The Fraser Government and the Indonesian Occupation of East Timor, 1975-1983

The Fraser government and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, 1975-1983

Peter George Job

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

May 2019

Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Australia's Global University

Surname/Family Name Job Given Name/s Peter George Abbreviation for degree as give in the University PhD calendar Faculty UNSW Canberra School School of Humanities and Social Sciences The Fraser government and the Indonesian occupation of East Thesis Title Timor, 1975-1983

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

This thesis examines the policies of the government of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (1975 - 1983) towards the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timar. It also investigates the response by Australian civil society to events in East Timor during this period, including the efforts of solidarity activists to bring the issue to domestic and international attention. As research by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timordocuments, the Fraser years corresponded to the worst period of the Indonesian occupation, during which grave human rights abuses took place and the Indonesian military strategy of targeting food resources in resistance-held areas caused an artificially produced famine involving a high loss of life. The Fraser government sought to present itself as an advocate for human rights, liberal democratic ideals, and the international rule of law. It was forthright in criticising the invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan, active in opposing apartheid in South Africa and played a significant role in working to end white majority rule in Zimbabwe. At the same time, it viewed relations with the pro Western and anti-communist Suharto regime as the key to its policy position in South East Asia. These two positions came into conflict due to the Indonesian invasion of East Timar. The Fraser government was accordingly forced to choose between applying the liberal democratic principles it purported to uphold to the situation in East Timar and prioritising its support for Suharto's New Order. The Fraser government's decision to take the latter path compelled it to work to neutralise the Timar issue and cover up the situation there. These efforts, however, were challenged by evidence of the humanitarian crisis in East Timar i' ; that came to the attention of the outside world and by a solidarity movement which campaigned to bring the issue to public attention. Moving beyond a state-centric lens, this thesis investigates the actions of both policymakers and activists, exploring the tensions between the two. It examines how the Fraser government became the Suharto regime's principal propagandist on the issue in the domestic and international arenas.

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Date ...... /.1...... M.'tJ ...... /bOtl...... ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the policies of the government of Prime Minister Malcolm

Fraser (1975 - 1983) towards the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor. It also investigates the response by Australian civil society to events in East Timor during this period, including the efforts of solidarity activists to bring the issue to domestic and international attention.

As research by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor documents, the Fraser years corresponded to the worst period of the Indonesian occupation, during which grave human rights abuses took place and the Indonesian military strategy of targeting food resources in resistance-held areas caused an artificially produced famine involving a high loss of life.

The Fraser government sought to present itself as an advocate for human rights, liberal democratic ideals, and the international rule of law. It was forthright in criticising the invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan, active in opposing apartheid in

South Africa and played a significant role in working to end white majority rule in

Zimbabwe. At the same time, it viewed relations with the pro-Western and anti- communist Suharto regime as the key to its policy position in South East Asia. These two positions came into conflict due to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. The

Fraser government was accordingly forced to choose between applying the liberal democratic principles it purported to uphold to the situation in East Timor and prioritising its support for Suharto’s New Order. The Fraser government’s decision to take the latter path compelled it to work to neutralise the Timor issue and cover up the situation there. These efforts, however, were challenged by evidence of the humanitarian crisis in East Timor that came to the attention of the outside world and by a solidarity movement which campaigned to bring the issue to public attention.

Moving beyond a state-centric lens, this thesis investigates the actions of both policymakers and activists, exploring the tensions between the two. It examines how the Fraser government became the Suharto regime’s principal propagandist on the issue in the domestic and international arenas.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... i GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS ...... v Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Research methodology ...... 5 1.2 Structure of the thesis ...... 7 Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature...... 11 2.1 Conclusion ...... 34 Chapter 3: Fraser takes government ...... 37 3.1 Introduction...... 37 3.2 The Whitlam period ...... 38 3.3 The Fraser ‘caretaker’ government ...... 50 3.4 Opening the door to an “appropriate solution” ...... 59 3.5 The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) ...... 62 3.6 The Timor issue at the United Nations ...... 65 3.7 The Ford/Suharto meeting ...... 67 3.8 The narrative of regrettable but understandable invasion ...... 69 3.9 The elected Fraser government ...... 72 3.10 The Timor issue in Parliament ...... 78 3.11 Peacock in Jakarta ...... 80 3.12 The Special Representative of the Secretary General ...... 83 3.13 The Timor issue in Cabinet ...... 87 3.14 Peacock addresses Parliament ...... 91 3.15 Conclusion ...... 91 Chapter 4: Bilateral policy and the Timor issue ...... 97 4.1 Introduction...... 97 4.2 The Fraser government in the international arena ...... 97 4.3 The unfolding situation in East Timor during the Fraser government ...... 102 4.4 The Fraser government’s knowledge of the situation ...... 105 4.5 The trajectory of official Australian policy ...... 108 4.6 “Business as usual” ...... 112 4.7 The evolving narrative of denial ...... 115 4.8 The Timor issue in Parliament ...... 119 4.9 The ALP position ...... 128

4.10 The Fraser government’s parliamentary response ...... 133 4.11 The solidarity movement ...... 136 4.12 Surveillance of the solidarity movement ...... 142 4.13 Fretilin in Australia ...... 144 4.14 Radio Maubere ...... 146 4.15 The Dawn ...... 149 4.16 The Jakarta Lobby ...... 151 4.17 Conclusion ...... 155 Chapter 5: Australian Timor policy at the United Nations ...... 159 5.1 Introduction ...... 159 5.2 “Reduce the pressure on the Indonesians” ...... 160 5.3 The Security Council 1975 ...... 163 5.4 The Security Council 1976 ...... 169 5.5 The move to abstention ...... 175 5.6 The move to a no vote ...... 179 5.7 1978-1981 ...... 186 5.8 General Assembly and Fourth Committee 1982 ...... 190 5.9 Conclusion ...... 198 Chapter 6: The Dunn Report on East Timor ...... 200 6.1 Introduction ...... 200 6.2 The report ...... 201 6.3 Impact and corroboration ...... 202 6.4 The Fraser government’s response ...... 206 6.5 The Indonesian reaction ...... 212 6.6 The parliamentary response ...... 217 6.7 The Fraser government, Dunn, and the international community ...... 223 6.8 US Congressional hearings ...... 226 6.9 Conclusion ...... 232 Chapter 7: The Fraser government and the famine ...... 237 7.1 Introduction ...... 237 7.2 The developing situation ...... 237 7.3 The Fraser agenda ...... 239 7.4 The Timor lobby and public opinion ...... 240 7.5 The Media Response ...... 244 7.6 The Fraser government’s use of information ...... 248 7.7 Indonesian briefings ...... 251

7.8 DFA Visits ...... 253 7.9 Indonesian pressure and its impact ...... 254 7.10 The ongoing construction of the narrative of denial ...... 256 7.11 The visit of the Ambassadors...... 261 7.12 The Rodgers pictures ...... 266 7.13 The Timor issue in the international area ...... 267 7.14 Australian lobbying ...... 269 7.15 Aid and the ICRC ...... 271 7.16 Conclusion ...... 272 Chapter 8: Policy after the famine ...... 277 8.1 Introduction...... 277 8.2 The ICRC and CRS ...... 278 8.3 The Indonesian relationship and the ongoing disinformation effort ...... 281 8.4 Civil society and the Timor issue ...... 288 8.5 The Timor issue in the international arena ...... 291 8.6 Australian lobbying ...... 295 8.7 The Fence of Legs ...... 296 8.8 The DPRD petition ...... 300 8.9 Whitlam, da Costa Lopes and the government narrative ...... 302 8.10 The Senate inquiry ...... 307 8.11 Conclusion ...... 311 Chapter 9: Conclusion ...... 316 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 323

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who have contributed to the successful completion of this thesis. First and foremost it was made possible by my wife, Dr April Weiss, whose support was vital in allowing me to undertake this project. Her enthusiasm for my research and encouragement throughout was a blessing and a pleasure. I am also greatly in dept to my excellent supervisor, Professor Clinton Fernandes. It was with his assistance that I entered the doctoral program at UNSW in Canberra. His dedication, guidance, understanding and knowledge were unrelenting throughout the program, as was his encouragement and support.

I would like to thank the School of Humanities and Social Sciences (HASS) at

UNSW Canberra for making thesis possible through the provision of my scholarship.

HASS was highly supportive of my work throughout, providing financial assistance for attending conferences and providing other important resources, including the numerous interesting and helpful seminars it facilitated, creating a stimulating and interesting atmosphere to work in. I am indebted to many in HASS, particularly the dedicated and convivial administrative staff who were helpful in every way throughout. In this regard I would particularly like to thank Bernadette McDermott, whose knowledge of administrative practices and constant willingness to help assisted greatly in my journey through the program. In a similar way, Shirley Ramsey was a significant source of assistance throughout. I am also in dept to the administrative assistance of Marilyn Anderson-Smith and Elvira Berra. The staff at the UNSW

Canberra library were also of considerable assistance in a number of ways, particularly Michael Lemmer and Susan Powter.

I am grateful to the academic staff at HASS who provided a stimulating and encouraging environment to work in, including Dr Ned Dobos, Professor Toni Eskine,

Professor Anthony Burke, Dr John Connor, Dr Belinda Edwards, Associate Professor

Eleanor Hancock, Professor Nicole Moore, Dr Heather Neilson, Professor Morten

Pedersen, Dr Minako Sakai, Dr Craig Stockings, Dr Christian Spittel and Professor

Peter Stanley. I am also indebted to my fellow post graduate students who made my journey pleasant and intellectually stimulating, including Birawa Anoraga, Beibei

Chen, Amy Doffegnies, Ross Mackie, Cecile Medail, Riza Nurdin, Ajie Saksono and

Haoyue Zu.

My fellow researchers in the Timor-Leste Studies Association also enhanced my understanding of my subject area as well as providing a source of intellectual stimulation and inspiration. In this regard, particular thanks go to Dr Susan Connelly,

Dr Vannessa Hearmann, Professor Michael Leach and Dr Hannah Loney.

The research that underpinned this thesis required a substantial amount of work at the National Archives of Australia and I would like to express my thanks to those who provided cheerful assistance there.

I am grateful to the archivists of the Clearing House for Archival Records on

Timor (CHART) whose diligence has created an invaluable resource of records relating to Australian relations with East Timor during the occupation. In this regard I am particularly grateful to John Waddingham whose assistance in navigating the archives, provision of key material, knowledge of the subject matter and stimulating and informed discussions was of invaluable help.

I would like to express my thanks to all those who agreed to provide interviews for my research. From the Department of Foreign Affairs this includes

Ross Cottrill, Malcolm Dan, Rawdon Dalrymple, Geoffrey Miller and Richard

Woolcott. From those who worked in solidarity with East Timor it includes Bill

Armstrong, John Dowd, James Dunn, Dr Richie Gunn, Gordon McIntosh, John

Waddingham, Pat Walsh and Robert Wesley-Smith.

Finally, I would like to thank my old friend and comrade the late Brian

Manning. It was his dedication and example that originally stimulated my interested

in the situation in East Timor and the policies of the Australian government towards it. Amongst other things this has led to this work many years later.

iii

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation

ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia: Indonesian Armed

Forces

ACFOA Australian Council for Overseas Aid

ACT Australian Capital Territory

ACTU Australian Council of Trade Unions

AETA Australia East Timor Association

AJA Australian Journalists Association

ALP Australian Labor Party

AM Morning news and current affairs program on ABC radio

Antara State owned news agency of Indonesia

ANU Australian National University

ANZUS Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty

Apodeti Associação Popular Democratica Timorense: Popular

Democratic Association of East Timor

ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations

ASIO Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation

BAKIN Badan Ko-ordinasi lnteligens Negara Indonesia: State

Intelligence Co-ordination Agency (Indonesia)

CAA Community Aid Abroad

CAVR Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de

Timor Leste: Commission for Reception, Truth and

Reconciliation in East Timor

CHART Clearing House for Archival Records on Timor

CIA Central Intelligence Organization (US)

CIET Campaign for an Independent East Timor

CPA Communist Party of Australia

CRS Catholic Relief Services

CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia)

DFA Department of Foreign Affairs (Australia)

DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)

DPRD Indonesian controlled Provincial Government of East Timor

DRET Democratic Republic of East Timor

EEC European Economic Community

Flamboyant Indonesian covert military operation for the incorporation of

Portuguese Timor

Fourth Committee Special Political and Decolonisation Committee of the UN

Fretilin Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente:

Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor

FRG Federal Republic of Germany

GAOR General Assembly Official Records

HRVD Human Rights Violations Database

ICJ International Court of Justice

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ICTJ International Center for Transitional Justice

IGGI Inter-government Group on Indonesia

IMF International Monetary Fund

INTERFET International Force East Timor

IPU International Parliamentary Union

IRC Indonesian Red Cross

JFADC Joint Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of Federal

Parliament

JIO Joint Intelligence Organisation (Australia)

Komodo Indonesian operation for the incorporation of Portuguese

Timor

KOTA Kilbur Oan Timur Aswain: ‘Sons of the Mountain Warrior-

dogs’

MP Member of Parliament

NCC National Civic Council

NCP National Country Party

NGO Non-government Organisation

NSW New South Wales (Australia)

NAA National Archives of Australia

ONA Office of National Assessments (Australia)

OPSUS Operasi Khusus: Special Operations Service, Indonesia

PGET Provisional Government of East Timor

PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia: Communist Party of Indonesia

PPT Permanent People’s Tribunal

QLD Queensland (Australia)

SCOR Security Council Official Records

Tapol UK based NGO monitoring human rights in Indonesia

TIS Timor Information Service

Trabalhista Partido Trabalhista Timor-Leste: East Timor Labour Party

UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UDT União Democrática Timorense: Timorese Democratic Union

UN United Nations

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

UNSW University of New South Wales

vii

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction

25 April 1974 saw the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which overthrew the long ruling authoritarian dictatorship. This development signalled the dismantling of the Portuguese colonial empire. In East Timor, a Portuguese colony since the 16th

Century, the prospect of independence saw the formation of three political parties: the left-wing Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), the more conservative Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), and the small Popular Democratic

Association of East Timor (Apodeti), the only one of the three which favoured integration with Indonesia. In Indonesia, the staunchly anti-communist Suharto regime saw the emergence of a potentially left inclined independent East Timor as a threat to its interests. A program of subversion instigated by the Indonesian government resulted in conflict between the Timorese parties, a brief civil war, the coming to power of Fretilin in September 1975 and a period of covert Indonesian military intervention which culminated in a full-scale Indonesian invasion on 7

December 1975.

The Fraser government (1975-1983) was appointed in a caretaker role on 11

November 1975, twenty-six days before the invasion, and was elected in its own right on 13 December. When it came to government it inherited a situation in which

Indonesian subversion of the decolonisation process was well advanced, along with a legacy of support for integration and Indonesian covert actions by the Whitlam government. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser was considered at the time as residing on the conservative wing of the Liberal Party, Australia’s main conservative party. He came to power after an acrimonious crusade against the reforms of Labor Prime

Minister Gough Whitlam, campaigning on a program of economic conservativism and cutbacks to government spending. He was intensely anti-communist, sceptical of détente, strongly critical of the Soviet Union and supportive of the US alliance and the

importance of ASEAN. His government accordingly considered good relations with

Suharto’s New Order to be of crucial importance to what it perceived to be the

Australian national interest due to the strategic and political importance of the regime to its policy objectives in the region and the world. At the same time, it sought to project itself as a supporter of international law and human rights, including the right of nations to self-determination.

During the Fraser years the Indonesian conquest of East Timor was accompanied by widespread human rights abuses and deliberately induced famine.

The Indonesian efforts to suppress Fretilin resistance resulted in a major humanitarian catastrophe that would take the lives of many Timorese. Despite the government’s insistence that it was not a “party principal” to the Timor issue, Australia was in a unique position to impact upon the amount of information coming from the then closed territory and the way in which the situation was understood in the wider world.

Australian actions accordingly had a substantial impact upon the willingness of many nations to respond to reports of abuses occurring there. Despite strong evidence of severe human rights abuses and a high fatality rate in its near neighbour, however, the

Fraser government not only failed to respond to the ongoing crisis, but actively facilitated the continued Indonesian occupation and the abuses which accompanied it, to the extent of supplying military aid to Indonesia and using its unique position to protect it diplomatically.

Having made the decision to prioritise support for the Suharto regime above the rights and welfare of the people of East Timor, the Fraser government was faced with the task of explaining its position to the Australian people and the international community in a manner that would appear consistent with its stated adherence to international norms regarding self-determination and human rights. This brought immediate challenges. A solidarity movement supporting the Timorese right to self-

determination was already in existence by the time Fraser came to government, with a number of publications and links with Fretilin officials. Aid organisations such as the

Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) and Community Aid Abroad (CAA) also took up the Timor issue. For the first three years of the Fraser government a radio link to Fretilin in East Timor conveyed news of the developing situation and the abuses occurring there. Evidence also came from Catholic sources and from refugees who had left the territory. The Australian Journalists Association (AJA) campaigned on the issue of the Balibo Five, as the five Australian based journalists killed by

Indonesian forces in Balibo on 16 October 1975 became known. A pro-Timorese parliamentary lobby was also active in criticising Indonesian actions and demanding the Australian government take a more critical position. In 1977 former consul to

Portuguese Timor James Dunn published the Dunn Report on East Timor, which, based on interviews with East Timorese refugees in Portugal, documented the extent of the humanitarian crisis and the nature of the abuses under which the Timorese people were suffering. In 1978 a group of foreign ambassadors visited the territory, making public statements regarding the extreme nature of the deprivation they observed. As events progressed, the governments and parliaments of a number of nations examined the issue, including sections of US Congress. The matter of East

Timor remained current at the United Nations, with yearly resolutions on the issue at the General Assembly.

The Suharto regime reacted strongly to criticism of its actions in East Timor by elements of civil society in Australia, making it known to the Australian government on a regular basis that it considered such agitation an impediment to the continuance of good relations. The Fraser government therefore felt compelled to respond in defence of its position and the actions of the Indonesian government in

East Timor.

This study will investigate how the government of a democratic country which professed to value human rights chose to take the position it did. It also explores how the Fraser government responded to the challenge to its policy position on East Timor posed by the pro-Timorese solidarity movement, other elements of civil society and concerns raised about the situation internationally. It examines how

Australian policymakers had to deal with public opposition in an area generally considered sealed off from domestic considerations. It investigates the actions of policymakers and activists and explores the tensions between the two. It explores how the Fraser government responded in the international arena, both at the United Nations and by directly lobbying the governments of other nations. It argues that in doing so it created a ‘narrative of denial’, a distorted account of the situation and events in East

Timor designed to position Indonesian actions in a positive light, deny the ongoing reality of the situation, neutralise concerns about it and depict the Fraser government’s own actions as principled and realistic.

I chose to examine the years of the Fraser government for a number of reasons. The Fraser government’s tenure from November 1975 until March 1983 closely correlates with the worst of the humanitarian crisis in East Timor, making an investigation into Australian policy during this period one of considerable significance. Although the Whitlam government established the precedent for the position adopted, it was during the caretaker Fraser government that the full invasion commenced, and it was the caretaker Fraser government that responded to it, including at the United Nations. It was the Fraser government that moved from a position of mild official criticism of Indonesian actions to de facto and then de jure recognition, and it was the Fraser government that developed the policies and the narrative that would remain the bilateral position during coalition and Labor governments in the following decades of occupation. It was during the Fraser years that the artificially induced famine which took the majority of lives of those who died

due to the occupation occurred, and it was the Fraser government that responded to it.

During the Fraser government two Security Council and eight General Assembly resolutions on East Timor were debated and passed. A study of this period accordingly allows an investigation into a defining period of Australian policy towards the occupation during which key events took place and key decisions were taken.

1.1 Research methodology

This thesis focuses on a study of archival documentary material relating to

Australian policy towards East Timor during this period. As well as government material, this includes documentation relating to the solidarity movement, the media, aid organisations, international developments, and other matters concerning East

Timor. Much of it was accessed at the National Archives of Australia (NAA) in

Canberra. According to figures provided on 1 July 2015 by the Director-General of

NAA, since 2007 his organisation has released 705 Commonwealth records relating to the occupation of East Timor and related matters which on average contain 250 pages per record.1 This release, still ongoing, provided extensive scope for this research.

Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) documentation make up most of these records and constitute a large proportion of the documents examined in this study. Joint

Intelligence Organisation (JIO) reports of the period regarding the situation in East

Timor also proved valuable. Archives from the Australian Security and Intelligence

Organisation (ASIO) relating to the Timor solidarity campaign and the individuals involved in it provided an insight into the solidarity movement and government surveillance of it.

1 Letter from David Fricker, Director-General of the National Archives of Australia to Ian Latham, 1 July 2015. NAA Reference 2015/2193.

The study made extensive use of newspaper, magazine and other media reports of the period. The online archive Trove, run by the National Library of

Australia, supplied an extensive number of relevant newspaper and magazine resources. The microfilm archives of Australian newspapers in the National Library were also utilised, as was the Google newspaper archive. The online collections of the

Clearing House for Archival Records on Timor (CHART) provided a valuable collection of newspaper and magazine articles, transcripts of radio and television programs and other material relating to East Timor. This included the complete issues of Timor Information Service (TIS) newsletters, complete issues of East Timor News produced by the Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET), and an extensive number of early CIET mimeographs and media releases. As well as assisting a study into the Australian Timor solidarity movement, these provided a useful insight into how events unfolding in the territory came to the attention of activists in Australia.

The papers of former Senator Gordon McIntosh provided a useful collection of relevant documentation relating to East Timor from a number of sources, including

DFA. This study also undertook an investigation into the Federal Parliamentary response to developments in East Timor, examining all references to it in Federal

Parliamentary Hansard during the Fraser years.

The documentary study was supplemented by interviews with participants who played a number of roles during this period, including former DFA officials, solidarity activists, parliamentarians, members of aid organisations and others.

Interviews were carried out in accordance with UNSW ethics requirements, including signed consent with the option of withdrawal. In accordance to guidelines, when a subject did not respond to an interview request no further contact was attempted. In one case a key subject phoned and engaged in an extensive telephone conversation, but finally declined to sign a consent form, meaning that the insights provided could not be used. Interviews were electronically recorded with permission, although this

was not always granted, in which cases notes had to make do. Overall, the interviews proved useful and revealing, providing valuable insights, leads, information and context. Statements and assertions by interview subjects were verified as far as possible by documentary sources for consistency and context. Analysis of material from diverse sources allowed the formulation of conclusions which were able to be tested in discussions with participants.

1.2 Structure of the thesis

Chapter Two is a review of the literature. It situates the research in the context of the previous work of scholars who have explored Australian policy during the

Fraser government. It determines gaps which this thesis endeavours to fill and underlines the fact that this remains a largely understudied area ripe for further research.

Chapter Three examines the challenges facing the Fraser government regarding East Timor when it took power. It covers the caretaker period from 11

November to 13 December 1975 and the first months of elected government up until

Foreign Minister Peacock’s address to Federal Parliament on 4 March 1976, during which he stipulated official Timor policy for the early period. It contains a brief overview of the issue during the Whitlam government, the situation the caretaker government inherited when it came to power, a brief examination of the alternatives available to it and the context of the decision to take the policy course that was embarked upon. It examines the narrative the government used with the public and at the United Nations to deflect blame for the invasion from the Indonesian government.

It examines the nature of the two-tier policy approach that was adopted in the early years, that of expressing official concern about self-determination and the use of force while in practice acting to support the Indonesian position.

Chapter Four investigates the bilateral relationship between Australia and

Indonesia in the context of the Timor issue and the factors that affected it. These include the Timor solidarity movement, the pro-Timor Parliamentary lobby, the official position of the Labor opposition which supported self-determination and an

Indonesian withdrawal during this period, and the Jakarta lobby which advocated in support of the Suharto regime. The chapter examines the trajectory of official policy during the Fraser years, from expressions of mild concern to de facto then de jure recognition. It also examines the ongoing development of the narrative regarding East

Timor the Australian government propagated to the Australian people and the international community during the Fraser years.

Chapter Five is a study of Australian policy and actions at the United Nations during the Fraser years. This includes its response to the two Security Council and eight General Assembly resolutions that were passed during this period and the narrative the Australian government employed regarding East Timor at the UN. It documents the move to abstention in 1976 and to a no vote in 1978 as well as the lobbying efforts by Australia on behalf of the Indonesian government in its attempts to remove East Timor from the UN agenda. This includes a study of events during

1982, including the role played by former Prime Minister Whitlam at the Fourth

(decolonisation) Committee.

Chapter Six examines the impact of the Dunn Report on East Timor by former

Consul to Portuguese Timor James Dunn, published in February 1977, and the Fraser government’s response to it. It documents the government’s attempts to discredit the claims of a humanitarian crisis in it and to neutralise the report’s impact in both the domestic and international arenas. This includes in the Netherlands where the report had a particular impact, and at the US Congressional House Committee on

International Relations at which Dunn was invited to testify.

Chapter Seven is a study of the Fraser government’s response to the famine of the late 1970s caused by the Indonesian military’s policy of destroying food resources in Fretilin controlled areas and forcing the population into transit and resettlement camps. It interrogates the Fraser government’s use of information regarding East

Timor and the narrative that it developed to support its goals, including its initial attempts to deny the extent of the crisis and then to divert blame away from the actions of the Suharto regime when this was no longer entirely possible. It examines the Fraser government’s response to the visit by a group of foreign ambassadors to

East Timor in late 1978 which brought evidence of the extent of the crisis to the international community. It documents the extent of the Fraser governments knowledge of the situation that came in part through briefings by Indonesian officials, and the disconnect between the intelligence available to it regarding the situation and the position it espoused publicly.

Chapter Eight is an examination of the policies of the Fraser government towards East Timor in the period after the famine, from the entry of the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) into East Timor in October 1979 to the end of the

Fraser government in March 1983. This entails an investigation into the Fraser government’s ongoing disinformation efforts on behalf of the Suharto regime. This includes the narrative it employed in response to the relocation of much of the

Timorese population by the Indonesian government, the “Fence of Legs” military operation that conscripted the civilian population in an attempt to flush out remaining

Fretilin forces, and other developments. It examines Australian lobbying efforts in response to international concerns about the situation and investigates Whitlam’s ongoing role in supporting the Indonesian position. It also interrogates the Australian supported narrative further with an examination of the DFA response to an Australian

Senate enquiry into the human rights and humanitarian situation in East Timor.

Chapter Nine summarises the analysis presented in Chapters Three to Eight. It then concludes with findings regarding the Fraser government’s response to the invasion and occupation of East Timor, the challenges posed to its position caused by those who opposed it, and the narrative it used in support of its policy position and the actions of the Suharto regime.

Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature

The literature relating to Australian policy towards the invasion and occupation of East Timor between 1975 and 1983 can be divided into two periods: the lead up to the invasion on 7 December 1975, and the period of occupation afterwards.

It is the latter that largely concerns this study, although the short period of Fraser caretaker government before the invasion is also directly relevant. The former period has been studied considerably more than the latter, which remains an understudied area ripe for further research.

Timor. A People Betrayed1 by James Dunn was first published in 1983 and republished with only small changes in 1993 and 1996. It was again republished under the title, East Timor: a rough passage to independence in 2003, with the addition of short chapters on the transition to independence, but otherwise minor changes. The author is a former consul to Portuguese Timor, a member of two fact finding missions during the pre-invasion period and a long-term advocate for Timorese independence.

As such he was able combine his research skills with his firsthand insights to produce an analysis of events in East Timor and Australian foreign policy towards the territory based on documentation in the public domain at the time.

Dunn examines developments in the lead up to the invasion, the role

Australian foreign policy played in facilitating the outcome, and the alternatives available to it. He describes what he calls, “the spirit of goodwill” apparent during his visit to East Timor as part of a two person DFA fact finding mission in June 1974, which he says, presented a “superb opportunity” for involvement by Australia and

Indonesia to support the decolonisation process.2 He argues for the viability of East

Timor as an independent state, contending it would be no more dependent on external

1 James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed (Sydney: ABC Books, 1996). 2 Dunn, Timor, 59.

support than many in the South Pacific.3 Among the many things Dunn interrogates are the significance and impact of the Whitlam/ Suharto meeting in September 1974,

DFA decision making processes towards East Timor, the “green light” Lieutenant

General Murtopo claimed Whitlam provided Suharto during their April 1975

Townsville meeting and the development of the Australian policy of “non- involvement” and its implications. He contends the latter acted in support of those in

Indonesia advocating for integration and discusses how Australia consistently missed opportunities to support policies which may well have resulted in a genuine act of self-determination and transfer of power. He accuses DFA of failing to respond to

Indonesian propaganda, including the claim that Fretilin was communist, making

Indonesian generals conclude that the use of force would be acceptable to Australia.4

He contrasts Whitlam’s position to the Department of Defence’s advocacy for acceptance of an independent East Timor, as put forward in the “frank report” produced by William Pritchett in September 1975.5

Even when Fraser took power, Dunn argues, the restrictions of caretaker government would not have prevented the government from deterring an act of aggression. He contends that Fraser and Peacock would have been able to deduce that

Suharto was a “reluctant party to the conspiracy to get East Timor by illegal means,” and that the killings in Balibo had caused him “further anxiety” due to the potential damage to the Australian relationship. He argues that the Fraser government could have taken up the issue with “Jakarta’s key western friends” on whom the Suharto regime was economically and militarily dependent, lobbying them to persuade

Indonesia to cease military intervention and pursue peaceful means. Such a strategy, he argues, would have had “reasonable prospects” of success even at that stage.

3 Dunn, Timor, 69. 4 Dunn, Timor, 141. 5 Dunn, Timor, 221-2.

Instead, he contends, the new government “acted very much like its predecessor,” blaming the policy on the Whitlam government while whitewashing Indonesian actions.6

Chapters Ten and Eleven deal with the period from the invasion until the early

1980s, including the Indonesian and Fretilin military and social strategies, their impact on Timorese society, the famine and the extensive human rights abuses which occurred during this period. There is little examination of Australian government policies, although Dunn accuses the US and Australia of shielding the Suharto regime from international criticism on human rights grounds.7 He also accuses the Australian parliamentary delegation led by Bill Morrison in July and August 1983 of producing a report which “glossed over the human rights issue” and misrepresented the historical background in order to provide a pretext for the Hawke government to “get the Timor issue off the agenda” in the interests of the Indonesian relationship and a settlement in the Timor Sea.8

The 1996 version contains a short chapter, Australia and Timor after 1975, which examines Australian policy from the invasion to the mid-1990s. Only five pages cover the Fraser years. He notes the early efforts by Peacock and Fraser to keep up an appearance of opposition to Indonesia, while in reality accepting incorporation and striving to prevent a rupture in the relationship. He briefly discusses the impact of

Fraser’s October 1976 visit to Jakarta, the move to de facto and then de jure recognition and the shift to abstention and then a no vote on the annual Timor resolutions at the UN General Assembly.9 The chapter also documents the change of

ALP policy under the Hawke government, the Timor Gap Treaty and the reaction to

6 Dunn, Timor, 232-3. 7 Dunn, Timor, 300. 8 Dunn, Timor, 302-3. 9 Dunn, Timor, 242-46.

the Santa Cruz massacre. Dunn accuses Australian governments during this period of enacting, “a continuity of Timor policy…based on miscalculations, false assumptions and plain lies.”10

Although Dunn provides an excellent and valuable piece of research, the lack of documentation in the public domain at the time he wrote constrains his analysis.

This is particularly so concerning Australian policy during the Fraser years which consequently is only dealt with briefly, leaving considerable gaps. Resources now available provide considerably more scope to explore Australian Timor policy during this period.

East Timor, Australia and Regional Order, by James Cotton (2004),11 is an examination of Australian policy towards East Timor from before the invasion to independence. The first chapter examines the development of policy towards East

Timor in the context of the Australia/Indonesia relationship and its importance in establishing a stronger identification by Australia with the region.12 Cotton demonstrates the continuity of policy over successive governments, but also how such orthodoxy was disputed in the arena of public opinion and within political parties, particularly ALP, in which the issue was kept alive by internal party disputation.13 The chapter provides an overview of Australian policy the 1960s, in which the incorporation of West Papua into Indonesia was viewed by Whitlam as an anti- colonialist position in contrast to the Menzies government’s original support for a continuation of Dutch rule.14 It discusses the role of Richard Woolcott (Australian

10 Dunn, Timor, 349. 11 James Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 12 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 5. 13 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 7. 14 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 8.

ambassador to Indonesia 1975-1978), which he calls a “powerful influence” in formulating Whitlam’s policy of a “pragmatic and realist” approach and allowing

“events to take their course” in the territory.15

Chapter Two contains a more detailed examination of DFA pre-invasion policy, much of it based on the collection Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

(DFAT) collection, Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor

(Way 2000).16 Cotton provides context with an outline of Australia/Indonesia relations during the Sukarno regime and the “profound reassessment” under the New Order, where improved relations led to aid and the negotiation of a seabed boundary.

Whitlam’s efforts to repudiate past associations with colonialism led to him to seek a close relationship with Suharto and underlined his attitude to the incorporation of East

Timor.17

Cotton discusses how the nature of Indonesian covert activities was apparent to DFA from late 1974 onwards, with Indonesian intelligence officer Harry Tjan and other OPSUS sources implicating DFA officials by providing them with details of operations.18 He contends that the growing evidence that political leadership had developed in the territory with a coherent and popular program along with the fact that the Portuguese did not have the capacity to complete its decolonisation program could have led to a reassessment of policy and support for self-determination. Instead,

Cotton demonstrates that Australian complicity with Indonesian designs deepened, despite the “significant counterpoint” provided by Pritchett and the Department of

Defence.19 There is little evidence, Cotton contends, that DFA officials gave any

15 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 9. 16 Wendy Way, ed., Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974- 1976 (Melbourne: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Melbourne University Press, 2000). 17 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 24-5. 18 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 27-8. 19 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 28-30.

thought to what Indonesian rule might entail for the Timorese people, despite knowledge of the “sea of blood” that had accompanied the advent of the New Order.20

In light of the evidence, Cotton argues that the Whitlam/Woolcott position, far from enhancing the bilateral relationship with Indonesia, actually did quite the opposite, increasing public suspicion of Indonesia and creating long-term tension in the relationship.21

Not all of Cotton’s conclusions are incontestable. He claims, for example, that a “powerful factor” conditioning Australian attitudes was the fear a communist state could emerge offering a foothold for a Chinese or Soviet presence.22 The bulk of evidence indicates in fact that DFA officials were overwhelmingly dismissive of

Soviet and Chinese influence as a threat. Cotton states that Indonesian Foreign

Minister Adam Malik, while initially sympathetic to independence, later became a leading advocate for integration and covert activities.23 While this was a claim made by OPSUS operative Harry Tjan, there is considerable evidence this was not the case and that such claims were made in pursuit of OPSUS objectives.24 25

Cotton has little to say about the Fraser period, simply noting continuity of policy between the Whitlam and Fraser governments. Later chapters examine policy under Keating and Howard, leading up to and including the INTERFET intervention.

Cotton notes that the material which became available in 2000 and on which he based much of his research “does not offer a comprehensive picture beyond 1976.”26 This is

20 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 39. 21 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 34-5. 22 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 4. 23 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 34. 24 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11,1, iii. Letter from M.J Dan to the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs. 20 November 1974. 25 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 15 August 1975. (Way, 310). In cases where NAA documents are published in the collection, Way, Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, the reference will be followed by “Way” in brackets, followed by the page number. Eg. (Way, 310). 26 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, 33.

no longer the case, and there is accordingly ample scope for a new documentary study into the 1975 to 1983 period.

The PhD thesis, A Transformational Analysis of the National Interest, by

Clinton Fernandes (2004),27 takes a “multidimensional approach”, going beyond what it calls a “state centric” lens to investigate the actions of both policymakers and activists. It combines a theoretical analysis of the concept of the ‘national interest’ in the context of International Relations Theory. It takes as a case study Australian foreign policy towards the invasion and occupation of East Timor, the transnational solidarity movement which opposed that policy, and the events which unfolded in

East Timor from before the invasion to the INTERFET intervention.

The principal strengths of this work are its examination of the concept of the national interest and the Realist tradition in the context of the invasion and occupation of East Timor, and its study of the role of the international solidarity movement. In regard to the latter in particular it has thematic similarities to this study. That said, there are differences in scope and in the availability of documentation that leave considerable gaps and allow for further study. Fernandes’ thesis encompasses the period from the early 1970s to 2000, while my research is focused on 1975 to 1983, leaving scope to explore issues in the latter period in greater depth. At the time

Fernandes wrote archival material relating to the Fraser government’s diplomacy was not available. Such material is now in the public domain, making a more detailed assessment possible.

27 Clinton Fernandes, “A Transformational Analysis of the National Interest.” (PhD diss., Deakin University, 2004).

Chega is the report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and

Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR) published electronically in 2005 and in print in

2013.28 At over 3000 pages in length and examining a wide range of human rights related issues, including self-determination, unlawful killings, disappearances, forced displacement, famine, detention, torture, sexual violence, violations of the rights of the child and economic and social rights, it is the best funded, researched and most comprehensive study of the period of Indonesian occupation and the events which led up to it.

