaks of the spring awakening: 'For, lo, the winter is past, The rain is over and gone; The flowers appear on the earth; The time of singing is come' (Chapter 2, verses 11 and 12). Again on Pesach, the Song of Moses is read in the synagogue and this is an appropriate time for reading the Song of Songs. Bible • 19 Abudraham gives as the reason the reference to the .Exodus (Chapter 1, verse 9): 'I have compared thee, 0, my love, To a steed in Pharaoh's chariots.' It might seem odd to us to compare a maiden to a horse, but in ancient poetry it was not deemed to be so, Egyptian horses being symbolic of beauty and gracefulness. Incidentally, in the official rabbinic interpretation of the book, the beloved maiden is the Community of Israel and her lover God Himsel( This leads some of the later Cabalists to note that in the midrashic literature it is said that at the time of the crossing of the Red Sea, the Egyptian horses led their riders, pursuing the Children of Israel, into the sea, against all attempts of the riders to make the horses halt. The Cabalists understand the verse to mean that Israel is compared to Pharaoh's steeds because just as there the horse led the rider, so, too, Israel leads God, as it were. This is the typical and very bold Cabalistic doctrine that man's deeds have cosmic significance. When man is virtuous, he sends up on high sacred impulses and these produce harmony in the upper realms so that the divine grace can flow through all creation. The reuniting of lover and his beloved was understood as a reference to the Messianic age, when Israel will return to its land and be reunited with God, which is another reason for reading the book on Pesach, the twin ideas of Pesach being the redemption from Egypt in the past and the Messianic redemption in the future. Something might here be said about the history of the interpretation of this book. As we have noted, for the talmudic rabbis the book consists of a dialogue between God and the Community of Israel. But for the early Cabalists the 'Community of Israel' is not only the physical community of Jews on earth, but is the name given to the Shechinah, the Divine Presence, which yields the further extremely bold idea that until the Messianic age dawns, there is a kind of disharmony and breach in the Godhead which will be healed only when God and His Shechinah are united. Neither in the Talmud nor in the early Cabala is the book understood as a dialogue between the individual soul and God. But Maimonides does so interpret it, quoting the book as the statement of the soul's longing to be reunited with God. This interpretation is also found in Cordovero and other mystics in sixteenth-century Safed and it plays a prominent part in the Chasidic movement. 20 • 14sk the Rabbi' Further to recent state01ents in this colwnn, surely the Orthodox view that God really did order the indiscrinrl­ nate slaughter of 01en, wo01en and children (as in the story of Joshua and other biblical passages) is sheer blasphe01y? H revelation 01eans that every word in the Torah is divinely dictated, it would followfro01 the Torah, therefore, that was not priDlarily the work of Hitler, but was ordained by God, who incited hiD1 to carry it through.

In my earlier replies I gave, in fact, both views: the traditional (or Orthodox) one, as above, and the more reasonable one (to my mind) that the stories to which you refer are precisely that: narratives told centuries after the events they purport to describe by human beings who reflected on the history of their past. On this latter view, there is a human element, conditioned by time, in the Torah we have today, and the savage passages, bloodthirsty in the extreme, were never intended to be read as factual. Seen in this way, it is neither God nor His revelation that needs to be defended, only the human beings who, for all their remarkable insights, were children of their day who were not shocked by such savagery in fiction, especially in fiction related to a profound moral purpose. Such fiction acted as a warning to their own people that if they were to become corrupt like the Canaanites, they, too, would suffer God's displeasure and would be destroyed. In other words, for this and other reasons, the more liberal view of revelation is to be preferred to the fundamentalist view that every word of our present Torah was dictated by God. So far I agree with you. But I must try to defend the fundamentalist view against your attack. Even the who believes that God did, in the remote past, order the extermination of the Canaanites does not profess to understand how God can have ordered it. He certainly does not believe that such a mysterious command will ever be given again. He would say something like this: 'I do not know why God commanded His people to do this terrible thing, but, then, I do not know why God allows little children to die of cancer. 'My belief in God and His revelation in the Torah does not mean that I have no difficulties. It is often hard to believe in both of these, but it is even harder not to believe in them. 'My faith means for me that in this life I shall never understand, but I am confident that somehow it will ultimately make sense. The alternative is to hold that the universe is doomed to permanent silence and tragedy, that God does not speak to man, and this seems to me to be the most heartless philosophy of all. 'This I do know: that my tradition has taught me to regard commands like "Love thy neighbour" as binding for all time, whereas there is not the slightest Bible • 21 trace in that tradition of the monstrous suggestion that God will ever again order any people to commit genocide.' You write that it follows that the Holocaust was not primarily the work of Hitler, but of God. It does not follow at all. On the contrary, the Torah (which, rightly understood, is the Bible interpreted by the sages of Israel) teaches that to murder a single human being is, as our rabbis declare, to destroy a whole world.

What are the reasons for the choice of Ezekiel, chapter one, as the haftara for the first day of Shavuot, and Habakkuk, chapter three, as the haftara for the second day? And why is the book of Ruth read on Shavuot?

Shavuot is the festival on which is celebrated the giving of the Torah, and the Torah reading on the first day describes the revelation at Sinai. This revelation was to the whole people assembled at the foot of the mountain. Ezekiel, chapter one, describes the vision of the divine chariot seen by the prophet in Exile. This, too, was a divine revelation, albeit of a lesser degree than that at Sinai; hence the aptness of the choice of this chapter. The vision of Ezekiel became in the Jewish tradition maasek merkava (~ccount of the Chariot'), the source of the mystical teachings regarding providence and the divine nature, which is why its study in depth was limited to the initiates, and hence the ruling today that this haftara should be recited only by a learned pious man of mature years. The Habakkuk chapter is also a description of a theophany, this time in the future, which provides the link with Shavuot. In addition, verse three - 'God cometh from Temen, and the Holy One from mount Paran' - is inter­ preted, in the well-known Midrash, to mean that God came to Sinai from these places after having offered the Torah to the nations of the world, who refused it, while Israel accepted it in love; a midrashic way of saying that God chose Israel because Israel chose God. A number of reasons have been advanced for the reading of the book of Ruth on ShaVU:ot. One of these is because, as tradition has it, King David, descended from Ruth, died on Shavuot. Lest it be thought inappropriate to mark the anniversary of a death on a festival, the further subtle twist is given that God allows the greatest of the saints to die on their birthday, so that Shavuot is the anniversary of David's birth. The reasons for reading the book at this time are that the book tells of Ruth and Naomi's sufferings and, similarly, the way to Torah is hard, and that Shavuot is also a harvest festival and the harvest period forms the background of the book. Yet again, Ruth is the prototype of the sincere proselyte, willingly accepting the 'yoke of the Torah' just as the people did at Sinai. 22 • 54sk the Rabbi' The theme of conversion to Judaism as being a kind of re-enactment of the events at Sinai for the individual who wishes to embrace the Jewish faith is found frequently in . For instance, the reason given in the Talmud for the need for a prospective convert toJudaism to undergo immersion is that our ancestors at Sinai immersed themselves in preparation for the tremendous event.

What is hnplied by karet ('extirpation')? In his com.­ m.entary to Genesis chapter 17, verse 14, Rashi says 'he goes barren and dies before his tUne'. Other com.m.en­ tators give different explanations. Is there a com.m.on factor in the 36 different sins for which karet is the punishm.ent? What is the difference between karet and 'death at the hands of Heaven'?

In tractate Katan (28a) karet is stated to be death at the age of 50 while the other - 'death at the hands of Heaven' - is stated to be death at the age of 60. But there are other opinions. As you remark, Rashi understands karet as including barrenness or the death of the sinner's minor children (see Rashi to 30b). There are other interpretations as well, including that of some non:Jewish commentators (as you say in your letter which I have abbreviated) who understand the punishment not as a Heavenly visitation but as exclusion from the community. As for the common factor in the 36 different sins for which karet is the punishment ( Keritut 1: 1) no mention is made of such explicitly in the Talmud but it would seem to be that they are all severe offences but not so severe as to deserve capital punishment.

In a recent reply to a difficulty in the Bible, you replied that the passage was not intended to be taken literally. But is not this too easy a way out, and if it is taken, how does one distinguish between the parts that are m.ere stories and the parts that do have to be taken literally?

There is a two-fold test or method of discrimination. The first is whether the passage in question has been understood literally in the Jewish tradition. The second is whether the passage itself indicates that it is not to be taken literally (I admit that this latter is subjective, but then our own taste and common sense are all that we have in judging any matter). For instance, a rabbi in the Talmud held thatJob was a fictitious character and the book is a story, but one with a high moral and religious purpose. In support, he quoted the story of the ewe lamb the prophet Nathan told King David in order to rebuke him for his sin. The other rabbis disagreed on the grounds that ifJob were not a real person Bible • 23 and the book was fiction, why was it necessary for us to be givenjob's place of residence. These rabbis also agree that theNa than story is a parable, so that the debate about job is really about what kind of literature it is. On this there can be more than one opinion. Obviously, there are many biblical passages where it is difficult to decide whether they are parables (and none the worse for that) or were intended to be read as statements of historical fact. Here is where the test from theJewish tradition comes in. Maimonides, and many other distinguished Jewish thinkers, hold that practically all the statements in the Bible about God's nature are metaphors. God is not really 'angry', nor does He really 'smell the sweet savour' of the sacrifices. How did Maimonides and the others know this? Surely because to think of God in human terms- that He is really like an 'old man in the sky'- is to have a very inferior concept of the Deity, one that is at variance with the whole of the tradition. In the example I gave, which you take me up on, the tradition states (in the rabbinic literature) that the verse in the Decalogue about visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children must have been intended to be limited in its application. For one thing, there are verses in the Bible which say the exact opposite - that He does not punish children for the sins of their parents; and for another, how could such a doctrine be squared with the idea so prominent in all Jewish teaching that God is the just Ruler who expects man to imitate Him in being just and pursuing justice? The whole point here is that the Bible, like any other text but even more so, requires interpretation. There is a wonderful tradition in Judaism of interpretation and re­ interpretation, by means of which the original texts are always made fruitful in Jewish life. One of the best-known examples in the Talmud is the interpretation of 'an eye for an eye' in terms of monetary compensation instead of actual physical IDJUry. Another is when a rabbi says that the law in Deuteronomy that the stubborn and rebellious son has to be stoned to death was intended only as a dire warning against the possibilities of character corruption and the law was never actually carried out, and, indeed, was never intended to be a law to be applied. This is why we have a sound method of dealing with new problems presented to us by contemporary thought. Or, as I believe I said in my earlier reply, if you want to take the Bible seriously, you must not take it literally. 24 • J.tsk the Rabbi' What is the basic idea of the Lord's conunandlnent to Moses of IDaking a IDetal snake to be put on a pole so that anyone bitten by a poisonous snake could look at it and be healed? And what is the Jewish response to the Christian claiJD of coiDparing this bronze snake to the elevation of Jesus (John 3:14)?

In reply to your second question, the Jewish response to the claim (if it is a claim: it seems rather to be a simple comparison, but this is not of any concern to Jews) is to reject it. In reply to your first question, I can do no better than refer you to two famous talmudic passages. In the first (Rosh Hashana, Mishnah 3:8) it is said: 'Did the metal snake have powers over life and death? But [the meaning of the narrative is] when Israel's gaze was turned on high and their hearts subjected to their Father in Heaven [i.e., this was the symbol of the snake lifted heavenwards] they were healed; otherwise they perished.' Thus the narrative is interpreted to mean that Moses showed the people who were bitten that the poisonous snakes were sent by God for their sins and if they will repent, God will heal them. The second passage (Chullin 6b-7 a) refers to the narrative in the Second Book of Kings (18:4) in which it said that King Hezekiah broke in pieces the bronze snake which Moses had made because people had begun to worship it. The Talmud comments on this that Hezekiah's ancestors left room for him to distinguish himself thereby, i.e., it was a bold thing to destroy something made by Moses at the command of God, but when Hezekiah saw that it was leading the people to idolatrous worship, he took his courage in his hands and destroyed it, seeing this as what God would have him do in the new circumstances.

Reading your recent conunents onJoshua, I was shocked by your observation that the savage passages contain actions 'never to be eiDulated'. Could it not be said that, in not following God's exaiDple in these respects, we are displaying IDore wisdoJD than our own Creator?

Your letter is far too lengthy to be quoted in full, but the above is, I think, a summary of your objections. May I repeat that there are two ways of looking at these very puzzling passages. One, the way I prefer, is to read them as fiction, a reflection on their ancient history by our ancestors, who saw the hand of God even in their savage past; leading them to treat these events as a special command of God with the implications that they were never to be emulated. The other way is to treat the passages as the very word of God, so that there really was a divine command to exterminate the Canaanites. Bible • 25 It is hard for me to defend such a view, which I cannot share, but I did say that, even according to those who hold this view, the events are never to be repeated, in obedience to the same wisdom of the Creator, by which the command was originally given, for reasons of which we can now only obtain a glimmer of understanding. The important point to be noted, whichever way of reading the stories is adopted, is thatJudaism has never read them as commands to its adherents to engage in genocide. Obviously, Judaism sets its face against murder of any human being and refuses to believe that God will ever issue a command to slaughter people. Jews have been taught by their religion that the Sixth Commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill', contains the wisdom of the Creator for all time and in all circumstances, whereas the savage passages were never understood as displaying this wisdom; rather are they mysterious and only evidence of that wisdom if they are understood in a non-literal fashion. There are, for instance, rabbinic midrashim which deny that any of the Canaanites were ever slaughtered unless they were frrst given the opportunity either to be converted to the true monotheistic faith, which condemns their murderous practices, or leave the Holy Land, so that it was free from such abominable acts. It must not be forgotten that one of the main reasons why humanity went beyond the stage of child sacrifices to bloodthirsty deities is that the inspiration of the whole Bible, including these terrible warnings, has made itself felt. But I have to repeat that people who see it as I do are not bothered by Joshua's campaigns because they acknowledge that there is a higher and lower in the Bible. If there is the 'command' to exterminate the Canaanites, there is more significantly the command to love thy neighbour and the Sixth Command­ ment. It all depends on how one reads the Bible - that savage book in parts that has, nonetheless, redeemed us from savagery.

In view of the fact that the deity is regarded as omni­ present, did Elijah's 'still, sn1all voice' eDlanate froDl within hUnself, and was it akin to the voice of conscience?

Although the term 'the still, small voice of conscience' is frequently used in English, suggesting, as you say, that Elijah 'heard' the voice from within his own psyche, this cannot possibly be the plain meaning of the narrative, since the still, small voice is here contrasted with the strong wind, the earthquake and the fire which Elijah saw and heard. It is, however, possible that, as some of the Jewish commentators explain (see Malbim to the verse), the whole episode took place in a prophetic vision, i.e., Elijah 'saw' and 'heard' all these manifestations not as objective, physical phenomena, but in the recesses of his own soul. 26 • 54sk the Rabbi' This ties up with the question, widely discussed by the medieval Jewish thinkers, whether all the biblical references to God 'speaking' are to an actual voice created for that purpose (since God has no vocal organs), or to some other form of mysterious communication between God and man through the psyche of the prophet.

Since it is recorded that beams of light shone fro01Moses' face, and that Moses was put in the position of the deity in respect to Pharaoh, is it possible to conclude that Moses was in so01e way regarded as an 'avator', a person in who01 the deity is 01ore apparent than in the ordinary hUDlan being?

A good deal depends on what you mean by 'more apparent'. In every version ofJewish thought, Moses is a human being, born of human parents and with his quota of human faults. No human being, and this includes Moses, is ever an object of worship inJudaism. Historically considered, attitudes towards the character of Moses varied, partly, at least, in response to the particular challenges provided to Judaism by rival religions and philosophies. For instance, in a Christian environment there is generally to be discerned amongJewish thinkers a marked attempt at playing down, as it were, the exclusive significance of Moses. The rabbis refer to Moses as Moshe Rabbenu, 'Moses, our Teacher', so that Moses is no more and no less than a great human teacher, although he is the recipient of God's word. It has been noted that while none of the Talmudic rabbis were actually named Moses, some of them were called 'Moses' by their colleagues, evidently to suggest that the rabbis had something in them of Moses' character and were the heirs to his teachings and continued his work. On the other hand, in Islamic lands there is a tendency to speak of Moses as 'The Prophet', much as Mohammed is spoken of in Islam as 'The Prophet'. This, in all probability, explains why Maimonides sees fit to record it as an essential Jewish belief that there will never arise a greater prophet than Moses. In other words, in an environment where there existed a danger of something like a doctrine of incarnation entering into Judaism, the frailty of Moses was stressed, while in a different environment, when the danger lay in the denigration of Moses compared with other religious leaders, Moses' uniqueness as the man of God was stressed. Bible • 27 I have read that one of the ways the sages interpreted the Torah is known by the tenn 'ren1ez'. I have seen this word translated as 'inference' or 'allusion', but with no explana­ tion of how the n1ethod was used. Can you clarify this n1ethod of exegesis?

The word remez means 'hint' and the meaning of the term as applied to exegesis of the Bible was originally what we call the allegorical method. For instance, when the biblical characters are said to represent this or that feature of human nature, it is the method of remez that is being used. It is called a 'hint' because the idea read out of the text, or into it, is not the plain meaning, so that one can only say that the idea is hinted at there. Later on, remez also came to mean the kind of interpretation in which one word of the text is said to hint at another, by means of numerical value (gematria) for example. The other three methods used in the Middle Ages are peshat, the 'plain meaning', derash, the homiletical or sermonic meaning; and sod, the secret meaning, later the Cabalistic meaning. The initial letters of the four methods make up the word , itself an example of remez.

We are told that the Oral Law was part of the Revelation at Sinai. If so, I 8.111 puzzled as to why the EthiopianJews appear to have little or no knowledge of it. What histori­ cal inforn1ation do we have about the transD1ission of the Oral Law prior to the co01pilation of the Mishna?

In modern times there has been tremendous scholarly activity on the very questions you raise. To refer to only one well-known study, Professor Baer wrote a monograph on what he called 'The Historical Foundations of the Halacha', that is, of the Oral Law. Historically understood, the whole doctrine of the Oral Law means a good deal more than a static transmission of a number of propositions from generation to generation reaching back to Sinai. It also means that new laws and institutions were developed by the later Jewish teachers. These were held to be part of the Oral Law because, while not explicitly stated at Sinai, they were implicit in the whole process of Torah. In addition to the Ethiopian Jews, there were a number of sects for whom there was little knowledge of the Oral Law. The Karaites, for example, rejected the whole doctrine, as did the Sadducees at an earlier period. These facts certainly militate against an understanding of the Oral Law in terms of direct transmission, but not of that understanding of the doctrine which sees development in response to outside conditions and challenges to be itself part of the Oral Torah. 28 • 54sk the Rabbi) For this reason it would be correct to say that, whenever difficult decisions have to be made (and are made) in Jewish Law, such as on the status of the EthiopianJews, the Oral Law is not only being discovered, but is being created. The response to the new situation is new in that it had never previously been expressed. It is yet old and part of the Oral Torah because it is the way in which the Written Torah becomes fruitful in the actual lives of Jews.

Did the Patriarchs have a calendar, or was it first given to Moses?

The Patriarchs must have had a calendar, but the presentJewish calendar is attributed to Moses. This must be so since the months are counted from the Exodus which, of course, took place in the days of Moses (Exodus 12:2). TheJewish calendar is a lunar one; the Hebrew word for 'month' is chodesh, which refers to renewal of the moon. Since, however, Passover must fall in the time of Aviv ('spring', see Deuteronomy 16: 1), the lunar calendar is made to coincide with the solar by introducing, from time to time, an additional month in a leap year. This is a very brief statement of a subtle and intricate process. For further details you should consult the encyclopaedias and other general works on the Jewish religion.

An article referred to the first five of the Ten Co:tn­ :tnand:tnents as duties between :tnan and God and the second five between :tnan and his neighbour. But surely 'Honour thy father and thy :tnother', the fifth coD1:111and:tnent, is between :tnan and his neighbour? And I a:tn puzzled by the first coD1:111and:tnent: 'I a:tn the Lord thy God'. This see:tns to be not so :tnuch a coD1:111and:tnent as a state:tnent.

The fifth commandment is, in reality, more of a religious than an ethical obligation. That is to say, 'love thy neighbour' obviously applies to parents; our fathers and mothers are also our 'neighbours'. But that is covered by 'Love thy neighbour', which, incidentally, is not one of the Ten Commandments, important though it is. The extra obligation to 'honour' parents may have to do with the fact that, as the rabbis say, parents are partners with God in the creation of human life. (This may be one of the reasons why 'length of days' is promised to those who obey the fifth commandment.) To honour those who gave one life is to affirm that life is supremely worthwhile as a gift from God and the opportunity to serve Him. Bible • 29 From all this it is not too difficult to see why some of our sages, at least, counted the fifth commandment as one between man and God like the first four. The third commandment, too, is between man and God since, over and above the harm to one's neighbour when a false oath is taken in a court of law, there is the offence of taking God's name in vain. In fact, the later halachists debate whether the fifth commandment belongs in the category of between man and God or between man and his neighbour. If the former, some of them ask, why can a father renounce the honour his son is obliged to give? How can a parent give away that which is not his to give away? There is not too much difficulty in this. Even if the commandment is one between man and God, once the father renounces the honours due to him, the Godward dimension ceases to exist, since what God wants, as it were, is for honour to be paid only to the parent who wants it. With regard to your second question, the expression found in the Jewish sources for the Decalogue is not the ten commandments but the ten words (aseret hadibberot), so that the frrst word, as N achmanides argues, is in the nature of an introductory statement. On this view, 'I am the Lord thy God' means 'and consequently you must keep My commandments.' Maimonides, on the other hand, in his list of mitzvot, does count the frrst word as a mitzva, that is, as a commandment. Critics of Maimonides' formulation raise the obvious objection: how can the frrst word be a command to believe in Him, as Maimonides puts it, since if one already believes in God no command is necessary; and if one does not, then one does not believe that there is this (or any other) command. Maimonides was too good a master of logic (he wrote his treatise on logic at the age of 16) not to be aware of the difficulty. Perhaps by a mitzva he means that, after one has attained to frrm conviction that God is and the commands come from Him, one has fulfilled a mitzva. A number of medieval Jewish thinkers similarly understand the fust word as a command to contemplate the marvellous universe in which we live, so that faith in the Creator becomes so strong and irresistible that doubt is no longer possible. Others understand the frrst word not as a command to believe in God, but to believe that it is God who controls the universe, which is why 'I am the Lord thy God' is followed by 'who brought thee out of the land of Egypt'. 30 • 54sk the Rabbi' A passage in the Talmud states that HaDlan, Mordechai and Esther are hinted at in the Torah. How can this be, since they lived long after the Torah was given?

The passage to which you refer is in tractate Chullin, 139b, which states: 'Where is there a hint (remez) to Haman in the Torah? In the verse: "Is it (hamin) from the tree?" (Genesis 3:11). 'Where is there a hint to Esther in the Torah? In the verse: ''And I will surely hide (astir) my face (Deuteronomy 31: 18). 'Where is there a hint to Mordechai in the Torah? In the verse: "Flowing myrrh" (Exodus 30:23, morderorin Hebrew), which the renders as mira dakia' (a play on the name Mordechai). What we have here is a series of clever puns on the names of the much later biblical characters. Thus when in the Genesis narrative, God asks Adam: 'Is it from the tree (hamin ha'etz) that you have eaten?', the word hamin is read as Haman, who was hanged on a tree (Esther 7: 10). The name of Esther is hinted at in the verse which speaks of God hiding his face (astir, 'I will hide'); while the name of Mordechai resembles mor deror (the flowing myrrh used as an ingredient in the anointing oil) and, more especially, the Aramaic rendering of the Targum- mira dakia. It is plausible to suggest that there is a closer association than mere punning. It may well be that the Talmud is saying: Haman met his fitting retribution on the tree because the evil he sought to perpetrate goes back ultimately to Adam's sin of eating from the tree. (Incidentally, it is far too glib to assert, as is often done, thatJudaism knows nothing of the effect of Adam's sin on his descendants.) Similarly, the story of Esther, the heroine who saved her people when all seemed lost, is an example of how God intervenes to save His people even when His face is otherwise hidden - that is, in times when divine Providence is not at all in evidence. Mordechai, who rose to power, was, in a sense, 'anointed', so that it is right for his name to be associated with the anointing oil. Whether or not this is the meaning of the passage, what it cannot mean (to turn to your question) is that the Torah referred to the actual characters Haman, Esther and Mordechai, who were to live long after the Torah period. Although we fmd here and there in the Talmud statements which speak of early biblical characters prophesying events that were to occur centuries later, these - and our passage - cannot be understood literally as foretelling the future in detail. If the Torah or the prophets were to foretell in detail the deeds of people yet to be born, this would have the effect of depriving those people of the freedom to choose. The whole ofJudaism is based on the doctrine that human beings have freedom of choice, at least within certain limits. If, for example, the details of the event had been foretold in the Torah - that Haman would one day arise to seek to destroy the Jews, and Bible • 31 Mordechai and Esther would frustrate his evil designs - then Raman would have been obliged to do what he did. Mordechai and Esther, too, would have been similarly obliged to do what they did without having any choice in the matter, since it had all been decreed by God in the Torah. Raman would then have deserved no punishment, and Mordechai and Esther no credit. This is very different from the old problem of how God's fore-knowledge can be reconciled with human freedom, for there, as Maimonides says, it is the mysterious divine knowledge that is being discussed, and that is utterly beyond human comprehension. Here, however, if the Torah had communicated the knowledge of later events in detail to humans - and that would be implied by its being contained in the Torah read by human beings - it is impossible to see how human knowledge of future events can be anything than completely determinative. InJudaism, neither the biblical characters nor anyone else are manipulated from behind like puppets, but are freely choosing human beings who, under the guidance of God, are expected to work out their own destinies.

Why does the word 'Selah' have to be pronounced if it m.erely indicates a pause in a sentence? Is there any deeper m.eaning to the word?

No one really knows the significance of 'Selah'. It may suggest, as you say, a pause, or it may be an instruction to the musicians or the singers to raise or lower their voices. Generally, in rabbinic tradition, the word is associated with the word ~en' and is given the meaning of strong affrrmation and of 'for ever'. In other words, whatever the original meaning of the term and even if it were not originally part of the text, it has for some 2,000 years been considered part of the text.

What is the m.eaning and significance of the shew-bread?

On the golden table in the in the wilderness, and later on in the Temple, twelve loaves of bread had to be placed week by week. This is stated, among other places, in the verse: ~d thou shalt set upon the table lechem ha­ panim before Me always' (Exodus 25:30). What is the meaning of the Hebrew? We know that lechem means 'bread', but ha-panim means 'the face', so that a literal translation is 'bread of the face'. Some modern commentators suggest that the reference is to the 'face' of God and translate it as 'bread of the Presence'. Another suggestion is that it means bread, the face, i.e., the surface, of which is seen, hence the new Jewish translation 'display bread'. The translation, 'shew-bread', is given in the Authorised Version and seems 32 • 54sk the Rabbi' to go back to Tyndale. 'Shew-bread' is the older English form of 'show-bread'. The meaning is probably, according to this translation, 'bread that is shown'. There is a rabbinic statement to the effect that the bread miraculously kept its freshness throughout the week, so that the priests 'showed' it to demonstrate the miracle. The shew-bread, the lechem ha-panim, was placed on the golden table and was eventually eaten by the priests. Some have seen the injunction for it to be eaten by the priests to be so as to reject entirely the absurd notion that God requires bread (the worship of the pagan gods did frequently involve the provision of bread in their temples).

While I can unquestioningly accept as true all the events in the Bible, I frequently find it difficult to believe many midrashic stories. Do I thereby show a lack of faith?

It is important to appreciate that many of the midrashic stories are 'stories'. They are fictitious and were never intended to be treated as factual. For instance, all the stories about patriarchs are much more in the nature of preachments for the times of the rabbis than attempts at describing the history of patriarchal times. Abraham Ibn Ezra, in his introduction to his commentary on the Torah, states explicitly that one cannot possibly take literally many of the midrashic sayings. He cites, for example, the midrashic comment that the Torah was created 2,000 years before the creation of the world. How can there have been 2,000 years before the creation of the world? The meaning is, according to Ibn Ezra, that the Torah precedes the world in the sense that it is the Torah that is the purpose of creation. I would advise you to read Chapter 14 of Krochmal's 'More Nevukhey ha­ Zeman' and the lengthy discussion in Zevi Hirsch Chajes' 'The Student's Guide Through the Talmud'. Faith is not credulity and you are certainly not called on in the name of faith to 'believe' all the midrashic stories. I would be less than honest if I did not point out that many great Jewish thinkers have refused to take even many of the biblical stories literally. Maimonides, for example, holds that whenever the Bible speaks of angels appearing to humans, it means in a dream. It is well known that Gersonides understands the sun standing still for Joshua to mean that the battle was over and the victory so swift that it seemed as if the sun had not moved at all- and this in spite of the fact that the rabbinic Midrash does take the story literally. Similarly, Samuel ben Hophni Gaon refuses to understand the Witch of Endor narrative to mean that the witch actually brought up Samuel from the dead by her magical powers. All she did was to hypnotise Saul into imagining that Samuel had appeared. On the question of stories in the Talmud and Midrash regarding historical Bible • 33 events, Azariah de Rossi (in the sixteenth century) argued that the rabbis were not infallible in their accounts of these events. He gives the illustration of the rabbinic account that Titus died as a result of a tiny insect entering his nostrils and growing in his head until it killed him. Relying on Roman chronicles, de Rossi declares that this did not happen. An interesting interpretation given later is that the rabbis were expressing poetically the idea that Titus' small still voice of conscience, exceedingly weak at first, bothered him more and more, as he reflected on the terrible deed he had done by destroying the Temple, until he was unable to live with it. It is certainly true that some of the great rabbis of the day wished to ban de Rossi's book and the Maharal of Prague wrote a work against what he considered to be de Rossi's heresies; yet, nowadays, most Orthodox scholars seem to accept de Rossi's argument and do not see it as in any way detrimental to faith.

1979 presents no problem.s in ter1ns of years. How does the rationaliDind arrive at 5739? Is it a breach of the din to question its beginning and is blind faith a sine qua non of Judais~n?

Presumably, you are raising the hoary question of the vast age of the earth as depicted through scientific investigation and the chronology based on the biblical records, according to which the world is less than 6,000 years old, 57 39 being the count from the creation of the world. First, it must be said that no question of the din is here involved. The custom of dating documents, etc., from the creation is medieval and is purely a matter of convenience, neither law nor dogma being involved. Read Dr Hertz's note on Genesis in his commentary to the Pentateuch and you might also care to consult the famous statement of the great nineteenth-century teacher, Rabbi Israel Lipschtitz ('Tiferet Yisrael' on tractate Sanhedrin) in which this author, of unimpeachable Orthodoxy, accepts the fmdings of geology and so forth and argues, on the basis of certain talmudic passages, that there were 'creations' of other 'worlds' before this one was created. Many would go beyond Dr Hertz and Rabbi Lipschtitz to argue that the biblical accounts have to be read against the background knowledge of their time. It was possible, of course, for God in some miraculous manner to communicate to the inspired authors of the biblical books knowledge regarding the actual age of the earth, but He did not choose to do so any more than He chose, for example, to let them speak of an automobile causing injuries, instead of a goring ox. The biblical record has been described as 'eternity expressing itself in time'. The message is eternal, but since it was conveyed through human beings at a particular point or points in time, there was no way in which this tremendous 34 • ~sk the Rabbi' thing could have been achieved accept by the use of both the language and the thought patterns of a particular age or ages. Very many OrthodoxJews do not take literally the date 5739 from the creation, though, to be sure some do. These latter seem to argue that God placed the fossils there to give the appearance of extreme antiquity. This is not quite so ridiculous as it appears to be at first glance. The argument (which I do not share) is that just as Adam was born presumably with a navel, and trees with rings (otherwise Adam would not have been human and trees would not have been trees), the earth itself had to have the appearance of a very lengthy process of evolution. Blind faith is certainly not a sine qua non of Judaism.

I have been reading the Book of Daniel and would like to know how angels and archangels are dealt with in post­ biblical literature.

There are numerous references to various classes of angels in the talmudic literature, in the Cabala and in the prayer-book. The Talmud remarks that the Jews brought with them the names of the angels (e.g., Michael, ) from Babylon, an early recognition that it was only in the later period, possibly under foreign influences, that particular angels were identified by name. In the earlier passages of the Bible, the angels appear as mysterious beings who have no name. In medieval Jewish thought there is a whole line of interpretation, represented particularly by Maimonides, according to which angels are spiritual forces used by God for the fulfilment of His purposes. The higher the degree of these forces, the less accessible they are to man, but even the lowest of the angels, called 'men' because of their accessibility to humans, have no physical form, which leads Maimonides to the radical conclusion that wherever Scripture speaks of men 'seeing' angels, it means in a dream. In the , similarly, the angels are spiritual forces, but according to the Zohar men can see angels with the physical eye; for this to happen, however, the angels must take on the garments of the world, i.e., assume something resembling a human form. In a remarkable book by the late Rabbi Reuben Margaliot, called 'Malachey Elyon' (1\ngels of the Most High'), there is a complete list of all the angels mentioned in the talmudic and midrashic literature. It is not too difficult to see many of the passages about angels as a poetic way of stating that God helps us with powers that come direcdy from Him. Thus, in the well-known prayer, 'Let Michael be at my right hand, Gabriel at my left hand, Raphael behind me and Uriel before me, and over my head God's Presence', the meaning is that Michael, the angel of mercy, is on man's right hand, the stronger hand; Gabriel ('The Power of God') gives strength to man's weaker nature; Raphael ('God is Healer') is behind man to help heal his Bible • 35 mistakes after he has made them; and Uriel ('Light of God') illuminates his path in front. Whether or not angels are understood as real identifiable beings, the general attitude among the Jewish teachers is that man is superior to the angels in that he has freedom of choice. The Seraphim, say the rabbis, only pronounce the divine name after three words- 'Holy, holy, holy' -whereas Israel pronounces it after two - Shema Tisrael. These are just one or two ideas found in the post-biblical sources regarding the angelic beings. It would be a disservice to Judaism if, in the name of a supposed rationalism, we tried to get rid of references to the angels in our prayers since there has to be poetry as well as prose in prayer, and the prayers are not to the angels, but to the Creator of all. 2 Theology

What is the definition of the word shechina?

The word shechina is from a root meaning 'to dwell'. It is used for the indwelling presence of God, as when the rabbis say that wherever the Jewish people goes into exile, the shechina goes with them; or when they say that at the completion of the building of the Tabernacle, Moses blessed the people: 'May the shechina rest upon the work of your hands.' In one sometimes says of a man with a beautiful spiritual face that the shechina rests on his face. In other words, the term shechina is used whenever it is desired to say something about God's relationship to the world in general and to human beings in particular. The late Dr Joshua Abelson, of Leeds, many years ago published a book listing all the main references to the shechina in the rabbinic literature - 'The Immanence of God in Rabbinic Literature'. In it Abelson tries to show that the meaning of the shechina is that God is immanent as well as transcendent, though the ancient rabbis prefer the more concrete metaphor to abstract ideas such as transcendence and immanence.

Is it possible to be a Jewish atheist or is it preswnptuous to call oneself a Jew and an atheist?

I don't know about presumptuous, but it is certainly incorrect by any proper understanding of traditionalJudaism. Is not the Shema the cornerstone of the Jewish faith? The whole ofJewish teaching centres on belief in God. As Chesterton rightly says, God is not the main character in the Bible; He is the only character. Indeed, in biblical times, theoretical atheism seems to have been completely unknown. The 'fool' in the Book of Psalms who says in his heart 'There is no God' does not deny the existence of God. As is clear from the context, what he denies is that God is concerned with the way men conduct themselves on earth. It is true that, in modern times, one does come uponJews who love the Jewish way of life, but have no religious feelings or beliefs. Far be it from anyone to say to those who do not believe in God that they should cease to be Jews. Belief is often catching and, in any event, the Jewish way of life is good in itsel£ But there can be no doubt that a secular Judaism is a distortion of the Jewish faith as taught and followed throughout the ages. AJew was once approached to make up a . Told that he was an Theology • 37

atheist, the rabbi exclaimed: ~d if he's an atheist, doesn't he still have to daven mincha?'

IfJews do not recognise the Christian notion of Hell, what punishment is supposed to await the evil-doer in the next world?

The 'Christian notion of Hell' was, in fact, taken over fromJudaism, albeit, perhaps, with some additional Christian 'refinements' with regard to the tortures meted out there to the wicked. But we cannot afford to be superior. The torments of Hell (Gehinnom) are described just as fiercely in some Jewish sources as in Christian and the revulsion which set in against the whole notion was certainly not limited to Jews. ManyJews have given up the idea of Hell entirely but others have preferred to understand it in spiritual terms, i.e. Hell is not a place but a state of the soul which endures terrible anguish at the loss of God until it is eventually re-admitted, as it were, into His presence. There is a rabbinic teaching that the wicked are punished in Hell for twelve months, which is the reason, incidentally, why kaddish is only recited for eleven months after the death of the parent; to recite the kaddish for a full twelve months is to imply that the parent is wicked and is still in Hell. Maimonides seems to equate Hell not with actual torment but with total annihilation of the thoroughly wicked soul. The reaction against the crudities of the doctrine ought not to encourage us to go to the opposite extreme to deny that the wicked ever suffer for their sins. A religious outlook in which evil men must get off scot free because God is good is sheer sentimentality. Even eternal punishment in Hell is not unknown in some Jewish sources, in Saadia Gaon, for example, who argues that this dire threat is due to God's mercy in that it helps to keep men on the right path. Here most of us will fmd it preferable to believe that God's mercy is exercised in refusing to reject for all eternity even the most depraved of men.

At what IDOJDent does a soul enter the body?

There is a good deal of speculation on this question in the classical Jewish sources. For instance, there is a Talmudic dialogue (Sanhedrin 9lb) between RabbiJudah the Prince and the Roman Emperor, Antoninus. Antoninus held that the soul enters the 'body' at the time of conception, while RabbiJudah held, at frrst, at the time when the foetus is formed; but he later became con­ vinced of the correctness of Antoninus' opinion. In another Talmudic passage (Menachot 99b) it is said that the soul is 'formed' on the fortieth day from the time of conception. In any event, the general rabbinic view is that the soul is present in the foetus from a very early period in its development, and this acquires further elaboration in the beautiful 38 • 54sk the Rabbi' legends about the embryo praising God (Berachot 1Oa) and being taught the whole of the Torah ( 30b). A similar idea is found in Plato that all education is really a process of uncovering that which the soul already knows from before birth. But Saadiah Gaon, in the Middle Ages, denied that the soul enjoys an independent existence before the body comes into being. God creates the soul simultaneously with the completion of man's bodily form ('Beliefs and Opinions' 6:3). According to the Zohar the vital force in man is essential if he is to live at all so that this part of the soul is there in the foetus from the beginning; but the higher faculties of the soul come later, according to one view (Zohar 11, 98a) at the time of barmitzvah. Some of the Jewish philosophers in the Middle Ages, notably Maimonides, held that there is a part of the soul known as the 'acquired soul'. As its name implies, this is attained by man through his deep reflection on metaphysical truths and it is this alone that is immortal.

What does Judaism mean by the terms 'sin' and 'trans­ gression'?

You refer, presumably, to the Hebrew terms for these concepts. The three most frequently used terms for sin are chet, avon and pesha. These terms are found in the Bible and recur with frequency in the liturgy of Yom Kippur. The usual interpretation of the terms is that chet denotes unintentional or unwitting sin (the root meaning is to miss the mark, i.e., through error or lazi­ ness or ignorance); avon denotes intentional sin (the sinner knows that he is doing wrong, but fails to exercise the necessary degree of self-control); while pesha denotes the most serious of all three, a wilful rebellion against God's law (the sinner not only knows that he is doing wrong, but does it none the less, not because he fmds it hard to obey, but because he wishes to cast off the restraints of the divine law). To give two examples, one from religious law, the other from the ethical sphere: If a man profaned the Sabbath because he was unaware either of the seriousness of the offence or because he imagined that what he did does not fall under the heading of forbidden 'work', this is chet. If he knew that he was profaning the Sabbath, but did it because he felt it necessary for his trade or profession, that would be avon. If he did it solely to demonstrate that he has no regard for the sanctity of the Sabbath, that would be pesha. Again: If a man cheated another because he mistakenly was of the opinion that the money belonged to him, that would be chet. If he was a common thief, appropriating to himself the property of another, that would be avon. If he stole just for the fun of it, getting a 'kick' out of his sheer defiance of society, that would be pesha. The usual word for 'transgression' is avera, meaning, literally, 'transgression', Theology • 39 from a root meaning 'to pass by', i.e., to override God's law. An avera is the opposite of a mitzva, a divine command, a good deed. It is worth noting that the term avera is used also for purely ethical offences. The man who harms his neighbour commits an offence both against his neighbour and against God, who has commanded us to love our neighbours. In fact, it is doubtful whether the whole concept of sin has any meaning in other than a religious concept. Strictly speaking, while we can wrong our neighbour we cannot 'sin' against him, 'sin' being reserved for a failure to obey God. This is why the talmudic rabbis, in a famous statement, speak of Yom Kippur bringing atonement both for sins (avero~ against God and for sins against one's neighbour (i.e., for sins against God that are the result of wronging the neighbour); but in the latter, God does not pardon the sin unless the victim has first been appeased and adequately compensated for the injury done to him. Incidentally, inJudaism there is no such concept as a 'sinner' in the abstract or as a state or condition. If a man is to be described as a miserable sinner and the like, it is because he has committed or now commits certain sins.

I 8.lll very interested when people speak of the 'soul'. Is this part of the hwnan body and, if so, where is it situated?

Many books have been written by the Jewish thinkers on the nature of the soul. It can safely be said, however, that no sophisticatedJewish thinker has ever understood the soul to be in the body in a physical sense. They follow the talmudic analogy of the soul and God. What do we mean when we say that God is in the universe? We do not mean, surely, that there is a special place on earth or in the sky where he resides. He is everywhere in the universe in the sense that His providence extends over all things and His power keeps them in being. In similar fashion, the soul is the entity that pervades the human body. It expresses itself in the thoughts of the mind and the emotions of the heart, but both of these are spiritual, not physical. According to the traditionalJewish way of looking at the mystery of the soul, the latter is a spiritual entity with which the body is endowed to keep the body alive. When a man dies, we say that his soul has departed. But, again, according to traditional Jewish teaching, this entity does not cease to exist at the death of the body, but returns to God. ~d the dust returneth to the earth as it was, but the spirit returneth unto God who gave it' (Ecclesiastes 12:7). Some of the Jewish mystics have gone much further to hold that there is a divine spark in the soul, that it partakes of the actual divine nature. Other Jewish thinkers hold that this point of view is going a litde too far. Until modern times, all the thinkers held fast, in any event, to the doctrine 40 • i4sk the Rabbi' that the soul is immortal. I say, until modern times, although I cannot really see why it should be imagined that modern thought has compelled us to give up the idea. Contrary to what some people say,Judaism does believe that our lifespan on earth is a school for eternity. In other words, the real person is not the body, but the soul, which uses the body in this life, but is independent of it in eternal life. Even in everyday parlance, we give expression to this idea, for instance, when we say of a lovable, benevolent person that he or she is a gutter neshama - 'a good soul'. We do not say that he has a good soul, but that he is a good soul.

Could you explain the idea of a 'ban' or 'excommuni­ cation'? Are there different levels? What is the status of the 'excommunicant'?

There is a whole section of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 334) on 'the laws of chercm', but in current editions of the Shulchan Aruch a note is appended to the effect that all these laws are inoperative nowadays because we are obliged to observe the laws of the countries in which we reside and which make issuing a ban of this kind illegal. There are two types of ban: 1. niddui ('separation'); 2. chercm, the more severe excommunication. These bans are imposed for various offences listed in the Codes. The niddui is imposed for at least thirty days. If the sinner fails to repent of his misdeeds during this period, a further niddui is imposed on him. If he still fails to respond, the chercm is imposed. During the period of niddui the offender is kept apart from the community. He cannot be counted in a minyan for prayer and only the immediate members of his family are allowed to sit near to him (i.e., within his 'four ells'). People are allowed, however, to have commercial dealings with him and to study the Torah with him. A person under the more severe chercm ban must study on his own and he is assisted to 'open a small shop' solely for the purpose 'of keeping him alive', but there must be neither business nor any other dealings with him. It is permitted to converse with one under the ban of niddui or chercm, unless there had been an explicit ban to this effect, but conversation with him should be kept to a minimum. At one period (although this severity was later abandoned) the excom­ municant was not allowed a Jewish burial; his sons were not allowed to be circumcised; his wife was excluded from the synagogue, and his children from school; his bread and wine were forbidden; and his books declared anathema. Fortunately, the chercm was the cause of its own demise. So many bans and counter-bans were hurled by rabbis and communal leaders against one another Theology • 41 (e.g., at the time of the fierce Chasidic-Mitnaggedic polemics) that the whole thing became completely ridiculous.

In the light of recent controversy over rabbis taking part in conferences with Liberal and ReforJD leaders, what is the halachic status of the various Progressive JDove­ JDents? Have not Rabbi Joseph Baer Soloveitchik and ~nany other leading rabbis given perJDission to work together on non-religious ~natters with any other interested parties, including the Progressive groups?

From the rise of the Reform movement in Germany at the beginning of the last century, there has been considerable debate among Orthodox rabbis as to how the members and, especially, the leaders of the new movement were to be treated according to the din. Basically, there was no procedure in the halachic sources, since here was a group of men and women who quite evidently identified themselves with the Jewish community. The brunt of the battle was in Germany, where the Orthodox were divided, although in Hungary the conflict was hardly less severe. Many Orthodox rabbis took the view that, from the point of view of Orthodoxy, the Reformers were not to be treated as a separate group at all, but as individual sinners with whom it was quite permissible-indeed, in some instances, desirable - to co-operate. Other Orthodox leaders (the best-known exponent of this point of view was the famed Samson Raphael Hirsch) took the line that Reform was really a different kind of religion from OrthodoxJudaism and little fraternisation between the two was to be encouraged. Hirsch seems to have gone so far as to describe the relationship between Reform and Orthodoxy as akin to that, in Christendom, between Roman Catholicism and the Protestant Church. As a result of the turmoil in Hungary, there eventually arose no fewer than three types of communal organisation. The Reformers, the neologs, had their own and synagogal bodies; the separatist Orthodox lived up to their name; and there were the 'status quo' congregations who were Orthodox in outlook and practice, but who, as in former times, refused to exclude the non-observant, in the full sense, from membership. From all this it can be seen that one cannot possibly speak of the halachic attitude. It was, and is, far more a question of policy than of din; policy, more­ over, dependent to a large extent on the relative strength of the two 'parties'. It is no doubt a generalisation, but I have the impression that Lithuanian Jewry, somewhat aloof from the whole question in that there was no Reform movement in Lithuania, tended to disparage attempts at dividing Jews into parties or sects. Perhaps, too, they had taken to heart the baneful effects of the attempted forcing out of the Chasidim from the Lithuanian communists. 42 • Jtsk the Rabbi' In this country, as is well known, there was a ban on Reform at the beginning of the last century, but it is also well known that, for example, Claude Montefiore sat on the council of Jews' College and collaborated with Simeon Singer in producing the Authorised Daily Prayer Book. Singer himself delivered a sermon at the end of the last century in the Reform synagogue in Manchester, in which he said that the old controversies were a thing of the past, so that it was now possible for an Orthodox minister to preach in a Reform synagogue without anyone raising his voice in protest.

In a recent broadcast,JudaisJD was linked with IslaJD as a 'legal' religion, unlike the 'personal' religion of Christianity. SoJDe people even describedJudaisJD as an ethnic religion, or siJDply as a nationality. Is there a difference?

You appear to be asking two separate questions: 1. IsJudaism too legalistic?; 2. Is Judaism a matter of ethnicism rather than religion? But really the two questions are interconnected, as, indeed, you imply. Much has been written on this subject and here is a brief summary. Judaism, to be sure, does stress right action. It is important to carry out one's religious obligations in the correct manner, since there can be no more significant religious affirmation than to do God's will. It is also perfectly true that Judaism is inconceivable without the Jewish people and in this sense it is, in a way, 'ethnic'. Yet it is a complete travesty of Judaism to suggest that its sole concern is with mechanical observance and preserving the identity of the Jews. From the Bible onwards, the idea of kavvanah, inwardness, is repeatedly stressed. It is the heart that God wants, as the rabbis say. And the good motive in doing the mitzvot is similarly emphasised. The ideal that is ever present in Jewish teaching is that, when performing a , one should be fully conscious of what one is doing, and the reason for doing it should be for the greater glory of God. As for the accusation thatJudaism is merely a form of nationalism, the lie is given to this by the fact thatJudaism accepts converts to the faith. Here, too, the verse speaks of Israel not simply as a 'kingdom' or a 'nation', but as 'a kingdom of priests and holy nation' (Exodus 19:6). On the 'personal', presumably the individualistic, aspects of Judaism, it is enough to quote the famous rabbinic saying that Adam was created as a single individual to teach that each individual is a whole world in himself; as well as that other rabbinic saying according to which no two human beings are exactly alike, with the clear implication that each individual has a fraction of the divine light which he or she alone can reveal. The truth is that, unfortunately, misunderstandings have abounded regarding the nature of Judaism and these have been supported by Jews who Theology • 43 remain ignorant of the profundity of their religion. We should never be guilty of short-sellingJudaism.

Is there in Christianity (Catholic or Protestant), Islam, Buddhism or any of the other recognised religions any teaching, direction or counsel of any value - spiritual, moral or ethical-wbichhas not its counterpart, basically and fundamentally, injudaism?

The doctrine that our Torah is perfect (Psalm 19:8) implies that the answer to your query is in the negative. Judaism is rich enough and spiritually and ethically sufficiently comprehensive to cater to every religious need. But if you ask whether Jews learn anything from the teachers of other religions, the matter is rather more complicated. One finds, for example, that Jewish teachers occasionally draw attention to the way the adherents of other religions behave in order to encourage Jews to behave better. One of the reasons given by the great German Jewish authority, Rabbi David Hoffmann, for not smoking in the synagogue was that, since Christians would not dream of smoking in a church, it hardly befits Jews to have less reverence in their house of worship than Christians have in theirs. Maimonides, in an Islamic background, advocated, for the same reason, that Jews should wash their feet, as well as their hands, before entering the synagogue to pray. Maimonides and other Jewish theologians in the Middle Ages studied the philosophical writings of the Moslems and though, naturally, they were critical of these where they were in conflict withJudaism, they were nevertheless prepared to use some of the insights they found in those writings for the greater clarification of their own faith. ~ccept the truth from whichever source it comes' is a famous medieval Jewish maxim. Dr Hertz, in his introduction to the first edition of his commentary to the Chumash, quotes this maxim and relies on it. He remarks that this is sound rabbinic doctrine and he continues: ' ... even if it be from the pages of a devout Christian expositor or of an iconoclastic Bible scholar, Jewish or non:Jewish'. Bahya lbn Pakudah, in his marvellous work ofJewish religiosity, sometimes quotes as an example from the lives of Moslem saints, probably the Sufis; 44 • J.l.sk the Rabbi' Is there any halachic objection to reading the New TestaJDent? What is the general view of Jewish children in schools which require Scripture lessons? And if Scripture, as opposed to Christian nurture, is the subject, should Jewish children ask to be excused fron1 attending such readings?

Obviously it is not permitted for children, or, for that matter, adults to read the New Testament as sacred scripture, as a religious exercise. But what of reading it as literature, or in order to know what Christianity is all about for historical or apologetic reasons? There are no hard and fast rules here. We do know that many of the great Jewish sages were familiar with the New Testament. The Rev. A.A. Green, at the Hampstead Synagogue, had a class for older children in theNew Testament because he felt that, in order for them to be better Jews, they ought to know the Christian argument and be able to refute it. Yet the majority of rabbis in this country were fiercely opposed to Green's efforts, It is really a matter of discretion and taste. It would certainly be a little odd to teach New Testament to small children, to say the least. It is the usual practice for Jewish children in general schools to be excused from Scripture lessons, the time being spent on their Jewish education.

How does the halacha apply the prohibition of iDlages to the display of art work in one's hon1e? Could one, for instance, hang up a picture of Jacob wrestling with the angel?

The whole question of the relationship between art and image-making is extremely complicated and it is odd that no one has thought of writing a comprehensive work on the halachic aspects of the subject. But a brief reply can be given to your particular question. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 141:4 and 7) rules that unless a picture of an angel had been made to be worshipped, it is permitted to keep such a picture in the house. While it is permitted to paint the whole human figure, it is forbidden to sculpt a three-dimensional human form in its entirety (a bust is permitted and it goes without saying that there is no objection to having a painting of human figures in the house). Theology • 45 At this season of the year there is the inevitable awareness of the Christian religion. What is the attitude ofJudaism. to Christianity?

Judaism, it goes without saying, rejects the basic Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation as totally incompatible with pure monotheistic faith. In addition, there are the following vital differences between the two religions. Christians believe that Jesus was the Messiah foretold by the prophets, so that redemption has already come to mankind.Judaism sees no evidence that the prophecies have been fulfilled and looks forward to the redemption of mankind in the future Messianic Age. Christianity, at least in its classical form, though far less so nowadays, believes that the Jewish people has been rejected by God, the Church being the new Israel and the New Testament superseding the Old, beliefs which Judaism rejects by affirming the 'chosenness' of the Jews and the immutability of the Torah, thoughJewish teachers may differ in their understanding of what 'chosenness' means. Christianity believes in original sin, that all men are born in a state of sin consequent on Adam's disobedience, and require 'redemption' through belief in Jesus. It is true that in some varieties ofJudaism, in the Cabala, for example, the fall of Adam and its baneful consequences do occupy a prominent place, but, on the whole, Judaism has confidence in man's ability, with God's help, to pursue the good life, and it certainly does not accept the notion of a taint only to be removed by faith in a divine mediator. Other alleged differences are rather more problematical. It is often suggested, for example, that Christianity is based on love, whereas Judaism is based on justice, with Christians andJews vying with each other as to which is the superior virtue. This is far too neat a generalisation. I am not sufficiently familiar with Christian teaching, but surely Christianity knows of justice and it is a monstrous suggestion thatJudaism is indifferent to love. Similarly, it is sometimes said that, while Christianity encourages its adherents to turn the other cheek,Judaism insists that it is positively wrong to do this, as if there are no Jewish teachings about forgiving those who have wronged us and warning us not to pay evil with evil. Again, it is frequently stated that Christianity is other-worldly, whileJudaism is this-worldly, as if the rabbis do not teach that this life is a preparation for eternal life and this world the eve of the Sabbath when we are obliged to equip ourselves to be capable of enjoying the bliss of the eternal Sabbath. Apart from the above,Jewish teachers have differed in their views regarding the role of Christianity in God's plan for mankind. The attitude of total rejection is certainly not unknown, but thinkers like Maimonides have seen Christianity as paving the way for the coming of the Messiah and theologians like Menahem Meiri in the Middle Ages, in the eighteenth 46 • 54sk the Rabbi' century and Franz Rosenzweig in the twentieth have expressed their admiration for the lofty Christian ethic, occasionally adding, if only Christians would be true to their own.

