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Kirch V. Embarq Supreme Court Petition

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Kirch V. Embarq Supreme Court Petition No. _______ In The Supreme Court of the United States -------------------------- ʕ --------------------------- KATHLEEN AND TERRY KIRCH, Petitioners, v. EMBARQ MANAGEMENT COMPANY AND UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY OF EASTERN KANSAS, Respondents. -------------------------- ʕ -------------------------- ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT -------------------------- ʕ -------------------------- PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI -------------------------- ʕ -------------------------- Scott A. Kamber Joseph H. Malley Counsel of Record LAW OFFICE OF David A. Stampley JOSEPH H. MALLEY KAMBERLAW LLC 1045 North Zang Boulevard 100 Wall Street, 23rd Floor Dallas, Texas 75208 New York, New York 10005 (214) 943-6100 (212) 920-3072 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Petitioners Counsel for Petitioners Dated: March 28, 2013 THE LEX GROUPDC i 1825 K Street, N.W. i Suite 103 i Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 955-0001 i (800) 856-4419 i Fax: (202) 955-0022 i www.thelexgroup.com i QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Does an ISP acquire the contents of its customers electronic communications within the meaning of the ECPA when the ISP uses a device intentionally to redirect the customers communication to a third party without the consent of any party to the communications. 2. Does the fact that an ISP transmits customers electronic communications in its ordinary course of Business mean that an ISP acts within the ordinary course of business and therefore does not engage in interception when it reconfigures its network intentionally to redirect customers communications to a third party without the consent of any party to the communications. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................ ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... v OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1 JURISDICTION ......................................................... 1 RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS ................ 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 1 A. Statutory Background ........................... 2 1. Electronic communications ........ 2 2. ECPA, ISPs and the Internet ....................................... 4 B. Material Facts ....................................... 6 1. Embarq redirected the Kirches Internet communications to a third- party ............................................ 6 iii 2. Embarq reconfigured its network indiscriminately to redirect all Internet communications of its customers .................................... 6 C. Proceedings Below ................................. 7 1. The Kirches file suit ................... 7 2. The district court grants Embarqs summary judgment motion ......................... 7 3. The Tenth Circuit affirms on limited grounds ...................... 8 REASONS THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED .... 9 A. An electronic communication is intercepted when, without lawful purpose, the whole of it is redirected to an unintended recipient, regardless of whether communicative content is subsequently extracted from it ........... 14 B. The ECPA presupposes an ISPs acquisition of customers electronic communications .................. 21 C. Remand is necessary ........................... 24 CONCLUSION ......................................................... 25 iv APPENDIX Published Opinion and Judgment of The United States Court of Appeals for The Tenth Circuit entered DecemBer 28, 2012 ................ 1a Memorandum and Order of The United States District Court for The District of Kansas entered August 19, 2011 ................... 20a 18 U.S.C. § 2510 ........................................... 44a 18 U.S.C. § 2511 ........................................... 47a 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) ...................................... 52a v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ................... 17 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) ........................ 4, 10, 12, 13 Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285 (4th Cir.1995) ............................... 5 Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 2003 WL 22990064 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003) ................................ 24 Hall v. EarthLink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005) ........................... 23 In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003) ................................ 5 In re State Police Litigation, 888 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1995) .......... 18, 19 Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1978) .......................... 17 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ........................................ 12 vi Klumb v. Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) ......... 20 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) ........................................ 12 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ........................................ 13 Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620 (C.D. Ill. 2010) .............. 20 United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) .............................. 5 United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996) .......................... 16 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) ...................................... 10 United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) .................. 12, 16 United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988) ................................... 16-17 United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997) .......................... 16 vii United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 847 (1992) ................................ passim United States v. Shields, 675 F.2d 1152 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982) .................................. 12, 16 United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2010) ...................... 5, 15 United States v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1993) ........................... 15 United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) ............................ 12, 17, 19 STATUTES 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. ............................................... 1 18 U.S.C. § 2510 .......................................................... 4 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) ................................... 4, 15, 16, 20 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) ................................................... 3 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) ............................... 5, 13, 21, 23 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(iii) ......................................... 21 viii 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) ..................................................... 4 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ..................................................... 1 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ......................................................... 1 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ......................................................... 7 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) ................................................. 7 RULES Fed. R. App. P. 35(c) ................................................... 1 Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1) .............................................. 1 OTHER AUTHORITIES 132 Cong. Rec. H4039-01 (June 23, 1986) ................. 4 Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417 (2009) .......................... 4, 11 Presidents Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967) .... 13 S. Rep. No. 99-541, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1986 .......... 3, 18, 19 ix S. Rep. No. 1097, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1968 .................... 10 Steven R. Morrison, What The Cops Cant Do, Internet Service Providers Can: Preserving Privacy in Email Contents, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2011) ................................... 4 1 PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Petitioners Kathleen and Terry Kirch respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in this case. OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is published at 702 F.3d 1245 and reproduced at Pet.App.1a. The district courts unreported opinion is reproduced at Pet.App.20a. JURISDICTION The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, entering judgment on December 28, 2012. The time for filing a petition for rehearing elapsed 45 days later, on February 11, 2013. Fed. R. App. P. 35(c), 40(a)(1). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS Pertinent portions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., are reproduced in the appendix to this petition. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case presents the important federal question of whether an ISPs wholesale redirection of its customers Internet communications to an 2 unintended recipient without customer consent lies outside the ISPs ordinary course of business and constitutes interception under the ECPA. Here, Internet services provider Embarq, unbeknownst to its customers, installed a device in its Internet services network facility to transmit all customer Internet communications to an online advertising network. As part of that installation, Embarq recabled its network to redirect customers communications through the device before resuming the path to their intended, Internet-connected recipients. The third-party ad network paid Embarq for its access to the Embarq customer communications. The Tenth Circuit held Embarq did not engage
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