The mandate of the commission was to inquire into human rights abuses by all participants between April 1974 and December 1999, and to facilitate reconciliation for less serious offences. This entailed investigating the context, causes and motives which led to violations, the identities of those involved, whether they were part of a systematic pattern of abuse and whether they were the result of deliberate “planning, policy or authorisation on the part of the state, political groups, militia groups, liberation movements or other groups or individuals.” The mandate also included formulating recommendations for reforms to prevent future violations, recommending prosecutions, promoting reconciliation, assisting in restoring the dignity of victims and promoting human rights.29

The inquiry itself included 7668 statements from witnesses, victims and perpetrators, 1048 targeted research interviews, 1379 Community Reconciliation

Procedure cases in which perpetrators of more minor offences participated in village- based hearings aimed at re-integrating them into their communities, eight national public meetings and fifty-two public subdistrict hearings. It held 257 Community

28 Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade, e Reconciliacã̦ o Timor Leste (CAVR), Chega (Dili: CAVR, 2013). First published electronically in 2005 and in print in 2013. The citations in this thesis refer to the print edition. 29 CAVR, Chega, 73-76.

Profile workshops where members of communities with the most severe violations met to discuss their experiences. It conducted programs in West Timorese refugee camps and held six “Healing Workshops” in Dili. It also established an archive and documentation centre and a Human Rights Violations Database (HRVD) to contain the documentation of the 85,164 human rights violations reported to the

Commission.30

Chapter 7.1 of Chega dealt with Self Determination. It examined the parts played by the international community, including the United Nations and various countries, with a particular emphasis on Indonesia, Portugal and Australia. The

Commission reported that it had a “mixed response” in attempting to seek input and information from governments, with no official replies received from requests for information, although assistance was provided by representatives of governments in

Timor-Leste. The Commission also wrote to a number of former officials, including former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and the former Ambassador to

Indonesia Richard Woolcott, although it once again notes that responses were

“mixed”. It also drew on reports from the Australian parliament as well as the documents published in the Way (2000) collection.31

The section on Australia is ten pages long. It relies heavily on the Way

(2000), which makes up sixteen of the twenty-two references in this section. There are three references to Australian cabinet minutes, two to the 2000 Senate Report into

Australian policy towards East Timor and one to the DFA publication East Timor in

Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge.32

30 CAVR, Chega Plain Guide (Dili: CAVR, 2006), 11. 31 CAVR, Chega, 41-42. 32 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (DFAT), East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge (Canberra: DEFAT, 2001).

The chapter states that Australia, “was not a party principal to the Timor-

Leste conflict”,33 a position in accordance with the assertions of Australian government claims of the period, although one contestable given the history of

Australia’s engagement with East Timor and the realities of Australia’s position. The chapter’s summary, somewhat in contradiction, identifies Australia as one of three key stakeholders, along with Portugal and Indonesia during the 1974 to 1975 period. It describes Australia as, “well placed to influence policymaking on the issue because the people of Timor-Leste, President Suharto and the international community regarded its views on the question as important.”34 The report states that major western powers expected Australia to play a role and looked to it for “intelligence and policy advice on the issue”, and that this led the Suharto government to make efforts to win Australia to its position.35

The report notes that the key features of policy which would be central during

1974 and 1975 were developed in the 1960s, including the contention that the territory had no future under Portuguese rule and that it was not capable of political independence. Whitlam’s key role in determining policy is examined over three pages.

This includes the high priority given to cooperation with the Suharto regime and the impact of the 1974 and 1975 meetings with Suharto, during which it concludes

Whitlam “reduced the three options available to the Timorese people under international law to one, namely incorporation into Indonesia, provided that this was freely chosen by the Timorese people.” It cites Ali Murtopo as saying that Whitlam’s position helped them “crystallise their own thinking” into support for integration.36

The report interrogates the development of DFA policy, including Woolcott’s advice to show “understanding” of the Indonesian position rather than protest covert

33 CAVR, Chega, 625. 34 CAVR, Chega, 742-43. 35 CAVR, Chega, 725. 36 CAVR, Chega, 629.

activities, as well as his contention that Timor Sea issues could be more easily negotiated with Indonesia than with an independent East Timor. It presents Australia under Whitlam as supportive of Indonesian aims and actions to the extent of failing to protest Operation Flamboyant and the deaths of the Balibo Five.37

Less than two pages in total are devoted to the period of the Fraser government. It notes that the policy did not change when Fraser assumed power, with the new Prime Minister assuring Suharto via Ambassador Woolcott of the “high importance” it placed on bilateral relations and his government’s recognition of

Indonesia’s need for an “appropriate solution” to the “problem” of East Timor. It describes Fraser government policy during the early stages as “two pronged” in that it officially upheld the Timorese right to self-determination whilst in reality supporting

Indonesia. It notes that the de facto and de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in 1978 and 1979, along with a wider pattern of civilian and military cooperation with

Indonesia, “had the effect of consolidating and legitimising Indonesia’s sovereignty in

Timor-Leste.” It notes the basic trajectory of policy at the United Nations, including the reluctant vote for the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution, the attempts to have wording critical of Indonesia deleted and the moves to abstention and to a no vote, although the ambiguity of the wording makes the year by year Australian vote unclear.38

The report briefly touches on the Hawke Government, noting the recognition given to Indonesian sovereignty by Hawke on Indonesian National Day in 1985 and the signing of the Timor Gap Zone Treaty by Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Ali

Alatas in 1989. It documents the continuation of such policies under the Keating

37 CAVR, Chega, 627-30. 38 CAVR, Chega, 631-32.

government, the policy shift in the late 1990s and the series of events which led to independence.39

Chega concludes that the high expectations the people of East Timor held of

Australia were not fulfilled until 1999, with five successive governments effectively supporting integration. Noting Australia’s record of voting “against Timor-Leste” in the United Nations in all but one occasion, it contends that Australia’s “stance and attitude” undermined international support for East Timor. It quotes academic

Kenneth Chan’s conclusion that this policy was ultimately proved a failure.40

Comprehensive that it is in fulfilling its mandate of investigating and documenting the human rights violations which occurred in this period, its examination of Australia’s role does not constitute a major study of its policy towards

East Timor in the 1975 to 1983 period. The short section devoted to Australia’s role does not make use of the extensive documentation now available in the Australian

National Archives. The brevity of the section covering the Fraser period leaves the great majority of developments in this period unexamined.

Last Flight out of Dili, by David Scott (2005)41 is a mixture of personal memoir and documentary analysis written from the perspective of a long-term Timor solidarity activist, chair of Community Aid Abroad (CAA) and advocate for the

Australian Council for Oversea Aid (ACFOA). The book examines Australian policy towards the incorporation and occupation, as well as providing an insider account of

Timor solidarity activism during this period.

39 CAVR, Chega, 632-34. 40 CAVR, Chega, 634-35. 41 David Scott, Last Flight out of Dili (Melbourne: Pluto Press, 2005).

Scott alleges that the commitment Whitlam made to Suharto in support of integration during the 1974 meeting deprived Australia of the opportunity to play a constructive role and was a central factor in the Indonesian decision to proceed with covert activities in support of integration.42 He lists a number of assumptions which underlay the policy of supporting incorporation, including that it would soon be over, that Indonesian rule would be benign, that the world would forget the issue, that it would facilitate access to Timor Sea oil and that the policy would strengthen relations with Indonesia.43 All these, Scott contends, proved to be wrong. He traces how the briefings provided by Tjan to DFA officials compromised Australian policymaking and documents the debates which accompanied this within DFA and by elements of the defence department and by others arguing for an alternative course in support of genuine self-determination. The author claims there were four occasions when

Australian intervention could have prevented the invasion: after the Macau meeting, at the time of the UDT coup, prior to the Indonesian border crossings in September and following the deaths of the Balibo five.44 These are not, however, interrogated at any length, leaving the basis of such arguments unclear.

Scott’s most original contribution is arguably his examination of the role of the United States in the Indonesian decision to invade. As will be discussed in Chapter

Three, based on an examination of documentary evidence he contends that the US was

“not complicit” in the events leading to the invasion in the same way Australia was, and that it would have supported “a non-military solution” had Whitlam suggested it.45

42 David Scott, Last Flight out of Dili, 149-51. 43 David Scott, Last Flight out of Dili, 126-32. 44 David Scott, Last Flight out of Dili, 138. 45 David Scott, Last Flight out of Dili, 108-115.

Chapter Eight, Fraser to Hawke – Appeasing the Invader, contains a brief account of some aspects of policy during the Fraser government. These include his early proposal to establish a UN peacekeeping force and take the matter to the

Security Council before he was talked out of it by his political advisers, Australian support for Indonesia at the United Nations and the frustration of the UN mission of

Winspeare Guicciardi. He also makes passing mention of the granting of de facto and de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty.46 The great majority of events and policy developments, however, are not examined in any detail.

Amongst Scott’s strengths is an examination from an insider’s perspective of the response to the situation in East Timor by various domestic non-government groups and organisations, including the churches, the National Civic Council, aid agencies, war veterans, unions, business and the various Timor solidarity groups. This includes an outline of the tensions within support groups recounted from the perspective of one side of the factional divide.47

The brevity of Scott’s examination of the Fraser years leaves potential for a far more comprehensive examination of policy and developments during this period.

There is considerably more documentation now available than that employed by Scott, including those released into the National Archives.

The PhD thesis, Australian foreign policymaking towards the East Timor question from April 1974 to January 1978: a re-examination, by Tomohiko Kimura

(2012) of the University of New South Wales, is an examination of the development and implementation of Australian foreign policy towards East Timor from the

Carnation Revolution to the Australian granting of de facto recognition of Indonesian

46 David Scott, Last Flight out of Dili, 157-69. 47 David Scott, Last Flight out of Dili, 57-72, 186-213.

sovereignty of East Timor by Indonesia on 20 January 1978. In examining policy making it assesses the influence of two major factors: the importance of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia and the impact of public opinion. The study utilises sources from DFA, much of it based on the Way collection, but also including other

DFA material available in the National Archives. Other sources include cabinet documents, memoirs, personal papers, newspaper and magazine reports, books and archival material from Timor activist groups.

Kimura asserts that two major policy objectives pursued by the Australian government were fundamentally incompatible: prioritising closer relations with

Indonesia and placating an Australian domestic opinion favouring the right of the

Timorese people to self-determination.48 He identifies his main argument as that

Australian foreign policy was not simply guided by concerns over relations with

Indonesia, but by the necessity of the Whitlam and Fraser governments to “make clear their commitments to a proper and genuine process of self-determination” in order to placate public concerns.49

Kimura examines the central role of Whitlam in the policymaking process and his reliance on advice from Ambassadors Furlonger and Woolcott, which he sees as contrasting with a DFA in Australia more intent on supporting an act of self- determination in East Timor. He describes the focus of Chapter Three, for example, which deals with the period up to March 1975, as being, “how and why the Australian

DFA committed to a resolution in accordance with the will of the people of the territory, disregarding Prime Minister Whitlam’s preference for Indonesia’s

48 Tomohiko Kimura, “Australian foreign policy towards the East Timor question from April 1974 to January 1978: a re-examination.” (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, 2012), 280. 49 Kimura, “Australian foreign policy towards the East Timor question from April 1974 to January 1978: a re-examination,” 284.

incorporation of Portuguese Timor.”50 This contention puts him significantly at variance with a number of other researchers.

A key factor Kimura sees as motivating DFA’s alleged stand in support of self-determination is public opinion and the lobbying work of members of parliament, newspapers, church and community groups, aid groups and NGOs and what he calls,

“interest groups” such as the CIET and AETA. He examines the role of such groups in turning public opinion in favour of self-determination and forcing the Department and the government to take it into account in policymaking.

This theme continues in the last section of Chapter Five and Chapters Six and

Seven, which examine the early years of the Fraser government to January 1978.

Together they constitute ninety-seven out of 285 pages of the thesis. In the final section of Chapter Five he outlines the main developments from the appointment of

Fraser as caretaker Prime Minister, including his message to Suharto, the Australian government’s reaction to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and its response to the invasion itself. Chapter Six examines events from the invasion on 7

December 1975 to Indonesia’s declaration of incorporation on 17 July 1976. He outlines Australia’s vote on the 22 December 1975 General Assembly resolution on

East Timor, the Winspeare mission, the seizure of the Radio Maubere transceiver, the

April 1976 Security Council resolution, the discussions concerning attending the convening of the supposed “People’s Representative Council” on 31 May 1976 to facilitate integration, and the impact of the leaking of the Woolcott cable. He contends that “throughout this period the Australian government expressed its disagreement…more clearly than ever through a number of statements made by

50 Kimura, “Australian foreign policy towards the East Timor question from April 1974 to January 1978: a re-examination,” 57.

Foreign Minister Peacock and Prime Minister Fraser.”51 Once again, this puts Kimura considerably at odds with a number of other researchers. Chapter Seven examines what Kimura calls “Australia’s gradual policy shift” to the granting of de facto recognition in January 1978. He mentions Fraser’s October 1976 visit to Jakarta and the policy changes that accompanied it, touches on the Dunn report and its impact, including his testimony to US Congress, and discusses the role played by “interest groups” including ACFOA and Community Aid Abroad. Throughout the three chapters examining the early Fraser years he outlines the activities of solidarity activists, the role of parliamentarians and the role of the media.

Much of this, however, resembles more a narrative than a detailed analysis and, in addition to the contestable position he takes in regard to the position of DFA and the government, leaves considerable gaps. He makes no systematic examination, for example, of the alternatives available to the Fraser government when it assumed power. While mentioning the Australian response to the UDI he does not interrogate

Jakarta Embassy consultations with OPSUS on the issue and their implications. While presenting Peacock’s reaction to the invasion as a criticism of Indonesia he does not interrogate the arguably misleading manner in which Peacock statements were framed to minimise damage to the Indonesian relationship. In his outline of Australian actions and vote at the United Nations he does not examine in any detail the statements made at the General Assembly and Security Council by Australian representatives Harry and Campbell and the narrative regarding the situation they provided. His examination of Fraser’s October 1976 visit to Jakarta is relatively scant, as is his overall investigation of the trajectory of policy towards recognition. He makes no detailed assessment of the narrative regarding East Timor propagated by the Fraser government to the Australian people and the international community. His discussion

51 Kimura, “Australian foreign policy towards the East Timor question from April 1974 to January 1978: a re-examination,” 260.

of the Dunn Report and its implications is brief, and he makes no examination of the

Australian government’s response to it domestically or internationally. His relatively brief examination of the roles of the solidarity movement and the parliamentary lobby also leave considerable gaps. The five years of the Fraser government from early 1978 to 1983 are, of course, not covered.

As the introduction makes clear, the book Crossing the Line. Australia’s secret history in the Timor Sea (2017) by Kim McGrath, is “deliberately focused on one narrative” the assertion that a desire for Timor Sea oil was the “dominant driver” of Australian policy towards East Timor from the early 1960s onwards. McGrath also claims the Australian government engaged in a concerted effort to cover this up, including by the selective release of documentation. She disparagingly refers to the

Way (2000) collection of DFA documents as the Downer compilation, contending that the former foreign affairs minister Alexander Downer caused the deliberate omission of documents relating to the Timor Sea.52

McGrath provides a background to the development of the Timor Sea issue from the early 1960s onwards.53 She also provides a narrative of the major Australian actions in regard to the invasion and occupation, including Australia’s role in supporting the Indonesian position. So concerned is she to demonstrate the primacy of the Timor Sea issue, however, that she makes almost no mention of other factors.

McGrath has accordingly produced a work which fails to explore the multidimensional factors which impacted on the Australian position, resulting in a distorted analysis of Australian actions and policymaking.

52 Kim McGrath, Crossing the Line. Australia’s secret history in the Timor Sea (Carlton, VIC: Black Inc. Redback, 2017), 9. 53 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 16-23.

While it is clear there was some movement on the Timor Sea matter from

1963 onwards, this does not in itself demonstrate it was the principal or even a major driver of policy. However, throughout the book she juxtapositions events regarding the Timor Sea with the trajectory of Australian actions concerning East Timor to imply they are causally related. For example, she leads from a discussion of Woodside oil exploration in 1974 and 1975 directly to an examination of the briefings by CSIS operatives and their implications.54 She jumps from a discussion of Portuguese disinclination to negotiate on seabed boundaries in the pre-invasion period to a description of the Whitlam/Suharto meeting in Jogjakarta in 1974.55 She moves from the Australian government’s failure to respond to reports of the famine in late 1978 to noting that at the same time permit holders were lobbying for negotiation of a Timor

Sea boundary.56 She moves seamlessly from a description of the Indonesian “Fence of

Legs” operation in 1981 to the observation that in Canberra “the pressure from the mining companies” continued.57 In these cases and others she produces no evidence of an actual link and rarely cites an example of DFA officials discussing the Timor Sea issue.

The contention that the Way collection is deliberately slanted away from

Timor Sea documentation is not supported by an examination of the broader DFA archives during this period, which contain little discussion of the matter. Other considerations, including the Indonesian relationship itself and the desire to support the stability of the Suharto regime were considerably more paramount in discussions of Timor policy. While contending that Australian politicians and diplomats were

“very actively engaged in Australia’s Timor Sea oil agenda”,58 and that the issue was

54 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 68-70. 55 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 73. 56 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 132. 57 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 142-43. 58 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 10.

“front and centre of ‘Australian thinking and action’” she produces little documentary evidence to support this. Instead she uses the relatively scant references in DFA documentation to the Timor Sea issue to build the argument for it as a central policy driver, at times citing them out of context to support her case.

In the introduction she claims that the Australian government’s pursuit of “a ruthless, single-minded policy agenda” following the invasion to protect Timor Sea oil interests was “made explicit” in a January 1976 cable by Woolcott in which he advocates for a position of “Kissingerian realism” in support of Australia’s long-term national interests.59 However, the cable’s fifty-three paragraphs make no mention of the Timor Sea issue, instead putting a range of other arguments, including Indonesia’s own national interest and that of the region, the Suharto regime’s determination to incorporate the territory and supposed ethnic similarities between East and West

Timor. While Woolcott certainly cites “Kissingerian realism” in arguing for an

“understanding” of the Indonesian position to be in the Australian national interest, there is no evidence whatsoever that this is a reference to Australian oil interests in the

Timor Sea.60

McGrath also supports her case by misleadingly citing two distinct paragraphs from an August 1975 cable from Woolcott to DFA Secretary Renouf as if they are one. In a rare mention of the issue, Woolcott argues in the former that an agreement on the Timor Sea could be more readily negotiated with Indonesia than with an independent East Timor, while in the latter, the concluding paragraph of the cable, he states, “I know I am recommending a pragmatic rather than a principled stand but this is what national interest and foreign policy is all about.”61 McGrath collapses the two

59 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 12. 60 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xix. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Australia, Indonesia and East Timor. 5 January 1976. (Way, 652). 61 NAA: 10463, 801/12/11/1, xi. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 17 August 1975. (Way, 313).

paragraphs into one and publishes it as such to create the impression that Woolcott is advocating singularly about the Timor Sea issue. She makes no mention of the preceding twelve paragraphs that put other arguments, and to which the concluding paragraph refers to as much as the one before it on the Timor Sea.62

Similarly, McGrath cites a May 1977 cable from Woolcott to DFA Secretary

Parkinson in which he again argues that incorporation was “irreversible”, but complains that relations with Indonesia had been damaged by government statements of nonrecognition and the activities of parliamentarians. McGrath writes that “he then directly referred to the link between the Timor Sea boundary negotiations and recognition” by arguing that a Timor Sea settlement could only be negotiated with

Indonesia on the basis of recognition.63 In fact these parts of the cable are well separated, with the former in paragraph seven and the latter in paragraph twenty-one.

The cable in fact consists of fifty numbered paragraphs arguing for the importance of the Indonesian relationship to Australian defence interests, to trade and investment, to the US relationship, to relations with ASEAN nations, to relations with greater Asia and to other matters. McGrath makes no mention at all of these other arguments. The

Timor Sea issue is mentioned only once under the subheading “Other factors”. It makes no appearance at all in the eight paragraphs of conclusions nor in the sixteen paragraphs of recommendations.64

Seen in proper context, the mentions of the Timor Sea issue in both cables appear very much as secondary considerations by Woolcott in a much broader agenda.

This is particularly so in the context of the numerous other cables sent by him arguing the case for integration in which he makes no mention of the Timor Sea issue at all.

62 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 81-82. 63 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 111-12. 64 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, ii. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Australian/Indonesian relations. For Parkinson from Woolcott. 19 May 1977.

A lack of context is also evident in McGrath’s historical narratives regarding both the Timor Sea and the broader Timor issue. Without providing direct evidence she contends that the Minister for External Affairs Garfield Barwick’s redirection of policy towards acceptance of eventual Indonesian sovereignty was driven by a desire for Timorese Sea oil,65 making no reference to the abandonment of hostility to an

Indonesian takeover of West Papua which impacted directly on Timor policy.

McGrath makes a brief mention of the 1965/1966 anti-communist campaign in

Indonesia66 in the context of Australia’s Timor Sea claim. But she does not examine

Australia’s role in supporting this development nor its reasons for doing so, a matter central to an understanding of the Australian government position in respect to the

Suharto regime. She notes Whitlam’s support for a protest to Portugal about leases it provided on the Timor Sea,67 but she does not examine Whitlam’s broader attitudes and background regarding Indonesia, the New Order and the Asian region which clearly impacted his position.

Fifty-five of the 197 pages of the book cover the period of the Fraser government.68 McGrath examines the moves towards recognition, the Dunn Report and the government’s attempt to downplay it, the visit to East Timor by Peter Rodgers and Cavan Hogue in April 1977, the lobbying efforts by the Australian section of the

International Commission of Jurists, the visit of Richard Carleton to the territory and his subsequent critical reporting and the parliamentary lobbying on the Timor issue.

She outlines the ongoing situation in East Timor, including the ABRI campaign of encirclement and annihilation and the famine. She documents the lobbying efforts by

Woodside petroleum and others on the Timor Sea issue.

65 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 25. 66 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 32. 67 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 61. 68 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 90-144.

Her interpretation of these developments solely in terms of a desire for Timor

Sea oil, however, leads to a limited examination of policy motivation and goals that leaves many gaps. These include the significance of ASEAN and Indonesia to the

Fraser government’s regional policy, its desire to stabilise the pro-Western anti- communist Suharto regime, its overall Cold War agenda and its reaction to developments in South East Asia such as the unification of Vietnam and the situation in Cambodia. She interprets the trajectory of policies towards East Timor and

Indonesia under both Hawke and Keating entirely in terms of the Timor Sea issue without examining other important factors in a similar way.

The book contains an outline of the trajectory of Australian policy regarding the Timor Sea issue from the early 1960s until the present day. This was and remains a significant factor in Australian policy towards East Timor. However, understanding the nature of Australian policy towards the occupation requires an examination of the multi-dimensional considerations which underpinned it.

Cover-up and Denial of Genocide: Australia, the USA, East Timor and the

Aborigines,69 a twenty-two-page paper published in 2002 by Ben Kiernan, examines what he terms the denial of genocide in regard to both East Timor and Aboriginal rights. He argues that “a small circle of publicists and commentators” opposed the

Timor solidarity movement and supported the Suharto regime on the issue, and that essentially the same group also opposed the Aboriginal Land Rights and

Reconciliation movements.

The author documents the influence of the anti-communist Catholic group the

National Civic Council (NCC) led by B.A. Santamaria, its publication News Weekly,

69 Ben Kiernan, “Cover-up and Denial of Genocide: Australia, the USA, East Timor and the Aborigines," Critical Asian Studies, 34, no. 2 (June 2002): 163-192.

and the conservative journal Quadrant. Kiernan outlines how they campaigned in favour of Jakarta throughout the period of occupation, accusing Fretilin of atrocities and denying evidence of human rights abuses. Professor Heinz Arndt of ANU, a prominent contributor to Quadrant, accused supporters of East Timorese independence of being motivated by “racist arrogance”, and a Quadrant editorial compared them to “fanatical anti-Semites”.70 Kiernan argues that a motivation for such attitudes was not only anticommunism and support for Indonesia, but also the view that, “Australia’s domestic ‘left’ could not be allowed to go unchallenged, whatever the truth of its case for East Timor.” 71 Such attitudes, he contends, are as much connected with ideological struggles within Australia as with the issue itself. He compares this to the situation regarding Aboriginal land rights and reconciliation, arguing that similar motivations and themes are at play.

The paper’s examination of domestic support in Australia for the occupation contributes to an understanding of some sections of public opinion and community attitudes towards East Timor. However, his depiction of this group as being wholly or largely conservative provides only a limited perspective on the nature of those campaigning against the solidarity movement and in support of the occupation. This group also included some who regarded themselves as progressives and supported issues such as Aboriginal land rights and reconciliation.

2.1 Conclusion

As discussed in Chapter One, the purpose of the thesis is to examine

Australian policy towards the invasion and occupation of East Timor during the Fraser government from 1975 to 1983, the response of the government to events and how it responded to civil challenges to such policies.

70 Kiernan, Cover-up and Denial of Genocide, 174. 71 Kiernan, Cover-up and Denial of Genocide, 172.

While a number of researchers have studied this period, with the exception of

McGrath (2017) and Kimura (2012) they did so without most of the documentation that is available today. As discussed, a large number of documents relating to the East

Timor during this period from DFA and other organisations have been released in recent years. The period from 1976 to 1983 is considerably less studied than that of the pre-invasion period. Dunn briefly examines the Australian role in the UN and the granting of de facto and de jure recognition, accusing the US and Australia of shielding the Suharto regime from criticism on human rights grounds. Cotton makes a very brief examination of the period, with little more than two pages covering these years. Fernandes makes a valuable study of the role of the international solidarity movement, as well as examining other events in this period, including de facto and de jure recognition, although he notes that a “more detailed assessment” will be possible once more documentation is available. Chega makes a very brief investigation assessment of the Fraser years that leaves many gaps. Scott provides a valuable account of some aspects of the Timor solidarity network of this period, but does not interrogate in detail a number of key events, such as de jure and de facto recognition and developments at the UN.

Kimura makes use of material in the National Archives as well as the Way collection in his study of the first two years of the Fraser government. While he makes some assessment of DFA policy development, much of his account resembles a narrative rather than an analysis, leaving large gaps for further research. This includes a more comprehensive examination of Australian activities at the UN, the nuances of the language used by DFA officials and its implications and the development and use of the Fraser government’s Timor narrative. McGrath makes a study of the Fraser years, although her singular focus on the Timor Sea issue as the sole driver of policy precludes a satisfactory examination of the of the development and implementation of

Australian policy towards East Timor during this period.

The Fraser years are consequently an understudied period ripe for further research, with documentation now available affording ample new opportunities. This includes the response of the Fraser government to the invasion, the reversal in policy position by Andrew Peacock and the reasons for it, the Australian voting record at the

UN and the deliberations that took place around it, policy formulation leading to de facto and de jure recognition, the role of the Timor Sea negotiations, the impact of the

Dunn Report and the government’s response to it, the government’s response to the famine, and the overall Australian response to the human rights situation in the territory. There is also scope for further research into the solidarity movement throughout the period, including the role of support groups such as the CIET, AETA, unions, churches and aid groups, as well as the opposition to the solidarity movement, including the position of the National Civic Council and the journal Quadrant. There is scope for evaluation of DFA communications with Indonesian officials during this period, including OPSUS operatives, and the impact on policy. There is scope to examine the narrative concerning East Timor the Fraser government propagated to the

Australian people and the international community in pursuit of its policy goals.

A study of the period of the Fraser government provides the opportunity for a valuable investigation of policy towards East Timor during the late pre-invasion period, the invasion and the occupation to early 1983. During this period Australian policy largely focused on supporting the Suharto regime and neutralising the Timor issue, yet was challenged by an Australian and international solidarity movement which constrained policymaking and forced policymakers to deal with public opinion.

At the same time the Fraser government failed to respond to the reality of the situation in East Timor, the continued opposition to the invasion within the territory and the human rights violations occurring there. This study will examine how such a situation came to be so and how policy developed in response to these challenges.

Chapter 3: Fraser takes government

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the factors which caused the Fraser government to adopt the policy direction it took during its first months in government.

This includes the caretaker period of government from 11 November to 13 December

1975, and the early period of the elected Fraser government, to Foreign Minister

Andrew Peacock’s first statement to Federal Parliament on the Timor issue on 4

March 1976.

The first section of the chapter contains a brief overview of the Timor issue during the Whitlam government, which while in no way professing to be a detailed analysis nor a comprehensive rendition of developments during this period, provides an understanding of the situation faced by the caretaker Fraser government when it was appointed by the Governor General on 11 November 1975. The following sections examine the early influences on the Fraser government’s policy position, its response to the situation of covert Indonesian intervention in East Timor it inherited from the Whitlam government, its actions in the United Nations, its response to the invasion itself and to the developing situation in the months afterwards, as well as its interactions with the Suharto regime on the issue and its response to domestic concerns.

The chapter assesses the options available to the Fraser government when it took office and the factors that influenced it to continue a policy of prioritising the relationship with Indonesia above the rights to self-determination and the safety of the

Timorese people. It will examine the nature of the two-tier policy towards East Timor adopted by the Fraser government and how this caused it to produce a distorted

narrative regarding the situation in East Timor that it propagated to the Australian people and the international community.

3.2 The Whitlam period1

Amongst the features of the narrative latter propagated by the Jakarta Lobby2 was the contention that Australia’s position regarding East Timor was relatively unimportant in Indonesia’s eyes and subsequently unlikely to impact on its decision making and actions regarding the territory.3 Evidence in fact indicates that the burning of bridges with the Soviet Union and China entailed by the ascension of Suharto’s

New Order left the regime considerably dependent on good relations with western powers, particularly the US and Australia. A DFA memorandum to Whitlam in May

1973 described the importance to the regime of projecting an image of a nation which did not threaten its neighbours and co-operated peacefully with them.4 As early as

August 1974 Indonesian intelligence operative Harry Tjan told Ambassador Robert

Furlonger (Australian Ambassador to Indonesia 1972 to 1975) that Suharto regarded

Australian attitudes to any Timor initiatives as “vital”.5

Before the two leaders met in September 1974 Suharto conveyed to Whitlam his regard for the importance of Australia, his desire for closer relations and his belief it was unique amongst Western countries “in the degree of understanding” it displayed

1 Some of the material in this section was included in the following paper: Peter Job, “The anti-Fretilin hit list, secret briefings and the co-option of Australian foreign policy, 1974- 1975,” in Timor-Leste: 1975-40 years on, Timor-Leste: 1975-40 years on, Proceedings of the 2015 Timor-Leste Studies Association Conference Vol. II, ed. Sarah Smith, Antero B. da Silva, Nuno Canas Mendes, Alarico da Costa Ximenes, Clinton Fernandes and Michael Leach. (Hawthorn, Vic: Swinburne Press, 2016), 44. 2 See Chapter Four section Fifteen. 3 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Peter McCawley, interviewed by Bill Nicol, Australian Insight, 14 January 1982. Transcript. 4 NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3, iv. Indonesia and Portuguese Timor. Submission from Woolcott to Whitlam. 30 May 1973. (Way, 44). 5 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1 ii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. For Feakes from Furlonger. 19 August 1974.

towards his government.6 The DFA briefing to Whitlam before the meeting emphasised “Indonesia’s strong interest in Australia’s attitude”,7 and during the meeting itself Suharto stressed the importance of the relationship and of Australian civil and military aid.8 The Indonesian government would later express frustration about how its actions in East Timor had soured relations with nations around the world and express a desire to resolve it in order to play a larger role on the world stage, including in the non-aligned movement in which it sought a leadership role.9 As discussed in later chapters, Indonesian officials were well aware that Australia was seen as an authority on the Timor issue by much of the international community, and that many countries took their policy cue from it. Australia was consequently in a strong position to influence Indonesian policy towards East Timor during both the

Whitlam and Fraser governments and before and after the invasion.

In this context, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam made a strong intercession in favour of Indonesian intervention when he met twice with President Suharto in 1974 and 1975, each time telling him that an independent East Timor would be unwelcome to Australia and that he believed it should become part of Indonesia. While stressing that for the sake of Australian public opinion incorporation should appear “a natural process arising from the wishes of the people”, he nevertheless made it clear he believed such wishes could embrace only one outcome.10 11 Before this, however,

Whitlam set the stage for Australian cooperation with the efforts by a faction within the Suharto regime to undermine the East Timorese decolonisation process when in

6 NAA: A10463, 828/4/1, 11. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. For the Prime Minister from Furlonger. 2 September 1974. (Way, 93). 7 NAA: 10463, 801/13/11/1, iii. Brief for Whitlam. Prime Minister’s visit to Indonesia – Portuguese Timor. 2 September 1974. (Way, 90). 8 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, iii. Record of meeting between Whitlam and Suharto. State Guest House, Yogyakarta. 6 September 1974. (Way, 95-98). 9 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. Giles Bertin, “Timor,” AAP Newsfeature, 23 May 1982. 10 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, iii. Record of meeting between Whitlam and Suharto. 11 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, x. Record of conversation between Whitlam and Suharto. Townsville. 4 April 1975. (Way, 244-248).

June 1974 he had his private secretary, David Wilenski, initiate discussions in

Yogyakarta with Indonesian intelligence operative Harry Tjan of the Centre for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the think tank and diplomatic wing of the

Indonesian intelligence organisation OPSUS. According to Jusuf Wanandi (aka Lim

Bian Kie), another senior OPSUS operative, Wilenski conveyed to Tjan Whitlam’s view that East Timor should become part of Indonesia to ensure it did not come under the influence of “another, potentially unfriendly power.”12 Tjan later recalled to

Whitlam that at that time Indonesia had not been greatly focused on East Timor, but that the meeting led them to “greater consideration” of the issue.13 Confident in

Whitlam’s support, Tjan approached Jakarta embassy First Secretary Jan Arriens the following week to inform him that he intended to submit a paper to Suharto recommending a clandestine operation to ensure East Timor opted for incorporation into Indonesia. He also stated that he saw a role for Australia in “neutralising” unfavourable international opinion towards an Indonesian takeover.14

What followed in the ensuing year and half were a series of briefings by CSIS operatives to Jakarta embassy officials informing them of Indonesian efforts to undermine the East Timorese decolonisation process and force integration. Malcolm

Dan, the Minister of the Jakarta Embassy during this period, describes such meetings as taking place “almost every day.”15 Monk regards the briefings as being “of the kind that secret intelligence officers dream about.”16 However, as discussed in this writer’s own paper, the evidence indicates that they contained a mixture of information and

12 Jusuf Wanandi, Shades of Grey. A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2012), 195. 13 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Letter from Alexander to Hogue. 16 October 1979. 14 NAA: A11443, i. Letter from Furlonger to Feakes. Indonesia: Claudestine Operation in Portuguese Timor. 3 July 1974. (Way, 62). 15 Malcolm Dan, (Minister, Australian Embassy in Jakarta, June 1974 to August 1976) in discussion with the author, 13 October 2016. 16 Paul Monk, “Secret intelligence and escape clauses: Australia and the Indonesian Annexation of East Timor, 1963-1976.” Critical Asian Studies 33, no. 2, (2001), 109.

disinformation aimed at achieving OPSUS objectives, with the CSIS operatives misinforming the Australian diplomats about a number of matters, including the position of the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik.17 Nevertheless, the impact of the briefings was profound. For the Suharto regime the CSIS/OPSUS conduit had the advantage of allowing information and disinformation to be sent to the Australians through a source which had no official standing, gauging their reactions while compromising the Australian government through its knowledge of Indonesian covert activities. For the Australians it supposedly had the advantage of unofficial access to

Indonesian plans without the implications such information from an official source would have entailed. In practice, however, it would have significant implications in constraining policy and the Australian capacity to publicly protest Indonesian actions.

From late 1974 the briefings encapsulated details of the OPSUS program, codenamed Operation Komodo, to destabilise the decolonisation process and force integration. From an early stage, at a time when a peaceful self-determination process appeared entirely feasible, this included briefings concerning the potential use of force, scenarios for infiltration and subversion and for provoking a reaction from

Timorese parties to create a pretext for intervention.18

Nonetheless, by early 1975 it was clear that integration and self-determination were incompatible. The two principal East Timorese parties, the conservative

Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), which had originally advocated a continuing relationship with Portugal, and the more radical Revolutionary Front for an

Independent East Timor (Fretilin),19 formed a coalition in February 1975 and for a

17 Job, The anti-Fretilin hit list, 47. 18 Job, The anti-Fretilin hit list, 44-48. 19 Originally established as the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) in May 1974, the organisation changed its name to Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILN) in September that year. Although incorporating political views ranging from moderate social democratic to Marxist, it was strongly influenced by African anti-Portuguese colonialist movements, particularly FRELIMO of Mozambique. It advocated a transition to

time worked together to achieve independence, with only the small pro-Indonesian

Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti) supporting integration. This, however, was undermined by Operation Komodo, including broadcasts from

Indonesian West Timor making inflammatory allegations and encouraging divisions.