I am puzzled by the i.Jnportance given to the concept of the Messiah being descended froiD the House of David in view of the fact that David's own progenitors, Boaz and Ruth, were theiDselves descendants of illicit and incestu­ ous unions - Judah and Tamar, and Lot and his elder daughter, respectively. Do the rabbis coJDJDent on this apparent lack of purity in David's ancestry?

The rabbis were, of course, fully aware of it and imagine David's foes taunting him that he was not only unfit to be king, but excluded from the congregation of Israel. The rabbinic reply, in general, is that the unions to which you refer were not really illegitimate - in those days the union ofJudah and Tamar was a form of levirate marriage and the daughters of Lot acted in good faith because they thought that they and their father were the only human beings left alive and the new world had to be re-populated. For all that, it does seem strange that the whole Davidic descent seems to have been through questionable unions. In addition, you might have mentioned Solomon as the son of David and Bathsheba. The Cabalists develop the interesting idea that the Messiah is obliged to have a dubious genealogical tree because the victory over impurity can come only from the person who has, through his ancestry, both nobility and some association with the forces of impurity. In the Shabbatean heresy, this kind of reasoning was used to justify belief in Shabbetai Zevi even after his conversion to Islam. Needless to say, the Cabalists who gave the above interpretation would never have drawn from it the conclusion that there can only be redemption through sin.

Why are penitential prayers cast in the plural when one would appear to ask for personal forgiveness for sin and why are the prayers recited aloud?

The two questions, as perhaps you intended to imply, are interconnected. Many of our teachers point to the idea found in the Talmud that man should be so ashamed of his sins that he never confesses them when others can overhear. In public worship there is always the danger that others may overhear, so a stereotyped form of confession is used. There is the further important idea that all standard prayers are in the plural form because we are part of one another. We do not pray only for our own needs but for those of the community as a whole, and this applies to our Theology • 4 7 spiritual as well as our material needs. This is what congregational prayer is all about. For all that, there is nothing to prevent the individual privately expressing his own needs and voicing his own confession. Indeed, this is advocated by the Jewish masters of prayer. But this more intimate aspect of the life of prayer should be kept strictly private as a matter between man and his Creator and here no one else should be allowed to intrude.

Christians are the followers of Christ, and Moslem.s the followers of Mohammed. Whom do the Jews follow?

The questioner is not Jewish and adds a number of questions requesting information about the Jewish religion. For an answer to these I would recom­ mend Rabbi Dr I. Epstein's Penguin, :Judaism'. On the above question, the simple answer is that Jews do not look upon any human being as the leader whom one must follow. The Jews hold Moses, for example, in high veneration, though not in and for himself, but because he brought God's law to Israel. Abraham is the frrstJewish leader andJews who follow his example are called 'disciples of Abraham, our father', but here, too, Judaism is not Abrahamism, just as Judaism is not Mosaism. The Jewish religion centres on the Jewish people as a whole, not on a particular person, however eminent he may be.

What constitutes an 'Orthodox' Jew?

The term 'Orthodox' is of recent vintage and was frrst used by the Reformers as a term of reproach to the traditionalists, as if to say, you are hidebound and reactionary. It is an unfortunate term, taken, in fact, from Christian theology and meaning 'right thinking', i.e., believing in the right ideas. That is why some Jews, refusing to have their beliefs moulded too rigidly and inflexibly, prefer to call themselves, if they are observant, 'orthoprax'Jews, Jews who keep the mitzvot. Others, nowadays, prefer the term 'Torah-true'. Most people who do use the term 'Orthodox' nowadays mean an observant Jew and, paradoxical though it may sound, the term 'OrthodoxJew' is itself unorthodox. But usage is, I suppose, of some importance andJews who claim to be 'Orthodox' should be persons who try to live in accordance with the traditionalJewish law. It is certainly hard to see the justification of using the term for those who are more or less unobservant but belong to an 'Orthodox' synagogue, rather as if allegiance to a particular variety ofJudaism is like belonging to a political party and voting in the correct way. The Hebrew term used today for observantJews is charedim, 'God-fearers', which while more precise than 'Orthodox' is also perhaps too priggish. 48 • ~k the Rabbi' Does the Jew of today Hve in and for the Messianic hope? If so, what form does it take?

This question comes from a Christian clergyman. First, I am doubtful whether Jews would speak of 'living for', in addition to 'living in', the Messianic hope. As Judaism understands it, this life is God's gift to man and if there is to be 'living for', it must be for God in the here and now. This life is not seen solely as a preparation for the 'end', as the culmination of human history, as we know it, is called in the Jewish sources. As for the question regarding the Jew of today, it can safely be said that every religious Jew does live in the Messianic hope. The belief in the coming of the Messiah has long been a cardinal principle of the Jewish religion. This is not to say that all religious Jews of today understand the hope in the same way. In the prophets there are references both to what later became known as the Messianic age and to what later became known as a personal Messiah. OrthodoxJews today believe in the coming of a personal Messiah who will usher in the golden age. He is not, of course, a divine figure, but a human being inspired by God. Reform Jews generally stress the Messianic age rather than the personal Messiah, although of late some Reform rabbis have argued for a return to the traditional concept. What will happen in the Messianic age? The Talmud records two opinions. One of these stresses the miraculous, supernatural elements, the other the natural. Thus, according to the second opinion, there will still be poor people in the Messianic age and life's problems will still await their solution, the promises of the prophets being understood as referring to the World to Come, i.e., the state long after the coming of the Messiah. Again in the classicalJewish sources, there is a host of ideas regarding the nature of human life in that time, but the great Maimonides 800 years ago pointed out that much of this is pure speculation. In fact, Maimonides believes that the Jew who has faith should hope daily for the coming of the Messiah while leaving the details to God. Nevertheless, Maimonides himself endeavours to lift a corner of the veil and, at the end of his great Code of Jewish law, he states in a noble passage that the true sages of Israel do not look forward to the Messianic age in order to enjoy the things of this world. They have as their hope that in the Messianic age they will be free from all distractions and will so be able to devote themselves to the pursuit of the truth because it is true and to the Torah of truth because it will lead them to God and so ultimately to enjoy the nearness of God and the bliss of this experience for all eternity. Many devout Jews daily recite the 13 principles of the Jewish faith as laid down by Maimonides. One of these reads, in the current version: 'I believe Theology • 49 with perfect faith in the coming of the Messiah and even though he tarries I wait, nevertheless, for his coming each day until he does come.' It is on record that Jews in the death camps went to the gas chambers heroically singing this 'I believe'.formula.

I was brought up in an OrthodoxJewish home, but have been wondering for a number of years what proof we have. I sat down one evening and read the Old Testament from cover to cover, hoping my answers were going to be there, but to my horror they were not. If God created everything, who created him? And how do we know that the prophets were real and their teachings genuine?

There is aJewish tradition of the greatest richness in which the keenestJewish minds have interpreted the biblical record and applied its teachings to human life. These teachers have considered at length the kind of questions you mention. For instance, it does not make sense to ask who created God since, by defmition, God is uncreated. When we speak of God creating the world, we intend to suggest that there is an origin to the universe in a Being who is beyond space and time. God as understood inJudaism is the ultimate Cause of all, arrived at, in one way, at least, by reflection on the need to explain creation as having uncreated Mind as its source. Similarly, we know that the prophets are true because what they had to say has been so influential for good and because their words, even in translation, ring true. Consider, for example, that here was a succession of quite extraordinary men who brought a new teaching to mankind - that there is a God who is concerned about how human beings behave, who loves them and wishes them to practise justice and righteousness, be holy and show compassion, who has a plan for the human race and has chosen the people of Israel to be His special instrument for the realisation of that plan. My advice to you is, first, not to be discouraged by your doubts. Many religious teachers have seen doubt as a spur to further investigation, leading eventually to a deeper faith. Secondly, by all means pursue your researches, but by reading books on the Jewish religion. 1 As a beginning, I would recommend Dr I. Epstein's excellent Penguin entitled judaism'. This will introduce you to further works in English on the Jewish religion and you can then begin to engage on what is a life-long quest. One further point. I see from your letter that you live somewhat apart from a vibrantJewish community. TheJewish way can only be followed adequately through close association with otherJews. It would be presumptuous of me to advise you to move, but I would suggest that from time to time you make sure 50 • Jlsk the Rabbi' that you attend synagogue, listen to what Jewish speakers have to say and try to have a greater social contact with your fellow:Jews. We are all creatures influenced by our surroundings. The significance of having contact with believing and practisingJews is that the great truths upon which Judaism is based are really appreciated only when it is seen how they provide a living religion rather than an academic exercise. When you do eventually turn to the Bible, do not attempt to read the whole at one sitting. Rather take a single book, say Job or Isaiah or Psalms, and read this with the Soncino commentary. WeJews do not normally speak of 'reading' the Bible. We are encouraged to go much further. We are called upon to study the Bible.

Do Jews believe in predestination?

Jews certainly believe that man has freedom of choice in the moral and religious sphere, i.e., he can choose to be good and lead a good life, or be bad and lead a bad life. & one of the Talmudic rabbis puts it in a famous saying: 'Everything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven.' But in other matters there is a strong element of predeterminism, according to manyJewish teachers; indeed, as this saying itself implies: 'Everything is in the hands of Heaven', i.e., is predetermined by God. Experience, too, demonstrates that not everyone is born with the same opportunities. Another rabbinic saying puts it poetically that before a soul comes down to earth, it is decided whether the person whose soul it is will be rich or poor, strong or weak, wise or foolish. The only thing not predetermined is whether that person will be righteous or wicked. This depends on the person himsel£ Nevertheless, the very fact that there are prayers in the Jewish liturgy for wealth, strength and wisdom seems to suggest that a person's destiny can be changed if he is worthy of it. The truth is that there is no officialJewish belief on these matters and there are various interpretations of the relationship between God's general plan for each individual person and that person's ability to bring his own efforts to bear on the course of his life. This kind of question does not really lend itself to a cut-and-dried answer. The soundest religious attitude is to do all one can to further one's own future, but always with faith and trust in God. Some Jewish thinkers have developed the interesting idea that each man has, as it were, an area in which he is free to choose, and another in which he is predestined. For example, a child born into a den of thieves and brought up to believe that to thieve is an honourable occupation may fmd it well-nigh impossible not to be a thie£ His area of choice, even in the moral sphere, may thus be restricted, yet he, too, can choose, for example, whether or not to be compassionate. Theology • 51

I recendy ~net a severely defor~ned young person obvi­ ously born in this JDanner. Why does God allow such suffering? And should any special prayer or blessing be recited when JDeeting such a person?

Your first question is the age-old problem-one of the most difficult the believer has to face - of why there is evil, pain and suffering in the world created by the All-good. Religious thinkers have grappled with the problem and while we can see glimpses of a possible solution- e.g., that in a world without these things, everything would be good and there would be no room for human goodness and sympathy (indeed, there would be no human freedom at all) and there is the further idea that all will be put right in the Hereafter - the man of faith ultimately has to live with the problem, to which there is no fmal answer in this life. He is sustained by all the evidence of God's goodness and design in the universe and he is moved to affrrm that while it is hard to believe in God, it is even harder not to believe in Him. Judaism goes beyond all this in urging us to do all we can to make the life of those who suffer easier. A Chasidic master once said that when it comes to attending to the needs of the unfortunate, we must behave as if only we and not God can help, which is why, he suggested, God allows men to have doubts of His existence, for if everyone had complete faith in God it would all be left to God. As for the blessing, this is discussed in the Talmud (Berachot 58b). On the basis of this talmudic passage, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 225:9) rules that when one sees for the frrst time someone born deformed, one should recite the blessing: 'Blessed art Thou, who creates diverse forms of creatures', but if one sees someone whose deformities are the result of a later accident or illness, the blessing is: 'Blessed be the true judge.' In other words, the rabbis, who ordained these benedictions, were saying that we cannot see, with our limited, fmite minds, why God should not have created all His creatures in perfect form and why He should allow severely disabling accidents and illnesses to occur, but the devout Jew, even when he walks in darkness, should still bless his Maker.

In a recent reply you said that God would not punish the innocent for the sins of the guilty. But we are told that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children and the grandchildren.

The problem is dealt with in two talmudic passages. In one of these (Berachot 7a), two Scriptural verses are contrasted. One verse says: 'Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children' (Exodus 34:7), but the other verse says: 'The children shall not be put to death for the fathers' (Deuteronomy 24: 16). 52 • i4sk the Rabbi' The reply is that the first verse refers to children who persist in following the evil ways of their fathers, while the second verse refers to innocent children who are never punished for the misdeeds of their fathers. The other passage is more daring. Here ( 24a) it is said that Moses declared: 'visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children and upon the children's children, unto the third and fourth generation' (Exodus 34:7, as above), but the prophetEzekiellater revoked this, saying: 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die' (Ezekiell8:3--4). The meaning is that if we take this in conjunction with the other passage, no man is punished for the evil deeds of his ancestors. Even if he, too, leads an evil life and will be punished for it, he will not be punished for the sins of his fathers and grandfathers. Thus, what the rabbis are saying is that the verse in the Ten Commandments and elsewhere about children being punished for the sins of their parents cannot be taken literally, since to do so would be in contradiction to the idea of God's justice as taught in the other verses. The somewhat puzzling remark that Ezekiel 'revoked' that which Moses had stated in the name of God presumably means that Moses was not saying that this must happen, but was threatening the people with it if they would become faithless to God's word. In Ezekiel's day, the prophet saw, also through God's inspiration, that such threats would no longer be effective and he 'revoked' them. It remains to be said that all this has to do with direct divine punishment. That children do suffer for the mistakes of their fathers is, alas, only too true. A man who leads an evil life is hardly giving his children a good start in life, whereas the influence of good parents does extend over many subsequent generations.

A contributor to 'The Jewish Week' quoted the Midrash as stating that the Abnighty, though He is Omnipotent, still consulted with His angels before creating m.an. Is it the view that, before m.an was created, there existed a populated heaven created by God?

Yes, that is the traditional view. Although, interestingly enough, it is not stated explicitly in the Creation narrative in Genesis, there are references to the angelic hosts in many other biblical passages, for example, in the prelude to Job. This may well be the meaning of the biblical expression, 'The Lord of hosts', i.e., the hosts of angels. Naturally (perhaps one should say 'super­ naturally'), it all depends on how one understands 'angels'. According to Maimonides, the angels are spiritual forces used by God in His providential care for the world He has created and which He governs. On this view there is a strong element of poetry in the descriptions of the angelic beings as creatures who resemble man and who 'fly' through the air. Theology • 53 The biblical word most commonly used for angels is malachim, which also means 'messengers'. Indeed, Maimonides goes so far as to say that all the bibli­ cal references to angels appearing to human beings are to their 'appearance' in dreams because it is impossible to see a spiritual force with the physical eye. Nahmanides was severely critical of Maimonides for this since it reduces a number of biblical passages (e.g., Genesis chapters 18 and 19) to dreams rather than historical events. In the mystical tradition as found in the Zohar, the angels are literally out of this world so that, in the language of the Zohar, in order to appear to men the angels have to assume the garments of this world - to adopt a guise - otherwise the world would be unable to contain them. The Midrash to which you refer obviously only uses the term 'consults' figuratively - God does not require any advisers. As, in fact, the Midrash continues, it is to teach us human beings not to be embarrassed at seeking counsel with others before undertaking any important activity. For all the many references to angels in the Jewish tradition, there are very few prayers to angels in the Jewish liturgy and a number of rabbis objected to such few prayers. Prayer is to be offered only to God. Even those rabbis who did not object to the practice emphasised that the prayers should be directed to God alone. Considerations of space preclude a detailed examination of the role of angels inJudaism, but we might also refer to the unanimous rabbinical view that man is superior to the angels because they have no free will, whereas he has to struggle with himself in order freely to choose the good and reject the evil.

The Pope, it is reported, quoted his inunediate pre­ decessor's assertion that the creator was not only God the Father, but also God the Mother. The late Pope John Paul I had, in turn, argued that he was not saying anything original, but only echoing Isaiah. What is theJewish point of view?

First, the Isaiah reference. This is presumably the verse: 'Like one whom his mother comforteth so shall I comfort you' (Isaiah 66: 13). This verse is now generally recited during prayers at a house of mourning. Just as God appears in other parts of the Bible as a father, here He appears in the role of a mother. As the Midrash puts it: it is the mother particularly who comforts the child. I doubt whetherJudaism would express this as a belief in God the Mother. For that matter, reference to God as father is understood as metaphor: God has no sex. If He is described as our Father in Heaven, this is because we must use human language, the only language we have, so that all talk of God seeks to describe not His true nature, which cannot be known by humans, only by God 54 • .?tsk the Rabbi' Himself, but His manifestation in the universe, that is, our relationship with him. In the same vein, the rabbis say that when God is seen to combat evil, He is described, in the Bible, as a 'young warrior', whereas when He is seen in His role of teacher of the Torah, He is described as a venerable sage. Maimonides' chief aim in writing his 'Guide for the Perplexed' was precisely this, to negate from God, in any absolute sense, all human attributes. It is in the Cabala that we find the doctrine of a kind of female element in the Godhead. Of the names given to the ten sefirot (the powers or potencies in the Godhead), one is, in fact, called Mother and another (the shechinah) Daughter. It was for this reason that the Cabala found, and still finds, its strong opponents who argued that all this compromises strict Jewish monotheism. But even for the Cabalists, the sefirot belong to the world of emanation, to the process by means of which God reveals Himself to His creatures and brings them into being. En sqf, God as He is in Himself, is not the Object of human comprehension. En sqf, the 'Limitless', is beyond all human language. Indeed, the writes that, strictly speaking, we cannot even speak of en sofas en sqf, since this, too, is to use human language. So the Pope's statement can be accepted from the Jewish point of view provided it is understood as metaphor and, as I have suggested, it is better to avoid such a provocative expression as 'God the Mother'.

Has there been any seriousJewish theological attempt to disprove the theory of relativity?

The question implies that the theory of relativity presents some kind of threat to Judaism so that the theory has to be disproved in the interests of religion. Unfortunately, I do not have the training in physics required to grasp the theory at all adequately, but even to the uninitiated it is perfectly clear that Einstein's theory is a purely scientific hypothesis of relevance only to the structure of the physical universe and to be argued for or against by the normal methods of scientific inquiry. One hears that Einstein himself was at pains to deny that his theory had any relevance to metaphysics. There is no such thing as a kosher scientific theory any more than there is a kosher or non-kosher mathematics. Perhaps you refer to various popularisers who, relying on Einstein's work, have tried to suggest that relativism is therefore the attitude to be adopted in ethics and religion. There is no warrant in Einstein for any such attitude. Because the measurement of time is relative it does not follow in any way that absolute truth is unobtainable anywhere. It has often been pointed out that the statement 'everything is relative' is meaningless since for something to be relative it must be relative to something else not itself relative. Theology • 55 According toJewish teaching God is absolute and everything in the universe is relative to Him. As Maimonides puts it: There could be no universe without God but God would exist even if there were no universe. There has been no 'serious attempt' on the part of Jewish theology to disprove the theory of relativity because theology is concerned with beliefs about God not with the facts of the physical universe. Incidentally, many of the conflicts in the past between science and religion were caused by the misguided attempts of theologians trying to be scientists and scientists trying to be theologians. Good theologians and good scientists now generally acknowledge that a division of function is called for. The analogy from medicine is not unhelpful. Judaism is profoundly concerned that men should be healthy but it leaves it to the doctors to decide which course of treatment in a given case will serve to restore health to the sick patient. There is no specificallyJewish view of how the sick are to be treated, except, of course, in the cases where ethical and religious questions arise.

Belief in God as 'invisible' and 'formless' appears essential to judaisn1. What then didjacob n1ean when he said 'I have seen God face to face and n1y life has been preserved'?

The problem bothered the author of the Targum, the ancient Aramaic translation of the Bible. The Targum to the verse you quote (Genesis 32:31) renders it as: 'I have seen an angel of God face to face.' In the previous narrative it is, indeed, a 'man' who wrestles withJacob and to whom he here refers and this 'man' is identified by the prophet (Hosea 12:5) with an angel.

I an1 asked if the rabbis have anywhere discussed the origins of God and if so, what did they have to say on this tren1endous subject?

How ridiculous can one be? God has no 'origins'. He is the origin of all things. The notion of an origin of God is as semantically absurd as the idea behind the so-called 'death of God' philosophy. A god who could be born and who could die would not be God at all. The opening verse of the Yigdal hymn is: 'Magnified and praised be the living God: He is, and there is no limit in time to His being.' And the Adon Olam hymn speaks of God, as Jews have always done, as 'without beginning and without end'. The rabbinic protest against all pagan notions of the birth and death of the gods is expressed in the famous comment of Rabbi Abbahu on the verse: 'I am the first, and I am the last, and beside Me there is no God' (Isaiah 44:6). Rabbi Abbahu comments: 'I am the .first, for I have no father, and I am the 56 • 54sk the Rabbi' last, for I have no son, and besides Me there is no God, for I have no brother' (Midrash, Exodus Rabbah 29:5). But why spend time on refuting a notion that no Jewish teacher has even remotely entertained? I suspect that what you really mean is not the origin of God but the origin of the idea of God, i.e., how did the idea of God come to mankind? On this there is no particular rabbinic teaching and the Jew is free to see it in whatever way he chooses provided, of course, that he does not understand it in such a way as to deny the reality of God. For instance, even if a devoutJew comes to the conclusion that Freudian views on the origin of religion as due to the need for a father figure by primitive man and by his descendants are correct, this only means that he sees this as the vehicle by means of which God allowed Himself to be discovered. The standardJewish view is that God makes Himself known to man through the Torah and that He revealed Himself to Moses and to the Patriarchs. But there is nothing in the Jewish tradition which says that man is incapable of acknowledging God by working it out for himsel£ Indeed, according to a number of midrashic statements this is said to be precisely the way in which Abraham, whose father was an idolater, came to believe in God for himself.

What is the origin of the natne 'God'?Whatis the ~neaning of the Hebrew ~ehovah' and what is the significance of the coJDJDon transliteration-also used in the prayer book - of a double yod?

The English 'God' is from the Teutonic, supposedly derived from the Aryan gheu to invoke or to sacrifice, i.e., a being to whom sacrifices are offered. The Tetragrammaton must not be pronounced as it is spelled. Consequently, from an early period, it was pronounced Adonqy ('Lord') and the vowels of this word are placed under it. If these vowels are read together with the consonants of the Tetragrammaton (which was never intended) it produces the quite impossible form jehovah'. Now the rule is that the names of God must not be erased. Since it may happen that the prayer-books will one day be destroyed, the pious printers avoided the printing of this word in full, using, instead, the double yod (there are two hes in the Tetragrammaton and these have each the numerical value of five, totalling ten yod). The famous authority Shabbetai Cohen (Yoreh Deah 179: 11) takes it for granted that divine names in languages other than Hebrew may be erased and he refers specifically to the German Gott, so that there is no need for the current absurdity of writing G-d or A-lty. To do so is to be guilty of super-piety, discouraged by the rabbis. There is a delightful Chasidic saying on the two yods. When two yidden (also meaning :Jews') are side by side in harmony God's name is present. Theology • 57 Much of our liturgy consists of blessings - 'Blessed art Thou, 0 Lord' - and I have never understood how 01an can bless God; it see01s alD1ost presUD1ptuous. Surely the PsalD1ist's expression, 'Praise the Lord', is 01ore appro­ priate in indicating our feelings towards the Ahnighty.

But the Psalmist frequently uses the expression, 'Blessed be the Lord', for example, in Psalms 28:6, 31:22, 41: 14 and 66:20. As for your difficulty, various suggestions have been made by the Jewish teachers over the centuries. One of these is that baruch means, in fact, 'praise'. Others are that baruch means that God is the source of all blessing; or that God, in His relation to the world, does need man's blessing in the sense of man's co-operation with Him.

Is it in order for a Jew to participate in spirit or faith­ healing?

A distinction must be drawn between faith-healing as purely a method of helping the body through the mind, to cope with sickness, and faith-healing with religious overtones. The latter, unless these overtones were entirely in accord withJewish belief, would not be permitted. Within the Jewish tradition there have been a number of practitioners of the art of faith-healing, even if they did not necessarily call it by that name. It is tempting, for example, to understand the Talmudic accounts of certain sages taking the hand of a sick person and raising him from his sick-bed as examples of 'spiritual healing' (Berachot 5b). We are told that R.Johanan performed this service for R. Hiyya bar Abba and R. Eleazar. When R.Johanan was himself sick, this service was performed for him by R. Hanina; R. Johanan was unable, states the Talmud, to raise himself, since 'a prisoner cannot free himself from his prison-house'. Reference might also be made to the rabbinic saying that if a man visits a sick person born under the same star as himself (ben gilo), he takes away with him one-sixtieth part of the illness ( 39b). It seems to be established that some of the baalei shem of the pre-Chasidic period, and many of the Chasidic masters, had great powers of healing. Allowing for the numerous legendary accretions, the evidence of their possessing these powers is too strong for it to be lightly dismissed. There is no valid reason for doubting the effect of deep faith and strong will-power on the body and its disorders. It is fairly well known that in 1922 a graduate of the Hebrew Union College, Morris Lichtenstein, disturbed by defections from Judaism through the lure of Christian Science, founded a similar movement, which he claimed was in full accord with the Jewish tradition, calledJewish Science. But, it must be repeated, the greatest care needs to be taken that there be 58 • !4sk the Rabbi' no intrusion of ideas in this area that are foreign to Jewish beliefs, and the danger is very real. I notice, for example, that you refer to 'spirit' (as opposed to 'spiritual') healing. If this means the invocation of spirits, it would certainly be frowned upon by Jewish teaching. There is a Chasidic tale about the famous master, R. Simhah Bunem, who was blind and was advised to consult a Gentile faith-healer. He replied that he was quite willing to consult a Gentile physician who healed by normal methods, but if he was to rely on faith-healing he would go to the 'seer' of Lublin, his own Jewish master. 3 Ethics

What is the halachah concerning one Jew taking another Jew to a civil court?

The talmudic sources frown heavily on Jews having recourse to non:Jewish courts. On the verse (Exodus 21: 1), 'Now these are the ordinances which thou shalt set before them,' the Mechilta remarks that 'before them' means before aJewish court, even if the laws of a gentile court are as just as those of the Torah. Resorting to a non:Jewish court, it adds, implies that Jewish law is inadequate in the promotion of justice. In early talmudic times, the question was raised of what was to be done if one party refused to have the case presented in a Jewish court. The procedure was adopted - though by no means universally - that the other party would seek permission from the Beth Din to have redress to the gentile courts. This has now become standard practice. The question is part of the general problem of the Jews' accommodation to the general society to which they belong. Although it is not unusual for British Jews nowadays to prefer the civil courts, for example, there is nothing in English law to preventJews submitting their case to a Beth Din, which would then function as a court of arbitration. There is a grey area in the halachah in relation to this question, but devout Jews generally submit to the jurisdiction of a Beth Din and resort to the civil courts only when there is no alternative. It is hardly necessary to add that this applies only to civil matters where contractual arrangements agreed to by both parties are binding and where no religious laws are involved. In the last century, some of the early ReformJews argued that dina demalchuta dina - 'the law of the government is the law' - meant that, for example, a divorce granted by the civil courts was also valid in Jewish law, a view which was vehemently rejected - and rightly so - by all other Jewish authorities.

Why is the mitzva of ge:milut chasadiJn ('acts of benevo­ lence') so highly estee~ned when the recipient is likely to feel deJDeaned? Should he be grateful when the bestower ~nay be JDechanically fnlfimng mitzvot froiD IDotives of self-glorification and not out of genuine SyJDpathy?

You raise a very interesting question seldom discussed by the moralists: the possible baneful effects of good deeds. You have no doubt heard of the saying 60 • Msk the Rabbi' about the do-gooder: 'She goes through life doing good to people. You can tell the people by their hunted look.' A number of Jewish moralists have argued that love of the neighbour, if carried out solely because it is so commanded in the Torah, defeats its purpose. The command is to become the kind of person who is benevolent by nature, needing no spur of a mitzva so to be. Others are less severe on even mechanical acts of benevolence since these acts contribute to the cultivation of the kind of character the Torah requires and, in any event, there are those in unfortunate circumstances who are assisted whatever the motives of the donors. Human nature is very complex. A truly disinterested dt!ed is rare, which is why, in a well-known rabbinic homily, it is said that the only truly selfless act of benevolence is attendance at a funeral, where the recipient will never be able to repay, so that the act is devoid of self-seeking motivation. What is required is extreme tact and sensitivity on the part of the donor. The rabbis say that the highest form of charity, for instance, is where the donor does not know who is benefiting and the recipient does not know the identity of the person to whom he is indebted. Maimonides goes so far as to suggest that it is better not to give at all than to give and make the beneficiary feel demeaned. TheJerusalem Talmud remarks that in the Holy Land, wealthy men would beg the poor to do them the honour of accepting help from them. On the verse, 'If thou lend money to the poor with thee' (Exodus 22:24), Rashi comments that 'with thee' means put yourself in the place of the poor man who needs your help. Imagine how you would feel to have to be indebted to others and spare his feelings as much as you can. All this amounts to a protest against using others for our own spiritual advantage. The great Lithuanian moralist, Rabbi Israel Salanter (who died 100 years ago) held that if A had wronged B without B knowing of it, A should not inform B of it and beg his pardon, before Yom Kippur, because then B will become aware that A has wronged him. A man has no right to fmd pardon by causing hurt to another.

I have always understood that one ~nay not accept paYJDent for teaching Torah and that the paYJDent was to coJDpensate for 1noney lost were one to engage in other work. If this is so, how canJewish educational authori­ ties, for instance, offer a flat scale of salary when the person engaged JDight be foregoing a larger rate in other e~nploYJDent?

The meaning of the rule which developed regarding payment to compensate for money lost were one to engage in other work does not mean that in each individual case a careful assessment has to be made of the exact amount lost. Ethics • 61 How could this possibly be calculated? It would depend on the individual's talents and on the opportunities offered to him, as well as to the problematics of whether he would be successful in the other work or fail in it. The meaning of the rule is rather that it is permitted to receive a salary for teaching the Torah because the teacher is giving up all other work and he has to live. But the determination of how much he will earn as a Torah teacher depends, like any other contract, on the arrangements with his employers. I am passing no opinion on whether or not Jewish teachers are adequately paid. But this has nothing to do with the question you raise of compensating for other employment.

Is it correct that according toJewish tradition, no interest is to be charged on a loan ~nade to co-religionists?

It is not only 'according to Jewish tradition' that no interest is to be charged on a loan made to co-religionists. The prohibition of usury is recorded in a number of biblical passages, e.g., 1\nd if thy brother be waxen poor, and his means fail with thee; then thou shalt uphold him: as a stranger and a settler shall he live with thee. Take thou no interest of him or increase; but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee. Thou shalt not give him thy money upon interest, nor give him thy victuals for increase' (Leviticus 25:35-7). In the context, as can be seen from the reference to the brother as poor and from the comparison of lending money to lending food, the meaning is that the brother in need should be assisted without thought of gain and not crippled further by demanding interest on the loan. The Talmudic rabbis were very strict in this matter. The famous Babylonian jurist, R. Nahman, said (Baba Metzia 63b): 'The general principle concerning usury is: all payment for waiting for one's money is forbidden.' The rabbis understand 'payment' as including even the performance by the borrower to the lender of any special favour he would not otherwise have conferred, e.g., to greet him more warmly than he would have done if he were not in his debt. The Shulchan Aruch (YOFeh Deah 160: 14) rules that if A lends B a hundred coins on the condition that B will give one to charity this constitutes usury. However, particularly in the Babylonian Talmud (commercial activities being far more developed in Babylon than in Palestine), there are many discussions on how the prohibition of usury can be avoided when business loans entitle the creditor to a share in the profits. In the middle ages a special document was drawn up in order to permit business loans within well-defmed limits. Recent have considered such questions as investment in business and the purchase of shares in a limited company. A list of some of these Responsa is provided by Rabbi David Feldman in his edition of Solomon Ganzfried's Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, section 66. For a 62 • Msk the Rabbi' detailed discussion in English the fifth chapter of tractate Baba Metzia should be consulted in the Soncino translation of the Talmud. You refer in your question to 'co-religionists'. It is true that the Bible permits lending on interest to a 'foreigner' but that is because the term denotes one who visits the holy land and whose religion does not forbid him to take interest from Israelites. It would have been unfair in the circumstances to forbid Israelites to take interest from him. The rabbis had a definite tendency to limit severely the taking of interest even from a non:Jew but, as is well-known,Jewish attitudes differed consider­ ably in the middle ages, depending on the social and economic environment.

Do the prohibitions on '' and 'rechillut' apply to Jewish newspapers? If so, may one buy a newspaper if one knows that it regularly prints both of the above?

First, a definition of the terms. Lashon hara Oiterally, 'evil talk') is to repeat malicious gossip which has the effect of denigrating a person's character, even if what is said is true. Rechillut is talebearing, i.e., informing A that B has done him some harm or has spoken ill of him. The famous Chafetz Chayyim devoted a whole book to the castigation of these and in it he demonstrates that the two are also prohibited if they are given expression in writing. Rabbi Meir Shapiro, it is said, once jokingly remarked that the scapegoat was sent away with the sins of Israel by the hand of an ish itti ('an appointed man'), according to Leviticus 16:21. Rabbi Shapiro punned on the word itti so that it derived from et, 'time', i.e., a newspaper journalist. He said that a journalist was the most suitable person because he was fully accustomed to writing about the sins people commit. It is obvious that while there can, of course, be statements in newspapers that do offend against lashon hara and rechillut, it would be absurd to condemn all vigorous journalism which does not pull its punches. There were and are Orthodox newspapers with little aversion to exposing wrongs as they saw them and they were and are supported by competent rabbinic authorities. The truth is that there are occasions when it is permitted to expose wrongs; one of these is when to remain silent is to encourage an even greater wrong. The Chafetz Chayyim once intervened in a rabbinic dispute in which he wrote to a newspaper in a sharply critical vein of a prominent rabbi. There were those who denied that the Chafetz Chayyim, whose life was devoted to the fight against lashon hara, could possibly have written as he did, whereupon the Chafetz Chayyim retorted that for the sake of the honour of the Torah he was fully entitled to be critical. This is the justification for journalistic licence, though it goes without saying that a journalist, too, has responsibilities. Ethics • 63 In his book, entitled 'Chafetz Chayyim', the sage tellingly quotes in this connection the verse: 'Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people; neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbour' (Leviticus 19: 16) to yield the thought that while it is undoubtedly wrong to speak evil of others, this should not serve as an excuse for failing to speak out where the well-being of others is at stake. An illustrations given by the Chafetz Chayyim is where an innocent is about to go into partnership with a man known to be thoroughly dishonest in his business dealings. Here it is one's bounden duty to inform the potential victim of the bad reputation of the man so that he can at least go into it with open eyes.

Is there not a restriction in religious law on the right of those who provide religious services (such as shochethn and shomrim.) to withhold their labour?

There is no such restriction, I am sorry to say. Since Jewish law does allow labourers to withhold their labour (we have dealt with this more than once in this column) there is no logic in demanding that an exception be made. No one has an obligation to be a shochet or a shomer so, while he can be said to be carrying out a religious act if he does become a shochet or a shomer, it is in no way comparable, say, to the man who wears tefuin or gives alms. The law is that the meat must be kosher and hence a shochet is required. But the shochet is entitled to be given an adequate reward for his services, arguing in effect that he is being paid for undertaking this extremely difficult and very unpleasant task which he would not otherwise undertake and which he has no obligation to undertake unless he is paid. It follows that his contractual arrangements with his employers are to be treated no differently from other contractual arrangements and he is entitled, as all other workers are, to go on strike to improve his conditions. Whether a shochet is wise to go on strike when kashrut is made more difficult to observe is quite another matter. Most of us would make the moral, though not legal, demand of the shochet that he refrains from lowering the dignity of his office by treating it as just a job. 64 • J.l.sk the Rabbi'

If one wishes to fulfil the require~nent of giving a tithe, how does one calculate basic incoJDe (i.e., does one deduct national insurance, incoJDe tax, etc)? Must it be used for 'religious' purposes only? How often should one give? What is the status of a wife's incoJDe (1nust she give separately or is it to be given together with her husband's tithe)? And ~nay the 'covenant' systeJD be used for this purpose?

The source for the idea that one's income should be tithed for the poor is the to the verse: 'Thou shalt surely tithe all the increase of thy seed' (Deuteronomy 14:22). From the word 'all' in the verse, the Sifre (quoted by the Tosafists to Taanit 9a) derives the rule that, in addition to the agricultural tithes, it is necessary for the devout Jew to set aside a tenth of his income for charitable purposes. It is meritorious if he gives even more, but he should not give away more than a fifth (Ketubot 50a). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 249:1) formulates it in this way: 'The amount (of charity) to be given, if a man can afford it, is as much as can satisfY the needs of the poor. If he cannot afford so much, it is especially meritorious if he gives up to a fifth of his property. ~ tenth is average giving, while less than this is to be mean. This fifth should be in the first year from his capital and in subsequent years from his profits.' Isserles adds: 'But a man should not give more than a fifth lest he himself becomes impoverished so as to require to be assisted by others ... A man should not use his tithe to perform therewith a mitzva such as giving candles to the synagogue or for other religious purposes, but he should give it to the poor.' The Shach quotes authorities who hold that he may, however, buy religious books with the tithe, especially if he lends them to poor scholars, and a father can use his tithe money for the support of his children. These are the basic rules, although to deal in detail with all matters of tithing would require a whole volume. All I can do here in reply to your queries is to state more or less what it seems to me the sources would suggest you should do. It would appear from the above that the tithe is to be taken from the net, not the gross, income. And contrary to your suggestion, the tithe must be for the poor, not for general religious purposes. If there is a poor person to be helped on the spot, he should be given from each payment received; otherwise one may deposit the money in a special account to be used, when one is called upon to give. According to rabbinic law, the husband's tithing covers that of the wife and, indeed, it is considered wrong for a wife to give away large amounts to charity without her husband knowing of it. A 'covenant' is an arrangement by means of which the Inland Revenue Ethics • 65 will add an amount from one's income tax to sums donated for charitable purposes. But for the details you must consult an accountant, not a rabbi. Charitable organisations will also help you to work it out satisfactorily.

A basic question fro01 a reader who asks: Does Jewish law anywhere lay down what is considered to be a fair profit for those providing essential services to the coDl­ Dlunity, for exa01ple butchers or burial societies?

It is obvious that detailed sums cannot be stated to be fair for all time since prices and incomes, as we know only too well, fluctuate. What can and has been done is to state certain basic principles and leave the rest to the responsible authorities in each particular case. One such principle is contained in the verse: 'And if thou sell aught unto thy neighbour, or buy of thy neighbour's hand, ye shall not wrong one another' (Leviticus 25:14). This is known in the rabbinic literature as onaah, 'wronging', 'overcharging' or 'undercharging' and the whole of the fourth chapter of tractate Baba Metzia in the Talmud discusses the laws of it in great detail. Profits were only allowed of less than a sixth of the market price but, of course, the question in such cases as the one you mention is, what is the market price? A second great principle is that the communal leaders are entitled to impose sanctions whenever they feel that unfair advantage is being taken of people who wish to adhere to religious law. For instance, there is an old established custom of eating fish on the Sabbath but it is well known that if the purveyors of fish sought to take advantage of the custom by demanding very high prices for their wares, the Beth Din of the town would impose a ban on the eating of fish until the prices came down. Similarly, the Talmud ( 30a) tells how the great Babylonian teacher Samuel told people who dealt in certain utensils that if they raised their prices after Passover he would teach that the old vessels, even though they were chametz vessels and had been kept in the home over Passover, were permitted so that no advantage would be taken of the worthy people who wished to keep the law. The same authority warned the florists (Sukka 34b) that if they persisted in demanding high prices for the myrtles they sold for use on Sukkot, he would teach that the law follows the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon that broken myrtle branches are also valid for use. On the other hand, people whose business benefits the community are also entitled to their profits and it would be wrong to prevent them from earning an adequate living. No hard and fast rules can be laid down in detail, therefore, but the idea of justice for all is one to be pursued. Incidentally, in many communities the work of the burial society is carried 66 • i4sk the Rabbi' out by volunteers, it being a high honour to be elected to membership of this organisation.

A young wo~nan, the vict:Un of a vicious attack, was kept alive for 60 hours on a life-support systeJD. The doctors then decided to switch off the ~nachine because there was not the slightest chance she could ever have recovered. What are the halachic rules regarding switching off the ~nachine in such cases?

First, according to the halacha, it is an act of murder to kill a person who will, in any event, die in a very short time if left alone. Since all men die sooner or later, the defmition of murder covers even the taking away of a span of life, no matter how short. In the classic case recorded in the Talmud (Baba Kama, 26b), if a man hurls an infant from a roof in such a manner that the infant will die as soon as it hits the ground, anyone who kills the infant in mid-air is nonetheless held to be a murderer. But if A throws an earthenware vessel from a roof in such a manner that it will be broken in pieces when it hits the ground, B has no liability for the loss of the vessel if he breaks it with a stick in mid-air. The distinction is obvious. In the case of the vessel, once it has left the roof it is unusable, so that, as the Talmud formulates it, B has broken 'a broken vessel', i.e., a vessel that is already worthless. But in the case of a human being about to die, it is the deprivation of this moment of life that constitutes the act of murder. Consequently, from the point of view of the halacha, when the question of euthanasia is considered, the question to be asked is whether it is permitted to commit an act of murder in order to save the victim of this act from terrible suffering or from a vegetable-like existence. This is obviously an extremely difficult moral decision to have to make. Again, the Talmudic references to the evident permissibility of prayers that a sufferer may obtain a merciful release (see Ketubot 104a and Ran to Nedarim 40) are not really germane to the issue, there being an obvious distinction between praying that a person may die and taking physical steps to end his life. But the tragic case you mention did not involve any physical act on the person of the poor girl. It involved, rather, switching off the machine so that her life was not prolonged artificially. This is in a very different category from the usual cases of euthanasia. Switching off the machine could hardly be construed as an act of murder since the girl died from her injuries, not from the act which took away the artificial means that kept her alive where otherwise she would certainly have died. Relevant here is the following ruling in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah Ethics • 67 339: 1). When a man is on his deathbed it is forbidden, for example, to move his limbs if this will have the effects of speeding his death. It is, however, permitted to remove any external cause, such as the noise of a hammer outside his room, which prevents 'the departure of his soul'. Thus, a direct act is forbidden, but an indirect one, the removal of the noise of the hammer, to which switching off the machin~ is exactly analogous, is permitted. It would seem, therefore, that, according to the halacha, the doctors were right to switch off the machine.

What is the halachic attitude, if any, towards trade union­ ism. and, in particular, towards the closed shop? Is there any objection, religious or otherwise, towards either of these?

Trade unions developed in comparatively recent times, so that the halachic sources obviously do not deal with the question directly; but these sources do consider social and economic arrangements which have a bearing on the question. The general principle is that a community or a group of workers or tradesmen can make their own stipulations regarding their activities and these then become legally binding on the members. Thus the Talmud (Succah 51 b) speaks of the various guilds who, it is said, occupied special seats in the great synagogue in Alexandria and a stranger to the city would know to whom he could apply for membership of a guild. In tractate 8b, it is said that the people of each locality are entitled to fix democratically such matters as prices and wages and are further entitled to enforce their arrangements. Tractate Bava Kama 116b declares that ass drivers are entitled to have an arrangement whereby if one of them loses his ass, the others must make good his loss. In brief, then, these matters have to do with fmancial arrangements and there is as little objection to them as to any other honest fmancial arrangements. Justice demands that enactments for the benefit of the group as a whole must be binding on the minority who, while benefiting from the enactments, wish to dissociate themselves from their group responsibilities. There is thus certainly no possible objection inJudaism towards joining a trade union; quite the opposite. As for the closed shop, it seems to me that there is no objection to this either, though here one can think of conditions that might seriously interfere with human freedom. It is admittedly precarious to draw wide conclusions from the older sources for contemporary problems, but this does seem to be a plausible halachic attitude. There has recently been some halachic discussion on these questions in Israel. I would refer you, for example, to an excellent essay by Rabbi K.P. Tkursh in his 'Keter Efrayim' (Tel Aviv, 1967, No. 19, pp. 26Q-71). 68 • 54sk the Rabbi' So111e people appreciate visitors coming unannounced, while others insist on being notified first. Fro111 a Jewish viewpoint, what is the attitude to visits fro111 parents and friends?

Judaism respects a person's right to privacy. There is a midrashic interpreta­ tion of 'How goodly are thy tents, 0 Jacob' (Numbers 24:5) according to which the 'goodliness' lay in the tents being so arranged that the occupants of one tent would not be able to see what was going on in a neighbouring tent. With regard to children and parents, Maimonides rules (!shut 13: 14): 'If a man says to his wife, "I do not want your parents, your brothers and sisters to come to my house," we listen to him and she should rather go to visit them when it is required ... And they should visit her only when she is sick or has given birth and so forth. :And so, too, if she says, "I do not want your mother and your sisters to come to me, and I will not live with them in the same courtyard because they irritate me," we listen to her. For no one can be compelled to allow others to violate privacy.' It follows that children are legally entitled to demand that their parents telephone before paying them a visit. But such delicate matters should not be approached from a purely legal viewpoint: much depends on common sense. There were no telephones when the Book of Proverbs was compiled, but it rightly cautions (25: 17): 'Let thy foot be seldom in thy neighbour's house, lest he be sated with thee and hate thee.' With regards to visits by parents, it would be an odd sort of relationship if children were to insist on their rights and allow parents to visit only after a prior arrangement. Such an attitude would come very close to offending against the fifth commandment. Wise parents should nevertheless exercise discretion and avoid 'popping in' whenever they feel like it or interfering in their children's lives -whichJewish parents are often tempted to do at the slightest provocation.

What doesjudais111 have to say about the effect of punish­ Dlent on the wrongdoer, and about the considerations that ought to influence those who 111ete it out?

This is a big subject, which requires more than a short column for it to be dealt with adequately, but here are some ideas from the classicaljewish sources which have a bearing on the subject. The talmudic rabbis note that when the Torah speaks of a wrongdoer having been punished, it refers to him as 'thy brother', from which they derive the lesson: 'Once he has been punished, he is not to be reminded of his former guilt and is to be treated as a brother.' Furthermore, the rabbis understand the verse, 'Love thy neighbour as Ethics • 69 thyself', as applying to the criminal as well, so that degrading punishments must not be inflicted on him, and everything must be done to interpret the relevant verses in the Torah in such a way as to make the punishments which are recorded there as humane as possible. Vindictiveness on the part of society is to be avoided. Even when the Torah orders an execution, the words used are 'and thou shalt remove the evil from thy midst', i.e., the aim is to make society safe for the innocent, not to wreak vengeance on the criminal. You refer specifically in your letter to an article in which it is stated that a Christian view of punishment is to see it as follows: the unpleasantness of punishment helps to make the criminal aware of his true condition and gives him a chance to repent. You wish to know whether or not this is also a Jewish VIew. Indeed it is. Nachmanides, for example, in the Middle Ages, understands the whole institution of the sin-offering in Temple times as a kind of symbolic enactment of the fate the sinner deserves. When he reflects on the death of the animal offered up in his stead, the one who has sinned is moved by remorse and is filled with the resolve to sin no more. We fmd in the Talmud that certain penalties were waived altogether in order to encourage sinners to repent. For instance, strictly speaking, if a man stole a beam and built it into his house, the man from whom he had stolen the beam has a legal right to refuse monetary compensation and can demand that the actual beam stolen from him be returned, even if the thief will have to demolish his house. But the rabbis refused to allow such an attitude and ruled that monetary compensation is sufficient so as to encourage sinners to repent. There is an interesting observation of Maimonides in connection with the talmudic rule that where a wife petitions for divorce on solid grounds and the husband refuses to give the get, physical force can be exercised for the purpose of coercing him to agree to the get. This is the law, even though, normally, consent rendered under duress is invalid. Maimonides' explanation is that human beings are basically decent. The husband's improper behaviour, his refusal to do the right thing and release his wife from her marital ties where this is the right course, is due to his stub­ bornness and justice requires this to be overcome by force if that is the only way. But when the husband does eventually agree to the get being given, albeit under duress, he really wishes it to be given because of its inherent justice, which he, too, deep down, wishes to follow. 70 • Jtsk the Rabbi' It is only in recent years that the concepts of fair and unfair dismissal from employment have become distinc­ tive features in English law. I understand that the safe­ guarding of employment and the dignity of labour are specifically covered inJewish law and would like to know more about this.

Only a few of the Jewish teachings can here be given. In the Bible (Leviticus 19:13, Deuteronomy 24:14-15) the employer is warned against keeping back the wages of his employees. The early Midrash known as Sifre (Deuteronomy 279) comments on this: 'Why does the workman ascend the highest scaffolding and risk his life if you do not pay him his wages as soon as they are due?' The Talmud (Baba Metzia 1Oa) rules that a workman hired for the day may break his contract in the middle of the day (though the question of compen­ sation to his employer then arises and is discussed) because he is not a slave. The theological motivation for this rule is stated: 'The children of Israel are servants of the Most High. They are not slaves to other human beings.' Here is clearly stated the idea that human dignity must be preserved in labour relations. In 'Ethics of the Fathers' (1: 10) there occurs the saying, 'Love work; hate lordship; and seek no intimacy with the ruling power.' The meaning of the latter statement is probably, 'Do not seek to evade honest employment by courting the favour of the Roman authorities.' Dr Hertz's comment is worth repeating: 'Far from looking upon manual labour as a curse, the rabbis extolled it as an important factor in man's moral education; and many of the most eminent scholars were manual labourers. 'The slowness among Western nations to recognise the dignity of labour is no doubt due to the fact that, till quite recent times, classical literature monopolised the education of the governing classes among European peoples. As with the Greeks and Romans, idleness was for ages the mark of nobility.' According to the rabbis, it is a religious duty for a father to teach his son a craft or a trade so that he may be able to earn a living. These teachings could easily be multiplied. Yet it has to be appreciated that the classicalJewish sources, compiled long before the Industrial Revolution, are generally thinking of workmen hired for the day to do a specific job, not of the kind of situation which obtains today when people receive a weekly or annual wage and are employed for long periods or until retirement. Moreover, organised labour is a modern phenomenon. The problems nowadays are consequently much more difficult to solve and it is principles only that can be derived from the sources. It is also important to note that Jewish law permits- indeed, it advocates - the introduction of new legislation to promote greater social justice. Thus, in the case you mention of unfair dismissal, there is nothing to prevent the introduction of legislation to cover this. Ethics • 71 It is quite unrealistic to expectjudaism or 'rabbis' to provide a blueprint for social justice in today's world. Rabbis can only point to the principles contained in the Jewish sources and it is then up to the politicians to work out the details in accordance with these principles.

InJewishlawistheresuchathingasa 'gentleDlaD'sagree­ ment, i.e., a verbal contract of e~nploym.ent?

This question is discussed in the Talmud. The Mishna (Baba Metzia 4: 1) states that where money has been paid for goods and the goods have not yet been delivered, there has been no legal transfer and either party can retract. Yet, the Mishna goes on to state, if one of them does retract he is warned by the court: 'He who punished (mi shepara) the generation of the Deluge and the generation of the dispersion, He will punish one who does not keep his word.' It would seem from this that mi shepara only applies where the money has been handed over. Would it be, nonetheless, a breach of trust for either party to retract even where no money had been paid? This is debated in the Talmud (Baba Metzia 49a), Rab holding that it would not, R. Johanan holding that it would. The view of R.Johanan is accepted. Thus Maimonides (Mechirah 7:8) writes: 'Where there is only a verbal agreement it is still proper to keep one's word, even if there had been no payment of any money, no mark denoting ownership made on the goods and nothing taken as security. In this case whoever goes back on the transaction, whether the buyer or the seller, though there is no mi shepara, is of those lacking in trustworthiness.' It follows that a 'gentleman's agreement' is not legally binding in Jewish law but that there is, nonetheless, a strong moral obligation for a man to keep his word. If, however, the 'verbal agreement' is accompanied by an act recognised in that place as concluding the deal- for instance, a handshake - the agreement is legally binding (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 201 :2).

If an employer hires so~neone on a permanent basis, then flnds so~neone with better qualifications, can the employer diSIDiss the first employee, assmning there are no other grounds for dismissal, and hire the second?

According to the Mishna (Baba Metzia 7: 1) conditions and terms of employment are to be determined by the initial contract. Regarding matters on which the contract is silent the practice in the particular place in which the contract was made is to be followed, it being assumed, in the absence of any express statement to the contrary, that both parties intend to follow the norm in that particular place. Thus where there is a question of wrongful dismissal the case has to be decided by referring to the terms of the original contract. So much for the legal position. It is hard to try to lay down hard and fast 72 • 14sk the Rabbi' rules on the moral obligation of the employer, since this differs from case to case.

Is there a Jewish tradition regarding the require~nents to be JDet in drawing up a will, for exaJDple which JDeJDbers of a fanilly should benefit and how one's estate should be divided?

The two relevant biblical passages are, first, the rule (Deuteronomy 21: 15-17) that the first-born son inherits a double portion of the estate and, secondly, the following passage (Numbers 27:8-11) regarding the order of succession: ~d thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel, saying If a man die, and have no son, then ye shall cause his inheritance to pass unto his daughter. And if he have no daughter, then ye shall give his inheritance unto his brethren. And if he have no brethren, then ye shall give his inheritance unto his father's brethren. And if his father have no brethren, then ye shall give his inheritance unto his kinsman that is next to him of his family, and he shall possess it. And it shall be unto the children of Israel a statute of judgement, as the Lord commanded Moses.' On the basis of the final verse, the rabbis ruled that these laws of succession and the right of the first-born are binding and can never be changed if the intention is to interfere with the laws of inheritance. However, if part of the estate, or even the whole of it, is given to others in the form of a gift, to take effect retrospectively from the time the requisite deed was drawn up, it is a valid procedure since the laws in the Bible do not speak of a man who declares while alive how his estate is to be divided. The rules regarding this matter are extremely complicated and cannot be discussed in a short reply, but the following statement from Maimonides (Nachalot, chapter 6) goes some way towards answering your query. 'This (the proper order of succession) only applies when he said it by denoting that it is an inheritance but if he made it over as a gift it is valid. 'Consequently, if one divides up his estate among his sons while he is on his deathbed, giving more to one and less to the other or giving the same amount to the first-born as to the others, it is valid but if he said that it should operate as an inheritance he has said nothing at all. 'Whoever gives away his estate to others, forsaking his true heirs, even if the heirs do not conduct themselves properly, the spirit of the Sages is displeased with him, yet for all that those others acquire whatever he gave to them. 'It is a saintly rule that a pious man should never be a witness to a will in which property is taken away from an heir, even if it be from a son who does not conduct himself properly to one who does. 'The Sages command that a man should never show any special preference during his life time to one particular son in order to prevent dissension and envy as it happened in the case of Joseph and his brethren.' Ethics • 73 For a full statement of the rabbinic law the article on Wills in the new Encyclopaedia Judaica can be consulted with profit, though it is rather technical.

