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The Front National Since the 1970S: Electoral Impact and Party System

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The Front National Since the 1970S: Electoral Impact and Party System 2 The Front National since the 1970s: Electoral Impact and Party System Change James Shields In a book about the changing landscape of French politics since the 1970s, no party presses its case for consideration more forcefully than the Front National (FN). Between the National Assembly elections of 1973, which the FN was founded to contest in the name of a uni ed French nationalist right, and the most recent corresponding elections of 2012, the party increased its national vote share from 0.5 per cent (fewer than 125,000 votes) to 13.6 per cent (over 3.5 million votes). Between the same two elections, by contrast, the once powerful French Communist Party (PCF) saw its vote share collapse from 21.4 per cent in 1973 to a mere portion of the 6.9 per cent polled collectively in 2012 by the far- left alliance, the Front de Gauche (FG). Measured by performance in presidential elections over the same period, the growth of support for the FN is even more spectacular: from 0.7 per cent (fewer than 200,000 votes) in 1974 to 17.9 per cent (over 6.4 million votes) in 2012. 1 Located close to the perimeters of the FN’s lifespan, these elections frame some of the most profound changes in French politics under the Fifth Republic. The long- term rise of the FN and the decline of the PCF are part of a wider picture of change that has seen the ever disunited centre- right combine forces (mostly) in the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) while the ¡ ¢ ¢ ¡ £ ¤ ¥ ¦ § ¨ © © ¨ © ¢ 42 FRANCE SINCE THE 1970S Socialist Party (PS) has come to exert an unrivalled domination on the left. With the PS (29.3 per cent), the UMP (27.1 per cent) and the FN (13.6 per cent) accounting for fully 70 per cent of the vote in the 2012 National Assembly elections, and with no other party exceeding the 6.9 per cent of the Front de Gauche, the contours of France’s political map seem de ned today by a clear tripartite structure of centre- left, centre- right and far- right blocs. This three- way concentration of voting was even more pronounced in the 2012 presidential election, where almost three out of four rst-round votes (just under 74 per cent) went to the Socialist (28.6 per cent), UMP (27.2 per cent) and FN (17.9 per cent) candidates, leaving barely a quarter of the entire ballot to be shared among the remaining seven contenders. Yet this apparently simple ‘tripolarisation’ masks complexities in relation to the FN’s current positioning within French political space. In light of the de ning structural tensions in post- war French politics between fragmentation and bipolarisation, this chapter examines the role of the FN within the French party system today. 2 It seeks to provide some historical context for understanding the current strength of the FN and how this ts within the evolution of party competition in France over recent decades. It discusses the FN as a force for both fragmentation and bipolarisation, considering the positioning and repositioning of other parties vis-à-vis the FN; and it shows the FN to be a party whose reserves of support lie not only on the right but also on the left. The chapter concludes by assessing the prospects opened by the switch from a strategy of systematic opposition under Jean-Marie Le Pen to one of systemic integration under Marine Le Pen. Fragmentation and bipolarisation in contemporary French politics For party system analysts, France’s political landscape offers a rich and varied topography stretching back to the restoration of democracy following the Vichy regime of the Occupation years. Under the Fourth Republic (1946–58), the most marked feature of the French party system was its fragmentation, with electoral support dispersed across an array of old and new parties competing for power in a National Assembly elected by proportional representation. Geographical speci cities, socio- economic cleavages, sectoral interests and divergent policy agendas made for unstable and short- lived coalitions, shifting party alliances, and an average government life expectancy of some six months. Under the Fifth Republic (since 1958), this tendency to fragmentation has been constrained by the powerful countervailing force of a two- ballot majority voting system that exerts a polarising pull towards broad coalitions of right and left. These polarising constraints have not resulted in any lessening of inter- party competition. French voters continue to select from a wide range of ¡ ¢ ¢ ¡ £ ¤ ¥ ¦ § ¨ © ¨ © ¢ THE FRONT NATIONAL SINCE THE 1970S 43 parties, and those parties compete not just for the grand prize of the presidency but also for 577 seats in the National Assembly and 348 in the Senate, 1,880 seats in regional councils, 4,052 seats in departmental councils, 74 seats for France in the European Parliament, and no fewer than 519,417 seats on municipal councils. 