After a meeting with OPSUS chief Murtopo, in May UDT withdrew from the coalition. After a mixture of threats and persuasion in a further meeting with Murtopo,

UDT leaders launched a coup against Fretilin on 11 August 1975. A brief but bitter civil war ensued, with Fretilin20 gaining ascendancy and most of the UDT and Apodeti leadership, along with that of a number of minor parties, fleeing to Indonesian West

Timor by early September. As a condition of entry they were forced to sign an integration proposal calling for Indonesian intervention. The Portuguese governor fled to the offshore island of Atauro.21 The Indonesians claimed 40,000 refugees crossed the border at this time, although other sources put it at between 10,000 and 30,000, accusing them of inflating the figure to exaggerate the severity of the crisis and claim more international aid.22

Fretilin, however, issued a communiqué on 13 September recognising

Portuguese sovereignty and calling for a resumption of the decolonisation process.

CAVR relates that the Fretilin administration kept the Portuguese flag flying outside the governor’s office and made repeated calls for a Portuguese return.23 On 16

independence, land, health and education reforms and the building of a nationalist East Timorese identity. See, Helen Hill, Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor: Fretilin 1974-1978: the origins, ideologies and strategies of a nationalist movement (Otford, NSW: Otford Press, 2002.) 20 While the term for the armed wing of Fretilin was Falintil, this was not in widespread use during this period. Fretilin representatives, including the Fretilin radio link broadcasting from within East Timor from 1975-78, inevitably used the terms “Fretilin forces” “Fretilin operations” etc in reference to the operations of Fretilin combatants. Indonesian and Australian officials as well as solidarity activists used it in the same way. This thesis has accordingly followed this usage. 21 CAVR, Chega, 173-175, 180-186. Alan Taylor, East Timor. The Price of Freedom, (Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press, 1999), 50-54. 22 CAVR, Chega, 1228-9. 23 CAVR, Chega, 189-90.

September the Central Committee of Fretilin issued a statement that again stressed it recognised Portuguese sovereignty, called for talks in Baucau with representatives of the Portuguese government and for a joint conference between Portugal, Australia and

Indonesia to “eliminate rumours and misunderstandings.” It also stated it would

“welcome” a joint peace force consisting of Indonesian and East Timorese troops to patrol the border region, invited neighbouring countries and the media to send fact finding missions and stressed its commitment to friendship and co-operation with countries in the region.24 José Ramos Horta, Fretilin’s foreign affairs representative during this period, recalls he “sent off more than 400 telegrams to the Portuguese and some 20 other governments…as well as to the Security Council”, to no avail.25

In response Indonesia initiated Operation Flamboyant, a covert military operation launched from West Timor in which Indonesian soldiers attacked Fretilin defenders in East Timor under a pretence of being UDT and Apodeti troops. CSIS operatives made sure to keep their Australian contacts well informed, including specifics of military operations, plans to cut off food supplies to Dili, the planned infiltration of 3800 Indonesian soldiers, and an offensive on Balibo, which, although embassy officials did not know it, would lead to the deaths of five Australian-based journalists.26

With the Australian government complicit from an early stage in these illegal actions while at the same time needing to be seen to espouse international norms in public, Australian government representatives from the highest levels down found it necessary to misinform both the Australian people and the international community about the intentions of their Indonesian informants. The Foreign Minister, Don

24 Fretilin, press statement, Dili, 16 September 1975. http://chart- digital.info/items/show/644. 25 Jose-Ramos Horta, Funu. The Unfinished Saga of East Timor. (New Jersey: The Red Sea Press, 1987), 58. 26 Job, The anti-Fretilin hit list.

Willesee, for example, told an audience in Japan in June that the Indonesians “say they agree with all of us” regarding self-determination.27 Whitlam informed the House of Representatives on 26 August 1975 that “Indonesian policy is to respect the right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination” and denied it had “territorial ambitions.”28 He wrote to the Waterside Workers Federation of Australia on 18

September assuring them that Suharto was committed to peaceful decolonisation and had “exercised considerable restraint in her actions.”29 There was no protest or acknowledgement of Indonesian involvement in the deaths of the journalists at Balibo, despite DFA knowledge of the nature of the Balibo operation. DFA officials also denied knowledge of Indonesian covert actions to the Portuguese.30

However, with the actions of the Indonesian military reported in the media31 the covert Indonesian intervention became increasingly difficult to ignore. Noting this,

Renouf flagged to Willesee the need to “go on the record” regarding Australia’s official position concerning self-determination and opposition to the use of force with a public statement expressing “extreme disappointment” regarding Indonesian actions.

He recommended, however, that the statement balance its concerns with criticisms of

Fretilin and Portugal and that the Australian government inform the Indonesians of the statement beforehand and the reasons for it, stressing that it recognised the importance of the Indonesian relationship.32 On the advice of Woolcott supported by Whitlam, the draft statement was changed to remove references to Australian knowledge of

Indonesian covert operations so as not to compromise the Jakarta Embassy’s CSIS

27 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, xxiv. Don Willesee, Transcript of Question and Answer Session at the Australian Chamber of Commerce Luncheon. Tokyo, 17 June 1975. (Way, 279). 28 House of Representatives (HOR) Hansard, 26 August 1975. 29 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xiv. Letter from Whitlam to Bolger. 18 September 1975. 30 NAA: A1838, 3038/11/64, ANNEX. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 17 October 1975. 31 Eg, Michael Richardson, “Warships, bombers hit Fretilin garrison,” Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November 1975. 32 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2, ii. Portuguese Timor. Submission to Willesee. Canberra, 17 October 1975. (Way, 477-8).

informants.33 The result was a dishonestly qualified statement made to Parliament on

30 October, referring to “reports” suggesting Indonesian military intervention while also blaming “the immaturity of Timor’s own aspiring political leaders” for the situation, before stating that “were there substance in these reports, the Australian government would be extremely disappointed, and we have so informed the

Indonesian authorities.”34

In presenting a copy to Malik, Woolcott made it clear that it did not imply a change in policy and that he had been instructed to say that “Senator Willesee had in mind in making the statement the wish to do as little damage as possible to the relationship with Indonesia to which we would continue to attach great importance.”35

The nature of the statement itself and the message which accompanied it would have made it apparent to the Indonesians that it was intended for public consumption and as a matter of record regarding Australia’s professed adherence to international norms, without likely further implications.

Through the encouragement Whitlam provided to Suharto and the acquiescence the briefings implied to covert subversion and violence, the Australian government made it clear it would not effectively oppose integration by force. This was further reinforced by its refusal to protest the deaths of the journalists at Balibo.

Through public disinformation and denial of what it knew, the government provided cover to the Suharto regime’s efforts to undermine the Timorese decolonisation process, including by the use of force. By downplaying the role of Indonesian covert operations and propagating falsifications about the nature of the conflict during the

33 NAA: A1838, 3038/13/12/4, i. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 19 October 1975. (Way, 487). In this cable Woolcott argued that any reference to Australian knowledge of Indonesian covert activities would betray the trust of CSIS contacts and that such a statement should refer only to media reports of the incursions. Whitlam wrote “I find this convincing” on the margin. 34 HOR Hansard, 30 October 1975. 35 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xv. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Portuguese Timor – Minister’s Statement. 31 October 1975. (Way, 536-7).

Fretilin administration it foreshadowed the myth, to become a key part of the Fraser government’s Timor narrative, that the invasion was undertaken to bring order to a chaotic and destabilising situation not of the Indonesian government’s making.

The effective implementation of policy requires both support from elected leaders and a government apparatus prepared to carry it out. Both of these elements were present in Australia during this period, although the former was largely confined to the Prime Minister himself rather than the broader Labor government. Whitlam saw relations with the New Order as the key to his policy of opening Australia to Asia, while the Department had a history of working in cooperation with Indonesian military and intelligence and of accepting human rights abuses by them.36 Richard

Woolcott, Ambassador to Indonesia from March 1975 until March 1978, was particularly active throughout his ambassadorship in arguing for a “pragmatic” or

“Kissingerian” acceptance of Indonesian actions regarding East Timor, largely due to the importance of the Suharto regime to Australia's strategic and foreign policy goals.37

However, this position did not go unchallenged. Soon after the September

1974 meeting between Whitlam and Suharto Foreign Minister Don Willesee raised the possibility of taking the issue to the United Nations, a position opposed by DFA officials on the grounds that it would be contrary to undertakings by Whitlam to

Suharto.38 Despite largely supporting the Whitlam position and dampening concerns about Indonesian intentions in public, in June 1975 he expressed considerable concern about the Indonesian covert activities and the prospect of Indonesian military

36 Marlene Millott. “Australia’s role in the 1965-66 communist massacres in Indonesia.” Australian Outlook, 30 September 2015. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australias-role-in-the-1965-66- communist-massacres-in-indonesia/. 37 Eg, NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 17 August 1975. (Way doc 169); NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Australia, Indonesia and East Timor. 5 January 1976. (Way, 393) 38 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, xi. Letter from Lavett to Renouf. 28 September 1974. (Way, 114).

intervention, advocating persuading Indonesia to accept the possibility of an independent East Timor.39 The Whitlam/Woolcott position also met opposition from the Department of Defence. In August 1974 the First Assistant Secretary of that

Department’s Planning Division, Bill Pritchett, submitted the first of what were to be a number of papers arguing that an independent East Timor would be advantageous on strategic defence grounds and that acquiescing to an Indonesian takeover would damage Australia’s credibility in supporting Papua New Guinea.40 Defence Minister

Lance Barnard wrote to Willesee in February 1975 expressing similar views.41 In the same month Pritchett expanded his advocacy further, proposing that Whitlam write to

Suharto suggesting Indonesia accept an independent East Timor built around “a basic treaty relationship” with it regarding cooperation and security.42

Within the Department itself there were also a number of proposals in late

1974 in favour of accepting the possibility of an independent East Timor and working to encourage Indonesia to do the same, including from the head of DFA Public

Information, Warwick Mayne-Wilson,43 from First Secretary for North and West

Asia, Michael Cook44 and initially from the First Assistant Secretary of the South-East

Asia and PNG Division, Graham Feakes.45

During the Fretilin administration there was also a push from a number of officers for an acceptance of a Fretilin dominated independent East Timor and a policy of encouraging Indonesia to do the same. On 11 September Ross Cottrill of the

39 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2, i. Letter from Willesee to Woolcott. Canberra. 7 July 1975. 40 NAA: A1838, 696/5, iii. W.B. Pritchett, Defence Significance of Portuguese Timor. Memorandum to Rogers, 15 August 1974. (Way, 80-84). 41 NAA: A10463, 801/12/11/1, vii. Letter from Barnard to Willesee. 11 February 1975. (Way, doc 82). 42 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/7, i. Letter from Pritchett to Feakes. 21 February 1975. (Way, 190). 43 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, xiv. Minute from Mayne-Wilson to Feakes. 7 November 1974. (Way, 135). 44 NAA: A1838, 696/5,iii. Record of policy discussion. Portuguese Timor. 11 December 1974. (Way, 146-7). 45 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, iv. Portuguese Timor. Submission from Feakes to Willesee. 13 December 1974. (Way, 148-9).

DFA’s Policy Planning Section presented a paper arguing for such a position. He contended that Timor’s value to major hostile powers would be “quite slight” with the

Soviet Union unlikely to risk offending Indonesia, and China reluctant to damage the prospects of a resumption of relations with it or other ASEAN nations. Although the prospect of an independent East Timor leading to some destabilisation was not inconceivable, Cottrill argued, without outside encouragement it would be unlikely to engage in activities hostile to Indonesia. On the other hand, “a more difficult situation” would likely arise if Indonesian forces became bogged down in a long drawn out guerrilla campaign of resistance after an invasion, which would have repercussions throughout the region and damage the bilateral relationship with

Australia.46

Cottrill’s position was supported by the Assistant Secretary of the Executive

Secretariat, Geoffrey Miller, who forwarded Cottrill’s paper to Renouf and others accompanied by a paper of his own. It argued that smaller nations than East Timor were independent, warned of the dangers of a protracted struggle in the event of an invasion and suggested that Australia “attempt to influence events in favour of

Indonesia accepting, with whatever concessions, guarantees and safeguards it can obtain, the prospect of a Fretilin-dominated independent East Timor.”47 He put his case again on 1 October, arguing that a long Indonesian campaign of invasion and subversion would “not be disavowable” as it would inflame Australian public opinion and predicate UN action, asking “if we are to oppose them, should we not do so now

46 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, xxxi. Ross Cottrill, Policy planning section. Timor. 11 September 1975. 47 NAA: 1838, 3038/10/1, xxxi. Minute from Miller to Renouf. 17 September 1975. (Way, 417- 9).

and in private?”48 Although not apparent in these papers, in 2018 Miller recalled that he and Cottrill also advocated referring the matter to the United Nations.49

Support for such an approach also came from the head of the DFA Indonesian

Section, Michael Curtain, who in a minute of 15 October pointed out that Fretilin was not calling for immediate independence and described it as “the sort of party we would have welcomed…anywhere else than Timor.” Contending that Australia had a choice between a prolonged period of Indonesian action and a resumption of a decolonisation process, he advocated for “an Australian dissociation from Indonesian military intervention, and for early (rather than later) United Nations involvement.”50

These efforts made no headway. An insight into DFA policy direction on the

Timor issue during this period was provided by Cottrill in discussions with the author in 2017. He described policy formation as “reactive”, suffering from “poor intelligence and neglect” and with a tendency to base policy on “short-term, anecdotal, unsubstantiated evidence.” He also contended that DFA’s actions in obtaining the information through the CSIS/OPSUS briefings and failing to dissent caused Australia to become “an accomplice before the fact.” Describing Woolcott as

“prepared to be in collusion with the Indonesians” he insisted that his own position was a realistic one in asserting that “we do not have to pay that price.” The influence of Whitlam was strong, however, with fears of repercussions for dissent. For this reason when Woolcott “went too far” it was not possible to “get any bosses to rein him in.” In this context Cottrill recounted how his paper “was sent to Woolcott who

48 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, xxxiii. Minute from Miller to Joseph. Portuguese Timor. 1 October 1975. (Way, 441). 49 Geoffrey Miller (Assistant Secretary of the Executive Secretariat, DFA, 1975-1976) in discussion with the author, 24 August 2018. 50 NAA: A1838/10/1/2, ii. Minute from Curtin to Feakes and Joseph. 15 October 1975. (Way, 464).

sat on it for three months” and that those who held his position could do nothing as

“Woolcott had the support of Whitlam.”51

The supposedly “pragmatic” contention that independence was unviable, integration in Australian interests and acquiescence to the Indonesian demand for integration inevitable, was not the product of evidence-based inquiry nor a superior understanding of the situation in East Timor. It was very far from the only policy option available, and not the only one proposed or discussed within the Department or the Whitlam government. This position, however, dominated policy direction and precluded serious challenge, not because of any greater policy sophistication, but due to the insistent and uncompromising insistence of Whitlam and the consequent strength within the Department of Woolcott and others supporting his position.52

3.3 The Fraser ‘caretaker’ government

The Whitlam Government was dismissed by the Governor General on 11

November 1975 and replaced with a ‘caretaker’ administration led by Malcolm Fraser on the condition that elections soon be held. Under the ‘caretaker’ conventions the new government was obliged to govern as far as possible without changing the policies of its predecessor until the elections. However, what this meant in practice was sometimes unclear, particularly regarding Whitlam’s Timor policy which had been two-tiered in nature. While effectively encouraging Indonesian intervention, the government had maintained in public that it supported the rights to self-determination of the Timorese people and that it opposed military intervention by Indonesia.

Willesee had even made a qualified criticism of Indonesian covert intervention in

51 Ross Cottrill (Head, Policy Planning Section, DFA, 1975) in discussion with the author, 8 September and 6 October 2017. 52 For an examination of Australian policy towards East Timor during this period see Cotton, East Timor, Australia and the Regional Order, Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, Job, The anti- Fretilin hit list, and Monk, Secret intelligence and escape clauses.

parliament. It was therefore open to the interim Fraser government if it so chose to interpret policy in this way and act accordingly.

Dunn argues that even at this late stage it was not too late for the Australian government to act to discourage intervention by taking up the issue with Jakarta’s

Western friends.53 Fraser, on the other hand, later contended that he inherited a situation in which it was too late to prevent an Indonesian invasion.54 Determining whether the Suharto regime could have been induced to change direction on East

Timor at this stage is fraught, particularly as, as will be seen, it was also encouraged in its course by Portugal and in the last instance by the United States. Nevertheless, a number of factors indicate that even at this stage pressure on the Suharto regime may have led to a different outcome.

Fretilin was continuing to call for a Portuguese return and a resumption of the decolonisation process, and its invitation to neighbouring countries to send fact finding missions to East Timor still stood. During a visit to Australia on 28 October

Horta stressed to DFA officials that Fretilin was not a threat to Indonesia, was not

“communist” and was prepared to send a delegation to Jakarta to “find out what they want from us.” He told them that although Fretilin was not prepared to work with the

UDT and Apodeti leaders in West Timor, which it considered proxies under

Indonesian control, it was prepared to allow UDT and Apodeti in East Timor to operate freely and take part in a decolonisation process provided “Indonesia stayed out.” He also stated that although Fretilin was not willing to give up its arms, as this

53 Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, 232-33. 54 James Bennettt, “New evidence suggests Australia was warned about humanitarian crisis in East Timor and failed to act,” ABC News, 3 October 2013. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013- 10-03/new-evidence-suggests-australia-failed-to-act-soon-enough-to-he/4996412.

would leave it vulnerable to a further Indonesian intervention, it was prepared to sign a military agreement with Indonesia allowing border patrols.55

Other factors indicate that the Fretilin administration was moderate in nature and willing to work with the international community to facilitate a solution to the crisis. A delegation of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) headed by

James Dunn, which visited the territory in October, reported widespread support for

Fretilin and commented favourably on its health, education and agricultural programs.56 Dunn later described Fretilin in this period as “a sensitive and responsible organisation to work through” which was anxious to open a dialogue with Pires and prepared to be flexible in finding a pathway forward.57 A parliamentary delegation consisting of Labor MP Ken Fry, Labor Senator Arthur Gietzelt and Liberal Senator

Neville Bonner visited the territory from 16 to 17 September 1975. They reported food shortages and conflict in the border areas, but also that Fretilin was in effective control of the majority of the territory, was holding UDT prisoners from the civil war in acceptable conditions and appeared to have support from the majority of the population. They discounted claims that Fretilin was communist or influenced to any large extent by outside influences, describing its leadership as “moderate, highly responsible, dedicated and intelligent in their approach.” The Fretilin President Xavier

Amaral pressed on them the importance of facilitating talks with the Portuguese to organise the return of a skeleton Portuguese administration.58

David Hicks, an anthropologist working in the territory since before the

Carnation Revolution, who was in many respects very critical of Fretilin in the

55 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xv. Record of Conversation between Feakes, Joseph, Curtin and Horta. Portuguese Timor. 28 October 1975. (Way, 522). 56 ACFOA. Report on visit to East Timor of the ACFOA Task Force (Canberra: Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 1975). 57 Dunn, Timor. A people betrayed. 228-29. 58 Ken Fry and Arthus Geitzelt. Report on Visit to Portuguese East Timor by Senator Gietzel and K.L. Fry. 1975. http://chart-digital.info/items/show/644.

previous period, also nevertheless later described the moderate and responsible nature of the Fretilin administration.59 The Portuguese envoy, Dr Antonio Santos, who visited Governor Pires in Atauro in September, reported to DFA officials that after the civil war the moderates within Fretilin were predominant, with the small number of

“extremists” having no influence.60 DFA’s Darwin Liaison Officer John Starey made a one day visit on 17 October 1975, reporting that “Fretilin appears to have presented itself quite effectively to the people as the standard-bearer of nationalism, democracy and freedom from foreign domination…there appears to be general acceptance of the

Fretilin/freedom nexus”. He also observed that “Fretilin leadership is now presenting, for whatever reasons, a moderate face” with the influence of “extreme left ideologues” limited.61

The evidence suggests that Suharto himself may well have been open to persuasion, with a number of researchers commenting on his reluctance to use force in

East Timor, despite pressure from hardliners, due to his concerns about the impact it would have on Indonesia’s international position.62 In August Woolcott described the

President as “firm in his attitude that Indonesia should not intervene militarily” due to his concerns about the reaction of Australia, the attitude of the Non-aligned

Movement, the impact in the United Nations and his desire to concentrate resources on economic matters.63

With the government of President Gomes unsupportive of independence, the actions of the Portuguese during this period did not assist matters, including the

59 David Hicks, Rhetoric and the decolonization of East Timor (New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis), 163-67. 60 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, xxxiiA. Telegraph message from Darwin to Canberra. Timor. 7 September 1975. (Way, 393-4). 61 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xv. Telegraph message from Darwin to Canberra. Portuguese Timor – Political Situation. 22 October 1975. (Way, 499-500). 62 Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, 198-99; Taylor, East Timor, 52. 63 Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. August 22, 1975, in Richard Walsh and George Munster, Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1968-1975, 201. (Sydney: J.R Walsh and G.J. Munster, 1980).

withdrawal of Governor Pires to Atauro and the failure of the Portuguese government to respond to calls by Fretilin to return. Pires in fact reported that he sent numerous cables to Lisbon seeking advice without response.64 This Portuguese delinquency was heightened by a meeting in Rome on 1-2 November between Portuguese and

Indonesian foreign ministers, to which no Timorese was invited. Alex (aka Ali)

Alatas, who attended the meeting as secretary to Adam Malik, later described it as a

“friendly dialogue”, duplicitously claiming the two sides agreed to safeguard “the principle of the will of the people of East Timor.”65 It produced a joint press statement stressing “mutual cordiality” and “a wide concurrence of views” between the two governments. Despite the central role played by Indonesia in facilitating the ongoing conflict, the statement misleadingly presented the fighting as a Timorese affair, and advocated the convening of a meeting between Portugal and all Timorese parties, including those under Indonesian control, aimed at “ending armed strife” and facilitating a return to “an orderly implementation of decolonisation.” With the

Portuguese expressing no concerns whatsoever about Indonesian actions, it also stressed the need to “safeguard the legitimate interests” of Indonesia and other countries in the region.66 Both countries also agreed to work together to minimise UN involvement.67 The Portuguese government’s refusal to protest or even acknowledge

Indonesia’s continued military incursions, its legitimisation of Indonesian controlled party leaders in West Timor, its refusal to negotiate with Fretilin in regard to a resumption of a decolonisation process and the agreement with Indonesia to avoid UN involvement would have sent a message to Fretilin that the Portuguese government

64 Horta, Funu, 58. 65 Ali Alatas, The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor (Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, 2006), 16-17. 66 Joint Press Statement Concerning Talks between the Foreign Minister of Portugal and Indonesia, held at Rome on 1 and 2 November 1975, 3 November 1975. In Heike Krieger, ed., East Timor and the International Community. Basic Documents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 39. 67 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvi. Cable from Rome to Canberra. Portuguese Timor – Rome Talks. 4 November 1975. (Way, 546).

was seeking a route to a pro-forma decolonisation process leading to a sanctioned

Indonesian takeover.

Nevertheless, at the time of the appointment of the caretaker Fraser government, Fretilin’s relative moderation, its call for a Portuguese return and willingness to work with the international community provided openings for a defusing of the situation, a return to some form of normality and the prospects of a longer-term solution had the Indonesian covert intervention been curtailed. Fretilin was itself calling for United Nations involvement, and the option of taking the matter to the UN remained open to Australia, as did the kind of discussions with its allies mentioned by Dunn. Australia also had the option open to it of initiating a dialogue with Fretilin and offering its services in a mediating role. An Australian delegation to

East Timor reporting accurately on the situation, as had been a repeated request by

Fretilin, would in itself have had a significant impact, as would overall encouragement and facilitation of international scrutiny. A genuine evidence-based expression of concern by the new Australian government, either public or private, would have been taken very seriously by the Suharto regime, anxious as it clearly was about the standpoint of Australia and Indonesia’s position in the international community. Even if this had not been the case, regardless of the feasibility of immediately re- establishing a viable process of self-determination, the Indonesian covert intervention remained both lethal, illegal under international law and in contradiction to the

Australian government’s stated position regarding both self-determination and the use of force. As a near neighbour to East Timor the Australian government retained a certain responsibility to oppose it on those grounds alone.

When the caretaker Fraser government took office there was reason to believe a different direction might ensue. The new Foreign Minister, Andrew Peacock, had previously been very critical of the Whitlam Government’s position on East Timor.

He met Horta before the Foreign Minister would do so and in parliament on 25

February 1975 accused Whitlam of giving Suharto “approval for Indonesia to take over East Timor”. He advocated a “free act of self-determination” and a more proactive approach, including establishing links with Timorese politicians and acting as a mediator between Portugal, Indonesia and the Timorese.68 His position appears to have wavered somewhat, with Woolcott reporting that after a visit to Jakarta in April

1975 that he no longer believed an independent East Timor to be in Australia’s interests.69 He met with Tjan in Bali in September, with the latter claiming that

Peacock told him he supported early incorporation,70 although Dunn argues that Tjan later made exaggerated claims about Peacock’s position for the purposes of his own agenda.71 Fraser himself was at the time a hard-line anti-communist conservative who had expressed fears “of the possible communist control in Portuguese Timor”.72

Nevertheless, on 23 October Peacock was able to use a Liberal Party press release to accuse the government of following a “bankrupt foreign policy” for failing to engage with the developing situation, advocating instead for a “regional approach” involving

ASEAN nations.73 Just five days before taking power he published an article in the

Melbourne Herald supporting genuine self-determination, expressing fears about the danger of a prolonged guerrilla war, strongly criticising the government’s position of non-involvement and rejecting “the view that the matter can or should be left in

Portugal’s lap.” He reiterated his support for a regional approach and advocated

“adopting a mediating role and offering its good offices to assist negotiations.”74

68 HOR Hansard, 25 February 1975. 69 NAA: A1838, 49/2/1/1, vi. Letter from Woolcott to Feakes. 12 May 1975. (Way, 259). 70 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvi. Memorandum for Ambassador, Australian Embassy, Djkarta. 1 December 1975. 71 Dunn, Timor. A people betrayed, 199-201. 72 HOR Hansard, 28 February 1975. 73 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/3, iii. Liberal Party of Australia press release. Timor Conflict Appears to be at a Turning Point. Statement by the Hon. A.S. Peacock, M.P. Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs. 23 October 1975. 74 Andrew Peacock, “We pointed the way to Whitlam,” Herald, 6 November 1975.

Expectations were therefore held by Fretilin and its supporters that the new government would take a different approach. Dunn, in Timor at the time with the

ACFOA delegation, reported that the news of its appointment brought “a round of cheers” from the Fretilin leadership in Dili.75 There were in fact aborted attempts by

Peacock and later by Fraser for something of a change of direction, but in each case the Department was successful in asserting what by then was clearly its unambiguously preferred position. Fraser later claimed that he was not told of intelligence reports about Indonesia’s plans to invade when he became caretaker

Prime Minister,76 a claim somewhat ambiguous considering that plans for the full invasion that did occur were not entirely developed nor shared with DFA on 11

November. Nevertheless, it is clear Peacock was informed about the Indonesian covert intervention77 and in late November he drafted a private message to Suharto raising concerns about it. Woolcott successfully persuaded him against sending it on the grounds that it would create a “strong reaction” in Indonesia, breach the trust of personal contacts and supposedly violate the caretaker provisions. He argued instead that Indonesia should expect “understanding” or at least “as low a level of activity and criticism as is possible.”78

At the invasion itself Fraser raised the possibility of a United Nations peacekeeping force, but was persuaded out of the idea by Renouf, who argued that

Indonesia was “absolutely resolved” to incorporate the territory and that to take such a

“grave step” would be to effectively take Indonesia to the Security Council, severely damage the relationship with Indonesia and ASEAN and impact adversely on the

75 Dunn, Timor. A people betrayed, 230. 76 Hamish McDonald, “Secret papers confirm East Timor cover-up,” Sydney Morning Herald, 13 September 2000. 77 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/6/9, i. Dispatch from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Peacock. Indonesia: The Internal Situation. The uneasy calm. 19 November 1975. (Way, 577-8). 78 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvi. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Untitled. 27 November 1975. (Way, 582-4).

defence and strategic environment. In contradiction to Fraser’s claim he was not informed about the invasion plans, he also reminded the Prime Minister that Indonesia had the capacity to embarrass Australia by revealing that it had “kept it well acquainted beforehand with its plans.”79

Hopes that the new government would steer Australian policy in a different direction on East Timor were accordingly soon dashed, with the new government continuing its predecessor’s two-tier policy of maintaining in public that it supported the rights of the Timorese people to self-determination while in reality effectively encouraging Indonesian intervention. Peacock in particular made a hasty and extreme about face. After some consideration and telephone discussions with the author of this thesis, Peacock declined to be interviewed on the record regarding this matter.

Nevertheless, there is evidence from other sources that he came under strong pressure from two sides: from the Department, particularly the Jakarta Embassy which was campaigning strongly for a pro-Indonesian position, and from his own party, including Fraser himself.

A submission to him from Renouf of 13 November couched the problem as essentially one of relations with Indonesia, lamenting the damage done by “the well- publicised activities of private Australian groups.” He suggested it could be possible to “recover ground” by offering Indonesia support on Timor policy, or if this were not feasible at least be “as unobtrusive as possible” on the issue.80 As discussed, it is clear

Woolcott put considerable pressure on Peacock. In conversations with the author the then Jakarta Embassy Minister Malcolm Dan also related how he told the Foreign

Minister that it was “too late” as the Indonesians had a “gung ho” attitude and would

79 NAA: 1838, 935/17/3, xii. Portuguese Timor: Proposal for a Peace-Keeping Force. Submission from Renouf to Fraser. 8 December 1975. (Way, 607-9). 80 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/1, ii. Relations with Indonesia: Portuguese Timor. Submission from Renouf to Fraser. 13 November 1975. (Way, 565-6).

not at that stage have changed their position.81 The ardency with which Dan may have put his position is apparent from a strident handwritten note from him to Woolcott written several months previously in response to a DFA cable from Canberra canvassing policy options. In it he scoffs at the idea of a return to orderly decolonisation or a “regional initiative” as “completely out of touch with reality” as it would “severely hinder Indonesian freedom of action” and “deprive Indonesia of her objective - integration of P.T.” Such an approach, he contended, would “earn for us the enmity of Indonesia”, particularly as Indonesia had “confided her most secret plans and aims to Australia” and would therefore feel “justifiably double crossed.”82

It is also clear that Fraser remained staunchly anti-Fretilin during this period.

Senator Neville Bonner later related how upon his return from the parliamentary delegation to East Timor in September 1975 he met with Fraser and Peacock, to be told by the former that, “Nev, they’re a bunch of coms - forget ‘em.”83 At a time when

Peacock was preoccupied with an intense election campaign, such pressure from two sides, with virtually nothing moderating the argument in the other direction, would be likely to have proven difficult to resist.

3.4 Opening the door to an “appropriate solution”

The pressure from Renouf and the Department to “recover ground” with

Indonesia was taken seriously by Fraser. On 20 November he conveyed a message to

Suharto via Woolcott stressing “the great importance” he attached to the

Australian/Indonesia relationship, stating that he recognised the need for “Indonesia to

81 Malcolm Dan, (Minister, Australian Embassy in Jakarta, 1974 to 1976) in discussion with the author, 13 October 2016. 82 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xiii. Handwritten note, untitled, unsigned, undated, but in the handwriting of Malcolm Dan. Filed alongside document of 10 September 1975. Dan confirmed to the author that it was his handwriting, although he had no recollection of writing it. 83 Neville Bonner, interviewed by Robin Hughes, Australian Biography, 15 January 1992, http://www.australianbiography.gov.au/subjects/bonner/interview7.html

have an appropriate solution for the problem of Portuguese Timor”, proposing a meeting should Fraser be elected and promising not to receive Horta or any other

Fretilin representative.84

Whitlam later argued that this message, along with Fraser’s previous anti- communist stand, would have conveyed to Suharto that “any ‘anti-communist’ action it took would have support from Canberra” and that “his personal undertakings to me

[to abstain from military intervention] had lapsed.” 85 In a discussion with the author

Woolcott also expressed the opinion that the Fraser statement offered stronger encouragement to intervention than anything from Whitlam.86 It is clear that the message would have made Suharto aware that Australia under Fraser was in greater fear of poor relations with his own regime than of any actions Indonesia might take against the Timorese people. However, it should also be noted that any agreement regarding military action had already effectively lapsed with the Whitlam

Government’s acceptance of Operation Flamboyant. In the context of the continuing

Indonesian incursions, of which the Suharto regime knew the new government to be well aware, Fraser’s statement would have indicated to it continuity, a message that like its predecessor the Fraser government was supporting its Timor agenda and would be unlikely to oppose further military action in more than a perfunctory manner.

Australia was at this time engaged in an intense and acrimonious election campaign, diverting media attention and that of many activists away from the Timor issue. Nevertheless, news and protests about the situation in East Timor continued.

Fairfax journalist Michael Richardson reported on the ongoing Indonesian attacks,

84 NAA: A11443, [14]. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Australian Relations with Indonesia. 20 November 1975. (Way, 579). 85 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam government 1972-1975. (Melbourne: Viking, 1985), 111. 86 Richard Woolcott (Ambassador to Indonesia 1975 to 1978) in discussion with the author, 11 August 2016.

including a report in The Age and the Sydney Morning Herald on 26 November that

“Indonesian warships, aircraft and troops,” had launched a “fierce attack” on the town of Atabae.87 The Age, the Melbourne Herald, The Sydney Morning Herald, and The

Canberra Times all ran editorials demanding an Australian protest to the Indonesian government, with The Canberra Times stating on 27 November that it was “essential for Australian self-respect” that the government protest “forthrightly and publicly.” 88

Timor solidarity activists, although not large in numbers, targeted party meetings and rallies with protests and questions for candidates. Activists founded the Timor

Information Service during this period and organised a conference on East Timor on

22-23 November. The front page of the second edition of its newsletter, dated 3

December, stated that “an Indonesian invasion is imminent,” criticised the government for inaction and blamed Indonesia for the ongoing fighting.89

In this context the Fraser government set itself to the task, no doubt strongly encouraged and assisted by DFA, of creating and supporting a narrative, largely shared with the Suharto regime,90 aimed at minimising damage to relations between the two countries, justifying the Australian position and placing Indonesian actions in a light which would make them appear more reasonable. On the Channel 7 program A

Current Affair on 26 November Foreign Minister Peacock described “a lot of criticism of Indonesia in Australia”, as being “ill informed”.91 On 27 November Peacock declared he “deeply regretted the continued bloodshed,” yet stated only that it was

“difficult to deny” reports of Indonesian involvement. In homage to the caretaker conventions he referred to the 30 October parliamentary statement by Willesee as

87 Michael Richardson, “Warships, bombers hit Fretilin garrison,” Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November 1975. 88 Editorial, “Action and Inaction on East Timor,” Canberra Times, 27 November 1975. 89 “Australia must condemn Indonesian intervention in East Timor,” “Timor conference.,” and “Timor Meetings,” Timor Information Service Newsletter, no. 2, 3 December 1975. 90 Taylor, East Timor, 58-59. 91 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/3, iii. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Portuguese Timor. 28 November 1975.

policy, echoing “concern” about Indonesian actions whilst emphasising, the “special interest” of Indonesia in East Timor and noting its “public commitment to the principle of self-determination in the territory.” Also echoing Willesee’s 30 October statement, Peacock continued to identify “talks between the parties”, in reference to those in West Timor under Indonesian control as well as Fretilin, as a key Australian goal.92 This was in reality a call for a situation that would have severely disadvantaged

Fretilin, faced as it would have been by a number of Indonesian proxies unable to negotiate on their own account and clearly working on behalf of Indonesia for integration.

3.5 The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)

On 28 November Fretilin issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence

(UDI), establishing the Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET). The UDI is cited by some as evidence of Fretilin intransigence in acting without a proper process of self-determination, and irresponsibility in provoking the Indonesians. Fretilin in fact had come to the decision with a great deal of reluctance, after three months of unsuccessfully requesting a Portuguese return and petitioning help from the international community. James Dunn recounted that when he arrived with the

ACFOA mission in mid-October Fretilin leaders ruled out an UDI, telling him independence would require a long transition period and that they wanted the

Portuguese to return to oversee it.93 However, in the following months Fretilin came under intense military pressure, with Balibo and Maliana falling to covert Indonesian forces on 16 October. From 20 November Atabae also came under heavy naval and aerial bombardment, falling on 27 November.94 Fretilin appeals to the UN Security

92 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/3, iii. Statement by Andrew Peacock, caretaker Minister for Foreign Affairs, 27 November 1975. 93 Dunn, Timor. A people betrayed, 237. 94 CAVR, Chega, 195-6.