Why are many otherwise strictly observantJews more lax in :monetary :matters, even when they are exceedingly strict in various ritual :matters?

I suspect that when you and others make this kind of sweeping statement, it is because higher standards are demanded of OrthodoxJews, so that one of them who behaves badly in ethical matters is seen as letting down the whole side. Is it not sometimes the case that some of us feel guilty at our comparative laxity in observance, for which we have a need to compensate by suggesting that, while we might not be so good in our ritual observances, at least we shine over 'them' in our ethical conduct? It is as unfair to do what you and others are doing as it is to blame whole groups for the shortcomings of some of their members. I am unaware of any ways in which talmudic casuistry can make its practitioners find doubtful ways out of commitments. What may have had a degree of truth about East European Jews is that hardly any would have dreamed of, say, eating trefa food and yet they, like all other human beings, at times engaged in malicious gossip and slander or were guilty of other ethical offences of the same or of greater import in the Torah. R. Israel Salanter, founder of the Musar movement, argued that it was because religious observances, such as eating only kosher food, had become so ingrained in the lives ofJews that there was an automatic revulsion against trefa. The idea behind the whole movement was, in fact, that it was possible for the Jew, as a result of severe training in self-discipline, to make the ethical demands of the Torah just as much his second nature as were the ritual demands. The Jewish ideal is for the Jew to keep what the rabbis call 'the mitzvot between man and man' with as much care and enthusiasm as 'the rnitzvot between man and God'. The human situation is such that there is a tendency to pay more attention to one of these areas than to the other.

Does Jewish law sanction the withholding of labour in a work dispute?

It must be obvious that the problems of strikes experienced in our kind of society was non-existent before the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of a capital-labour situation. There are consequently no direct rules in the classical sources of Jewish law but certain principles are laid down in these which are of help in the contemporary situation. 74 • J.tsk the Rabbi' The basic principle above all others is that only a slave can be compelled to work so that every free man has an inalienable right to withhold his labour for whatever reason he chooses. The famous third century Babylonian teacher, Rab, ruled that a labourer may withdraw his labour even in the middle of the day. The reason given to justify the ruling is that Scripture says: 'For unto Me the children of Israel are servants; they are My servants' (Leviticus 25:55), upon which the Talmud(Baba Metzia lOa and 77a) comments: 'and not servants of servants.' However, in the same Talmudic source the saying of Rab is qualified somewhat if a contractual arrangement had been made with the employer so that a breach of contract may be involved. Thus, the two principles are the right of a worker to withhold his labour; and that the contract between employer and employee is as binding as any other contract and there can be legal redress for its breach. All this means in our society that Jewish law does give workers the right to strike.

Does Jewish law require that a testa.Dlentary wish of a parent should be carried out even if it is offensive to the conscience of the child?

The Talmudic references to the fact that 'it is a mitzva to carry out the wishes of the deceased' (Ketubot 70a, 14b, 15a, 40a) have to do with carrying out the wishes of the deceased with regard to the disposal of some of his estate. Does it apply; too, where the disposal of the estate is not involved? In other words, is there a rule that the wishes of the deceased should be carried out by his heirs even when his wishes have to do with external matters, where, for example, he objected to his son or daughter marrying a particular person? The authorities are divided on the question but in any event there is clearly no mitzva where the wishes of the deceased are offensive to the conscience of the child concerned (see the summary in the compendium Sede Chemed, by H.H. Medini, ed., Friedmann, Volume 4, pp. 311-12). The numerous 'ethical wills' of greatjews are based on the idea that in general matters, too, the children should carry out the wishes of the parent but they are ethical wills containing advice and counsel in religion, piety and ethical conduct. The duty to carry out the wishes of a dead parent is no more binding than the duty to carry out the wishes of a living parent and it is accepted everywhere injewish law that the fifth commandment does not apply where a parent orders a child to disobey the Torah. Ethics • 75 To what extent is an employee bound by his contract in Jewish law? I have discovered repeatedly that among Jewish institutions would-be employees are expected to leave their previous employers without the required notice.

The basic principle regarding contracts in Jewish law is that both parties can make any stipulation they choose provided it is agreed to by both and does not involve any infringements of Jewish law. It is true that a talmudic passage (Baba Metzia 1Oa) states that an employee can break his contract, since otherwise he would be like a slave, but there is then the question of compensation to his employer. It is also true that on the basis of this talmudic passage, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 333:3) frowns on a teacher hiring himself for three years or more, but, as the commentators suggest, this is not a categorical rule. For instance, with regard to a rabbi's contract, it has been argued that he may contract with his congregation for life and no 'slavery' is involved, since he, unlike a slave, has time off and holidays. Thus, I am puzzled by what you say has been the attitude of some Jewish institutions for which there appears to be no warrant in the halachic sources.

If the Bible prohibits a Jew taking interest from another Jew, how can there be Jewish banks, such as those under the control of the State of Israel? I notice in their London branch the Israeli national bank does not have visible a copy of their 'heter iska'. As Jewish banking is only a 'heter', should one not use a non-Jewish bank out of regard to the biblical prohibition?

You, yourself have answered your first question in the reference to the heter iska, a late rabbinic device to facilitate business loans as investments. Since there is a heter iska, with the document drawn up to satisfy the requirements of the law, it is permitted to use such a bank and there is no need for a copy of the document to be displayed at every branch. It is the existence of the document that makes it permitted, not the display of the document. As for your second question, the heter iska, though it has sometimes been abused in the past, is an authentic rabbinic institution, so that no infringement of the biblical law obtains. 76 • 54sk the Rabbi' Does the coJDJDandm.ent to forgive one's neighbour also apply to wilful harJD done to soJDeone in order to benefit froiD it, e.g., eJDbezzleJDent of ~noney? Must one forgive the ~nurder of a relative? If so, then the forgiveness surely does not coJDe froiD the heart.

There is no commandment to 'forgive' one's neighbour. Forgiveness is God's business, not ours. The commandment is to love one's neighbour and not to hate him, but these are not categorical. There is no obligation to love the murderer of one's relative - or, for that matter, any other murderer - unless he has repented severely of his crime and has undergone prolonged penances. In the case of embezzlement you mention, the command not to hate certainly does not mean that the victim of a crime must not seek redress in the courts. He is fully entitled to see that justice is done. It is well known that the rabbis declare that Yom Kippur does not afford atonement and pardon for sins committed against one's neighbour until the wrong done has been put right. In fact, in the famous prayer (printed in the old machzorim) by Rabbi Abraham Danzig, for recital before Kol Nidrei, the worshipper declares that he forgives all who have wronged him (i.e., he bears no grudge against them) except for legitimate claims which he does not forego and is not expected to forego. The command to love one's neighbour certainly does not mean that we must become door-mats, born victims of every rogue. A rabbinic illustration of the prohibition of taking revenge is: if a man refuses to lend you something today do not behave as he does and refuse to lend him something he wants tomorrow. 4 Kashrut

Why is it, I am. asked, that soDle rabbis will not eat Dleat at public functions, even when the slaughtering is under their own supervision?

Why indeed! If they have any doubts about the kashrut of the meal they have supervised they ought not to permit others to eat of it. I suppose their defence would be that we do find the idea that extremely pious folk may refrain from eating even kosher meat if there is somewhere an authority who holds that it is trefa or if there is the most far-fetched reason for supposing it is trefa, even if that reason is rejected by the law. In such instances it would certainly be wrong to be pious at the expense of others by declaring the meat trefa, which by law it is not, yet the rabbi may decide to be strict with himsel£ There is a reference in the Talmud (Chullin 37b) to the Prophet Ezekiel saying that he had never eaten the meat of an animal which had to be brought to a sage to decide whether or not it was trefa (i.e., even if he decided that, in fact, it was kosher). There is an old gibe about the Behomot and Leviathan served to the righteous, at the great banquet after the coming of the Messiah. God slaughtering both for the Zaddikim (the righteous ones). Why both? Because there will no doubt be there Zaddikim who will not trust even God's and He will have to provide them with a fish meal.

Recent Dledical research suggests that it is unhealthy to digest Dlilk proteins after Dleat proteins, the cheDlical table set up by the liver being different for each. If people decide to separate Dlilk and Dleat proteins, for such new health reasons only, does this weigh in the balance as a Dlitzva - or not?

First it must be said that no positive precept is performed when one refrains from forbidden food. Not to put too fme a point on it, your question should have been formulated as: 'Does this weigh in the balance as the avoidance of an averah (sin)?' Formulated in this way, the answer is that, while no merit has been accrued, it is also true that no averah has, in fact, been done. What you are really asking is whether there is any religious value in keeping the dietary laws for health reasons. Now the rabbis do say that a man should not argue that he hates forbidden food and would not eat it even if it was not forbidden. He should rather say that he refrains from it because his Father in 78 • 14sk the Rabbi' Heaven has so decreed, i.e., so that his abstention has a religious motivation. This is not necessarily to rule out entirely the hygienic interpretation of the dietary laws. Some have suggested that the reason why they are ordained is because God wishes man to be healthy. But there seems to be a logical contradiction in a demand that an act or abstention from an act where the motive is expressly not religious- you use the word 'only'-should at the same time be of religious significance. To take an example from the positive precepts: supposing someone was paid to wear . The rabbis say that observance, even out of unworthy motives, still counts as a mitzva and so, while far from the ideal, the man who is paid to wear tefillin and does it for this reason has still performed a mitzva. But it is hard to see how the man who declares that he wears tefillin only because he is paid so to do can be said to have carried out a mitzva. By declaring that he only does it because he is paid so to do he surely implies that he does not consider it to be a mitzva. It should also perhaps be said that the prohibition of eating milk after meat is rabbinic (as opposed to eatiQg meat and milk boiled together, which, say the rabbis, is biblical). Moreover, there is no prohibition on eating meat after milk, whereas your 'health' reason would presumably apply to either. I am extremely dubious about any attempt to bolster up the dietary or similar laws by trying to show that they are in accord with the latest medical discoveries. The cause of holiness served by these and similar laws is sufficient justification and no service is done for religion by a reductionist philosophy in which religious rites and ceremonies are practised because they are useful for other than religious purposes. To do this is, in a sense, to sell the pass.

When did the practice of shechita coJDe into Jewish life, as Leviticus does not state how an anilnal is to be slaughtered?

The Talmud ( 28a) observes that Moses was instructed in the details of shechita by word of mouth, that is, part of the Oral Torah. At the very least, this points to the fact that from early rabbinic times the methods were employed that are still employed today. Nowhere in the whole of Talmudic literature is there to be found any dissenting voice. Historians may argue that the detailed laws did not drop down ready-made from Heaven, but are the result of a long process. Yet the clear fact remains that this is how shechita was practised amongJews for as long as Jewish memory reaches. Why does shechita have to be performed in this way and in no other? Some Jewish teachers have dismissed the very question as impious. God has so commanded and that is the end of the matter. Others, however, have argued that only by means of shechita can the blood by adequately drained from the animal, that shechita is the most painless way Kashrut • 79 of killing an animal for food and that the Torah is concerned that no needless pain be caused to animals (see the introduction of the Peri Megadim to the laws of shechita in the Yoreh Deah). A tradition that goes back at least 2,000 years and which has served the cause of holiness and compassion is sufficient justification for it to be followed byJews today. I believe that the Reform position is to leave the question of shechita to the individual, arguing, on the grounds you mention, that it is not intrinsically binding. But Orthodox and Conservative Jews staunchly uphold these laws and will continue to do so.

I would Hke to learn to slaughter poultry the kosher way. Are wom.en pennitted to perform. shechita and, if so, how does one go about it? I only wish to m.ake use of it for m.y own dom.estic needs.

The first Mishna in tractate Chullin (dealing in the main with shechita) states that women may carry it out. The very first Tosaftsts (the French medieval glosses to the Talmud) in this tractate refute the argument of an early work that women may not in the first instance carry out shechita because they cannot be trusted to do it properly (perhaps because women are tender-hearted). It is also well-known that, on occasion, women have been authorised by Orthodox rabbis to perform shechita after having mastered the laws and the correct techniques. But I doubt whether any shochet ·will today be willing to teach you. In contemporary life, the act of shechita is allowed to be carried out only by fully trained shochetim who have received what is known as cabala (in this context, authorisation) from a competent Beth Din or individual rabbi. So, much as I admire your ambition, I doubt whether you will be able to realise it.

If, as you stated, there is no prohibition in using objects m.ade from. forbidden anim.als - pigskin shoes, for exam.ple -why is it forbidden to rear pigs, especially as there seem.s to be no objection to the rearing of cam.els, horses or rabbits?

Briefly; the matter is as follows. As I stated, it is permitted to have benefit from objects made from pigs and other unclean animals. Secondly; though this is permitted, it is not permitted for a Jew to earn his living by selling the meat of trefa animals to non:Jews (Mishna, Sheviit 7:3). For this reason, it is not, in fact, permitted to rear rabbits, for example, for food, but it is permitted to rear horses, since this is not normally for food (see Tosafists to Baba Kama 82b). 80 • 14sk the Rabbi' Since pigs are usually reared for food it is obviously forbidden, just as it is to rear other unclean animals for this purpose. But the truth is that even if pigs are reared for other purposes than for food it is still forbidden, according to the Mishna (Baba Kama 7:7). This is due to the extreme abhorrence with which the pig in particular is treated in theJewish tradition. The Talmud (Baba Kama 82b-83a) also connects the prohibition to an episode immediately prior to the destruction of the Temple. The reason why pigskin shoes are permitted is that, as we noted, only the rearing of pigs and the selling of pig meat is forbidden, but there is no ban on other less direct modes of having benefit from unclean animals, not even from pigs.

Are the laws of kashrut designed to protect our health or are they purely religious?

Even if the underlying reason were that of protecting our health, it could still be 'purely religious', as you put it, since to look after one's health - in appreciation that life is God's gift - is itself a religious act. It has to be noted, however, that a hygienic reason for the dietary laws is found neither in the Bible nor in the Talmud, where the stress is on holiness and on obedience to God's will. But in the writings of Maimonides, in particular, the hygienic reason is mentioned. For him, God does not order us to obey arbitrary rules, so there must be strong reasons why we are commanded to obey the dietary laws. This reason may not be evident on the surface, but on closer examination it can be seen to be highly significant for human life. Thus, says Maimonides in his 'Guide for the Perplexed', we are forbidden to eat swineflesh because the pig is a repulsive dirty animal, and we are forbidden to eat meat cooked in milk because this is 'exceedingly gross food' and highly indigestible. A number of arguments have been advanced against understanding the kashrut laws on hygienic grounds. First, the implication is that if modern science discovers that these foods are not harmful - and might even be beneficial - there is no longer any need to follow the laws. This would run counter to the doctrine that the Torah laws are eternal and can never be suspended. Secondly, while the promotion of health is undoubtedly good, there is an element of self-seeking in making this the aim of kashrut instead of the more sublime aim of divine worship. On this view, the Torah laws are for the healing of the soul rather than of the body. Thus, the main reason for observing the dietary laws is indeed religious. To obey the dictates of religion is not a means to an end, but an end in itself - that end being the worship of God. The Jew, through the laws of kashrut, is aware of God even while satisfying his physical needs. Kashrut • 81 Why does the Jewish religion insist on kosher meat?

According to the Talmud, the laws of shechita were given to Moses at Sinai. For many a devoutJew, this means that God has commanded us to eat meat only if the animal has been slaughtered in this manner. But while obedience to the will of God is perhaps the most powerful motive in keeping these laws, a number ofJewish thinkers and teachers have pointed out that shechita, contrary to what its enemies affrrm, is the most humane method of killing animals for food. It should not need repeating that the most distinguished medical authorities have affrrmed that this method results in instantaneous loss of consciousness on the part of the animal, so that the method is as painless as any method can be. Despite assertions to the contrary, it would be a gross interference with the rights of its citizens for any State to deny its Moslem andJewish citizens the opportunity of eating meat. All killing of animals for food involves some pain to the animal, so the next logical step would be for the law to enforce vegetarianism. For an excellent statement on the Jewish attitude you can do no better than to read Dr Hertz's comment, entided 'Kindness to Animals', in his com­ mentary to the Chumash, pp. 854-5.

What happens if a kosher animal consumes a quantity of pig fat or anything of the sort?

The frrst teacher to discuss the question is the famous German authority Mordecai ben Hillel (d. 1298) in his compendium ofJewish law (Mordecai to , Chapter 7, No. 66). The Talmud (Yevamot 66b) states that if a Cohen hires an animal from an Israelite he must not feed the animal with , the priest's tithe, which may only be eaten by a Cohen. No reason is given and some commentators suggest that when the animal is returned to the Israelite he might eat it and would then be guilty of eating the terumah that is forbidden to him. Mordecai dismisses this. If that were the reason, he observes, how can we eat birds that have fed on worms? The reason why there is no objection is obvious. Once the forbidden food has been digested by the bird or animal, it has lost its former identity, to say nothing of the fact that the forbidden food has contributed in only slight measure to the growth of the bird or the animal. It would appear, however, from the Tosaftsts (Terumah 31a) that if an animal had been fattened from birth on nothing but forbidden food that animal would be forbidden. Thus the ruling is given by Isserles in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 60:1 ): ~ animal that has been fattened with forbidden food is permitted, but if it had been fattened all its life with nothing but forbidden food the animal is forbidden.' 82 • J.tsk the Rabbi' The commentators to the Shulchan Aruch go even further in ruling that not only is the animal that has fed on forbidden food permitted, but one is actually permitted to feed an animal one intends to eat with food that is forbidden.

What is the prohibition against selling im.ported kosher m.eat?

The takkanat hakohal ('communal enactment') is an important institution in Jewish law. Communities have the right to ban certain foods, even though these are kosher, where there is adequate reason for so doing. In a number of communities, enactments were made with regard to shechita, e.g., that only a particular shochet should perform it (Yoreh Deah, 1: 11) or that no kosher meat be imported into the community. The aim of such enactments was twofold: to make sure that the meat was kosher by being supervised by the rabbi of the community, and to protect the local butchers against competition. If these were to go out of business, there would be no guarantee that kosher meat would be forthcoming. Rabbi Yechiel Michael Epstein (1829-1908) states (~eh Hashulchan', Yoreh Deah, 1:57) that in his town of Novogrudok there was a to the effect that if meat was brought into the town from without, it was treated as if it were trefa, even to the extent of rendering unfit the utensils in which the meat had been cooked. In some places the term for this was shechutey chutz ('outside slaughtering'), a term originally referring to animals slaughtered 'outside' the Temple, but it is here applied to kosher meat that comes from 'outside' the community. The recent notice from the National Council of Shechita Boards did not state that the meat was not kosher because it was intrinsically unfit, i.e., because it had been prepared under unsatisfactory conditions of supervision. All that was implied was the truth, that the meat constituted shechutey chutz, and where this applies the authorities have a duty to warn people not to offend against the takkanah. Whether or not shechutey chutz applies here is another matter. One would have to ask the following questions: Was there ever such a takkanah in Anglo­ Jewry? If there was, has it fallen into disuse? Is such a takkanah binding on a community such as ours, with its great diversity in which, in any event, there is more than one shechita authority? Can the takko:nah apply to imported packaged meat where there is no fear of trefa and where, it might well be argued, the interests of the customers should be paramount? · If the principle of shechutey chutz is to be invoked, how is it that the strictest rabbinic authorities in America do not object to, say, packaged meat pre­ pared in New York being sold in Chicago or Los Angeles? The National Council should make known to the public in greater detail whatever case it has. Kashrut • 83 H a meat knife is used by mistake to cut cheese would it be made kosher after putting it in the ground (earth) for several hours?

There is some confusion here. The general principle in these matters is that a knife used for cutting trefa food or a meat knife used for cutting cheese only requires to be koshered if either the knife or the food it cuts is hot. It must then be koshered by immersion in boiling hot water. But if a cold meat knife is used by mistake to cut cold cheese the knife remains kosher and nothing further need be done. The law to which you refer is as follows. Although, as has been said, where neither the knife nor the food it cuts is hot the knife remains kosher, particles of the forbidden food may still adhere to it and in order to remove these the knife is put into hard, compact soil.

What is the origin of supervised milk and why (in America for instance) do many leading rabbis not consider it necessary? Does kosher butter and cheese have to be made with supervised milk? And what is the din with regard to cheese made by a Jewish firm which operates on Shabbat?

The prohibition of non-Jewish milk, where ajewwas not present at the milking, is stated in the Mishnah ( 2:6). The reason given in the (Avodah Zarah 35b) is out of fear that a Gentile may add to the kosher milk, or substitute for it milk from a non-kosher animal, e.g., a she-ass or a camel. This is the origin of the prohibition. As for your question regarding cheese and butter, Isserles, in his note to Yoreh Deah 115:1, states: 'Milk of a non-Jew, once it is forbidden, remains forbidden even if cheese or butter was made from it.' The meaning is that forbidden milk does not curdle, so that one ought to have been allowed to make cheese and butter from non-Jewish milk, since the very fact that these had been manufactured from it demonstrates that the milk was kosher. Nevertheless, Isserles rules that it is still forbidden on the grounds that once the prohibition had, as it were, descended upon it, that prohibition can never be removed. The famous authority, Hezekiah Da Silva ( 1659-95), argued for a relaxation of the whole prohibition on the grounds that in 'these lands' there is little non­ kosher milk, so that the fear of its being sold by a non-Jew is extremely remote. In modern times there is, in any event, a strict law against misrepresentation of foods for sale by State law. Da Silva argued that it is not as if there were a formal proclamation by the ancient rabbis that non-Jewish milk is forbidden, in which case there would arise the difficult question of whether the law can be repealed. It is simply a case of the rabbis fearing the mixture of forbidden milk. 84 • i4sk the Rabbi' The rabbis you mention probably rely on this in not requiring supervision for milk. The many authorities who do require it, however, argue, contrary to Da Silva, that the original prohibition was, indeed, a formal one which has never been repealed. As for your fmal question, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 318: 1) rules that products obtained as a result of ajew's profanation of the Sabbath are nonetheless permitted to others after the Sabbath, but not on the Sabbath itsel£

Would you explain Deuteronomy 14, verse 21: 'Ye shall not eat of anything that clieth of itself; thou shalt give it to the stranger that is within thy gates, that he may eat it; or thou mayest sell it unto an alien.' Literally inter­ preted, this would seem to be very unsociable to non-Jews and would seem to condone the sale for profit of meat or fish unfit for Jews (and possibly anyone else} to eat.

The verse cannot be speaking of food unfit to be eaten for then the 'stranger' would not accept the gift and the 'alien' would not buy it. The verse, in fact, concludes: 'for thou art a holy people unto the Lord thy God'. It is not a hygienic precaution that is referred to but a ritual law. The offence of eating 'anything that dieth of itself' (nevela) applies even if the meat is perfectly sound and wholesome and the reason is because of the special holy character the people of Israel has to cultivate. (According to the Rabbis, nevela is perfectly normal meat but of an animal that has not had shechita.) Such a purely religious law is not binding upon non-lsraelites. They are not bound by the religious law of Israel but have their own religious laws. The verse thus states that although it is forbidden for an Israelite to eat the forbidden food he should not waste it but dispose of it to someone who is allowed to eat it. The 'stranger that is within thy gates' is a non-Israelite who has decided to live permanently in the land. He should be given the forbidden food since he is in many respects a citizen of the land, though not bound by its religious laws. But the 'alien' referred to is one passing through the country, a traveller on business, for instance. There is no obligation to give him the food but it is permitted to sell it to him. The verse, according to the rabbis, teaches us that it is permitted to have benefit from nevela even though one may not eat it. The verse has never been interpreted to mean that a Jew may profit by selling food unfit to eat because it is rotten or harmful and the like. Such practices are strictly forbidden according to the Jewish religion. Kashrut • 85 Can such products advertised as dried skimmed or non­ fat milk be conswned after a meat meal?

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 87:6-8) gives the definition of what constitutes 'milk' for the purpose of the dietary laws and it is clear that the products you mention would be considered as 'milk', though not so as to incur the full prohibition. In the USA a special synthetic milk is used after meat meals but that is a very different product. As I have seen, when such a product is used there it is customary to place the carton on the table so that people are not misled into thinking that real milk is being consumed after meat.

'Thou shalt not boll the kid in its mother's milk.' Why is this Biblical injunction given wider application to milk conswned after any kind of meat or poultry rather than its strictly literal meaning?

Historically considered, in all probability, the original meaning of the verse was the literal one, which was later extended to include other meat and milk. However, the wider application took place in any event at so early a period that throughout rabbinic literature it is assumed that the wider meaning is the original meaning of the verse. Some of the medieval Biblical commentators seek to explain it this way. The prohibition is against boiling any meat and milk together, but kid's meat is tender and a delicacy when cooked in milk while the mother's milk is ready to hand. Seen in this way, the reference to a 'kid' and its 'mother' is simply an example of the kind of cooking together that is likely to occur. In the same way, for example, the laws about the goring ox apply to other animals which do harm as well, a dog which bites, for instance. But the law gives as an example an instance most likely to occur in the kind of society in which the law was first promulgated. It should further be said that your interpretation of the law is inaccurate on several counts. First, the verse speaks of 'a' kid not 'the' kid (gedi not hagedz). Secondly, according to the rabbis, the Biblical prohibition refers only to boiling meat and milk together and to eating (or having any other benefit from) the mixture which results or any part of it. Drinking milk after meat is forbidden only by rabbinic law as a 'fence to the Torah'. Thirdly, the Biblical law, according to the rabbis, does not apply to poultry. This, too, is a rabbinic extension and the view is recorded in the Talmud that some authorities do not known of even a rabbinic prohibition here (although this is not the view that is followed). 86 • 54sk the Rabbi' Is it forbidden to eat 01eat or any kind of 01eat product before the fish course of a 01eal?

In a Talmudic passage (Pesachim 78b) it is said that Mar b. R. Ashi forbade the eating of fish baked together with meat because of the bad odour it leaves in the mouth and because it may bring on leprosy (referred to euphemistically as 'something else'). Maimonides makes no mention of the prohibition in his Code but the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 116:2) records that it is even forbidden to eat meat and fish together, let alone to eat them when they have been cooked together. The Shulchan Aruch also rules that it is necessary to wash the hands after eating meat, in order to remove particles of meat from them, before eating fish at the same meal. From this latter ruling it is clear that even those who prohibit the eating of meat and fish together allow them to be eaten one after the other at the same meal, which answers your question. The author of 'Magen Avraham', R. Abraham Gombiner (ea. 1635-ca. 83), in his notes to the latter passage, remarks that possibly nowadays there is less fear of any harm resulting from meat and fish being eaten together since there are many things mentioned in the Talmud as injurious to health which are so no longer 'because nature has changed' and because these matters depend on geographical and climatical conditions.

Is a person who keeps a kosher ho01e perDlitted to utilise the services of a street knife-grinder who 01ay possibly have ground utensils fro01 a non-kosher or non-:Jewish ho01e?

The rule is that a knife or other such utensil can only be rendered trefa if it comes into contact with trefa food that is boiling hot or if the knife is hot. Contact with cold trefa food with a cold knife does not render the knife trefa, though, of course, the trefa food must be removed (the practice is to remove it by digging the knife in hard soil). It follows that there is not the slightest objection to using the services of a street knife-grinder.

A lady wishes to know if a dishwasher can be 01ade kosher for 01eat dishes after having been used for D1ilk and how does one kosher plates and cutlery which have been used for trefa foods?

Let us deal with the second question first. According to the rabbis, the flavour (taam) of trefa food is also forbidden, which is why utensils in which trefa food has been cooked have to be koshered before they can be used. The koshering removes the substance that imparts the flavour. Kashrut • 87 The principle is that the trefa flavour is removed from the utensil by the same process with which it was absorbed in the first instance. Thus a spit, for example, having been used on the frre, has to be placed again in the frre for it to become kosher while a pot in which trefa food has been boiled can be koshered either by boiling water in it or by plunging it into a cauldron of boiling water. A verse quoted in this connection is: 'Every thing that may abide the frre, ye shall make to go through the frre, and it shall be clean ... and all that abideth not the frre ye shall make to go through water' (Numbers 31 :23). Chinaware cannot be koshered on the principle that earthenware absorbs the trefa flavour in such a manner that it can never be entirely removed. The verse quoted in this connection is: 'But the earthen vessel wherein it is sodden shall be broken; and if it be sodden in a brazen vessel, it shall be scoured and rinsed in water' (Leviticus 6:21). Now for the dishwasher question. Although, as above, the flavour (taam) of meat in milk would be forbidden, so that one must not drink hot milk out of a dish that has been used for meat, the 'flavour of a flavour' (the Talmud calls this 'that which gives flavour is a son of that which gives flavour', noten taam bar noten taam, abbreviated to nat bar nat) is permitted. The Talmud gives the example of fish cooked in a meat utensil which it is permitted to eat with a milk sauce (Hullin llb). Now even if the meat and milk dishes are placed together in the dishwasher (provided, of course, that they have first been cleaned of actual pieces of meat or milk products) all that happens is that flavour comes into contact with flavour. Nevertheless, it is not customary to use the dishwasher for meat and milk at the same time but there is certainly no objection to using the same dishwasher for meat and milk dishes one after the other, though some pious folk, just to make sure, allow the dishwasher to run on its own with boiling water between the two. There is the further point that in any event whatever flavour there is becomes neutralised - bate/ be-shishim. (For all this see Rema, Yoreh Deah 95:3; Minhat Shelomo by Rabbi S.L. Levin of Minneapolis, New York, 1963, No. 23; Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah, Part 11 by Rabbi , New York, 1973, Nos. 23 and 29.)

What is glatt kosher? I know what is kosher and what is not kosher, but what is glatt?

Glatt, in Yiddish, means 'smooth'. Many animals have adhesions on the lung. There are complicated rules for determining which of these render the animal trefa and which do not. The usual practice is for the shochet, who has been trained for the purpose, to conduct an examination of the lungs. He is relied on to state whether, as a result of the examination, the animal is kosher or not. But some pious Jews, unwilling to rely on the shochet's examination, 88 • i4sk the Rabbi' adopted the practice (not demanded by the din but as an extra precaution) of eating meat only from an animal without adhesions on the lung. Such a lung is 'smooth', i.e., having no adhesions, hence the term glatt kosher. In recent years, evidence of a determined swing to the right in Orthodox circles, what was previously the practice of the extremely pious has been adopted by many ordinaryJews who can lay no claim to any special piety, with a proliferation of glatt kosher butcher shops. Moreover, the term, originally only applicable to meat, has been extended to other matters of kashrut, so that glatt kosher becomes a term for 'very kosher' or 'extremely kosher'. Basically, this is an absurdity. Kosher means the absence of trefa and is a term that does not allow superlatives. It is not like 'holy', say, where one man can be holier than another. If something is kosher, it is kosher, and that is an end of the matter. It is impossible for something to be more kosher than something else. If the term has any meaning at all, it can denote that greater precautions have been taken to avoid the slightest possibility of trefa. What has really happened here is that rules and attitudes, traditionally the preserve of the saintly, have been adopted, or urged upon, ordinaryJews. Such adoption of religious one-upmanship really runs contrary to the Jewish tradition which frowns on saintliness unless practised unconsciously by a saint. The traditional term for it is yohara, meaning something like 'religious arrogance' or 'showing off'.

So:me of :my friends deride :me for keeping the laws of kashrut. They are vegetarians and cla.Un that the kashrut laws are outdated since it is as unhealthy to eat any :meat, kosher or not, as it is to eat s:moked fish such as sal:mon. How should I answer the:m?

Their derision is based on the unwarranted assumption that the dietary laws were introduced for hygienic purposes. This kind of argument is often heard, i.e., in ancient times the dietary laws were the best that people could do to promote health, but, nowadays, we have far better methods. The truth is that, in the Torah, the dietary laws are stated to be for the purpose of holy living. By abstaining from certain foods, by the discipline to our appetites in obedience to God's will, we bring religion even into those areas associated with the material and physical. So the answer you ought to give to your friends is that you prefer to follow a way of living conducive to holiness that has made the Jews a holy people. If you want to be rude (and I do not see why not since they were rude to you) you might accuse them of fadishness. How many doctors or scientists would agree that smoked salmon should be banned? Kashrut • 89 American Conservative Jews are permitted the use of gelatine and of cheese made with rennet. What is the Orthodox viewpoint on this?

The main contention of the Conservative rabbis is that the bone substance from which gelatine is manufactured and the dried skins from which rennet is manufactured have undergone a complete change in their constitution as a result of the chemical processes to which they have been subjected and are, consequently, no longer trefa. This is not put forward as a 'Conservative' argument but claims, with justice, to be based on authoritative statements of the famous legal luminaries accepted by the Orthodox. In fact, the celebrated Orthodox authority Rabbi Jehiel Michel Epstein (1829-1908), in his gigantic compendium ofJewish Law, Aruch Ha-Shulchan, is inclined to leniency with regard to cheese 'nowadays' for this very reason and in a Responsum published in 1966 Rabbi K. Kahana permits gelatine made from chrome leather for the same reason. I have no doubt that many Orthodox rabbis would not be so lenient but the argument, none the less, has much to commend it even from the Orthodox point of view.

Is the consumption of such animal fats as lard and suets against the Jewish dietary laws and, if so, why?

We read in the book of Leviticus: 'Ye shall eat no fat, of ox, or , or ... For whosoever eateth the fat of the beast, of which men present an offering made by fire unto the Lord, even the soul that eateth it shall be cut off from his people' (Leviticus 7:23-5). This means that all that part of the animal which was offered on the altar, when the animal was a sacrifice, must not be eaten. The fats of which you speak belong in this category and are known in rabbinic literature as ('fat'), as opposed to shuman, the other fatty parts. From this verse, and other indications in the Torah, it would seem that a major reason for the prohibition is precisely because this fat is offered on the altar. It belongs to the forbidden area of the sacred to God. It is also stated in rabbinic literature that the prohibition does not apply to the fat of beasts of chase, e.g., deer; hence Scripture speaks of 'ox, sheep, or goat'. Moreover - and this supports the reason we have suggested - these animals, beasts of chase, are never offered on the altar. 90 • 54sk the Rabbi' In DlY profession I unavoidably co01e into contact with trefa food and especially cooked pig 01eat. What (if any) are the laws concerning the cleansing of oneself after such contact or is it forbidden altogether? Also, are there any laws relating to the 01aterial fro01 which a yar01ulka 01ay be 01ade?

Forbidden food such as pig's meat does not contaminate (there are no laws of contamination nowadays, in any event, since these applied only to the Temple), nor is there any prohibition of contact with pig's meat. As for your second question: there is a rule that a sefer Torah must be written only on the skin prepared from a kosher animal, but this applies only to such an object of extreme sanctity as a sefer Torah. Even if a yarmulka were sacred, which it is not, it could be made from any material (naturally, not of ). The truth is that a yarmulka has no sanctity whatever. It is simply a means of covering the head for religious purposes and any headgear can serve the same function. All this is accepted by the strictest of OrthodoxJews.

I have Orthodox friends who serve 'Dlilchig' snacks with a drink before dinner and then, at a separate table, eat a 01eat 01eal. Is this right?

There is no objection to eating meat dishes after milk, only to eating milk after meat. The main reason given for the distinction is that meat more readily remains in the mouth than does milk so that, in fact, it is not correct to eat meat after having eaten hard cheese. Otherwise it is perfectly correct and your friends did not offend in any way.

Is a Jewish wo01an allowed to wear real pearls - that is, fro01 a forbidden substance?

There are two kinds of forbidden substances: l. those it is forbidden to eat; 2. those from which no benefit whatever may be derived. As examples of the first are trefa food, those which come from forbidden animals, birds and fishes. As examples of the second are objects used in idolatrous worship, and chametz on Pesach. Thus, it is permitted, for instance, for a Jew who happens to have in his possession some pork to give it or sell it to a non:Jew (he may not, however, engage in the sale of trefa food on a permanent basis), but he may neither give nor sell chametz on Pesach to a non:Jew because by so doing he would be enjoying some benefit from the forbidden substance. This no doubt seems odd on the face of it. Surely, it will be asked, if one Kashrut • 91 may not benefit from chametz, how can it be permitted to have any benefit from the far more abhorrent pork? The answer given in the sources is that chametz has to be treated far more strictly precisely because it is not forbidden during the rest of the year and there is consequently the danger of forgetting that it is Pesach, when it is forbidden. Objects used in idolatrous worship, on the other hand, are so abhorrent to the Jewish consciousness that a complete taboo is placed on them. It follows from this that for a substance to be banned even for use or benefit, it must either be non-abhorrent or totally abhorrent. Trefa food is neither one nor the other and is hence forbidden for food, but permitted for other purposes. This is why, contrary to what many people imagine, the din permits the use of a wallet or shoes made from pigskin or crocodile skin and also why, in reply to your question, a Jewish woman is allowed to wear real pearls.

The Kashrut Directory issued by the office of the Chief Rabbi says that bread and rolls as well as cakes and bis­ cuits are not pernrltted unless produced under rabbinical supervision. I always understood that by law ordinary bread was eaten except by particularly pious people. Do you agree with the new ruling?

First let us be clear on the question of bread baked by a non:Jew. From the Talmudic discussion on this subject it appears that while as an ideal a Jew ought only to eat bread baked by Jews the enforcement of this would have been a rule which the 'majority cannot endure'. Hence, as you say, only particularly pious people, and others during the ten days of penitence, have been strict in this matter. But all this only applies where the non:Jewish bread is kosher, i.e., contains no trefa products. The reason the Kashrut Directory requires rabbinical supervision for bread is, and I quote, that 'they are liable to contain non-kosher ingredients such as fats, emulsifiers and other additives'. However, it can be ascertained, without 'rabbinical supervision', which bread contains such non-kosher ingredients and bread which does not is kosher.

I see the will not allow the use of hind­ quarters. What is the rabbinic objection?

It is not the hindquarters themselves that are objectionable. How could one half of an animal be kosher and the other half trefa? The point is that the hindquarters contain the forbidden fats (Leviticus 7:22-5) and the sinew of the thigh (Genesis 32:33). These can be removed by 'porging' but the rabbis 92 • 14sk the Rabbi' of the Beth Din argue that where Biblical prohibitions such as these are con­ cerned it is unwise to rely on all butchers carrying out the porging accurately. The anomaly of it is that in Israel porging is done even for the hindquarters and these are permitted. It was also permitted in most East European communities. It was the rule, too, here in Great Britain until the notorious hardening of attitudes which began some 30 years ago. We are stricter in this and in other matters than the majority of Jewish communities with no appreciable gain to religion.

Why does a blood spot in an egg make it non-kosher? Are there are other similar restrictions regarding eggs?

The rule, as given in the Talmud (Chullin 64b) is: 'If there was found a spot of blood (in an egg) the blood must be thrown away and the rest may be eaten ... This applies only if the blood was found on the white of the egg but if it was found on the yolk the whole egg is forbidden, for the decay has spread through the entire egg.' Many of the commentators understand this to mean that the blood spot is the beginning, as it were, of the embryo and is thus treated as if it were a dead chick, which is forbidden under the head of 'creeping things'. The custom in most places is not to eat the egg even when the blood spot is found on the white of the egg. The other restriction regarding eggs is that only the eggs of a kosher fowl may be eaten. The eggs of a non-kosher fowl are forbidden on the principle that 'whatever proceeds from the unclean is itself unclean'.

When a fowl is opened, and a shell egg is found, should this be treated as tleishig and koshered as usual, half an hour in water, and one hour in salt? Or is it treated as an ordinary egg, as purchased in the shop, and treated as parev?

The Talmud (Betzah 6b) states quite explicitly that if one fmds perfectly formed eggs in a fowl it is permitted to eat these eggs together with milk, i.e., they are parev and do not required to be salted. This rule is recorded in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 87:5), but the commentators point out that it is a custom of the womenfolk not to eat such eggs together with milk. Even according to the custom of the womenfolk, there is no need for these eggs to be salted. Kashrut • 93 H we are not allowed to eat the hindquarters of lamb, such as leg of lamb, why may we eat the leg of a chicken, as that, too, belongs to the hindquarters?

The simple answer is that there is no prohibition of the hindquarters in themselves and in some communities these are eaten after they have been adequately porged of the forbidden fats and sinews. The reason why, in comparatively recent years, there has been a ban on hindquarter meat in this country is because the rabbis do not trust the butchers to carry out the porging correctly. There are no forbidden fats in a chicken, so you can enjoy chicken legs without any qualms.

May one eat or drink from bone china as it consists of animal bone, which I imagine could be of •ny animal?

First, even if it is known that the bones were those of a kosher animal, there would still be the question of shechita, so your formulation of the question is not too precise. The reason bone china is permitted is as follows. The full prohibition of eating a trefa animal applies only to the edible parts, not to the bones, though, if these are moist, there is still a lesser prohibition. But, according to many authorities, there is no prohibition whatever even to eat a powder manufactured from completely dry bones. But even according to the authorities who hold that a lesser prohibition applies even here, it is permitted to eat or drink from bone china since no 'taste' is imparted into the food or drink or, at any rate, the 'taste' is insufficient to render the food or drink forbidden. If your question concerns not the kashrut of the food or drink in the bone china but the use of the china itself, I have to inform you that there is no prohibition in using a substance manufactured from a trefa substance since the trefa substance itself is only forbidden to be eaten. There is no prohibition in using it, which is why, as I have stated previously in this column, one may wear shoes made of pigskin.

My wife and I are non-Jewish vegetarians, so we have no trefa food in our home, and we would like to invite Ortho­ dox families to stay with us. How do we make our kitchen kosher? We do not use animal products in the kitchen, use Pyrex dishes and have a dishwasher.

If the kitchen has not been used for animal products, it is kosher automatically. There is no need for any special ritual to make it kosher. Kosher in this context simply means that the food is not trefa. It is not as if some kind of prayer or benediction is required to make a kitchen kosher. 94 • 54sk the Rabbi' If one buys and uses a food product which one later dis­ covers contained a trefa ingredient (e.g., animal fat in a cake mix), which procedure~nust be followed to re-kosher the utensils involved, so1ne of which are no longer identi­ fiable (e.g., plates on which the cake was served)?

This column does not answer the kind of shaala for which your own rabbi should be consulted. Nevertheless, it can safely be said that you need have no qualms about using the plates. The rule about the contamination of utensils by trefa food only applies if the food is boiling hot. Cold trefa food placed in a utensil does not render that utensil trefa so your plates are quite kosher.

I noticed a recent comm.ent that there is no prohibition on taking milk before ~neat. Would it therefore be in order to serve a 'crea~n soup' as an entree to a dinner?

Strictly speaking, it would be quite in order, but the din demands that about half-an-hour should elapse after the milk dish and that the mouth be thoroughly rinsed before partaking of the meat course. This would rather inhibit the procedure you have in mind.

I have been sold :&ozen liver ready for koshering and wonder whether grilling 1neats can be handled similarly, i.e., :&ozen and koshered at the tilDe of usage?

Yes, provided that the meat is treated as one treats liver. It may not, however, be salted in the usual way and then cooked in a pan.

Why is it wrong, as I have been infor~ned, to use a plastic draining board drilled with holes for koshering ~neat?

The Babylonian teacher Samuel ruled (Chullin 113a) that meat can only be salted in a vessel that has holes so that the blood can drain away. On the basis of this, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 69: 16) rules that the salting must be done in such a way that the blood can freely run off the meat, e.g., in a vessel with holes, as Samuel says, or on a board placed on a slope and so forth and this is the practice followed. There is nothing in the sources about the composition of the board. Why should there be and what difference can it make? Kashrut • 95 I have been inform.ed that raspberries and sim.ilar fruit are considered trefa. Is this correct?

They are certainly not trefa in themselves. I can only surmise that whoever told you this was thinking of the possibility that these fruits may contain tiny worms. But these can easily be detected and removed before eating so that there is no warrant for declaring the fruit trefa.

Presum.ably, from. your recent answers, I should be using separate pairs of rubber gloves for washing up m.ilk and m.eat dishes?

Although some pious Jewesses do use different pairs of rubber gloves for milk and meat when washing up it is not strictly necessary and I cannot see how you based your presumption on anything I have written in this column. Without going once again into the details of these complicated laws, it is doubtful whether the rubber gloves absorb the flavour of the meat or milk in the dishes and even if they do the flavour absorbed is so faint and rendered so tasteless by the rubber that there can be no objection to using the same pair of gloves for both sets of dishes. All this is only provided that the gloves are washed thoroughly between the washing of the meat and milk dishes so that particles of meat or milk do not cling to them.

Is one allowed to participate in a m.eal served at a catered kosher function at which no shom.er is in attendance?

The purpose of the shomer is to make sure that no trefa food is served. This is his sole function. The reason why a shomer is usually insisted on by the rabbinic authorities in this country is because the caterer may not be sufficiently careful in this matter. It follows that if you are, indeed, certain that nothing trefa is served and all is completely kosher, you may eat as you would in a friend's home you know to be kosher. It can be argued, however (and the rabbinic authorities do so argue), that as a matter of communal discipline and for the furtherance of the kashrut ideal, one should not eat at a public function unless it is catered under rabbinic supervision. 96 • 54sk the Rabbi' In a recent food and wine supplement, the making of kosher cheese with the rennet of a calf was described. How can it be permissible to mix meat and milk in this way?

This question is discussed in the Mishna: 'If a man curdled milk with the skin of the stomach of an animal that was validly slaughtered and it imparted its flavour to the milk it is forbidden' (Hullin 8:5), i.e., but if it does not impart its flavour it is permitted and this is the ruling given in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 87:11). The commentators explain that the prohibition of meat and milk (which, according to the rabbis, is, in any event, only of biblical authority when the two have been boiled together) does not apply where the quantity and pungency of the rennet is too minute to impart a flavour to the milk.

May one serve a meat meal to one individual and a dairy meal to another at the same table?

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 88:2) rules that it is permitted to serve a meat meal to one individual and a dairy meal to another at the same table provided that some object not usually there is placed on the table to remind them not to take anything from one another.

Why should honey produced by the bee, a forbidden insect, be allowed as a kosher food?

The question is discussed in the Talmud (Bechorot 7b), where two opinions are advanced as to why honey is permitted even though it comes from that which is 'unclean'. The first reason stated is that the honey, which comes originally from the flowers, is held to be 'stored' in the bee and is thus not a secretion from the actual body of the 'unclean thing'. Another reason consists of Scriptural exegesis. It is stated in Scripture: 'Yet these may ye eat of all the winged swarming things' (Leviticus 11 :21 ). From this it is derived that only the 'winged swarming things' themselves are forbidden, not that which is secreted from their bodies. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 81 :8), permits honey even if it contains pieces of the bees' legs or wings on the grounds that these make the honey unpalatable and hence are permitted; but the commentators advise, nonethe­ less, that the honey first be strained to remove any parts of the bees that may be in it. Kashrut • 97

My 1nother always used two kinds of :6.sh to ~nake ge:6.1te :6.sh; is there any religious significance in this?

The only religious significance I can fmd is that your mother did it because she had seen her moth~r do it and she wished to have fish as tasty as possible for the Sabbath, in which case she fulfilled both the fourth and the fifth com­ mandments, no mean achievement when preparing fish.

There is nmch confusion over how long one has to wait after eating ~neat before one ~nay eat dairy dishes. Why are there so ~nany diff'erent custoJDS?

The source in the Talmud has it that it is forbidden only to eat meat and milk together at the same meal, but one talmudic rabbi is reported as saying that, while he did eat milk at the next meal, his more pious father would refrain from eating milk dishes until 24 hours had elapsed since he had eaten meat. There thus arose some uncertainty as to what is meant by 'the next meal'. On the whole, there are three customs. Some wait six hours, some one hour, and, in this country, three hours. 5 Sabbath

Is it true that Jewish tradition bnbues sexual relations between a JDan and his wife on Shahbat with soJDe special ~nerit?

The Talmud (Baba Kama 82a) remarks that garlic, held to be an aphrodisiac, was sold on Fridays, quoting the verse. 'That bringeth forth its fruit in its season' (Psalms 1:3), and applying it to the man who performs his marital duty on Friday night. It is further said (Ketubot 62b), in the name of the great Babylonian teacher Samuel, that the time when scholars perform their marital duty is on Friday night. The reference to scholars may mean that during the week these are not at home but engaged in studying the Torah in the Bet Ha-Midrash, though the other reference seems to suggest that there is no attempt to limit it to scholars but that it is meritorious for all. Rashi's comment to this passage is 'Because this is a night of delight, rest and physical pleasure'. Since we know that some Jewish sects in ancient times held sexual inter­ course, as a creative act, to be sternly forbidden on the Sabbath, it is possible that the rabbinic stress on the merits of intercourse on the Sabbath is a conscious protest against sectarian views. In the Cabala the mystical adepts are advised to have union with their wives on the Sabbath. The Zohar (11, 89a-b) interprets the verse, 'For thus saith the Lord unto the eunuchs that keep My Sabbaths' (Isaiah 56:4), as referring to the students of the Torah who make themselves 'eunuchs' during the six days of the week for the Torah's sake and reserve Friday night for their conjugal umon. The reason given is that on the Sabbath there takes place on high the 'sacred marriage' between 'the Holy One, blessed be He' and the Shechina i.e., between, as it were, two aspects of the Divine manifestation, and this has to be re-enacted upon earth. The harmony which then reigns on high is to be reflected in the love act performed by husband and wife. The Zohar continues that are then born on high and these are brought down to earth when husband and wife are united in holiness on the holy Sabbath. 'For this reason the mystics sanctify themselves on this night in the holiness of their Lord with deep contemplation and concentration, and bring good and holy children into the world.' In the prayer book compiled by R.Jacob Emden (1697-1776) there is a detailed account of sexual conduct in the light of Jewish teaching and this is appended, significantly enough, to the section dealing with the Friday night prayers. Sabbath • 99 Can you explain the justification for using a 'shabbos goy' to carry out certain essential chores on the Sabbath. The coiDIDancbnents appear to forbid the use of JDanservants or even asses to carry out chores (which are, presum.ably, not absolutely essential). Is the use of the 'shabbos goy' preferable to carrying out that which is necessary one­ self?

There is so much misunderstanding of this matter that we ought to examine carefully howJewish law understands the fourth commandment and how and when the institution of the 'shabbos goy' operates. The word translated as 'manservant' really means a male slave, and that translated 'maidservant' a female slave, both of whom are compelled to work for their master. While in ancient times slavery was permitted, it was considered inhumane not to allow slaves a day off. For the same reason, the 'asses', too, were to be spared on the Sabbath. (There are further elaborations on both the question of slaves working on the Sabbath and of animals, but to examine these in detail would take us too far from the relevant question.) According to rabbinic teaching, there is no objection whatever to a non­ Jew working on the Sabbath. Indeed, some of the rabbis say that a non:Jew is not allowed to keep the Sabbath (according to Maimonides, because one must either be aJew, keeping the whole Torah, or a non:Jew, keeping the 'seven laws of the sons of Noah', without there being any intermediate status which involves picking and choosing among the mitzvot). Consequently, the rabbis say, according to biblical law, a non:Jewish servant, who freely engages himself to work in a Jewish home and who can, unlike the slave, leave whenever he desires, may do all manner of work for his Jewish employer on the Sabbath. It is quite different from, say, asking a non:Jew to steal on behalf of a Jew. In that case, one would be asking a non:Jew to commit a wrong for him, too, and that, of course, is strictly forbidden, whereas the non:Jew who works on the Sabbath commits no wrong. The prohibition of work on the Sabbath is not that no work can be done on the Sabbath, only that a Jew must not do work on the Sabbath. In that case, you might well ask, why are only essential services permitted? The answer is that, by rabbinic law, it is forbidden to ask a non:Jew to work on one's own behalf on the Sabbath, as a precautionary measure. IfJews were allowed to have done for them that which they are forbidden to do themselves, they might easily forget and actually do it themselves when a non:Jew is not available. Consequently, there is a rabbinic prohibition which is relaxed, since it is rabbinic and not biblical, in certain circumstances, e.g., for a sick person, even when there is only danger to health and not to life. Since in cold climes the absence of fire in the home will lead to ill-health, the din permits the 'shabbos goy' to heat the home on the Sabbath. This does 100 • Ylsk the Rabbi' not mean that he can do everything for the Jew on the Sabbath: it is forbidden by rabbinic law for a Jew to request a non-:Jew to cook or bake for him on the Sabbath. In other words, the institution of the 'shabbos goy' is not an evasion of the law, it is not a trick resorted to by the rabbis in order to get round the law. On the contrary, the rabbinic innovation was to forbid resort to the 'shabbos goy', except in the cases we have mentioned, in obedience to their principle of 'making a fence round the Torah'.

I am asked if the practice of marking cash ofFerings dur­ ing Sabbath services with cards and string really amounts to :O.outing the intent of the relevant laws.

Let us first see what is the intent of the relevant laws. The Prophet declares: 'If thou turn thy foot away because of the Sabbath, from pursuing thy business on My holy day; and call the Sabbath a delight; and the holy of the Lord honourable; and shalt honour it, not doing thy wonted ways, nor pursuing thy business, nor speaking thereof ... ' (Isaiah 58: 13). The rabbis (Sabbath 150a) stress 'thy business' to conclude that accounts in connection with religion may be calculated on the Sabbath and promises to donate money to charity may be made on the Sabbath. (As Rabbi Israel Salanter once said: Concern for a neighbour's material well-being is a spiritual concern.) Rabbi Moses Isserles in his note to the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 306:6) states that while one authority does frown on the declaration on the Sabbath of the actual amount of money to be given, it is customary to permit even this. To write down the amounts donated is, of course, forbidden, which is why the cards and string are used. This is not a circumvention of the law against writing on the Sabbath, nor is it against its intent. Card marking in this way is simply not subsumed by the law under the heading of writing and it patently is not 'writing'. It follows from all this that no intent of any law is being flouted. There is no intent in law to forbid the declaration that one will make a donation to charity on the Sabbath. On the contrary, it is seen as fully within the spirit of the Sabbath. As for the intent of the law against writing this is not flouted at all. Many synagogues are not, in fact, happy about the institution of 'shnoddering' but on entirely different grounds from those you mention, namely, a public announcement of the sums donated by each tends to put the poorer congregants to shame. This is, indeed, a weighty objection. Sabbath • 10 1 I have an Orthodox friend living near a football ground who insists that since he has a season ticket, he is allowed to attend Sabbath n1atches. Is this right?

There is no real objection to watching a football match on the Sabbath. Since your question is from the Orthodox point of view your friend will have difficulties with regard to carrying his season ticket. Some would also argue that there is the question of having regard for appearances (marit qyyin) since people might think that he has paid for his ticket.

May a battery-operated wristwatch be worn on Shabbat, and how is the din applied in connection with a hearing­ aid, a heartpacen1aker and other shnilar battery-operated appliances?