3 Competition at all of these electoral levels, however, is tempered by the imperative to preserve tactical alliances, observing what the Socialist and Communist parties have long called ‘la discipline républicaine’, most evident in second- ballot withdrawal agreements. The resulting ‘bipolar multipartism’ has ensured that, whatever the proliferation of parties and candidates contesting elections, every government under the Fifth Republic (except for the transitional administration of 1958–62) has been supported by an effectively sound parliamentary majority or coalition of right or left. This prevalence of polarisation over fragmentation has given Fifth Republic politics their structural logic. The classic expression of this polarisation is a presidential election by universal suffrage where only two candidates can advance to the run- off, each dependent for election on mustering the larger presidential coalition; but the same polarising pull has been a structuring force in all arenas of political competition. It has also led recently to what some analysts have identi ed as a shift from multiparty to bipartisan polarisation, or the beginnings in France of a predominantly two- party system on the Anglo-Saxon model. 4 Other analysts see pluralist fragmentation as a de ning feature still of the French party system, a fragmentation that continues to be arti cially masked by institutional curbs and strategic imperatives. 5 The respective performances of the PCF and the Gaullist Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR) in 1958 laid bare the mechanics of electoral competition under the Fifth Republic. Having won over a quarter of the vote and over a quarter of National Assembly seats (145) in 1956 under the proportional system of the Fourth Republic, the PCF saw its 18.9 per cent of rst- round votes in 1958 translated into just over 2 per cent of seats (10) on the second round. The most powerful party of 1956 was thus reduced to the weakest in 1958 by a two- ballot voting system that nulli ed a party as strong as the PCF if it could not reach out to wider support through tactical alliances for the crucial run- off ballot. The Gaullist UNR, with a smaller share of the rst- round vote (18 per cent), drew suf cient support from conservative, centre- right and even centre- left voters in the second round to win some 40 per cent of the seats (188). 6 This inauguration of the new electoral rules in 1958 and the early dominance enjoyed by the UNR would compel other parties to reassess their political alliances and to seek wider reserves of second- preference support. This would result in the re- mapping of the political landscape into what Maurice Duverger would call a ‘bipolar quartet’, a con guration that was to nd its most balanced expression in the National Assembly elections of 1978 when the PS, the PCF, the neo-Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), and the smaller centre-right parties in and around the Union pour la ¡ ¢ ¢ ¡ £ ¤ ¥ ¦ § ¨ © ¨ © ¢ 44 FRANCE SINCE THE 1970S Démocratie Française (UDF) each attracted 20–25 per cent of the ballot, accounting between them for close to 90 per cent of the entire vote. 7 Though the neat symmetry of the 1978 election was to be the exception rather than the rule, the power balance between the opposing left–right coalitions was broadly maintained in the 1980s and 1990s, with a strengthened PS compensating for its declining Communist partner and with the RPR competing with its UDF ally for supremacy on the right. As Pascal Perrineau reminds us in the previous chapter, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s quali cation for the second round of the presidential election in 2002 put an end to the comfortable assumption that such run- offs were the preserve of centre- right and centre- left. It did not, however, alter the power balance between the dominant forces of French politics. In the subsequent National Assembly elections of 2002, the newly formed centre- right UMP was returned with an emphatic majority – a majority it would retain in 2007 in de ance of a pattern that had seen governing majorities swing from right to left and back again at all National Assembly elections since the victory of the right in 1978: 1981 (left), 1986 (right), 1988 (left), 1993 (right), 1997 (left) and 2002 (right). This period saw the normalising not only of left–right alternation in government but also of power sharing, with three spells of left–right ‘cohabitation’ (1986–8, 1993–5, 1997–2002) tightening the hold over power exercised by the ‘parties of government’. The same period witnessed the emergence of new political forces (far- right, far- left, green and other) as challengers and/or auxiliaries to the established blocs of right and left.
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