Council and the international community, including Australia, met with little response.

Portugal, Australia and the international community failed to make any credible protests regarding these attacks and their public statements continued to support the fiction that the fighting was between Timorese. Australia even failed to make any effective response to the deaths of five Australian based journalists. The

Rome talks privileged Indonesia as a negotiating party and couched the ongoing fighting as an issue between Timorese whilst ignoring Indonesian violations. That along with Portugal’s continued failure to negotiate with Fretilin made it clear

Portugal would not be standing against Indonesian actions nor returning to oversee a credible decolonisation process. As Taylor notes, Fretilin hoped that an appeal from an independent state to the UN might receive more attention than their previous entreaties.95 Dunn describes the UDI as “a desperate measure which was virtually forced on the Timorese by the domestic and international circumstances arising from

Indonesia’s covert aggression against them, and by the refusal of the colonial power,

Portugal, as well as Australia, United Nations and the world community in general to intervene in order to dissuade Indonesia from a gross violation of internationally accepted standards of behaviour.”96

The UDI was anticipated by Indonesia and Australia. A cable from Jakarta the very day of its proclamation recounted a discussion with Tjan and Liem Bian Kie, reporting that they “expected Fretilin to make such a move and would not be unhappy about it.”97 The following day the two OPSUS operatives provided Malcolm Dan with a remarkably frank and detailed account of Indonesia’s planned strategy in response to

95 Taylor, East Timor, 63. 96 Dunn Timor. A people betrayed, 242. 97 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 28 November 1975. (Way, 586).

the development. Malik would issue a statement that day blaming Fretilin for derailing the decolonisation process. UDT/Apodeti would issue a Declaration of

Integration with Indonesia and request Indonesian protection. Indonesia would accept it and the supposed “Indonesian assistance to UDT/Apodeti forces” would be stepped up with the aim of taking Dili. Indonesia would appeal to “friendly countries” to support it, while as diplomatic cover moving a “consensus statement” at the UN supporting a solution through talks. Australia’s attitude would be “very important”.

Tjan advised that Australian citizens in the territory should be evacuated as their lives were in “great danger”.98

The Declaration of Integration was made that day. As well as the West Timor based leaders of UDT and Apodeti, it was signed by those of the minor parties Partido

Trabalhista and KOTA, although after escaping Indonesian custody several months later the KOTA leader, José Martins, would claim the declaration had been coerced.99

Peacock greeted the UDI with a statement that Australia “could not accept claims by any one of the three main Timorese parties to be the only true representatives of Portuguese Timor.” In accordance with the second tier of Timor policy he continued to propose talks between the parties while emphasising the government’s support for a resolution of the conflict by “peaceful means through which the will of the people could be expressed.”100 The Australian Ambassador in

Lisbon reported that the Director General of Political Affairs of the Portuguese

Foreign Ministry, Magalhaes Cruz, “was unable to disguise his relief” as the matter

98 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 29 November 1975. (Way, 588-9). 99 Letter from Jose Martins to the Secretary General of the UN. 29 April 1976. In TIS Newsletter, no. 9-10, 6 May 1976. 100 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvi. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Minister’s statement on East Timor. 29 November 1975.

was “now between Fretilin and Indonesia”, allowing Portugal to refer the matter to the

United Nations and withdraw sooner than expected.101

Indonesia made its intentions very clear, with Murtopo on 1 December indicating to the Washington Post, that an invasion was imminent.102 On 2 December

Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik told a press conference that diplomacy was

“finished” and that “the solution to the Timor problem is now in the front line of battle.”103 Neither the CSIS briefing nor Malik’s statement elicited any expression of concern, public or otherwise, from the Australian government.

3.6 The Timor issue at the United Nations

Whilst failing to effectively protest Indonesian covert actions or the threats from Malik, the Australian government worked at the United Nations to make the imminent Indonesian intervention appear more reasonable and reconcile the

Australian position with its public support for self-determination. In accordance with the strategy outlined by Tjan, on 2 December Australia co-sponsored with Indonesia and an “ASEAN-plus group”, comprising Australia and New Zealand as well as the five ASEAN nations, a resolution at the Special Political and Decolonisation

Committee (Fourth Committee) of the United Nations calling on Portugal to convene talks with Timorese parties to determine a process of self-determination. In a situation in which Fraser and Peacock were feverishly involved in an election campaign, the strategy and narrative deployed would undoubtedly have been a product of DFA officials.

101 NAA: 1838, 49/2/1/1, viii. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 29 November 1975. (Way, 590-1). 102 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 1 December 1975. (Way, 592). 103 “Malik Warns,” Canberra Times, 3 December 1975.

In speaking in its support, the Australian Deputy Permanent Representative

Duncan Campbell referred to “a struggle for supremacy among the Timorese political groups,” from which Fretilin “emerged as initially stronger than its rivals.” He blamed

Fretilin’s UDI for rejecting a role for UDT or Apodeti and provoking those parties to issue the Declaration of Integration. Australia had rejected both declarations as it did not “pretend to know what the people of Portuguese Timor want.” Contending that such matters should not be settled by force of arms he called for “an end to the continuing conflict” and stated that the UN should support the proposal for talks to restore an orderly process of decolonisation and enable the people of the territory to determine their own future.104

Campbell and the government he represented would have been well aware, of course, that there was no prospect the co-sponsor of the resolution, Indonesia, would allow its Timorese proxies to participate in talks which could produce any such outcome. In apportioning the blame equally for the “struggle for supremacy” between parties his statement fudged the origins of the coup. It disregarded the context of the

UDI and made no mention of Fretilin’s request over months for a Portuguese return, nor its undertaking, provided by Horta to Australian officials in October, to accept a role for other parties in a decolonisation process.105 There was also considerable irony in the expressed hopes for an end to fighting and the stress on the importance of not settling matters by force of arms when the supposed civil war was in fact being sustained, in the words of a cable from the Jakarta embassy itself the day before by

“Indonesian forces supplemented by a few Timorese soldiers.”106 In failing to address the central Indonesian role in sustaining the conflict it facilitated a covering narrative

104 NAA: 1838, 906/30/14/3, i. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations. 2 December 1975. 105 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xv. Record of Conversation between Feakes, Joseph, Curtin and Horta. October 28, 1975. 106 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 1 December 1975.

to justify the Australian position and to depict Indonesia as a bystander to a destabilising internal Timorese struggle on its border which it had finally felt compelled to end.

On the day of Campbell’s speech, 2 December, the Australian government strongly advised all Australian citizens to leave East Timor.107 In a media interview on

3 December Peacock again depicted the conflict as a “civil war” between Timorese, reiterated that Indonesian “patience” should be noted and claimed that two out of the three “warring parties” supported integration. When asked about the chance of an invasion he avoided answering by responding that it was “well known” that

“Indonesia is giving sympathy and support to UDT and Apodeti.”108 Out of the public eye, Woolcott was somewhat franker, contending in a cable to Canberra the same day that it was time to “grasp the nettle” and accept that hopes that talks would end the conflict or restore a decolonisation process were unrealistic. Less lives would be lost in a direct intervention than in a “slow war of attrition” he argued, and “In essence we look like being confronted with a basic choice between Indonesia and Fretilin.”109

3.7 The Ford/Suharto meeting

US President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Suharto in Jakarta on 6 December 1975. Suharto raised the Timor issue well into the meeting, expounding the Indonesian narrative of an irresponsible Fretilin which had seized power by force, refused to attend talks and declared unilateral independence, a

Portugal unable to restore stability and an Indonesia “faced with a fait accompli” of suffering refugees and ongoing fighting. Suharto requested “understanding if we deem

107 “The Democratic Republic of East Timor is born,” CIET mimeograph, 4 December 1975. 108 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/3, iii. Statement by Andrew Peacock, caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs. Evacuations of Australians from Portuguese Timor. 3 December 1975. 109 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1. xvi. Letter from Woolcott to Feakes. 3 December 1975. (Way, 597-8).

it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.” Ford replied that his administration would

“understand and not press you on the issue.” Kissinger added that due to US domestic reaction it was important it succeed quickly, but that “whatever you do…we will try to handle it in the best way possible.”110

Some have argued that this relegates the role of Australia in the events leading to the invasion to a minor one. Scott, however, takes a different position. He notes that records of a meeting between Kissinger and his advisers just after the UDT coup on

12 August demonstrate that Kissinger assumed Australia would feel “impelled” to support Timorese self-determination and that the US wanted to avoid controversy on the issue. He cites a number of other documents in support of this position, noting that

Kissinger assumed there would be a return to orderly decolonisation after the civil war and took what Scott calls an, “objective, even conciliatory [attitude] towards Fretilin.”

Scott accordingly downplays the importance of the summit between Ford and Suharto on 6 December, citing a State Department cable to Kissinger two days earlier as stating that Fretilin had not cooperated with plans for a meeting, had declared independence unilaterally and that other parties had petitioned for integration. The author’s implication appears to be that the US based its assumptions on limited and inaccurate information. He concludes that, “the US was not complicit to the

Indonesian invasion, in the intimate way Australia was” and while noting the compliance Ford gave Suharto during the summit itself, nevertheless concludes that “a non-military solution that offered Suharto the security he sought” would have been supported by the US had Whitlam suggested it.111

110 US Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State. Text of Ford-Kissinger-Suharto Discussion. 6 December 1975. National Security Achieve, The George Washington University. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc4.pdf 111Scott, Last Flight out of Dili, 108-115.

This position is supported by a number of factors. While the US too placed great importance on its relationship with the Suharto regime,112 it did not demonstrate a clear position on East Timor until a late stage in developments, regarding it as

“peripheral to United States interests” and making it clear to DFA it was happy to follow the Australian lead.113 As Scott notes, Suharto had previously raised the issue of East Timor with Ford at a meeting between the two leaders at camp David on 5

July 1975, when his attempt to elicit a statement of understanding of Indonesia’s position was met with non-commitment.114 On 16 August the US Ambassador to

Indonesia, David Newsom, told Woolcott that he was under instructions from

Kissinger not to involve himself in discussions of East Timor as the US had problems of “greater importance” to worry about, contending that “if Indonesia were to intervene the United States would hope they would do so ‘effectively, quickly and not use our equipment.’”115 While certainly a necessary condition for the Indonesian invasion, the American endorsement was a late intervention in a situation that had developed over a considerable period of time, and in which Australian policy and actions had already played a very significant role. As Scott contends, it is likely that had other policies been followed and a process of self-determination supported by

Australia been in place, Ford and the Americans would have accepted it.

3.8 The narrative of regrettable but understandable invasion

In a statement that yet again elicited no expression of concern from Canberra,

Indonesia again flagged its intentions very clearly on 4 December, accusing Fretilin of

112 Taylor, East Timor, 54-55. 113 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, i. Memorandum from McCarthy, Washington, to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 21 March 1975. (Way, 229). 114 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto. 5 July 1975. National Security Achieve, The George Washington University. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc1.pdf 115 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xi. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. 17 August 1975. (Way, 314).

“terror, torture and cruelty” against its opponents, of mortar attacks and raids on

Indonesian territory and of causing thousands of refugees to flee into Indonesian territory. Employing a narrative similar to that extrapolated by Campbell, it blamed

Fretilin for ending the hopes of the Rome agreement with the UDI, stating it would

“take the necessary actions to guarantee national territorial security…so that the process of decolonisation can be realised in accordance with the aspirations and the desire of the whole people of Portuguese Timor.”116

On 6 December Woolcott informed Canberra of information from senior

Indonesian defence sources of the imminent action against East Timor. Couching his cable in accordance with the Indonesian fiction that the forces would consist of a combination of Timorese and Indonesian “volunteers”, the Ambassador emphasised that Indonesia would be looking to the Australian government for “understanding,” and “to blunt the further growth of anti-Indonesian feeling in Australia in the long- term interests of both countries.” His cable foreshadowed the public narratives

Australian governments would use regarding the invasion in the following years. Any public statement in response to the invasion, he argued, while needing to repeat

Australia’s opposition to the use of force, should emphasise its efforts to “secure a negotiated settlement on the basis of self-determination” whilst showing understanding of Indonesia’s concerns, including “the 40,000 refugees” in West

Timor. In response to public criticism, it should hold Fretilin responsible for supposedly failing to seek an accommodation with Indonesia and for the “folly of the

UDI which triggered off the present situation.” It should make the point that Indonesia believed the stability which it had “fought for [for] many years” was at stake, that the territory had been artificially divided by colonial history, and that there was “no intrinsic reason” it would not be better off as part of Indonesia than as “a brittle and

116 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, i. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 4 December 1975. (Way, 599-601).

divided state.” Describing it as a matter of “national interest” he concluded with what was by then a well-practiced phrase, stating that “It is really a choice between a pragmatic realistic position and a principled but ineffective posture.”117

Indonesia launched its full-scale assault on Dili early on 7 December 1975.

The media published reports based on radio messages from Fretilin Information

Minister Alarico Fernandes the following day, with The Canberra Times headline,

Indonesia Takes Control in Dili reporting that “Women and children were being killed indiscriminately in the streets.”118

Believing the invasion to herald an irreversible integration, the Fraser government went about providing as much support to the Indonesian government’s position as appearances would allow while publicly claiming to adhere to its stated position of opposing the use of force and supporting the principle of self- determination. A media release by Peacock on 7 December avoided direct condemnation of the Indonesian action, instead regretting “the course which events in

East Timor have taken” whilst appreciating “the gravity of the problems posed for the

Indonesian government”, and placing blame on the “internal disarray” of Portugal and on Fretilin for the UDI.119 In a statement the following day he built on this narrative further by stressing the “great difficulties” caused to Indonesia by the “conflict between the various political groups” which had “culminated in the attack upon and capture of Dili.” He also misrepresented what he knew to be the Suharto regime’s motives and intentions, describing Indonesia’s objective as “the restoration of law and order” as a pre-condition for an act of self-determination. Declaring this objective

“laudable” he nevertheless stated that Australia did not “condone the attack upon Dili”

117 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xvii. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 6 December 1975. (Way, 601-3). 118 “Indonesia takes control in Dili,” Canberra Times, 8 December 1975. 119 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, i. Statement by Andrew Peacock, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Portuguese Timor. 7 December 1975.

and would press for a cease-fire and an act of self-determination at the Security

Council.120 At a Press Club luncheon also on 8 December Prime Minister Fraser declined to explicitly condemn the invasion, stating he had nothing to add to

Peacock’s statement of 7 December.121

As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, while reluctantly accepting the need, in accordance with its requirement to appear to be upholding international norms, to support a resolution expressing some concern about the invasion, Australia worked to soften the wording during the draft process and even attempted to have specific mention of Indonesia removed entirely.122 In speaking to the motion, Campbell continued to inaccurately depict Indonesia as an innocent party reluctantly intervening in destabilising circumstances of Timorese origin for the purpose of restoring “law and order” in the interests of its own national security.123

The resolution, expressing deep “concern” at the invasion and calling for an immediate Indonesian withdrawal, was passed by the General Assembly on 12

December 1975.

3.9 The elected Fraser government

The Fraser government was elected in its own right on 13 December 1975. In a submission to Peacock of 22 December DFA Secretary Alan Renouf argued that

Indonesia was set on incorporating the territory, and there seemed no “Australian interest” in endangering the important Indonesian relationship by opposing this, particularly as it was now impossible to alter the course of events and Indonesian

120 NAA: A1838, 935/17/3, xii. DFA News Release. Portuguese Timor. 8 December 1975. 121 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/3, iii. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor. Prime Minister’s Remarks. 8 December 1975. 122 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations. 10 December 1975. 123 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, iii. Statement by Campbell in Fourth Committee of UN General Assembly. 11 December 1975.

forces would remain regardless of Security Council determinations. There was, however, a small risk of a prolonged conflict, in which case Australia would have to consider persuading the Indonesians to accept “a more genuine process of self- determination.” In the meantime, it was not in Australia’s interests for the

“internationally responsible” Suharto regime to be condemned in the United Nations.

Participation in any UN initiative would be unwise as it would cast Australia as either the “guarantor” of Indonesian good behaviour or as “an accomplice to Indonesian activities”, both of which would provoke domestic opinion. While emphasising the need for “public presentation to be carefully managed”, he recommended a two-tier policy: accepting the incorporation as “an accomplished fact” and remaining as detached as possible, whilst continuing to support self-determination in public and explaining to the Indonesians the importance of Australian public opinion.124

Accepting this advice, the Fraser government accordingly sought to continue what one official called the “business as usual” approach to the Australia/Indonesia relationship while attempting to minimise the impact of the Timor issue.125 This, however, left a large gap between the policy announced to the public and the one actually implemented, requiring an ongoing campaign of disinformation. As will be seen, far from remaining detached, the nature of this narrative itself and the Fraser government’s determination to protect the Suharto regime caused it to become the regime’s principal lobbyist on the Timor issue in the international arena. Despite

Renouf’s entreaty that the policy be reassessed in the event of a prolonged conflict, the strength of the Fraser government’s commitment to prioritising the Indonesian relationship also prevented it from changing direction in the face of evidence of an increasingly dire situation in the territory in the following years.

124 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2, iii. Portuguese Timor. Submission to Peacock. 22 December 1975. (Way, 644). 125 NAA: A1838, 3038/13/2/1, xii. Note on Timor. January 1976. (Way, 678)

Utilising a strategy they would continue to employ throughout the occupation,

Indonesian officials proved adept at producing an acquiescent approach from

Australia by convincing its officials that the strength of the relationship was in peril due to the Timor issue. Tjan reacted to the Australian General Assembly vote by describing it as “disastrous” to Jakarta embassy diplomats. He cited intelligence chief

Murdani as calling it a “double cross” and Murtopo as saying Indonesia would have to consider what “positive action” to take against Australia.126 The Suharto regime’s displeasure was maintained in the following months, rejecting a proposal for Fraser to visit Bali at the end of the ASEAN Summit in late February due to its position on East

Timor.127

Woolcott continued to lobby for a position “sympathetic” to that of Indonesia, stating on 5 January that Australia’s vote in the General Assembly came as “a shock to Indonesia from the President down”, as it had believed it was acting in accordance with a shared objective with Australia. The government, he argued, was faced with a choice between “Wilsonian idealism or Kissingerian realism”, and Indonesia was looking to Australia to redress a perceived “anti-Indonesian pro-Fretilin bias” in the

Australian community. He recommended that Australia inform Indonesia that it accepted “the realities of the situation”, making it clear it believed incorporation to be the best solution while expressing official regret that “the situation that had led to a resort to force.” Like Renouf, he advocated a two-tier policy, publicly emphasising the need for an act of self-determination while accepting that in reality it would not be genuine and acting meanwhile to blunt hostility towards Indonesia within the

Australian community.128

126 NAA: A10463,801/13/11/1, xvii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 12 December 1975. (Way, 626). 127 NAA: A1838/13/10/1, iii. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. The ASEAN Summit and Australia. 30 January 1976. (Way, 682). 128 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xix. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Australia, Indonesia and East Timor. 5 January 1976. (Way, 652-60).

However, the government’s efforts to proceed with “business as usual” with the Suharto regime were challenged by information reaching Australia from East

Timor, a Timor solidarity movement that sought to highlight what was happening in the territory, a Timor parliamentary lobby, sections of the media, and, as the situation progressed, increasing international concerns.

Before the invasion solidarity activists provided Fretilin with a portable radio transceiver with which to communicate with supporters in and near Darwin. Given the title Radio Maubere, it was operated within East Timor by Fretilin Minister of Internal

Affairs and Security Alarico Fernandes until his capture in late 1978. Messages were also recorded and passed on to their stated recipients by the Telecom run Outpost

Radio until the Government put an end to it in late 1976.129 The Australian side of

Radio Maubere also initially communicated openly with a transceiver operated by supporters in Darwin, but as discussed below, this was confiscated by Telecom on 27

January. From then onwards it continued to operate surreptitiously from bush locations, and whilst a number of Australia based operators were subsequently caught, charged and radios confiscated, activists were successful each time in replacing them promptly. Fernandes sent news of the situation in the territory, including Indonesian operations and abuses and Fretilin resistance, as well as a regular magazine program for re-broadcast within Australia by community radio stations such as 3CR in

Melbourne. He also sent messages from the DRET government to the United Nations and foreign governments and liaised with Fretilin external missions in New York and

Mozambique. His bulletins were reported in the Australian media including the public

129 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, iv. Cable from Canberra to embassies. Australia cuts final Fretilin communications link with outside world. Melbourne Overseas Service in English. Transcript. 17 November 1976.

international broadcaster Radio Australia, causing particular annoyance to the Suharto regime.130 131

In the first weeks and months the radio link broadcast reports of landings, bombings and bombardments from ships and aircraft, troop operations and conflict with Fretilin forces. It claimed effective Fretilin resistance and success in containing

Indonesian forces to limited areas. As late as 19 December it claimed fighting was continuing in Dili and Baucau.132 It also carried allegations of severe and widespread human rights abuses, including reports of executions and massacres, the abduction and rape of girls, extensive and organised looting and the burning and destruction of property. It carried regular appeals to the international community in this period both general and specific, such as a statement on 11 December that “only internationalistic militance of brotherly people and nations will avoid the massacres of our people.”133

On 2 January it reported that “thousands of refugees” were facing starvation and that the Indonesians were “deliberately destroying crops”, calling on the Australian government to apply pressure to allow assistance from international aid organisations.

The same day it reported a purported eye-witness account of the execution of

Australian journalist Roger East on the Dili Waterfront.134 A message from DRET

Vice-President Nicolau Lobato of 4 January proposed the airstrip at Same be considered a neutral zone to allow the landing of aid.135 On 5 January the radio link alleged the use of chemical weapons.136

Solidarity organisations were active, with the Sydney based Campaign for an

Independent East Timor (CIET) and the Melbourne based Timor Information Service

130 CAVR, Chega, 712. 131 News and messages from these broadcasts can be found in East Timor News, Numbers 1- 42 and Timor Information Service Newsletters, numbers 1-27. 132 “Messages received from East Timor,” CIET mimeograph, December 1975. 133 “East Timor calling,” Timor Information Service (TIS) newsletter, no. 4, 17 December 1975. 134 “East Timor calling, message 22,” TIS newsletter, no. 6, 15 January 1975. 135 “East Timor calling, message 24,” TIS newsletter, no. 6. 136 “East Timor calling, message 25,” TIS newsletter, no. 6.

(TIS) both producing regular publications containing news from the radio link and other sources. CIET and the Melbourne based Australia East Timor Association

(AETA) jointly decided to call for an Australia wide East Timor Moratorium based on the successful Vietnam War Moratoriums of the early 1970s, scheduled for 18 to 19

March.137 The founding meeting of the Sydney Moratorium attracted 150 people.138

The solidarity movement also organised an Australia wide tour of a DRET delegation consisting of the exiled Minister for Economic and Social Affairs, Abilio Araujo and

Estanislau da Silva of the Fretilin committee in Lisbon.139

Concerns were also voiced by trade unions and churches. In late December four Anglican bishops telegraphed Fraser calling for an Australian initiative to establish a neutral zone to allow the passage of aid.140 On 17 December the Victorian branch of the Meat Industry Employees Union banned delivery of meat and livestock to Indonesia while the occupation continued, and in Canberra the ACT Trades and

Labour Council banned services to the Indonesian Embassy and the homes of

Indonesian diplomats.141 On 19 February the ACTU Executive endorsed a recommendation by the Maritime and Waterfront unions that a ban be placed on

Indonesian registered vessels and on the loading of any military supplies to

Indonesia.142

An insight into the nature of the government’s two-tier policy was provided to the public with the leak of sections of Woolcott’s cable of 5 January, published in The

Canberra Times on 16 January, in which he argued for sympathy for Indonesia,

137 “East Timor Moratorium,” CIET mimeograph, 2 February 1976. 138 “Sydney East Timor Moratorium set for March 18,” CIET mimeograph, 11 February 1976. 139 CIET Press release. Delegation from Democratic Republic of East Timor arrives for month speaking tour of Australia and Papua New Guinea. 26 February 1976. 140 “Bishops press PM to aid Timor refugees,” The Age, 31 December 1975. 141 “Trade union action against Indonesian aggression grows,” CIET mimeograph, December 1975. 142 “Decision of ACTU executive relating to Timor,” TIS newsletter, no. 8, 1 March 1976.

“Kissingerian realism” regarding incorporation and efforts to blunt public hostility towards the Suharto regime.143

3.10 The Timor issue in Parliament

Over the course of the Fraser government its Timor narrative was also challenged in parliament, by both Labor MPs and members of Fraser’s own party.

These included Tom Uren, Ken Fry, Gordon Macintosh, Arthur Gietzelt in the ALP and Alan Missen, Michael Hodgman and Neville Bonner in the Liberal Party.

Amongst the most vocal in the early weeks after parliament’s return on 17 February was Victorian Labor Senator Cyril Primmer. On 19 February 1976 he cited the

Indonesian appointed Governor Lopes da Cruz, reported in The Age on 14 February, reporting casualties of 60,000 “mostly women and children”, asking what protests had been made to “the neo-fascist Government of Indonesia.”144 On 24 February, in terms that would surely have galled his leader Whitlam, he raised concerns about Australian trained Indonesian officers potentially operating in the territory, referring to the invaders as “neo-fascists” and “extreme right wing militarists”, who he accused of the

“massacre, rape, torture and pillage” of a people who had supported Australia against the Japanese in World War II.145

On the other side of politics Liberal Senator for Victoria, Alan Missen questioned the Minister representing the Foreign Minister in the Senate, Senator

Withers, regarding Fretilin control of territory, access to East Timor by the United

Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Australian initiatives to pressure Indonesia to withdraw.146 Other parliamentarians who raised the

Timor issue during this early period included Victorian ALP Senator John Button,

143 Bruce Juddery, “Envoy Puts Jakarta’s View,” Canberra Times, 16 January 1976. 144 Senate Hansard, 19 February 1976. 145 Senate Hansard, 24 February 1976. 146 Senate Hansard, 19 February 1976.

who questioned the Government regarding a UN mission to East Timor and on the statement of Da Cruz regarding 60,000 casualties,147 and ALP MP Gordon Bryant, who asked Foreign Minister Peacock for an assurance regarding the Australian commitment to self-determination.148

Peacock, and Withers in the Senate on his behalf, responded in accordance with the two-tier policy, elaborating the government supported narrative as events progressed for the purpose of justifying the government position and deflecting blame from Indonesia. With evidence of atrocities reaching Australia even at this early stage, this included a narrative of denial regarding evidence of abuses, a belittling of those claiming otherwise, and an outright refusal to make specific protests to the Indonesian government regarding human rights. It also included a willingness to propagate

Indonesian fictions regarding the nature of the conflict.

Withers reacted to Primmer by defending “close and friendly relations” with

Indonesia, belittling his reference to the 60,000 casualty figure and stating he did not know if he should “even attempt” to seek information given the tone of the question.149 Conveying a response from Peacock on 2 March, Withers attributed the figure to the 40,000 supposed to have fled to West Timor, to others “displaced from their homes” and to “mass graves discovered at Aileu and Bobonaro after their capture by PGET150 forces from Fretilin.” He emphasised that “there is no question of a protest to the Government of Indonesia.”151 In a situation in which the ABRI nature of the anti-Fretilin offensive was beyond doubt, Withers’ reference to the supposed capture of towns by “PGET forces” indicated a government willingness to echo one of the most blatant of Indonesian fictions. In response to Missen he explained

147 Senate Hansard, 24 February 1976. 148 HOR Hansard, 25 February 1976. 149 Senate Hansard, 19 February 1976. 150 Provisional Government of East Timor. The proxy entity created by Indonesia with the merger of the parties which had signed the Declaration of Integration. 151 Senate Hansard, 2 March 1976.

government policy “a cessation of the conflict, resumption of international humanitarian aid, a withdrawal of Indonesian forces and a genuine act of self- determination.”152 Peacock himself responded to Bryant on 25 February by stating the same policy.153

Government representatives had an easy option with which to blunt opposition criticisms of its Timor policy. On 18 February the Liberal MP for

Bradfield David Connolly stated that the “unfortunate situation” the government inherited was caused by Whitlam’s assurances to Suharto that Australia would “not make any trouble if you take over Timor’” and his refusal to act in a mediating role between the Indonesians and the Timorese.154 On 25 February, in response to Bryant’s question about the government’s commitment to self-determination, Peacock contrasted the Fraser government’s supposedly proactive approach in the United

Nations as being in “marked contrast to what was done by previous administrations.”

In what would become a recurring theme, there were others in the government ranks who strayed in the other direction regarding Timor policy. On 2 March Liberal

MP Peter Richardson contended that it had been “fortunate for us that others prevented East Timor becoming a bankrupt socialist coconut republic” dependent on

Russian aid offered in return for military facilities.155

3.11 Peacock in Jakarta

Despite efforts to minimise the issue in public, there was an awareness by the government from an early stage of the effectiveness of Fretilin resistance and the serious situation the Indonesian military found itself in during the months after the invasion. There were even some initial indications that Fraser and Peacock might take

152 Senate Hansard, 2 March 1976. 153 HOR, 25 February 1976. 154 HOR, 18 February 1976. 155 HOR Hansard, 2 March 1976.

Renouf’s recommendation to reassess policy in the light of indications of a prolonged conflict seriously. However, this came to nothing due to Indonesian hostility and advice from senior DFA officials.

Peacock made a brief visit to Jakarta from 19 to 20 January 1976, and in preparation for it Fraser directed the Foreign Minister be provided with up-to-date intelligence concerning the military situation in the territory.156 On 19 January Fraser also expressed to DFA officials fears that Indonesia could be entering a “long drawn- out military failure” in East Timor, with the potential to undermine the Suharto regime. He directed them to explore ways of persuading the Indonesians “to switch from a military to a political operation in Timor.”157

In Jakarta Peacock agreed with his hosts that “the matter should be solved quickly” and an act of self-determination held promptly. This appears to have been largely intended as a reference to a perfunctory rubber stamping of incorporation rather than a genuine choice, with Woolcott later telling Renouf that it would have likely been interpreted by the Indonesians as support for “the way they are currently tackling it.”158 Peacock was careful to emphasise the importance of the relationship between the two countries and of resolving difficulties “between friends”, expressing understanding of the Indonesia fear of instability.159 Malik confirmed that the

Indonesians expected order to be restored within six months and an act of self- determination held within that time. Peacock expressed concern that the conflict could

“role on and become a festering sore”, causing a drain on Indonesian resources and souring relations with allies. He suggested that if the conflict continued Australia and

156 NAA: 10463, 801/13/11/1, ixx. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Secret - Timor. For Parkinson alone from Renouf. 18 January 1976. 157 NAA: A11443, [14]. Minute from Parkinston to Feakes. Indonesia and Timor. 19 January 1976. (Way, 668). 158 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, xlii. Letter from Woolcott to Renouf. 21 January 1976. (Way, 669- 70). 159 NAA: 10463, 801/13/11/1, xix. Record of conversation between Peacock and Malik. 19 January 1976.

other friendly countries might take part in a policing order to assist an act of self- determination. He received no direct response to this from either Suharto or Malik.160

Woolcott reported that when Peacock raised the possibility of international participation Indonesian Defence Minister Panggabean replied that it was “too late”.161

During the visit Peacock also raised the prospect of Australian participation in a United Nations peace-keeping operation with DFA officials, expressing concerns that a prolonged conflict would damage the stability of the region and impact on

Australian public opinion to the extent that relations with Indonesia would suffer and potentially endanger United States military assistance. Woolcott opposed it, contending it would strain relations with Indonesia and would not change its determination to integrate the territory. As the act of self-determination “will inevitably be a questionable act”, he argued, it would be unwise for Australia to be associated with it. He was dismissive about the prospect of a prolonged conflict, pointing to the isolated position of Fretilin in regard to arms and supplies and to what the Indonesians believed to be a lack of grass roots support. If a prolonged conflict developed, he maintained “the Indonesians would…act to cauterise it.”162

To the media Peacock described the visit as “a friendly and comprehensive exchange of views” in which he had reiterated to the President “Australia’s desire for close relations between the two countries.” On Timor he propagated the second tier of policy, claiming he had emphasised the need for an end to hostilities and bloodshed, a genuine act of self-determination and a resumption of humanitarian aid through the

ICRC. Emphasising the “frankness” of the discussions on both sides he concluded by

160 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Record of conversation between Peacock and Suharto. 20 January 1976. 161 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor – Minister’s Visit. 30 January 1976. (Way, 680-1). 162 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor – Minister’s Visit. 30 January 1976.

saying that while it was “natural” for two friendly countries to have differences, the situation in East Timor should be seen in the context of the long-term importance of the “close and co-operative relations” between them.163

3.12 The Special Representative of the Secretary General

With the short-lived inquiries by Fraser and Peacock regarding a redirection of policy curtailed, Australian policy as implemented became the position recommended by Woolcott and other DFA officials. The contradictions of this policy, its claim to support self-determination and a withdrawal of Indonesian forces while in reality accepting the perceived inevitability of incorporation, its incongruous attempt to eschew involvement while working to bolster the position of the Suharto regime internationally, and its claims to support international due processes while in reality undermining them, were brought to the fore by its response to the investigation of the

Special Representative of the Secretary General in early 1976.

In accordance with a Security Council request of 22 December, on 29

December UN official Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi was appointed Special

Representative of the Secretary General to investigate the situation in East Timor.164

Peacock had previously welcomed such an appointment, describing it on 23

December as “a consistent objective of Australian policy.”165 However, with the appointment itself he expressed the view at an early stage that it would be preferable

163 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/3, iii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Visit by Minister to Indonesia: Statement on Departure. 21 January 1976. 164 Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolutions 384 (1975), 12 March 1976. In Krieger, East Timor and the international community, 87. 165 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/3, iii. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Portuguese Timor. 23 December 1975.

for Winspeare not to visit Australia, as it would create the impression Australia were a

“party principal” to the Timor issue and push it to greater involvement.166

This attempt to minimise Australia’s involvement, its sensitivity to doing anything which might offend the Suharto regime and the extent to which its actions had compromised its independence was apparent in the response to two requests by

Winspeare: that Australia advise regarding the situation in the territory and that it assist in arranging a private Australian charter aircraft. A cable from Canberra of 8

January described these as “plac[ing] us in some difficulties” as it wished to avoid the visit causing tension with Indonesia or encouraging “hostility towards Indonesia” in the Australian community. The requests could lead Australia to be seen as a “party principal” it argued and, in a clear reference to the CSIS briefings, it described much of the information it had on East Timor as coming from “highly sensitive material which could not be conveyed to Winspeare.”167

US intelligence reports document Indonesia efforts to prepare for the visit, concealing the presence of Indonesian troops and equipment and covering up war damage in Dili. PGET personnel were coached, a number of towns “cleared” so they could be visited, and Indonesian air force personnel prohibited from entering airports.168

Winspeare’s own attitudes were revealed when he told Campbell on 6 January that information received via the radio link was “clearly exaggerated” and that he had no intention of agreeing to a Fretilin request that he meet Timorese refugees in

Darwin.169 He later expressed annoyance to Woolcott that Portugal had taken the issue

166 Way, Australia and the Incorporation of East Timor, 660, footnote. 167 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xix. Cable from Canberra to New York. Timor: Special Representative of the Secretary-General. 8 January 1976. (Way, 664-5). 168 Dale van Atta and Brian Toohey, “The Timor papers part two,” National Times, 6-12 June 1982. 169 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xix. Cable from Canberra to New York. Timor: Special Representative of the Secretary-General. 8 January 1976. (Way, 661).

of East Timor to the Security Council when the “far more important” issue of Angola had not been considered there. He told the ambassador that “the passage of time” might allow the Security Council to divest itself of the problem and, citing Malik, that the dry season would be likely to provide a “solution on the ground.”170

Winspeare spent several tightly controlled days in East Timor from 20 to 22

January, flying to Oecusse, Atauro and Dili, then by helicopter to Manatuto and

Baucau before returning to Jakarta.171 Unsurprisingly, he reported to Woolcott that he did not see a single Indonesian soldier or supply ship or much evidence of military activity. His impressions were largely in accordance with Indonesian claims: that

Indonesia was largely in control, that the “backwardness” of Timorese people made them unprepared for self-determination and that Fretilin claims to control 80% of the territory were “clearly wrong”. He apparently took the testimony of the coached representatives of the PGET at their word as supporting integration. Based on meetings with two former Fretilin leaders under Indonesian control he even stated that there were “two Fretilins”, the “radicals” and the “moderates” cooperating with the

PGET.172

US intelligence briefings also document Indonesian efforts to prevent

Winspeare from reaching Fretilin controlled areas so as to prevent him finding “a large Indonesian military force and evidence that Fretilin is stronger than admitted.”