The questioner, in his letter to me, describes in detail four different kinds of battery-operated wristwatches, two of which involve switching on the motor. Here, the majority of Orthodox rabbis would not permit turning on the switch. With regard to the others, I cannot see what objection there can be. The fact that the battery operates is no cause for forbidding it, since it operates automatically. Even to wind a clock or watch on the Sabbath is permitted by many authorities. According to 'Darchey Chayyim Ye-Shalom' Gerusalem, 1974), the Munkacer Rav saw no reason to forbid the winding of a clock or watch on the Sabbath (No. 419); afortioriwhen the watch is self-winding. Rabbi Moses Feinstein ('Iggerot Mosheh', Orach Chaim, Part Ill, No. 49) permits an electric clock to be moved on the Sabbath even if it is plugged into the socket. As for a battery-operated hearing-aid, some authorities permit it even to be switched on, their reason being that the mere operation of an electric current offends against no Sabbath law (see RabbiS. Braun: 'Shearim Ha'Metzuyanim Be-Halachah', New York, 1949, Vol. 11, pp. 137-8). The same would apply to a pacemaker. To sum up: although your own rabbi should be consulted, there is certainly no objection to wearing appliances which work automatically without any need to switch them on. Where switching on is required for them to work, it is far more questionable, but in cases of need, such as hearing-aids and pacemakers (so far as I know these do not require to be switched on in any event), there is good reason to permit it. 102 • 14.sk the Rabbi' In a Jewish old-age home, will one pair of Shabbat candles suffice for all the residents or must each have his or her own candles?

All the evidence goes to show that originally the purpose of the Shabbat candle or candles was that the home should be bright and appealing on the day of rest. Unlike the Chanucah candles, where the kindling is a special symbolic act in itself, the Shabbat candle had the sole (but, of course, very important) purpose of dispelling the darkness and gloom. For this reason, some medieval authorities ruled that there is no special benediction over the kindling of the Shabbat candles, as there is for the kindling of the Chanucah lights. Eventually, however, the actual kindling of the Shabbat candles came to be seen as a mitzva in itself, and a special benediction was recited over it. But the custom was still only for a single kindling to be carried out in each home on behalf of all the members of the household. This is universally done by the woman who presides over the house; but where a man is on his own, he lights the Shabbat candles. The Lubavitcher Rebbe has recently urged that each female in the house should light her own Shabbat candles, but this has not won wide acceptance. With regard to your question, while it is certainly the custom for each female resident, at least, to kindle her own Shabbat candles, the mitzva would be carried out adequately if a single pair of candles were to be kindled on behalf of all the residents, the old-age home being treated as a single residence. The only reservation - and it is a serious one - is that the elderly ladies, accustomed to kindling their own Shabbat candles in their own homes, will feel deprived if they are denied the privilege in their new surroundings. Since it is obviously desirable to make the old folk feel at home, it is far better to allow them to follow their previous practice. It all depends, therefore, on the reason for having only a single pair of Shabbat candles in these circumstances. If it is a question of, say, fire hazard, the din would allow a single kindling. If, however, the reason is to save the cost of the extra candles, this should not be a determinative factor.

Is a devoutjew allowed to keep his business open on the Sabbath day even though he himself is not present and does Judaism recognise any exceptional circumstances in which a man may attend to his business even on the Sabbath day?

The answer to your second question, much as I sympathise with what seems to be your problem, is, I am afraid, that the law forbids a man to attend to his business on the Sabbath day even under the most exceptional circumstances. Sabbath • 103 As for the ftrst question, some rabbis do permit a Jew who would otherwise ruin his business to take in a non-:Jewish partner, even in a token manner, who will receive his salary in the form of a share in the business, given him by the profits earned, on the Sabbath day. He will thus be working on that day for himself, which, of course, he is allowed to do, the Torah not being binding upon him. For this purpose a special contract is drawn up and signed and sealed. If, as it seems, this is a personal problem, I would advise you to consult your own rabbi for details as to the procedure to be adopted. But, it should be said, some rabbis are reluctant to arrange for this dispensation to be made.

If switching on an electric light is forbidden on the Shah­ bat (so01ethingthe scientists would say converts potential energy into kinetic energy), why is there no siDlilar prohibition against turning on a water tap which involves just the sa01e use of energy, both in piping water into the house and distributing it :fro01 the tank, especiaDy if one uses hot water?

First, it is necessary to see how traditional Judaism understands the verse forbidding the making of ftre on the Sabbath: 'Ye shall kindle no ftre throughout your habitations upon the Sabbath day' (Exodus 35:3). The Talmud (Shabbat 70a) records a debate between R.Jose and R. N a than on whether kindling a frre is signalled out for special mention because it is less severe than other types of work forbidden on the Sabbath but, in any event, kindling is counted in the Mishna (Shabbat 7:2) among the 39 main categories of forbidden work. The general principle regarding those types of work which are forbidden is based on the juxtaposition of the Sabbath laws in Exodus 33:1-3 with the command to build the Sanctuary in the previous chapters of Exodus (Mechilta to Exodus 35:1: Shabbat 70a and 97b), i.e., Moses told the people not to do anything required for the Sanctuary on the Sabbath. Thus any type of work needed for the construction of the Sanctuary is forbidden on the Sabbath. A careful examination of this list of 39 demonstrates that the prohibition only extends to constructive and creative activities. These alone are construed as 'work' but are forbidden even if no real effort is required. It follows that popular argument in favour of switching on lights or for striking matches on the Sabbath-that in those days much effort was required to produce frre- is unfounded. The degree of effort is irrelevant. In Mishnaic times, for instance, it was forbidden to kindle one lamp from another even though the effort involved was negligible. It also follows that there is no prohibition against 'converting potential energy into kinetic energy' and, as you say, it is permitted to turn on the water tap. (The question of turning on the hot water tap is debated by the authorities 104 • fuk the Rabbi' but there the problem is not the conversion of energy but whether indirect causation of boiling is forbidden since the cold water runs into the tank to be heated.) When electric light first came into use rabbis discussed whether switching on a light is forbidden on the Sabbath. But their discussion centred on an entirely different question, namely, whether this type of 'kindling' falls under the defmition of kindling fue as stated in the Talmud. The rabbis who declared that it is forbidden to switch on electric lights (and this is the attitude of the overwhelming majority of Orthodox rabbis today) argued that there is no logical distinction between kindling an oil lamp and switching on an electric light. In both instances frre is produced. The rabbis who permitted it advanced these arguments: frrst, this type of 'kindling' was unknown in the construction of the Sanctuary (based on the Tosaftsts to Shabbat 94a); second, the kindling of the filament is not to be construed as kindling fue since there is no combustion and, third, when the switch is pressed the result is for the electric current to flow and the kindling is not the direct but the indirect result. Years ago, the present Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Goren, advanced arguments similar to these (for which, incidentally, he was severely criticised) to support the contention that switching on an electric light falls under the category of a rabbinic not a Biblical prohibition and hence there are grounds for leniency in certain circumstances.

Some people are unable to come home before sunset on Fridays to light the Shabbat candles. Is it permitted to transgress the Sabbath by lighting the candles after sun­ set or should one forgo lighting them?

There is no question at all that, according to the din, it is strictly forbidden to light the candles once Sabbath has come in. The Sabbath may be set aside only in order to save life. Since you mention the kindling of the Sabbath candles and can even think of this as being so important that it overrides the Sabbath, it is perhaps as well to point out that, according to the original law, the significant thing was for the home to be adequately lit on the Sabbath. The custom of kindling special Sabbath lights was not introduced until the Middle Ages. The custom is, of course, to be followed, but certainly not by profaning the Sabbath. The correct procedure for someone who is unable to be at home at the advent of the Sabbath, or who wishes to do some work after the kindling of the candles, is to light the candles before Sabbath comes in and make the proviso that the strictness of the Sabbath laws is not taken on until Shabbat actually comes in. I appreciate that this cannot be done if one is away from home during Sabbath • 105 the major part of the day, and then it is only correct to forego the kindling of the Sabbath lights, relying on the fact that, in any event, the home is well­ lit. In some Reform and Liberal synagogues, I am told, the ritual of lighting the candles is done in the synagogue on Friday night after Shabbat has come in. Needless to say, this is not tolerated by Orthodoxy; which considers it to be a desecration of the Sabbath.

Which sports are allowed to be watched and played on Shabbat? ·

Some of the games mentioned in halachic works as permitted on the Sabbath are ball-games in a private domain (i.e., which do not involve carrying in the public domain on the Sabbath); card games (provided, of course, no money is involved); chess and draughts; billiards and table-tennis; Scrabble (the making of the letters of this game into words does not constitute writing); and similar games of this nature. There is no objection to watching a cricket or football match, provided that one does not pay for admission to the ground or carry a ticket of admission. All this is according to the actual din. There is the further consideration of activities in keeping with the spirit of Sabbath rest, which is not a mere negative concept, but a shining, positive, spiritual principle. One has to weigh up, in every such case, the two principles, which may come into conflict- of Sabbath enjoyment (oneg shabbat) and Sabbath rest (menucha). Where the din is permissive, the right balance must be left to the individual.

May food be eaten if it has been cooked by a Jew on Shabbat?

The law as laid down in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:1) is as follows. If a Jew cooked food on the Sabbath knowing full well that it was Sabbath and that such an act is forbidden, then that food is forbidden to him even after the Sabbath. But it is permitted to otherJews as soon as the Sabbath is out, though not on the Sabbath itself. If the Jew cooked the food either because he forgot that it was the Sabbath or because he thought it was allowed to cook on the Sabbath, then neither he nor others may eat the food on the Sabbath itself but he, too, may eat it as soon as the Sabbath is out. The principles involved are obvious. On the Sabbath itself it is forbidden to enjoy food prepared through an act of violation of the day even if the act was not performed with the intention of doing wrong. Where the violation is intentional the rabbis forbid the food permanently to the one who was guilty 106 • Jtsk the Rabbi' of the violation but others may enjoy it after the Sabbath is over since for them no penance is required.

Is it perlllissible to push a baby in a pra111 to synagogue on Shabbat?

Pushing a pram is said to constitute 'carrying' in the public domain on Shabbat, which is forbidden. I personally believe that a good case can be made for permitting it, although I must emphasise that most other Orthodox rabbis would not agree (except, naturally, in cities like Jerusalem where there is an eruv to permit carrying and, hence, pushing a pram). My argument is that, according to many authorities (and the view is also found in the Shulchan Aruch), the streets in our cities, for reasons we cannot go into here, do not constitute a 'public domain' within the defmition of that term. Carrying there is still prohibited, but by rabbinic law, not biblical law. There are instances where rabbinic prohibitions are relaxed on the Sabbath for the sake of the performance of a mitzva. Furthermore, it is not absolutely clear that pushing a pram would fall under the heading of 'carrying'. Although many rabbis would not agree with this, they would, presumably, still allow the baby to be pushed in its pram by a non­ Jewish maid or nanny since non-Jews do not have any obligation to keep the Shabbat (see Mishna Berura 308, notel54). It is also not irrelevant to refer to the response of the famous Baghdadi authority, Rabbi Yoseh Chaim, where an argument is put forward to permit riding a bicycle on Shabbat if it is for the purpose of a mitzva (Responsa Rav Pealim, Orach Chaim, No. 25, and note at end of introduction to Volume 1).

May one use an electric blanket on Shabbat it if is con­ nected to a tUne switch?

Why is this different from having the electric lights in one's home connected to a time switch? The only possible difference is that the electric blanket is muktzeh (an object which it is forbidden to handle), since it contains the electric wrres. But since the wires are part of the blanket and the blanket can serve as such even when the electricity is not switched on it is not muktzeh. The question was addressed to two of the outstanding authorities of our day, Rabbi Moses Feinstein (lggerot Moshe, Vol. 5, Orach Chaim 3, No. 50) and Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, the Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel (Responsa, Yechaveh Daat, Vol. 2, No. 49) and they both permit the use of an electric blanket connected to a time switch. Sabbath • 107 Is it permitted to walk to the synagogue on the Sabbath with the aid of a stick, which needs to be used owing to a physical disability?

The principle here is that where the stick is indispensable, it is not treated as an object that is carried, but like a shoe that is worn on the foot. Thus the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 301: 17) states: ~ lame person who cannot walk without a stick may walk [in the street] with the stick even if it is not tied to the hand. But if he is able to walk without the aid of the stick and only uses the stick for support, it is forbidden.' Isserles adds: ~d a sick person [i.e., a disabled person] has the same law as that of a lame person.' The commentators discuss how to define the indispensability of the stick. The majority opinion is strict in that it is permitted only if the stick is used at home, although some permit it even if it is not used in the home, but is required in the street - where, for instance, there is danger of slipping on ice. These are the principles, but for an actual ruling you must consult your own rabbi. It might be added, however, that there is a further reason to be lenient where the purpose is to visit the synagogue.

What is the reason for lighting two candles every Friday night? Would it be in order for only one candle to be lit or even a three light or five light candelabrmn?

The original purpose of the Sabbath lights, according to the Talmud, was simply for the home to be well-lit in honour of the sacred day, and so that there will be no discomfort, which may lead to strife, in the home on this day. It was not until the Middle Ages that the custom developed of having at least two candles. The official explanation is that the Fourth Commandment - to keep the Sabbath - is repeated in the Torah. In Exodus (20:8) the wording is: 'Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy' but in Deuteronomy (5:12) the wording is: 'Keep the sabbath day'. We now have, therefore, two candles: one for 'Remember' and one for 'Keep'. There is no objection to having more than two candles.

The reason given to Dle why one should not play a Dlusical instrmnent on the Sabbath is that, if one were allowed to play, one might carry the instrmnent around, and to carry is forbidden. In that case, why is the playing of a piano forbidden? Who would carry a piano around?

You were misinformed. There is no prohibition against carrying things around in the home, so this cannot possibly be the reason. The real reason (and this 108 • Jl.sk the Rabbi' obviously applies to a piano) is stated by Maimonides (based on l04a) in his Code (Yad, Shabbat 23:4) as follows: 'Whatever adds a finishing touch to a object falls under the heading of 'smiting with a hammer' (i.e., completing a vessel by knocking it into shape). Consequently, whoever scrapes away (in order to complete a process of manu­ facture) or who repairs a vessel in any way is liable. 'Therefore it is forbidden (by rabbinic law) to produce musical sounds on the Sabbath, whether by means of such musical instruments as pipes and flutes or whether by other means. 'It is forbidden even to strike the fmger on the ground or against a tablet or to smite two fmgers one against the other, as the musicians do, or to rattle a nut to please an infant, or to quieten him by ringing a bell. All such things ae forbidden (by rabbinic law) because they might lead to the repairing of a musical instrument.' It is true that the Tosafists (Betzah 30a) refer to the custom in medieval France of dancing on the Sabbath and Yomtov, even though this was forbidden for the same reason, arguing that the reason no longer applies because 'we are not sufficiently skilled to fashion musical instruments'. But here the question arises (and this would appear to be the difference in attitude between Maimonides and the Tosafists) whether a law, once promulgated, is automati­ cally repealed when the reason no longer applies, or whether it is still in force. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 339:3) follows Maimonides, while Isserles records the view of the Tosafists. However, Isserles refers only to dancing and appears to agree with the other statement of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 338: 1) that to play a musical instrument is forbidden (perhaps because it is comparatively easy to repair that instrument). All this was widely discussed, incidentally, at the time of the Hamburg Temple at the beginning of the last century. In the well-known booklet, 'Eleh Divrey ha-Berit', published in Altona in 1819 against the innovations of that Temple, the Orthodox rabbis held that it was not only forbidden to play the organ on the Sabbath, but it was forbidden to instruct a non:Jewish musician to play the instrument.

Upon being challenged, you recently retracted one of your repHes. In m.y opinion, I beHeve you should do the sam.e on the question of a television set switched on before Shabbat begins. Great authorities in the past have not perm.itted either this or radio: there is marit ayyin and the question of the Shabbat spirit.

On the question of the Shabbat spirit, I did qualify my reply by stating that if TV programmes are watched, they should obviously be those which do not offend against this spirit. Many great authorities in former times permitted the reading of newspapers, for example, on the Sabbath. Sabbath • 109 On the question of marit ayyin ('for the sake of appearances', i.e., presumably people may think the set has been switched on during Shabbat), the answer is clear: if it is permitted to have the set switched on before Shabbat, why should anyone imagine that it has been switched on during Shabbat? Unless this argument is accepted, why is it permitted to have a time switch for the Shabbat? Here, too, people may imagine that the lights have been switched on during Shabbat. There are matters forbidden by Jewish law because of marit ayyin, but this is generally limited to those stated in the Talmud. The marit ayyin principle surely does not mean that anything otherwise permitted must be forbidden because others may mistakenly assume that the Sabbath has been desecrated. For instance, the best-known example of marit ayyin is the talmudic rule that if a man has been drenched in a shower or downpour or through falling into a river, he should not hang out his garments to dry on the washing-line because it might give the impression that he has washed the clothes on Shabbat. When people hang out washing on the line, it is usually because they have just washed the clothes they hang out. A parallel example would be to enter a store on Shabbat where others may conclude that it is for the usual purpose, namely, to buy something. In our case, however, if it is permitted to have the set switched on before Shabbat, then it would be the usual thing for Jews who do not switch on electrical appliances on Shabbat to switch them on before Shabbat, and everyone at all interested will know this. In short, I was asked whether, according to the strict din, it is permitted and my duty was to reply in the affirmative.

When I was a boy, brought up in Gateshead, it was considered sinfal to play any gam.e, inside or outside the home, on Shabbat. The result was that I could not become a member of my school's football team.. Now I visit Ortho­ dox families on Shabbat and find that it is customary to play gam.es in the garden. I am. told that this is permitted, but that outside the home it is not. Is this true and, if so, what are the reasons?

From the Tosafists (to Betzah 12a, bottom of page) it emerges that in medieval France they used to play a ball game (evidently a kind of tennis) in the public domain on Yomtov. So far as the actual game is concerned, there is no difference between Yomtov and Sabbath, so that there was no objection to the game as such even on the Sabbath; but since it is forbidden to throw a ball in the public domain on the Sabbath, ball games of this kind were permitted on the Sabbath only within the confines of the home. Other authorities disagree with the Tosafists. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach 11 0 • Ylsk the Rabbi, Chaim 308:45): 'It is forbidden to play with a ball on the Sabbath and on Yomtov', following these other authorities. But Isserles' note states: 'But some authorities (i.e., the Tosafists) permit it. And it is customary to be lenient.' The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 301 :2) states that youths who enjoy running and taking exercise may do so on the Sabbath. Jogging would presumably not be covered by this since the main purpose is for health rather than for pleasure (see Gumbiner, 'Magen Abraham' to the passage note 5). Thus, the reason for the distinction between games in the home and ball games outside is clear. The game itself is not forbidden, but it is forbidden to throw a ball in the public domain on the Sabbath. It would follow from the Tosafists and the ruling of Isserles that it is permitted to play table-tennis and billiards, though, needless to say, the score must not be chalked up. Rabbi Gedaliah Felder ('Yesodey Yeshurun' on the type of work forbidden on the Sabbath, Vol. 2, p. 53) cannot discover any real reason why Scrabble and Monopoly should not be played on the Sabbath and his only reasons for suggesting that they should not be played is because they are not in the spirit of the Sabbath and because one might be led to write down the scores. This, however, is hardly a matter of the din and the question of whether or not an otherwise permitted activity is disturbing to the Sabbath spirit is rather subjective.

What are the laws regarding the lighting of candles on Shabbat?

The Sabbath candles were originally simply a means of preventing darkness in the home. It was not so much a religious duty to light special lamps for the Sabbath, but to see to it that the home was well-lit in honour of the day. In the Middle Ages the ritual was developed to have at least two special lights for the Sabbath, one corresponding to 'Remember the Sabbath day' and the other to 'Keep the Sabbath day'. The Sabbath lights became a special ritual institution, but without any particular rules about the way they were to be kindled. The rule is that, as stated, at least two candles are required. Beyond that all depends on local custom, some people, for instance, having a candle for every member of the family. The Lubavitcher Rebbe has recently been urging his followers, and others, that each female in the household should light her own candle. Sabbath • 111 How are the times for the beginning and end of Shabbat arrived at? Is there a formula one could use to calculate them if one knew the local time of sunset, or is it a little more complicated?

In the talmudic sources the onset of night is determined by the sighting of three average-sized stars, but the twilight period is treated as a period of doubtful night and, consequently, it is necessary to commence the Sabbath observance before this period. But there are debates among the rabbis as to when this doubtful period begins, and debates among the post-talmudic authorities on the different time factors involved in lands other than Eretz Israel and Babylon. The arrival at the correct times for the commencement and termination of the Sabbath is thus very complicated, which is why we rely on the 'official' calculations in this country. The :Jewish Year Book' puts it as follows: 'For the beginning of Sabbaths and festivals, rules were laid down for the latitude of London by David Nieto, Haham of the Sephardi community (1702-28). 'The hours for nightfall given here are based on those fixed by N a than Marcus Adler, Chief Rabbi, in accordance with the formula of Michael Friedlander, principal of Jews' College, but adjusted to take account of the movement of the Jewish population within the Metropolis since their day.'

Is it permitted to use a home swimming-pool on Shabbat, provided that<ering and heating are carried out before­ hand or activated by a pre-set automatic programmer?

The Mishnah (Batzah 5:2) rules that it is forbidden on Yomtov and Shabbat to swim 'on the surface of the water'. However, from a discussion in the Talmud (Sabbath 40b-4la) it is clear that the phrase 'on the surface of the water' means a river or a pool, the water of which reaches to its edges and so is like a river in that the water flows away. A pool which contains the water like our swimming-pools is treated as if it were a huge vessel in which it is permitted to swim. This is the ruling given in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 339:2). 6 Festivals

May the Megilah be read in the synagogue on behalf of the congregation by a boy under the age of barmitzvah, or is it essential for the reader to be of age?

The obligation to read the Megilah on Purim devolves on each individual. The reader of the Megilah in the synagogue acts as an agent for all the other congregants, his reading being treated as if they themselves had read it. The general principle is that one who is not himself obliged to carry out a particular religious obligation cannot perform it on behalf of one so obliged. For a man to release others from their obligation by carrying out a religious act on their behalf, he must be a person to whom the obligation applies. To take an extreme example: it would obviously be invalid for a non:Jew to read the Megilah on behalf ofJews, since a gentile's obligations, according to the Torah, certainly do not include the reading of the Megilah. A minor has no obligation to read the Megilah just as he has no obligation to carry out any other mitzvah. All religious obligations become binding only when a boy reaches the age of thirteen and a girl reaches the age of twelve (that is the meaning of barmitzvah and batmitzvah). It follows that a minor is not, in the language of the tradition, a bar chiyyuva ('a son of obligation') and, on the principle stated above, he cannot serve as a reader of the Megilah. This, in fact, is the clear and explicit ruling given in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 689:2). Some authorities, however, do allow a minor to read the Megilah in the synagogue on behalf of the congregation when no adult is available to act as reader (Mishnah Berurah 689, note 6). Their argument is that a minor does qualifY as a bar chiyyuva, since his parents have the obligation to train their children (chinuch) to carry out the mitzvot. It is a moot point whether this obligation - on the parents rather than on the child himself - is sufficient to render him a bar chiyyuva, but, according to these authorities, it is sufficient reason to enable the minor to act as the reader of the Megilah where no adult is available. By the same reasoning, some authorities allow a minor to kindle the Chanucah lights on behalf of adults. Unfortunately (perhaps one should say fortunately), nowadays it is not all that unusual for children to be better informed in religious matters than some older members of a congregation. It should be noted that while the question refers to a reader in the synagogue, the recitation of the Megilah on Purim is an individual rather than a communal obligation. Ideally, the Megilah should be read in public, but that is for the very different reason of 'giving prominence to the miracle' (pirsuma nisa). Festivals • 113 Where there is no synagogal reading, the individual still has the obligation of reading the Megilah, or of having it read for him, and the same principles would apply that the reading should be done by an adult. In this respect, the reading of the Megilah on Purim differs from the reading of the Torah and on Sabbaths and festivals. For this, a quorum of ten (a minyan) is an essential requirement. On the other hand, the requirement for reading the Torah and haftarah has to do more with hearing the Torah being read than with reading the Torah, so that in some congregations (see, however, the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 282:3 and commentaries) a minor is allowed to read the Torah and the question of bar chryyuva does not arise. A minor should therefore not act as reader of the Megilah unless no adult is available who can do the reading adequately. The same applies to reading of the Torah, except that here some would permit a minor to read even in the first instance, and many would certainly allow a minor to read the haftarah, although this is not the norm in Anglo:Jewish congregations. Since the obligation to blow the shofar on is biblical, all would agree that a minor cannot serve as a baal tekiah.

The obligation to fast on Yom Kippur is based on the verse in Leviticus (16:29), 'Ye shall afDict your souls', but how do we know that this means fasting? How does fasting afflict the soul? And what is the reason behind the command to fast?

The Hebrew word nifesh, translated here and elsewhere as 'soul', really means 'self', an abstract concept foreign to the concrete nature of ancient Hebrew. A more accurate translation would be, 'You shall afflict yourselves'. The New Hebrew version translates it as 'You shall practise self-denial', and the New English Bible as 'You shall mortifY yourselves'. The reference is not to the spiritual entity we now call the soul, but simply to physical affliction. The Talmud has its own exegetical method of establishing that this means fasting, although it is obvious that it was not the exegesis that in itself produced a command to fast. The exegesis is an attempt to fmd in Scripture that which has always been understood in the tradition- that Jews fast on Yom Kippur. In the haftara for Yom Kippur morning, the prophet uses 'affiicting the soul' as a synonym for fasting: 'Wherefore have we fasted, and thou seest not? Wherefore have we affiicted our souls, and thou takest no knowledge?' (Isaiah 58:3). In a number of passages, the Bible mentions fasting in association with prayer and repentance- for example,Joell: 14; 2:15;Jonah 3:7; Esther 4:16. It is self-denial, not self-torment, that is required on Yom Kippur; not to inflict positive pain on oneself, but to suffer the pain caused if the hunger and thirst remain unsatisfied. 114 • 14sk the Rabbi' The rabbis add four further activities from which one must abstain on Yom Kippur: bathing, anointing the body with oil (the usual practice in ancient times), wearing leather shoes (kinder on the feet), and sexual relations. Why do we fast on Yom Kippur? Some pious Jews would see, and have seen, the question as an impertinence. The Torah orders us to fast, and it is not for us to reason why. In a similar context when the Talmud asks, 'Why do we blow the shofar on Rosh Hashanah?', the reply is given: 'Because the Torah says so'. For all that, there is a respectable history ofJewish thinkers like Maimonides trying to discover the reasons for the commandments, since they refused to see the Almighty as a king who imposes arbitrary or meaningless rules on his subjects. To look for reasons why God commanded is very different from questioning God's will. Among the reasons given by the Jewish teachers for fasting on Yom K.ippur is that fasting serves as a penance. The sinner who really feels remorse cannot assuage his guilt if he is let off too lightly. Perhaps that is why only negative denial is enjoined, not positive acts of self-torture which might cater to masochistic urges. Another reason is to encourage feelings of charity and benevolence. When we experience having to go without for only one day, we are moved to help overcome the sufferings of those who have to go without every day. Finally, there is the ministering angels idea. Admittedly, the rabbis say that God does not make too heavy demands on us since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels. Yet on this one day in the year, Jews, putting worldly appetites and worldly concerns behind them, resemble the angels as they delight in singing for praises of the Almighty. As Rabbi Yitzchak of Berditchev put it: 'Who wants to eat on Yom Kippur?'

Since the period between Passover and Shavuot - the Sefirah period -is said to be a tUne of joyfUlly counting the days until the anniversary of the giving of the Torah when did the period become one of mourning and is there any reference to this in the Talmud?

The Talmud does not refer to the period as one of mourning, but does say (Yevamot 62b) that during this period 24,000 disciples of died of a plague. In the Middle Ages this was the usual reason given for mourning during the Sefrrah. But there are also a number of references to other tragic events that took place during this period, such as the Crusades in the Rhineland, when manyJews were killed. Festivals • 115 Regarding the thirty-three days of mourning during the Se&.rat ha-, why do some people count these days :&om Rosh Chodesh and others :&om the second day of Passover? What exacdy is really proscribed? I always understood that, for instance, only live social music, such as one hears at weddings, is prohibited, but I have heard that some rabbis do not permit even inadvertent music to be heard, such as that between radio programmes.

It appears that the earliest custom was to observe the period of mourning from the second day of Passover until Lag b'Omer. However, Isserles, in his note to the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 493:3), states that some communities keep it from Rosh Chodesh lyar until three days before Shavuot, with the exception of Lag b'Omer. In Anglo:Jewry it has long been the practice to follow the latter custom, weddings being permitted up to and including Rosh Chodesh Iyar. It is not generally realised, but the Shulchan Aruch says nothing about a prohibition of listening to music during the Omer period. Magen Avraham to the Shulchan Aruch (493, note 1) says that only weddings must not be celebrated during this period, but it is permitted to have engagements. He adds that these latter should not be attended during this period with 'rounds and dances' (rikkudim u-mecholo~, which is no doubt the origin of the alleged prohibition of listening to music. It certainly seems extreme to prohibit listening to incidental music to a radio programme.

Is it in order for the Megila to be read in an English trans­ lation, instead of in Hebrew? And is a woman permitted to be the reader of the Megila?

With regard to the first question, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 590:9) does rule that it is valid if the Megila is read out of a scroll written in a language other than Hebrew, provided the language is fully understood. But this means that the scroll, although in another language, must be written on parchment and that all the other rules about the correct manner of writing the Megila are observed. In other words, the Shulchan Aruch is ruling that a Megila may be written in other languages and then, since it is a kosher Megila, one may read from it. But since megilot are not written, nowadays, in languages other than Hebrew, the question becomes academic. It is certainly not valid to read the Megila in English translation out of a printed book. On the other hand, where the reading is done from a properly written scroll in Hebrew, even those who do not understand this language have fulfilled their obligation (Aruch ha-Shulchan, Orach Chaim 490: 13). 116 • ~k the Rabbi' On the question of a woman as reader, the general principal in these matters is that only a person obliged to carry out a religious precept can perform it on behalf of others similarly obliged. That is why a woman, exempt from the performance of precepts to be carried out at a specific time, cannot act as shofar-blower on Rosh Hashana. But women are, in fact, obliged to carry out the precept of the Megila even though it is dependent for its performance on a given time. The reason stated in the Talmud (Arachin 3a) is that women as well as men were saved when Haman's designs were frustrated. Rashi to the talmudic passage understands it to mean that since women have an obligation to read the Megila, a woman may act as the reader even on behalf of men, there being no difference whatever in terms of obligation between men and women. The Tosaflsts to the same passage understand it differently, holding that women do have an obligation to hear the reading of the Megila, but not actually to read it. Thus a man, who has an obligation to read the Megila, can read it on behalf of other men and it is then considered as if they had read it. But a woman, whose obligation is only to hear the Megila, cannot act as the agent, as it were, of men, who have an obligation to read. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 689: 1-2) refers to both opinions-that a woman can act as the Megila reader and that she cannot - but the practice is for the reading to be carried out by a man. Isserles adds that some authorities rule that where a woman reads the Megila on behalf of other women or on her own behalf, the wording of the benediction should be 'commanded us to hear the Megila', not 'commanded us concerning the reading of the Megila'. The distinction made by the authorities mentioned above is hard to follow. Where is the logic in imposing on women only a partial obligation - to hear the Megila, but not to read it? Possibly, these authorities argue that since there is a conflict between the principle that women are not obliged to carry out precepts dependent on a specific time and the other principle that women should have an obligation because they, too, were saved, the compromise is adopted so as to make their obligation only partial. Festivals • 11 7 It says in the standard machzor that the congregation should kneel at certain points in the Days of Awe service. I am told that in some United synagogues the congrega­ tion does not follow this custom. Is this because there are stone floors in these synagogues or is there another reason for not kneeling?

First, allow me to elaborate a little on your reference to 'stone floors'. We read in Leviticus 26: 1: 'neither shall ye place any figured stone in your land, to bow down upon it'. In the context, the reference appears to be to some kind of idolatrous worship, but the rabbis extend the prohibition to bowing down in prostration even to God on a stone floor. The famous scholar Rabbi Abraham Gumbiner (Magen Abraham to Orach Chaim 131, note 19) holds that the prohibition only applies to a stone floor and not to one made of brick or wood. Rabbi Moses Isserles, in his note to the same passage in the Shulchan Aruch ( 131 :8), states that even if the floor is made of stone, it is permitted to prostrate oneself if the floor is covered with rushes and that this is the practice in synagogue on Yom Kippur. It follows that in our synagogues, where even if the floor is of stone it is generally covered with carpeting, there is no possible objection. I can only conclude that in those congregations where people do not kneel, it is because they feel that it is to be guilty of religious one-upmanship and an excessive display of piety, but there is no warrant for such an attitude in the tradition. To my knowledge in at least one well-known United synagogue it was the custom for the whole congregation to fall on the face at the appropriate points in the High Holy-day services.

Is it correct that one who has suffered a bereavement should not send out New Year cards?

This notion appears to be fairly widely held, but there is no basis to it. There could not be any references to it in the sources since the sending of New Year cards is a recent innovation. Nor can there be any possible reason for not sending out New Year cards in the circumstances. It is surely as right and proper for a mourner to wish friends and relatives a happy new year as it is for anyone else, and if he chooses to do it by means of the customary cards, why not? 118 • Jlsk the Rabbi' Is there any halachic basis for wearing a white cap in lieu of a hat on Rosh Hashana and YoDl Kippur?

Not much. But there are references to people donning white garments on Rosh Hashana in confidence that God in His mercy will pardon their sins, which is one of the reasons why the white kittel is worn and why the ark curtain and the scroll covers are in white during this period. This is also the reason why some people have a with white in lieu of black stripes for the Days of Awe.

Why is the 01onth of Tishri's Rosh Chodesh not cele­ brated in the Sabbath service preceding the week when the day or days of Rosh Chodesh are observed during daily prayer services? ·

The simple answer is because the first day of Tishri is not only the beginning of the month - Rosh Chodesh - but also the beginning of the year - Rosh Hashana. It would be unfitting to refer to this day for its minor importance. There is also the idea that, nowadays, the reason we refer to the day on the preceding Sabbath is chiefly as a reminder of which day Rash Chodesh is in the coming week, whereas on Tishri everyone will known in any event which day is Rosh Chodesh because it is also the day on which Rosh Hashana falls.

Both Chanucah and PuriDl have the sa01e status as bnportant Dlinor festivals and yet Hallel is recited on Chanucah, but there is no special seuda (festive Dleal). On the other hand, there is a PurUn seuda, but Hallel is not recited. Is this not inconsistent?

The reason why there is no special seuda on Chanucah is suggested by Rabbi Mordechaijaffe (died 1612), known after his work as the Levush ('Garment'). Purim celebrates the physical survival of the Jewish people. Haman's plot was to destroy the Jews, not their religion. It is right and proper, therefore, that the physical aspects of the festival - eating and drinking-be stressed. The body that was at risk is given, as it were, its share in the festivities. On Chanucah, however, it is the spiritual aspect that is stressed. The physical survival of theJews would not have been jeopardised had they been prepared to give up their religion. The deliverance was of theJewish soul; hence physical pleasures yield to spiritual joy. For all that, it is wrong to fast on Chanucah. It is only the special festive meal that is not enjoined. Festivals • 119 It might further be suggested that, while it is reasonable to have a special festive meal on a festival which lasts for one day only, it would be overdoing it a bit to demand special festive meals for the eight days of Chanucah. As for the Hallel question, this is discussed in the Talmud (Megila 14a). The general principle is that Hallel is recited over a miraculous deliverance, which is why it is recited on Chanucah and why, in theory, it should be recited on Purim. One reason, given in the Talmud, why Hallel is not recited on Purim is that it is unnecessary since the reading of the Megila, with the implied praises of God, is itself a form of Hallel, meaning 'praise'. The other reason given is that Hallel is recited only over a miracle which took place in the Holy Land, like Chanucah, whereas the events commemo­ rated on Purim took place outside the Holy Land. On this latter reason, the Talmud objects that Hallel is recited on Pesach and the Exodus was from Egypt. To this the reply is given that Israel at the Exodus became totally free from Pharaoh; but, while their lives were spared, the Jews remained subjects of Ahasuerus. Possibly, the two reasons are really one. The reading of the Megila is made to suffice as a kind of lesser Hallel, the full Hallel being reserved for the miracle that took place in the Holy Land. In short, there is no inconsistency. The special festive meal, but no Hallel, is suitable to express the Purim mood, the Hallel and no special meal to express the different Chanucah mood. In the same way, the canti.llation of the Torah is in a different melody from that of the Prophets, and both from that of the Megila. Variety is the spice of Jewish life.

Some succot have thick walls which stand permanendy in the garden, and in some synagogues the succah is an actual room in the building, but open to the sky for the duration of the festival. How can such succot be kosher if, as we are frequendy told, the whole idea of the succah is to suggest impermanence and act as a reminder of the tents in which our ancestors lived in the wilderness?

The word 'succah' is derived from a root meaning 'to cover'. Hence, in the rabbinic tradition, while there are rules regarding the walls, the main entity known as the succah is identified with the covering - the sechach, as it is called in the talmudic literature. Nor is the idea of impermanence particularly stressed, except that a booth covered with things that grow is by nature somewhat impermanent. Thus the mitzva, as understood by the rabbis, is to sit under the sechach, the walls being little more than supports for the sechach. A succah does not need to have more than two complete walls and a third 120 • 5-isk the Rabbi' not thicker than a handbreadth. But since the type of wall is irrelevant, it follows that the walls can be strong and fixed. Another common misconception is that it is essential for the sechach to be very lightly spread. This is incorrect. Indeed, if there is more open space than sechach, the succah is not kosher because then one would not be sitting in a succah at all, but under the open sky. Although these are references to a small area being open to the stars, this is a late addition and does not mean that over the whole area of the succah the sechach must be thinly spread. Rather it is better to have a really thick covering so that rain cannot easily penetrate. The only provision made by some authorities is that the sechach should not be so thick that even the heaviest rain cannot penetrate, and this condition, too, is only because then it looks like a house, not because the succah is thereby invalidated per se. Nevertheless, it is the universal practice, where a succah is fitted with a roof, to open the roof over the sechach when using the succah so that one is sitting underneath the sechach and not the roo£ The three conditions with regard to the material used for the sechach are: 1) it must be something which grows from the soil; 2) it must be detached from the ground; 3) it must not be subject to ritual contamination, as stated in the relevant passages about this in the Book of Leviticus. Thus, bales of cannot be used because they do not grow from the soil. The branches of a tree with leaves cannot be used unless they have first been detached from the tree. And food cannot be used because it is subject to ritual contamination. (Hanging fruit is for the adornment of the succah and is not part of the sechach.) There seems to be abroad today in some circles the curious idea that only fresh leaves may be used for the sechach; many of us remember when it was the normal practice to cover the succah with straw. This is a perfectly kosher form of sechach since it grows from the soil, is detached from the soil and does not suffer ritual contamination. We are not told the reason for these three conditions, at least not in the halachic sources, but the homilists point out that our gratitude to God for His care and bounty is best expressed through the use of His natural gifts, things which grow, and things pure.

Why are there 100 blasts on the shofar? Surely there were fewer in Te01ple tUnes.

Rosh Hashana is described asyom teruah, 'a day on which a teruah is sounded' (Numbers 29: 1). According to rabbinic exegesis, the teruah sound has to be preceded and followed by a tekiah sound. The problem is, what kind of sound is the teruah? The Talmud (Rosh Hashana 33b) quotes the Aramaic Targum of teruah as yebava. Now, of the mother of Sisera, the word vateyabev (connected withyebava) is used Gudges Festivals • 121 5:28) and this word is interpreted as 'she wept'. Thus the teruah is a weeping sound. There is a further piece of rabbinic exegesis according to which the teruah has to be sounded three times, each preceded and followed by a tekiah. Thus the basic sounds are tekiah, teruah, tekiak, sounded three times. But the Talmud (Rosh Hashana 34a) further states that there is some doubt as to whether the teruah sound is that of wailing (our teruah, a series of short blasts) or of groaning (our shevarim, three longer blasts). Rabbi Abahu therefore ordained in Caesarea in the third century that, to make sure, the 30 notes (tekiah, shevarim, teruah, tekiah; tekiah, shevarim, tekiah; tekiah, teruah, tekiah, each set three times) we now use should be sounded. Some of these have to be repeated during the musaf (customs vary on these), and then at a much later date (sixteenth century, referred to by Isaiah Horqwitz in his 'Shelah', section on Rosh Hashana) the idea of sounding 100 sounds was referred, said to correspond to the 100 weeping sounds of Sisera's mother. Louis Ginzberg, in his '', puzzled by the reference to Sisera's mother, suggested that originally this read 'our mother Sarah' and this was corrupted to 'the mother of Sisera'. The connection of Sarah with the is obvious and is a Rosh Hashana theme. However, since the Talmud, as we have seen, does tie up the teruah with the mother of Sisera, this reading, contra Ginzberg, is probably correct.

Would it be superstitious to use only white flowers in one's home on the High Holy-days?

This question is not discussed in the sources, but there is a close enough reference in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 605: 1). Rabbi Moses Isserles states that where it is the custom to use a fowl for the kapparot ceremony on the eve of Yom Kippur, it is the practice to prefer white cocks for the purpose as a symbol of 'If your sins are as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow'. Rabbijoel Sirkes, however, remarks (quoted by the commentary Baer Hetev to the passage) that one should not make a special point of trying hard only to obtain white cocks because to do this smacks of 'the ways of the Amorites', the rabbinic term for superstition.

Why do some authorities prefer baaley te&la for the High Holy-days to have beards?

The Baer Hetev to the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 581: 1, note 7) states that it is preferable for the baal teftla on these days to be married and to have a beard (he uses the rabbinic term for a beard - hadrat panim, 'adornment of the face'). 122 • 54sk the Rabbi' He should be married because he can then pray for his wife and family (the High Priest on Yom Kippur in Temple times had to have a wife for the same reason), and have a beard presumably because this lends him dignity. It is worth noting, however, that the Mishna Berura to the passage observes that the main qualification is for the baal teflla to be learned and God-fearing and this takes precedence over the qualification that he be married. Presumably it would also take precedence over the requirement to have a beard.

May the horn of any anim.al be used for the shofar and does it have to conforJD to any particular shape?

The Mishna (Rosh Hashana 3:2) states that all shofarot are fit to be used for the shofar of Rosh Hashana except for the horn of a cow. It is clear from the discussion in the Talmud on this Mishna that the horn of a bull is also unfit for use as a shofar and this leaves us with the question why the Mishna refers only to the horn of a cow. It is possible that a cow is mentioned particularly because these horns were more easily available than those of a bull. But, again from the discussion in the Talmud, it would appear that the cow species is meant, and the reason a cow is stated is because this type of horn is unfit for use since it recalls the Golden Cal£ As the Talmud puts it: ~prosecuting council cannot act [in the same case] as the defending counsel.' In other words, it is totally unfitting for that which recalls sin to be the means of entreating God to pardon sin. The Talmud states, in the name of the third-century Palestinian teacher, Rabbi Abahu, that it is the practice to use a shofar taken from a ram as a reminder of the ram found and offered up as a sacrifice by Abraham. Thus it emerges that while a symbol that recalls sin is invalid, one that recalls the sacrifice of Isaac is not only valid, but should be chosen. Maimonides (Hilchot Shofar 1: 1) goes so far as to declare that only the ram's horn is valid, but his critic, R. Abraham lbn David, observes that while it is indisputably a special mitzva to use a ram's horn, as R. Abahu states, the horn of an antelope is also valid for use. It should be noted that, with regard to the shape of the shofar, the horn of an antelope is usually straight, whereas the ram's horn is usually curved. The Talmud says that a curved shofar is to be preferred because on Rosh Hashana the more a man bows in submission to God, the better it is. It is interesting that the practice is for the ram's horn to be facing upwards. Perhaps the symbolism here is that submission to God is one of the highest virtues, but it does not involve a slavish debasement of the person. On the contrary, the man who submits to God's law finds his true self and his humble heart if elevated. It has been pointed out that by blowing the shofar at the narrow end, the sounds proceed from the broader end. This is said to give expression to the Festivals • 12 3 verse, 'Out of the depths I called upon the Lord. He answered me with great enlargement.' The good life is difficult at first and man often fmds anguish and distress. If, nonetheless, he places his trust in God, he is saved from any narrow view of life and a broad vision awaits him.

Sephardinl eat rice and rice dishes on Pesach, but Ashkenazinl do not. Why is this? Either rice is chatnetz or it is not. How can it be chatnetz for Ashkenazinl and not for Sephardinl?

The Talmud (Pesahim 35a) records a debate between the sages and R.Johanan ben Nuri. The latter holds that rice can indeed become chametz and is strictly forbidden when it does, but the sages hold that the 'fermentation' of rice does not qualifY as real 'fermentation', but as 'decay'. According to the sages, only fermented wheat, barley, spelt, rye and oats are forbidden as chametz. Now the Talmud (Pesahim 104b) states explicitly that no one takes any notice of the opinion of R. Johanan ben Nuri, so that there is no question that, according to talmudic law, rice is permitted in all circumstances on Pesach. Maimonides states the rule clearly (Yad, Hametz u-Matzah 5:1): 'Even if one kneaded flour of rice with hot water and covered the dough with garments until it began to rise just like dough that has fermented, it is permitted to eat it since this is not ferment, but decay.' In Germany in the Middle Ages, however, there were some who began to place a ban on the use of rice. This could not have been because they believed rice capable of becoming chametz: they would not have taken issue with the ruling of the Talmud that R.Johanan ben Nuri's opinion is utterly rejected. The ban was introduced for a different reason, namely, that a fermented dough of rice, albeit technically not chametz, looks like chametz, so that if it be permitted, the ignorant may be puzzled as to why it should be permitted and they might imagine that other kinds of dough are permitted. In other words, what was introduced was what is known as agezera, a rabbinic decree, and while, generally speaking, the introduction of new prohibitions as a fence around the law was limited to the talmudic sages, there are occasions - and this is one - when even the post-talmudic authorities introduced such new legislation. The result is that the ban on rice would apply to those in whose lands it was introduced, and even there it was obeyed not so much as a particular Pesach law, but rather under the general heading of acceptance of local custom, which also has a certain binding force in the halacha. Sephardi authorities such as Maimonides never introduced any such ban, so that there was no local custom of prohibition among the Sephardim. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 453: 1) records categorically that rice 124 • ~sk the Rabbi' is permitted, though Isserles' gloss states: 'But it is the Ashkenazi practice to forbid it and this must not be changed.' In reply to the question, therefore, both Ashkenazim and Sephardim agree that rice is never chametz and the reason why the Ashkenazim ban the use of rice is ultimately because of the binding force of local custom. Incidentally, legumes have the same status as rice in this connection. They are permitted to the Sephardim, but not to the Ashkenazim. On the basis of our analysis, it becomes clear why, in times of emergency - when food was scarce - some Ashkenazi rabbis permitted legumes for Pesach. (A very interesting essay on this is that of Rabbi Seymour Siegel: 'The War of the .Kitnf:yot (Legumes)', in the 'Festschrift' for Rabbi Wolfe Kelman, New York, 1978, pp. 383-94.)

I have long been puzzled at what appear to be the super­ stitious ele01ents in the celebration of Rosh Hashana: the custom of eating sweet things as a good sign; the tashlich cere01ony of casting sins into the water; and the references of blowing the shofar in order to confuse . Can you explain how these can be reconciled with a refined faith?

There is not much point denying that some people today do follow the practices you mention for superstitious reasons and I would go further in admitting that they may have had a superstitious origin. But origins in these matters are less important than interpretation or, better, re-interpretation. There are many instances of magical or superstitious practices being accepted because they had become too deeply rooted to be eradicated. What the Jewish teachers did, when this was the case, was to give ajewish meaning to the practice, to make it serve theJewish ideal. We can observe how this principle operates in the three instances to which you refer. The eating of sweet things on Rosh Hashana eve, reciting the prayer, 'May God give us a sweet and good year', is understood by the rabbis as a psycho­ logical means of beginning the New Year in a spirit of confidence. It is not suggested that merely because we eat sweet things, God is coerced into giving us a good year. That would, indeed, be a base form of magic unworthy of the Jewish spirit. The practice only serves as a reminder to us that if we want the coming year to be sweet and wholesome, we must try so to live that we make it so. 'Sweets to the sweet' contains a good deal of wisdom if it is understood as meaning that those whose nature is sweet will fmd sweetness in life, while those sour in character will make themselves and others miserable by their unhealthy disposition. Life is soured by the sour character. Tashlich is similarly symbolic. The casting off of sins into the deep waters Festivals • 125 represents the banishing of sinfulness from the place people inhabit, as if to say, we shall do our best in the coming year to divert our aggressive and other unworthy instincts from the realm of society where they can do harm. The references to blowing the shofar in order to confuse Satan is made more rational when it is appreciated, as Maimonides and otherJewish thinkers have pointed out in this connection, that there is a profound rabbinic saying: 'Satan, the Angel of Death and the Evil Inclination are one and the same.' On any sophisticated view of human nature, there is something perverse in man which leads him to pursue evil and reject the good. This is called by the rabbis the evil inclination, which frustrates life (hence it is also the angel of death) and is personified as Satan (which word is closely connected with the word for perversity). The great commentator Rashi explains in this vein the rabbinic reference to the shofar confusing Satan. The blowing of the shofar is done in two sets and it is in this connection that the expression 'in order to confuse Satan' occurs. Indeed, says Rashi in so many words. For to carry out the mitzva twice suggests that we love to carry out God's commands and never tire of them. How better to overcome the darker side of our nature! I am certainly not suggesting that all the Jewish teachers have seen it all in this way. But what is undoubtedly true is that a sufficient number of teachers have given the rationalistic interpretation to free those who observe these practices from the taint of magic and superstition.

If a woman writes a Megila, may it be used for the public reading on Purim?

Somewhat surprisingly, this question is discussed neither in the Talmud nor in the earliest Codes. The basic legal question is this: is the writing of the Megila to be compared to the writing of the Torah which, according to a majority of the codifiers, is invalid if written by a woman scribe, or should it rather be compared to the writing of a get? The latter is valid if written by a woman on the grounds that the laws of divorce apply to women as well as to men; from which it might follow that, since women are obliged to hear the reading of the Megila (and, according to some authorities, a woman may even read the Megila on behalf of men), a Megila written by a woman scribe is perfectly kosher. When we turn to the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 281 :3), we fmd that the ruling given there is that a woman is disqualified from writing a sefer Torah, yet the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 691: 1) significantly omits women from the list of those disqualified from writing a Megila. Rabbi H.H. Medini ( 1832-1904), in his great compendium of Jewish law, 'Sedey Chemed' (section on Purim, No. 12), refers to a manuscript he had seen, dated 1734, in which the author, aJerusalem sage, argues that a Megila written by a woman scribe is perfectly kosher. 126 • :Ask the Rabbi' While on such matters as the style of writing (e.g., on ruled lines and on parchment) the Megila is compared to a sefer Torah, on other matters the Megila is not compared to the sefer Torah. Medini concludes, after quoting the pros and cons, that even ab initio it is permitted to read on Purim from a Megila written by a woman scribe. Others, however, allow the reading from a Megila written by a woman scribe as valid only when it is afait accompli (Shaarey Teshuva to Orach Chaim 691, note 2). Rabbi SJ. Sevin ('Ha-Moadim Ba'Halachah', Vol. 11, p. 243) quotes an ingenious proof for the validity of a Megila written by a woman, in the name of Rabbi Solomon Gantzfried. The Talmud (Megila 19a) derives the rule that the Megila must be written on parchment and with ink from the fact that 'writing' implies these, and the word 'writing' occurs in the verse ~d Esther the queen wrote' (Esther 9:29). The Talmud thus takes the verse to mean that Esther wrote a kosher Megila, which would seem to solve the problem once and for all. Not necessarily so. There have recently appeared the volumes 'Mikraey Kodesh', by the late Zevi Pesach Franck, Av Beth Din ofJerusalem, who reports Rabbi Sevin's observation (made to him personally, evidently before Sevin's book had been published), but who seeks to demolish the argument with equal ingenuity. The Talmud (Avoda Zara 27 a) seeks to prove that a circumcision performed by a woman is valid from the verse 'Then Zippora took a flint and cut off the foreskin of her son' (Exodus 4:25). To this the Talmud replies that there is no proof; the verse might mean that Zippora instructed a man to do it (although, in fact, a brit performed by a woman is valid, according to the fmal ruling in the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 264: 1). If the Talmud can say, Rabbi Franckretorts, that 'Zippora tooR and 'Zippora cut qfJ' may mean that she instructed someone to do it, by the same token the verse ~d Esther the queen wrote' may mean that she instructed a man to write the Megila.

Since wine cannot be Dlade without commercial yeast or wild yeast, and since we cannot obtain kosher-for-Pesach raisins, how can I ~nake wine kosher for Pesach?

Yeast of grain cannot, of course, be used for making wine for Pesach. Wild yeast, as you put it simply, means, I take it, that the wine has become fermented without the use of grain. It is not fermentation as such that renders a substance unfit for Pesach, but only grain fermentation. I am puzzled by your reference to the difficulty of obtaining raisins that are kosher for Pesach. Provided they are free from any trace of leaven, all raisins are automatically kosher for Pesach. You seem to imagine that wine can be made with ordinary yeast before Festivals • 12 7 Pesach and filtered, and that this makes it kosher for Pesach. This is incorrect. Once the wine has been made with fermented grain - yeast - it cannot be made kosher by filtering. As for other requirements, ideally the wine should be red (because in the Bible wine is referred to as 'red'), but white wine is still kosher and can be used at the Seder for the four cups. There is, incidentally, evidence that in some communities in former times, when the absurd and tragic presented an ever-present danger to Jews, it was advised that only white wine should be used at the Seder. Beyond that, all you need to do is to make sure that all the utensils are completely free of any trace of leaven.

Is it in order to bake bread and cakes before Pesach speci­ fically for sale in the shops immediately after Pesach - this merchandise being properly sold to a non-Jew in the interim?

I can understand the objection (voiced, incidentally, by a number of rabbis) to the whole institution of the sale of chametz, but it has to be appreciated that it was introduced to prevent heavy fmancialloss (for instance, to Jewish owners of inns in Poland who would face ruin if they had to get rid of all their stocks of alcohol containing chametz). Furthermore, the sale is a real sale, drawn up according to the requirements ofJewish law. It is not as if one is trying to circumvent the Torah law since, as the rabbis explain it, the Torah only forbids the ownership of chametz by a Jew during Pesach. It is permitted to have chametz belonging to a non:Jew in the home during Pesach. Hence there is no negation of the whole idea of Pesach in what the bakers do. The Jewish housewives are busily cleaning out their own chametz, which it is forbidden to keep in the home, or to own, during Pesach. But the bakers are quite legitimately transferring the ownership of the chametz, and this is permitted, even if their clear intention is to buy it back again after Pesach. It is not a case of trying to cheat or to fool God, as attempts to avoid ethical commitments would be. The sole concern is with religious law, and this depends on the definition of the type of chametz one must not have in the home. 128 • 'Ask the Rabbi' Is it essential to place around the house, before the search for chan1etz begins, ten small pieces of bread? And may an electric torch be used for the search instead of a candle?

The custom of leaving around the house small pieces of hard chametz (hard, so that no crumbs are left behind) is referred to by Isserles (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 432:2). The reason given is that, otherwise, no chametz may be found during the search and the benediction will then have been recited to no purpose, since the benediction implies a search that will lead to the discovery of leaven. Isserles goes on to state, however, that if the pieces of chametz were not placed around the house, the search is still valid, since the benediction does not, in fact, imply that chametz will be found, only that if chametz is found, it will be removed from the house. On this, Rabbi David Halevi, the Taz, remarks that it is better not to follow the custom of leaving the pieces of chametz, since one or two may be over­ looked and chametz will remain in the house. Rabbi Solomon Ganzfried, in his Kitzur Shulchan Aruch ( 111 :8), adds that if one simply picks up the pieces one has previously placed around the house and engages in a very perfunctory search, one's benediction will certainly be to no purpose, since simply to pick up these pieces hardly constitutes a search. Two further reasons have been given for the custom. The first is that nowadays, when the house is in any event swept out regularly, there is little likelihood of fmding chametz and so, in order for the mitzva of searching to be carried out, it is necessary to place the pieces of chametz in the rooms beforehand. The second reason is that, according to some authorities, it is not enough to make sure that there is no chametz in the house. It is necessary for the chametz to be removed and destroyed, so that the pieces are essential, otherwise no chametz may be found for the positive removal. In the Cabala, a mystical reason is given and it is here that the number of pieces is stated as ten. It is an ancient custom and, while some authorities disapprove of it, the general opinion seems to be that the custom should be observed. There has been much discussion on whether an electric light qualifies as a 'lamp' (ner) where such is required by the law. For instance, are electric candles suitable for the Sabbath candles, and may an electric light be used as the ner in the synagogue? With regards to the search for chametz, however, there is no rule that a lamp must be 'kindled', only that there should be sufficient light for the search to be conducted adequately. For this reason, some authorities argue that it is better to use an electric torch. Again, however, custom has a say in these matters, and the most universal custom is to use a candle. Festivals • 129 Why do many people eat dairy food oD Shavuot?

A number of reasons have been given for the custom. The most attractive is that the Torah is compared, among other liquids, to milk, in that the Torah provided spiritual nourishment. It is essential even to babies in arms and, as the rabbis say, it goes sour if kept in gold or silver vessels. So, too, the student of the Torah must not be proud and must be prepared, if necessary, to give up his wealth in order to pursue the Torah. Another reason given is that when the Torah was given, the call to the people to assemble at the foot of Sinai came so suddenly that they had time only to snatch a quick snack of dairy food. A more prosaic reason is that the climate is generally hot on Shavuot and dairy dishes are more refreshing than meat dishes. But who wants prose when we can have poetry?

Why is the synagogue decorated with :ftowers and plants oDShavuot?

The usual reason given is that, as the Midrash states, when the Torah was given on Sinai the otherwise barren mountain suddenly became covered with fragrant flowers. Again, the decoration of the synagogue with things that grow reminds us that the Torah aims to foster our spiritual growth, not to frustrate it.

Could you explain the details of the ban OD live social music during the Omer period, as many people seem to be confused in this matter, accepting stringeDcies as if they were actual halacha.

I assume you mean that the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 493) refers only to the custom of not celebrating weddings during this period and of not having a haircut. There is, indeed, nothing about listening to music, perhaps because there was some doubt about the legality of listening to music in any event at any time of the year. But, nowadays, when many observantJews see no harm in such a pastime, the implications of your question are correct: there is no special din about listening to music during the Sefrrah period.

Why are the sounds of shevarim and teruah sounded together without pause?

According to the Talmud, the teruah sound mentioned in the Torah is a weeping sound, since the Targum, the Aramaic translation, renders teruah as 130 • 5-:tsk the Rabbi' yabava, which means 'weeping'. Now, when a person weeps there are first the short, broken sounds represented by the shevarim, and then the less violent but more frequent sobs, represented by the teruah. There is a doubt as to whether the teruah sound is that of the first part of the 'weeping', i.e., the shevarim sounds, or the latter part of the 'weeping', i.e., the teruah sounds, or, possibly, it means both of these. Consequently, in order to be free of any doubt we sound first the shevarim, teruah sounds together in case the Torah means both sounds; then we sound the shevarim sounds on their own, in case the Torah means these alone; and fmally we sound the teruah sounds on their own in case the Torah means these on their own. It follows that when we sound shevarim, teruah we do so because this might be the teruah sound intended by the Torah and since, presumably, a single sound is intended, we sound the two together without pause in between. However, there is a fourth possibility that the Torah might mean the two separate sounds of shevarim and teruah. That is why some very observant Jews, during the second set of soundings, do, in fact, make a pause between the shevarim and the teruah.

Is there any connection between the rabbinic condem­ nation of Tashlich and the popular Gentile charge in the medieval period that Jews were causing disease by poisoning the wells? In other words, did the rabbis fear that Tashlich could give rise to misunderstanding? The codes make a point that no one should throw anything into the water when he says Tashlich.

The connection to which you refer was seen by a number of scholars (see Lauterbach's lengthy essay on Tashlich in his 'Rabbinic Essays', page 3 78, note 102, and page 431). Against the theory is the fact that the accusations against the Jews that they poisoned the wells was not raised before the beginning of the Black Death in 1348, and yet Petrarch, on his visit to Cologne in 1333, noticed a similar custom of throwing things into the water among the Gentiles, so that the Christians would not have misunderstood the purpose of the Jews since they, themselves, had such a ceremony. In any event, I am not sure what you mean by rabbinic 'condemnation' of Tashlich. The only 'condemnation' one fmds is that of throwing things into the water, to which you refer, not the ceremony itsel£ It is likely, indeed, that the opposition to throwing things into the water is due to rabbinic recognition of the pagan origin of this practice, i.e., giving gifts to Neptune. The Vilna Gaon did not condemn Tashlich, but did not observe the custom himself (Maaseh Rav, No. 209, in Siddur Ha-Gra), but that was evidently Festivals • 131 because he did not feel justified in spending time on walking to the river when he could spend it more profitably in study of the Torah.

Why do we recite the benediction, 'Who has conunanded us to eat 1natza' only at the Seder and not during the other days of Passover?

The Talmud (Pesachim 120a) quotes the verse, 'at eventide you must eat matzot' (Exodus 12: 18), as meaning that at the Seder there is an obligation to eat matza, but on the other days it is reshut, 'optional'. The question is what is the precise significance of this term, reshut? The usual understanding is that there is neither an obligation nor is it a mitzva to eat matza on the other days of Passover. On this understanding, the verses (Exodus 12:15 and 23:15) which speak of eating matza for 'seven days' are to be interpreted as 'If you want to eat bread on the other days of Passover, you must eat unleavened bread, not leaven, but if you wish, you may abstain from eating matza'. Thus, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 17 5: 7), after stating the obligation to eat matza at the Seder, goes on to say: 'There is no obligation to eat matza except on the first night.' However, the thirteenth-century Bible commentator Hezekiah ben Manoah (Hazzekuni to Exodus 12: 15) understands the term reshut to mean that, unlike on the first night, there is no obligation to eat matza. In this sense alone is it 'optional', but if one does eat matza during the other days of Passover, one has fulfilled a mitzva (see also lbn Ezra to Exodus 23:15). On this understanding, the eating of matza during the other days is to be compared to eating in the succah on Succot. There, too, there is only an obligation to eat in the succah on the first night of Succot. Nevertheless, if one wants to eat bread during the other days, one must eat in the succah and then a mitzva is fulfilled. On this interpretation of the matter, the verses which speak of eating matza on the other days of Passover, while not an obligation, are a positive command, i.e., if one does eat matza, though not obliged to do so, one has fulfilled a positive mitzva. In the account of the religious practices of the Vilna Gaon (Maaseh Rav, No. 185), it is said that the Gaon understood it in this way and made a special effort to eat matza whenever he could during the other days of Passover. There is thus considerable doubt whether it is, in fact, a mitzva to eat matza during the other days of Passover, which is why no benediction is recited; the principle being that where there is doubt whether or not a benediction is required, no benediction must be recited. It is forbidden to use God's name in a benediction that may not be necessary. In an interesting responsum, the famed Galician halachist, Rabbi S.M. Shwadron (Responsa Maharsham, I, No. 209), tells of a visit paid to the 132 • :AsktheRabbi' Romanian town ofJassy by a Chasidic Rebbe who did recite the benediction before eating matza during the other days of Passover, for which the Dayan ofJassy rebuked him. Rabbi Shwadron sides with the dayan.

Why is it that in the whole of the Hagada there is no mention of Moses?

Actually, there is one incidental reference to Moses, but the omission is nonetheless startling at first glance. The reason generally given is this. The compilers wished to stress that the deliverance from Egypt was solely the result of divine intervention and that it was not due to any clever strategy of Moses, who was, as it were, a passive instrument for the fulfJlment of the divine purpose. Moses himself, the man whom the Torah describes as 'very meek', would have been pleased by the omission. It is all in line with the cry of the Psalmist (Psalm 105:1): 'Not unto us, 0 Lord, not unto us, but unto Thy Name give glory, for Thy loving kindness and for Thy truth's sake.'

Why is Y"IZkor not recited on Rosh Hashana and why is Hallel not recited on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur?

The custom of reciting the Yizkor prayer originated in Germany and was introduced as part of the Yom Kippur liturgy. Thus, while the Shulchan Aruch does not mention the prayer at all, Isserles (Orach Chaim 621:6) who records the Ashkenazi customs, remarks (on the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, following the German practice here, that it is the custom on Yom Kippur to make promises to give charity on behalf of the dead): ~d mention is made [mazkirin, the same word as 'Ytzkor'] of their souls, for there is atonement on Yom K.ippur for the dead as well.' At a later date, the Ashkenazi custom was extended for the last day of all the festivals, with the exception of Rosh Hashana. One reason suggested for the omission on Rosh Hashana is that Ytzkor is usually recited immediately after the reading of the Torah, and on Rosh Hashana, at this part of the service, the shofar is sounded. Rather than move the Yizkor prayer to another part of the service, it was omitted entirely. But a more cogent reason would appear to be that, strictly speaking, it is in any event somewhat incongruous to recite this prayer on the other festivals (and, as above, it was done only as an extension of the original Yom K.ippur practice, where it had meaning) and on Rosh Hashana it would have been doubly incongruous to refer to the dead on a Yomtov when all the prayers, at the beginning of the year, are for life. The question of why Hallel is not recited is discussed in the Talmud Festivals • 133 (Arachim lOb), where the third-century Palestinian teacher, Rabbi Abahu, is quoted. Rabbi Abahu says: 'The Ministering Angels ask God: "Why do Thy children not sing Thy praises (i.e., in the Hallel) on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur?" God replies: "The books of Life and Death are open and the King sits on His throne of justice and shall My children sing praises?"' Maimonides (Chanucah 3:6) puts it as follows: 'No Hallel is recited on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur because these are days of repentance, fear and dread, not days of extraordinary joy.' Maimonides means by this that while Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur are festivals and hence days of rejoicing (simcha), for Hallel to be recited it is necessary for there to be 'extraordinary joy' (simcha yetera) and this is absent on days where the more solemn aspects of human existence are in our minds and hearts. All this is a very interesting illustration of how psychological motivation has influencedJewish practice. We see that the halacha imagines it to be quite possible for the human mind to blend solemnity and joy. Rosh Hashana is a festival of quiet confidence in God's mercy wedded to natural anxiety and feelings of guilt at our shortcomings. Yom Kippur, too, is a day of rejoicing at pardon for sin and yet it is a fast-day on which there is repeated confession.

I have always wondered about the origin of the naDle Egypt, since it is biblically referred to as mitzrayim. How is this difference explained?

Mit<.rl!Jim is the Hebrew name and is perhaps from a root meaning 'to drain', i.e., the well-irrigated land. The name Egypt is derived from the Greek, which, in turn, originates from an Egyptian name for Memphis. We, of course, only use the term in English based on the Greek translation. ManyJews, though, do prefer the name mitzrl!Jim, the biblical name. It might also be remarked that there are a number of folk-etymologies of mitzrl!Jim. One of these connects it with the word metzar, meaning a narrow path, and so understands it as a land narrow in spirit; but this is naturally purely homiletical. That the biblical mitzrl!Jim is to be identified with part of present-day Egypt is shown by such biblical references as to the Pharaohs as the rulers of the land, by Egyptian terms paralleled in archaeological discoveries, and by the many references to the 'river' which, in the context, is clearly the Nile. 134 • fuk the Rabbi' do not eat rice on Passover, although SephardUn do. If anAshkenaziJewis invited to a Sephardi home, may he eat of the dishes or are they considered to be chametz?

The Talmud rules that rice is not chametz and may be eaten on Passover. The reason for the Ashkenazi custom, however, is that rice may be confused with grain that is chametz. Thus, it is not at all a question of chametz, but of following one's own custom. Custom is binding in these matters, but it is not, strictly speaking, a Passover law that is to be obeyed, but a law about keeping one's own customs. It follows that an Ashkenazijew must not eat rice dishes in a Sephardi home on Passover. If he does, his offence is not a 'Passover' offence, but a 'custom' offence.

Following on from the above, my family, who hail from Salonika, do not eat either rice or potatoes on Pesach since both are considered chametz. The only way they could possibly be eaten is by being served very hot before the starch has allowed to form, in which case they could burn the tongue.

Your family custom is interesting in that both rice and potatoes are forbidden on Pesach, whereas in the usual Sephardi practice, rice is permitted; even in the Ashkenazi practice, only rice is forbidden (and legumes), but not potatoes. I have to repeat, however, that these things forbidden by custom are not forbidden, as you imply, because they are chametz. The custom of forbidding them arose in Germany in the Middle Ages because they may contain a mixture of chametz and also because they may be confused with chametz. If, say, a dough made from rice is permitted, people might wrongly conclude that a dough of real chametz is also permitted. Ashkenazim, and the people of Salonika you mention, are bound to keep these laws not because rice (or potatoes) are chametz, or even because there is a real fear of chametz, but solely because of the very different principle (suggested above) that one must follow the customs of one's forbears. There is a good deal of teaching on the need for people to preserve their own customs. Since it is on these grounds, a number of rabbinic authorities have tended to be lenient in the matter, even for Ashkenazim, in time of food shortage - in wartime, for instance. Festivals • 135 SoiDe of the iteiDs in the YoiD Kippur confession (the al chet) are rather puzzling- for exa~nple, 'the sin we have coiDIDitted under coiDpulsion' and 'the sin we have coiD­ IDitted unwittingly'. Surely an act perforiDed under co~npulsion or unwittingly is not a sin? 'The sin we have coiDIDitted with the evil inclination' is also difficult to understand. What does this IDean, since every sin is coiDIDitted with the evil inclination?

First, it has to be appreciated that the author of the al chet arranged his list in alphabetical order (perhaps to suggest that we have sinned from alifto tav), so that too much should not be read into all the categories of transgressions he mentions. For example, he may have chosen be'ones ('under compulsion') simply because he was looking for an item that begins with the letter alef and this was the only one that came to mind at the time. Nevertheless, the commentaries to the prayer-book do try to fmd some meaning to the items you mention. Although it is true, as you say, that an act carried out under compulsion (under threat of severe violence or because of an uncontrollable urge) is not sinful according to the strict letter of the law, it is possible that the person who sins under compulsion is secretly glad that he has been compelled to commit the sin. In that case, although he is not blamed for the sinful act per se, he is blameworthy for his enjoyment of the opportunity to sin, and it is to this that he confesses. He may also have failed to take steps that would have prevented him being placed in the situation in which he is compelled to sin. 'Unwittingly' in Hebrew is beloyodeim, literally, 'without knowledge'. This might refer to a person who sins in ignorance. He cannot be blamed for committing the sin, since he was unaware at the time that it was a sin, but he is blameworthy for his ignorance if he had had the means of overcoming that ignorance through knowledge. It may also refer to the callous attitude of the person who says: 'I do not wish to know', who prefers to turn his back on the sufferings of others. As for 'the sin we have committed with the evil inclination' (yetzer hara), this might mean 'for the sheer hell of it', so to speak. 136 • ~sk the Rabbi' Why does Alenu occupy such a central place in the High Holy-day liturgy? Why is it recited after every prayer during the year? And why do we prostrate ourselves on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur when we say Alenu, but only bow at other times?

Its origin uncertain, Alenu first appears- as a liturgical hymn to be recited by the whole congregation-in the Rosh Hashana musaf. Later, it was also recited on Yom Kippur and, later still, at the conclusion of every service of the year. Thus, special prominence is given to Alenu on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur. It is only on these occasions that the Ark is opened for Alenu and the hymn is recited to the special triumphant melody used in the Ashkenazi rite. The genius of the Jewish liturgy consists in large measure in the sense of balance achieved. It is good that we acknowledge God's sovereignty at all times, but acknowledgement with special fervour is reserved for the Days of Awe. It is frequently said that we do not kneel and prostrate ourselves while reciting Alenu during the rest of the year because kneeling has become associated with Christian worship. But if that were so, why is it done on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur? Surely the Days of Awe are occasions when this association should especially be avoided? - unless it is argued that, when all the emphasis is on the purity ofJewish monotheism and the Jewish religion, no association of this kind will be allowed to obtrude. It is possible that prostration is performed only on these occasions for the same reason that the Ark is opened and the special melody used: to give prominence to the hymn on the Days of Awe. On Yom Kippur, the service in the Temple is re-enacted in the musaf (the avoda) and here there are references to complete prostration by the priests and the people, which is why the congregation performs this today as the ancient service is recalled. It is possible that since, in any event, there is this prostration on Yom Kippur, it was extended to the Alenu on Yom Kippur and then to Alenu on Rosh Hash ana. Another suggestion is that, according to the rabbinic interpretation of 'neither shall ye place any figured stone in your hand, to bow down upon it' (Leviticus 26: 1), it is forbidden to have full prostration on arv' stone because of associations with idolatrous worship. Since many synagogues had stone floors, prostration was forbidden in the synagogue on the basis of this verse. On Yom Kippur, especially, when full prostration (with one's face to the ground) was engaged in, rushes or straw were placed all around to provide an interposition between the worshippers and the stone floors. Festivals • 13 7 Why are six people called up for the reading of the Torah on Yo1n Kippur, as against seven on the Sabbath and five on the festivals?

Tractate Megila (22b) states that, for the ordinary weekday reading, three people are called up - a Cohen, a Levite and an Israelite. This is the basic number. But a further aliya is added on days when something additional is stated in the Bible for that day. On Rosh Chodesh and Chol Hamoed, in Temple times, the additional sacrifice (the musa!J was offered, hence a further aliya is added on those days. On festivals, work is forbidden, so there is a further addition and hence an additional aliya, totalling five. Yom Kippur has further additional features-fasting, for example -making the total number of aliyot six. And Shabbat has still more features, so that the number on the Sabbath is seven. Most authorities hold that, while it is permitted on Shabbat to add to the aliyot, this should not be done on Yom Kippur, on the festivals and on the other days in order to maintain the distinction between them.

We do not nor~nally wear a talit at night-tUne. Why do we wear one on Kol Nidre night?

The chief reason for wearing a talit is to carry out the precept of , the fringes of a four-cornered garment (Numbers 15:37-41). Since the verse says of the tzitzit 'that you may look' (Numbers 15:39), the rabbis say that the precept of tzitzit applies only when the fringes can be seen without artificial light - that is, by day and not by night. Hence there is no obligation to wear a talit at night; and since there is no obligation, the benediction must not be recited. There is, however, a secondary purpose in wearing a talit. This is to be wrapped around with a 'prayer shawl' as an aid to concentration and as a token of special respect, which is why the chazan normally wears a talit even for the night prayers (though he does not recite the benediction). It is the custom in most places for all the congregation to wear the talit on Kol Nidre night, perhaps because of the special solemnity of this night or, as some suggest, because Israel is like the angelic forces, described in the Bible as 'clothed in white'. lsserles (Orach Chaim 18: 1) rules, consequently, that the talit should be put on while it is still day, before the Kol Nidre service begins, and then the benediction can be recited over it. · 138 • 14sk the Rabbi' Is it correct that on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur the prayers should be recited with bent posture and with a loud voice?

The Tur (Orach Chaim 582) observes: 'It is the custom in Germany (Ashkenaz) to recite the prayers (on Rash Hashana and Yam Kippur) with bent posture. Since our verdict hangs in the balance, it is proper to recite the prayers in dread and awe. But the scrupulous see to it that they stand erect at the conclusion of each benediction.' The reason for the latter is that the Talmud (Berachot 34a) frowns on the worshipper bowing during the beginning and end of the actual benedictions, except at the four stages ordained, on the grounds that a parade of excessive submission is really to 'show off'. In the words of Rabbi Moses Safer in another connection, we are not so great that we can afford to demonstrate how small we are. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 582:4) formulates it less categorically: 'Some people are accustomed to pray with bent posture on Rosh Hashana and Yam Kippur, but they must stand erect at the conclusion of the benedictions.' The practice of reciting the prayers on these days with a loud voice has had a rather more complicated history. The medieval work known as Piskey Tosefot (Rash Hashana No. 72) records the practice, stating that people are unfamiliar with the lengthy benedictions and that they recite these aloud in order to assist one another's memory. In fact, this work concludes, it frequently has the opposite effect, because they confuse one another. Consequently, to make sure, the reader repeats the amida on their behal£ Rabbijoseph Karo (Bet Yosef to Tur, Orach Chaim 101) quotes the German authority, Mordecai ben Hillel, who also defends the practice, adding that since most people have machzorim, there is little fear of confusion. Another reason Karo advances is that greater concentration is required on these days and it is a powerful aid to concentration to recite the prayers aloud. Thus, Karo records in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 582:9): 'Although during the rest of the year the prayers (i.e., the amida) are recited softly, it is the custom on Rash Hashana and Yam Kippur to recite them in a loud voice and there is no fear of errors being made, since people have their machzorim.' The Talmud (Berachot 3la) states, however, on the basis of the prayer of Hannah - 'Only her lips moved, but her voice was not heard' (I Samuel 1: 13) -that it is forbidden to raise one's voice during the amida (as if God could not otherwise hear). Although it can be argued that an exception is made on these days, the famous eighteenth-century Sephardi teacher, R. Hayyimjoseph David Azulai (see Shaarey Teshuvah, Orach Chaim 582, note 6), refers to the Cabalists, who appear to demand only a silent amida at all times. The Hafetz Hayyim (Mishneh Berurah 582, note 24) compromises by urging that even if the voice is raised, it should not be raised too much. Festivals • 139 R. Hayyim Eleazar Shapira of Munkaes (Nimmukey Orach Chaim 582, p. 108a), after surveying the pros and cons, plaintively concludes: 'And may God protect us and deliver us, may He save us and help us; speedily and in our days may He accept our prayers in love and compassion. Amen.'

May the shofar be sounded in the synagogue irrespective of whether a lllinyan is present? What is the exact significance and origin of the shofar?

The obligation to blow the shofar or to hear it sounded on Rosh Hashana is one that devolves on the individualJew. It is emphatically not a communal rite. The reason why it is blown in the synagogue is so that each individual, including those who cannot blow themselves, can fulfil his obligation. It follows that no minyan is required for the sounding of the shofar. As for the significance of the shofar, various suggestions have been put forward. Well-known is Maimonides' reason-he calls it a 'hint', i.e., that there are probably other reasons. Maimonides suggest that it's a piercing sound in order to awaken people from their spiritual slumber, a call to sincere repentance. Other reasons that have been suggested by the Jewish teachers are that trumpets are sounded at the coronation of a king, and God is hailed as King on Rosh Hashana; that the ram's horn is a reminder of the binding of Isaac; that it is a note of hope, since a great shofar will be sounded when the Messiah comes; that it is a weeping sound, representing man's grief over his sins in the past year; and that it is a reminder of the giving of the Torah, when a shofar was sounded.

Why do so01e Torah scholars object to the custo01 of tashlich on Rosh Hashana?

I take it that by 'Torah scholars' you mean OrthodoxJews who are observant of the halacha, not scholars who reject the tashlich ceremony on the grounds that it has a superstitious origin (see the comprehensive article by Jacob Z. Lauterbach in his 'Rabbinic Essays', Cincinnati, 1951, pp. 299-436). I have heard of a number of pious Lithuanian rabbis who did not observe tashlich. In the prayer-book of the Vilna Gaon, 'Ishey Yisrael', the tashlich ceremony is recorded in full, but in the notes ('Maaseh Rav', p. 518) on the actual practice of the Gaon, it is stated: 'He did not go to a river or well for the purpose of reciting tashlich.' I have heard on good authority that this was not because the Gaon rejected the custom, but rather because he felt such a solemn day as Rosh Hashana was far better spent in the uninterrupted study of the Torah. 140 • 54sk the Rabbi' In the :&rst paragraph of the Unesaneh Tokef prayer it says that even the hosts of Heaven are judged on Rosh Hashana and that even they are 'not guildess'. If angels have no 'free will', how can they be judged or how can they 'not be guildess'?

Although this is obviously a poetic hymn and, as such, does not bear too close a literal scrutiny, its probable meaning is that the angels, too, can be 'guilty' of not carrying out their functions adequately. In the rabbinic scheme, angels cannot do evil deeds (except, of course, for the malicious angels, whose task it is to do evil), but they can fail in the tasks given to them. There is a talmudic passage, for example, in which the high angel, Metatron, is punished for failing to take proper care (Chagigah 15a). There is the further thought thatykku means 'to be clean'. The angels are not 'clean' in God's sight, i.e., in the presence of the Almighty they shudder in awe at their unworthiness.

Would you comment on the Hagada passage Shefoch Chamatcha (Pour out thy wrath ...) which rnany hold to be vindictive?

These Scriptural verses have been recited during the Seder since the Middle Ages. Their place in our Hagada is when the door is opened as a sign of deliverance, and the verses are obviously an expression of Jewish defiance of the oppressor. There is no need to offer any apology for our ancestors, in times of blood libels and pogroms, indulging in the sentiments contained in the verses. It would surely not have been wrong, quite the opposite, for us to have wished the Nazis, for example, to be destroyed. The question that bothers many sensitive people is why these verses should be recited today. We do not want any nations to be destroyed so why preserve a tradition that is, against the background of our day, a perversion of Jewish teaching, directly opposed to theJewish belief that God is the Father of all men? A number of courses are open to use. The frrst and most obvious is to discontinue the practice, as many of us in fact do. No harm is done to the traditional nature of the Seder if a late insertion into the Hagada is now consigned to oblivion. Those for whom the Hagada in its totality is sacrosanct, can recite these verses not as a prayer but as quotes from Scripture, reminding us of the dark days of the past and as thanksgiving for being privileged to enjoy more enlightened times. Thoroughgoing literalists, not content with this, will feel obliged to recite the verses as a prayer, but as good Jews they will apply the supplication not to whole groups but to those evil individuals who work for the destruction of the human race. Festivals • 141 Having said all this, my advice, if your conscience still troubles you in any way, is to leave out the verses and substitute for them prayers for the well-being of the State of Israel, for example, and for world peace.

Must we eat matzot throughout Passover or will other unleavened food suffice?

The verse: 'In the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month at even, ye shall eat unleavened bread, until the orte and twentieth day of the month, at even' (Exodus 12: 18) is interpreted by the rabbis (Pesachim 120a) to mean that the obligation to eat matzo is on the first night of Passover alone ('on the fourteenth day ... at even'). On the other days of Passover it is optional (reshut), i.e., when our verse speaks of eating matza on the other days it means 'and not chametz;', but if one so wishes one can eat neither. However, some medieval authorities, as well as the Gaon of Vilna, understand the reference to matza on the other days being optional as meaning that while there is obligation to eat matza, if one does, a mitzva is fulfilled. The analogy used by the Vilna Gaon is that of eating in the succah on the other days of . There is no obligation to eat in the succah (one need not eat at all), but whenever one does eat in there a mitzva is fulfilled. 7 Ceremonies

A spot of bother in a small community has brought an intriguing question from a congregant who writes: 'Our one regular Cohen is traditionally called up &rst to the Reading of the Law. Recendy another local Cohen came to synagogue and was called up in his place. The &rst Cohenhas now started coming to synagogue late in protest against being "usurped". Is his behaviour admissible?'

The answer is: it is inadmissible. But let us see why. The Mishna (Gittin 5:8) states that the reason a Cohen is given the first and a Levite the second is 'for the sake of peace', i.e., other members of the congregation will be prevented from quarrelling about who is to be given the honour of being called up first since the Cohen has not acquired the right by his personal merits but simply because of his birth. Now it is obvious that it is not any reflection on a man that he happens not to have been born a Cohen. The Talmud (Gittin 59b) to this Mishna gives another reason for preferring the Cohen. This is because Scripture states of the Cohen: 'Thou shalt sanctify him' (Leviticus 21 :8), i.e., pay him honour. In that case why does the Mishna say that the reason is 'for the sake of peace'? To this two answers are given. The first is that the Mishna is providing a reason for the Scriptural preference for the Cohen. The second is that on the basis of the Scriptural passage there would be no harm if the Cohen wishes to decline the honour but because of the reason of 'for the sake of peace' he should not do so. It follows from all this that the role of a Cohen being called up frrst is to pay honour to the Cohen as a Cohen, not to him as an individual and that, therefore, no Cohen has any more right to the frrst aliyah than any other Cohen. Consequently, your 'regular Cohen' has no right by virtue of the fact that he is a Cohen. His rival, too, is a Cohen. It might, however, be argued that he has a presumptive right, known in the sources as a chazak.a. Now nowhere in the Talmud is the idea of chazak.a applied in the sense that if a man has performed a certain function for some time he and he alone has the right to perform it in the future. That is why a number of codiflers decide that if, for example, a man has had for a number of years the honour of blowing the shofar in the synagogue, the congregation, if it so wishes, can give the honour to someone else. Other codiflers disagree, arguing that the principle of chazaka applies here, too, so that for as long as he wishes the man can claim the honour of blowing the shofar. But surely our case is different even according to these latter authorities. Ceremonies • 14 3 In the case of the shofar blower only one man in the congregation can perform the mitzva and it is therefore argued that this man has the chazaka. But aliyot are distributed among the members of the congregation week by week so that what your Cohen is demanding is not to enjoy the mitzva but to have a monopoly over a mitzva that by its nature should be distributed fairly. He is seeking, in fact, to deprive the other Cohen of his mitzva. It is not even the same as a man who claims to have a chazaka over, shall we say, shelishi or shishi. Other members of the congregation are not being deprived thereby of having a mitzva for they can have other aliyot. But in our case the other Cohen can only be called to the Cohen aliyah and your Cohen wishes to deprive him of it. Finally, it is not as if, other Cohanim being present, the honour was given especially to him. The reason he has always been called first is simply because there was no other Cohen. This hardly gives him a chazaka. Now that there is another Cohen the honours should be shared, one being called one week the other the next, and he has no right to take umbrage. It is obvious, too, that even a congregant with legitimate grounds for complaint should not 'take it out' on the congregation by coming late to the services.

I understand that in America a Cohen 111ay go to a non­ Jewish funeral, but in England this is not perll1itted. Is this correct?

In the Talmud (Yevamot 61 a), Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai holds that it is permitted for a Cohen to be in the same room as a Gentile corpse or to walk in a Gentile cemetery (but not to touch a Gentile corpse, Ravina on the same page), while the other rabbis hold that it is forbidden. The question then arises as to whose opinion is followed. The Tosafists (Yevamot 6la) follow the view of the other rabbis, but Maimonides (Yad, Evel 3:3) follows Rabbi Simeon. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 372:2) states: 'It is proper for a Cohen to take care not to walk where there are Gentile graves.' lsserles' note to this adds: 'Although some authorities permit it. But it is more correct to take the stricter view.'

To judge fro111 the nUII1ber of questions received, there is renewed interest in such ritual objects as the talit and tefilin. A reader asks: What is the significance of the lines woven into the talit, which appear as black in wool ones and blue in ?

Can we first examine the interesting question of the original thread of blue in the tsitsit? The verse stated: 'Speak unto the children of Israel, and bid them that they make them throughout their generations fringes in the corners of 144 • 14sk the Rabbi' their garments, and that they put with the fringe of each corner a thread of blue' (Numbers 15:38). TheJerusalem Talmud (Berachot 1:5) states, in the name of Rabbi Meir, that the techelet (the word translated as 'blue') resembles the colour of the sea, the sea resembles grass and grass resembles the colour of the heavens, i.e., so that the techelet is intended gradually to direct man's heart and mind heavenwards. From this it would seem that the techelet was a bluish green colour. This dye was said to be obtained from the snail chillazon and the Talmud distinguishes it from the similar dye kela ilan, indigo. The Mishna (Menachot 4: 1) rules that while it is advisable for the thread of techelet to be put into the tsitsit its absence does not render them invalid. Owing to the uncertainty of identification of the chillazon, it became the practice in post-Talmudic times to have only white threads in the tsitsit. It is well known that the nineteenth-century Chasidic master, Rabbi Gershon Leiner, the Radziner Rebbe, claimed to have rediscovered the ancient dye and the Radziner Chasidim, as well as one or two other Chasidic groups, do now insert the blue thread into the tsitsit. The majority of rabbinical authorities, however, did not accept the Radziner Rebbe's claim. Professor has recently argued that the techelet was, in fact, the famed purple dye used by the Roman rulers, 'wearing the purple', and that this is why the techelet was discontinued. It was dangerous to wear a garment with this dye since it suggested that theJews were in revolt against Rome. Kaplan takes his argument a step further and says that, if this is the reason, Jews nowadays ought proudly to wear the techelet as a token of Jewish nobility. Be that as it may, it is not the normal practice for the techelet to be worn. But, as in other matters, theJewish teachers were concerned that the ancient practice should not be entirely forgotten. As a reminder, then, of the techelet, it became the custom to have the lines to which you refer in the talit itself instead of as part of the fringes and only as a reminder. Can we establish the exact date when this was introduced? It does not appear to be very old. The great commentator to the Shulchan Aruch, Rabbi Joseph Teomim (d. 1792), author of the work Peri Megadim (Eshel Avraham, Orach Chaim 9:6) remarks that 'in our talitot the edge of the garment is made to resemble the techelet', from which it would appear that the custom cannot be much earlier than the eighteenth century.

Are there any restrictions injewishlaw on the dem.olition of a synagogue or the manner of its disposal if it is no longer required for congregational purposes?

The two relevant passages in the Talmud are the following: The famous Babylonian teacher R. Hisda ruled that it is forbidden to demolish an old synagogue before a new one has been built and there is a Ceremonies • 145 discussion as to when this rule applies ( 26b). In any event, there are circumstances when it is permitted to demolish a synagogue. In the other passage (Megillah 27b) the ruling is given that a synagogue can be sold (the money to be used for a new synagogue) and the purchaser may use it for any purpose he wishes except as a bathhouse or a lavatory or the like. However, even this latter is qualified in that if the 'seven good men of the city' sell it, i.e., if it is sold by the elected representatives of the people, it can be sold even if the purchaser will use it for these, the reason being that its sanctity was only conditional on its being used as a synagogue. On the basis of all this the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 152: 1 and 153:9) rules as follows: 'It is forbidden to demolish a synagogue in order to build another synagogue since something may happen to prevent them building the other synagogue (and they will then have nowhere to pray). 'They should first build the other synagogue and then they may demolish the frrst one. But this only applies where the old synagogue is still sound. If, however, its foundations are unsound or its walls are in danger of collapsing it should be demolished at once and they should begin to rebuild speedily, working day and night so that it should not remain a ruin. 'When the men of a village sell a synagogue they are allowed to sell it permanently. The purchaser can do with it as he pleases but must not use it as a bathhouse, a tannery, a place of immersion or a lavatory. But if the seven good men of the city sold it in the presence of the men of the city the purchaser is allowed even to use it for these purposes.' On the basis of all this it is the universal custom to demolish or sell synagogues that are no longer required for congregational purposes. However, people do try to insert a clause in the deed of sale preventing disrespectful use of the building after it has been sold.

Which way should the mezuza slant on the frame of a door? I have seen it done both facing inwards and facing outwards in various homes I visit.

From the talmudic sources it appears that the mezuza must be fiXed to the right-hand doorpost as one enters the room, but there is no reference there to the mezuza being placed at a slant. What happened in post-talmudic times was this. Some authorities under­ stood the Talmud to mean that the mezuza should be fixed in a horizontal position, others that it should be fiXed in a vertical position. By a typical rabbinic compromise, it was decided that it should be fiXed in a slanting position, which qualified as both horizontal and vertical and hence satisfies the demands of both sets of authorities. From this point of view it could be slanted either way, but since the mezuza has to be fiXed to the right-hand door as one enters the room, it should slant inwards and upwards towards the room. 146 • Jl.sk the Rabbi' Thus, the correct place for the mezuza is at the top third of the right-hand doorpost and slanting inwards and upwards towards the room. As you say, many people do it otherwise, but they are wrong.

Why doesjudaism. frown on lone prayer such as obviously gives comfort to m.any non-:Jews who can just drop into a church and com.m.une with God from. those hallowed surroundings?

It is completely erroneous to assume thatJudaism does frown on lone prayer. It is true that much is made, and rightly so, of the value of tefillah be-tzibbur ('congregational prayer') but this was never intended to exclude private prayer. Indeed, the masters of attach great importance to pouring out one's heart to God in private and the famed chasidic master, Nahman of Bratlav, urged his followers to practise this daily. These teachers were not thinking particularly of private prayer in the synagogue but the idea that the synagogue is an especially hallowed spot even for private prayeris found in the ShulchanAruch where it is said (Orach Chaim 90:9) that even when prayer is not offered together with the congregation it should, if possible, be offered in the synagogue. There is a good deal of nonsense spoken by those who do not know any better about private devotion in the house of worship being 'Christian' and therefore 'un:Jewish'. Nothing could be further from the truth. The practice to which you refer is thoroughly Jewish and commendable. In that case, you may ask, why are so few synagogues open all day for the purpose? A number of synagogue are, and those that are closed are no doubt worried about vandalism, examples of which are not, alas, too rare. But I am sure that the synagogue authorities will never refuse to allow sincere worshippers to spend as much time as they wish in private prayer in the synagogue.

If a m.inyan for m.orning prayer includes one who refuses to don tefilin, can he nevertheless be counted?

We have had this one before. It is only necessary to repeat that he can certainly be counted. The general tendency among the rabbis is not to exclude anyJew from being counted as a Jew. In fact, one passage in the Talmud has it that on a fast-day, when the prayers of all the congregation are required to ascend heavenwards, there must be sinners present. It is true that some authorities have suggested that people who openly profane the Sabbath ·should be excluded because they are no longer to be treated as Jews, but even here many of the more recent authorities hold that in Talmudic times any open profanation of the Sabbath demonstrated a wish Ceremonies • 14 7 to have no connection with Judaism. This is hardly so, nowadays, as the presence of the man in the synagogue for prayers shows. It is hardly likely in any event that a man who refuses to wear tefllin, though he attends the services, does so as an act of wilful rejection. He probably believes that tefllin are not important and, wrong though he is, he is not a sinner according to his own views. The proper course is surely to be tolerant and seek to persuade him gendy that tefilin are important. The ways of the Torah are 'ways of pleasantness' and it does no good to adopt the principle of exclusiveness.

What is the significance-andlaw-regardingthe wearing of a yarm.ulka indoors, apart from. praying? And do the sam.e laws apply out of doors?

We have had this kind of question many times before. It is astonishing how much interest there has been, and still is, in a minor act of piety which has developed for many into a test of true piety. So here we go again. There is a reference in the Talmud (Shabbat 118b) to the effect that some teachers would refrain from walking four cubits with uncovered head (the yarmulka or cappel- coppel in Cockney Hebrew- is, of course, very recent), since to cover the head is a mark of reverence for God. The V:tlna Gaon (Biur Ha-Gra to Orach Chaim 8:2) states: ~ccording to the strict letter of the law it is permitted even to pray and to enter the synagogue without head covering. There is no prohibition against baring the head. But in the presence of distinguished persons and at times of prayer it is fitting that the head be covered as a mark of correct behaviour. And for holy men who stand constandy in God's presence it applies at all times.' Thus, whose who wear a yarmulka at all times appear to be saying: 'See what a holy man am I.' However, it is only fair to point out that many authorities have argued that, once the wearing of a head cover was adopted by Jews, to go bare-headed is to offend against the prohibition of copying Gentile practices (chukkot ha-goy). I believe that of the greatJewish moralist, R. Israel Salanter, it is told that he once said: 'There is no law that a Jew must keep his head covered, but a Jew keeps his head covered.' This is certainly the practice among the majority of OrthodoxJews nowadays. Yet it is also right to note that, until fairly recendy, it was not the custom in Anglo-Jewry to have the head covered at all times. Outstanding leaders of Orthodoxy in this country - such as the late Chief Rabbi Dr Hertz and the principal of Jews' College, Dr Friedlander, were often to be seen, and were photographed, without any head-covering. There is a vast literature on the whole subject. I would refer you to the following three very comprehensive articles. J.Z. Lauterbach: 'Should one cover one's head when participating in Divine worship?' (Yearbook, Central 148 • 51sk the Rabbi' Conference of American Rabbis, Vol. 38 1928, pp. 586-603); Samuel Krauss: 'The Jewish rite of covering the head' (Hebrew Union College Annual, Vol. 19, 1945-46, pp. 121-68); Isaac Rivkind: 1\. responsum of Leo de Modena on uncovering of the head' (Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume, New York, 1945, Hebrew Section, pp. 401-24).

During the interm.ediate days of Passover and on a day when a brit m.ila was perform.ed following the service, a num.ber of Orthodox synagogue worshippers did not don tefilin, writes a reader who asks: What is the ruling about this and are there other occasions apart from. Sabbath and festivals when tefilin are not put on?

Rabbi Akiba is reported as ruling that it is wrong to wear tefllin on the Sabbath and on festivals since these days are called a 'sign' and tefilin, too, are a 'sign' (Menachot 36b) i.e., to wear tefllin on these days is a slight to their sanctity, implying as it does that the 'sign' they provide is inadequate. The question arises whether Rabbi Akiba's use of the term 'festivals' includes the intermediate days (chol ha-moed). The medieval authorities (see Tosafists to the passage) were divided on the question. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 31 :2) rules that it is forbidden to wear the tefllin on intermediate days but Rabbi Moses Isserles' note adds that it is the custom in Poland to wear the tefilin, with the difference that the bene­ dictions over the tefilin are recited quietly in the synagogue on these days. There is, however, a passage in the Zohar which comes down heavily against the wearing of tefllin on intermediate days which is why the chasidim, who generally follow the Zohar in these matters, do not wear them. This explains how it was on the occasion you mention, some Orthodox Jews did wear the tefilin while others did not. It should be added that according to many authorities it is not proper for some to wear tefilin on intermediate days and others, in the same synagogue, not to wear them. I am quite puzzled by your reference to a brit mila. On the contrary, the custom is to wear the tefilin when the brit is carried out in the synagogue since both tefilin and the brit are called a 'sign' (Shakh to Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 265:24). (Incidentally, there is no contradiction between this and the idea of not having two 'signs' since the 'sign' of the berit is, on this occasion, for the infant alone and, moreover, every Jew has the two 'signs' of the berit and tefilin whereas the Sabbath only comes round once a week.) · Finally, tefilin are not worn by a mourner on the first day of the death of his near relative and they are not worn before midday on the fast of the Ninth of Av. The reason given is that in a period of intense mourning it is unfitting to wear tefilin which are described as a diadem of glory. Ceremonies • 149 Does anyone know which of the are chukldm as distinctfrommishpatim.? How many ch•,Jdrim are there and how are they distinguished from the rest of the Taryag mitzvot: is there any literature on the subject? This is the three-part question set me by a London reader.

For the meaning of these Hebrew words, read on. The concept of the 613 (Taryag) commandments is found in the rabbinic literature but only in a general sense. For example, there are said to be 248 positive precepts corresponding to the limbs of the human body and 365 negative precepts corresponding to the days of the solar year, i.e., the precepts of the Torah embrace man's whole being. It was not until the Middle Ages that attempts were made byJewish teachers to treat the concept as conveying an actual list of 613 identifiable precepts. The other concept to which you refer, that there are mishpatim, command­ ments for which the reason is evident, and chukkim, those for which there seems to be no easily discovered reason, is also found in the rabbinic literature, but again the attempt to explore this further is medieval and even in the Middle Ages there was no systematic attempt at listing the chukkim separately. What did happen in this period was that soine thinkers (notably Maimonides in the third part of his Guide for the Perplexed and the author of the Sefer Ha-Chinuch) sought to provide reasons for all the mitzvot, including the chukkim. Other thinkers tended to frown on the whole exercise of trying to discover the reasons for the mitzvot, arguing that the fact God had commanded them is sufficient reason for their observance. It follows from all this that while the medieval thinkers considered those precepts for which there is no immediately apparent reason to be chukkim, nowhere, to my knowledge, does one fmd an actual classification in terms of chukkim and mishpatim. However, among the precepts referred to by the Talmudic rabbis as chukkim are the dietary laws, the law of the red heifer, the laws against sowing mixed kinds and those prohibiting the wearing of a garment of wool and flax. Thus, there is hardly any literature on the specific point you mention. The exception is the work Horeb by Samson Raphael Hirsch (translated by Dayan Grunfeld, Soncino Press, 1962). In Volume 2, section four, of this work, a list of chukkim is given, with the sub-title: 'Laws of righteousness towards those beings which are subordinate to man: towards earth, plant, animal, towards one's own body, mind, spirit and word.' On the general question of chukkim you should consult I. Heinemann's Taame Ha-Mitzvot, Volume !,Jerusalem, 1949; and the recently published A Philosophy of the Mitzvot by Gersion Appel, New York, 1975. 150 • J.lsk the Rabbi' A relevant question from. a reader who asks if there is any halachic ruling which precludes a m.ixed choir in synagogue?

First, let us try to remove some current misconceptions. There are rabbis who object strongly to a mixed choir but it is not because the choir is 'mixed' but because of the female voices. They would object all the more to an all-female choir. Secondly, their objection is not, as is generally and quite incorrectly assumed, on the grounds that there are times when a woman must not utter the sacred words of prayer. There is an explicit ruling in the Talmud ( 22b) that there is no such prohibition. What then is the objection? The source is in the Talmud (Berakhot 24a) where the famous third century Babylonian teacher Samuel says: ~woman's voice is to be regarded as naked­ ness (ervah): as it is said, "For sweet is thy voice, and thy countenance comely'' (Song of Songs 2: 14).' Rashi to the passage explains that since the verse praises a woman for her voice it follows that a woman's voice is attractive to men. (It is also possible that Samuel is punning on the word for 'sweet' - arev - so as to associate it with the word ervah.) Maimonides (lssure Viah 21 :2) understands this to mean that a man must not listen to the voice of a woman forbidden to him (presumably when she is singing). Two other medieval authorities are divided on the question. Asher ben Yehiel (the Rosh) seems to agree with Maimonides but the German authority Mordecai ben Hillel (the Mordekhai) states in the name of R. Hai Gaon that Samuel (as it seems from the context) refers only to listening to a woman's voice while one is reading the Shema. On the basis of all this the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 75:3) rules, with an unusual degree of indefiniteness, 'One should take care not to listen to a woman singing at the time when he reads the Shema'. It follows that since it is very unlikely that the choir will be singing at the time when the congregation is reading the Shema, there is no objection to having female voices in the choir, unless, of course, the opinion of Maimonides and the Rosh is followed, according to which it is wrong to listen to a woman singing at any time. But then, to be consistent, if it is these authorities that are followed, no women should be allowed to sing the hymns in the synagogue and, indeed, men should never go to the opera. In short, in reply to your question, there is no halachic ruling specifically directed against a 'mixed choir'. If one is prepared to listen to a woman singing at any time there is no reason why it should be held to be forbidden in the synagogue. As for the argument that in any event a mixed choir is untraditional, this is true but then the whole institution of a choir in the synagogue is untraditional Ceremonies • 151 and was severely opposed by the more conservative rabbis when it was first introduced (see the Responsum of Judah Lean of Modena, 15 71-1648, in Responsa Zikne Yehudah, No. 6, edited S. Simonson,Jer, 1956).

Why do many congregations either turn their backs or avert their eyes when the coha.nUn recite the priesdy benedictions and what are the laws concerning the days on which this benediction should be recited?

There is a saying in the Babylonian Talmud (Hagiga 16a) that the eyes of one who looks at the priests when they recite the priestly benediction become dim. This is qualified in the Talmudic passage which says that it only applied in Temple times when the cohanim used the Shem Ha-Meforash, the special divine name. However, the Tosafists to the passage quote the to the effect that the reason for averting one's eyes is in order to avoid distraction and this reason would apply even nowadays. Maimonides (Yad, Tefilla 14:7) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 128:23) state that the people should avert their eyes and look downwards in order to assist concentration on the blessing, i.e., it is not particularly that one must not look at the cohanim but one must not look at anything at all except the words in the prayer-book. It has therefore been suggested that since the reason is simply in order to avoid distraction there is no harm in an occasional glance. The custom is, nevertheless, not to look at the cohanim at all as a reminder of the practice in Temple times (Magen Avraham 128:38). the custom of turning one's back on the cohanim is wrong however since the benediction has to be delivered face to face (faz 128:20). As for your second question. R. Moses lsserles in his notes to the Shulchan Aruch (128:44) observes that it is the Ashkenazi practice to recite the priestly benediction only during Musaf on the festivals. The reason is that a blessing should only be given when the one who gives it is in a joyous frame of mind and so far as we are concerned this desirable state only obtains on the festivals during the part of the service when, our duty done, we are about to go home for the festive meal. On Yom Kippur, though there is no festive meal, there is the greatjoy of finding pardon and atonement. Logically it should follow from this that duchaning should take place when a festival falls on the Sabbath.Joy is present because of the festival and it is hardly decreased because it happens to be Sabbath as well (see Mishna Berura to 128:165). However, in some congregations there is no duchaning on the Sabbath (one reason given is that petitionary prayers are sometimes recited while the cohanim are duchaning and this is forbidden on the Sabbath) and this has long been the Anglo-:Jewish custom. 152 • 54sk the Rabbi' Tradition tells us that when a boy is 13 years old he is a barmitzvah. Can you explain how this came about? I have looked in the Old Testament and the Shulchan Aruch but can find no reference to it.

You no doubt consulted the abbreviated edition of the Shulchan Aruch, because in the Shulchan Aruch proper there are numerous references to a boy becoming barmitzvah at the age of 13. The point is that Scripture speaks of adults being obliged to keep the precepts - mitzvot - but not minors. The question then is at what age does a person become an adult. The answer is not given explicitly in Scripture but, as you say, it is based on tradition. The tradition, in turn, is based on the physical changes which take place at adolescence. For a boy, this is usually at the age of 13, so that at this age it is assumed that he has the signs of puberty and, for the purpose of responsibility and obligation, has to keep the precepts. He is an adult. The earliest statement we have in this connection is the passage in Ethics of the Fathers (5:21 ): 'Thirteen (years of age) for mitzvot' -hence bar ('son of') mitzvah. It is well known that the rabbis believed that a girl matures both physically and mentally a year earlier than a boy, hence a girl becomes batmitzvah ('daughter of the mitzvah') at the age of twelve. It should be added that there are references in the rabbinic sources to the idea that all this applies only to the boy's responsibilities (and the girl's) so far as the community is concerned, i.e., he or she is an adult injewish law 'on earth'. Full responsibility so far as 'Heaven' is concerned - i.e., to be fully responsible in the eyes of God - is not attained until the age of 20 for both men and women.

Why can a boy under barmitzvah age m.ake up a m.inyan providing he keeps a Bible under his arm.?

From a medieval discussion the following emerges: According to some authorities a minor can make up the minyan, while according to others he cannot. The holding of a Chumash is irrelevant (Rabbenu Tarn in the Tosafists to Berachot says it is 'stupid') since, if he can, no Chumash is required and, if he cannot, his holding of a Chumash does not alter the situation. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 55:4) states: 'Some permit the kedushah prayers to be recited where nine are present together with a child who is over six years of age and who knows to whom one prays, but their opinion does not seem plausible to the great Codifiers.' Rabbi Moses Isserles adds that this applies even if he has a Chumash in his hand, but that in an emergency (i.e., where otherwise there would be no minyan at all) some are lenient. Later authorities do, however, reintroduce the idea of the child holding a Ceremonies • 15 3 Chumash and say that this is the custom 'nowadays' (see Mishnah Berurah), but others frown on the whole idea of adding the child to form the minyan. This very complicated question must therefore be left to local custom. I have known small communities (where without a minor it is practically impossible to have a minyan) relying on Isserles. But then there seems no point in the child holding a Chumash.

What is the meaning and signification of the knots and bindings of the tsitsit?

One of the earliest attempts at explaining the symbolism of the knots and bindings is that of Rashi (Menachot 43b). Commenting on a saying in the Talmud that the precept of tsitsit is equal to all the other precepts, Rashi observes that the numerical value of the word tsitsit is 600 (tzadi twice= 180; yod twice = 20; tav = 400). There are five knots and eight strands, and their total, when added to 600, makes a total of 613, corresponding to the taryag (613) precepts of which the rabbis speak. A later symbol is the following: It is the custom to wind the longer strand around the others 7, 8, 11 and 13 times. The total is 39. 'The Lord is One' in Hebrew also has the numerical value of 39 (the Tetragrammaton = 26; echad = 13). The tsitsit reminds us always of the unity of God. There are five knots and these are said to correspond to the Five Books Moses.

During the ceremony of Gelila (the binding of the sefer Torah) which part of the Scroll goes on top of the other?

The first part (i.e., from Genesis to the portion read) goes on top of the second. The reason for this is because the scroll is written from right to left and in the right always predominates.

Do manzerim enjoy the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben?

Your question sent me to the sources since I could not recall any discussion of it. To my surprise I was, in fact, unable to discover anywhere a reference to the question of whether the mamzer has to have a pidyon ha-ben. The Mishna (Yevamot 22a) states explicitly that a mamzer is in law the son of his father for all purposes and on the basis of this the Codes rule that he is to be treated like any other Jew. Thus, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 265:4) rules that a mamzer has to have a brit like any other Jewish child. By the same token, one supposes, he has to have a pidyon ha-ben if he is the first-born of his mother, unless it be argued that the identity of his natural father not being known the father may be a Cohen or a Levite whose child does not require to have a pidyon ha-ben. 154 • 54sk the Rabbi' If a wom.an m.arries a m.an who isn't a Cohen and who already has a son, would her first-born (who would not be the first-born of the husband) need to be redeem.ed with the cerem.ony of ?

The verse (Exodus 13:2) speaks of 'opening the womb' in connection with Pidyon Haben, from which the rabbis derive the rule that it is the first-born of the mother, not of the father, who has to be redeemed. Yes, in the case you mention, Pidyon Haben would be required.

Can you be rejected as a Jew, even though born to Jewish parents, if for som.e reason circum.cision was not perform.ed?

It is a common misunderstanding that circumcision makes a childJewish. That this is not so can be seen from the fact that where there is danger to the child it is forbidden to have him circumcised, yet no one doubts that such a child is fully Jewish. According to the rabbis (e.g., in Chullin 5a) an adultjew whose father had not had him circumcised and who wilfully refused to have himself circumcised is guilty of a very serious sin of omission but this does not affect hisjewishness. He is ajewish sinner but is still ajew.

What is the reasoning behind the com.m.andm.ent to wear a tallit and tzitzit?