These include considering pressuring Australia to prevent him visiting Darwin to board a Portuguese naval vessel or preventing the ship porting in Darwin. They even considered whether they could “sink the vessel before it reaches Darwin.”173 When

170 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 27 January 1976. 171 Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolutions 384 (1975), 12 March 1976. In Krieger, East Timor and the international community, 90. 172 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor. 24 January 1976. (Way, 673-6). 173 Van Atta & Toohey, Timor papers, entry for February 1.

Winspeare nevertheless flew to Darwin on 1 February the Indonesian military accelerated its operations to deny him “any place to land by sea or air,”174 bombing airstrips and launching an offensive on the West coast. On 2 February an operative of the intelligence organisation BAKIN, Sunarso, made it clear to DFA officials that it would do all it could to ensure the UN envoy did not succeed in visiting Fretilin areas.175

The nature of the two-tier policy came to the fore, with Australia professing to support Winspeare visiting a Fretilin area while effectively supporting Indonesian efforts to prevent it. The radio link in Darwin was confiscated on 25 January, shortly after Winspeare had requested the Fretilin representative in Darwin, Tony Belo, use it to arrange with Fretilin for him to fly to Same.176 Winspeare complained on the ABC on 27 January that this action made his task of getting to the Fretilin held areas extremely difficult, and had cut Fretilin off from the outside world. DFA officials insisted the timing was coincidental and that the decision was taken to ensure

Australian neutrality as the link was conveying information of a military nature. They suggested Winspeare use the radio facilities on two Portuguese corvettes in the area to contact Fretilin.177 The Jakarta Embassy Counsellor Alan Taylor, however, stated privately the following day that the Indonesians were not concerned about the military aspects of the radio, only its propaganda capacity.178

On 27 January Peacock issued a public statement contending that “the uncertainties of the security situation” prevented the use of an Australian aircraft to fly the UN representative into Fretilin areas. He instead made the unrealistic suggestion

174 Van Atta & Toohey, Timor papers, entry for February 4. 175 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Record of conversation between Sunarso and Rodgers. Portuguese Timor. 2 February 1976. (Way, 687). 176 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor. 24 January 1976. (Way, 675). 177 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/3, iii. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor. 27 January 1976. 178 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Letter from Taylor to Curtin. 28 January 1976.

that Indonesian authorities might fly him to Atauro from where he could board a

Portuguese vessel to take him to a Fretilin controlled area. The Foreign Minister insisted there was “no basis to allegations that Australia was frustrating the mission” and that if Portugal still claimed to be the administrating power such arrangements were its responsibility.179

A DFA representative in Darwin reported on 4 February that the Portuguese corvettes had failed to establish radio communication with Fretilin. A request by

Winspeare that the confiscated Fretilin radio in Darwin be released for use under supervision to contact Fretilin was not approved.180 Winspeare returned to Geneva on

9 February. His report, presented on 12 March 1976, did little other than sum up the unsatisfactory nature of his investigation.181

3.13 The Timor issue in Cabinet

The Federal cabinet considered policy towards East Timor on 9 February

1976, informed by submissions from the Department of Defence and DFA as well as a report from the National Intelligence Committee.

In contrast to the Pritchett position of the previous year, the Defence submission stated that “no Australian material interest” was affected by the situation in East Timor. Indonesian integrationist policy was “firmly set” and while Australian interests could suffer in the event or a prolonged conflict, it assessed this as unlikely as Indonesian operation were “proceeding effectively”. In an apparent reference to visits by Horta to a number of communist countries, it stated that Fretilin’s “hard-core leadership” had aligned itself with “radical international elements”, and it was

179 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/3, iii. DFA News Release. Timor. 27 January 1976. 180 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Telegraph message from Darwin to Canberra. 4 February 1976. (Way, 689). 181 Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolutions 384 (1975), 12 March 1976. In Krieger, East Timor and the International Community, 87-93.

accordingly not in Australia’s strategic interests that integration be delayed as it would risk intervention by countries such as China or Vietnam. An independent East Timor under Fretilin would be “poor and weak” and become a source of instability in the region, while opposing Indonesia could prejudice cooperation on matters such as the

Timor Sea issue and communications through the archipelago. Australian strategic interests were therefore best served by “the early integration of East Timor into

Indonesia.”

The submission cautioned against involvement in a “probably inadequate” act of self-determination as it would cause Australia to acquiesce in a fait accompli caused by force of arms, and against participation in a peace-keeping force as it would risk clashing with Indonesia and assisting “the now radicalised Fretilin.” However, as complete acquiescence to Indonesian use of force would risk condoning conduct which could jeopardise Australia’s security interests, it recommended a “formal statement” objecting to the use of such force, whilst recognising that in reality the

Indonesians would not be deflected from their course of action. Australia’s best interest would be served by maintaining a low profile, it argued, including minimising involvement in any UN initiative which might develop.182

However, in an indication that the Fraser government was quite aware that a significant conflict was continuing, the National Intelligence Committee report stated that Indonesia was “having trouble moving out of coastal towns” and probably controlled only about 100,000 of the 600,000 population. It included a map that showed only a small proportion of the country under Indonesian control. Nevertheless, as it assessed the likelihood of Fretilin obtaining external military aid to be low, it concluded that long-term resistance was unlikely, and that Indonesia was “firmly set”

182 NAA: A12934, FAD 2. Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (FAD) paper no. 2. Australian Relations with Indonesia and the Issue of East Timor – Minister Responsible: Mr Killen. Consideration of Defence Committee Report of 5 February 1976.

on the path to successful incorporation.183 The potential humanitarian implications of this situation were not examined.

Peacock’s submission itself reflected the contradictions of the two-tier nature of the Fraser government’s Timor policy. The cover page of Peacock’s submission stated:

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated the Government’s position publicly

as follows: there should be a cessation of hostilities, and end to the bloodshed,

a withdrawal of Indonesian forces, and a genuine act of self-determination.

In contrast, the body of the submission, written in the first person as if by the

Foreign Minister himself, stated that Indonesian forces were “well on their way” to integrating East Timor and would remain until this goal was achieved. There was “no tangible Australian national interest” in the territory and Australia’s capacity to alter events “was very limited indeed.” On the other hand, it was not in Australia’s interest to “connive in a forceful Indonesian takeover” as it would lose respect in Indonesia’s eyes by doing so. Peacock therefore outlined the policy of the government as to criticise publicly and privately the use of force, call for an end to hostilities, ask for a withdrawal of Indonesian forces, ask “with little hope” for a genuine process of self- determination, press for the resumption of aid by the ICRC, and show a willingness in private to participate in an international presence to replace the Indonesians, although noting the possibility “to be slight”.

Peacock presented three options: continuing the existing policy as described, taking a supposedly different “Whitlam or ‘realpolitik’” option of recognising the overriding importance of the Indonesian relationship and the “foregone conclusion” of the outcome, or taking “anti-Indonesian” steps such as cutting off or limiting aid or

183 NAA: A12934, FAD 2. National Intelligence Committee. Assessment of the Timor Situation. 27 January 1976.

withdrawing the Australian ambassador for consultations. Of the three he recommended the first (Option A) on the grounds that it demonstrated Australian opposition to the use of force and commitment to self-determination, taking into account Australian public opinion whilst causing only limited damage to the

Australian/Indonesian relationship.184

Peacock’s differentiation of Fraser government policy from the “realpolitik” of Whitlam may have reflected a genuine perception of difference on his behalf. It was also a clear attempt to distance itself from Whitlam’s failings as well as pay obeisance to Peacock’s previous criticisms of it while in opposition. This was, however, in reality problematic given that the two-tier policies of both governments had in actuality demonstrated significant continuity regarding prioritisation of the

Indonesian relationship, responses to Indonesian actions, and the ways both had misrepresented the Timor situation and Indonesian actions to the public and the international community.

Cabinet accepted this recommendation, deciding that the Prime Minister should restate Australia’s position to the UN Secretary General. It further agreed to examine the position of Timorese refugees and minimise as much as possible Fretilin activities in Australia. It directed that Peacock, in consultation with the Defence and

Immigration ministers, prepare a draft statement of government policy, including a reference to the “nature of Fretilin and the nature of the support it is receiving.” In a further attempt to differentiate the Fraser government policies from those of Whitlam, the phrase “non-involvement”, criticised by Peacock regularly in opposition, was replaced by the term “minimum as possible” to describe the current position, although the practical difference was unclear.185

184 NAA: A12934, FAD 1. Andrew Peacock. East Timor. For Cabinet. 5 February 1976. 185 NAA: A13075, 200/FAD. Cabinet Minute, Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. Decision No. 200. 9 February 1976.

3.14 Peacock addresses Parliament

Peacock gave his first statement as Foreign Minister to Federal Parliament on

4 March 1976. He again described Timor policy as built around four policy points: advocacy for a cessation of hostilities, a resumption of international humanitarian aid, a withdrawal of Indonesian forces and a “genuine act of self-determination.” He stressed the efforts the Government had made to assist the work of the UN Special

Representative, regretting that his visit to Darwin did not lead to a visit to Fretilin areas. Rejecting suggestions the Government should “take our opposition to the

Indonesian action in Timor to the length of a breach of the relationship between the two countries”, he stated the Government would continue to put its views firmly, whilst believing “the relations between the two countries are such as to allow a frank airing of views.” It had, however “no intention of allowing a breakdown in relations” as it would help neither the Timorese nor Australia.186

3.15 Conclusion

The Fraser government came to power when momentum towards full-scale

Indonesian invasion was well advanced and Australian policy in support of integration effectively well established. Operation Flamboyant, although stalled by the strength of

Fretilin resistance, had entailed a commitment in policy and resources by the Suharto regime that would have required a very significant change and a considerable loss of face, particularly by some factions, to curtail. Working to change it would have required a considerable reorientation of Australian policy direction and a willingness to firmly condemn and resist Indonesian actions.

Nevertheless, Fraser became caretaker Prime Minister seventeen days before the UDI, at a time of intense and ongoing Indonesian covert intervention, but also at a

186 HOR Hansard, 4 March 1976.

time when Fretilin was continuing to call for a Portuguese return, an orderly process of decolonisation and the involvement of international institutions in support of it.

Effecting change would have required forthrightly opposing Indonesian covert intervention, taking the matter up with allies and at the United Nations, as well as an Australian commitment to work in support of a genuine process of self- determination. However, irrespective of its actual position, such a stance was in accordance with the publicly expressed position of the Whitlam government.

‘Caretaker’ provisions notwithstanding, it was open to the Fraser government to so redirect policy had it so chosen. The evidence indicates that until a late stage Suharto himself remained concerned about the Australian and US reaction to large scale invasion and consequently reluctant to agree to it. Australian support for an authentic decolonisation process supported by a range of measures, including a UN overseen decolonisation process and an agreement between the new nation and Indonesia, would have significantly enhanced the chance Suharto would have declined to sanction full-scale intervention. Referral of the issue to the UN, an option discussed by senior DFA policy officers and in accordance with requests from Fretilin, was an entirely realistic option. Australia also had the prospect available to it of opening a dialogue with Fretilin and offering its services in a mediating role, as had been advocated by Peacock in opposition. Taking up Fretilin’s offer of sending a fact- finding mission to East Timor would have made the Suharto regime considerably less likely to intervene and would have opened the territory to international scrutiny.

Protests by Woolcott and others regarding the betrayal of trust of contacts are nonsensical in the context of the self-determination of a nation and the lives of thousands. However, a referral of matters to the UN or a forthright protest, initially in private but if necessary in public, would not necessarily have required reference to the

CSIS briefings given the abundance of evidence regarding Indonesian intervention.

Peacock’s public position in opposition had indicated likely support for a change of direction. The Fraser government was more supportive of a UN role than its predecessor and Peacock demonstrated some inclination to challenge the Indonesian covert intervention. The preoccupations of an intense election campaign would not have assisted such a reorientation. That said, the extent of Peacock’s change in direction in a very short time is extraordinary.

Peacock and Fraser would later argue that when they took government they were faced with a fait accompli, but it was their decision to not oppose the ongoing covert Indonesian military intervention or support the pathways still open to self- determination that ultimately sanctioned the invasion. Fraser’s supportive and entirely uncritical message to Suharto conveyed through Woolcott on 20 November at a time when illegal and lethal covert Indonesian military intervention was continuing would have sent a message that a Fraser government, like its predecessor, would not engage in any meaningful opposition to a full-scale invasion.

As with the Whitlam Government, the centrepiece of the Fraser government approach during this period was support for “talks between the parties”. Yet the parties in West Timor were firmly under Indonesian control, and in any such situation

Fretilin would have found itself outnumbered by what it would have regarded as

Indonesian controlled proxies. The orientation of Australian policy around this objective was not conducive to establishing the conditions for genuine self- determination. It was clearly aimed instead at appeasing public and international opinion and either manipulating Fretilin into a process in which integration was pre- determined, or establishing a covering narrative for Indonesian intervention. By taking this approach and ignoring other options the Fraser government closed down the remaining opportunities for a peaceful outcome, as Fretilin would not have surrendered to a process rigged against it.

The Fraser government abetted the Suharto regime at the UN by co- sponsoring a motion which not only failed to acknowledge the reality of Indonesian covert intervention but propagated a distorted narrative regarding the circumstances leading up to the UDI and the political and military situation forced upon Fretilin. The deceptive depiction of Operation Flamboyant as a civil war assisted Indonesia’s purpose by making its subsequent invasion appear to be a response to Fretilin irresponsibility and destabilising circumstances beyond Indonesia’s control.

After the invasion the Indonesian relationship continued to be treated as paramount, yet the Fraser government also found it necessary to pander to Australian domestic opinion and appear to be acting as a responsible international citizen in the international arena. This caused it to continue the two-tier policy of paying obeisance to self-determination and calls for a withdrawal whilst in practice accepting the supposed “reality” of incorporation and seeking to minimise the impact on the

Indonesian relationship.

Peacock’s visit to Jakarta of 20 January and his accompanying statements regarding putting the Timor issue into the context of the need for close relations between the two countries sent a message to the Indonesian government that

Australia’s publicly expressed concerns were for public consumption, that it had accepted integration and would not be pressing Indonesia on the means it was using to achieve it. Option A, presented to cabinet as a moderate alternative between two extremes, in reality precluded any substantive opposition to Indonesian actions or attempt to mitigate the severity of the abuses which accompanied them.

There appears to have been an awareness at an early stage of the potential for a drawn-out conflict. Yet as would become a recurring theme, Renouf’s advice that policy be reassessed in the light of changed circumstances was ignored. The Fraser government proved itself incapable of moving beyond its vision of the Australian

national interest or its conception of the role the Suharto regime played in it, despite strong evidence of what was occurring in the territory. The “business as usual” approach required the Australian government to eschew criticism regarding the situation in East Timor and to work to protect Indonesia from censure. This in turn required the creation of a narrative which would deflect blame from it. Such a narrative had to distort, cover up and misrepresent the events which had led to the invasion. The Fraser government positioned itself as acting appropriately in a difficult and unfortunate situation beyond its control, one in which it claimed to have differences with a Suharto regime itself driven by unfortunate but understandable circumstances.

As will be examined, in the following years the government continued to develop a narrative which served to deny the ongoing reality of the situation in East

Timor and the nature of the Indonesian tactics of repression and their consequences, including the extent of the ongoing human rights abuses and the famine. It was the continuation of this distorted narrative and its elaboration in the light of new events which would provide the bedrock to the Fraser government’s efforts to minimise the impact of the Timor issue in Australian society, diminish harm to the Indonesian relationship, undermine the efforts of solidarity activists and deny the reality of the situation in the territory.

As will be demonstrated, far from minimising Australian involvement, the nature of this narrative and the Fraser government’s efforts to project it into both the domestic and international arenas would cause Australia to become the Suharto regime’s principal international propagandist on the Timor issue. The subsequent chapters will examine how this situation continued to play out as the conflict turned from drawn out military confrontation to humanitarian catastrophe in the following years.

Chapter 4: Bilateral policy and the Timor issue

4.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Fraser government, like its Labor predecessor, chose a two-tier approach to the Timor issue, prioritising the bilateral relationship with Indonesia above the rights of the East Timorese to self- determination, whilst claiming to support due processes and the rights of the Timorese people in public. It chose to respond to the Indonesian covert military operations and the invasion that followed by adapting a policy which not only effectively accepted the Indonesian intervention, but propagated a distorted narrative to the Australian and the international communities regarding the situation in East Timor.

This chapter will provide an overview as to how this approach responded to developments in East Timor over the years of the Fraser government. This includes the challenges it faced in implementing a position supportive of the Suharto government’s occupation of East Timor, the narrative it developed to do so and the trajectory of official policy during this time. It will examine how it responded to a pro-Timor lobby in Australian Parliament and the narrative it developed and employed to do so. It will interrogate how the Fraser government responded to a solidarity movement attempting to bring the situation in the territory to the attention of the Australian public and the international community, including the degree of proactive intervention by the Prime Minister himself.

4.2 The Fraser government in the international arena

According to Alan Renouf, who remained DFA Secretary until 1977, Fraser himself dominated “both the formulation and practice” of Australian foreign policy to

an exceptional extent, having “little time for the advice of public servants.”1 Fraser at the time was a hard line conservative in foreign policy matters, strongly supportive of the Western Alliance and intensely anti-communist, described by Renouf as positioning Australia as “one of the most virulent critics” of the Soviet Union.2 He was sceptical of détente, suggesting soon after he became opposition leader that it was being used by the Soviet Union “to disarm the democracies” and allow it to “probe further and further” into “soft spots” around the world.3

In his first foreign policy speech as Prime Minister on 1 June 1976, Fraser invoked a concept of “enlightened realism”, which he explained as facing “the world as it is” rather than “the world as we would like it to be.” He painted a picture of

Soviet expansionism as demonstrated by intervention in Angola, support for Vietnam, assistance to wars of liberation and naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. He spoke strongly in support of the US alliance and ANZUS and in favour of a “realistic” relationship with China based on overlapping interests to balance alleged Soviet expansionism. He stressed the importance of ASEAN, particularly the relationship with Indonesia. While publicly reiterating official support for self-determination in

East Timor, he stressed “the underlying strength of the relationship” with Indonesia and the importance of continuing “the friendship we both value.”4

The Fraser years were framed by turbulence in the international arena. In

Cambodia the Pol Pot regime caused the deaths of millions until its ousting by a

Vietnamese invasion in 1978, followed in turn by a retaliatory invasion of Vietnam by

China. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, commencing a prolonged war of occupation. In the same year Islamic militants overthrew the US backed Shah in

1 Alan Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian foreign policy. (Sydney: Australian Professional Publications, 1986), 72, 78. 2 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian foreign policy, 189. 3 HOR Hansard, 8 April 1975. 4 HOR Hansard, 1 June 1976.

Iran and the left-wing Sandinistas overthrew the US backed Somoza dictatorship in

Nicaragua. The unification of Vietnam caused a large outflow of Vietnamese refugees by boat, including some arriving in northern Australia. The strongly anti-communist

Margaret Thatcher was elected in the United Kingdom in 1979 and the similarly aligned Ronald Reagan in the US in 1980. There was a re-intensification of the Cold

War and arms race. As well as creating a policy atmosphere hostile to a left wing independence movement such as Fretilin, these developments also had the effect of diverting the attention paid by the media and activists from East Timor, thereby assisting the government in positioning the situation there as one of peripheral importance amongst the international issues it faced.

Fraser was in the forefront in criticising both the Cambodian and Afghan invasions as violations of international law, continuing to recognise the ousted Pol Pot regime and attempting unsuccessfully to impose an Australian boycott on the Moscow

Olympics. Throughout his prime ministership he spoke about the dangers of a Soviet naval build up in the Indian Ocean. Fraser sought simultaneously to project himself as an upholder of liberal democratic ideals. He was active in the Commonwealth, which he strongly supported, in facilitating an end to white majority rule in Zimbabwe and in opposing apartheid in South Africa.5

In this context, the Fraser government considered good relations with

Suharto’s New Order to be central to its foreign policy objectives. A decade earlier

Suharto himself had played a key role in the removal by the military of Sukarno from power and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party, developments which, despite a death toll of upwards of 500,000,6 had been welcomed by the Australian government and supported through the government international broadcaster Radio

5 Renouf, Malcolm Fraser and Australian foreign policy. 6 Theodore Friend, Indonesian Destinies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University press, 2003), 113.

Australia.7 In a Cold War climate and with human rights not an overriding concern, the New Order was seen by the government, senior DFA officials and their US counterparts as having brought a certain kind of order and stability to Indonesia after the chaotic period under Sukarno. The Fraser government also considered the Suharto regime central to its goals of strengthening ties with the wider Asian region, particularly the anti-communist ASEAN nations of which Indonesia was the largest and closest. The desire to reach an agreement on the exploitation of Timor Sea resources added a further dimension to these factors.

In this context, the Fraser government’s attitude towards the situation in East

Timor was summed up by former Ambassador Rawdon Dalrymple (Ambassador to

Indonesia 1981-1985) in a conversation with the author in 2018. When asked if matters of human rights in the territory were raised with Indonesian officials he replied:

Probably, but I don’t remember. Certainly, the Australian government, if they were

instructing us…didn’t do so with any enthusiasm or any intention that we should

make a big deal of it…I am not suggesting that it was just treated as a routine thing.

But it wasn’t anything anyone was prepared to die in a ditch over either. Remember

that this was a time when the Australian government [was aware] of the importance of

Indonesia and of the fact that the Suharto government was firmly entrenched [and

that] was determining Australian policy…There was no disposition for it to be a casus

belli or something that would really disrupt the Australian relationship.8

Chomsky and Herman also note that the US put pressure on Australia to accept the Indonesian takeover, citing a report in The Age of 3 August 1976 which outlined high level discussions between the two countries and asserted that the US

7 Millott, “Australia’s role in the 1965-66 communist massacres in Indonesia.” 8 Rawdon Dalrymple (Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, 1981-1985) in discussion with the author, 17 July 2018.

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position was motivated by a desire for secure passage for its submarines through the deep water Ombar-Wetar Straits to the north of East Timor.9 While there appears to be little evidence of consideration of this specific matter in the DFA archives, at least in those that have not been redacted or withheld, it is clear that US interests, which saw the New Order as of increased strategic importance after its defeat in Vietnam, would have exerted a further influence on Australian policy towards a position supportive of the Suharto regime.

The situation in East Timor was a distraction from Fraser’s foreign policy agenda, with the support his government provided to the Suharto regime on the Timor issue in obvious contradiction to the way in which it sought to project itself in the international arena as a stalwart supporter of international law, self-determination, opposition to the use of military force and regard for human rights. With complete silence not possible, the Fraser government therefore sought to marginalise the Timor issue as much as possible. This led it to adapt approaches protective of the New Order in both the domestic and international arenas, including a narrative that distorted the events leading to the invasion, denied the reality of the situation in East Timor and sought to neutralise the issue both domestically and internationally. Australia in effect became an apologist and by implication a propagandist of Indonesian interests in regard to the invasion and occupation. As demonstrated by Gunn, Australia was far from the only country to provide effective support for the actions of the Suharto regime in East Timor during the occupation, including the supply of arms.10 However, as will be discussed, Australia had a particularly significant position due to its

9 Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 163-64. 10 Geoffrey Gunn, Complicity in Genocide. Report to the East Timor “Truth Commission” on International Actors (Macau: Geoffrey C. Gunn, 2006).

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proximity to East Timor and the fact that it was regarded by many other nations as possessing particular expertise on the issue.

Within Australia the Fraser government responded to domestic criticism by attempting to marginalise the Timor issue, deflect public and parliamentary concerns and deny the reality of the unfolding situation in the territory by the propagation of an alternative narrative. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, in the international arena it supported Indonesia diplomatically at the United Nations, opposing motions on East Timor in the General Assembly and attempting to keep it off the agenda of various UN forums. It made use of its narrative to deflect attention from the reality of the situation in the territory and attempt to create an acceptance of the supposed inevitability of incorporation in pursuit of eventual international recognition of Indonesian sovereignty.

4.3 The unfolding situation in East Timor during the Fraser

government

The attempt to marginalise the Timor issue and eventually bury it in the public mind required moving purposely towards recognition, while at the same time creating the impression that incorporation was inevitable, that the situation in the territory was stable and that the invasion, while undesirable, was a matter of the past.

However, this goal was threatened by the ongoing catastrophic events occurring in

East Timor, the dire circumstances of the Timorese people and the evidence that reached the Australian and international public about them.

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Developments in East Timor in the years following the invasion have been documented by CAVR, Fernandes,11 Loney,12 Robinson,13 Taylor,14 and others. The invasion, which was met by fierce resistance from Fretilin, was accompanied by widespread and systematic human rights violations aimed at terrorising the population into compliance, including massacres from the first day, torture, sexual violence and detention. Large numbers fled to Fretilin controlled areas, where in a situation of traditional subsistence agriculture Fretilin was initially successful in establishing a functioning society and even carrying out social programs, including literacy campaigns. Based on a series of oral history interviews of women, Loney reports that many of her informants even had “fond memories” of taking part in the social and cultural programs of those early days.15 In response, ABRI initiated a strategy of

“encirclement and annihilation” in the late 1970s aimed at destroying food resources and the relocation of the population into transit and resettlement camps. This led to an artificially caused famine and widespread civilian deaths. Testimony provided to

CAVR from a number of sources indicate that operations, boosted by US supplied air power, made use of biological and chemical weapons, including napalm, poisoning the water and food supplies.16

Indonesian figures themselves put the number of people in camps in late 1978 at between 268,644 and 318,921.17 The inadequate conditions in them regarding food, shelter and medical support, the disruption caused by the destruction of agriculture and restrictions placed on freedom of movement resulted in a major artificially caused

11 Clinton Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011), Chapter 3. 12 Hannah Loney, In Women’s Words. Violence and Everyday Life during the Indonesian Occupation of East Timor, 1975-1999 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2018). 13 Geoffrey Robinson, “If You Leave Us Here We Will Die”: How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 14 Taylor, East Timor, Chapters 6-9. 15 Loney, In Women’s Words, 50. 16 CAVR, Chega, 212-35, 1747-9. 17 CAVR, Chega, 492.

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famine and the deaths of tens of thousands due to hunger and disease.18 The situation was made worse by the refusal by Indonesia to allow international humanitarian agencies access to East Timor until late 1979 when ABRI believed most Fretilin resistance to be over.19

CAVR estimated the total of actual killings in the 1975-1999 period to be 16,000, with a margin of error of +/- 4,400, plus a further 103,000 to 183,300 deaths due to hunger and illness caused by the conflict, a total of between 114,600 and 203,700.20 Using a different methodology Sarah Staveteig of the International Institute for Applied Systems

Analysis estimated a mortality due to the conflict of 204,000 +/- 51,000.21 The

Portuguese census reported a population of 609,477 in 1970,22 although it is likely to have been higher at the invasion. CAVR reports that the death rate due to hunger and illness rose to its highest level from 1975-1980 and that 67.4 percent of actual killings occurred in the years 1975-1981.23 The Fraser years therefore coincided with the worst of the suffering in East Timor under the occupation.

During these events the Suharto regime worked to keep East Timor isolated from the world, assisted in a number of ways by the Australian government.

Nevertheless, evidence of the strength of Fretilin resistance and the condition of the

Timorese population reached the outside world via a variety of sources from the start of the full-scale invasion. Central to this was the work of East Timor solidarity activists, with organisations such as CIET and AETA, aid organisations such as

ACFOA and sections of the Catholic Church playing an important role in breaking the

18 CAVR, Chega, 1173-75, 1338. 19 CAVR, Chega, 1347, finding 54. 20 CAVR, Chega, Chapters 3 and 6. 21 Susan Staveteig, How Many Persons in East Timor Went ‘Missing’ During the Indonesian Occupation?; Results from Indirect Estimates (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2007). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8452/. 22 CAVR, Chega, 499. 23 CAVR, Chega, 499, 505.

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blockade on information about the situation in the territory and bringing it to public attention.

4.4 The Fraser government’s knowledge of the situation

Despite the narrative propagated by the Fraser government, considerable information reached the outside world concerning the situation in East Timor during this period. As discussed, the solidarity movement was aided by the Radio Maubere link. Fernandes used the link to send news of the situation in the territory, including

Indonesian operations, Fretilin resistance and severe and widespread human rights abuses, including bombardments of civilian areas, massacres of civilians including women, children and old people, the use of chemical weapons, sexual violence and the burning down of houses.24 These were disseminated in the publications of the solidarity movement and carried by some sections of the mainstream media, particularly the ABC. On occasion activists took politicians and journalists to speak directly with Fernandes, such as ALP parliamentarian Ken Fry in May 197725 and a team from Channel 9 in October 1977.26 The disdain expressed by DFA officials for the accuracy of the reports and their complaints regarding their impact on the

Indonesian relationship were not accompanied by calls for independent verification by either themselves nor other elements of the Fraser government.27

Information also came from a number of other sources. In an interview reported in the mainstream Australian media, in February 1976 the Vice Chairman of the Indonesian appointed Provisional Government of East Timor (PGET), Lopes da

24 “Radio messages from East Timor, messages 32, 33, 36,” TIS Newsletter, no. 7, 1 February 1976. 25 Ken Fry, A Humble Backbencher (Charnwood, ACT: Ginninderra Press, 2002), 123. 26 “Fretilin talks to Channel 9,” Tribune, 12 December 1977. 27 NAA: A10005, TS202/1/1, ANNEX 2. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 15 December 1975. NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xix. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Australia, Indonesia and East Timor. 5 January 1976. (Way 630, 659).

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Cruz, stated that about 60,000 mostly women and children had been killed in the conflict.28 In December 1976 the Australian Catholic Commission for Justice and

Peace wrote to Fraser citing “highly reliable sources” which were not sympathetic to

Fretilin alleging that upwards of 60,000 people had been killed, and that 80% of territory was outside Indonesian control.29 As will be discussed in Chapter Six, in early 1977 former Consul to East Timor James Dunn released a report of his own based on interviews with Timorese refugees in Lisbon alleging a high death toll, widespread killings, famine and other abuses.30

In April 1976 José Martins, the leader of the minor KOTA party, who had been amongst the signatories to the declaration of integration, defected during a visit as a member of the PGET to the United Nations in New York. In an open letter to the

UN Secretary General he claimed he had been forced to sign the declaration of integration “not as a free man” and that the PGET lacked legitimacy as its members had been coerced. He denounced the “bloody intervention in East Timor which has already cost many thousands of lives” and predicted that if Indonesian forces did not withdraw “many people will continue to die each day.”31 A steady flow of letters were smuggled out of the territory, such as an anonymous Catholic priest published in

Nation Review in January 1978 alleging that hundreds were dying on a daily basis from famine, sickness and death, that intensive military strikes were occurring by “sea and air”, that Fretilin troops were killed upon capture and that firing squads occurred regularly “without justification”.32

28 “Timor deaths 60,000: leader,” The Age, 14 February 1976. 29 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) press release. East Timor. 6 December 1976. 30 James Dunn, “The Dunn Report on East Timor,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 7, no. 3, (1977): 409, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472337785390411. Also published as a stand-alone publication on 11 February 1977. 31 Letter from Jose Martins to the Secretary General of the UN. 29 April 1976. In TIS Newsletter, no. 9-10, 6 May 1976. 32 “God hasn’t forsaken Timor,” Nation Review, 12-18 January 1978.

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This evidence was publicised by solidarity activists through their publications and other activities, creating a challenge to the Fraser government’s efforts to neutralise the Timor issue. As will be seen, this caused it to work with the Indonesian government to stifle the flow of information from the territory and propagate an alternative narrative aimed at casting doubt on the veracity of such claims.

Nevertheless, the assessment by DFA officials of the developing situation in East

Timor was often poor, with a tendency to privilege preconceptions and wishful thinking in support of policy goals. Ambassador Woolcott claimed to the Joint

Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (JFADC) of Federal Parliament in September

1976 that Fretilin represented “little more than small, city based, Eurasian elites” with no evidence of a mass base throughout the territory,33 a piece of apparent DFA mythology in conflict with the assessments by those who had studied the situation and the reality of Fretilin resistance.34 Jakarta Embassy Counsellor Alan Taylor led a DFA team to East Timor in late April and May 1976 to investigate the fate of the Balibo

Five, as the five journalists killed at Balibo had become known, although he also reported on the wider situation. While conceding that he “saw little…that the

Indonesians did not want me to see” he made no mention of Indonesian abuses while noting accounts of killings and atrocities by Fretilin. Although reporting signs of

Fretilin activity around Balibo and Maliana, he nevertheless asserted that “East Timor was rapidly becoming part of Indonesia” and that “I saw no signs of opposition to this development.”35

In the ongoing construction of a narrative to support its agenda, senior DFA officials also at times displayed a marked propensity to accept Indonesian claims at face value. After a visit to East Timor along with other foreign ambassadors in

33 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/1, vi. Briefing by Woolcott to JFADC. 14 September 1976. 34 Hill, Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor. Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1978). 35 NAA: A1838 3038/10/12/4 iv. Visit to East Timor. Alan Taylor. May 1976.

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September 1978, Ambassador Tom Critchley, (Ambassador to Indonesia 1978-1981) uncritically repeated Indonesian claims that “there are no detention camps as the policy is to resettle all people in their homes as quickly as possible”, and surmised that

“I can believe that Indonesian policy may be to combine military pressure on the insurgents (sic) with encouragement to give up and lenient treatment when they do so.”36

4.5 The trajectory of official Australian policy

The increasing death toll and deteriorating human rights situation of the

Timorese people in the late 1970s was paralleled by changes in official Australian policy moving purposely towards eventual recognition of integration at a pace judged tolerable to public opinion. During his January 1976 visit to Jakarta Peacock emphasised the “utmost importance” of the Indonesian relationship, stating that there were “few countries with which Australia had a need for as close relations.” He expressed a willingness to embrace Indonesian fictions by conveying an understanding of Indonesia’s fear of a “civil war” in the archipelago. Eager to disassociate himself from domestic criticisms of Indonesian actions, he told Malik his government “was concerned that no one in Australia should denigrate a friendly government.” He stressed that the Fretilin Information Office in Australia had been established without government consent and it was powerless to close it, undertaking, incorrectly as it turned out at that stage, to prevent further entry into Australia of

Fretilin representatives.37 Little more than a month after the invasion, in a situation of escalating conflict and abuses, such statements would have given the Indonesians

36 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Critchley, Jakarta, to Canberra. Visit to East Timor. 14 September 1978. 37 NAA: 10463, 801/13/11/1, xix. Record of conversation between Peacock and Malik. 19 January 1976.

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confidence to continue their campaign without fear of conflict with Australia, or risk that Australia would criticise Indonesia in the international arena.

When Indonesia made arrangements for an “Act of Integration” for 31 May

1976, there followed discussion as to whether Australia should send an observer. With the Fraser government cognisant of the need to be seen to pay deference to international norms, the decision was taken not to do so as it could be seen to imply acquiescence in an “inadequate” process, or force Australia to take a position regarding its authenticity.38 Woolcott reported Indonesian anger at the decision as they believed it to be a key factor in the decision of other countries not to attend.39

Nevertheless, in an indication of the Suharto regime’s need for a cooperative partner, the Australians were able to call in favours. At Australia’s request Suharto brought the date for the signing of the bill supposedly integrating East Timor forward from 17

August to 17 July so as not to coincide with the resumption of Australian parliament.40

Woolcott recommended “tacitly accepting” the “reality” of incorporation, lessening

Australia’s role in the issue at the UN and seeking to limit pro-Fretilin activity.41 He was supported by others within and without DFA, such as Roger Holdich of the

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, who argued that integration was an

“accomplished fact” and that continuing to maintain otherwise would only damage relations while achieving nothing.42

In the leadup to Fraser’s October 1976 visit to Jakarta, the Indonesians made it known they expected to secure de facto recognition of their control of East Timor,

38 NAA: A1838, 3038, 10/1/2. Iv. Timor: Self-Determination Process. Submission from Renouf to Peacock. 13 May 1976.; NAA: A10005, TS202/1/1, ANNEX 3. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: Dili meeting. 30 May 1976. (Way 751, 771). 39 NAA: A1209, 1976/55, iv. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: The Dili meeting and the process of incorporation. For the Secretary from Woolcott. 7 June 1976. 40 British Archives file FCO 24/2208. Political Relations between Australia and Indonesia. 41 Cited in Way, Australia and the incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 823. 42 NAA: A1209, 75/55, vii. Relations with Indonesia: Timor. Submission from Holdich to Fraser. 6 August 1976. (Way 825).

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with Woolcott predicting “more difficulties” in the relationship if they did not do so.43

However, Fraser apparently judged an explicit statement at that stage to be too far ahead of public opinion. Speaking to Indonesian parliament on 9 October, he declined to specifically acknowledge de facto recognition, but also refused to repeat the four policy points, stressing instead the need to “look to the future” to alleviate suffering in

East Timor and emphasising the “close and cooperative relationship” between the two countries.44 Upon his return to Australia he again refused to voice criticism of

Indonesia, claiming that repeating a policy which had already been stated “on many occasions by the Foreign Minister” would put other aspects of the relationship with

Indonesia at risk.45 As will be discussed in more detail, a principal outcome of the visit was a proactive commitment, overseen to a large extent by Fraser himself, to assist the Indonesians in enforcing a human and informational blockade of East

Timor, preventing attempts to reach the territory by sea, banning Fretilin representatives from visiting Australia and attempting to mute the Fretilin radio link.