The Torah itself speaks of this as a 'reminder', that is, to remind us of our religious and ethical obligations. An analogy that has been suggested is that of tying a knot in a handkerchief when we wish to remember something we might otherwise forget. A further idea is that when we wrap ourselves round with the tallit, we are surrounded by mitzvot. Still a further homily remarks that the four corners of the garment represent the 'four corners of the earth'. By attaching the tzitzit, we demonstrate symbolically that God is Lord of all the earth, but the world He has created is imperfect and He requires man to be His partner in bringing the world to greater perfection. Ceremonies • 155 Would it not be better to have a microphone in the synagogue so that the rabbi and the chazan will not have to strain their voices? The microphone controversy died a natural death (or rather was killed by the Orthodox ecclesiastical authorities) several years ago- or so it was thought. It is nice to know that it is still alive and well and seeking residence once again in the :Jewish Chronicle'. To recount: a microphone was installed in the Edgware (United) Synagogue until it was removed on the orders of a member of the London Beth Din, whereupon the minister of the synagogue circulated his sermons in print. Even the learned dayan, search as he may have done, was unable to fmd any warrant for prohibiting reading sermons. The chief halachic ground for the prohibition of a microphone on the Sabbath and Yomtov is that electricity is generated through the human voice. But it is by no means clear from the sources that the generation of electricity on these days is forbidden per se. As for the alleged production of sparks, this falls under the heading of causing indirectly insubstantial flashes of light and it is questionable, to say the least, whether such a procedure falls into the category of making fire. For instance, it is permitted to put on a nylon shirt on the Sabbath even though sparks sometimes fly. With regard to the chazan's use of the microphone, the matter is a little more complicated. Some authorities have argued that it is incorrect for the chazan to use a microphone even on weekdays since the congregation does not then hear his actual voice. I am no electrical engineer, but the experts may tell us that the microphone only assists the sending of the sound waves and that what one hears is the actual voice of the one who uses the microphone. For all the opposition, there have been Orthodox congregations in this country who used a microphone even on the Sabbath with the approval of the rabbinic authorities. But, as you seem to imply, times have changed.

Is a silk tallit strictly kosher for prayer? Since the Torah speaks of fringes in a 'garment', and elsewhere clothes made of wool or are called 'garments, there is an opinion in talmudic literature that the biblical obligation to have tzitzit in a garment applies only to one of wool or linen. Other garments, such as silken ones, are exempt in biblical law, but there is nonetheless a rabbinic injunction to have tzitzit in these as well. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 8: 1) adopts this view. Isserles, however, records the other opinion as being authoritative, according to which there is the full biblical injunction to have tzitzit even in silken garments. 156 • i4sk the Rabbi' The reason why pious Jews prefer to have a woollen tallit is that they wish to have the full biblical obligation according to all the authorities. But Ashkenazijews always follow Isserles, so that there is no question at all that a silken tallit is perfectly kosher provided it is of the correct size (sufficient to cover the major part of the body). Once it is of this size, it is not invalidated if it rides up on the body. This is the bare statement of the rules, but some qualification is necessary. Strictly speaking, the tallit is not a prayer-shawl and has nothing to do specifically with prayer. The tallit of four corners was introduced in the Middle Ages in Western lands when Jews no longer wore garments with four corners, so that if it were not for the special tallit, the precept of tzitzit would have been forgotten entirely. The famous biblical commentator, Abraham lbn Ezra (to skelach lecha), goes so far as to remark that there is no need for the special tallit to be worn during prayer since there is no need to remind a man not to sin while he is engaged m prayer. It is true that the universal practice is now to wear the tallit for prayer, but it follows from the above that whether a tallit is kosher or not is a law about tzitzit, not about prayer. Prayer is as effective and acceptable without a tallit as with one, which must in any event be obvious since women do not wear a tallit and men do not at night - and yet their prayers are fully acceptable. The only thing that remains to be said is that if a silken tallit is worn, it should not be a tiny scarf-like affair which just goes round the neck; but that would apply to a woollen tallit as well. It is the size, not the material, which counts.

What is the difference between a batmitzvah and a bat chayil?

The rule that a boy attains his religious majority (becomes a bar mitzva, 'son of the mitzva') at the age of 13 and a girl at the age of 12 (when she becomes a bat mitzvah) is very old, going back to early talmudic times. What is new is the ceremony. The barmitzvah ceremony was introduced in Germany in the Middle Ages. A girl simply became batmitzvah automatically. But in more recent years many communities have argued that just as the barmitzvah ceremony is an innovation, there is no reason why girls who come of age should not have their own ceremony. The opposition to the idea has been on two grounds. First, it was held to be untraditional (but then so was the barmitzvah ceremony when it was first introduced). More significantly, it was objected to as an attempt to copy the church practice of confrrmation. I can only imagine that the bat chayil institution was an attempt to have a Ceremonies • 15 7 batmitzvah ceremony without rousing the ire of the traditionalists. It was given a different name and hence made, so it seems to have been believed, more innocuous. So, in reply to your questions, there is no difference between the two ceremonies. In the Anglo:Jewish community, it is nowadays not at all unusual to have a batmitzvah ceremony, although there is no uniform way of observing it as there is for barmitzvah.

Which is better, to recite the prayers in Hebrew (most of which I do not understand) or to recite them in English, which goes against all that is traditional and Orthodox?

Many devoutJews today face the same problem. It is hard to advise you since, as you remark, whatever you decide to do will be unsatisfactory from one point of view. A possible solution would be to recite the Shema and the benedictions of the Shema, as well as the other main prayers, in Hebrew, and to recite the others, quiedy and to yourself, in English. In your lengthy letter, which you have asked me to condense, you say that to look into the English translation while you are reciting the prayers in Hebrew does not work for you. I can appreciate this, but why not learn thoroughly, by means of the English translation, the meaning of the main prayers and you will then be familiar with them when you recite them in Hebrew? This ought not to prove too difficult a task, especially since I am sure the rabbi of your synagogue will be only too ready to help you and other congre­ gants, in the same situation to acquire a closer familiarity with the Hebrew of the prayer-book.

Circumcision is the first major convenant with the Almighty. Secularists claim that its purpose was devised for reasons of hygiene, though the medical profession refutes this premise. Furthermore, it is claimed that circumcision was performed in Egypt and preceded the Hebrew practice. Was this so?

First, the hygienic reason is not advanced in the Jewish sources, where, as you say, circumcision is a major covenant with the Almighty. As for the idea that circumcision was practised before it was stated as the covenantal rite in the Torah, even if true, this makes no difference whatever to the practice of circumcision as a sign of the covenant. A good example of a sign of a covenant existing long before it was used as such is the rainbow, which, in Genesis, God declares is the sign of His covenant after the flood. As a number of the great medieval commentators note, the appearance of 158 • 'Ask the Rabbi' the rainbow is a natural phenomenon. It was not created at the time of Noah, but used in his day as the special sign. From the Jewish point of view, it can be held that circumcision, too, had a double origin; the second when the Torah used an ancient rite for the new and tremendous purpose of perpetuating the covenant. Where, in fact, circumcision was practised prior to the Torah by ancient peoples is a matter for anthropology to investigate. It has no relevance one way or another to the religious significance of the brit.

I was told that Progressive rabbis do not require circum.­ cision for a conversion. Why not? Is such a conversion valid?

A conversion of a male without circumcision is, inJewish law, no conversion at all. That is certain. But I believe that you are misinformed. Very many Progressive rabbis do require circumcision. As for those who do not, you must ask them why. I might add that circumcision for a convert is status-affecting, i.e., he does not become a Jew in the eyes of Jewish law until he has been circumcised, ·whereas a child born to a Jewish mother is Jewish even if he has not been circumcised. For him circumcision is not an initiatory rite.

What are the rules for establishing the tUne when one 01ay recite the three 01ain prayers of the day and, if I have to leave ho01e for work when it is still dark, can I say the 01orning prayer before leaving?

There is much discussion in the Talmud (in tractate Berachot, Chapters l-4) on the times of the three prayers of the day and of the Shema morning and evening. The time for the Shema depends on what is meant by 'when thou risest up', and 'when thou liest down' while the times of the prayers depend on the times of the corresponding sacrifices in Temple times. The final ruling is as follows. Morning prayer: from about an hour before sunrise to midday, but for the Shema until a third of the day. Mternoon prayer: from half-an-hour after midday until nightfall. Evening prayer: from about one hour and a quarter before nightfall Oonger in the summer months) until dawn the next day. In your case, when unavoidably you have to leave for work very early in the morning, the procedure is as follows: The tefllin should be put on (and the benediction recited) and the prayers should then be recited with the exception of the benedictions of the Shema. Ceremonies • 159 When it is day, a short break from work should be taken to recite once again the Shema, this time with the benedictions but, of course, without the tefilin. At least, this is the procedure given by a number of authorities for soldiers who have to be at their duties before daybreak.

A wide-ranging question from a reader who asks: When was the format of the traditional prayer-book laid down and what lee-way is there for reforming it, either by an individual rabbi or an entire community? In fact, has it any rabbinic sanction at all?

One thing is quite certain. The prayer-book in the form we now have it is the result of a long period of more or less spontaneous growth and there is nothing like a formal rabbinically sanctioned prayer-book. The history of the liturgy is fascinating but to try to describe it in detail is beyond the scope of this column. Briefly, however, this is how the prayer-book came to be. The Talmud records a number of prayers, the central features of the liturgy in Talmudic times being the Shema and the benedictions of the Shema and the Amida. Practice and custom produced further elaborations, the additions of some Psalms for instance. At various periods, siddurim were produced containing the order of service as followed in the communities in which the authors resided. The two earliest are the siddurim of and Saadiah Gaon Maimonides, too, in his great Code of Law, gives an order of service. With the invention of printing, features that were added, at times by the whim of the printers, acquired a kind of sanctity if only because a far greater number of people were now able to use the printed prayer-books which became available. The question of prayer-book revision was an acute source of contention after the rise of the Chasidic movement in the eighteenth century. Rabbinic opposition to the innovation of the special Chasidic prayer-book, as well as, later on, to Reform innovations and revisions, were chiefly on the grounds that it is wrong to depart from the custom of our fathers. However, few communities have been consistently conservative in this matter. To take the obvious example of the Singer's Prayer Book in this country, 'authorised' though it was by the Chief Rabbi, there are significant omissions and one or two additions, including the printing of the English text side by side with the Hebrew. To be sure, all very innocent, but if the argument is that custom must at all costs be followed and that there must be no departure from the order as recited by our ancestors no innovations of any kind can be tolerated. At the same time, some rabbis with reformist leanings have, on occasion, 160 • !4sk the Rabbi' been guilty of distorting the whole spirit of the liturgy by unnecessary and unimaginative tampering with the prayer-book. So I suppose that the answer to your question is that a revision is advisable, even from the Orthodox point of view, but it should be undertaken byJewish scholars with a keen sense of how the liturgy developed and of what is and what is not important.

Why are the haftarot not written on a scroll like the megillot or Torah? I understand that in earlier times this was done. When did it stop?

The answer is that it did not stop. There are still some communities which use either a scroll containing all the haftarot or separate scrolls for each of the Prophets. In my youth I used to attend services at a small synagogue, the members of which hailed from Lithuania, where they followed the practice of their native land and read the haftarot from hand-written scrolls of the Prophets. I have also seen this done in synagogues in Israel. Let me quote from the Mishnah Berurah (284: 1): 'The Levush writes: "I am astonished in that I have never seen the practice of writing the haftarot according to the rules regarding the writing of a sefer Torah. For it appears to me that they do not fulfil their obligation at all when they read the haftarah out of printed Chumashim since these are not written according to the rules of a sefer Torah and a megillah." 'But the Taz and the Magen Avraham defend the custom, holding that even though it is a printed book and on paper (i.e., not on parchment) and is not a scroll, it is permitted for this purpose. Nevertheless, the Magen Avraham holds that it is essential to read the haftarah out of a printed book of the Prophets, not out of the haftarah as printed in a Chumash, and this is also the opinion of the Eliyahu Rabba. 'However, if all they have is the haftarah as printed in the Chumash, one can rely on the more lenient view rather than do without the reading of the haftarah. But, in the first instance, it is certainly fit and proper for each congregation to have a copy of the Prophets written on a parchment according to the rules, for then the divine names are written (by hand) with the intention to sanctifY them, whereas this is not done in printing on paper. This is how the Gaon of Vilna saw to it that it was done in his community and it has now been adopted in many Jewish communities, happy is their lot.' Ceremonies • 161

The r~bbi in DlY synagogue will not pronounce the priesdy benediction on a barDlitzvah boy or to a 01arried couple under the chupa. He says that this should only be done by a Cohen. Is there a rabbinic or halachic ruling on his prohibition?

According to Rashi's understanding of the Talmud (Ketubot 24b), it is forbidden for a non-priest to recite the priestly blessing with the hands raised over the recipient's head because Scripture states: 'Ye shall bless the children of Israel' (Numbers 6:23)-ye, the priests, and not ordinary Israelites. Against this is the saying of Rabbijose (Shabbat 118b): 'I know full well that I am not a Cohen, yet if my colleagues would say to me, '1\.scend the duchan", I would ascend, since I have never disobeyed my colleagues.' It has been ingeniously suggested that the duchan referred to here is a place of honour (and not to 'duchaning') and that instead of 'I am not a Cohen' the reading should be, 'I am not worthy' (kedai for ). Rabbijose was protesting that he was unworthy to receive honours, yet he would accept them rather than disobey his colleagues. However, the Tosafists to the passage in Shabbat argue that there is, in fact, no prohibition against a non-priest reciting the priestly blessing except that he would not be allowed, of course, to recite the special benediction before carrying the mitzvah. The plain fact is that it is the universal custom of parents and teachers to bless their children and pupils with the priestly blessing, e.g., on Friday night before . Either the view is held that there is no prohibition at all for a non-priest to recite the priestly blessing or that, if there is a prohibition, it applies only to a public blessing, i.e., it is wrong for a non-priest to duchan. In an interesting discussion of this question, Rabbi Baruch Epstein ('Torah Temimah' to the priestly blessing, Numbers 6:23, note 131) remarks that he heard from a reliable source that when the Gaon of Vilna blessed a disciple at the latter's wedding, he did so with only one hand raised above the recipient's head. I cannot for the moment recall where I saw this, but it has been suggested that nowadays it would be wrong to raise one hand in blessing because this resembles a church blessing. To sum up: There are very good grounds for permitting a rabbi who is not a priest to recite the priestly blessing over a barmitzvah or under the chupah. It is hard to see how this differs from the universal practice of a teacher blessing his pupils. However, it is not for me to take issue with your rabbi and I suppose he holds that such a blessing in public would offend against the prohibition as understood by Rashi in his interpretation of the passage in Ketubot. The classical Codes are silent on the alleged prohibition. It is found neither in Maimonides nor in the Shulchan Aruch. 162 • 54sk the Rabbi' Last year I heard a broadcast in Israel of a service on Holocaust Day during which the kaddish was recited for the victbns. Apropos of your recent comment on the response 'Amen', was it right for those who heard it being broadcast live to answer 'Amen', since we were not actually there when the kaddish was being recited.

The question of answering ~en' to a benediction or, in this case, to the kaddish, broadcast over the radio or television has been discussed by the rabbinic authorities, who generally come to the conclusion that ~en' should be recited by those who have heard it. Two talmudic passages have been quoted as relevant to the issue (there was, of course, no radio or television in talmudic times, yet by a process of analogy the decision can be arrived at for the new situation). The first passage states that, when the High Priest on the Day of Atonement pronounced the divine name, it was heard far beyond the confmes of the Temple and the people who heard it responded, which shows that, even if one is not actually present when a benediction is being recited, one can - and, indeed, should - respond. The other passage contains an account of the huge synagogue in Alexandria at which, it is said, a man waved a flag whenever the Reader came to the end of a benediction so that those too far away from the reading desk for them to hear could answer ~en'. This shows that, provided one knows that the benediction has been said, even if one does not hear, it is proper to answer ~en'. From both passages it would appear that it is right and proper to answer ~en' to a benediction or the kaddish heard over the radio and television. Incidentally, by a similar process of reasoning, some rabbis hold that the benediction to be recited when seeing a royal personage should be recited even when the Queen is seen on television.

I have several friends who have beco01e :free01asons. I aDl rather concerned as the cere01onies appear to be based on false doctrines connected with the building of the Te01ple. Is it wise for Jews to get involved with a society such as that of the :free01asons?

I am not a freemason and have no close familiarity with its doctrines. However, I am aware that a good deal of the ritual has to do with alleged events in the time of Solomon's Temple. These happenings are almost certainly unhistorical and, in this sense, 'false'. But, I imagine, many freemasons would not take the ritual all that seriously, looking upon it as play-acting for a good purpose. Only if the doctrines were Ceremonies • 163 'false' in the sense of harmful to Jewish faith (which they are not) would there be an objection to Jews becoming freemasons. I am not sure about practices at some Masonic funerals which seem to be connected with the supposed worship by the Druids. And, of course, if freemasonry is seen as a different religion rather than a pleasant secret society, it is wrong for a devout Jew to belong to the society. But, on the whole, it is all very harmless and, while there are enough colourful rituals inJudaism to satisfY mind and soul, if some people want to belong to this or a similar society, why not? A former Chief Rabbi was a prominent freemason. I once asked him your very question. He replied that there was a good deal of mistaken history in the society, but nothing objectionable from the point of view of faith.

Why do m.anyJews pray to the m.oon outdoors? I thought it was forbidden to pray to som.ething one is able to see.

The blessing is referred to in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 42a) and reads (in the translation in Singer's Prayer Book, page 390): 'Blessed art Thou ... by whose word the heavens were created, and by the breath of whose mouth all their host. Thou didst assign them a statute and a season, that they should not change their appointed charge. 'They are glad and rejoice to do the will of their Master, the truthful Worker whose work is truth, who bade the moon renew itself, a crown of glory unto those that have been upborne by him from the womb, who in the time to come will themselves be renewed like it, to honour their Creator for his glorious kingdom's sake. Blessed art Thou, 0 Lord, who renewest the months.' Thus it is as clear as can be that not only is there not the slightest suggestion of a prayer being addressed to the moon, but the blessing is a direct protest against worship of the heavenly bodies. It is God who is worshipped as Creator of the moon. In the second part of the blessing there is a reference to the choice of Israel, the Jewish people being compared to the moon, which waxes and wanes, i.e., the fortunes of the Jewish people fluctuate, but the hope of redemption for them and for all mankind is never abandoned. The blessing, then, appears to be strange only if its full import is not understood. When this is appreciated, the blessing is a wonderful hymn to God as Creator and Redeemer. I admit that the later addition to the rite (not given in Singer) - in which the worshipper jumps towards the moon while saying, :Just as I jump towards thee and am unable to reach thee, so may all my enemies be unable to reach me to do me harm' - is more questionable. Some years ago Rabbi Goren, the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, discovered a version of this which read ~d I do not reach thee', instead of 164 • Ylsk the Rabbi'

~d I cannot reach thee', which he said was preferable because, now, man can reach the moon.

Where does the word davening come from? Is it from the word dibber, 'speak'?

It is not certain, but it is generally assumed that the Yiddish expression to daven, meaning to pray, is derived from the Latin devotionem, from which our English word 'devotion' is also derived.

What can be done when the warden of a synagogue refuses to give an aliya, or any mitzva, to a member of a congregation?

This column does not discuss particular instances of alleged impropriety and this must be left to local congregations and their rabbis to decide what should be done. As a general principle, the warden, appointed democratically by the congregation, represents the will of the congregation and is given the right to decide how the aliyot are to be apportioned- unless it is a matter of din, e.g., which person has priority. Then it is for the rabbi to decide.

Why do we call the priesdy blessing duchaning? A dxchn is a platform- does it come from this word?

Yes. The duchan was the platform on which the priests stood when reciting the priestly blessing. The usual Hebrew name is, however, birkatkohanim, the priestly blessing.

What is shaatnez? Is it a mixture of wool and cotton or of wool and linen, which is made of flax? And what is the reason for its prohibition?

Scripture (Deuteronomy 22:11) states: 'Thou shalt not wear a mingled stuff (shaatne;:,), wool and linen together.' Thus, shaatne;:, is clearly a mixture of linen and wool and, according to rabbinic interpretation, the prohibition applies even when the two are present in the same garment without their being 'mingled' as a single stuff. As for the reason, the rabbinic view is that this law belongs among those for which no reason is given and which have to be observed because this is the will of God as recorded in the Torah. Ceremonies • 165 Nevertheless, the post-talmudic teachers have suggested various possi­ bilities, one or two of which may here be mentioned. Maimonides believes that the idolatrous priests used garments of this kind, so that the law is intended as a constant protest against idolatry. Others refer to the story of Cain and Abel, Cain bringing an offering 'of the fruit of the ground', while Abel brought an offering 'of the frrstlings of this flock' (see Genesis 4: 1-15). The association of flax and wool thus calls to mind the first murder and is a permanent protest against violence. Others suggest as a reason for the prohibition the need to preserve the order created by God in which things which grow from the soil are kept distinct from and the products of these. The devout Jew who keeps these laws can perhaps be compared to the member of a famous regiment who dresses in such a way that his very garments remind him of the battles fought and won by the regiment of which he is so proud. In the same way,Judaism encourages its adherents to pursue the idea of holiness in the way they dress as well as in the food they eat.

Having been a 01e01ber of the United Synagogue for a nwnber of years, I have often wondered why the lighting in the synagogue is by electric light and not by candle.

It is true that, in the past, people would consider it to be meritorious to donate candles for the lighting of the synagogue, but the purpose was solely that the synagogue should be well-lit. There is no significance in the type of lighting used. Nowadays, when electric lights serve the purpose even more adequately, it is preferable to have this form of lighting. As for the need of individual donors to carry out this mitzva, they do it by their contribution to the upkeep of the synagogue, and there is no reason why if, say, someone wishes to have this special mitzva in memory of his parents and the like, he should not offer to pay for the lighting for a given period or to provide the lamp bulbs and containers. In some synagogues, even today, the ner tamid, the perpetual light, is in the form of an oil lamp, presumably as a reminder of the menora in the Temple, in which oil was used. But the majority of rabbis rule that, even for this purpose, an electric light may be used since, after all, it is no more than a reminder. These rabbis tend to argue that here as well electric lights are to be preferred because they normally burn without going out and there is less danger of fire breaking out. The reasoning behind all this is that the synagogue lights are not a kind of offering to God, but are for the benefit of the congregation both in that they help them to read the prayer-books and help to awaken their feelings of reverence, light being a symbol of the Torah. As theJewish mystics put it, a brightly lit room is conducive to prayer because in it attention is called to spiritual light. 166 • J.lsk the Rabbi' What is the origin of the 'anim.als' usually decorating the Ark in the synagogue?

The custom of having representations of lions, generally upholding the two tablets of stone, is based on the idea that for the Torah to be followed and upheld, it requires, on the part of Jews, the courage of a lion. There is the well-known passage in Ethics of the Fathers (5:23): 'Be strong as a leopard, light as an eagle, fleet as a hart, and strong as a lion, to do the will of thy Father who is in heaven.' In some holy books, all four animals are represented on the frontispiece. It is true that some rabbis have objected to the depiction of the lions on the Ark curtain or above the Ark because all pictorial representations are reprehensible in the synagogue. However, the custom is so widespread and has been so generally accepted by the most pious of rabbis that it is now absurd to urge that it be discontinued.

I have heard that a kiddush cup with a flat base is Dlore kosher than one with a ste01. Is this correct?

I have never heard of any such thing and, so far as I know, there is no reference to this in any of the sources.

Have the rabbis ever ruled on the correct way of wearing a talit?

It was only during the Middle Ages, when it was no longer usual for Jews to wear four-cornered garments and there was a danger that the whole mitzva of tzitzit would be forgotten, that the special four-cornered 'prayer-shawl' was introduced. The result is that we do not find any rules on how the talit is to be worn in the early literature but here are the rules as recorded in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 8). The talit is to be wrapped around the body in the way in which people wear a robe while working, at times with the head covered by the robe, at other times with the head uncovered by it. Nonetheless, it is good to cover the head with the talit. The talit should further be worn in such a way that two of the four tzitzit should be behind the wearer and the other two in front of him so that he is surrounded by mitzvot. Although the Shulchan Aruch states that it is good for the talit to be worn over the head, the custom developed in many places that this was only permitted to a scholar. Ceremonies • 16 7 What is the origin of the exemption of women from having to fulfil positive commands which have a fixed time for their observance?

The rule is stated in the Mishna in the first chapter of tractate Kiddushin, which means that, at the latest, by the second century CE it was a long­ established rule. A well-known suggestion is that of Abudraham, who says that women, who frequently have obligations to their families, cannot be expected to interrupt their daily tasks in order to carry out mitzvot at a given time. A Chasidic master suggested that the reason is because the soul of women comes from a higher source than that of men, a source beyond time to such an extent that time-bound precepts, as it were, are inapplicable. Still another reason, advanced in a late Midrash, is that the purpose of the mitzvot is to refine human nature. Very gallantly, the Midrash observes that women are refined far more than men, in any event, and they do not require so many mitzvot. An interesting reason given by a modern scholar suggests that the majority of time-bound mitzvot have to do with the festivals, occurring in the time sequence. Among many ancient peoples, there were female devotees of the cult who played an important role during the festivals. As part of the Torah's rejection of all idolatrous worship, it removed from women the time-bound obligations.

What are the main factors which ascertain that a new set of tefillin are completely fit and perfect, and what authority can be consulted to verify that such tefillin are in order?

The main factors are that the portions have been written by a competent scribe, not printed, on parchment and that the boxes have been prepared in the proper way, e.g., are square and black. If you have any doubts, the boxes can be opened by a scribe, who will be able to tell you whether or not the portions are kosher. Many people make sure by purchasing only tefillin to which there is attached a seal of authorisation by an accredited rabbinic authority.

Is it obligatory to wear tzitzit throughout the day?

The biblical injunction is for tzitzit to be attached to four-cornered garments. When Jews in the Middle Ages followed the Western mode of dress and no longer wore four-cornered garments, there was no obligation to have tzitzit fixed to the garments. 168 • 54sk the Rabbi' In order to prevent the mitzva dying out completely, a four-cornered garment was worn for prayers - the tallit gadol, 'large tallit' -and a smaller one - the tallit katan - worn all the time. It should be noted, however, that, while a religious precept is carried out when the tallit katan is worn, there is no obligation to wear one. This is because the mitzva depends on the four-cornered garment. It is not as if the Torah says, 'Wear tzitzit'. What it states is rather, 'When you wear a garment of four corners, have tzitzit at the four corners'. It follows that a maleJew who does not wear a tallit katan commits no wrong, but he does miss out on the mitzva. It is rather like reciting a benediction over, say, wine. If one wishes to drink wine, it is obligatory to recite the benediction, but there is certainly no obligation to drink wine solely in order to recite the benediction. The analogy is not quite exact, since the practice of wearing a tallit katan does further the purpose for which presumably the mitzva of tzitzit was ordained, namely, to remember the commandments, and for this reason it is an act of piety to wear the tallit katan at all times. So the short answer to your question is: there is no obligation to wear a tallit katan, but it is good to wear one.

What is the procedure if the reader (baal tefila) is the only Cohen during a festival service? Does he duchan while someone else reads the service? If no Levite is present may a Cohen duchan without being ritually prepared by the washing of his hands?

The reader duchans while someone else calls out the words of the priestly blessing, which normally the reader does during duchaning. On such an occasion the reader should duchan without having his hands washed ritually so as to avoid any interruption of the service. A first-born should wash the Cohen's hands when there is no Levite in the synagogue. If neither a Levite nor a first-born is present the Cohen should wash his own hands.

Are there any specific injunctions against praying in the dark, e.g., saying the Maariv service? Are there any prayers or blessings which are only to be said in the dark, or conversely (apart, of course, from daytime services of prayer) which should not be said in the dark?

The nearest to your question in the traditional sources is the custom referred to repeatedly of having the synagogue well-lit during prayers but that is because of the respect and honour due to the house of prayer of the same aesthetic order as the need for decorating the synagogue. A further idea in this Ceremonies • 169 connection is that light is a symbol of the Torah and of man's immortal soul. But all this has to do with the synagogue. I have been unable to discover anywhere a reference to either some of the prayers being required to be recited in a room that is light or, conversely, to some of them being required to be recited in a room that is dark. With regard to the reading of the Shema there is an explicit reference to it being recited in a dark room (Berachot 3a) where from the context it is clear that there is no objection to this whatsoever.

In view of the definite use of incense in worship (as mentioned in the later part of Exodus), why has it been discontinued?

Since the references to incense in the Bible and in the later sources are to Temple worship, your question really amounts to this: why did the synagogue not follow the practice in the Temple? Formulated in this way, one answer is that precisely because incense was used in Temple worship, it was not used in the synagogue. There is a definite tendency injewish teaching to avoid treating the syna­ gogue like the Temple inJerusalem, even though, in the Talmud, the synagogue is called (after a biblical verse) 'a temple in miniature'. Thus, for example, it is forbidden to have a menora in the synagogue fashioned like the menora in the Temple. In fact, according to many authorities, it is forbidden to have any menora of seven branches like the Temple menora. And, of course, it is strictly forbidden to offer up sacrifices in the synagogue. Furthermore, the passage in Exodus to which you refer forbids even the making of the incense with the ingredients stated for other than Temple use. On the other hand, the ner tamid ('perpetual light') does·burn in the synagogue as a reminder of the light that burned in the Temple (though there it did not burn all the time, only at night), but this is a very late custom. The similar custom might have developed of burning some kind of incense as a reminder of the Temple, and the reason it did not develop was no doubt because incense is used in the Christian church. There are, nevertheless, references to keeping synagogues clean and fresh smelling and, no doubt, this was done, at times, by spraying sweet-smelling herbs and the like. Obviously, this is a very different matter from burning incense as an act of worship. The nearest we get to anything like the use of incense is the practice among some groups of Chasidim of smoking aromatic tobacco and this they call 'incense', though clearly only in a very loose way. I recall that in my youth I saw a Chasidic Rebbe smoke a Turkish cigarette before beginning to recite the afternoon prayer. 170 • fuk the Rabbi' When praying in synagogue, is there any extra m.erit in saying prayers loudly and audibly?

A distinction is made in the rabbinic sources between the amida (the shemona esrez) and all other prayers and hymns. The former is to be recited 'softly' (belachash), the latter 'loudly' (beko~. In both instances the words have to be uttered sufficiently loud for the worshipper himself to hear what he is saying. Thus, to refer to the amida, as is sometimes done, as 'the silent prayer' is not too accurate. Reciting this prayer 'softly' means not as loud as the other prayers; ideally, so that no other persons present overhear the words, only the worshipper himsel£ , It is advocated that those parts of the liturgy in which the praises of God are sung - the Psalms, for instance - should be recited (or, better, sung) in a loud voice. Nevertheless, much depends on how loud the voice is, and there have been differing opinions on this. On the whole, the more traditional rabbinic authorities urge worshippers to preserve a proper sense of decorum, and they urge especially that regard should be had for others so as not to disturb them in their prayers. Chasidim, on the other hand, generally believe in the loud praises, said to be those of the early 'saints' (Chasidim) in Psalm 149, in whose mouths there are 'the high praises of God' (verse 6). It has to be appreciated that, as the medieval masters of prayer were fond of saying, 'a loud voice awakens concentration'. But a sense of proportion is called for, and a good deal depends on local custom. The Sephardim, for instance, recite aloud more of the prayers than the Ashkenazim, and in 'Westernised' congregations, different ideas of decorum prevail from those in, say, a shtibl. There is a talmudic ruling that it is forbidden to say ~en' in a louder voice than that of the one who recites the benediction to which one responds.

While in Israeli bought am.ezuza, which I have since been told is printed on plain paper and not hand-written. Surely this is not perm.itted.

When printing was first invented, the Jewish authorities discussed whether it is to be considered in law as writing for those religious objects, such as a mezuza, which have to be written. The question concerned a mezuza printed on correctly prepared parch­ ment, not on ordinary paper. The consensus was that printing was not to be construed as writing and a printed mezuza is consequently invalid. With the advent of photography, the further question arose: is a photograph of a mezuza (on correctly prepared parchment) valid? On the one hand, this Ceremonies • 171 is better than a printed mezuza in that it is a reproduction of a perfectly kosher, i.e., hand-written, mezuza. But from another point of view it is worse than a printed mezuza since there the act of printing might be considered to be 'writing', whereas here is it a mere reproduction of a mezuza that had been written. Again the consensus is that a photographic reproduction of a mezuza is invalid. It follows that the mezuza you bought is invalid both because it was printed and not hand-written and because it was of plain paper. You are no doubt puzzled that this type of activity should be allowed in Israel. Rabbis in Israel are very concerned at this trend and have tried hard to warn the innocent not to buy mezuzot from anyone except a duly accredited person who has rabbinic authorisation. Part of the trouble is that some unscrupulous dealers may claim that they are not selling kosher mezuzot, but only replicas, and they may ingenuously protest that they had no idea that the invalid mezuzot they sell are actually to be used as mezuzot. That is why people aware of the true situation only buy mezuzot and tefilin which have a certificate of kashrut from a recognised rabbinic authority.

When it is desired to add to the seven people called up to the Torah reading, should the addition be 01ade in the seventh portion (shevi'a1 or before? May any four verses be recited and is there a liDlit to the nUD1ber of additions that can be 01ade?

The additions can be made by dividing any portion of the sidra, though, if possible, the first two portions should be left undivided. Ideally, one should keep to the seven, but where there are more than seven entitled to be called up (e.g., when they have Yahrzeit), additions can be made. The minimum portion for each person called up is three, not four, verses. The reading of the divided portion must leave at least three verses to the end of a paragraph (a petuhah or setumah).

As an obstetrician, I a01 aware of cases of baby boys being born already 'circUDlcised'. What is the religious require­ Dlent in this event?

The question is discussed in the Talmud (Shabbat 135a) where the ruling is given that a few drops of the blood of the covenant must be drawn from the child. This is the rule as given in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 263:4) where it is added that great care must be taken when performing this operation. The benediction is not recited when the operation is performed in these circumstances. 172 • 54sk the Rabbi' What are the regulations concerning a child who is unfit to undergo his brit on the eighth day after birth - I am told that it m.ust wait until the 15th day, even if healthy before that?

Your informant was no doubt thinking of the ruling, based on the Talmud, in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 262:2) that even when an infant too ill to have a brit has recovered, it is necessary to wait a full seven days from the day he recovers. This is said to apply only to an illness in which the whole body of the infant is affected. The usual procedure is for the mohel to examine the infant beforehand and it is left to him to decide.

Please can you tell m.e the form.ula for m.aking the ink for blackening the tefilin?

The sources (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 32:40 and 33:3) do not speak of 'ink' in this connection but of 'dye' and rule only that this must be black, implying that any kind of black ink or dye will suffice. It also appears that throughout the ages the scribes had various methods of blackening the tefllin. So there is no special formula, although do-it-yourself tefilin repairing is not recommended. An expert scribe should be engaged to do the job.

If one is in a hospital ward, where there are specim.en bottles and chamber pots, m.ay one put on te:&lin in the same ward?

On the basis of the verse, 'and cover that which cometh from thee' (Deuteronomy 23: 13), the Talmud (Berachot 25b) rules that if excrement is in a bottle, it is permitted to read the Shema near to the bottle, because there is a 'covering'. To make sure, the curtains around one's bed should be drawn and this then makes the area around the bed a separate compartment and it is permitted. (See Braun's 'Shearim Metzuyanim Ba-Halacha', Volume I, page 39, note 5.) 8 Marriage and Divorce

My maternal grandmother, a Jewess, married a non-Jew. My mother also 'married out'. Am I, nevertheless, a Jewess in the full sense of the term?

Yes, you are. Since your grandmother was Jewish your mother was Jewish and so, therefore, you too, areJewish.

Is a Jew who has married a non-Jewish girl allowed to be called up in shul?

Among authorities who discuss this question is Rabbi Judah Griinwald of Sotmar (1845-1920). In a responsum on the subject (Zichron Yehudah, Vol. I, No. 45), Rabbi Griinwald cannot discover any definite ruling on the subject, but holds that even if it is not forbidden, according to the strict letter of the law, to call up to the Torah a man who has married out, synagogues should adopt it as a rule not to call such men up as a precautionary measure, i.e., to discourage those who might be tempted to follow their example if they are given honours in the synagogue. Although he takes issue with it, Rabbi Griinwald refers to some congregations who do call up people who have married out. So far as I know, the United Synagogue in this country accepts as members Jewish men who are married to non:Jewish women and allows them to be called up on such occasions as a yahrzeit.

Since it is wrong to marry out, does it not follow that it is wrong for Jewish parents to bring up their children in a Gentile country when they could be living in Israel, where their children would not be tempted to commit such a wrong?

Yes, if all Jews lived in Israel this particular problem would be solved, but it is hardly realistic to envisage that this will happen and, in any event, the reason for aliya to Israel ought not to be this negative one, but the positive privilege of living there. Ever since the emergence of the Jew from the ghetto this problem has loomed large. I need not repeat that rabbis and communal leaders are fully aware of the problem and are taking steps to avoid it by providing more opportunities for young Jews and Jewesses to meet. 17 4 • :Ask the Rabbi' Your solution is no solution at all because it is completely unrealistic. Indeed, its constant formulation would tend to inhibit the necessary steps taken to deal with the problem of Jews who continue to live in the diaspora. Unless I am mistaken, the mood today in Israel itself is not to negate the diaspora, but to encourage a more vibrant Jewish life there. Another 'solution' sometimes put forward is for Jews to retreat into the ghetto. This, too, is no solution at all because it is unworkable, even if desirable - and many of us would refuse to admit to its desirability.

Does Jewish law offer any relief to a wife abandoned by her husband whose whereabouts cannot be traced? This is the problem of the aguna about which so much has been written and which is, indeed, the cause of a great deal of anguish. The position in traditional Jewish law is as follows: The court can never issue a divorce, only the husband, who has to deliver the Get to his wife before she can remarry. The function of the Beth Din at the Get is only to see that the rules are obeyed and the correct procedures carried out. This means that where the husband's whereabouts are unknown there is no possibility of the court breaking the marriage bond. From the days of the Talmudic rabbis strenuous efforts were made by the great legal authorities to help the abandoned wife, the aguna (the word means 'one who is tied'). For instance, although two witnesses are required in most legal procedures, the rabbis allowed the testimony of a single witness to the death of the husband to suffice for the wife to remarry. In the last century many rabbinic authorities relaxed the rules about a husband missing at sea where there was no clear evidence that he had died. In the older law his wife could not remarry in the absence of such evidence but it was argued by these later authorities that, nowadays, when communications have improved to a degree unthought of in Talmudic times, the wife can be allowed to remarry since if the husband were alive he would get in touch with his wife. Authorities such as Dayan Weiss, formerly of Manchester and now in Jerusalem, permitted the wives of inmates of the concentration camps who did not return to remarry on the grounds that their death would be assumed. Rabbi Goren, it is well known, permitted the wives of the sailors drowned in the submarine Dakar to remarry. So, if there are reasonable grounds for assuming the husband to be dead something can be, and is, done. The problem of the deserted wife is more difficult. The only way within the framework of the traditional law that this problem can be tackled is to try to invalidate the marriage, i.e., by discovering legal grounds why the marriage was invalid in the first instance so that no Get is required. Naturally, not every case yields to such treatment. Marriage and Divorce • 17 5 In really hard cases, very few in number, the Conservative Bet Din in the USA has been prepared to release the wife by nullifying the marriage in any event on the grounds that a court is empowered to do this if the circumstances demand it. But such a solution has not proved acceptable to Orthodox authorities.

Is it true that the non.:Jewish wife of a husband buried in an Orthodox cemetery may not be mentioned on the tombstone?

There are no rules retarding the wording on a tombstone: I cannot see why the name of the non:Jewish wife should not appear on the tombstone and I know of instances where this is recorded in cemeteries belonging to the Orthodox United Synagogue.

Is there any ruling in Jewish sources about whether a bridegroom should or should not wear a talit under the chupa? Custom seems to vary as between synagogue and synagogue.

The sources say nothing about a bridegroom wearing a talit under the chupa. Those who do wear it do so only as a token of extra respect for the occasion much as the reader in the synagogue wears a talit for the Maariv service although, strictly speaking, there is no obligation to wear a talit at night-time. The same applies to the ministers who officiate under the chupa. It all depends on local custom and there are no rules about it.

According to halacha, a child is of the mother's religion. Therefore, if a Jewish man marries a non.:Jewish woman who does not convert, a child born of that union is not Jewish. If the father decides he wants his children to be Jewish, in the case of a male child, is a brit mila sufficient to declare the boy a Jew, and for a girl does the naming ceremony in the synagogue declare her a Jew? This does not take into account what education, traditions and practices follow, merely the declaration at birth.

There is considerable confusion in your presentation of the question. For one thing, the naming ceremony in the synagogue for a girl has nothing to do with the case and is a ceremony for a girl who is already Jewish. The position is that the children are technically non:Jewish and require conversion to theJewish faith if they are to become Jews. The conversion rites 17 6 • 54sk the Rahbi' involve circumcision and immersion in a mikva for a male child and immersion for a female child. The Beth Din will require guarantees that the children are to be educated and brought up as Jews. This is the Orthodox view and is the one generally followed in these matters, except for the Liberals, who hold that it depends neither on the father nor on the mother alone but on their willingness to bring up the child as aJew.

Why is a wedding ring placed on the forefinger of the right hand of a bride and not on the third finger of the left hand during the marriage ceremony?

On the right hand because 'right' symbolises justice, righteousness, good and so forth; on the forefmger because, as the fmger of direction, it is similarly symbolic of the right way.

A few years ago, my brother passed away and left a widow with three small boys. Soon after, I was told that his widow was no longer my sister-in-law. Is this correct according toJewish law? How does the loss of my brother affect the relationship of my nephews to me?

Since your brother's widow is now free to marry someone else, the bond between her and your brother has obviously been technically severed by his death and, in this sense, she is no longer your sister-in-law. That is obvious. With regard to your nephews, there is no question at all that they remain your blood relations. According to Jewish law, a man may not marry his deceased father's sister. The boys are, according to Jewish law, just as much your nephews now as they were when your brother was still alive.

Can a Beth Din refuse a Get to a person who cannot afford the costs of the court?

First, it must be realised that the Get is not issued by the Beth Din but by the husband; nowadays, only where the wife consents to it. The function of the Beth Din is to see that the Get is written out properly and the other requirements of establishedJewish law are carried out. Every Beth Din I know of only charges a fee for expenses, the payment of the scribe, for instance, and this is usually a very small amount. I have never heard, and am sure it is not true, of a Beth Din refusing to perform this function when the couple who require the Get are too poor to afford even this small amount. Marriage and Divorce • 17 7 Can a ceremony properly be performed without a minister or rabbi? What halachic elements constitute a valid wedding ceremony?

No rabbi is required to be present for the marriage to be valid. Halachically, the requirements of a valid marriage are that some object of value (nowadays the ring) be given by the groom to the bride, in the presence of two witnesses, the groom declaring that he betroths her with that object, and the bride consenting to the betrothal. It is important to appreciate that injudaism marriage is a religious contract entered into by bride and groom of their own free choice and it is effected by them and by none other. There is no such concept injudaism as marriage being effected by a priest acting on behalf of God or that it take place in a consecrated place. In any event, the rabbi is not a priest. If there is any need for a rabbi to be present, it is only to make sure that the marriage ceremony is performed in the proper way. In modern congregations there is, of course, an address by the rabbi, but that is a recent innovation and seems, indeed, to have been copied from the practices of the Church. That is why the ultra-Orthodox frown on it, as they do on marriages in a synagogue! This part of the marriage ceremony is known as the betrothal, erusin, and in ancient times was performed quite separately from the ceremony known as the chupa, nisuin, from which time the joint obligations of the couple come into force. From the Middle Ages onwards it has been the custom to have these two ceremonies performed together, i.e., erusin or kiddushin under the chupa, as we do. There are benedictions for both erusin and nisuin, the latter known as the sheva berachot, 'seven benedictions'. But the marriage is valid even if the benedictions are not recited. Ten males must be present for the sheva berachot to be recited. All this explains why there are a number of responsa by the halachic authorities on instances where a young man made a declaration of marriage in jest in the presence of witnesses. If it is clear that the girl had no intention of marrying the young man and accepted the ring only in jest, the marriage, they rule, is not binding; but the reason for this is not because no rabbi was present, but because the consent of the girl was not really forthcoming and the young man also intended the whole thing in jest. 178 • ~sk the Rabbi' Please explain the status of children of a m.arriage between a divorced woJDan and a Cohen. Are such child­ ren classified as m.am.zeriJD or are they under a lesser disability which prevents theJD froJD following the status of their father?

According to the Orthodox law, a child is only a mamzer if he is the issue of an adulterous or incestuous union, for instance, the union of a man with a woman married to another or the union of brother and sister. The union of a Cohen and a divorced woman, though forbidden, does not render the issue of the union a mamzer. If the child is female, she is different from the daughter of an Israelite or Levite in status and she may not marry a Cohen. If the child is a male, he is otherwise perfectly kosher, but he does not have the full status of a Cohen. He cannot enjoy any of the privileges of the priesthood - for instance, to be called up first to the reading of the Torah or to recite the priestly blessing in the synagogue.

My fiance and I are going to Los Angeles to be m.arried by a rabbi. My fiance is Jewish, but I am. a Christian, hence the reason for being m.arried in USA (since you advised us once that it is not possible to be JDarried by a rabbi here). On our return we would very JDuch like to have a m.arriage blessing by a rabbi and I wonder if this would be possible.

Since you will not have been converted tojudaism, no rabbi here (Orthodox, Reform or Liberal) would have officiated at the wedding ceremony, though a few rabbis in the USA do officiate, to the consternation of their colleagues. Since this is so, I must tell you that no rabbi in this country would agree to give you the 'marriage blessing'.

May a non-:Jew m.arried to a Jewess, whose children have been brought up as Jews, stand under the chupa with his wife in a Liberal or Reform. synagogue? And m.ay the non­ Jewish parents of a Liberal or Reform. convert participate in the JDarriage cereJDony?

I do not know what the position is in this connection in Liberal and Reform synagogues, but I would imagine that there is no objection in both the instances you mention to the non:Jewish parent standing under the chupa. Indeed, I cannot see any objection to a non:Jewish parent acting as unterforer even in an Orthodox synagogue. Marriage and Divorce • 179 My reason for this is that the whole institution of unterforer has no real authority in tradition. It appears to be simply a matter of the parents escorting bride and groom to the chupa and of paying respect to the parents. A convert toJudaism is obliged, according to the din, to honour his parents, and a child who has a non:Jewish father but whose mother is Jewish to honour that father. It is not as if the parents, by standing under the chupa, are really participants in the actual ceremony. To my mind (though, when I wrote something similar a year or two ago, some Orthodox rabbis disagreed vehemently), there is only an objection to a non:Jew taking part in the actual ceremony, reciting the benedictions, for instance. There is no objection, say to a non:Jewish man acting as best man or a non:Jewish girl acting as a bridesmaid, even though these do stand under the chupa. This is obviously so since there is no such institution in Judaism as a best man or a bridesmaid with the consequence that the din has nothing to say about these. Could there possibly be any objection to non:Jewish friends of the bride and groom signing the civil registers in the synagogue or providing the flowers or acting as ushers? It seems heartless and cruel to prevent non:Jewish parents standing under the chupa if they wish to do so, and since, as above, there seems to be no legal objection, they should not only be allowed to do so, but encouraged to do so.

Can you explain the breaking of the glass under the chupa?

The Talmud (tractate Berachot, 3la) tells of a rabbi at a wedding feast who observed that some of the guests were in a too frivolous state of mind. To sober them up the rabbi had fetched a precious glass vase and broke it in their presence. In the context, the meaning is that life is a serious business, so that even on the happiest of occasions men must be aware that there is tragedy as well as joy, suffering as well as happiness. Further, in the same Talmudic passage, the consciousness of the tragic side of human existence is connected with the destruction of the Temple. Only in the Messianic age, it is said, will unqualified mirth be permitted. The famous French commentators, the Tosafists, remark of the passage: 'This is the origin of the custom of breaking a glass at a wedding.' On the basis of all this, the official explanation of the custom is said to be that bride and bridegroom symbolically remind themselves of the destruction of the Temple, i.e., are aware of the sufferings of the past and resolve to repair some of its ravages by building a faithful Jewish home. Of course, all peoples have customs of this kind at a wedding. It is not unknown to break something in order to ward off the demons who might be 180 • fuk the Rabbi, jealous of the good fortune of the young couple and who are persuaded by the breaking of objects that there is really no cause for rejoicing. For a very comprehensive account of the ceremony and its development you should consult the article: 'The Ceremony of Breaking a Glass at Weddings', by Jacob Z. Lauterbach in the 'Hebrew Union College Annual', Vol. 2, Cincinnati, 1925.

Why do some synagogues not allow the children of widowed parents to attend the service if their surviving parent remarries and is there any prohibition against a child 'giving away' such a parent?

I have never heard of a synagogue refusing to allow the children of widowed parents to attend the service if their surviving parent remarries. This has nothing to do with Jewish law and is entirely a matter of personal preference. No one has a right to prevent the children being present if they and the couple being married so wish it. There is also no objection to a child 'giving away' the parent in such circumstances, though of late, in some places, various customs, without warrant from the sources, have grown up around the question of who may and who may not 'give away'. The truth is that there is nothing in the sources about 'giving away' and so there are no rules regarding who may and who may not serve in this capacity.

Is it voluntary or is it a 'must' for Jewish bride to attend the m.ikva before she gets married? Will the minister refuse to marry her if she does not wish to go?

In Israel, as far as I know, the rabbis do insist on a bride attending the mikva before she gets married. In other communities it depends on the attitude of the officiating rabbi. According to Orthodox law a couple may not live together as man and wife if the wife has not attended the mikva after she has had her periods, but this does not apply only to the time she gets married. The din, in fact, permits the marriage of a woman while she has her periods, although, of course, the couple may not live together until the periods are over and the wife has attended the mikva. It would seem to be inconsistent for rabbis to demand attendance at the mikva only for this single occasion. Possibly, the rabbis feel that by introducing the bride to the mikva she will continue to keep the laws after her marriage or they may argue that her attendance at the mikva before her marriage is necessary because the rabbi is officiating at the marriage and does not wish to be a party to any breach of the law. Marriage and Divorce • 181 You wrote recendy: 'All the Jewish authorities agree that it is a sin for a Jewish wo01an to 01arry a Gentile.' The usually accepted 01eaning of 'sin' is a transgression against divine law or principles of ~norality. What is your definition of 'sin' and how does it relate to a ntixed 01arriage such as you describe.

First, it is not my defmition of 'sin' that we are discussing, but that of the Jewish authorities to whom I referred and whose definition, as a rabbi, I accept. I imagine that they would concur in your defmition, though they would probably add that a transgression against principles of morality is not an 'or' but is itself a transgression against the divine law. The implication of your observation is that a mixed marriage does not offend against divine law, but then the question is, what do you mean by divine law? If Judaism is a revealed religion - and, I believe with the :Jewish authorities' I quoted that it is -thenJewish law has to be seen as an expression of the divine will. One does not have to follow the fundamentalist view of a series of direct divine communications in order to affrrm that Jewish law is divinely based. To put this in other words, since God wishes Jews to be Jews and obey the Torah (even though many will acknowledge that there is a human element in the latter), then it must follow that any departure from such a basic rule of the Torah as the prohibition of marrying out is an offence against divine law and is consequendy a 'sin' according to your own defmition. If you mean to imply that you cannot identify this rule of the Torah with the divine law, I wonder why. Surely, if large numbers ofJews disregarded this law there would soon be no Judaism. Or are you saying that only actions that harm other human beings are 'sinful'? Even if we took this as given (though it is obvious that the religious dimension would thereby be ignored) how can it possibly be suggested that no harm is done to others in such a relationship? There is harm to Jews everywhere. There is harm to many Gentiles who wish to preserve their own faith. There is harm to both sets of parents. There is harm to the children who will be born in that they will always have to face problems of identity and insecurity. And there is harm to the couple themselves in that they are adding an acute tension to the normal tensions which are bound to exist in every marriage. To say all this is not, of course, to engage in the presumptuous task of condemning particular individuals. God is the sole judge of all human endeavour and activity and it is not for any of us to play God. But the question addressed to me was what Jewish law says about the matter, and on that there is no ambiguity whatever. According to Jewish law, as stated by all the experts on the subject, it is quite categorically a sin. 182 • 54sk the Rabbi' I have no intention of marrying out of the faith, but I do go out with non-:Jewish girls if I cannot find a suitable Jewish girl with who1n to go out. Is this wrong?

You may bravely declare that you have no intention of marrying out of the faith, but are you not making it exceedingly difficult for yourself if you go out with a non:Jewish girl and fall in love with her? There is certainly no guarantee in these matters. And have you considered the effect on the girl if she falls in love with you? Is it fair to her? What do you mean when you say that you cannot fmd a 'suitable Jewish girl'? Why not? As a rabbi I can give only one answer to your query: yes, it is wrong. In your letter you remark that your Jewish friends tell you it is wrong, but that they are hypocrites because they themselves do not eat kosher. Certainly they should, but that does not mean their instinctive reaction is less reliable than yours.

Are there any circUJDStances in whichJewish law permits the ~narriage of first cousins?

Jewish law permits the marriage of first cousins categorically. However, if there is disease in the family and the doctors advise against the marriage on these grounds their advice should be followed. In the halachic annual, Noam, published in Israel, some articles a year or two ago argued for greater caution to be exercised in the matter of marriage between near relatives, including that of uncle and niece which the Talmud (Yevamot 62a-b) considers to be meritorious.

Are there any writtenJewish conventions or laws dealing with kinship and related responsibilities, say, towards widowed parents, childless aunts, uncles and siblings? Is there a stated hierarchy of responsibility, and does the kin's sex count for anything? WouldJewish law tally with EngHshconventions?

The rabbis (Ketubot 52b and 86a) interpret the verse, ~d that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh' (Isaiah 58:7), to mean that one has a duty to render assistance to near relatives who are in need. These have prior claim over all others (Baba Metzia 7la). In reply to your questions, I can do no better than to quote the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 251 :3). Here it is ruled that parents must be assisted before all others, and the same applies to other relatives. Marriage and Divorce • 183 A half-brother from the same father is to be assisted before a half-brother from the same mother. The 'poor of one's own household' come before the poor who do not belong to the household, and the poor of one's own town come before the poor of another town. Isserles, in his note, clarifies it all by stating the following order of precedence explicitly: parents; children; brothers and sisters; other relatives; near neighbours; the general poor of the town; the poor of other towns.

The vows of the English marriage service are well known, being imparted through literature, mass media and theatre. On perusing ajewish certificate, we noticed no mention of the conventional phraseology 'to love, cherish and obey'. What are thejewish attitudes and vows?