Peacock publicly announced de facto recognition on 20 January 1978, arguing it was necessary to assist with humanitarian aid and family reunion, and describing it as “a reality with which we must come to terms.”46 McGrath presents this development as almost solely motivated by a desire for an agreement on Timor Sea resources.47 This was clearly a factor, with the cabinet decision on the matter directing that “appropriate Departments prepare for Ministerial consideration” of the Timor Sea

43 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxvii. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Relations with Indonesia – Prime Minister’s Visit. Personal for the Prime Minister and Secretary. Undated. 44 NAA: A1838 3038/10/1/3, xi. Address at the special session of the House of the People’s Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia. Prime Minister, for press. 9 October 1976. 45 NAA: A1838 3038/10/1/3, vi. Prime Minister’s interview on State of the Nation. 14 October 1976. 46 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, ANNEX B. Relations with Indonesia. DFA New release. 20 January 1978. (Way 838). 47 McGrath, Crossing the Line, 120-24.

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issue and indicate to the Indonesians Australia was prepared to begin negotiations.48

However, it is also clear from Peacock’s cabinet submission on the matter that a key element in the decision was declining public interest, as indicated by the fact that the volume of letters being received on the issue had “dropped substantially” over the previous six months.49 With Australia committed to prioritising the Indonesian relationship for reasons previously discussed, it is likely that recognition would have followed a similar trajectory regardless of the Timor Sea issue.

In an interview with Antara in October that year Fraser linked de jure recognition with the commencement of talks on seabed boundaries, stating that such negotiations would “quite plainly…carry implications for the nature of recognition.”50

Peacock made a similar statement on the occasion of a visit by Foreign Minister

Mochtar in December, citing his government’s willingness to enter into negotiations and stating that when they commenced they would “signify de jure recognition [as] a matter of law.”51 The position produced some consternation amongst the Portuguese, with the Director General of Political Affairs in Lisbon expressing “surprise” to the

Australian Ambassador that this had occurred without consultation with his government and stressing Portugal’s continuing claim to be the administering power.52

Nevertheless, with its position clear the Fraser government was able to move to de

48 NAA: A12909, 1865. East Timor – Australian Policy. Cabinet minute, Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. 17 January 1978. Submission No. 1865. 49 NAA: A12909, 1865. Reconsideration of Australian policy towards the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. Peacock. Attachment to, Cabinet minute, Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. 17 January 1978. 50 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Antara interview with Prime Minister. 23 October 1978. 51 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Visit of Indonesian Foreign Minister. 16 December 1978. 52 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Timor – formal recognition of incorporation. 20 December 1978.

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jure recognition without the inconvenient need for a public announcement when negotiations began in Canberra in February 1979.53

4.6 “Business as usual”

As discussed, a key goal of Timor policy was to ensure as much as possible that it facilitated what one DFA official in January 1976 described as “an appro[ach] to bilateral relations which emphasises ‘business as usual’, including in the aid and defence co-operation areas.”54 With ASEAN seen as central to regional policy in the wake of the unification of Vietnam and the perceived Soviet expansion of influence in the region, and Indonesia, as the largest and nearest ASEAN nation, seen as central to forging links with it, Woolcott argued in March 1976 that Australia could not expect

Indonesia to help it do so while it continued to be “in the vanguard of Indonesia’s international critics”, or showed a “lack of understanding of Indonesia’s national interests.”55 Keeping relations with it on a ‘normal’ keel was therefore considered a central key to Australian foreign policy.

At all levels Australian officials made efforts to instil an atmosphere of cordiality and cooperation with the Indonesian government. In a speech to the

Indonesian press club during his April 1976 visit to Jakarta, Peacock referred to his

“friend Adam Malik”, stressed the importance of Australian/Indonesian friendship and argued that differences such as that on Timor were a mark of the “give and take” possible in a mature relationship which should not deter the creation of understanding and respect between the two countries.56 During Fraser’s October 1976 visit the two

53 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Canberra to Lisbon. Australia’s de jure recognition of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. 31 January 1979. 54 NAA: A1838, 3038/13/2/1, xii. Note on Timor. January 1976. 55 NAA: A11443, 10. Letter from Woolcott to Renouf. 10 March 1976. 56 NAA: A1838 3038/10/1/3, iv. DFA News Release. Text of speech by Peacock to Indonesian Press Club, Jakarta. 14 April 1976.

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discussed bilateral cultural contacts as a means of expanding “mutual understanding and friendship.”57

Matters of bilateral concern on which the two nations cooperated included the stability of Indochina, the response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978,

ASEAN and the ‘ASEAN plus’ grouping of which Australia was a member. The issue of Indochinese refugees and the arrival of refugee boats in both nations in the wake of the unification of Vietnam was an issue of mutual concern and cooperation, with the two nations working together to facilitate orderly refugee settlement and discourage boat movements. An element perceived to be of key importance to ensuring the ongoing stability of the relationship was the provision of civil and military aid. The predictions of Pritchett and others that an invasion would lead to a curtailment of the latter were not realised. Writing to Defence Minister Killen in March 1976 that “it would be a mistake to allow the Timor situation to prejudice other areas of our bilateral relationship”, Peacock agreed to extend the military aid program for a second triennium, stating only that “we should seek specific assurances that it will not be used in Timor.”58

Subsequent military aid provided during the Fraser government included eight patrol boats, eighteen Nomad aircraft, sixteen Sabre aircraft, twelve helicopters and

250 military Land Rovers, as well as field transmitters and training.59 Even in the immediate wake of the invasion there was no more than a perfunctory effort to ensure such materials were not used in East Timor, with Tjan, who was not an official government spokesperson, providing a “categorical assurance” on 25 March 1976 that this was the case. Woolcott insisted there was no need to take the matter further as the

57 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxvii. Press Release, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, The Hague. Communiqué issued at the end of the state visit of Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser to Indonesia from 7 to 11 October 1976. 13 October, 1976. 58 NAA: A1209, 1976/55, iii. Letter from Peacock to Killen. 26 March 1976. 59 Statement by Foreign Minister Tony Street, HOR Hansard, 6 May 1982.

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operation was “virtually over” and further inquiries would “only irritate an important group of contacts” who were already showing “coolness” to Australia.60 Adenan, a middle ranking official at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, provided a more official verbal undertaking the following day.61 After de jure recognition any such pretentions came to an end, with Foreign Minister Street stating in response to a parliamentary question on the matter in 1982 that the only restriction on the use of military aid was on “disposal to a third country” without prior consent.62

With the military campaign in East Timor proving a considerable drain on

Indonesian military resources and internationally supplied military equipment playing a crucial role, much of the Australian provided aid would have been compatible with

Indonesian operations, particularly the 250 military Land Rovers. With their short take-off capacity, slow speed and manoeuvrability, the Nomad aircraft would also have been well suited to Indonesian offensive operations. Indeed, use of this equipment in East Timor appears to have preceded full recognition. An Australian embassy official sighted a Nomad on the apron of Komoro airfield near Dili during a visit to investigate the use of Australian humanitarian aid on 29 January 1979, shortly before the commencement of negotiations on seabed boundaries the following month cemented de jure recognition.63 Dunn also cites a “senior Australian aircraft industry executive” confiding to him at this time that the Indonesians were using recently supplied Nomad aircraft in East Timor.64

60 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxi. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor: Defence Cooperation with Indonesia. 25 March 1976. 61 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: Defence Cooperation with Indonesia. 26 March 1976. 62 HOR Hansard, 6 May 1982. 63 A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Visit to East Timor. Undated, probably February 1979. Attachment to Memorandum by Allen, Jakarta embassy. East Timor. 15 March 1979. 64 Dunn, East Timor. A people betryayed, 276.

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4.7 The evolving narrative of denial

In its efforts to marginalise the Timor issue a key strategy employed by the

Fraser government was simply silence on it as much as possible, as recommended by

Woolcott after Fraser’s 1976 visit to Jakarta in order to allow the government to proceed steadily and without fuss towards recognition.65 However, criticism of

Australia’s Timor policy continued not only from the solidarity movement and concerned parliamentarians, but from the wider community and sections of the mainstream media. An editorial in the Canberra Times on 19 November 1976, for example, labelled the “official line” a “sham”, describing the Australian position as

“humiliating” in “passively acquiescing in Indonesia’s takeover.”66 At the same time,

Indonesian officials continued to pressure the Australian government regarding its perfunctory “official” criticisms of Indonesian actions, its position at the United

Nations, the actions of the solidarity movement, the broadcasts of Radio Australia which reached Indonesia, and in the first period the admission of Fretilin leaders to

Australia.67

The Fraser government therefore perceived a need to pander to Indonesian sentiments while at the same time placating as much as possible public concerns.68

The narrative it used to achieve this, while multifaceted and evolving over time as events progressed, contained a number of key elements: present the situation as a matter of the past which the Australian government, while acting honourably in accordance with international norms, had been powerless to prevent; distort the

65 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxvii. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Prime Minister’s Visit – Relations with Indonesia. 21 October 1976. 66 Editorial, “A matter of truth,” Canberra Times, 19 November 1976. 67 NAA: A1209, 1976/55, iii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Entry of Fretilin Leaders to Australia. 29 March 1976. 68 This theme, incorporating sections from this thesis, was explored in the following paper: Peter Job, “The evolving narrative of denial: the Fraser government and the Timorese genocide, 1975–1980,” Critical Asian Studies 50, no. 3 (May 2018), 442.

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historical narrative to lay blame on Timorese for the events leading to the invasion to make the Indonesian actions appear more reasonable; deny allegations of a humanitarian crisis and disparage those making them; when this is not possible, dispute the cause so as to divert blame from Indonesian actions.

In adherence to the Fraser government’s claim to be acting in accordance with international norms, Peacock and others at first employed a narrative based on the four policy points announced to parliament on 4 March 1976. In a letter to concerned parliamentarians that month, he speciously cited “our diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a ceasefire and a withdrawal of Indonesian troops,” but rejected an end to military aid on the grounds that it was “of value to both countries.”69 Government officials continued to repeat the mantra of a largely responsible Indonesia reluctantly intervening in a chaotic and destabilising situation not of its making. DFA did so to the parliamentary Joint Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (JFADC) in April

1976, with DFA Deputy Secretary John Rowland presenting an account of the events leading to the invasion which omitted Indonesian subversion, depicted the civil war as continuing to the invasion and the invasion itself as having taken place in response to escalating internal conflict, the UDI and the Portuguese withdrawal. He cited

Indonesian policy as “self-determination in conditions of peace and order” and stressed that “a chaotic situation…prompted great worry in Indonesia” due to the dangers of foreign intervention.70

Peacock did so in a speech to the United Nations Association of Australia in

May 1976, blaming the Timorese and Portuguese for the “most unhappy chain of events” which had culminated in the “Indonesian action during December”, while stressing the need to place the Timor issue “into the context of the totality of the

69 A1838 3038/10/1/3, iv. Letter from Peacock to Parkes. Undated, but probably March 1976. 70 A1838 3038/10/1/3, iv. JFADC – Briefing on East Timor. 27 April 1976.

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bilateral relationship.” He blamed the Whitlam government for its inaction, and contrasted it with the “principled stand” of the Fraser government in deploring “the whole course of events since early August.” He repeated the four policy points but, claiming that Australia alone in the region had criticised intervention, stressed that there were “limits to what Australia can and should attempt to do” as the “harsh practical reality” was that a “collision course” with regional neighbours was neither desirable nor viable.71

After Fraser’s October 1976 visit to Jakarta put an end to direct mention of the four policy points, the emphasis shifted to efforts to depict Indonesian actions in a positive light. The construction of the narrative was purposeful, facilitated by the recommendations of high-level officials. Responding to what he described as “serious inaccuracies and exaggerations” by left wingers with an anti-Indonesian agenda, soon after the visit Ambassador Woolcott recommended that a number of points be

“seeded” into government statements and comments: that annexation came about due to Indonesian national security concerns rather than any appetite for conquest; that there was no evidence of a threat to Papua New Guinea; that there was no conclusive evidence as to how the Balibo Five died; that the cited figure of 60,000 deaths since the invasion was false and included refugees in West Timor and the casualties of the civil war; that there had been no act of self-determination for other Portuguese colonies and no reason to expect East Timor to be the first; that the assumption that

East Timor wanted to be independent was questionable and it would likely be better off under Indonesia in any case; and that given the way the situation developed the

Indonesians, “had little option but to employ the means they did”.72

71 A1838 3038/10/1/3, vi. Andrew Peacock. Summary of address to the United Nations Association of Australia – The problem of East Timor. 21 May 1976. 72 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxvii. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Timor. 25 October 1976.

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In the early years in particular, the government strategy in response to evidence of the crisis was simply denial, along with efforts to discredit those making such claims. As will be examined in Chapter Six, in early 1977 a former Consul to

Portuguese Timor, James Dunn, produced a report based on the testimony of

Timorese refugees in Lisbon alleging major human rights abuses in East Timor and a severe and worsening humanitarian situation. As will be discussed, DFA responded in the international arena by disparaging the report as “hearsay”, and contending without evidence that the claims in it were greatly exaggerated and in contrary to its own information. At other times when the government narrative was challenged it would often simply refuse to engage in discussion, such as in December 1977 when in response to the establishment by ACFOA of an East Timor Commission of Inquiry,

Peacock stated that the government position had been “stated publicly on many occasions and I have nothing further to add.”73

As events developed and the dire circumstances of the Timorese people could not be completely concealed the Australian government worked to divert blame from

Indonesia. As will be examined in Chapter Seven, a visit to East Timor by a group of foreign ambassadors in September 1978, including Australia’s Ambassador Tom

Critchley, reported an extreme situation of suffering and hunger. In response Critchley cabled Canberra a series of points to divert blame from the Indonesian government and the actions of ABRI. Blaming the crisis on the historical poverty and underdevelopment of East Timor exacerbated by the irresponsible actions of the

Timorese themselves, he depicted the Indonesian government as dealing as best it could with the problem of resettling people in poor condition exiting Fretilin control by keeping them in camps for three months and providing them with food, clothing

73 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Letter from Peacock to Byrne. 9 December 1977.

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and medical attention before sending them to their homes.74 The Department accordingly issued a public statement stressing that the “subsistence level”, “very poor agricultural terrain” and “very great long-term and infrastructure problems” and been exacerbated by “the fighting and its aftermath”, leaving the Indonesian government with the problem of resettlement and care of displaced people.75

4.8 The Timor issue in Parliament

However, the Fraser government’s approach was challenged both by the solidarity movement and in parliament. A number of MPs raised issues concerning

East Timor on a regular basis, providing evidence of the situation and calling for parliamentary inquiries and protests to Indonesia. They worked actively with the wider solidarity movement, speaking at rallies and raising issues in the media. The following three sections will investigate the impact of this parliamentary Timor lobby and the role played by certain individuals from both parties. It will examine the impediment this caused to the Fraser government’s efforts to normalise the relationship, with Indonesian officials pointing to the existence of the parliamentary lobby, particularly those in government ranks, as evidence of hypocrisy. Given that

Parliament, unlike the solidarity movement, was something to which the government was to some extent forced to respond, these sections will explore how it expanded and deployed its narrative regarding the situation in order to do so. It will also examine the development of ALP policy during this period, the role it played in Parliament and the government’s response to it.

Tom Uren, Deputy Leader of the Opposition from 1975 to 1977 and a former prisoner of war who fought in West Timor during the Second World War, was

74 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Critchley, Jakarta, to Canberra. Humanitarian assistance to East Timor. 11 September 1978. 75 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. East Timor: Visit by Australian Ambassador to Indonesia. 14 September 1978.

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amongst the most vocal critics of the Fraser government’s Timor policy. He accused it of “appeasement rivalling Munich” after Fraser’s October 1976 Jakarta visit,76 described the Australian decision to abstain on the December 1976 UN General

Assembly resolution on East Timor as a “final betrayal” and accused the government of playing a “devious role” through its two tier policy.77 He was supportive of the broader solidarity movement, accusing the government of acting in “an extremely harsh way” to harass the movement by freezing Fretilin accounts, closing the radio link and subjecting supporters to “indignities”.78 Australian Capital Territory Labor

MP Ken Fry, another veteran of World War II, was also very vocal, accusing the

Fraser government of “duplicity…which is immoral, unprincipled and deceitful in the extreme”,79 raising allegations of atrocities80 and the use of napalm and defoliants.81

Fry also raised the issue of East Timor at the Commonwealth Parliamentary

Conference in Mauritius in 197682 and at the Interparliamentary Union Conference in

Bulgaria in 1977.83

Left wing Labor Senator Arthur Gietzelt, president of the cross-party parliamentary group Friends of Timor was proactive in criticising both the Fraser government and in acknowledging the failings under Whitlam.84 He was critical of the actions of the pro-Jakarta lobby within DFA, admonished Australia’s “weak kneed, low posture” at the United Nations, spoke in support of Fretilin85 and regularly presented evidence of atrocities and suffering in East Timor. Victorian ALP Senator

76 HOR Hansard, 7 October 1976. 77 HOR Hansard, 6 October 1977. 78 HOR Hansard, 6 October 1977. 79 HOR Hansard, 4 May 1976. 80 HOR Hansard, 7 December 1976. 81 HOR Hansard, 2 November 1977. 82 Scott, Last Flight out of Dili, 94. 83 Fry, A humble backbencher, 112. 84 Senate Hansard, 7 April 1976. 85 Senate Hansard, 6 November 1979.

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Cyril Primmer raised issues such as the use of napalm,86 tabled documents from

Catholic sources alleging a continued struggle by Fretilin and details of continued barbarities,87 asked questions regarding the use of the Australian aid provided via the

Indonesian Red Cross,88 and spoke in support of the solidarity movement.89 Other

Labor parliamentarians active in support of East Timor included Gordon McIntosh,

Gordon Bryant, Clive Holding and Senator George Georges.

A number of Liberal parliamentarians were also active on the Timor issue. On

21 February 1977 Tasmanian Liberal Senator Michael Hodgman published an article in The Australian, Appeasement Must End,90 following it up in parliament by calling for an international inquiry into atrocities in the territory.91 He was proactive in lobbying for a parliamentary delegation to East Timor in August 1977 and in strongly protesting to the Indonesian embassy when visas were refused.92 He emphatically criticised the granting of de facto recognition, quoting Churchill to categorise the invasion as “brutal, immoral and wrong.”93 In September 1978 he moved that “[the

House] notes with horror reports of the deaths by starvation of tens of thousands of

East Timorese”, calling for the immediate admission of the ICRC.94

Throughout the Fraser government Liberal Senator Neville Bonner continued to speak out on Timor issues, seeking assurances in 1976 that the government would not extend de facto or de jure recognition,95 supporting efforts for Senate inquiries and criticising the Australian position at the United Nations.96 He supported efforts by his

86 Senate Hansard, 18 October 1977. 87 Senate Hansard, 22 February 1978. 88 Senate Hansard, 13 September 1979 and 13 November 1979. 89 Senate Hansard, 30 September 1979 and 2 June 1977. 90 Michael Hodgman, “Appeasement Must End,” The Australian, 21 February 1977. 91 Senate Hansard, 10 March 1977. 92 Senate Hansard, 25 August 1977. 93 Senate Hansard, 7 March 1978. 94 Senate Hansard, 12 September 1978. 95 Senate Hansard, 18 August 1976. 96 Senate Hansard, 12 November 1981.

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fellow member of the September 1975 parliamentary delegation, Senator Gietzelt, to depict Fretilin as a moderate regime seeking achievable goals which would have averted bloodshed, like Gietzelt laying the blame for the failure to do so on both the

Whitlam and Fraser governments.97 The speeches by Bonner and Gietzelt proved so useful to solidarity activists that they were published as a book entitled East Timor: the guilty men by CIET.98

Victorian Liberal Senator Alan Missen was also vocal, asking the Foreign

Minister in late 1976 whether media reports of continued heavy fighting, atrocities and large Fretilin held areas were correct, and what the Australian government intended to do about its previously expressed position on Indonesian withdrawal, self- determination and the need for the entry of the ICRC.99 He criticised the confiscation of the radio,100 supported parliamentary inquiries and criticised his own government’s extension of de facto recognition as “an unwise decision.”101 Other conservatives to express concern included NSW Liberal Maurice Neil and Northern Territory Country

Liberal Party Senator Bernie Kilgariff.

Although generally more restrained in their tone of criticism than their Labor counterparts there were exceptions, such as when Hodgman referred to Australia’s

“gutless diplomacy”102 and when Bonner accused his own government of having

“blood on its hands.”103 In May 1977 Senators Bonner and Missen crossed the floor to vote against their own party’s position and support an unsuccessful attempt to establish a Senate Select Committee inquiry into the East Timor situation.104

97 Senate Hansard, 7 April 1976. 98 Arthur Gietzelt and Neville Bonner, East Timor: the guilty men (Sydney: CIET, 1976). 99 Senate Hansard, 21 September 1976. 100 Senate Hansard, 5 October 1976. 101 Senate Hansard, 22 February 1978. 102 Senate Hansard, 16 November 1978. 103 Senate Hansard, 31 March 1977. 104 Senate Hansard, 26 May 1977.

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The multi-party group Friends of Timor established in early 1976 coordinated a petition signed by forty-three ALP and twelve coalition members of parliament to the UN Secretary General urging the establishment of a United Nations presence in

East Timor, access by the ICRC and the implementation of Security Council

Resolution 384, which called for an Indonesian withdrawal and an act of self- determination.105 On 3 June 1976 an inter-party group of twenty-five parliamentarians, including the government Senators Bonner, Missen and Kilgariff, submitted a letter to the chairman of the Inter-governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), which in consultation with the IMF and World Bank coordinated international aid to Indonesia, calling on the IGGI to refuse aid to Indonesia until an withdrawal and act of self- determination.106 In March 1977 the parliamentary group of Amnesty International coordinated a parliamentary petition to President Carter urging him to seek assurances from Indonesia it would comply with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and allow access to the ICRC.107 In the wake of the September 1978 visit of ambassadors to East Timor a cross-party petition initiated by Michael Hodgman and signed by 76

Australian parliamentarians was sent to the UN Secretary General calling for access by the ICRC.108

These efforts proved a considerable irritant to the government’s efforts to neutralise the Timor issue, producing outraged criticism from Jakarta and damaging the efforts of the government and DFA to normalise the relationship. As will be seen, a constant refrain from Indonesian officials was that the efforts of parliamentarians, particularly those from government ranks, represented the “real” position of the

Australian government and that it was acting duplicitously by claiming otherwise. The

105 Senate Hansard, 7 April 1976. 106 “Australian MPs call for cessation of aid to Indonesia,” TIS Newsletter, no. 11-12, 26 June 1976. 107 HOR Hansard, 10 March 1977. 108 “MPs seek Red Cross entry to Timor,” Canberra Times, 3 October 1978.

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parliamentary lobby reinforced the wider solidarity movement, and with the demonstrated support of some on both sides of politics provided a broadened legitimacy to it. It highlighted the developing situation in the territory and the abuses which were occurring there, making it more difficult for the government to claim that the situation was stable and the invasion a matter of the past.

However, while the parliamentary opposition on East Timor was a distraction from the Fraser government’s efforts to marginalise the issue, parliamentary agitation on the Timor issue should be seen in perspective. The number of parliamentarians who took a proactive position on it was relatively small on both sides of the house, and the Timor issue did not dominate what was, in the context of turbulent international events, a busy foreign policy agenda. As with the wider solidarity movement, the parliamentary opposition on the Timor issue was not successful in changing government policy nor even in achieving any substantial modifications to it.

Nevertheless, like the wider solidarity movement, the parliamentary Timor lobby was reasonably well informed, belying claims that verifiable information concerning the situation of East Timor was not available during this period. Although the Radio Maubere link was occasionally quoted, supportive parliamentarians more often cited other sources, such as Catholic channels and letters, aid organisations or the testimony of refugees. On occasion information proved incorrect, such as when

Labor Senator Ruth Coleman claimed former Fretilin Information Minister Alarico

Fernandes had been “bound hand and foot” and thrown out of a helicopter.109

Nevertheless, parliamentarians documented reasonably accurate evidence regarding the situation throughout the Fraser years, including the scale and substance of atrocities, fairly correct estimations of the death toll, the use of napalm and defoliants, the displacement of the civilian population due to Indonesian actions, the scale and

109 Senate Hansard, 30 May 1979.

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impact of the famine, the misuse by the Indonesian military of Australian supplied aid, the abuses during the Fence of Legs operation and the use by Indonesia of western arms.

The lobby was opposed by a number of parliamentarians who spoke in support of the government agenda and attacked both Fretilin and the Timor solidarity movement. In the context of events in the South East Asian region and the re- intensification of the Cold War in the late 1970s, much was based on anti-communist

Cold War predilections. The National Country Party (NCP) MP for the Northern

Territory, Stephen Calder, spoke of Fretilin as part of the “downward thrust of communism.”110 WA Liberal MP John Martyr described the Timor Moratorium as a

“stalking horse” for “Marxist oriented guerrillas” seeking to support a communist takeover in East Timor and weaken Australian ties with Indonesia.111 New South

Wales NCP MP John Sullivan depicted Fretilin as part of a Chinese communist threat to Indonesia and Australia.112 On 4 November 1976 Queensland Liberal Senator Ian

Wood disparaged criticisms of the invasion, asking rhetorically “Do we want the

Fretilin commos there? Of course not.”113 On 5 October 1976 Queensland Liberal MP

Kevin Cairns moved a motion stressing the importance that relations with Indonesia not be “poisoned” by a campaign on East Timor.114 On 23 March 1977 Victorian NCP

MP Rendle Holten complained of a “communist campaign” to denigrate Indonesia in the eyes of the world, speaking in approving terms of Indonesian actions against

“communist aggression.”115

Efforts by the Timor lobby were often met with obstruction, derision or trivialisation. Anti-communist Tasmanian independent Senator Brian Harradine

110 HOR Hansard, 23 March 1976. 111 HOR Hansard, 23 March 1976. 112 HOR Hansard, 25 March 1976. 113 Senate Hansard, 4 November 1976. 114 HOR Hansard, 5 October 1977. 115 HOR Hansard, 23 March 1977.

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highlighted links between CIET and the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), accusing Timorese activists of “hypocrisy” for the different position many on the left had taken on West Papua in the 1960s.116 In December 1976 Harradine berated Uren,

Fry and Gietzelt for what he described as a “very serious” misuse of the “sacred” War

Memorial after they attended a wreath laying service there to commemorate the first anniversary of the invasion and remember the fallen Australians and Timorese in the

Second World War. Liberal Senator Walters read Uren’s speech at the ceremony into

Hansard, not to highlight the evidence of deaths and atrocities, criticism of the

Australian abstention at the UN and provision of military aid it referred to, but to demonstrate the Senator’s complaint that it was not about Australians who died in

World War II.117

Others took a different approach in support of the supposedly “realistic” position the Australian government had taken in response to a regrettable matter beyond its control, employing the government supported narrative aimed at deflecting blame from Indonesia by depicting it too as responding in an unfortunate way to understandable circumstances not of its own making. Queensland NCP MP David

Thomson repudiated “any strong censure of Indonesians actions” as counterproductive, stressing the need to see the issue in the context of “our overall relationship with a great neighbour.”118

Amongst government defenders in the Senate was Victorian Liberal Senator

Sir Magnus Cormack, who as Chair of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs from

1967 to 1969 and Chair of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence from

1976 to 1978 was particularly close to DFA. Advocating in April 1977 for a “realist” approach to the Timor issue reminiscent of DFA thinking, he criticised what he called

116 Senate Hansard, 5 October 1976. 117 Senate Hansard, 8 December 1976. 118 HOR Hansard, 4 May 1976.

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the “selective morality” of the Timor lobby, complaining that relations with Indonesia had “almost been destroyed” and stating that “the fate of future generations of

Australians, Timorese and Indonesians is of far greater importance than the brutalities that may or may not have occurred.”119 Reflecting the government narrative, he argued that the best way to alleviate the suffering of the Timorese people was to extend de facto recognition and “persuade the Indonesian government of our good faith” in order to facilitate the entry of aid.120

In the House of Representatives, NSW Liberal MP David Connolly, a former diplomat who remained close to DFA, played a similar role. Speaking in response to the tabling of the ALP Caucus position on 4 May 1976, he criticised the Whitlam record on East Timor and, echoing DFA advice to Peacock before his January 1976 visit, affirmed that “we have no intention of allowing a breach in our relations to take place.”121 In late 1979, while acknowledging “an extremely sad human catastrophe”,

Connolly referred to “the political fact” that “Timor is part of Indonesia.” Echoing the government narrative, he claimed that Indonesia faced “fundamental administrative problems” of Portuguese neglect which it had responded to as best it could, arguing that help for the Timorese people must occur “with the support of the Indonesian authorities.”122

Similarly, in December 1982 the conservative WA Liberal Senator John

Martyr referred to an editorial in the Australian Financial Review denying the existence of ongoing famine. He accused the ALP of “selective moralising” and creating unnecessary trouble between Australia and Indonesia, suggesting it was time for Australia to “practise the virtues of charity and reconciliation as well as

119 Senate Hansard, 21 April 1977. 120 Senate Hansard, 5 April 1978. 121 HOR Hansard, 4 May 1976. 122 HOR Hansard, 13 November 1979.

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truthfulness and good sense.”123 The following day South Australian Liberal Senator

Baden Teague referred in positive terms to a CSIS sponsored Australian/Indonesian symposium as overcoming “a handful of irritants which have diminished our neighbourly relationship”, suggesting the two governments “open a fresh chapter.”124

4.9 The ALP position

With Whitlam continuing as parliamentary Labor leader until the 1977 election, his commitment to the prioritisation of the Indonesian relationship was largely opposed by a parliamentary membership inclined otherwise. In a clear break from the Whitlam position, on 31 March 1976 the Caucus of the Parliamentary Labor

Party passed a strongly worded resolution demanding a withdrawal of Indonesian forces, the stationing of a UN peacekeeping force and the establishment of a UN Trust

Administration to facilitate a genuine act of self-determination. It also called for the entry of humanitarian aid and suspension of Australian military aid to Indonesia.

Caucus deplored Indonesia’s refusal to comply with the General Assembly and

Security Council resolutions of the previous December, condemned the Fraser government’s failure to implement the Security Council resolution and its efforts to silence the radio link. It expressed “grave concern” about the Balibo Five and Roger

East and the evidence they had been killed by Indonesian forces.125

Whitlam’s position was also defeated within the wider Labor Party. With agitation from both grassroots ALP branches and sections of the union movement, a resolution on East Timor at the ALP National Conference in July 1977 condemned the invasion, demanded an immediate withdrawal, noted the establishment of the

Democratic Republic of East Timor, called for international aid through the ICRC and

123 Senate Hansard 14 December 1982. 124 Senate Hansard, 15 December 1982. 125 Tabled by Tom Uren, HOR Hansard, 4 May 1976.

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for unimpeded communication with the “national independence forces” of East Timor.

It committed a future Labor government to suspend military aid to Indonesia until a withdrawal of troops, to recognise a government of East Timor after an act of self- determination and to establish a parliamentary inquiry into the invasion.126 Uren writes that Whitlam was the only person at the conference to oppose the motion and that the ALP position following the invasion was “very strong”.127

The next Conference resolution on East Timor in 1979, during Fraser’s second term, was briefer and more modest. While making no specific mention of self- determination, Indonesian withdrawal nor of the Timorese resistance, it condemned

“in the strongest terms” the Australian recognition of incorporation and committed a

Labor government to reverse it. It also undertook to end military aid to Indonesia and to press for a UN mission with functions to include monitoring violations of the UN

Declaration of Human Rights.128 The 1982 Conference decision which superseded it was more detailed, recognising “the inalienable right of the East Timorese to self- determination and independence”, condemning the Australian recognition of incorporation and opposing military aid to Indonesia. Aimed at policy in opposition as well as in government, it committed Labor to uphold UN resolutions in support of the rights of the Timorese, to publicise the issue in the international arena, to demand

Fretilin representatives be allowed to visit Australia, to press for a parliamentary delegation to visit the territory and for increased family reunion.129

During the two years he remained opposition leader Whitlam was in conflict with much of the parliamentary ALP on the Timor issue. To the surprise of frontbencher Clyde Cameron and others, Whitlam did not oppose the 31 March 1976

126 ALP National Conference, Resolution on East Timor. July 1976. Moved T. Uren, Seconded J. Roulston. 127 Tom Uren, Straight Left, (Milsons Point, NSW: Random House, 1994), 301. 128 Resolutions, 1979 ALP National Conference. Item 3. 129 ALP Platform 1982. East Timor.

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Caucus resolution condemning the invasion, probably to avoid debate.130 However, in the party room and in public he acted to stymie criticisms of Indonesia and support for

East Timor. In March 1977 he persuaded the ALP Executive not to include an item inquiring into “the origin of the conflict” in a move for a Senate Select Committee inquiry into the Timor issue.131 In Caucus he opposed supporting Michael Hodgman’s motion of 25 August 1977 criticising Indonesia for refusing visas for a parliamentary delegation, with Whitlam attacking Fretilin as authoritarian, comparing the proposed visit to a visit of foreign parliamentarians to Palm Island and claiming more Timorese had been killed by other Timorese than by Indonesians. The claims were met with derision and Whitlam was heavily defeated.132

Whitlam’s position came to a head during his last months as opposition leader when on the ABC program Monday Conference he publicly repeated the claim that more Timorese had been killed by other Timorese than by Indonesians, insisted that those campaigning for East Timor were greatly harming relations with Indonesia and stated he did not support the ALP Conference position on ending military aid. In response a number of ALP parliamentarians met to consider a no-confidence motion in him for undermining official policy, with Kim Beazley Senior sounding out Bill

Hayden for a challenge. In the end it was decided to move a censure motion against

Whitlam instead, which after lengthy debate in Caucus on 21 September was further amended, on the grounds that division would harm electoral prospects, to a decision affirming Caucus policy and directing Whitlam to meet with the Foreign Affairs

Committee on the issue.133

130 Clyde Cameron, The Cameron Diaries, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), 102. 131 Cameron, The Cameron Diaries, 336-7. 132 Cameron, The Cameron Diaries, 619-20. 133 Cameron, The Cameron Diaries, 639-41, 645-50, 653-4.

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Tellingly, however, Cameron recounts that when the Monday Conference transcript became available it became known Whitlam had also spoken against ALP uranium policy and that “if [Whitlam’s] statement on uranium had been known, he would certainly have come in for an even worse drubbing than he got on East

Timor.”134 With uranium cited as more important, it is clear Timor was not an issue of primary significance to many in the parliamentary party.

Whitlam’s record on East Timor made him vulnerable to government attack, both to deflect criticism on the Timor issue and as a method of undermining his standing as opposition leader. Cameron recounts how after an attempt by Whitlam to raise the Balibo Five issue he was effectively “taunted” by Peacock for encouraging

Suharto to invade. Whitlam, says Cameron, was “very tense”, starting to rise in reply but changing his mind and sitting down again, and was “badly mauled” in the ensuing debate.135 In the wake of a claim by Malik that Whitlam had assented to an invasion,

Liberal backbencher Maurice Neil gave notice of a motion on 26 April 1977 condemning Whitlam for sanctioning the invasion and calling on him to resign his seat for having misled parliament.136 Cameron commented that Whitlam “appeared pretty rattled”, providing the unconvincing explanation that his government never approved an intervention: true only in the strict sense, Cameron observed, that the broader government was not consulted on the issue.137

Whitlam was also attacked on the issue outside of parliament. Whitlam staffer

Patricia Evans recounted that when he addressed a conference in Melbourne members of the audience started a slow clap when he came on stage, chanting “Blood on your hands!” Whitlam, she said, was “stunned” by their reaction.138

134 Cameron, The Cameron Diaries, 667. 135 Cameron, The Cameron Diaries, 123. 136 HOR Hansard, 26 April 1977. 137 Cameron, The Cameron Diaries, pp. 490-1. 138 Cameron, The Cameron Diaries, 667-8.