The ketubah is a legal document in which are stated the obligations, financial and otherwise, of husband and wife. It has nothing to do with attitudes or emotions. These are taken for granted, or, it is better to say, are implied in a marriage. Apart from the fact that Judaism disapproves of the taking of vows and that, in any event, there can be no vow 'until death us do part' - since this would rule out a subsequent divorce - it is as meaningless for bride and bridegroom to promise to love one another as it would be for them to promise to love their children when they become parents. They will love their children and, by the same token, they are in love with one another, otherwise they would not wish to marry. By spelling out what the marriage bond entails in love and affection, the full exercise of these is inhibited. Where love has to depend on the fulfilment of a solemn promise, there is no love, the essence of which is its spontaneity. For married love to have to depend on obligation is rather like the advice in Yiddish given in some of the old prayer-books: 'At this stage one must weep'; 'At this prayer one must be full of joy'! But, of course, asjudaism sees marriage, it involves 'to love and to cherish'. As for 'obey', this, too, does not have much meaning since it is not at all clear who has to obey whom. In one talmudic passage it is suggested that, where a dispute between husband and wife is about religious matters, the husband should have the fmal word, otherwise the wife should have the final word. The pupils of Rabbi Israel Salanter are reported to have said that, in his case, the poor wife had the worst of it, since everything for him was a religious matter. 184 • 14sk the Rabbi' I was saddened to learn that the Talmud is scathing in its denunciation of the bachelor - 'he who is without a wife lives without blessing' - and of a spinster - 'a wom.an before her m.arriage is like an unshaped lum.p'. Marriage, though desired, is not always possible for m.any people, so why add to their m.isery?

As you say, the Talmud does hold that it is a high religious obligation to marry, but, for instance, it advises against a man marrying before he has the means to support a wife and family. 'He who lives without a wife lives without blessing' is a charming tribute to womanhood, but can hardly be described as a denunciation of one who fmds that he is obliged to live, for the time being, without having this blessing. Your quote about the 'spinster' is totally incorrect. 'Shapeless lump' (golem) is a literal translation of a word that here means 'an unfmished vessel'. It does not refer to a spinster at all. The meaning, as is clear from the context, is that a woman is not normally as attached to her second husband as she is to her first, to the man (using an obvious euphemism) who made her into a complete woman. It is not generally realised that the Talmud, far from sympathising with the woman who has not found the right man, releases a spinster from any obligation to marry. In rabbinic law, the duty to marry and have children devolves only on a man. The reason for the distinction is not stated explicitly, but it may be because it would be unreasonable and indelicate to expect a woman to pursue a man, as presumably she would be obliged to do if the duty of marriage devolved upon her as well.

If a person is sharing accom.m.odation with other Jews and finds that the accom.m.odation is being used for inunoral purposes, is he required to leave?

There is a law, based on the verse 'Thou shalt not put a stumbling-block before the blind' (Leviticus 19:14), that it is forbidden to cause others to do wrong. Presumably, in your case, the landlord alone is responsible for allowing the accommodation to be used for immoral purposes, so that it is he and not one of the tenants who is guilty of an infringement of the law. Yet, ethically, it does not seem right to live in such premises and there is a strong element of guilt by association. It is a sound principle inJewish ethics that one must not be seen to be doing wrong even if one is really innocent. Marriage and Divorce • 185 Why do some people get married out of doors?

Isserles, in his note to the Shulchan Aruch (Even Ha-Ezer 61: 1) states: 'Some say that the chupa should be under the open sky as a good sign, i.e., that their offspring should be as the stars of heaven.' However, as has often been pointed out, Isserles himself elsewhere (Yoreh Deah 391 :3) refers to the chupa taking place in the synagogue. For a very full discussion of the question, especially whether it is permitted to have a chupa in the synagogue, see the great compendium of Jewish law and practice. 'Sedey Chemed' (maarechet chatan ve-chalah) and the interesting responsum of Rabbi Herzog, 'Hechal Yitzhak, Even Ha-Ezer', Volume 2, No. 27.

Why does the bride walk round the bridegroom seven times when they are standing under the chupa?

First, the custom is by no means universal in Orthodox synagogues. It is only rarely followed in United synagogues, for instance. The official reason given in the sources is that the bridegroom is like a king on the day of his wedding (and the bride like a queen), and when the king appears in public his officers come out to greet him and surround him. In fact, in these sources it is the bride and the unteiferers who walk round the groom and they generally mention three times, not seven, corresponding to the three verses in the book of Deuteronomy, in which occurs the expression: 'If a man takes a woman to wife.' Several years ago, an American rabbi wrote that he had discovered in his researches for a book on Jewish marriage customs that some sources refer to the custom of the bride walking seven times around the groom on the grounds that he needs protection on this day from the evil designs of Lillith. Some sources also quote the verse in the book ofJeremiah 31:22, which they render as: ~woman shall walk around a man.' In short, there is no single reason for this and similar customs in connection with marriage and life and death. In all probability, some of these go back a long way and may well have had their origin in ancient superstitions.

If a Jewish man produces an illegitimate child with a Gentile woman, what halachic responsibility does he bear for the support of the child?

The Mishnah (Yebamot 2:5) states that the child in such circumstances is not held to be the child of the Jewish father, but of the Gentile mother, for all purposes of the law. Thus, according to the halacha, in itself the answer to your question has been given. 186 • Jlsk the Rabbi' But it is not as simple as that. If the law of the land does demand that the father be responsible for maintenance of the child, then, on the principle that 'the law of the land is law' (dina de-malchuta dina), the father has an halachic obligation to obey the law of the land. This is to say nothing about the obvious demands of Judaism that Jews must behave correctly and must not be guilty of anything that would cause a profanation of the divine name () and that the obligation to go beyond the bare letter of the law is also an injunction ofJudaism.

Is there any halachic stigm.a attached to so:meone born to a :mother who had not been to the :mikva?

The Talmud (Yebamot 60a) states explicitly that the 'child of a niddah' may marry even a Cohen, so there is clearly no halachic stigma as you put it. The Shulchan Aruch (Even Ha-Ezer 4: 13) states: 'The child of a niddah, although deficient (pagum), is not a mamzer even by rabbinic law.' This follows the statement of Maimonides (Yad, Issurey Viah 15: 1). The only problem is, since the child is perfectly kosher even according to rabbinic law and, if a daughter, even to marry a Cohen, what does the statement that the child is 'deficient' mean? The VIlna Gaon, in his notes to the passage in the Shulchan Aruch, argues that Maimonides is not stating an halachic ruling, but means that the child will have a deficiency in character. It is true that in a number of more recent responsa (Zekan Aharon, by R. Aaron Valkin, Vol. I, No. 54; Divrey Malkiel, by R. Malkiel Tennenbaum, Vol. 4, Even Ha-Ezer, No. 107; Yaskil Avdi, by R. Obadiah Hadaya, Vol. 7, Even Ha-Ezer, No. 3), there is a marked tendency to emphasise the baneful character of such a child, but this is on extra-halachic grounds. I have never heard of any Orthodox rabbi refusing to officiate at the marriage of such a child.

What is the basis of the require:mentforOrthodox:married wo:men to wear a wig?

According to talmudic law, it is necessary for the hair of a married woman to be covered and all the evidence goes to show that pious women did, in fact, have a head-covering whenever they were exposed to the public gaze. The idea here is that a woman's hair is her glory and it is consequently immodest for the hair of married women to be exposed in public since this calls attention to her attractiveness. When, from the sixteenth century in Europe, the fashion arose of wearing wigs, many pious women, who wished to follow the fashion, tended to argue that the wig, although made of hair, still acted as a technical 'covering' of their natural hair and so satisfied the requirements of the law. Many rabbis protested against this, but to no avail. Eventually, the rabbis Marriage and Divorce • 187 came round to the view that there could be no objection to the wearing of a sheitl even though no other head-covering was worn. The brief answer to your query is that there is no special merit in wearing a sheitl in itself, but the sheitl does enable an Orthodoxjewess to satisfy the demands of the law that her hair be covered. Oriental Jews, who were in no way influenced by the European custom of wearing wigs (if they were pious), wore a headcovering. In some communities in Eastern Europe it was the custom to shave the head of a bride so that her sheitl took the place of her natural hair. I have heard prominent Sephardi rabbis express their horror at this practice. They have argued that there is no warrant for this in the classical sources and it amounts to an affront againstjewish women that they should be obliged to remove the 'glory' given to them by God.

Can a husband and wife who have divorced re~narry each other according to Orthodox practice?

The law in Deuteronomy (24: 14) forbids the remarriage of a divorced couple if the wife has in the meantime been married to another man (who has later died or who has divorced her). Otherwise there is no objection for a divorced couple to remarry. Indeed, some authorities hold it to be meritorious for a divorced couple to make it up and remarry.

Does Jewish law specify anywhere what are the conjugal rights respectively of a wife and husband and is the denial of sexual relations after the establishlnent of a faJDily a ground for divorce?

The answer to the second question is yes, it is a ground for divorce. As to the frequency of marital relations, which is, presumably, what you mean by your first question, surely these matters have to be arranged by mutual consent and there is not much point in either partner seeking to compel the other to have relations against his or her wish. In other words, this is hardly a legal matter to be approached in terms of rights and obligations but in the spirit of mutual affection. Nevertheless, there is a legal side to the question, discussed in the Mishna, namely, what is the minimum that can be demanded if divorce is not to take place. (Interestingly enough, this question is discussed in the Mishna in terms of the husband's minimum capacity to satisfy his wife.) The Mishna (Ketubot 5:6) states that, legally speaking, a wife has a right to demand relations of her husband every night if he has a private income and so is not obliged to work. Of a workman she can demand her rights twice a week, of an ass-driver, who is away from home for some of the week, once 188 • fuk the Rabbi' a week, and for a camel-driver, away from home for longer periods, once in 30 days. There are the further Talmudic sayings that a man is obliged to have relations with his wife on the night she returns from her ritual immersion and whenever he senses that she desires him. To repeat, these, with the exception of the last two, are really for lawyers who have to decide whether or not there are grounds for divorce. But it is a poor marriage arrangement if husband and wife have to involve the law in the intimate aspects of their married life. The rabbis are insistent that a husband woo his wife before he has relations with her and never forces his attentions on her.

My brother and I are the chlldren of a Jewish 01other and a non-:Jewish father. What is our status? Are we bothJews according to Jewish law? Does the fact that 01y brother was not circmncised have any bearing on the question?

According to Jewish law, both you and your brother are Jewish, the children of aJewish mother and a non:Jewish father having the status of the mother. The converse is also true, that the children of a non:Jewish mother and a Jewish father are not Jewish and require to be formally converted to Judaism. (fhe procedure is, of course, a lengthy one and full details as to the correct course of action should be obtained from the Beth Din.) Your brother has an obligation to be circumcised now, but this does not affect his Jewish status, which (having had a Jewish mother) he has even before he is circumcised. Here is not the place to go into further details, but I have simply stated the law as it is according to all the Orthodox authorities because I notice from your long and poignant letter that you are extremely anxious about your status and that of your children. It can be said quite categorically that both you and your children are Jewish according to the halacha.

The Book of Leviticus (Chapter 18,verse 20, and Chapter 20, verse 13) contains a list of prohibited sexual relation­ ships, including the comm.and 'Man shall not lie with01an as with a wo01an'. But nowhere does it appear specifically to forbid a wo01an to lie with a wo01an as with a 01an. Does this not see01 to condone lesbianis01?

It is important to appreciate that the biblical passages you quote refer not to tendencies, but to practices. In all probability, the omission of the prohibition of female homosexual practices is because it is simply not possible for 'a woman to lie with a woman as with a man', as you put it. Marriage and Divorce • 189 The rabbinic sources do condemn lesbian practices, but, precisely because these are not mentioned explicitly in the Bible as forbidden, treat them less severely than they do in the case of male homosexual practices. The bases the prohibition of lesbian practices not on the lists of forbidden unions to which you refer, but on a different verse. This is the verse: Mer the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do; and after the doings of the land of , whither I bring you, shall ye not do; neither shall ye walk in their statutes.' (Leviticus 18:3). In its comment to this verse, the Sifra observes that it does not mean Jews are not allowed to copy the architectural styles, for instance, of Egypt and Canaan, but that it refers rather to their sexual practices. 'What did they do?' continues the Sifra in defming these practices. 'They allowed a man to marry a man and woman a woman.' Thus, according to the Sifra, lesbianism is forbidden on the basis of this verse; but a lesbian act is not treated as akin to adultery or incest or the other offences mentioned in the two lists to which you refer. The matter is discussed in one or two passages in the Talmud, on the basis of which Maimonides (Issurei Viah 21 :8) rules that lesbian practices are forbidden, but that a married woman guilty of them does not thereby become automatically forbidden to her husband, i.e., it is not treated as adultery.

Can a conversion to JudaiSDl ever be revoked?

The Talmud (Yevamot 4 7b) states explicitly that if a pagan has been converted to Judaism and later reverts to paganism by worshipping idols, he still has the status of a Jew (albeit a meshummad, a Jewish sinner). Another talmudic passage (Bechorot 30b) says that if a prospective proselyte is willing to be converted only if he does not have to keep some of the laws, or even one of them, he is not to be accepted. But once a conversion has taken place, even if the proselyte is suspected of not keeping the laws (and cannot be relied on in matters of kashrut, for example), he does not lose his Jewish status. In both passages, the illustration is given of a proselyte, whose conversion toJudaism has been validly carried out, marrying aJewish woman after he has reverted to paganism. The woman would require a get from him before she could marry someone else; since he is still a Jew, the present marriage is a valid one. This rule is recorded in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 268:2) without any dissenting VOICe. Turning to Maimonides (Yad, Issurei Viah 13:14-18), we discover a qualification. If a pagan had been accepted by an unlearned court (het din shel hedyoto~, which made no prior investigation as to whether he was sincere in his desire to embrace Judaism or whether he only pretended - out of ulterior motives-to relinquish his idolatrous practices, an investigation has to be made. 190 • 14sk the Rabbi' If he is seen to have reverted to paganism, he is not ajew at all, since he was never validly converted in the frrst place. This distinction is perfectly clear. No valid conversion can ever be revoked -and here the 'once ajew, always ajew' principle obtains- but where the conversion was in error in the frrst place, it is not a question of revoking it, since no conversion took place. Nowhere in the classical sources is it stated that if, after his conversion to Judaism, a proselyte fails to keep some of the mitzvot, his conversion would be rendered null and void. If that were the case, every convert to Judaism would remain in a state of limbo, because at some future date he may not observe all the laws.

Why m.ay an uncle m.arry a niece, but an aunt m.ay not m.arry a nephew?

The simple answer is that, in the list of forbidden marriages in Leviticus, Chapter 18, the prohibition is stated explicitly of a nephew marrying his aunt, but there is no prohibition against an uncle marrying his niece. If, as I suspect, you want to know why the Torah itself makes this distinction, it is very difficult to reply. The famous Egyptian authority, Rabbi David Ibn Abi Zimra (14 79-15 73), replying to a similar question (see his Responsa, No. 352), states that all the forbidden unions are by divine decree, so that it is not a matter to which we can apply reasoning by analogy. We simply do not know why one relationship is forbidden and another permitted. It should perhaps be mentioned that a year or two ago the rabbinic journal, 'Noam' (published in Israel), devoted a major part of one issue to warning people that, according to the best medical opinion today, there are severe risks to the children of the union if an uncle marries his niece, even though, in talmudic times, it was held not only to be permitted, but to be a mitzva. It is well known that in the famous ethical will of R.Judah the Saint (twelfth to thirteenth century), an uncle is strongly advised not to marry his niece, though some think that the Saint was limiting his advice to his own family.

If a person converts to Judaism., what is his or her halachic relationship to natural parents and relations?

~ convert to Judaism is like a new-born child' (Yevamot 22a). This talmudic statement means that a convert is, as it were, considered to have been born again from the moment of his conversion, with the consequences that all relationships with his family have been severed completely. Strictly speaking, then, if a brother and sister were converted, they should be allowed to marry one another. But here, and in other such instances, the Marriage and Divorce • 191 rabbinic principle comes into operation that if, as a result of the conversion, lower standards are allowed than those which obtained before conversion, the converts will look upon Judaism as an inferior faith to their previous one (Yevamot 22a). Similarly, a convert inherits, inJewish law, the estate of his Gentile father, otherwise he may be tempted to revoke his conversion (Kiddushin 17b). Although, strictly speaking, the fifth commandment does not apply directly to a convert, he is still obliged to show respect to his Gentile parents (Maimonides, Yad, Mamrim 5: 11 ). Some latter-day authorities even argue that a convert should say kaddish when his Gentile parents die. In short, the 'new birth' of the convert is a theological concept. It is not applied halachically where so to do would result in any kind of inhumane attitude or in a lowering of Jewish standards.

My wife and I are both Orthodox. My son married a girl whose parents are of an Orthodox family, and are com­ pletely Jewish without any question, in an An1erican Reform synagogue. What is the status of my son and his wife in Jewish law and, more important, that of any children they may have? Are these fully Jewish?

It cannot be stated too emphatically that, according to the Din, provided the wife is Jewish, the children are completely Jewish, the synagogue in which the marriage took place being totally irrelevant. Indeed, the children would be completely 'kosher' andJewish even if the parents had not been married at all. A child born out of wedlock is not a mamzer; only the issue of an adulterous or incestuous union has this unfortunate status inJewish law. In talmudic times, marriages were not held in synagogues or in communal halls. Provided witnesses were present and the correct formula was recited, the marriage was perfectly valid. In the Middle Ages, for the sake of greater control over marriages by the community, the ceremony was conducted in a more official way, i.e., with proper supervision by the communal leaders and in a public place like the courtyard of the synagogue (not, incidentally, in the synagogue itself: in many communities, to this day, there are Orthodox rabbis who frown on weddings in the synagogue itself on the grounds that this is an aping of church weddings. Not that I agree with their attitude, but I refer to it in order to point out that the synagogue wedding is irrelevant to the status of the children). You need have no worry on this score. Provided your son and daughter-in­ law can prove that they are both Jewish and have not been previously married - and from your letter I see that they can - their children will be accepted as Jewish in the most Orthodox synagogue. 192 • ?tsk the Rabbi'

Apropos the recent article on rape (~udaism', 12 Febru­ ary), what punishment is given to the rapist? And what is the legal status of a child conceived through an act of rape?

First, here is a brief account of the main sources of the law: Deuteronomy 22:28-29; Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 42a--43b (the rabbinic interpretations and extensions of the biblical rules); Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha-Ezer 177 (the fmal codification of the law); and Encyclopaedia Talmudit, Vol. I, pp. 168-72 (a summary of the discussions by the legal authorities). From these sources, the following emerges. The fine of 50 shekels and the obligation for the rapist to marry the woman he has raped applies only when the girl is under the age of twelve years and six months and is a virgin. But in every case of rape the victim is entitled to fmancial compensation like any other victim of a physical assault. The court fixes the amount by taking into consideration the physical and psychological damage sustained, as well as any medical fees that might be required. The legal term for rape is o'nes, the same term used for any act performed under compulsion for which there is no culpability whatever inJewish criminal law. But the plea of o'nes is not accepted on behalf of one guilty of a physical assault or damage to property (see Sanhedrin 72a and Tosefists to Yebamot 53b, top), from which it follows a.fortiori that there is no plea of 'contributory negligence' in cases of rape. Very interesting is the ruling of the fourth-century Babylonian teacher, Rava, that once the act of rape had begun, it is still considered to be rape even if the victim consents to its completion, since her passions have gained control so that it is still a case of o'nes (Ketubot 51 b). In traditional Jewish law, the punishment of imprisonment is hardly known at all. But in these matters the courts are empowered to introduce new penal legislation. Thus, from the article by Judge Haim Cohn entitled 'Sexual Offences' (EncyclopaediaJudaica, Vol. 14, pp. 1207-8), we learn that in the State of Israel rape is punishable with up to 16 years' imprisonment and when committed in the presence of several accessories to the crime, the punishment is up to 20 years' imprisonment. As for the status of a child conceived as a result of the rape of an unmarried woman, there is no question at all that the child is completely kasher (i.e., is not a mamzer). Contrary to what some people imagine; a child born out of wedlock suffers no disabilities whatever inJewish law unless there are severe legal impediments to the union of the parents, such as where the union is incestuous. Marriage and Divorce • 193 1. A practising Jew told JDe that there is nothing in the Torah or Jewish teachings to forbid pre-JDarital sex. Is that a fact? 2. The Seventh CoJDJDandJDent forbids adultery. Does a sexual relationship in which one of the partners is JDarried, though not according toJewish rites and law, count as adultery? If not, how is this kind of conduct to be regarded in the light of Jewish teaching?

1. Maimonides (Yad, !shut 1: 1 and 4) rules that the verse, 'There shall be no harlot of the daughters of Israel' (Deuteronomy 23: 18), applies to pre-marital sex even if the couple have sexual relations only with one another. Abraham lbn David (ad loc.) understands the verse as referring only to a promiscuous woman, though he agrees that there is some prohibition, albeit of a lesser degree, in all pre-marital sex. Nachmanides goes so far as to permit what we today call a common-law marriage and refers to the 'concubine' permitted in the Torah. (Maimonides holds that a 'concubine' is only permitted to a king, not to a commoner.) The Shulchan Aruch (Even Ha-Ezer 26:1 in Isserles) records both opinions. Thus the only vestige of truth in the remarks of your informant is that, according to a minority opinion (see the discussion in Otzar ha-Posekim, Vol. 10, pp. 1-8), which is rejected by the later authorities, it is permitted for a man and woman to live together as man and wife even though they are not formally married. In practice this view has not been adopted in Jewish communities and is not, in any event, really an example of pre-marital sex since, though not formally married, the couple do live together as man and wife, forsaking all others. 'Sleeping around' is certainly frowned upon very severely by the Jewish teachers.

2. Adultery applies only where the marriage is a valid one inJewish law. How is this kind of conduct to be regarded, you ask, where the marriage is not valid but where, as in the first case, the couple live together as man and wife? Here, over and above the general prohibition of extra-marital or pre­ marital sex, there is the ethical offence of disloyalty to the other partner. But it is not adultery, the practical difference being that if the woman had a child from her lover, the child is not a mamzer.

For young JDarried couples who are financially unable to start a faJDily, which JDethods of contraception are per­ JDitted, and specifically what is the attitude towards the Pm?

Let me quote Chief RabbiJakobovits (:Jewish Medical Ethics', 2nd edition, page 270) summarising contemporary rabbinic attitudes towards the Pill 194 • ~k the Rabbi' (though he obsexves that there is a strong reluctance to permit it on other than grounds of health): 'Within these general guidelines, the actual verdicts show some variations, ranging from almost unqualified permissiveness to stern warnings against the immoral blandishments of birth-control propagandists. 'The very first responsa on the subject, in the early 1960s, were, moreover, greatly concerned by the drug's tendency to cause irregular bleeding (which would render it unusable because of the niddah laws) and possibly other dangers to health. In later responsa it was recognised that these hazards had receded with the constant improvement of "the Pill" and its use was therefore more freely permitted.' The Chief Rabbi (page 272) lists IUD (an intra-uterine device) as the most favoured by the authorities together with the Pill, provided it does not have abortifacient effect.

In view of the prohibition regarding transvestism, what is the attitude towards Jews who attend pantomimes at this time of year? My son's Orthodox day school had such an outing and I was regarded as odd for protesting that this was unfit entertainment.

It is not quite correct that there is a prohibition regarding transvestism. What is prohibited (Deuteronomy 22:5) is the wearing by a man of a woman's garments and the wearing by a woman of a man's garments, i.e., transvestite activity as it is generally regarded. But this does not deal with your question. Of more direct relevance is the ruling by Isserles in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 696:8), that on Purim it is permitted for men to wear women's garments and for women to wear men's garments 'since the intention is purely for the purpose of jollity'. Evidently, on this view, the prohibition applies only where the change of clothing is for immoral purposes or perhaps it is permitted because on Purim, since the sexes did change clothes, the particular garments were, on that day, not peculiar to either sex. Now, everyone knows that the pantomime dame is a man and the principal boy a woman and there is not the slightest attempt to disguise this, so it would seem that the prohibition does not apply. But even if we do not follow Isserles in this, and some authorities disagree with him, the prohibition does not apply to non:Jews (remember, as we have said, it is the act of wearing the garments of the opposite sex that is forbidden and this applies only to Jews). Consequently, the performers are committing no sin, according to the halacha, and since this is so, there is no offence in watching the performance. Marriage and Divorce • 195 Is ceHbacy a.Dlong fertile individuals considered a sin in the Jewish reHgion, since it does not comply with the exhortadon to be fruitful and muldply?

First it should be noted that in rabbinic law, while it is considered meritorious for a woman to marry and have children, the full obligation to be fruitful and multiply devolves upon a man only, so that while celibacy is held to be wrong (a 'sin' is perhaps too strong an expression, since what is involved is a failure to perform a mitzva, not a positive offence) for a man, it is not considered to be wrong for a woman. The reason for the distinction is not stated explicitly in the sources; perhaps it was held to be unfair to place an obligation on a woman to fmd a husband, or perhaps no obligation was held to be necessary because of a woman's natural maternal instincts. Are there any exceptions even in the case of a man? The Talmud (Yevamot 63b) tells of the second-century teacher, Ben Azai, who once preached an eloquent sermon on the duty of procreation, although he himself was unmarried. When his colleagues reproached him for failing to practise what he preached, he retorted: 'What can I do? My soul is in love with the Torah. The world will be populated by others.' This would seem to suggest that important though it is for a man to marry and have children, the study of the Torah is even more important, and the former must yield to the latter. Maimonides, in his great Code (Ishut 15:3), formulates it as follows: 'Whoever's soul is in love with the Torah, devoted to it like Ben Azai and attached to it all his days, and he does not (therefore) marry, he commits no offence, provided that his (sexual) inclinations do not get the better of him. But if he has strong sexual leanings, he is obliged to marry.' The Shulchan Aruch (Even Ha-Ezer 1:4) repeats Maimonides' formulation. Thus, for any life-long student of the Torah, there is a dispensation from the duty to procreate. In some of the Lithuanian yeshivot, it was far from unknown for students of comparatively advanced years to remain in the yeshiva without marrying in order to study the Torah. However, the majority of commentators to the Talmud, Mairnonides and the Shulchan Aruch (see the Ritba to the passage in Yevamot and the digest, Otzar Ha-Posekim, in the passage in the Shulchan Aruch) refuse to accept that 'nowadays' anyone can be as devoted to the Torah as Ben Azai and as free from sexual thoughts as Mairnonides advises. They rule, therefore, that even a life-long student of the Torah must not remain celibate. All this means that there might well have developed injudaism something like a monastic vocation, but in fact this did not happen. It was rare in allJewish communities to appoint as a rabbi an unmarried man. 196 • 7J.sk the Rabbi' The drive for lovers to be united is a powerful one. Does JudaisJD recognise this or does it justify keeping perJDan­ endy apart people who feel that, despite everything, they belong together and de~nand renunciation of a love which ~nay never die? Why does it refuse to allow conversion of a non-:Jewish partner (so~netiJDes without any religion) brought towardjudaisJD through love?

Who told you thatJudaism refuses to allow conversion of a non:Jewish partner brought towardJudaism through love? It is true that the Talmud suspects the motives of a conversion solely for the purpose of marriage, but already in the Middle Ages it was argued that such matters must be left to the discretion of the court. If the Beth Din comes to realise that, although the original motive for conversion was marriage yet the man or woman sincerely wishes to embrace the Jewish faith, that prospective convert may be accepted. Nowadays, it is virtually the universal practice of batei din to accept converts who, unless they wished to marry aJew orJewess, would not have contemplated conversion, but because of their love do wish to beJewish. And it is well known that such converts frequently become better Jews than the person for whose sake they converted in the first instance. The ultimate test demanded by the Beth Din is a sincere desire to embrace Judaism and a willingness to live by its teachings. So you have been mis­ informed, or perhaps have gained a wrong impression from the over-strict and rejectionist attitude of some batei din - though, in fairness to their members, they have been known more than once eventually to accept converts whose initial motivation was marriage.

Is an adulteress allowed to 1narry in an Orthodox syna­ gogue after having received a Get?

She will not be allowed to marry the man with whom she had relations (nor will she be allowed to re-marry her husband) but, once she has obtained the Get, she will be allowed to marry in an Orthodox synagogue.

Is there a rabbinic prohibition against the staging of 'stag nights', with nude fe~nale perfor~ners, such as recendy reported in the colUJDDs of theJewish Chronicle? Does the fact that these are for charity JDake any difference?

The rabbis frown on any sexual arousal outside marriage and have much to say on the sinfulness of 'gazing lustfully' (histaklut) at a woman to whom one Marriage and Divorce • 197 is not married. Obviously they do not approve of a woman displaying her nude body for the titillation of men. Indeed, it would be rather more correct to say, that according to the rabbis, the prohibition is not 'rabbinic' but biblical, based on the verse in the Shema: 'and that ye go not about after your own heart and your own eyes, after which ye use to go astray' (Numbers 15:39). It is sometimes argued that if men do these things it is, at least, less harmful if charity benefits. This is undoubtedly so but if you ask whether the rabbis would approve of organising such displays in order to benefit good causes the answer is unequivocally in the negative. There are many rabbinic teachings about the wrongfulness of a mitzva that is attained through an avera (a wrong-doing). For instance it is forbidden to use a stolen lulav on Succot or to recite grace over food that has been stolen. 9 Death and Burial

I have a friend, born as a Roman Catholic, who converted to Judaism according to the halacha. She leads an active Jewish life, regularly attends synagogue services and keeps a kosher household. She recently lost her mother, a Roman Catholic, and according to her own faith would like to have sat shiva and to have said kaddish. Would that have been possible and permissible?

There is no reason at all why she should not have sat shiva. Mter all, her non­ Jewish mother was still her mother and as a faithful Jewess she is obliged by her new faith to keep the fifth commandment. The question of saying kaddish for her mother is only a little more complicated since, in this country at least, it is unusual for women to say kaddish for parents in any event. But if your friend lives in a community where women do say kaddish, she may certainly do so. Your question was, in fact, discussed with regard to a male convert (may he say kaddish for his non:Jewish father?) by the renowned RabbiAaron Walkin (1865-194 7) of Pinsk (Responsa, 'Zekan Aharon', Vol. 2, No. 87). Rabbi Walkin states that in his opinion there is no doubt at all that the convert may say kaddish for his father, but he adds that a good argument can be made out for the view that the convert must say kaddish. He has a few reservations, because kaddish is not a prayer for the dead, but a specifically Jewish form of praise which may be unsuitable on behalf of one who was not aJew. Rabbi Walkin sees no harm, however, in the convert occasionally saying kaddish.

Can a person not born of a Jewish mother but converted by Reform, be buried in a cemetery other than Reform or Liberal? Am I correct that to do so would desecrate holy ground?

Since Orthodox rabbis do not recognise the validity of Reform conversions, to bury a person converted by Reform or Liberal rabbis would be, technically speaking, to bury a non:Jew in a Jewish cemetery, which is contrary to the din; though I have no doubt that some Orthodox rabbis would be sufficiently sympathetic in such a tragic case not to insist on the technicalities and allow the burial. Your remark about desecrating holy ground is nonsense for two reasons. Death a:nd Burial • 199 First, the ground of the cemetery, far from being 'holy', is in fact, according to Jewish law, 'unclean'. That is why a priest must not come into contact with the graves. Secondly, the reason why non-:Jews are not buried in a Jewish cemetery has nothing to do with desecration. It is simply that only those who shared the Jewish faith while alive should rest together in death. Terms such as the 'desecration of holy ground' or, for that matter, the 'consecration' of a tombstone, have been taken over, no doubt unwittingly, from Christianity and have no support in the Jewish tradition.

In a case where an adopted child has died, is it the adoptive parents or the natural parents - or both -who observe the rites of mourning? In particular, I am interested in a case where the fact of the adoption had been kept secret and the adoptive parents were generally believed to be the natural parents. The natural mother, however, was the adoptive mother's sister. The second question is this: There is a natural sister who becomes aware of the relationship several years after her brother's death. When she learns that it is not her cousin but her brother who had died, must she sit shiva for him? And assuming that kaddish has been recited by other mourners for the usual period after the death, where and by whom may it be recited now?

Rabbinic law knows nothing of legal adoption and yet, for all that, the rabbis wax eloquent on the great virtues of people who adopt children and bring them up as their own. Consequently, the relationship of an adopted child to his adoptive parents is ethical and moral, but not legal, whereas to his natural parents it is legal but with very weak ethical overtones. With regard to your first question, therefore, the natural parents have a legal obligation to sit shiva, while the adoptive parents have no legal obligation to do so - though, of course, they may do so if they wish. As regards your second question, there is no shiva in any event when a brother or sister learns of the death of his or her sibling thirty days after the death has occurred (except for a token 'sitting' of one hour). Kaddish must not be recited after eleven months, so that your point about kaddish does not arise either, although kaddish should be recited on the yahrzeit by the natural relative. Again, there is no objection-and it is indeed extremely meritorious - for an adopted son to say kaddish for the parents who adopted him. 200 • 54sk the Rabbi' A familiar but obviously troubling question has come up again, a reader asking: Does Jewish law require parents to observe shiva if their child marries out of the faith, and does a child sit shiva for a parent who remarries out of the faith either at the time of that marriage or upon the parents' death? It is as well to state once again that it is utterly repugnant for mourning rites to be observed over one who is still alive and that far from this being enjoined by Jewish law it is contrary to the whole spirit of the Torah whose 'ways are ways of pleasantness'. How did the misconception arise? The famous author of the Shulchan Aruch, RabbiJoseph Karo, in his great work Bet Yosef (Yoreh Deah 345 end) quotes a report that Rabbenu Gershom of Mainz (960-1 028) sat shiva for his son who had been converted to Christianity. The meaning appears to be that Rabbenu Gershom sat shiva for his son, in spite of the conversion, when the son died. But this was later misunderstood to mean that Rabbenu Gershom sat shiva at the time of the conversion, even though the son was still alive, the conversion itself being considered as if the son had died. In their justifiably strong objection to 'marrying out' some parents seem to have extended the notion of sitting shiva for a child who has been converted to include a child who has married outside of the Jewish faith. It is notorious that among some fanatics, during the heat of the Chasidic­ Mitnaggedic controversy, parents of one of the parties to the dispute would even sit shiva if one of their children married into a family belonging to the opposite camp! The well-known Hungarian authority Rabbi Simhah Bunem Sofer ( 1842-1906), a rabbi hardly noted for his lenience, states (Responsa Shevet Sofer, No. 108) with regard to the case of a convert to another faith: 'His parents should weep at the time of his apostasy but there should be no keria, no shiva and no sitting on the ground.' There is nothing in Judaism which demands that parents should ever consider one of their children to be dead even if he is alive and well. As for your final question, a parent who has married out is still a parent and the rites of mourning should be carried out when he dies. No purpose at all is served by mistakenly invoking Jewish law to support inhuman attitudes.

Should an Orthodox person say kaddish for a parent who has been cremated? Also, should a yahrzeit candle be lit and an offering made in remembrance? The reason why some are of the opinion that the mourning rites should not be observed by a son for his parent who has been cremated is that the sources rule that there are to be no mourning rites over sinners who 'separate themselves from the Jewish community'. Death and Burial • 20 1 The idea here is that the death of such sinners cannot be a cause for mourning. But two things have to be said in this connection. The first is that the rule applies only to abject sinners whose deeds demonstrate that they have no regard for Jewry and the Jewish religion. This hardly applies, nowadays, to people who order their bodies to be cremated. Secondly, practically all the commentators state that the rule, even with regard to such out-and-out sinners, applies only to the rites of mourning, not to kaddish and other prayers for the dead. The argument here is that the son is duty bound to honour his father by praying for his atonement. Indeed, it has been argued that, so far as the kaddish is concerned, the greater the sinner, the more his soul requires the son's atoning kaddish. In view of all this I am convinced that the proper procedure, in the case you mention, is for the son to recite the kaddish, kindle the yahrzeit light and make offerings for the repose of his parent's soul. Judaism is a humane religion. The ways of the Torah are 'ways of pleasantness'. It surely does not demand that a child stifle his natural instinct to pray for the soul of his dead parent.

An advertisen1ent by Jewish undertakers in New York offers burial in an1ausoleum above ground. Is such burial perD1issible according to the halacha (I had always understood bodies n1ust be buried in the earth)?

·The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 362:1) rules that it is forbidden to place the body in a coffm and leave it without burial in the ground (bekarka). The question, then, is what is meant by 'in the ground?' Does it mean in soil? Now we know from the Talmud and from the archaeological evidence that in Talmudic times it was the usual practice to bury the dead in caves and catacombs with niches in the walls for the bodies. Thus it is clear that there is no need for the body to be actually covered with soil. But all the evidence goes to show that the talmudic mausoleum was hewn out of the rock or otherwise ordered under the surface of the ground and it can be argued that at least the body has to be placed in the ground not on top of it. If this were not so why does the Shulchan Aruch forbid the body to be left in the coffin on the ground? Maimonides (Yad, Evel4:4), speaking of the older method of burial, says: 'They dig caves in the earth.' Thus, in reply to your question, it is not permissible according to the halacha to bury the dead in a mausoleum above ground. Griinwald in his famous compendium on these laws (Kol , p. 411, note 1) states that it is strictly forbidden to bury the dead in a mausoleum above ground. The mausoleums over the graves of famous rabbis, e.g., at Edmonton over the graves of the Sassover Rebbe and Rabbi Eliezer Gordon of Telz are, of course, structures built over actual graves in the ground. It appears from Solomon B. Freehof's Reform Jewish Practice (Vol. I, 202 • ~k the Rabbi' pp. 123ff.) that ReformJews do bury their dead occasionally in this manner in the USA and Freehof, while admitting that the Orthodox authorities forbid it, holds that it is permitted because it does conform with the talmudic practice. But I assume that your question is from the Orthodox point of view and here the answer is as I have stated it.

Here is an interesting question: Does JudaisiD believe that the dead can be asked-through prayer-to intercede on behalf of the living?

There are two possible objections. The first is that there is a prohibition against 'inquiring of the dead' (Deuteronomy 18: 11) but, in the context, this refers to necromancy. The other possible objection is thatJudaism does not believe in approaching God through an intermediary. One of the reasons given in the Talmud (Taanit 16a) for visiting the cemetery on a public fast-day when there are prayers for rain is: 'It is in order that the departed ones should pray for mercy on our behalf.' It could be argued that in this passage the dead are not actually entreated to pray on our behalf but another passage in the Talmud ( 34b) does seem to clinch the argument. Here it is said that Caleb (Numbers Chapter 13) prostrated himself upon the graves of the patriarchs, saying to them: 'My fathers, pray on my behalf that I may be delivered from the plan of the spies.' The legality of asking the dead to pray for the living is discussed at length by the famous Hungarian authority, Rabbi Moses Schick (1807-1879), the Maaharam Schick (Responsa, Orach Chaim, No. 293). Maaharam Schick states categorically that the prohibition of inquiring of the dead does not apply but he is none too happy about the other prohibition. Some authorities, he remarks, do, nevertheless, permit it because when we inform the dead of our needs they are moved to pray on our behalf. Even if we ourselves are unworthy of having our prayers answered, God may grant them in order not to cause distress to the righteous dead who pray for us. The many references to the prohibition of praying to the angels to intercede for us is not because there is any objection to prayer through an intermediary but because prayers through angels are being given a semi-divine status. So, to reply directly to your question, there is a strong body of opinion in Judaism that the dead can be asked - through prayer - to intercede on behalf of the living but it is not a unanimous opinion.

Is a pregnantwoiDan periDitted to attend a stone-setting?

Contrary to an opinion which seems to be widely held, there is no law to prevent a pregnant woman going to the cemetery. That this is so can be seen Death and Burial • 203 from the discussion whether the wife of a Cohen who is pregnant may go a cemetery since she may be carrying a male child, and male Cohanim must not come into contact with graves. I do know that some people do not advise this (or her attending a funeral) and can see some point in it not because of any actual law against it, but because it may cause her distress, and that might be harmful to her and to the child she carries. So, in reply to your question: it is permitted and if she wishes to attend, she may, but it is advisable for her to consult her doctor and follow his advice.

Our sages said: 'He who mourns for the dead in excess wiD have cause to mourn for another death.' Would a compassionate God let death befall another (innocent) person just to punish the one who mourns excessively?

The saying to which you refer is in the Talmud (Moed Katan 27b), and 'in excess' means beyond the specified mourning period. Two things must be appreciated. The first is that the statement is not theological, but is in the nature of rabbinic hyperbole. Of course, it does not mean that God will cause an innocent person to die in order to punish the one who mourns in excess. That would, indeed, be intolerable and totally incompatible with Jewish teachings about God's love for His creatures. It is rather a way of expressing, in admittedly exaggerated form, that while to mourn is right and proper, it is morbid to dwell on death. One who does so appears to be wallowing in grief, and even perversely looking forward to having the experience again. Secondly, the harshness of the saying is best understood as motivated by compassion. The passage continues, in fact, that God says to the one who mourns in excess: 'You are not more compassionate than I am.' The meaning of all this is that the rabbis were profound students of human nature. They realised the strong therapeutic value of mourning, of giving expression to feelings of grief at the death of a loved one, of not bottling it up. At the same time, they wished to discourage the attitude, which is basically atheistic, that God does not care for His creatures or that there is no God to care. The true message of comfortjudaism gives to mourners is that death, too, has its purpose in God's creation and the deceased has gone to his eternal home. The body has died, the soul is immortal. Some commentators, in fact, understand the saying to mean that the one who mourns in excess is really mourning for 'another death', that is, he mourns for the death of the soul, refusing to believe that the deceased still lives on. While it seems to me far-fetched to read this into the saying, it is an idea implicit in the whole passage. 204 • fuk the Rabbi' It is worth noting that Maimonides, in his Code (Evel 13: 11-12), says nothing about the one who mourns in excess having to mourn for another, but states simply that to mourn in excess is to fail to recognise that death eventually comes to all. It is futile to behave as if the world were differently constituted than it is. That is to say, the religious person accepts, in submission to God's will, life as it really is. On the other hand, Maimonides continues, one who does not mourn for a near relative as the sages ordain is cruel. Why cruel? Because, by failing to mourn, he demonstrates that he has no love in his heart even for his closest relatives. The famous Egyptian rabbi, David lbn Abi Zimra (sixteenth century), was severely critical of a rabbi who shed no tears at his son's funeral. Stoicism in the face of death is not the Jewish way. As in so many other matters,Judaism seeks to encourage a sane and balanced attitude. Life is often grim and tragic and there are occasions when it is right to mourn. But we still believe in God who is compassionate and so total surrender to grief is clearly impossible.

May a Cohen be a member of a cardiac arrest team with the subsequent danger of defilement by contact with a possible cadaver?

The principle of pikuach nifesh- that the laws of the Torah are set aside in order to save human life - surely applies here. The permission to set aside the law in order to save life is not only given where it is certain that life will be saved. It is also permitted to profane the Sabbath in order to save a person's life even when it is doubtful whether, in fact, the sick person is likely to recover. From the Middle Ages, there is a comment of some relevance to your question. In tractate Baba Metzia (114a), the prophet Elijah is said to have been a Cohen. In that case, ask the famous French commentators (Tosaftsts to the passage), how could Elijah have placed himself on the corpse of the widow's child in order to bring him back from the dead? The Tosaftsts reply that Elijah was perfectly confident that he would revive the child and that therefore this, too, falls under the heading of . It is true that here the Tosaftsts say that there was a complete conviction on the part of Elijah that he would succeed in reviving the child, whereas, as we have noted, the law of pikuach nefesh applies even where it is doubtful whether a life will be saved. But, then, the Tosaftsts are dealing with the supernatural. The child was dead. It would obviously be absurd for a Cohen to come into contact with a corpse because he believed that he could bring the corpse back to life. Only one like Elijah, for whom the supernatural means used were so Death and Burial • 205 'natural' that he was sure they would work, can be allowed to apply the pikuach nifesh principle to a case of reviving the dead. The attempts to revive a person suffering cardiac arrest are natural attempts practised by physicians, and the principle of pikuach nifesh undoubtedly applies. Nor is it correct to argue that since people who are not Cohanim can be members of the team, why should a Cohen take the risk? The pikuach nifesh principle rejects such an argument. Where the Sabbath has to be profaned in order to save a life, it is explicitly stated that the work must be carried out by adult Jews who must not delegate it to non:Jews or to minors who have no obligation to keep the Sabbath. It might, however, be argued that a Cohen ought not to acquire the skills to treat cardiac patients, and then the duty of pikuach nifesh would not be binding upon him. If this argument were to be accepted, its logical conclusion would be that a Cohen should not practise medicine at all. Every doctor is bound sooner or later to come into contact with a corpse. For this reason, some pious Cohanim will, indeed, refuse to study medicine. But the majority of the rabbis who have considered this kind of question say that there is no prohibition against bringing oneself voluntarily into a situation in which a law of the Torah will have to be set aside in order to save life.

Please explain the Jewish attitude to organ transplant.

For the halachic views, I would recommend the essays on the subject in :Jewish Bioethics', edited by Fred Rosner and]. David Bleich (Hebrew Publishing Co., New York, 1979). The subject is so vast that I can give only a brief summary here and it should be appreciated that there is much more to be said. NoJewish teacher, so far as I am aware, is bothered by the objection voiced recently by a canon of the church that he does not wish his 'spare parts' to become part of another's body because that person may use them to sin. As his colleague pointed out, if he could have a share in the recipient's sins, he would also have a share in his good deeds. The Jewish objections are: 1) The donor may not be actually dead when the organ is taken from his body, and to kill a man who is dying constitutes murder in Jewish law. 2) It is forbidden by Jewish law to mutilate a corpse. 3) It is forbidden to have any benefit from a corpse. All three objections have been met by the rabbinic authorities, although there are, naturally, a variety of views with regard to the details. As for the first objection, it must indeed be known that death has occurred, and here the discussion centres on what is the legal definition of death. The other two objections are answered by the contention that heart transplants and the like save the life of the recipient and the law may (indeed, must) be set aside where life is at stake. Just as a person may eat on Yom Kippur if his life depends on it, and just as he may eat trefa food for the same reason, it is permitted to set aside the 206 • Xsk the Rabbi' prohibitions of mutilating a corpse and having benefit from the dead if it is in order to save life. Corneal grafting is not for the purpose of saving life; nevertheless, the removal of the cornea does not constitute mutilation of the corpse and, as Rabbi Unterman has brilliantly argued, the cornea, when grafted on to the eye of a living person, loses its status as part of a corpse from which it is forbidden to have benefit. It is now living tissue. For someone to be a kidney donor in order to save the life of a sufferer who will die if he does not receive a kidney is rather more complicated. Here the question is whetherJewish law allows a man to risk his own life in order to save the life of another. There is a passage in the Jerusalem Talmud which requires a man to risk his life if the result will be the saving of another from certain death. Naturally, a good deal depends on the degree of risk and the certainty of the cure. One understands that in cases of kidney transplant the cure is usually effective and the risks to the donor are not very great.

Does a memorial stone have to be consecrated or is it sufficient for it to be laid without prayers?

First, it should be noted that although the expression 'tombstone consecration' is now widely used, there is no basis in Jewish tradition for this usage. There is nothing sacred about a grave (in the Bible a corpse is a source of ritual contamination) and there is no meaning to consecrating (which means 'making it holy') something appertaining to a corpse, such as a tombstone. The stone is set up as a reminder of the deceased and this is, indeed, a very ancient custom. But it is chiefly a private matter which the bereaved family should arrange. The present order of service is a recent innovation and, while it can do no harm and is a way of paying further respect to the deceased, the stone can certainly be set without the necessity of having prayers at the time.

What is the ruling regarding counting the months of mourning during a leap year, i.e., do Adar andAdar Sheni count as one month or two? And when is the yahrzeit if a death occurs during either of the months of Adar in a leap year?

If a death occurs in an ordinary year and this is followed by a leap year, kaddish is recited for only eleven months, i.e., until the date of the day of the death in Shevat. But the period of mourning for a parent continues until twelve months have elapsed, i.e., until the date of the day of the death on the first Adar. If the death occurred in the first Adar, kaddish is recited for eleven months Death and Burial • 207 and the mourning period comes to an end twelve months after the death - in Shevat. With regard to the yahrzeit, if the death occurred in a leap year, the yahrzeit is observed in subsequent leap years on the month of the death, whether Adar Rishon or Adar Sheni. Where the death occurred in an ordinary year, there is much debate about which Adar should be the date of the yahrzeit in a leap year. Isserles (Orach Chaim 568:7) quotes authorities to the effect that both months, Adar Rishon and Adar Sheni, should be observed as the Yahrzeit. If, say a relative died on Adar 10 in an ordinary year, the yahrzeit, in a leap year, should be observed on both Adar Rishon 10 and Adar Sheni 10. This is the general custom nowadays.

I recendy visited a cemetery and noticed facilities for washing the hands when leaving the grounds. What is the reason for this, since I have never seen it in my native Alnerica? Is it a law or a tradition?

Insofar as a statement in the Shulchan Aruch is a 'law', this is a law, since it is recorded there (Yoreh Deah 3 76:4). Among the reasons given is that of Samson Raphael Hirsch, that the living express symbolically that life must go on. They wash their hands of death in the sense that they resolve not to dwell morbidly on it, but to live better lives in the future. An earlier reason advanced is that the dead contaminate, and in Temple times purification from this source of contamination was by means of water. Still another early idea is that the hands are washed to declare symbolically that proper respect has been paid to the dead at the funeral, so that the hands of the living are clean from guilt.

Shrouds are white, so why are coffins at United Syna­ gogue ce~neteries covered in black? And why have a cover at all- why not leave the wooden coffin as it is?

There is, in fact, no law that a coffin should be covered; in some communities it is, indeed, left as it is. In Israel, even the coffin is dispensed with, the body being buried only in the shroud. In defence of Anglo:Jewish tradition, a distinction has to be made between the different functions of the shroud and the coffin cover. At the earliest period, the Talmud tells us, the shrouds were made of whatever cloth people favoured - and they were usually dyed. But since such dyed cloth was very expensive, the practice was introduced of using only white (that is, undyed) cloth so that poor families would not suffer great hardship through their wish to conform to custom. 208 • Jtsk the Rabbi' Later on, white shrouds were justified on the grounds that they were a sign of purity and atonement for the dead as he departed for the next world. Thus, the shrouds are for the dead, so to speak, while the coffin cover is for the living, as a token of grie£ Black, as a colour of mourning, is mentioned in both the Bible and the Talmud. Many Orthodox rabbis, however, frown on the use of black arm­ bands, but that is because it is wrong to copy the religious practices of another religion (chukkot hagoy), whereas, it seems to be argued, the black cover is simply an example of a universal custom. The question of when certain practices offend against the principle of chukkot hagoy, and when they do not, is complicated and ultimately depends on the nature of the practice and on good taste. Some frown on having flowers on the coffin and the grave, but those who see nothing wrong in this point out that the Talmud speaks of myrtles being placed on graves, so that it is not a specifically Christian practice. In short, all such matters can safely be left to the particular practices of each local community.

The biblical figure Ahitophel coJJUD.itted suicide, yet was buried in his father's ton1b. Does this suggest that suicide was not considered a serious sin until the later rabbis n1ade it so?

Nowhere in the Bible is it implied that Ahitophel's suicide was condoned. In the rabbinic tradition, Ahitophel is the prototype of the wise and outstanding scholar who is considered to have gone 'off the rails'. The sages appreciated that while the study of the Torah was an antidote to the evil inclination, the propensity for wrongdoing, it failed to work for some students, perhaps because their studies were insincere. Looking around for a biblical figure they could use as a paradigm, they seized on Ahitophel. Neither in the Bible nor in the rabbinic literature is his death regarded as a warrant for concluding that suicide is not a serious sin. In fact, the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10:2) lists Ahitophel among those who have no share in the world to come. The rabbis derive the prohibition of suicide from the verse: ~d surely your blood of your lives will I require' (Genesis 9:5). This is interpreted as: 'I will require your blood if you shed it yourselves' (Baba Kama 9lb). The 'Encyclopaedia Judaica' is therefore wrong in stating that suicide is nowhere explicitly prohibited in the Talmud. On the other hand, it rightly observes that since murder is so sternly forbidden in the Bible, there was no need specifically to prohibit suicide. In both instances, the offence is clear - the taking of human life. Only the God who gives life can take it away. Jewish attitudes to the suicide himself, as opposed to the offence, have Death and Burial • 209 differed through the ages. The general tendency is to give the suicide the benefit of the doubt - that he acted under duress or while of unsound mind. Nevertheless, in times when there was a proliferation of suicides in difficult circumstances, and in order to stem the tide, the rabbinic authorities tended to treat suicides with special severity by denying the relatives the right to sit shiva.

It is generally assumed that conununication with the dead (spiritualisJD) is forbidden according to Orthodox JudaisJD. What authority is there for this? Is the narrative of Saul calling up the spirit of Sa~nuel conclusive proof of life after death?

On the face of it, any attempt to communicate with the dead is proscribed by the biblical injunctions not to practise necromancy. It is, however, not quite as simple as that. Without going too much into the technical details, the prohibition of necromancy is defmed by the talmudic rabbis in such a way that it has to do with magical and idolatrous practices, so that some medieval authorities permit attempts to contact the spirits of the dead, allowing, for instance, two friends to make a pact that whoever dies first will return to inform the other of life beyond the veil. This is rarely tolerated by Orthodox rabbis nowadays. When the late Rabbi A. I. Kookwas asked whether it was permitted, or even advocated, to strengthen belief in the immortality of the soul by attending seances and the like, he replied that the believing Jew should not try to strengthen his faith by such questionable methods. There would appear to be no basic objection to an Orthodoxjew engaging in what is now called psychical research, i.e., to investigate paranormal phenomena by strictly scientific means and solely as a subject of inquiry. But that is a far cry from spiritualism, which is a rival religion to Judaism, with hymns and prayers of its own and with reference to Christian dogmas. I would imagine that spiritualism would be frowned upon not only by Orthodoxy, but by most Reform and Liberal Jews as well. As for the Witch of Endor bringing up Samuel from the dead, I do not understand what you mean by 'conclusive proof' from this of life after death. Even if the narrative is taken literally, it only means that the narrator tells us that it happened and would serve as 'conclusive proof' only for one who accepted the truth of the Book of Samuel. For the sceptic, the 'proof' would itself require to be proven. It so happens that the tenth-century Gaon Samuellbn Hophni, a renowned rabbinic leader and father-in-law of Hai Gaon, refused to understand the narrative literally. He could not believe that the Witch of Endor would have the power to bring up the prophet Samuel from the dead. His interpretation 210 • ~sk the Rabbi' of the narrative is that the witch hypnotised Saul into seeing that which he wanted to see. It is only right to point out that Hai Gaon took strong issue with his father­ in-law, since from talmudic passages it appears that the rabbis did understand the narrative to mean that the witch, without intending it, really did serve as God's instrument to bring up Samuel from the dead. I would refer you for further information on the subject to the ghost stories at the beginning of the third chapter of tractate Berachot in the Babylonian Talmud and to the commentaries on them.

Is an Orthodox rabbi allowed to go to the funeral of a Jew who conunitted suicide without being of unsound mind and to hold a hesped 'defending' the person's deed; and should the body not be buried on the side near the wall of the cemetery?

The short reply is that it has long been the practice of many Orthodox rabbis to give the person the benefit of the doubt and to assume that a suicide's mind was disturbed, as it generally is, and hence the rigour of the law you mention be not applied. In fact, some authorities hold that the law recorded in the Yoreh Deah is only to be applied where a man who threatens suicide is first given a warning by two witnesses that if he persists he will be treated as a sinner. If he then does persist, it can be assumed that he does it in cold blood. If you will consult the Pitchei Teshuvah, you will see how concerned the rabbis were to give the benefit of the doubt to the majority of suicides. There is a very full discussion in Grunvald's compendium on the laws of mourning (New York, 1955, pp. 318-21). Among other points recorded by Grunvald is the important one that the feelings of the living must be taken into account and nothing should be done to embarrass the suicide's family.

What is the official ruling regarding donating one's body or, alternatively, organs for medical research?

Let us first consider what objections there can be to donating one's body or organs for medical research. There are, on the whole, three possible objections: 1) The body has to be buried. 2) It is forbidden to mutilate a human corpse. 3) It is forbidden to have any benefit from a human corpse. There has been a good deal of discussion on whether all these objections can be applied in our problem, but the central idea is that the saving of life takes precedence over these prohibitions, just as the Sabbath may be profaned (indeed, must be profaned) in order to save life. In one of the very earliest discussions on the legitimacy of dissection, the Death and Burial • 211 famous Rabbi of Prague, Ezekiel Landau (end of eighteenth century), in a reply to a query from England (Responsa 'Noda Bi-Yehudah', 2nd Series, Yoreh Deah, No. 21 0), ruled that while there is no doubt that an autopsy may be performed in order to save life, it can only be permitted if it may afford direct help to someone suffering from the same illness as the deceased. This responsum by the great authority became classical, so that in most subsequent discussions on dissection for the sake of medical research the real question to be considered is how far the increase of medical knowledge can be construed as 'immediate' relief for sufferers. On this the rabbis have been divided. A very comprehensive summary is given by the Chief Rabbi in his jewish Medical Ethics' (New York, 1975, pp. 132-52). I regret, though, that there is still no official ruling. Mter recording the rabbis who advise it and those who forbid it, the Chief Rabbi concludes with the words: 1\nd so the debate continues unabated.' For what it is worth, my own inclination is to side with the rabbis who are permissive, since it is axiomatic that Judaism is on the side of life. As Professor I. Leibovitz has argued, since Judaism presumably approves of medical research and since medical research cannot proceed adequately without the dissection of corpses, it ought to follow that Judaism has no objection-quite the opposite -to people who donate their bodies for medical research.

At a shiva I recently attended we were unable to get a Dlinyan and the rabbi said we would be unable to recite kaddish. What would have been so terrible if all of us eight men had recited kaddish, or anything else, for that matter? This was the one prayer we were most anxious to say.

You say, 'or anything else, for that matter'. There would have been no objection to the eight men reciting most of the service, and certainly nothing to prevent them saying prayers for the departed. It is only the kaddish prayer and prayers like it, such as the kedushah, for which a minyan is required. In the Talmud this is based on the verse: 'I will be hallowed among the children of Israel' (Leviticus 22:32). 'Hallowing', that is to say, prayers in which the holiness of God is mentioned, requires a community so that it can qualify as 'the children of Israel', and for this the minimum number is ten. The kaddish means, in fact, 'prayer of sanctification' and is not a prayer for the dead. What all this means is something like the following. There are prayers so sacred that individuals are not worthy to utter them unless they are part of a congregation, when there is the merit of the whole community. Ten constitutes a very small community; fewer than ten is thought of as a gathering of individuals. 212 • Jtsk the Rabbi' Thus, behind the requirement of a minyan is reverence for the sanctity of God's name. It is for the very same reason that most of the authorities frown on saying too many kaddishim even when a minyan is present. Over-familiarity is to be avoided. I can well understand your feelings in that you imagine the kaddish to be especially for the benefit of the departed or, at least, for the purpose of assuaging the grief of the mourners. Your feelings regarding the departed and the mourners - laudable, indeed - could have been satisfied by reciting the actual prayer for the dead as printed in the prayer-books. It should also be noted that byJudaism's insistence on a minyan for certain prayers and for the reading of the Torah, the communal spirit has been fostered.

What is the origin of covering up :mirrors at a shiva?

It is difficult to know when this custom arose. There is no reference to it in the Talmud. It would appear to have originated in the late Middle Ages, in superstitions connected with death, e.g., that the sight of a coffm or a mourner in a mirror suggests a duplication of the tragic event. But, like some other superstitions, a more religious and ethical motivation was later provided, such as that mirrors are for the purpose of adornment and it is unfitting for a mourner to have his thoughts on worldly matters. For the superstitious aspect, see Joshua Trachtenberg's :Jewish Magic and Superstition' (New York, 1970, page 302, note 56). For the later rationalisation, see Grunvald's 'Kol Bo' (New York, 1956, page 262, note 11). As an historical aside, I might mention that the custom could not have been recorded in the Talmud because in those days mirrors were of highly polished brass and were generally hand mirrors.

Why do we place stones on graves? Does this traditional practice Dlean that we are 01ore acceptant of death than are other reHgions?

I am not too sure what you mean by the stones being an 'acceptance' of death. Presumably you mean that the custom of placing the stones there is to demonstrate that we accept that the dead are in the grave. I have never heard this interpretation of the practice. The best-known reason for it is to show that someone has visited the grave and that the departed has not been forgotten. There are other reasons but, if the custom is to be followed, this seems to me to be the best way of understanding it. Death and Burial • 213 Orthodox or otherwise, the final line on a tombstone invariably reads as five letters (initials) or one word, 'Shalom'. A widow recendy wished to have as the final line, 'May his soul rest in peace', in Hebrew. Why should this not be allowed?

I do not know of any law against it, but the initial letters to which you refer stand for 'May his soul be bound up in the bond of the living' - and this really is more or less the equivalent of 'May his soul rest in peace'. 'Resting in peace' of the soul has no exact Hebrew equivalent in any event, and a literal translation into Hebrew would be awkward and untrue to the Hebrew idiom. It is important to appreciate that with regard to the wording on a tombstone, the usual practice is to be guided by custom in the absence of any precise laws.

I have always understood that in Jewish law it was obHgatory to 'fence in' a grave (I am not referring to the cemetery). Is this correct and what is the authority for it? .Also, what is the law (not the mjnhag) with regard to marking the grave, i.e., tombstones?

It all depends on what you mean by 'fence in'. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 362:3) states that two people must not be buried 'together' unless the 'wall of the grave' divides them; but there the reference is to the sides of the graves, i.e., to the earth between the two graves. There is no obligation to have a 'fence' around the grave. As to your second question, although it is a very ancient (custom) to have a tombstone (matzevah), it is a minhag, so that your distinction between the 'law' and 'minhag has no application here. Oddly enough, there is only one possible reference to a tombstone in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 348:2), evidently because of this fact that it is a minhag. Customs are often very important in themselves.

Is it permitted to use a hoist to lift the body from the receptacle, in which the tahara was performed, into the coffin?

I have been unable to discover any reference to this in the standard works on the subject. I cannot see what objection there can be unless it is on the grounds that it is disrespectful to the deceased. This would naturally depend on the circumstances. 214 • :Ask the Rabbi' If there is a minyan and a rabbi present and kaddish is said, is anything ~nore necessary at a to~nbstone consecration?

There is no special traditional ceremony for the setting of a tombstone. In Eastern Europe, for example, the usual practice was simply for the immediate family to assemble at the stone not long after the funeral. Nowadays, in this country, a special order of service has been prepared, but there are no rules about this. Strictly speaking, no minyan is required either, but if the kaddish is to be recited, this does, of course, require a minyan.

What is Kaddish De-Rabbanan and is there an obligation for a 1nourner to say it?

Studies in the origin of the Kaddish have demonstrated that, originally, the Kaddish was recited immediately after the study of the rabbinic , that is, the non-legal part of rabbinic literature. This frequently dwells on the Messianic hope, so it was appropriate to recite then the Kaddish, a prayer in which hope is expressed for the dawning of the age when God's great name will be 'sanctified' (kaddish meaning 'sanctification'). Since it was recited after a study of the teachings of the rabbis, it was also appropriate to add a section praying for the welfare of rabbis and teachers (hence De-Rabbanan, i.e., on behalf of the rabbis and teachers in Israel). It was not until the Middle Ages that the Kaddish for mourners was introduced. As has often been noted, this is not a prayer for the dead, but the idea behind it is that there is merit to the deceased parent if the child utters the prayer of sanctification in public. For this purpose, the shorter form, i.e., without the prayer for the rabbis, was introduced, but there is no logic whatever in mourners omitting the Kaddish De-Rabbanan after rabbinic passages in the liturgy. In other words, Kaddish De-Rabbanan, in the places where it is ordained, is at least as much a mourner's Kaddish as the shorter form. Indeed, it is the more original form of the Kaddish. In your question, which I have abbreviated, you refer to the fact that in a United synagogue you attended, Kaddish De-Rabbanan was not said at all. I can only imagine that this was not because of any conscious desire to eliminate this form of the Kaddish, but rather because the relevant rabbinic passages (such as 'Bameh Madlikin') were not recited. Death and Burial • 215 Why is Tachanun not recited in a house of mourning? If one prays in a house of mourning, has one to recite Tachanun when returning home?

The answer to both questions is to be found in R. David Halevi's Turey Zahav to the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chairn 131, note 9. The somewhat curious reason given why no Tachanun is recited is because mourning is compared to a festival, presumably meaning that when a man suffers, God is near to him and his sins are forgiven. If one prays at a house of mourning, the recitation of Tachanun is suspended as it is on a festival. Consequently, it should not be recited at all even when one returns home from the shiva. Although I have not seen it stated anywhere explicitly, it is possible that the reason why Tachanun is not recited in a house of mourning is because the mourner has suffered enough and to recite these prayers of suffering would be to pour salt on his wounds.

May a Jew who has been tattooed be buried in an Orthodox cemetery?

The prohibition of tattooing is biblical (Leviticus 19:28); this is the traditional understanding of the word kaaka in the verse. The detailed laws are recorded in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 180). Various reasons have been advanced for the prohibition, among them that it is associated with idolatrous worship, which is, I imagine, why you query whether a Jew who has been tattooed may be buried in an Orthodox cemetery and whether, because of the tattooing, he has thereby lost his Jewish status. But according to all the authorities, tattooing is a negative prohibition, like other negative prohibitions of the Torah. AJew who knowingly offends against this law is a sinner, but no one has ever questioned his right to be buried in a Jewish cemetery. I am, in fact, puzzled by your question. Is it based on some rumour you have heard that burial was refused? This is quite impossible and no Orthodox rabbi would ever have given such a perverse ruling.

What is theJewish attitude at death to a Jew who changed his religion but whose family want him buried according to Jewish custom?

He can be buried in the Jewish cemetery but away from the other graves (see the Responsa of Rabbi Moses Sofer, Yoreh Deah, No. 341, quoted by Griinwald in his compendium on mourning rights, Kol Bo, pp. 192-3). 216 • 54sk the Rabbi' My 01other died in a concentration ca01p during the war; I do not know where or when. When does one say kaddish for her?

The usual practice in such tragic cases is to pick any day and always to observe the yahrzeit on that day. Many prefer the fast day of the tenth of Tevet.

What degree of wickedness is that which decides that a wicked Jew should not be buried next to the righteous, who could 01ake such a decision and have you knowledge of it ever being enforced?

The law to which you refer is found in the Babylonian Talmud, tractate Sanhedrin 4 7a. There it is said that criminals executed by the court were buried so that one who had committed a less terrible crime was not buried beside one who had committed a more heinous crime. From this it follows, states the Talmud, that afortiori a wicked person should not be buried beside a pious man. Strangely enough, Maimonides does not record this ruling in his Code. But the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 365:5) states: 'It is forbidden to bury a wicked man beside a righteous man and it is even forbidden to bury a man less wicked beside one whose wickedness is greater. So, too, it is forbidden to bury a righteous man, to say nothing of an average person, beside a great saint. But it is permitted to bury a repentant sinner beside a man who has been righteous all his life.' So far as I know there were communities in the not too distant past in which these rules were preserved and I suppose such delicate decisions were made by the local Beth Din. But one does not hear, nowadays, certainly not in this country, of any attempt to discriminate, possibly because the coffins are not actually adjacent one to the other (see Griinwald: Kol Bo, New York, 1956, p. 179) or, more likely, because it is assumed that even the sinner had repented before he died.

Are watchers (for the dead) really necessary?

From the discussion in the two Talmudic passages (Berachot 18a; Sabbath 151 b) which speak of watching the dead it would seem that the reason was to make sure that rodents did not attack the corpse. In much later works the reason is given that it is in order to prevent the demons gaining admission to the corpse, which they desire to inhabit. The first reason is not normally applicable today and the second reason is superstition. However, the tradition does advise having watchers, and a further reason has been suggested that it is to pay respect to the departed. It is, in fact, customary to recite psalms while watching over the dead. Death and Burial • 21 7 Is or is not cretnation pertnitted to Jews?

' does permit cremation but Orthodoxy declares it to be categorically forbidden byJewish law, the main reason being that it is forbidden to mutilate a corpse. Just as a scroll of the Torah, when no longer fit to be used, must be buried reverentially in the soil and not destroyed by hand, so the human body, once capable of practising the mitzvot, must be buried and not cremated. Further reasons given are that the Jewish practice since time immemorial has been burial; that cremation is a pagan practice and that cremation betokens lack of faith in the resurrection of the dead. For further discussion I would recommend A Guide to Life, by Rabbi Dr H. Rabinowicz, London, 1964, pp. 25-9.

What is the tneaning of the letters engraved at the bottotn of tnetnorial stones?

The letters are tav, nun, tzadi, bet, hey and are the first letters of the words tehi nqfsho tzerurah bitzror nachqyyim, 'May his (her) soul be bound up in the bundle of life'. The expression 'to be bound in the bundle of life' occurs in the first book of Samuel, Chapter 25, verse 29. In that context the meaning is something like to live long here on earth; but when used on a tombstone the reference is obviously to eternal life in the hereafter. Some homilists have also interpreted it as meaning, may the memory of the departed live on in the hearts and minds of those who loved him - 'in the bundle of life' -and it should not be a memory that is faint and becomes dead to those still alive.

Is it proper to observe Yahrzeit for a deceased spouse if the surviving party has tnarried?

The Talmud (Moed Katan 2b) states that if a man's frrst wife has died and his second wife is still living with him, it is wrong to offer him condolences because this will upset his second wife. The Talmud evidently refers to a man who has two wives at the same time (polygamy being permitted at that time); afortiori it would be unfeeling for a spouse who has remarried to observe Yahrzeit for his or her frrst spouse. Grunwald refers to the question in his 'Kol Bo' on the laws of mourning (p. 404) and surely rightly comes to the conclusion that visible signs of mourning, such as kindling a Yahrzeit light, should not be carried out. But there is no harm in reciting Yitzkor for the deceased spouse since the living spouse will not know of this. 218 • 'Ask the Rabbi' In 'The Fauill.y Moskat', by Isaac Bashevis Singer, in the description of a shiva in Warsaw in 1911, the following statement occurs: 'On the window-sill stood a small basin of water with a linen-rag soaking in it, so that the soul of the departed would be able to perform the ritual ablution.' What is the significance of this ritual?

It is referred to in the later sources (see Rabbi H. Rabinowicz: ~ Guide to Life', page 59, note 6; Eisenstein: 'Otzar Dinim U-Minhagim', page 4; Grunvald: 'Kol Bo', page 261, No. 9). Some authorities object to the practice as pagan. Grunvald gives a rationalised explanation that it is a reminder of the taharah, the washing of the body, when a light is kindled, the purpose being to prevent it being forgotten during the shiva that there has been a bereavement.

Why is the kaddish so important even to Jews who keep nothing?

You refer, of course, to the mourner's kaddish. This is, in fact, a late custom originating in Germany in the Middle Ages. One interpretation of the mourner's kaddish is that the son declares, by implication, that he, like his departed parent before him, will continue to sanctifY God's name (kaddish means 'sanctification'). Later still, the belief grew that by saying kaddish, the son brings merit to his deceased parents. Thus it is easy to understand how the kaddish came to assume importance. Respect for parents, even after they have died, is enjoined in our tradition, and children generally feel, no matter how lax they might be with regard to other observances, that they can somehow make up, by saying kaddish, for all the lack of respect they might have shown to their parents during their lifetime. I know that some rabbis tend to deplore the emphasis on the kaddish when there are many otherJewish observance of far greater import. Yet rabbis, and allJews, ought to welcome the fact that this is one area in which aJewish rite exercises a powerful appeal. The kaddish, after all, brings otherwise unobservant Jews in close touch with synagogue life for eleven months and, if we believe in the power ofJewish worship, the results can only be beneficial to Judaism. Death and Burial • 219 Can a burial ground also be laid out as a park, as is done with some Christian ce01eteries - that is a place for the public to walk, sit or read?

This question, or one very similar, was discussed by Rabbi Hayyim Eleazar Shapira (1872-1937) of Munkacs (Minhat Eleazar, Vol. rv, No. 61). Rabbi Shapira quotes a Responsum on the question from his grandfather Solo­ mon Shapira ( 1832-1893) who is strongly opposed to planting trees and flowers for decorative purposes in ajewish cemetery. One of his reasons is that it is forbidden to waste anything of value and the flowers can be used for more necessary purposes. Another reason he gives is that it is forbidden to have any benefit from the earth of the graves. This latter reason would only apply to flowers which grow on the graves themselves and the first reason is dubious. Mter all, as you suggest, the flowers and park land will benefit visitors to the cemetery. The main reason for Rabbi Shapira's objection is that it is aping Gentile customs - Chukkot ha-goy. Without knowing it, you seem to support his contention since you say: 'as is done with some Christian cemeteries.' The question of which practices fall within this prohibition and which do not is extremely complicated. The Shapira family in Hungary tended to come down heavily against any departure from traditional norms as Chukkot ha­ goy. The sources are less uncompromising. According to many authorities the prohibition only applies when a practice is copied that has doctrinal significance or where it suggests some mysterious purpose, not where there is good reason for it. For instance, in Islamic lands, where doctors wore a special kind of robe, the ruling was given that this does not fall under the prohibition. There does not seem, therefore, to be any real objection to your suggestion.

Is there any law prohibiting the burial of more than one person in one grave? I a01 told that the Sephardim. bury their dead one above the other?

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 362:4) rules that it is forbidden to bury one person on top of another (the reason given by the commentators is that it is disrespectful to the one below) but if there are six handbreadths of earth between the two coffms it is permitted (i.e., because then it is as if they were buried in two separate graves). 220 • i4sk the Rabbi' A reader asks if it is the view of Jewish teaching that so~neone dying froiD an incurable disease should be told the facts or if he or she should be kept in ignorance.

It appears that in the earlier sources ofJudaism there could not have been any discussion of this acute moral question because before the rise of modern medicine and advanced methods of prognosis, on the one hand every illness was treated seriously and on the other no illness was looked upon as incurable. What can be done is to see whether any general principle is recorded in the Jewish sources that can help us here. We read in the second book of Kings, Chapter 20, that when King Hezekiah was 'sick unto death' the prophet Isaiah said to him: 'Thus saith the Lord: Set thy house in order; for thou shalt die and not live.' Thus Isaiah, at the command of God, did tell Hezekiah that he was doomed. Yet a moment's reflection will show that this has nothing to do with our problem. Isaiah said what he did to Hezekiah not as a doctor but as a prophet conveying a special communication to that particular man. If God tells His prophet that a man will die this is obviously a very different . thing from a doctor informing his patient that there is no hope. Even if the doctor is convinced that there is, indeed, no hope, there is no warrant from this chapter of the Bible for him to feel obliged to tell the patient. In fact, there is a fascinating comment on the incident of Isaiah and Hezekiah in the Talmud (Berakhot 1Oa). Hezekiah refuses to believe that he is doomed and he prays for recovery and is, in fact, healed. These words are put into Hezekiah's mouth: 'I have a tradition from my father's house (i.e., from King David) that even if a sharp sword is set against a man's neck he should not give up hope of having God's mercies.' Rather more to the point is the Talmudic statement (Sabbath 32a) that when a sick man is 'about to die' he is told to confess his sins. This is how the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 338: 1) puts it: 'When the sick man is about to die they tell him to confess his sins. They say to him: "Many have confessed and yet did not die while many who did not confess their sins did die. As a reward for confessing your sins you will live and whoever confesses his sins has a portion in the World to Come."' This carefully worded passage, based on earlier sources, shows how concerned the Jewish teachers were not to frighten the dying man and even when it seems certain that he will die and so the duty of confession is to be urged on him, it is done with great tact and hope is held out for him. In fact, the commentaries (see Shakh to the passage) suggest that the Shulchan Aruch only allows the sick man to be told when it is clear that he is 'about to die', not some time beforehand, the implication being, even if the doctor has stated that he will certainly die. From all this it seems that the balance ofJewish teaching is opposed to the patient being told. Why should the poor man be further aggrieved for no purpose? Death and Burial • 221 However, it is obviously not a hard and fast rule and there may be circumstances where it seems best to inform him. In these delicate matters a legal approach is hardly the best one. But it should be repeated that it does seem that generally speaking the patient should not be informed.

On a toJDbstone the practice is to engrave the Hebrew naJDe of the deceased as the son (daughter) of the father, i.e., Yosef ben Yaakov. Is there any law which would prohibit the addition of the JDother's naJDe so that it would read, Yosef ben Yaakov v'Rahel?

Although it is not recorded in Zimmel's ~shkenazim and Sephardim', I learn from Tykochinsky's 'Gesher Ha-Chayyim' Gerusalem, 1960, Vol. I, pp. 305 and 338-9) that the Sephardim always give the mother's name, not the father's, on a tombstone. It is the universal custom of the Ashkenazim to have only the father's name. I have been unable to discover any law against having the names of both father and mother and the only objection I can see is that in these matters one should not depart from the long-established custom, whether Ashkenazi or Sephardi.

Why is it traditional in the diaspora not to erect a to~nbstone until the first yahrzeit, while in Israel it is done after 30 days?

There is no din about this. So far as I am aware, it is only in this country that the memorial stone is not set until after eleven months have elapsed, perhaps because that is when the saying of kaddish ends.

Would it be possible to transfer the re~nains of a close relative buried in a Jewish ceJDetery outside London to a localjewish ceJDetery? The to~nbstone consecration has not yet been perfor~ned.

There is much discussion in the sources regarding the question of disinterring a corpse in order to re bury it elsewhere. The main relevant Talmudic statement is found in the Jerusalem Talmud (Moed Katan 2:4) where it is said that it is normally forbidden to disinter the remains for reburial unless it is for the purpose of reburial in a family plot. A number of reasons are given for the prohibition, among them that to dig up a corpse is a disgrace and that it is disrespectful to the righteous dead who 222 • ){sk the Rabbi' are buried in that cemetery when a body buried there is removed, as if they are unworthy of having the corpse rest among them. On the basis of this the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 363:1) rules that it is generally forbidden unless it is for the purpose mentioned or in order to rebury the remains in the Holy Land or where there is a risk that the corpse will be desecrated if it is allowed to remain in its original resting place. It follows that there might be grounds for permitting it in your case if the deceased's parents, for example, are buried in the local cemetery. Whether or not the tombstone consecration has taken place is irrelevant. However, this column is for the purpose of answering questions in a general sense not to render decisions in particular cases. For this, your own rabbi must be consulted.

For what reason do mourners have an article of clothing cut?

There are a number of Biblical references to rending garments as a sign of grief and mourning (e.g., Genesis 37:34; 11 Samuell: lO;Job l :20). The token cutting of a garment when a near relative dies is known as keria ('cutting' or 'tearing'). The practice is for someone to make a small cut with a knife and for the mourner to extend it. For parents the rent is made on the left side and for other relatives on the right. ReformJews do not usually observe the rules of keria.

Is embalming contrary to Jewish law?

We read in the Book of Genesis (50:2-3 and 28) thatJacob andJoseph were embalmed and no disapproval is expressed of the practice. But theJewish legal authorities argue that no mutilation of the corpse can have been involved since Jewish law forbids such mutilation. Moreover, according to Orthodox opinion all the organs of the body must be buried, whereas in the embalming process as carried out nowadays one gathers that some of them must be removed. Consequently, according to the Orthodox view it is not permitted to embalm the body.

Is it permissible when attending a fUneral also to pay a visit to the graveside of one's relatives buried in the same grounds?

I cannot see any reason not to and so far as I am aware this is the usual practice. What objection can there be, unless it is perhaps argued that to visit one's own relatives at the same time tends to suggest that one would have visited the Death and Burial • 223 grounds in any event and this might be held to detract from the respects being paid to the person being buried. But no rabbinic authority, to my knowledge, has ever advanced such an argument.

Does one sit shiva and recite kaddish for a step-parent?

The obligation to sit shiva applies only when one of the seven near relatives dies: father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister and spouse. Kaddish is generally recited only for parents. But, according to rabbinic teaching the Fifth Commandment includes the obligation to pay respect to step-parents. Consequently, Rabbi Eliezer Fleckeles of Prague (1754-1826) rules that some mourning rites, but not the full shiva, must be observed for step-parents (Pitchey Teshuvah to Yoreh Deah 374:3) and it is obvious that if there is no son to say kaddish the step-son should.

H a Jew who was not a m.em.ber of a congregation dies totally without friends or relatives and also without disposable funds, who is responsible for his burial?

There can be no doubt about the answer. The local Jewish community is responsible for the burial. Such a person falls under the heading of what is known in the sources as met mitz;vah, a corpse whom it is a special mitzva to bury. To my knowledge this is, in fact, as we might have expected, the procedure of Jewish communities everywhere. 10 Miscellaneous

I wonder what pron1pted the questioner who asks: Do the sources discuss the role and responsibilities of the rabbi's wife, and, if so, what do they say?

There is nothing at all in the classical sources of direct relevance to the role and responsibilities of the rabbi's wife. The sole very indirectly relevant statement is that one must pay respect to the wife of a scholar as one does to the scholar himself (Shavuot 30b). This silence in the source is not at all surprising. Traditionally, the rabbi is chiefly one who renders decisions in Jewish law and teaches the Torah so that his wife is not directly involved in the role he plays in the community. There is no law that a rabbi, qua rabbi, has to have a wife. It is true, nevertheless, that in many communities the rabbi's wife did supervise some of the benevolent activities, especially those connected with the welfare of women. Some wives of rabbis were tempted to act as the real power behind the throne in general communal affairs and this was normally resented. It is said that the wife of the famous rabbi of Lemberg,J.S. Nathansohn, used her wealth and authority to obtain the position for her husband and that she used to say to him: 'Do not imagine that I am a rebbetzin because you are the rabbi. You are the rabbi because I am a rebbetzin.'

I aD1 asked if Freen1asonry is con1patible with Orthodox judaisn1.

I am not a Freemason myself and am consequently unaware of the details involved in membership of the order. One is able, however, to pick up bits of information about Masonic activities and there are books on the subject. It is obvious that if Freemasonry were a rival religion to Judaism no Jew could be a Freemason. But I have never met a mason who claimed that his 'craft' was a religion. In so far as beliefs are involved at all, Freemasonry is based on belief in God as the architect of the universe and beyond this affirmation it has nothing to say about the religious beliefs of its members. Other possible objections to an OrthodoxJew becoming a mason are the oath of secrecy that is taken (the rabbis frown on a Jew taking an oath without adequate reason) and the ceremonies and rituals which might savour of idolatrous worship. Against these objections it can be argued, the oath of secrecy is not taken without adequate reason and the rituals are pure play-acting and have no religious significance and certainly no idolatrous associations. Miscellaneous • 225 In fact, from what one hears, some of the ceremonies are based on the biblical traditions about Solomon's Temple and Hiram King of Tyre and there seems to be some slight connection with Cabalistic ideas. The plain fact is that a number of distinguished Orthodox rabbis (including the previous Chief Rabbi) have occupied high offices in the Masonic movement. I am told, however, that in some branches of Freemasonry the rituals refer to Christian dogmas as true. If this is so (I repeat, all my information is by hearsay) membership of these branches is incompatible with Orthodoxy or for that matter with any other variety of Jewish belief and practice. I was once present at a Masonic funeral at which verses from Ecclesiastes were recited (no harm at all in this) and then sprigs of acacia were thrown into the open grave, supposedly in reference to the practices of the ancient Druids. It would be extremely odd, to say the least, for an Orthodox Jew to try to be an ancient Druid.

In the days of the Temple, where didJews living far from. Jerusalem. worship since, I believe, there were no synagogues then?

The origin of the synagogue is still shrouded in obscurity. According to many scholars there is some evidence that there were synagogues, or places very much like them, during the whole of the period all over the holy land. But it is certain that there were no synagogues during the period of the first Temple so your question is still pertinent. The simple answer is that people offered private prayers. The vast majority of prayers found in the Bible, for instance, are the private prayers of individuals in times of need. The great Maimonides remarks that while the obligation to pray daily is biblical, the times of prayers and their order and form are rabbinic. This is only another way of saying that the synagogue and synagogue worship is a later development inJudaism but, naturally, one of tremendous significance.

Why do some Jewish clergymen allow themselves to be described as 'Reverend' and why do some wear clerical collars? Is this not an undignified aping of Christian practices?

Actually, in Anglo:Jewry both matters to which you refer are becoming very much a thing of the past. The title 'Reverend' or 'minister' was, I believe, originally introduced here (it is unknown elsewhere in theJewish world) because Chief Rabbi Adler held his position to be that of sole rabbinic authority for 226 • Ylsk the Rabbi' the entire community and he would not tolerate the use of the title 'Rabbi' by any of his 'ministers'. But there is no halachic objection to the use of the title 'Reverend' or to the wearing of the clerical collar, any more than there is to the wearing of canonicals by the rabbi and the chazan. The point here is that the offence of chukkot hagoy - copying the practices of other religions - applies only to practices with a doctrinal significance, e.g., for a Jew to wear a cross, even if it is not because of any belief in Christianity. The clerical collar worn by Christian ministers is simply to distinguish a man of the cloth from others (on a less arrogant plane, in order that he be recognised when his ministrations are required) and we do fmd in the Talmud, for example, that rabbis wore a special robe of distinction. For instance, the famous Italian authority, Rabbijoseph Colon (1420-1480), sees no objection (Responsa Maharik, No. 88) to a Jewish doctor wearing the special doctor's cloak worn by Gentile doctors, and this ruling is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 178: 1). Portraits of rabbis from former times show that, not infrequently, rabbinic dress was an adaptation of that worn by non:Jewish clergy of the period. It is perfectly true that many Orthodox rabbis in the last century did object, on the grounds of chukkot hagoy, to the wearing of canonicals by rabbis and so forth, but then, these authorities forbade, on the same grounds, a wedding ceremony in the synagogue. We must preserve a sense of proportion in these matters. I am told that the Chief Rabbi of Israel is known as 'His Eminence', and if this is not a title copied from general usage I don't know what is.

Is there any halachic basis for MenacheDl Begin's refusal to negotiate Judea and SaDlaria in return for a secure peace?

According to the halacha, it is forbidden to give away or to sell to non:Jews any part of the Holy Land. The question in the present circumstances is whether this law may be set aside for the sake of a 'secure peace'. It is difficult to see why it should not, just as the Sabbath, for example, not only may be set aside, but must be in order to save life. Of course, whether this course will, in fact, promote peace is a matter not for the halachic authorities, but for those who possess the necessary expertise, much as it is not the rabbi, but the doctor, who decides when it is necessary to profane the Sabbath, i.e., whether or not the sick person requires the Sabbath to be profaned in order to save life. In the latest issue of the journal, 'L'Eylah', published by the Office of the Chief Rabbi, there is a fairly full account of the matter by Rabbi J. Sacks, entitled 'The Administered Territories in the Light of Halacha'. Miscellaneous • 227 There are repeated references in the Midrashim. and elsewhere to acadelllies for studying Torah in the patriarchal period (Shem and Eber, etc.). How could people be studying Torah long before it was given or revealed?

Nahman Krochmal, in his 'More Nevuchey Ha-Zeman' (Gate 14) has provided us with a real key to the understanding of the kind of midrashic statements which you mention and it removes all the difficulties regarding the anachronisms which seem to be involved. Krochmal shows that the chief aim of the midrashic authors is not to describe the past, but to use the past as a guide to the present. When, for instance, the rabbinic Midrash states that Pharaoh was a Magus, a Zoroastrian priest, they surely did not imagine for one moment that there were Zoroastrian priests in ancient Egypt. Rather they were saying to their congregations something like this: if you want to know the type of opposition our ancestors had to face in Egypt from Pharaoh and his sages, think of our ideological struggles in Babylon with the representatives of the Zoroastrian faith. By the same token, when the midrashists speak of the yeshivot in patriarchal times, they are really saying that the study of the Torah is so important that the yeshiva institution must be read back into the earliest period. But it was not with that early period that they were primarily concerned. They were not ancient historians- the rabbis of the Midrash- but preachers to Jews in their own day. It is rather like the Dutch painters who depicted the biblical heroes wearing contemporary dress or, say, like a Chasid thinking of Elisha as a Rebbe with Chasidim and wearing a streimel. A modern preacher, too, will often say, for instance, that Haman was a Hitler. Professor H.L. Ginzberg has similarly said, or so I have heard, that the figures of the patriarchs frequently serve the same function as Uncle Sam in the USA orJohn Bull in this country, i.e., they are ideal types (though this does not mean that the patriarchs were not real people as well) into which the typical ideals of the Jewish people can legitimately be read.

Is the synagogue sermon a Jewish tradition or something 'borrowed' from the Christian service?

There is no doubt that the form of the modern sermon in the vernacular, and as exhortation as well as instruction, has been adapted by Jews since the beginning of the last century from Christian models. But it is a mistake to see the sermon per se as 'borrowed' from Christian worship. On the contrary, Christianity took over the idea of the sermon from the 'derashah', theJewish exposition of Scripture. 228 • 54sk the Rabbi' One of the reasons for Leopold Zunz writing his epoch-making study of Jewish preaching through the ages, Die gottesdienstlichen Vortraege derjuden, in 1832, was the need to reply to this very accusation that the sermon is un­ Jewish. Mter all, the whole process of Midrash, in the later application of the method, consists in the elaboration of Scripture for homiletical purposes.

An always interesting topic is raised by the reader who asks if there is anything in religious law specifically forbidding a wom.an to conduct or participate in a religious service and questioning whether there were not in fact wom.en m.usicians and singers in the service of the Tem.ple?

It is no doubt surprising but true that there is no specific religious law forbidding a woman to participate in the service or even to conduct the service. (Of course, well-nigh universal custom has been against it, until modern times in some congregations, and custom of this kind does have some weight.) There is an explicit ruling in the Talmud (Megilla 23a) that a woman can be called up to the reading of the Torah, though, in the same passage, this is not advised. It is well known that some medieval authorities rule that in a congregation of Cohanim the first aliya should be given to one of the male congregants and the other six to women! As for preaching, there is no law at all about who can preach and who may not. There is, in fact, no legal objection to having a woman rabbi. How can there be since there is no rule about who can be a rabbi or, it is better to put it, there is no such thing as a rabbi in Jewish law in the sense of a 'priest' who conducts the service. A rabbi is a teacher of the Torah and there is no reason whatsoever why a duly qualified woman teacher should not function as a rabbi if she is sufficiently well-versed in the Torah. Nor is the idea that there are times when a woman may not recite the prayers of any substance in Jewish law. The Talmud (Berachot 22a) explicitly states that this is not so. The truth is, historically considered, that women did not participate in the service not because of any laws peculiar to the conduct of services but rather because in ancient and medieval times women did not participate in any public function and there was a much stricter segregation of the sexes in every walk of life than there is nowadays. This obviously is not a matter of law but of custom. I do want to repeat, however, that custom also has a voice in theJewish tradition and the emotional resistance of many worthy people to greater participation of women in the synagogue service is not to be ridiculed. For all that, in this matter especially, Jewish law provides precedents for a much more liberal attitude. Miscellaneous • 229 Incidentally, in the question it is taken for granted that there were women musicians and singers in the service of the Temple. This is not certain. The verse usually quoted in this connection is: 'and they had two hundred singing men and singing women' (Ezra 2:65). The traditional commentators understand this verse to mean not that there were women singers in the actual service in the Temple, but lay singers who perhaps sang as the Levites went to perform their services in the Temple.

In the course of IDY business, I was asked to supply a gar~nent IDeant to be worn by a IDan, but to be buttoned the wo~nan's way, i.e., the buttons and button holes on the reverse side. Why do soiDe Orthodox people de~nand this.?

The reason is Cabalistic. According to the Cabala, the attributes of God's mercy and love are represented symbolically by the 'right', whereas His judgements and seventies are represented by the 'left'' because the former are, as it were, stronger than the latter. Furthermore, 'right' is the symbol of the sacred domain, while 'left' sometimes represents the demonic side of existence. Since, again according to the Cabala, man's deeds have a cosmic signi­ ficance, it is important for man, whenever he can, to give the right prominence over the left. That is why people influenced, directly or indirectly, by the Cabala button their coats right on left rather than left on right.

I have been asked to recoJDJDend a course of reading for 'an ignorant layJDan' who wishes to acquaint hiiDself with the basic tenets and practices of the Jewish faith.

Here are some books that will prove helpful to such a 'layman'. (I do not like the word in this context. AllJews are 'laymen' since there are no 'priests'. Or, if you prefer to put it in this way, allJews are priests.) A Guide to Jewish Knowledge by C. Pearl and R. Brookes is a very useful handbook of the Jewish religion, published by Vallentine Mitchell. There are the excellent little books on the festivals published by the same firm. Judaism by Rabbi Dr I. Epstein is a fme statement of the whole range of Jewish thought and practice, published as a Penguin book. This and Dr Epstein's The Faith ofJudaism are from the Orthodox point of view, as is the older TheJewish Religion by Professor M. Friedlander and The Dietary Laws by Dayan Grunfeld, recently published by the Soncino Press. From the point of view of moderate Reform there is Morris Joseph's Judaism as Creed and Life, of which a new edition was published some years ago with a preface by Rabbi Reinhart. Milton Steinberg's BasicJudaism gives 230 • 54sk the Rabbi' both the Reform and the Orthodox points of view but this handy little book seems to be out of print. Loen Roth'sJudaism: A Portrait, published by Faber is, as its title indicates, an impression of the significance ofJudaism as seen by a distinguished Jewish philosopher. Herman Wouk's This is My God is a beautifully written account by a best-selling American novelist. A new edition, bringing the book up to date, has recently been published by Collins. For the Bible the Soncino series of Commentaries can be recommended and on the Pentateuch there is, of course, the famous Hertz Chumash. Dr Hertz's Commentary to the Prayer Book is a similarly inspiring work. For ambitious readers there is the Soncino Talmud for an insight into this gigantic work and A Rabbinic Anthology by Montefiore and Loewe has recently been reprinted. ' OnJewish History, Solomon Grayzel's A History of the Jews is a readable one-volume work. The six volume History ofJewish Literature by M. Waxman will tempt some readers. A splendid account of the influence of Judaism is given in The Legacy of Israel, Clarendon Press, Oxford. On chasidism, now very popular, there are the two comprehensive anthologies: The Hasidic Anthology by Louis Newman and Tales of the Hasidim by Martin Buber. For those who can afford it the new EncyclopaediaJudaica in 16 volumes is essential and the older The Jewish Encyclopaedia is still a most useful tool. The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in the USA has published a detailed bibliography in The Study of Judaism, published by Ktav. These are only a few of the numerous works that will appeal to your 'ignorant layman' and after reading them he will be ignorant no more. He should also become a regular reader of this column.

Is it pennissible for a rabbi to participate in an inter­ denolllinational church service on soDle State or civic occasion (that is by reading a PsalDl or froDl soDle other acceptable Jewish source)?

What objections can there be to a rabbi participating in such an inter­ denominational service? He is there as a representative ofJudaism so that his participation can in no way be construed as an acceptance in the slightest degree of the teachings of Christianity. The problem which bothers many is when the service takes place in a church. Now it is perfectly true thatJewish law is very strict on the question of entering a place in which idols are worshipped. But whatever the views of medieval teachers (a good history of these and more recent views is to be found inJacob Katz's Exclusiveness and Tolerance), the generally accepted opinion in the classical sources is that Christianity, while considered to be 'idolatry' so far as Jews are concerned, is not idolatry for Gentiles, i.e., according to the Miscellaneous • 231 Torah for Gentiles (the 'seven laws of the sons of Noah') a Gentile is committing no wrong by being a Christian and, on the contrary, his religion brings him nearer to God. It follows that much of the opposition to entering a place in which idols are worshipped does not apply to a church. I am fully aware that many, perhaps most, Orthodox rabbis would take a stricter line, but even the Chief Rabbis in this country have attended church services and though they have only done so on State occasions there is no logical reason for distinguishing between these occasions and the one you mention. Naturally, in all such circumstances care must be taken not to give the impression in any way that there is a relativist attitude towards religion and that one's Judaism is in any way compromised. Tact and sensitivity are especially required here.

What possible hnplications arise for Judaism. if cloning were to be achieved?

As I understand it, the overwhelming opinion of the experts today is that the reproduction of a human being by 'cloning' is quite beyond the realms of possibility. But as an academic exercise, it is perhaps interesting to speculate what Jewish teaching would have to say if, one day, cloning were to happen. Obviously, there can be no references to this in the classical sources of Judaism, but there is an analogous situation. It was widely believed in ancient times that the sages could use the work known as 'Sefer Yetzirah' ('Book of Creation') in order to create a human being. What would be the status of such a creature inJewish law? The question was discussed by Haham Zevi Ashkenazi ( 1660-1 718) in his Responsa ('Haham Zevi' No. 93) and by his son, Jacob Emden (1697-1776), in his 'Sheelat Yaavetz' (Part 11, No. 82). Ashkenazi refers to the Talmudic story of the creation of a man by means of the 'Sefer Yetzirah' (Sanhedrin 65b) in which it is stated that the rabbi who created the man later destroyed him. This shows that the prohibition of murder only applies to a man born of a woman. On the other hand, remarks Ashkenazi, the man created in this way might be said to be his creator's adopted child, and according to the Talmud (Sanhedrin 19b) an adopted child is counted as the offspring of the people who adopt it.

Is there any precedent in our history for setting an age lim.it for leaders of the com.m.unity?

Here are the relevant sources. The Levites were obliged to retire from active service at the age of 50 (Numbers 8:24), but the Talmud (Chullin 24a) qualifies 232 • 14sk the Rabbi' this. First, it is stated that the law applied only to Levites, not to priests. Secondly, even with regard to Levites the law applied only to the Tabernacle in the wilderness, which was portable and required great strength to move from place to place. In the Temple, the Levites, it is said, could continue to serve indefmitely, except the singers, who were obliged to retire once their voices became inadequate for the task. One interpretation of 'The captain of 50' in Isaiah 3:3 is 'a man who is 50 years of age'. Thus, the ruling of R. Abbahu is quoted: 'From here we learn that a Meturgeman (one who translates the Bible into Aramaic) may not be appointed over a congregation who is less than 50 years of age' (Chagigah 14a). The reference to a Meturgeman is somewhat puzzling. Why only this functionary? In the parallel passage in the Yalkut (Isaiah 394) R. Abbahu is made to refer to a parnas, a leader of the congregation. With regard to membership of the Sanhedrin there is, on the face of it, a contradiction. On the one hand (Sanhedrin 17a), 'old age' is given as one of the qualifications for membership of this body. But, on the other hand, it is stated (Sanhedrin 36b) that an old man cannot be appointed to be a member of the Sanhedrin. Maimonides (Yad, Sanhedrin 2:3) resolves the contradiction by ruling that the members of the Sanhedrin should be old men, but not so old that they have become remote from life's sorrows and problems and have therefore lost some of the compassion essential to members of the highest judicial authority. The Mechilta (Yitro 5) speaks of an old man being 'full of compassion'. Relevant, too, of course, is the famous saying in the passage about the ages of man that counsel can be given at the age of 50 (Avot 5:21) i.e., and not before this age. So far as I am aware, there is no reference anywhere in the classical sources on the need for a competent leader to retire. As a matter of fact, some of the great rabbis of the past exercised their rabbinic functions well into advanced old age. R. Sherira lived to be 100 and only retired in his old age to make way for his son, R. Hai Gaon, who continued in the office of Gaon of Pumbedita until his death at the age of 99. There is a reliable report that R. Aryeh Laib, author of the 'Shaagat Aryeh', was appointed, in the eighteenth century, to be Rabbi of Metz at the age of 60 and served in that capacity until his death, due to an accident, at the age of 90. Naturally, there is no objection to a community drawing up its own rules regarding retirement age for its leaders. In these matters, communal agreements are binding, since there is no actual law which states that leaders must never be compelled to retire. But, as we have noted, neither is there any law which states that it is forbidden for a leader to continue to occupy his office once he has reached a certain age.

( Miscellaneous • 233 What are the traditional Jewish rules about naming children? Which grandparent should have a child named after him (or her) first? What about uncles and aunts? And is there any rule applicable to middle names?

If you look at Genesis, Chapter 38, you will fmd that of the birth of the first son (verse 3) it says that Judah, the father, gave him his name, whereas the second son (in verse 4) was given his name by Tamar, his mother. On the basis of this, the great commentator, Rabbi David Kimchi, remarks that in ancient times it was the practice for the father to choose the name for the first child, and the mother for the second child. Nachmanides, in his comment to the chapter, takes issue with this and, in fact, the practice is exactly the opposite, the mother choosing the name of the first child, the father of the second, and so on. It is not the custom among the Ashkenazim to call a child after a living person, though it is usual to call the child after a dead grandparent. This means that the first child will be called after the mother's dead grandfather or grand­ mother, and the second child after the father's grandfather or grandmother. Although some authorities are none too happy about giving the same name for male and female, the custom is to call a male child after a female, slightly changing the name, of course, and a female child after a male. The truth is that there are no laws about it, in any event, and it is really left to the discretion of the parents. The famous contemporary authority, the Chazon Ish, strongly advised parents not to choose an unusual name for their child, since this would cause him embarrassment in his later life. It follows from what has been said that a child can be called after an uncle or aunt or, indeed, after anyone else if that is what the parents decide. Some people prefer to give the name of a biblical character who features in the sidra read in the synagogue in the week of the child's birth. As for middle names, it was certainly not unusual for a child to be called after two different people, so that the child had a middle name. In your letter there is a further question: Why do people, nowadays, have the same name, e.g., there are many boys called Abraham or David and many girls called Sarah or Rachel, whereas each biblical name is unique - there is only one David or Solomon. The answer is that it so happens that of the comparatively few names of the biblical heroes and heroines, no two happened to be the same (and even this is not entirely correct; some names are found for more than one person), but there is nothing to prevent parents from using a popular name. Indeed, since biblical names were given frequently, it is not at all surprising that many boys and girls have the same name. In the Talmud, more than one rabbi is called Isaac or Jacob, but, surprisingly enough, none is called Moses orAbraham. It might also be mentioned that in some communities it was the practice 234 • J:lsk the Rabbi' to give a child born on a particular day the name of that day, which is why we have names like Yom Tov, Pesach and Chanucah (this is rare), though, for some reason, never Succot or Shavuot. On middle names it should also be mentioned that when a child is dangerously ill he is sometimes given an additional name denoting long life, and so the child has a 'middle' name. Names of this kind are Chaim ('Life'), Refael ('Healing') and Yair ('Illumination').

When the sefer Torah is being carried fro111 the ark to the biJnah 111any people bow to it. Surely the coll1Jl1andJnent 'thou shalt not bow down' forbids this action.

The commandment 'thou shalt not bow down' means to other gods in worship. It does not prohibit, say, bowing to someone as a mark of respect. But it can be argued that by bowing to the sefer Torah, the most sacred object we possess, it does look as if the scroll is being worshipped, and for all the reverence we are expected to have for the Torah, the Torah is never an object of worship injudaism but the way to God, who alone is to be worshipped. Those who defend the custom would argue, on the other hand, that when we bow to the sefer Torah, we are simply paying it the kind of respect we offer to another human being when we bow to him. It is not the act of bowing in itself that is offensive, but the intention behind it, and here the intention is certainly not to worship the Torah. They point to the Berich shemey prayer from the Zohar, recited in many congregations when the sefer Torah is taken from the ark, in which there is a reference to bowing before the Torah. It has also been suggested that this is why we sing Psalm 29 when we return the sefer Torah to the ark. The psalm speaks of bowing down to God and it is as if we are saying: 'When we bow to the sefer, it is not to the Torah that we bow, but to Him, to the Giver of the Torah.' For all that, Rabbi Joshua Boaz in his 'Shiltey ha-Gibborim' to the Rif (Kiddushin, Vilna edition, page l4b) quotes Rabbi Isaiah de Trani the Younger, who writes: 'We are obliged to rise before the sefer Torah. If we rise in respect before students of the Torah, how much more so before the Torah itsel£ 'But it appears to me that the sages only ordained that we should rise before the Torah, not that we bow to it. We do not find anywhere in the Torah that one should bow even to the holy ark.' Miscellaneous • 235 How can we rationally meet the charge that Jewish education is really a form of indoctrination? Inevitably it is concerned with influencing children's religious thinking and attitudes, whereas true education empha­ sises genuine open inquiry and the development of personal autonomy.

A good deal depends on the way in whichjudaism is taught to children. Parents and teachers cannot help influencing children in the religious and ethical aspects of life. Children cannot be expected to create their own values and they look up to adults to provide them with guidelines. To imply that religion and ethics can be approached in an entirely objective way, so that the children must eventually make up their own minds, is itself a form of indoctrination. It is a subde way of influencing children to believe that religious and ethical values are relative and is an attempt to indoctrinate the children with a particular philosophy of life. And yet we all have today a legitimate horror of attempting to brainwash the children under our care and we realise that even from the religious and ethical point of view the free development of the human personality is a supreme good. So we are faced with a real dilemma. If we give the impression of not caring whether or not our children have a regard for Judaism based on knowledge we are guilty of abandoning any claims for our faith to be true. If, on the other hand, we force the children to accept the faith blindly we are certainly guilty of indoctrination. The wise parent and teacher, believingjudaism to be true and a great boom to the child, will teachjudaism with enthusiasm. But he will at the same time help the child to develop his critical faculties so that the child is gradually encouraged to think things through for himsel£ It is the old question of 'my God' and 'my father's God'. With children one can start only with the latter concept, with the riches of the Jewish tradition. But if the child is eventually to discover his God questions will be welcomed and the idea of a search for the truth within the framework of the truth that is Judaism will be encouraged. It is, indeed, important for the child to learn that his parents and teachers do not have all the answers, but it is equally important for the healthy growth of the child that he knows his parents and teachers have some of the answers. Any harm that is done is not done by the teaching of Judaism as truth, but by an unintelligent and dogmatic insistence that the child is incapable of reasomng. The account of the four sons in the Passover Hagada reminds us that the wise son is not the one who accepts unquestioningly everything he has been told, but the one gifted with the talent and curiosity to discover more and more about the deeper meaning of Judaism. 236 • Xrk the Rabbi' A very sensitive question from a reader who asks: How valid is the contention that Israel's retention of the West Bank (~udea and Samaria') is a Jewish religious obligation?

It is perfectly true that there are to be found in the classical sources ofJudaism statements which would seem to lend support to the view you mention, and one held by a number of religious teachers, that it is forbidden to surrender the West Bank because, once having come intoJewish hands, it must be retained as part of the Holy Land. Two things, however, require to be said in this connection. First, many of the references in the sources are in a Messianic context. They speak of the culmination of human history and so have no relevance to the practical question at the present time. Many religious Jews do look upon the establishment of the State of Israel as athalta degeulah, 'the beginning of the redemption', i.e., the State of Israel has Messianic overtones. No one has seriously suggested that it is the full realisation of the Messianic hope. Secondly, even if there are sources which suggest that even now there is a religious obligation for Jews to hold on to as much of the Holy Land as they can, this obligation, as Rabbi J.B. Soloveitchik of Boston has courageously argued, is no different from other religious obligations over which the saving of human life takes precedence. There is, for instance, the strongest religious obligation to keep the Sabbath yet, if a doctor declares that in order to save the life of a sick person food must be cooked for him on the Sabbath, it is not only permitted for devout Jews to cook for him, it is a mitzva for them to do so, a religious obligation of greater weight and of more binding power than that of keeping the Sabbath. By the same token, if permanent peace can be obtained by the sacrifice of land, the land must be surrendered. At the moment, unfortunately, this is a very big if. Yet the question of how and when peace is to be secured is a matter for the experts, the statesmen and politicians, not the rabbis. They must, to be sure, be governed byJewish religious principles but it would be as wrong for rabbis to advance political arguments in the guise of religious obligation as it would for them to tell the doctors when and when not the sick person requires hot food on the Sabbath. To put all this in other words, the sacredness of human life is a great principle ofJudaism and martyrdom is only demanded in rare instances. The refusal to sacrifice human beings on the altar of religious obligation is itself a supreme religious obligation. Miscellaneous • 237 Were theJewish people already 'Jews' when they received the Torah, or was it the receipt of the Torah that Jnade the01jews?

Neither, in the way you formulate it. The term :Jews' is from the kingdom of Judah so that the name was not used until after the destruction of the First Temple. The question should be reformulated: Was it the receipt of the Torah that made them into the 'children of Israel'? To this there can only be one answer: they were called the 'children of Israel' while still in Egypt and in the account of the giving of the Torah it is said, 'In the third month after the children of Israel were gone forth out of the land of Egypt, the same day came they into the wilderness of Sinai' (Exodus 19: 1). I would surmise that what you really mean is, was the giving of the Torah only the addition of further laws or did it change the status of the people? To this the rabbinic answer is that there was a definite change of status, from that of 'sons of Noah' into the 'children of Israel', not alone in the older sense of children of the PatriarchJacob but also in the new sense that they now belonged in a different category from that of 'sons of Noah'. In a remarkable Talmudic passage (Sabbath 146a) it is implied that mankind had been tainted with something like 'original sin' but that when Israel stood at Sinai this taint was taken away from them. In another Talmudic passage (Yevamot 46a and Rashi) their new status is spoken of as a 'conversion' which required the conversion rites by means of which, in laterJudaism, a would-be proselyte becomes aJew.

Is there a Jewish tradition of not going around the ho01e barefooted and, if so, where did this originate? The Talmud (Pesahim 112a) tells us that Rabbi Akiba instructed his son Rabbi Joshua: 'Let not thy feet be without shoes.' The standard commentator R. Samuel b. Meir, Rashbam, comments: 'Because it is disgraceful for a scholar to walk about barefooted, as the rabbis say (Sabbath 129a): A man should sell all he possesses in order to buy shoes for his feet.' Thus, in the context, the Talmud is thinking of the need for a student of the Torah to have a degree of self-respect which he would forfeit if he were to walk about barefooted in the street. There is nothing here to forbid anyJew from being barefooted in the privacy of his own home. Nonetheless, the custom to which you refer does seem to have emerged in some quarters, perhaps because barefootedness is associated with mourning. Sperling (Taamey Ha-Minghagim, Likkutim, No. 87) is aware of the custom (hardly a 'tradition', as you call it) and he quotes a mystical author who argues that when Adam sinned the very ground became cursed so that the bare feet are not allowed to come into direct contact with the ground. This is why, that author continues, the shoes are removed on holy ground, which is immune from the 'curse', and why we do not wear shoes on the holy Day of Atonement.