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The ascension of Bill Hayden as opposition leader after the December 1977 election strengthened the opposition’s position on the Timor issue when, in contrast to his later position as Foreign Minister, he was proactive on it. He accused the government of double standards for criticising the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia while accepting and endorsing “an exact parallel action by Indonesia in East

Timor.”139 In the context of debate about sanctions on the Soviet Union over the invasion of Afghanistan, he criticised the Fraser government for recognising Timorese incorporation while fighting was continuing and in disregard of a General Assembly resolution calling for Indonesian withdrawal.140 In April 1980 he referred to de facto recognition of incorporation as “a surrender”.141 He claimed to have raised the issue of human rights in a meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar142 and he strongly defended Jim Dunn when there was an attempt to transfer him from his parliamentary library research position.143 On 22 April 1980 he stated that “We should not condemn ruthless military repression and invasion in Afghanistan but ignore or excuse it in East Timor.”144

That said, much of the running on the Timor issue was done by others, such as

Uren, Fry, Gietzelt and Lionel Bowen, who as Deputy Leader of the Opposition from

1977 criticised the government position on Timor on a regular basis. In the wake of the revelations concerning the famine in late 1979 he stated that “at the present time there is no greater concern in Australia than in relation to the treatment of the East

Timorese”, citing evidence of a tragedy for which “there is no parallel to be found in the world.” He condemned Australia for voting in favour of Indonesia at the General

Assembly and for doing too little in response to the “great destruction of human life in

139 HOR Hansard, 27 February 1979. 140 HOR Hansard, 19 February 1980. 141 HOR Hansard, 2 April 1980. 142 HOR Hansard, 2 April 1980. 143 HOR Hansard, 15 April 1980. 144 HOR Hansard, 22 April 1980.

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East Timor.” Citing “the genocide of the whole of the East Timorese people” he called for an Australian parliamentary delegation to visit the territory.145

4.10 The Fraser government’s parliamentary response

The government’s parliamentary response was largely based on the fictions of the second public tier of policy as it changed over time and the evolving narrative of denial. Senator Withers, the Senate government spokesperson on Foreign Affairs, for example, cited the four policy points in June 1976 to claim that government policy had been “rigorously consistent and based on fundamental principles.” Such policies, he insisted, had not only been “proclaimed publicly but also urged privately upon the

Indonesian government.”146 However, the response in practice translated into a concerted effort to protect the Suharto regime from criticism. As information about the situation in East Timor came out over time, this included stock responses to allegations of human rights and humanitarian abuses, paying lip service to the importance of these concepts whilst in practice acting to cover up and dissimulate the reality of the situation in the territory and work to prevent challenge or action. When it did become necessary to acknowledge abuses, language was nuanced so as to divert blame from the Indonesian government, such as in late 1976 when Senator Withers expressed “regret” on behalf of the government for “the loss of life and human suffering which has resulted from the fighting in the territory”, making no mention of the invasion whilst defending the “value” of the defence cooperation program.147

In the early Fraser years in particular, the closed nature of the territory made denial a feasible option, such as in December 1976 when Peacock stated that the government was “not in a position to investigate the allegations referred to” as it had

145 HOR Hansard, 13 November 1979. 146 Senate Hansard, 2 June 1976. 147 Senate Hansard, 30 November 1976.

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no representation in East Timor.148 The government displayed no such reticence in regard to Indonesian allegations against Fretilin, with Senator Withers in February

1977 citing a note from Peacock stating that the government was “aware” of allegations of Fretilin atrocities made in an Indonesian document Massacre in East

Timor, adding it was also aware of reports “that Fretilin used civilians, including women and children, to shield its soldiers in combat.”149 The following month Senator

Withers insisted that “there is no reason to single out East Timor” when other nations which had undergone conflict also suffered abuses, arguing that “to interfere in the affairs of other nations is often the worst way to deal with such problems” and describing allegations of a high death rate in East Timor as “hearsay”.150 In response to a question from Fry in November 1977 Peacock claimed he had no information

“regarding allegations that are constantly made by a clique in this country concerning genocide and the use of napalm in Timor.” He did not respond to Fry’s query about what actions the government had taken to confirm such reports.151

As a growing body of evidence made denial of the existence of abuses more difficult, the government resorted to stock phrases. When Peacock was asked in late

1980 by Victorian MP Clive Holding what protests the government intended making in regard to allegations of abuses by the American Chairman of Amnesty

International, Peacock responded that he had “no information to corroborate” such allegations and that “the position of the Australian government regarding violations of internationally accepted standards of human rights is well known to the Indonesian government.”152 Senate spokesperson on Foreign Affairs for the government Senator

148 HOR Hansard, 3 December 1976. 149 Senate Hansard, 23 February 1977. 150 Senate Hansard, 23 March 1977. 151 HOR Hansard, 2 November 1977. 152 HOR Hansard, 18 September 1980.

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Margaret Guilfoyle used almost identical language on a number of occasions in response to similar questions.153

On 20 October 1976, soon after Fraser’s visit to Jakarta, Peacock, in refusing to reiterate policy or criticise Indonesia, told parliament that it was necessary to “face the fact” that previous official policy could not be implemented, that there were

“limits to what Australia alone can and indeed should attempt to do” and that the

“political reality” was that it did not serve Australia’s interests to “place itself on a massive collision course” with Indonesia.154 Such sentiments, emphasising the

“realism” of Australian policy, the “irreversibility” of incorporation and the need to work with the Indonesians became recurring themes in government statements.

Senator Bernard Kilgariff, for example, evoked it representing the Minister for

Foreign Affairs in April 1978, blaming the Whitlam government for the invasion, but stating the “only realistic action” that could be taken to facilitate family reunion and improve the situation in East Timor was to recognise Indonesian control and work with the Indonesians.155 In May 1981 Senator Guilfoyle stated that while the government regretted the “circumstances” of incorporation “it believes that the best interests of the people of Timor are now served by positive encouragement of the

Indonesian government in its efforts to improve the living conditions of the population.”156 In November 1982 Guilfoyle dismissed United Nations resolutions on

East Timor as “unrealistic and impractical”, emphasising that “the only realistic way in which to help the people of East Timor is to work through the Indonesian authorities.”157

153 Senate Hansard, 10 March 1981, 12 May 1981. 154 HOR Hansard, 20 October 1976. 155 Senate Hansard, 5 April 1978. 156 Senate Hansard, 12 May 1981. 157 Senate Hansard, 25 November 1982.

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The extension of de jure recognition allowed the government to be publicly franker regarding its attitude to Indonesian attacks on Fretilin. When asked about

Indonesian atrocities during the Fence of Legs operations, Peacock’s successor as

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tony Street, responded that as Fretilin was still active and hostile “it is for the Indonesian government to decide how to deal with this threat” and that the government had “no evidence” to substantiate allegations of Indonesian army atrocities. Echoing Peacock, he also stated that the government’s position on human rights “is of course well known” and that “The Indonesian government is aware of Australia’s views.”158

Prime Minister Fraser himself was careful to emphasise the importance of the

Indonesian relationship and to depict Indonesia in a positive light. During the height of the famine in May 1979 he spoke of “the very significant lengths” Indonesia was going to “to advance the cause and wellbeing of the people” of East Timor, emphasising the importance of “both Australia and Indonesia…working together in a constructive manner.”159 The following month he emphasised that “past difficulties between Australia and Indonesia are now firmly behind us and we are determined to look to the future constructively and realistically” giving Indonesia credit for working for “the economic and social development of East Timor.”160

4.11 The solidarity movement

As the following five sections will demonstrate, the early years of the Fraser government were an active period for the solidarity movement. Hopes by activists that the Timor issue would generate a mass protest movement were frustrated. However, buoyed by the presence of Fretilin representatives in Australia during most of the first

158 HOR Hansard, 25 August 1981. 159 HOR Hansard, 22 May 1979. 160 HOR Hansard, 7 June 1979.

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year of occupation, the existence of a radio link to Fretilin in East Timor until late

1978, and a physical attempt to take aid to them in late 1976, the movement was initially sufficiently active to prove an impediment to the Fraser government’s goal of moving rapidly towards recognition and relegating the Timor issue to the past. With the movement challenging Fraser government policy objectives and with ASIO and other security organisations perceiving it as their role to monitor and at times impede such activities, the movement came under surveillance from them. These sections will examine the nature of the solidarity movement itself, its goals, strategies and activities as well as the tensions within it. It will examine the extent and nature of surveillance of the movement and the government’s efforts to curtail its activities, including efforts to silence the radio link and to prevent an attempt to take aid to the territory by boat. It will also demonstrate the particular attention the Prime Minister himself paid to these activities and the role he had in facilitating them.

By the time of the invasion a solidarity movement in support of East Timor was well established, with organisations in each capital city, a number of publications and a regular source of information from the radio link. As Fernandes demonstrates,

Timor solidarity organisations were established in a number of other countries in the years preceding and following the invasion, including Britain, the US, New Zealand,

Portugal and Japan.161

However, in an environment rich in other significant world events and an

Australian public largely indifferent to a small impoverished territory to its north with which it had few connections, even at its height the impact of the solidarity movement was relatively limited. The media did not take up the issue of East Timor in a significant way, although the ABC and sections of the print media continued to occasionally carry stories from the radio link until its end. But while information from

161 Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor, Chapter 3.

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a number of other sources confirmed what was happening, it lacked the visual images that are so important in activating public concern. Clancy argues that the CPA domination of the radio link also discredited it as a source in the eyes of many.162 As will be examined in forthcoming chapters, in much of the media the Indonesian position, buoyed by a supportive narrative propagated by the Australian government and sympathetic academics and journalists, was often taken at face value and information about the situation in the territory from other sources consequently ignored. The task of the solidarity movement was therefore not only to highlight evidence of the situation in East Timor, but to convince the media and the wider

Australian public of its importance, as well as to challenge the Fraser government’s contention that Australia was not a “party principal” in the conflict.

Early hopes by organisers for a movement on the scale of the Vietnam War protests were disappointed, with the East Timor Moratorium in March 1976 attracting no more than 600 in Sydney and around 1,000 in Melbourne.163 While such events continued, numbers declined thereafter, with the CIET Winter Mobilisation Rally in

Brisbane in June, for example, attracting around forty participants according to ASIO surveillance.164 A demonstration outside the Department of Foreign Affairs in July

1976 in Melbourne attracted around two hundred.165

Activist David Scott later wrote that “East Timor supporters had to be prepared to be patronised as ‘attention seekers’, ‘communists’, ‘fellow travellers’,

‘bleeding hearts’, ‘pinkos’, ‘un-Australian’ and the cruellest of all, ‘naïve’.”166

162 Michael Clancy, “Your friends do not forget you,” early Australian activism on the ‘Timor Issue’ 1975-1979,” in Timor-Leste: 1975-40 years on, Vol. II, edited by Sarah Smith, Antero B. da Silva, Nuno Canas Mendes, Alarico da Costa Ximenes, Clinton Fernandes and Michael Leach. Melbourne: Swinburne Press, 2016: 39-43. 163 Denis Freney, A Map of Days. (Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1991), 358. 164 NAA: A6122, 2400, x. ASIO minute no. 524/76. Campaign for Independent East Timor. 26 June 1976. 165 NAA: A1838 3038/10/3 iii. DFA Memo No: 316/76. East Timor: Demonstration. 16 July 1976. 166 Scott, Last Flight our of Dili, 71.

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Particularly after 1976, the movement came to be seen as of marginal significance even amongst much of the activist left. Lobbies such as the campaigns against apartheid and nuclear energy regularly attracted considerably greater numbers at meetings and rallies. After the end of the radio link in late 1978 the movement became even smaller, attracting only handfuls of people to rallies and events. An ASIO minute in March 1984 noted that from 1980 activities by Timor solidarity activists declined considerably, explaining a low level of interest by ASIO in the Timor campaign as reflective of the limited level of solidarity activity.167

Nevertheless, in the early years following the invasion Timor solidarity activists remained committed and active. A short film made by Boubaker Adjali in late 1975, Timor: Isle of Fear, Isle of Hope, which depicted events leading to the invasion from a position sympathetic to Fretilin and contained the last available footage from the Balibo Five, was used as a tool by groups throughout Australia to spread information about East Timor.168 In response to the Commonwealth Bank freezing of a Fretilin account, Fretilin supporters in Sydney poured glue into the keyholes of ten banks on 3 April 1976.169 Fretilin representatives Abilio de Araujo,

Estanislau da Silva and Ameila Sequeira visited Australia and toured from February to

March 1976,170 and Roque Rodrigues and Adelina Tilman in July that year.171

Australian based Fretilin representative Chris Santos toured university campuses in mid-1977, although his efforts on behalf of Fretilin caused him to have difficulty in getting his visa renewed.172 Activists targeted Ali Murtopo with demonstrations when

167 NAA: A6122/2386, xv. ASIO Minute. Royal Commission Enquiry – ‘When did ASIO cease interest in the Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET)’. 28 March 1984. 168 NAA: A6122/2401, xi. ASIO Intelligence Report. East Timor Association. 8 May 1977. 169 “Fretilin’s money war,” The Age, 8 April 1976. 170 “East Timor delegation visit to Sydney,” CIET mimeograph, 9 March 1976. 171 NAA: A6122, 2400, x. ASIO intercept. Campaign for Independent East Timor. 21 June 1976. 172 NAA: A6122/2401, xi. CIET (SA) Information sheet. Chris Santo to Tour Campuses. 1 June 1977.

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he attended a conference in Canberra in October 1977.173 CIET members prevented the Indonesian Ambassador from holding a reception in Adelaide in October 1977. In another incident Adelaide activists prevented him from peacefully having a meal at a restaurant by chanting to drown out his conversation from outside.174

The solidarity movement was well informed to the extent of the information available at the time and reasonably sophisticated in its analysis. It was aware of the nature of the government’s two-tier policy and discussed and analysed it in its publications.175 Activists were also aware of developments in East Timor, such as the use of US Bronco aircraft, with Sydney based activist Dennis Freney referring to it in an interview on Melbourne radio station 3XY in May 1978.176 From 1977 the East

Timor activist community was regularly referring to “genocide” in East Timor and by

1979 were attempting to publicise the ongoing famine and its impacts.177

The issues of the Balibo Five and Roger East continued to be pursued by the

Australian Journalists Association (AJA), which called for a public probe into the incident, criticised the “weak attitude” displayed by the Australian government and condemned it for accepting information from pro-Indonesian parties which was

“inadequate, incomplete and incompetent.”178 Claims by the KOTA President José

Martins after his defection that ABRI was responsible for the Balibo deaths gave further impetus to the campaign.179 The issue was enhanced by the efforts of relatives of the deceased, particularly Shirley Shackleton, in relentlessly pursuing the matter, the prolonged efforts of the AJA and the slow unfolding of information about the

173 “Conference plan angers E. Timor supporters,” Canberra Times, 1 October 1977. 174 “Adelaide Protests,” East Timor News, 3 November 1977. 175 Eg. “Australia and East Timor – The Liberal Government,” TIS Newsletter no. 16-17, December 1976. 176 NAA: A6122/2684, xiii. ASIO minute. Fretilin. 8 May 1978. 177 NAA: A6122/2685, xiv. CIET SA. Rally – War Starvation and Aid. Leaflet in support of rally for the fourth anniversary of the invasion of East Timor. Undated. 178 “AJA seeks probe on Timor five,” The Age, 3 March 1976. 179 “Before the Invasion – Indonesian Operations,” TIS newsletter, no. 16-17, December 1976.

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incidents over the years. It provided the Timor campaign with traction, with much of the media more interested in pursuing a matter concerning the deaths of Australian residents than those involving Timorese. This also made it more difficult for the

Australian government to claim that it was not a party principal to the conflict.

From an early stage tensions emerged within the Timor solidarity movement, including between the Melbourne based AETA, which was strongly influenced by aid groups such as ACFOA, and the Sydney base CIET, largely dominated by the very active Dennis Freney, a CPA member and journalist for the CPA weekly Tribune.180

As early as 15 January 1976 Freney confidentially circulated a letter to fellow activists to “set the record straight” and defend himself against accusations of dominating information from the radio link, of questionable use of Fretilin funds to which he had access for use on the radio, and of having made an “unfair” attack on James Dunn.181

A key difference emerged between activists specifically committed to Fretilin and those who focused on a wider concept of self-determination for the Timorese people.

In early 1976, for example, South Australian activist Ian Gordon proposed a reorientation of the goals for the Timor Moratorium away from explicit backing for

Fretilin to broader support for independence and Indonesian withdrawal.182 In response a South Australian Tribune Supplement defended Fretilin as “the main force for independence and freedom” and described the proposals as “a step backwards for

CIET.”183

180 Scott, Last flight out of Dili, 189. 181 Letter by Dennis Freney to CIET and AETA groups. 15 January 1976. 182 Ian Gordon, “Motions for CIET General Meeting April,” CIET mimeograph. March 1976. 183 NAA: A6122/2398, viii. “Timor Eyewitness Visiting Adelaide,” South Australian Tribune Supplement, 31 March 1976.

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4.12 Surveillance of the solidarity movement

The solidarity movement was taken sufficiently seriously by the Indonesian government to prove an irritant to the government’s goal of marginalising the issue and maintaining a business as usual approach to the relationship. The Radio Maubere link was a source of particular frustration to both governments, with Foreign Minister

Malik publicly pressuring Fraser on the issue before his October 1976 Jakarta visit.184

Indonesian officials also regularly complained to their Australian counterparts about what a Jakarta embassy cable described as the Australian government’s responsiveness “to pro-Fretilin and anti-Indonesian pressures”, which they claimed encouraged such elements further, thereby “inevitably eroding the wider relationship between the two countries.”185 In early 1976 Indonesian Ambassador Kadri expressed concern to DFA officials about the Timor Moratorium planned for 18-20 March, including what he called the “plausibility” of Moratorium literature.186 In a letter leaked to the AETA, the Indonesian embassy also pressured its own citizens studying in Australia to monitor Timorese solidarity activities on campus and send the results to the embassy.187

The Fraser government therefore saw it as its task to counter the work of the solidarity movement as well as to assist in keeping East Timor isolated from the world. Following the October 1976 visit, the Fraser government made a particular effort to crack down on pro-Timorese and pro-Fretilin activities, attempting to close the radio link, preventing attempts to send aid to the territory by boat, denying visas to

184 “Ban Fretilin activists, Fraser urged,” The Age, 6 October 1976. 185 NAA: A1838/3038/10/3, ii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor – Trade union action. 4 March 1976. 186 NAA: A1838/3038/10/3, ii. Record of conversation between Kadri, Sellars and Curtin. Timor “Moratorium”. Undated, but probably February or early March 1976. 187 Embassy of Indonesia. Help to face the activities of the Moratorium on Timor. 12 March 1976. Translated and republished in TIS newsletter, 9-10, 6 May 1976.

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Fretilin representatives and using the facilities of ASIO and the Commonwealth police to increase surveillance of the movement.

ASIO, the Commonwealth Police and JIO monitored the solidarity movement and the work of Fretilin representatives in Australia, including surveillance of organisations, meetings and individuals. ASIO and JIO monitored Fretilin finances in

Australia in some detail.188 ASIO was particularly active in Darwin in relation to the radio link and the attempt to sail to East Timor. It noted the factional differences in

Darwin between CPA member Brian Manning and Robert Wesley-Smith in relation to control of the radio and other issues,189 documented the use of the radio by Ken Fry and Fry’s policy differences with Freney,190 as well as documenting demonstrations and other activities. Telephone conversations between activists Manning in Darwin and Freney in Sydney were monitored and reports compiled on their backgrounds and activities. Details on Freney included material on his personal life, attempts to find employment as a teacher and even his preferred day for grocery shopping.

As early as February 1976 MP Ken Fry alleged in parliament that he was being investigated by the Commonwealth Police for his pro-Fretilin activities, which he characterised as a breach of parliamentary privilege and as a form of intimidation aimed at stifling the free flow of information on the Timor issue.191 Fry later wrote that a former ASIO employee revealed to him that such actions were part of an ASIO operation called Operation Answer, which was aimed at identifying public servants, parliamentary staffers and journalists who were sympathetic to the Timor cause. It

188 NAA: A6122, 2399, ix. JIO Memorandum. CIET and FRETILIN Finances. 20 July 1976. 189 NAA: A6122, 2684. ASIO minute. The emerging of factions in Campaign for an Independent East Timor in Australia. May 1978. 190 NAA: A6122, 2684. ASIO minute. Campaign for an Independent East Timor Darwin Branch. 15 June 1978. 191 HOR Hansard, 24 February 1976.

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involved phone taps, electronic bugging of premises, the search of bank accounts and the placing of file marks on typewriters to identify the origin of documents.192

4.13 Fretilin in Australia

From the first days after the invasion the government and its agencies also worked to limit the activity of Fretilin representatives in Australia. In early 1976 the

Commonwealth Bank refused to allow Horta to withdraw funds from a Fretilin account in Darwin on the grounds that the joint signatory, who had not escaped East

Timor, could not sign a withdrawal form. DFA officials worked to keep the account closed, with Graham Feakes recommending the rejection of a suggestion put to

Treasury by the bank’s chairman that under the circumstances the usual procedures be overlooked.193 In January 1976 Feakes raised the legal status of the Timor Information

Centre and of the DRET representative who staffed it, Chris Santos, with the DFA

Legal and Treaties Division, which concluded that his activities were legal.194 When

JIO head Gordon Jockel also inquired about the status of the information centre, DFA officials informed him they knew little, but were instead concentrating on the issue of

Santos’ passport and visa and the entry of other Fretilin representatives to Australia.195

As discussed, during Peacock’s January 1976 visit to Jakarta, Peacock undertook, subject to cabinet approval, to prevent the further entry of Fretilin representatives.196 Upon his return he wrote to Immigration Minister Michael

MacKellar expressing fears of Australia becoming a base for Fretilin activities if

192 Fry, A humble backbencher, 132-4. 193 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2, iii. Memorandum from Feakes to the Minister. Timor: Ramos Horta: Bank Account in Australia. 9 March 1976. 194 NAA: 1838, 3038/10/3, i. Memorandum from Gilchrist to Feakes. Information Office – Democratic Republic of East Timor. 12 January 1976. 195 NAA: 1838, 3038/10/3, i. Memorandum from Williams to Feakes. Information Office – Democratic Republic of East Timor. 16 January 1976. 196 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2 iii. Memorandum from Feakes to the Minister. East Timor- Entry of FRETILIN leaders into Australia. 27 January 1976.

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leaders were allowed to visit, and of the “acute” impact the establishment of a

Timorese government in exile in Australia would have on the Indonesian relationship.197 However, Peacock’s promise to Malik proved premature. A

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet memorandum of 20 February argued that as the government had managed to “defuse the Timor issue” such a “heavy handed” approach could prove counter-productive by gaining more publicity for it. It instead recommended allowing entrance for a limited time on the basis of a submitted program.198

Fretilin representatives Abilio de Araujo, Estanislau da Silva and Ameila

Sequeira toured Australia in February and March 1976.199 Fretilin Defence Minister

Rogerio Lobato was admitted on his arrival in Perth on 16 March with a seven day visa issued by the Australian embassy in Tanzania, although there was consternation within DFA that the Minister had not been consulted beforehand.200 Horta visited

Australia three times in 1976, in January, February and May.201 Mozambique based

Roque Rodrigues and Adelina Tilman visited in July and spoke at rallies.202

The Indonesians continued to exert pressure on the issue, with Tjan complaining to Taylor and Dan on 29 March about the entry of Fretilin representatives and claiming the existence of a BAKIN “special report” strongly criticising Australia for providing Fretilin a platform on which to attack Indonesia.203 An Antara article in

197 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2 iii. Letter from Peacock to MacKellar. Undated, probably January or February 1976. 198 NAA: A1209, 1976/55, iv. Memorandum from A.T. Griffith, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Visas for FRETILIN members. 20 February 1976. 199 CIET Press release. Delegation from Democratic Republic of East Timor arrives for month speaking tour of Australia and Papua New Guinea. 26 February 1976. 200 NAA: A1209, 1976/55, iii. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Entry of Fretilin Leaders to Australia. 16 March 1976. 201 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, v. Memorandum by Peter Dalkin, Indonesian Section DFA. Jose Ramos Horta: Visits to Australia. December 1977. 202 NAA: A6122, 2399. ASIO report. Campaign for an Independent East Timor. 26 July 1976. 203 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxi. Cable from Taylor, Jakarta, to Canberra. Entry of Fretilin leaders to Australia. 29 March 1976.

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May 1976 condemned the arrival in Australia of “two left-wing FRETILIN terrorist leaders”, Horta and José Martins (sic).204 DFA officials advised, at that time unsuccessfully, against Fretilin visits.205

In the leadup to Fraser’s October 1976 visit to Jakarta, Malik made it publicly known that support for Fretilin in Australia would be regarded as action hostile to Indonesia.

He demanded Australia ban entry to Fretilin activists, instruct Telecom to stop passing on Fretilin messages and prevent attempts to take aid to Fretilin by sea.206 Although not stated publicly, an outcome from the visit was an undertaking by Fraser to Suharto that further visits of Fretilin officials would be prevented, with cabinet adopting a policy of refusing visas to Fretilin representatives.207 Government concerns widened into unease about the broader Timorese community, with Fraser himself writing to

Immigration Minister Michael MacKellar about the “problem posed by increasing numbers of Timorese being granted residence in Australia.”208

4.14 Radio Maubere

Throughout its operation until late 1978, the radio link continued to be a point of contention with Indonesia. Tjan and Murtopo went as far as claiming the broadcasts were not coming from East Timor,209 a claim discounted by DFA officials.210 The importance the government placed on closing the radio clashed with its desire to marginalise public attention on the Timor issue, leading it to disown the real reason

204 NAA: A1209, 1976/55, iv. Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor. 15 May 1976. 205 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, ii. Memorandum from Feakes. East Timor – Entry of Fretilin leaders into Australia. 19 February 1976. Feakes later confirmed the visas had been granted.; NAA: A1209, 1976/55, iii. Timor – entry of three Fretilin leaders. 25 February 1976. 206 Ban Fretilin activists, Fraser urged,” The Age, 6 October 1976. 207 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. Memorandum from Michael MacKellar, Michael, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. Admission to Australia of Representatives of Fretilin. Undated. 208 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, iv. Letter from Fraser to MacKellar. 26 October 1976. 209 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, i. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 5 January 1976. NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, iv. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: Radio Maubere. 11 February 1976. 210 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, iv. Cable from Canberra to Canberra. East Timor: Radio Maubere. 25 February 1976.

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for radio confiscations. Fraser and Peacock both made it clear from an early stage that they wanted the broadcasts stopped, but to in order avoid it being seen to be done on their initiative, the action to be taken by the Postmaster General’s Department with the official reason to be given that the broadcasts were illegal under the telecommunications act.211

As previously mentioned, a transmitter was seized on 25 January 1976, shortly before it was to be used by UN representative Winspeare to arrange a visit to a

Fretilin area. With a new transmitter soon broadcasting from clandestine locations, the issue was taken seriously at the highest levels, although with the publicly maintained fiction that it was simply an issue of illegal radio broadcasting. Fraser instructed that further transmitters should be confiscated without official reference to Ministers.212

But the pretence of non-involvement by the government was a thin one, with the

Prime Minister’s department asking to be kept informed before a transmitter was shut down “so that Ministers can be appropriately forewarned about likely publicity.”213 In a departure from usual practice for an illegally broadcasting radio, the Department of

Post and Telecommunications worked closely with ASIO, the Department of Defence,

Northern Territory police and narcotics officials in tracing it.214

A second radio was seized on 27 September. Fraser acknowledged at a press conference he had been aware of the search for the transmitter, claiming it had been shut down due to policy of the Department of Posts and Telecommunications, although adding that the radio “embarrassed all Australians because of the nature of

211 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, i. Discussion between Young, Postmaster-General’s Department, and Feakes. Darwin Radio Transmissions. 21 January 1976. 212 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. Unlicensed radio transmitters – Darwin area: Legal position and policy and practical measures taken to close them down. Undated, probably September 1976. 213 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. To the Prime Minister. Illegal Fretilin radio at Darwin. 1 September 1976. 214 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Note for file. 21 September 1976.

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its activities.”215 With Fretilin representative Chris Santos announcing another link would be established “quickly and easily”, a memorandum to the Prime Minister recommended he continue to publicly claim it was seized “because it was illegal” and that its purpose was not “really relevant to the government’s decision to close it.”216

Nevertheless, a number of newspapers reported the action had been taken at the instigation of Fraser in order to silence it before his visit to Jakarta after a request from the Indonesian government.217

As discussed in Chapter Three, until late 1976 messages were also passed on by Telecom’s Outpost Radio public transceiver, although there was an attempt by management, initially thwarted by the telecommunications union, to prevent this.218

Along with the matter of Fretilin representatives, Malik exerted public pressure on the radio issue in the leadup to Fraser’s October visit to Jakarta.219 The visit produced an agreement to put an end to the passing on of Fretilin messages by Outpost Radio, although this was explained to the public as on the grounds they could supposedly not be “authenticated”.220 Fraser also agreed to proactively act against the Australian side of Radio Maubere.

The following years saw a cat and mouse game between the Fraser government and a well-coordinated clandestine activist network which worked effectively to keep the link operating. Organised by CPA activists Manning in Darwin and Freney in Sydney, the clandestine radio broadcasted from bush locations in the following years, changing positions to avoid capture. Backup receivers and volunteers

215 “Fretilin radio moves known,” The Australian, 4 October 1976. 216 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. Darwin Radio. To the Prime Minister. 3 October 1976. 217 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, iv. Cable from Canberra to New York. Press reports, 2 October. 2 October 1976. 218 “The crimes of the Australian caretaker government,” CIET mimeograph, December 1975. 219 “Ban Fretilin activists, Fraser urged,” The Age, 6 October 1976. 220 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/3, iv. Cable from Canberra to embassies. Australia cuts final Fretilin communications link with outside world. Transcript, Melbourne Overseas Service in English, 1130 GMT 17 November 1976.

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operating on alert allowed transmission to be back on air on a short time in event of a volunteer being caught. In order to avoid the bush operators from having to compromise their security by going into town to post recorded messages, it was supported by a secondary “public” receiving post equipped with a radio mast on a property owned by Manning some distance outside of Darwin. Volunteers would take recorded messages to Manning in Darwin, who would send them to Freney in Sydney, who would in turn transcribe them and release them to the media, as well as send them to Fretilin missions in New York and Mozambique.221 With the broadcasts from the radio reported by the ABC and elements of the mainstream media, as well as in the publications of the solidarity movement, the radio continued to be a major element in keeping the Timor issue alive in the public consciousness until its closure in late 1978.

4.15 The Dawn

Prime Minister Fraser also paid proactive attention to the other factor assisting the Indonesians keeping East Timor isolated from the world, the enforcement of a naval blockade. In early 1976 the Australian government prevented the aid ship Alana

Fay from travelling to the territory, allegedly on the grounds that its safety could not be guaranteed.222 It took a similar approach to the union funded vessel Sol in May.223

When in late 1976 it became apparent that activists were attempting to travel to East Timor to contact Fretilin, the matter was taken seriously at the highest levels.

A Commonwealth Police note to the Prime Minister in September 1976 attached an

ASIO report stating that information from a “delicate source” suggested activists were preparing to sail from Darwin in the following few days, although there was no

221 Robert Wesley-Smith, “Radio Maubere and links to East Timor,” in Free East Timor, ed. Jim Aubrey (Sydney: Random House Australia, 1998), 91-94. 222 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2 iii. Letter from Peacock to Mr Whitehall, President, Australian Society for Intercountry Aid. Timor. 1 March 1976. 223 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2, iv. Timor: Aid ships. Submission from Joseph to the Minister. 17 May 1976.

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evidence they would be in breach of the law.224 ASIO records report that the purpose of the voyage was to set up a “tactical” radio network and start a series of voyages to ferry refugees and Fretilin representatives, bring photos of “alleged atrocities” and take journalists to the territory.225 In a conversation with the author, however, the organiser Robert Wesley-Smith insisted that the primary aim was the transportation of food and medicines. He denied claims in ASIO documentation that there were plans for himself or others to stay in East Timor.226

Considerable resources were expended to prevent the voyage, with an interdepartmental meeting on 15 September between ASIO, Defence and DFA recommending the allocation of two RAAF Orion aircraft and a naval patrol boat for the purpose. A memorandum to the Prime Minister also recommended he discuss with the Immigration Minister and the Attorney General what long-term arrangements should be made to counter attempts.227 Officials met that day with Fraser himself, who expressed the view that efforts should be made to warn the party against leaving and to monitor the boat’s progress. He also phoned the Minister for Defence to ensure a naval vessel was available.228

The activities of the proposed crew were closely monitored, and when their vessel was seen to load cargo at a secluded part of Darwin Harbour and proceed out to sea, it was intercepted by the naval patrol boat HMAS Adroit.229 As a precaution

224 NAA: A4090, 757/2/1. Memorandum from McElligott, External Relations and Defence Division. Small Boat Movement to East Timor. 11 September 1976. 225 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. ASIO memorandum to Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 21 September 1976. 226 Robert Wesley-Smith (Darwin based Timor activist) in discussion with the author, 2 February 2017. 227 NAA: A1209, 1976/2183. Memorandum from Griffith, First Assistant Secretary, to the Prime Minister. Timor – Small Boat Movements out of Darwin. 15 September 1976. 228 NAA: A1209, 1976/2183. Memorandum from Simington. Timor – Small Boats Movements. Undated. 229 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. ASIO report. 17 September 1976.

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against the vessel being a diversion, a RAAF Orion was sent to search for others.230

The four crew members were taken to the Darwin Customs House. Wesley-Smith recounted that they were initially informed no charges would be laid, but after an official engaged in a phone conversation in which the crew members heard him use the phrase “Mr Prime Minister” several times as a term of address, they were informed they would be.231 They were held in the Darwin watch house overnight and faced court the following morning on charges of illegal export of weapons and narcotics based on one rifle and three shotguns onboard and a quantity of morphine amongst the medications.232 The four were found guilty at the initial trial, but exonerated on appeal. They did, however, suffer considerable financial loss through legal fees and damage to the vessel, The Dawn, when it was in storage, which was only partly compensated by customs after they were acquitted.233

Fraser himself accorded a high priority to preventing another such incident, ensuring the creation of an ad hoc interdepartmental working group to consider ways to prevent further such incidents,234 including a “continuous pre-emptive surveillance” of the Timor Sea while pro-Fretilin activities continued in Australia.235

4.16 The Jakarta Lobby

The solidarity movement was also countered by a group of bureaucrats, academics, journalists and politicians who actively campaigned for the Suharto regime and sought to discredit the movement and the activists within it. Collectively it

230 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. Memorandum from Simington to the Prime Minister. 16 September 1976. 231 Robert Wesley-Smith in discussion with the author, 2 February 2017. 232 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. Memorandum from Griffith to the Prime Minister. 17 September 1976. 233 Robert Wesley-Smith in discussion with the author, 2 February 2017. 234 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. Memorandum from Griffith to the Prime Minister. Timor: The Handling of Intelligence. 11 November 1976. 235 NAA: A1209 1976/2183. Record of meeting of Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Defence Surveillance of Timor Sea. 18 November 1976.

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became known as the Jakarta Lobby. Fernandes documents how in the 1960s a group of officials who supported Suharto during his ascension to power formed the “Third

Monday Club”, where ANU academics met with officials from the Departments of foreign affairs, treasury, trade, defence, and immigration to discuss issues. The group also established relations with the media through non-attributable briefings to sympathetic editors and journalists.236

Despite the bloody events of 1965 and 1966, the group shared the view that the new regime was in Australian interests due to its suppression of the Indonesian

Communist Party (PKI), support for the Cold War agenda backed by Australia and the

US, and end to the chaotic period under Sukarno. The lobby’s support for a concept of order and stability that underpinned Australia’s foreign policy objectives in the region placed little emphasis on human rights. Fernandes distinguishes between the term

“Jakarta lobby” and “Indonesia lobby” due to the elitist nature of its relationship with

Indonesian officials, its tolerance of the repression of Indonesian citizens by the regime and its acceptance of the Indonesian military as “the best guarantor of social and political control of the population.” He emphasises that far from hijacking

Australian policy the lobby worked in harmony with it, supporting the New Order not due to subservience, but because of the regime’s ability to ensure a form of social and political control in accordance with Australian policy objectives.237

The aim of the lobby was to encourage a bi-partisan consensus on the importance of supporting the Suharto regime and to depict it in a positive light within the Australian community. After the invasion of East Timor, it worked to propagate a narrative in support of the invasion and occupation. With its views often in conflict of with those of the wider Australian community, a key belief underpinning the lobby’s

236 Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour. Australia and the independence of East Timor (Melbourne: Scribe, 2004), 10-12. 237 Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour, 19-25.

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conception of itself was, as described by Burchill, that the Indonesian relationship required “careful management by ‘experts’ with a proper sympathy for and understanding of Jakarta’s difficulties.”238 This precluded public participation in policy making and entailed a consequent disdain for what the group regarded as the ill-informed views of those advocating positions it saw as damaging to its project.

Communication between the groups was facilitated by regular meetings at ANU involving officials from DFA, defence, treasury and other departments, as well as academics and journalists. There was also regular movement of individuals between the different groups. The non-government elements of the lobby, particularly those in academia, acted to support bipartisan policy towards the New Order by providing policy with supposed academic credence and publicly taking on its critics. It was therefore in a position to remonstrate the solidarity movement in ways in which DFA was more restricted.

ANU economist and board member of the conservative journal Quadrant

Heinz Arndt actively defended the Suharto regime and the occupation and regularly accused Timor activists of pursuing a “vendetta” against Indonesia for racist motives.239 Indonesian studies scholar Jamie Mackie, at Monash University until 1979 then at ANU, also strongly defended the occupation and criticised Timor solidarity activists,240 as did ANU Indonesian scholar Peter McCawley.241 The annual Indonesia

Update at ANU provided the academic lobby with coherence. While their analysis of the Timor situation was neither sophisticated nor evidence based, the standing of some of them as prominent academics nevertheless gave them credibility in the eyes of

238 Scott Burchill, “East Timor, Australia and Indonesia,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32, no. 1 and 2 (January to June 2000): 60. 239 Heinz Arndt, “Timor Vendetta against Indonesia,” Quadrant 23, December 1979: 13-17. 240 Jamie Mackie, interviewed by Margot O’Neill, Lateline, ABC, 22 March 1994, cited in John Braithwaite and Hilary Charlesworth, Networked Governance of Freedom and Tyranny: Peace in Timor-Leste. (Canberra, ANU press, 2012), 72. 241 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Peter McCawley, interviewed by Bill Nicol, Australian Insight, 14 January 1982. Transcript.

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many, allowing political leaders to point to them to counter dissidence within their own parties and elsewhere. DFA facilitated links between academics and Indonesian intelligence, with Tjan suggesting to DFA in 1979 that ANU send a research assistant to CSIS, which the centre would help seek out documents to “set the record straight” regarding the Indonesian intervention.242

They were supported by a number of journalists, including Greg Sheridan at

The Australian, who regularly defended Indonesia and attacked Timor solidarity activists in his weekly column, like Arndt evoking the White Australia policy to label

East Timor activists as racists for criticising Indonesia. Fairfax journalist Peter

Hastings, David Jenkins of the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Jakarta

Embassy diplomat turned Fairfax journalist Peter Rodgers also emerged as supporters of the Australian government position and the narrative propagated by it. A later editor of Quadrant, Padraic “Paddy” McGuinness also defended the occupation, touring the territory as editor of the Australian Financial Review in late 1982 and proclaiming it to be “in reasonably good shape” without prospect of famine, and

Fretilin a spent force.243

Staunch anti-communist B.A. Santamaria also regularly attacked Timor activists and their claims through the National Civic Council’s News Weekly and his weekly paid television program Point of View.244 Although considered on the margins of Australian politics by many, Santamaria and his organisation nevertheless exerted considerable influence on the conservative wing of the Liberal Party and on some sections of the Catholic Church.

242 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Letter from Alexander to Hogue. 16 October 1979. 243 Mark Aarons, “Truth, Death & Diplomacy in East Timor,” The Monthly, April 2006. 244 Eg, “Left’s Timor genocide stories exposed,” News Weekly, 12 December 1979.; “East Timor casualties ‘shamelessly, recklessly exaggerated’ – Whitlam.” News Weekly, 16 July 1980.

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As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, Whitlam remained a staunch supporter of the Suharto regime and of integration and became a particularly fierce critic of the solidarity movement after he left parliament in 1978. On the invitation of

Suharto he visited East Timor in March 1982, publicly praising the alleged progress in schools, hospitals and roads and denouncing the outspoken Catholic Apostolic

Administrator of East Timor, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, as “a liar” and “a mendacious and malicious correspondent” for his criticisms of Indonesian actions.245

He wrote an article for The Bulletin claiming conditions had improved since the

Indonesian takeover, denying the existence of famine or atrocities, rebuffing claims by da Costa Lopes and denouncing “propagandists in Australia” for quoting allegedly biased “church sources” to tarnish Indonesia. He accused the aid agencies Community

Aid Abroad (CAA) and ACFOA of “leading the crusade against Indonesia.”246

4.17 Conclusion

In accordance with Fraser’s professed “enlightened realism”, his government sought to project itself in the international arena as a strong supporter of a pro-

Western anti-communist agenda, while at the same time one of liberal disposition regarding human rights. These two positions were manifested by opposition to a perceived build-up of Soviet influence in the region, strong condemnations of the invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan, efforts to contain the influence of Vietnam, while at the same time positioning itself as strong opponent of apartheid in South

Africa and white majority rule in Rhodesia. These stances affected a commitment to the international rule of law. The first also entailed support for the staunchly anti-

245 Gough Whitlam interview by Richard Andrews, Frontline, Radio Australia, 26 March 1982. https://timorarchives.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/eto_w-h_09.pdf 246 Gough Whitlam, “Gough Whitlam: The truth about Timor,” The Bulletin, 30 March 1982.

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communist Suharto regime and the pursuit of assistance from it in achieving

Australia’s objectives in the South East Asian region and the world.

This agenda was threatened by the developing situation in East Timor and the need to respond to it, with the actions of the solidarity movement ensuring that the issue remained an active rebuttal to the Fraser government’s claims regarding its adherence to international norms and support for human rights. An evidenced based approach acknowledging the real situation in East Timor would have brought the contradiction between its policy position elsewhere and its effective support for the abuses committed by the Suharto regime in the territory into sharp contrast. The

Fraser government would have been forced to choose between severely compromising its claim to be a supporter of self-determination, international law and human rights, or abandoning its uncritical support for the Suharto regime by taking up the rights of the Timorese people in the international arena.

The Fraser government accordingly chose instead to position itself as an apologist and propagandist for the Suharto regime and its actions in East Timor. This required the development of an ongoing narrative to cover up the situation in East

Timor, deflect blame from the Indonesian government and deny the consequences of its actions. Initially this approach required the development of a narrative which distorted the events leading up to the invasion and concealed the Indonesian role in them. As events developed it expanded to one which denied the serious humanitarian and human rights situation in the territory, and when it could not be concealed completely, one which deflected blame for it from the Suharto regime.

Key to this narrative was the claim that the invasion was an irreversible matter of the past which Australia had objected to, but that it was powerless to change. This in turn produced the contention that the interests of the Timorese people were best suited by working with an Indonesian regime depicted as well intentioned, but acting

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under difficult circumstances brought about by the negligence of the Portuguese and the consequences of the civil war, in which it had intervened reluctantly in the interests of its own national security. With the actions of the solidarity movement challenging this narrative and perceived to be impacting on the Indonesian relationship, limiting its impact became a priority. Propagating a narrative of denial also required assisting the Suharto regime in an informational blockade of East Timor.

The personal interest Fraser took in maritime movements and the radio link can be understood in this context.

The inaccurate and self-serving nature of many DFA assessments regarding the situation in East Timor came about largely because it suited the official position.

In a context in which Australia wished to propagate a narrative in support of

Indonesian actions, accurate assessments and intelligence were not required, and would in fact have worked against policy goals. It was in this context that information which emanated from the radio link, refugees in Lisbon, the Catholic Church or other sources was ignored and belittled. Conversely, there was for the same reason a tendency to accept Indonesian claims without due analysis.

The Fraser government’s efforts were aided by the fact that East Timor was never an issue of the first order for much of the parliamentary Labor Party, nor for a great deal of the activist left. The generalised lack of interest by most sections of

Australian society, including the media, allowed the government to proceed with its agenda with some success. The government’s narrative did not convince the relatively small number made aware of the situation in East Timor by the information available at the time. However, it did convince a large segment of the public as well as a considerable number of journalists, academics and politicians that the Timor issue was a matter of the past. This allowed the government to essentially achieve its goal of

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neutralising the issue for most of the period of the Fraser government, increasingly so in the latter years.

This chapter has focused upon the development of Australian policy and the exposition of its narrative in the context of the bilateral relationship as events developed in East Timor and the Australian government responded to them. The following chapter will examine how the Fraser government acted in a similar way in the international arena, working with the Suharto regime to oppose developments at the United Nations which challenged the Indonesian actions in East Timor and assisted it in covering up the reality of the situation there. Chapter Six will examine the government reaction to the publication of The Dunn Report on East Timor, which, based on the testimony of Timorese refugees, threw light on the reality of the situation in East Timor and challenged its narrative. The following chapters will examine how the Fraser government continued to respond with a narrative protective of the

Indonesian government during the famine and the events after it.

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Chapter 5: Australian Timor policy at the United

Nations

5.1 Introduction

Chapter Four examined how the Fraser government’s decision to prioritise its relationship with the Suharto regime over the rights and welfare of the Timorese people caused it to develop and propagate a ‘narrative of denial’ to the Australian public concerning the ongoing situation in East Timor. This chapter will examine how it took this narrative to the United Nations and used it there to support and protect the regime and its actions in East Timor. It will demonstrate that, while the need to espouse a commitment to international norms caused the Fraser government to publicly profess different official positions at different times, the period was in fact marked by an underlying policy coherence throughout aimed at neutralising the impact of the Timor issue and eventually removing it from the UN agenda.

During the Fraser government there were two Security Council resolutions passed on East Timor in 1975 and 1976 and eight at the General Assembly from 1975 to 1982. This chapter will examine how, while official Australian policy towards the status of East Timor moved from reluctantly expressed official concern, to a policy of non-comment, to de facto and then de jure recognition, policy at the United Nations also moved through corresponding stages. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion

Australia reluctantly voted in favour of the 1975 United Nations General Assembly

(UNGA) resolution on East Timor, while pleading for an “understanding” of the

Indonesian position and working to weaken criticisms of Indonesia at UNGA and at the Security Council. In the wake of Fraser’s visit to Jakarta in late 1976 Australia moved to abstention, largely declining to take part in debate while lobbying for the interests of the Suharto regime at the UN and in other international arenas. After the

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granting of de facto recognition in 1978 the Australian position moved to a no vote, while continuing to consult and work with Indonesian officials to advocate for this position amongst nations with which it had influence. In 1982, after a close result in the Fourth Committee, Australia joined Indonesia in a concerted although ultimately unsuccessful campaign to defeat the resolution in plenary and remove it from the UN agenda.

This chapter will demonstrate how these different stages were characterised by an overall consistency of policy direction aimed at working with the Indonesian government to minimise the impact of the issue at the UN and protect it from the kind of scrutiny that would have undermined the Indonesian goals of subjecting and incorporating the territory. As with the domestic agenda, this required the propagation of a narrative denying the historical circumstances of the invasion and the reality of the ongoing situation.

5.2 “Reduce the pressure on the Indonesians”

The following three sections examine Australia’s role in the General

Assembly and the Security Council on the Timor issue in 1975 and early 1976. They will demonstrate how from the invasion the Fraser government identified protecting the Indonesian government as its primary goal at the UN, and to this end worked to establish and propagate Indonesian fictions concerning events leading to the invasion.

Chapter Three examined how Australia took its narrative regarding the situation in East Timor to the UN before the invasion, ignoring Indonesian covert subversion, inaccurately blaming the continuing pre-invasion conflict on Timorese and depicting Indonesia as a largely responsible entity responding to a chaotic

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situation not of its making in the interests of its own national security.1 In this context,

Australia’s Permanent Representative at the UN, Ralph Harry, made Australian policy goals explicit in the aftermath of the invasion on 9 December 1975, when he characterised his task as “to do what we can to reduce the pressure on the

Indonesians.” Citing Malik as pledging a withdrawal once stability had been re- established, he recommended that Australia work towards a resolution which avoided condemning Indonesia and linked withdrawal of its forces to an Indonesian supported program of self-determination, possibly with a small UN presence, to allow time for the occupying forces to “restore law and order”.2

While accepting the inevitability of a resolution in the General Assembly to some degree critical of the invasion, Australia accordingly worked to weaken it and remove as far as possible specific censure of Indonesia. Amendments proposed by

Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique to the draft resolution “strongly condemn[ed]” the

“interventionist policies” and “invasion” of East Timor by Indonesia and demanded an unconditional withdrawal.3 Australia negotiated to weaken the resolution in return for supporting it,4 resulting in the use of the weaker term “deplored” in place of

“condemned”.5 Australia also attempted unsuccessfully to have any specific mention of Indonesia removed entirely.6

1 NAA: 1838, 906/30/14/3, i. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations. 2 December 1975. 2 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 9 December 1975. 3 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations. 12 December 1975. 4 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations. 9 December 1975. 5 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations. 9 December 1975. Note: While sharing the same date and title as the citation above, this is a separate cable. 6 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations. 10 December 1975.

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As previously, Campbell provided the international community, much of which was not well informed about Timor and looked to Australia for a lead, with a selective and misleading account of the events leading to the invasion. In his statement to the Fourth Committee he made no mention of Indonesian efforts to destabilise the decolonisation process or of its covert military interventions, of which he was well informed. He ignored Fretilin efforts to facilitate a Portuguese return, misleadingly presented the covert Indonesian military intervention as a civil war between Timorese and cited the very instability caused by it as a mitigating factor in explaining the Indonesian decision to invade. While describing the use of force as “a matter of deep regret”, he deflected blame from the Suharto regime by referring to

“the circumstances thrust on the Indonesian government” and expressing an

“understanding” of Indonesia’s “laudable” desire to “restore law and order.” While reiterating the importance of an act of self-determination, he identified Portuguese inaction as the “basic factor” contributing to the crisis and encouraged the acceptance of an Indonesian administered process by stating that it was understandable that it had

“been moved to undertake heavy responsibilities which properly belonged elsewhere.”7

In his statement at the General Assembly itself, Harry also propagated

Indonesian fictions by contending that the invasion had taken place “in support of the parties now in control there.” Expressing regret that amendments proposed by

Australia to remove direct mention of Indonesia had been unsuccessful, he nevertheless stated that Australia would vote for it as it agreed with its support for the principle of self-determination. He avoided criticism of Indonesia by making a generalised statement of “regret” regarding the use of force by “political factions in

7 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3,iii. Statement by Campbell in Fourth Committee of UN General Assembly. 11 December 1975.

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the territory” or “outside powers”.8 The resolution, which expressed deep “concern” at the Indonesian invasion and called for an immediate withdrawal, was passed by the

General Assembly on 12 December, 72 to 10, with 38 abstentions, with Australia reluctantly voting for it.9

Woolcott continued his advocacy for a strongly pro-Indonesian position.

Immediately after the passing of the resolution he described Australia’s vote as a threat to Indonesian relations, citing Tjan as describing it as “disastrous” and Murdani as terming it a “double cross”.10 Anxious in response to demonstrate his own credentials in support of the Indonesians, Harry emphasised the close cooperation his mission had with its Indonesian counterpart and the “candid advice” it provided to them on how to moderate international criticisms. He contended Australia had been the only country in the region to display an “understanding” of the Indonesian position and cited the Indonesian UN representative Sani as saying Australia had been

“as helpful as possible”.11 Such attitudes would underwrite the Australian position and actions at the United Nations for the remainder of the Fraser government.

5.3 The Security Council 1975

Portuguese strategy was to take the question of East Timor to the General

Assembly first to get the strongest resolution possible there in order to strengthen the position on the matter in the Security Council. At the request of Portugal, the matter accordingly then proceeded to the latter. With the Fraser government understanding

8 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, iii. Statement in explanation of vote on Portuguese Timor made in plenary by the Australian Ambassador, Mr R. L. Harry. 12 December 1975. 9 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations. 12 December 1975. 10 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 12 December 1975. 11 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations. 12 December 1975.

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its role as that of “taking the pressure off” the Suharto regime, Australia sought to address the Council on the issue.

Other powers also worked to protect Indonesian interests. Japan circulated a draft resolution which, although recognising a right to self-determination and calling for a withdrawal of Indonesian “volunteers”, made no specific condemnation of the invasion, instead expressing “regret” at the situation and requesting the Secretary

General to mediate a solution.12 In an indication that they too accepted the narrative of an Indonesia reluctantly intervening to curtail a destabilising situation not of its making, France and the United Kingdom emphasised the need to link any call for an

Indonesian withdrawal to a process “acceptable to Indonesia” to maintain “peace and order”.13 In an oft quoted statement the then US Ambassador to the UN, Patrick

Moynihan, later wrote how the US State Department determined that the UN should prove “utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook”, a task he carried out

“with considerable success.”14

The Portuguese position was ambiguous. Late 1975 was a period of political turmoil in Portugal, with different factions vying for power, including an unsuccessful leftist coup and conservative counter coup on 25 November. A cable from the

Australian Ambassador in Lisbon, Frank Cooper, of 15 December reported that

“incredible as it may seem” the Foreign Minister had informed him that no instructions had been sent to New York.15 Nevertheless, the Portuguese Ambassador to the UN, Galvao Teles, spoke at length when discussion commenced on 15

12 NAA: A1838, 3038/13/9/1/1, i. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor - Security Council. 15 December 1975. 13 NAA: A1838, 3038/13/9/1/1,i. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor - Security Council. 15 December 1975. Note: While sharing the same date and title as the citation above, this is a separate cable. 14 Daniel Moyniham and Susan Weaver, A Dangerous Place (London: Secker & Warburg, 1997), 150. 15 NAA: 1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Portuguese Timor. 15 December 1975.

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December, sharply criticising Indonesia while providing a distorted outline of events aimed at justifying Portuguese actions. He made no mention of Indonesian covert military activities during the Fretilin administration nor of Fretilin calls for a

Portuguese return, while portraying the Rome meeting as a responsible attempt by both countries to find a peaceful solution. He condemned both the UDI and the declaration of integration, but described the Indonesian invasion as “a blatant, undeniable violation” of the UN Charter, claiming the Indonesian position had

“changed radically” since the Rome talks. He urged the UN to condemn the

Indonesian aggression and demand an immediate withdrawal. In an indication of his awareness of his own nation’s impotence, he called for intervention by the Secretary

General to establish the conditions for self-determination.16

Indonesian Ambassador Sani defended the Indonesian position as could be expected. He claimed that the UDT coup had taken Indonesia by surprise, that 50,000

Timorese had fled to West Timor and that four Timorese parties had petitioned for integration. He alleged Fretilin atrocities and claimed violent incursions into

Indonesian territory, insisting Indonesia had exercised “the utmost restraint” in the face of such provocations. He cited the Rome talks as evidence of Indonesian goodwill but blamed the UDI for having “dashed all hopes” of self-determination.

Arguing that the Portuguese had abdicated responsibility by fleeing to Atauro, he reiterated the fiction that the invading forces were “volunteers” responding to a call for help against “the Fretilin regime of terror”. Depicting the situation as a threat to the stability of the South East Asian region, he claimed his government was willing to cooperate with the UN in an act of self-determination.17

16 Security Council Official Records (SCOR), 1864th meeting, Galvao Teles, Portugal, 15 December 1975, in Heike Krieger, East Timor and the International Community. Basic Documents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 54-60. 17 SCOR, 1864th meeting, Anwar Sani, Indonesia, 15 December 1975, in Krieger, East Timor and the International Community, 60-63.

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Horta alleged Indonesian complicity in the UDT coup and spoke emotively of

“thousands of people” killed by the “criminal action” of “Javanese troops”. He emphasised Fretilin efforts to secure a Portuguese return and placed the UDI in the context of the failure of Portugal and other nations to condemn covert Indonesian military actions. He denied that East Timor could be a threat to Indonesia and emphasised Fretilin’s willingness to cooperate with nations in the region. He called on the Security Council to strongly condemn the Indonesian actions, demand an immediate withdrawal, send a fact-finding mission and enforce UN decisions. He also invited “representatives of any country” to visit the DRET and expressed a willingness to commence talks with the Indonesian government.18

Cognisant of the example of West Papua, Indonesia saw a degree of UN involvement to rubber stamp integration as in its interests. A cable of 15 December informed Canberra that in seeking to avoid condemnation in the Security Council, the

Indonesian mission would not object to a call for a ceasefire and would be prepared to accept a visiting mission from the UN, which the Indonesians believed they could use to their advantage.19 The two countries accordingly cooperated in order to facilitate a mission suitable to Indonesian interests. Harry later boasted that Australia had lobbied successfully for a visit by a single representative of the Secretary General rather than a larger mission which was seen to be more problematic for the Indonesians.20

A cable from Canberra of 16 December conveying ministerial instructions on addressing the Security Council also makes it clear that the Fraser government, while paying lip service to international norms, aimed to support processes which rubber stamped incorporation. It furthermore demonstrates the primacy it put on supporting

18 SCOR, 1864th meeting, Jose Ramos Horta, Democratic Republic of East Timor, 15 December 1975, in Krieger, East Timor and the International Community, 64-67. 19 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor - Security Council. 15 December 1975. 20 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor and the United Nations. 23 January 1976.

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Indonesia, to the extent of privileging Indonesian fictions even in its internal communications. Noting that “Indonesia is watching closely”, it argued that

Australia’s supposedly “courageous” position at the General Assembly now allowed it to now be “less harsh”. Australia should therefore not condemn Indonesia expressly, but support a ceasefire “acceptable to Indonesia” and advocate for the withdrawal of

Indonesian “volunteers” only once “circumstances on the ground” permitted.

Australia should argue that the main objective was establishing conditions for an act of free choice, which it described as “Indonesia’s stated objective”, and support some sort of UN mission that should also be “acceptable to Indonesia”.21

Harry carried out his instructions on 16 December, putting a position to the

Council patently aimed at legitimising a continuing Indonesian presence and eventual incorporation, while upholding Indonesian fictions regarding the nature of the conflict. Spuriously referring to the fighting as “between the political parties” he expressed confidence that “Indonesian elements” would withdraw once fighting between them had ceased. He implored the Council not to apportion blame, but to propose practical measures to facilitate self-determination, arguing time and organisation were required for it, and that some form of civil authority was required in the meantime to prevent a “regression into chaos”. Noting that Portugal was not in a position to resume control he advocated “some United Nations presence” as desired by all parties, “including Indonesia”. He advocated for the appointment of a Special

Representative of the Secretary-General and committed Australia to the provision of humanitarian aid.22

21 NAA: A1838, 3038/13/9/1/1, i. Cable from Canberra to New York. Portuguese Timor: Security Council. 16 December 1975. 22 NAA: A1838, 3038/13/9/1/1,i. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: Security Council. 16 December 1975.

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This position, of course, was in manifest contradiction to what DFA knew to be Indonesian intentions, as indicated by candid ongoing consultations since well before the invasion. On 18 December, for example, Woolcott, after consultations with

Malik’s personal assistant, reported that although Indonesia wished to achieve incorporation as legally as possible, it would not withdraw “whatever the Security

Council decided” and would proceed with it regardless. The president and other policy makers, he stressed, regarded UN consideration of East Timor as “something of a charade” although they were hoping to have the UN associated with a perfunctory act of self-determination once Indonesia had ensured the result by gaining complete control of the territory. Until this had been achieved any UN visit would be “a piecemeal exercise”.23

A cable from New York to Canberra that afternoon reported that Indonesian representatives expressed gratitude for Australia’s position. Indicative of Australia’s influence, it also reported that the UK and Swedish delegations had responded favourably.24 David Scott, on the other hand, referring to his experiences in the UN

Delegates Lounge at this time, later described how members of missions “expressed surprise that Australia, as the representative of Western democracy in the region, had failed to inform the United Nations of Indonesia’s intentions or take action to prevent the invasion and that Australia now supported Indonesia.”25

Security Council Resolution 384 (1975) of 22 December 1975 was something of a compromise, using relatively restrained language in its criticism of Indonesia. It expressed grave concern about “the deterioration of the situation” and the loss of life, deplored armed intervention by Indonesia, regretted that Portugal had not fully

23 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xviii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: United Nations involvement. 18 December 1975. 24 NAA: A1838, 906/30/14/3, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: Security Council. 16 December 1975. 25 Scott, Last flight out of Dili, 38.

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discharged its responsibilities and called upon “all States” to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor and the inalienable right of its people to self-determination. It did, however, call upon Indonesia to “withdraw without delay” and for all states to cooperate with the UN to achieve a peaceful solution and facilitate decolonisation. It requested the Secretary General send a Special Representative to East Timor to report on the situation and to submit recommendations to the Security Council. It was adopted unanimously.26

On 23 December Foreign Minister Peacock issued a media release presenting a version of the situation far removed from known Indonesian intentions, Australian policy goals and the reality of events then playing out in East Timor. He welcomed the thrust of the resolution as a step towards a return to a peaceful process of decolonisation, particularly the call for the dispatch of a Special Representative of the

Secretary General, which he said had been a consistent objective of Australian policy.

It was encouraging, he said, that both Indonesia and Portugal had promised cooperation with the Special Representative, and if the parties did the same “the prospects for progress would improve.”27

5.4 The Security Council 1976

By April 1976, when the Timor again issue came under consideration at the

Security Council, the invasion was several months old and broadcasts from Radio

Maubere were indicating a continued conflict. This section will examine how the

Fraser government expanded the narrative it used at the UN to encompass this situation. This included a remarkably uncritical dissemination of Indonesian fictions concerning the nature of the Provisional Government of East Timor (PGET) and the

26 Security Council Resolution 384 (1975) [East Timor], 22 December 1975. 27 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/13, iii. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Portuguese Timor. 23 December 1975.

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depiction of the invasion itself as a conflict between “parties on the ground”, perpetuating the fiction that the invasion had occurred at the request of Timorese factions. It also involved a deceptive depiction of what the Fraser government knew to be Indonesian intentions.

Horta writes that from the outset the mission of the Special Representative was “meant to fail”, citing an unnamed senior UN official as telling him that

“[Secretary General] Waldheim didn’t want Guicciardi to succeed anyway and gave him no support whatsoever.”28 As discussed in Chapter Four, Winspeare himself displayed a less than robust attitude towards his mission, expressing annoyance to

Woolcott that the matter had gone to the Security Council and even citing Malik that the dry season might provide a “solution on the ground”.29 While obstruction from

Indonesia and Australia certainly impeded his mission, his refusal to meet Timorese refugees in Darwin, his pre-judgement of the accounts from Radio Maubere30 and an apparent willingness to accept Indonesian claims at their face value further limited the effectiveness of his investigation.

The result was a report which added little information while privileging

Indonesian fictions. Although outlining the UDT coup, the Fretilin response and the

UDI, the report failed to mention the Indonesian covert military intervention, perpetuating the claim that civil war between Timorese had continued to the invasion.

While stating that the limited nature of his visit made assessment of the situation elusive, he upheld the Indonesian narrative of intervention by stating that “the

28 Horta, Funu, 114. 29 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xx. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 27 January 1976. 30 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xix. Cable from New York to Canberra. Portuguese Timor: Special Representative of Secretary-General. 6 January 1976.

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Government of Indonesia pointed out that the presence of Indonesian volunteers in

East Timor was upon the request of APODETI, UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista.”31

Australian officials and senior ministers would have been well aware of the inability of UDT or Apodeti to renew fighting without Indonesian support. It nevertheless propagated an assertion that an immediate Indonesian withdrawal would lead to a renewed conflict. In this it was joined by the UK which attempted to take pressure off Indonesia by postulating whether the “moderate” members of the Security

Council could persuade Indonesia to make a “token” withdrawal of forces before the

Security Council debate on the issue in order to defuse it. The Australian mission expressed interest, although admitting that not calling for an Indonesian withdrawal

“would be difficult.”32 Indonesia indeed announced the withdrawal of 350

“volunteers” on 21 March, a claim welcomed by the Australian mission.33

The Australian mission continued to lobby for Indonesia and propagate its fictions. On 19 March, for example, it argued to the Chinese delegation that the UDI had “forced” a patient and reluctant Indonesia to come to the aid of its “supporters” and that Australia “had been assured” Indonesia would withdraw once the PGET requested it.34 The Indonesian mission encouraged Australia to take part in the

Security Council debate, with Sani stating that interventions by its “friends” would help counter the activities of African countries.35 The two missions continued to cooperate on details. On 24 March Sani and Harry discussed ways in which to nuance the Australian statement to the Security Council so as to optimally advantage

Indonesia, including distinguishing between military and civilian Indonesian

31 Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolutions 384 (1975), 12 March 1976. In Krieger, East Timor and the International Community, 87-93. 32 NAA: A1209/1976/281, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor. 19 March 1976. 33 NAA: A1209/1976/281, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor. 22 March 1976. 34 NAA: A1209/1976/281, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra, East Timor. 22 March 1976. Paragraph 9. 35 NAA: A1209/1976/281, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor. 24 March 1976.

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“volunteers” when discussing any military withdrawal. In an indication of the expectations of both, Sani expressed the hope that the UN would tire of the Timor issue after integration was ratified by Indonesian parliament later that year. In his account to Canberra, Harry emphasised the regular contact between the two missions and the Indonesian recognition of the value of the Australian assistance.36 Although the evidence does not suggest it was central to Australian intentions, the Timor Sea issue continued to exert an influence. In a discussion with Indonesian Foreign

Minister Mochtar in New York on 22 March, Harry described the seabed boundary with Indonesia negotiated in 1972 as “very satisfactory”, expressing the hope the boundary could be completed south of East Timor once the future of the territory “was clear.”37

After consultations with Peacock, Harry addressed the Security Council on 14

April. He described the situation in Timor as a matter of “the position of the parties on the ground” rather than of foreign invasion. He continued to propagate Indonesian fictions by welcoming the claim the PGET, in reality an Indonesian proxy without independent agency,38 had “notified Indonesia” it would be repatriating Indonesian forces and that it appeared some had already been withdrawn. He stated Australian support for a withdrawal of “outside forces” and an act of self-determination, although stressing that it did not stipulate a precise formula for the latter. He called for a resumption of international humanitarian aid and a return of the ICRC. He welcomed

Winspeare’s report, noted Indonesian “assistance” to him during his visit, expressed regret that he had been unable to visit Fretilin areas despite Australian efforts and called for the extension of his mandate to allow a return visit.39

36 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, ANNEX B. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor. 25 March 1976. 37 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, ANNEX B. Cable from New York to Canberra. Law of the Sea: Indonesia - Mochtar. 25 March 1976. 38 CAVR, Chega, 389. 39 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, ii. Statement by Harry to Security Council. 14 April 1976.

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Horta continued to lobby strongly, with the Australian mission crediting his efforts as contributing to a strengthening of the resolution, including the removal of any reference to claimed Indonesian troop withdrawals and a retention, despite

Indonesian efforts, of a call for an Indonesian withdrawal “without delay”.40 In his speech to the council on 12 April he cited Lopez da Cruz to claim that 60,000

Timorese “have just been slaughtered by the Javanese troops”, also claiming the

Indonesian use of chemical and biological weapons, napalm, and the destruction of the “food base”. He went as far as referring to “the Nazi army of Java” and the

“fascist regime of Jakarta”. He committed the DRET to fully cooperate with the UN, including dialogue under its auspices.41

Fretilin’s lobbying efforts were assisted by the journalist and activist Jill

Jolliffe and the federal Labor parliamentarian Ken Fry. Fry later wrote that Australia’s open lobbying in support of Indonesia was seen as a disappointment by some

European missions who had looked to it for a lead.42 Addressing the committee at the request of ACFOA, he repudiated claims that Fretilin was communist, describing the

Fretilin administration he encountered in September 1975 as “responsible and moderate” and “obviously enjoy[ing] strong support from the East Timorese people.”

In contradiction to the Australian narrative, he stressed that the civil war had been started by UDT with encouragement from Indonesia, that it had ended by mid-

September and that fighting after that had been aggression by Indonesian forces.43

As discussed, the credibility of the Indonesian narrative of intervention was dealt a blow when in March 1976 José Martins, the president of KOTA who had

40 NAA: A1209/1976/281, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Security Council: East Timor. 20 April 1976. 41 SCOR, 1908th meeting, Jose Ramos Horta, Democratic Republic of East Timor, 12 April 1976, in Krieger, East Timor and the International Community, 93-98. 42 Fry, A humble backbencher, 109. 43 SCOR, 1909th meeting, Ken Fry, Australian Parliament, 14 April 1976, in Krieger, East Timor and the International Community, 106.

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addressed the Council on behalf of the Indonesian position the previous December, defected to denounce the Indonesian invasion and repudiate key Indonesian claims.

He submitted an affidavit to the Secretary General claiming that his previous testimony had been made under duress, as had those of the other Timorese party leaders whose families had been held in Indonesian captivity. He stressed that the declaration of integration had been forced, that those who had crossed into Indonesia during the civil war had been made virtual prisoners and had been prevented from returning to East Timor, instead being obliged to fight against Fretilin or work without pay.44 He later made similar allegations in a widely circulated open letter to the

Secretary General45 and in an extensive Portuguese language report.46 He also claimed to have evidence regarding ABRI responsibility for the deaths of the Balibo Five.

Although he did not address the Council he appeared at the UN to lobby delegations in the lead up to the vote.47

Such evidence should have been regarded as highly significant, calling into question the basis of the policy of supporting “talks between parties” the Australian government had pursued since September and the credibility it accorded the PGET.

The Australian mission, however, was dismissive, stating that “only Fretilin has taken

[Martins] seriously” and repeating an Indonesian claim he had asked them for a bribe.48

Adopted on 22 April, Resolution 389 (1976) was similar to the December resolution, calling for “all States” to respect the right of Timorese self-determination,

44 Jose Martins, Affidavit submitted to the UN Secretary General. March 1976. Cited in Dunn, Timor. A people betrayed. 193. 45 Letter from Jose Martins to the Secretary General of the UN. 29 April 1976. In TIS Newsletter, no. 9-10, 6 May 1976. 46 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/13/1, ii. Jose Martins, CFM Termos Acusatorios Contra o Estado Indonesio. 47 NAA: A1209/1976/281, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor: Jose Martins. 21 April 1976. 48 NAA: A1209/1976/281, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor: Jose Martins. 21 April 1976.

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for an Indonesian withdrawal and requesting an extension of the mandate of the

Special Representative. The US and Japan, however, destroyed the unanimity of the first resolution by abstaining.49

5.5 The move to abstention

As the following two sections will examine, in accordance with the Fraser government’s steady move towards recognition, the Australian position shifted to abstention in 1976 and to a no vote in 1978, the timing of each governed by a need to placate public opinion as interest in the issue waned.

Horta writes that in the following years Portuguese efforts became negligible on the Timor issue,50 with Fretilin “virtually alone” at the UN. During this time, Horta and his colleagues Roque Rodrigues and José Louise Guterres lobbied the missions of nations from around the world, seeking sponsors for the yearly General Assembly resolutions and lobbying on content and vote.51 With little evidence of movement,

Chris Santos wrote to the Secretary General on behalf of the DRET in June 1976, urging him to implement the Security Council resolution and complaining of perceptions that the failure to act was intended to allow the Indonesian occupation to become a “fait accompli”.52

Winspeare never returned to East Timor. With a visit seen as favouring an

Indonesian administration skilled at facilitating whitewashed tours, Harry urged

Waldheim to have Winspeare take part in an organised “fact-finding mission” to be attended by representatives of Malaysia, India, South Korea, Iran and Syria in June

1976. Waldheim replied that Winspeare was not prepared to return if he could not

49 Security Council Resolution 389 (1976) [East Timor], 22 April 1976. 50 Horta, Funu, 125. 51 Horta, Funu, 128. 52 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, i. Cable from Geneva to Canberra. East Timor. 10 June 1976.

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contact the opposition.53 As a result Winspeare’s second report, delivered on 22 June

1976 and based on little more than meetings with the PGET and the Indonesian government, was even less consequential than the first, containing no criticism of

Indonesia and making no findings.54 A departmental submission to Peacock described it as having “a strong sense of finality”, stating that the Secretary General intended no further action on Timor unless instructed by the Security Council.55

The Australian position on Timor at the UN was contradictory. Continuing to insist it was not a “party principal” ,56 Australia generally refrained from participation in UNGA debates on East Timor, other than short explanations of its vote. At the same time, it advocated on the issue from the invasion, denying evidence of abuses, propagating a distorted narrative and encouraging other countries to move to a more pro-Indonesian position. While moving purposely towards de jure recognition at a speed it assessed as acceptable to public opinion, at the UN it worked to neutralise the

Timor issue while endeavouring to appear to be upholding international norms. In practice this made an immediate adoption of a no vote problematic. At the same time, placating the Suharto regime was deemed crucial.

Indonesian Counsellor of the New York mission, Djoko Joewono, told Harry on 19 October that the strategy of having its allies attempt to amend resolutions had not worked, asking instead if Australia would abstain. Harry replied that his mission could not comment until it had seen the terms of the resolution.57 There were hopes from the Australian mission and from the Indonesians that a stronger resolution would

53 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, i. Cable from New York to Canberra. Timor- Visit by Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. 13 June 1976. 54 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, i. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor: Second Winspeare Report. 23 June 1976. 55 NAA: A1838/319, 3038/10/1/2, iv. Submission to Peacock. Timor: Roundup of Developments. 30 June 1976. 56 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxiv. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor: Committee of 24. 7 July 1976. 57 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Timor. 20 October 1976.

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work in Indonesia’s favour by making it more likely to fail. As the New York mission informed Canberra, an early draft circulated by Mozambique called for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces and described Fretilin as “the legitimate representative of the people of East Timor”.58 A cable in response of 27 October emphasised the importance of not appearing to be involved in consultations about a draft so as not to express any view about its contents.59 A subsequent cable from the New York mission expressed the hope that such a resolution might provide justification for a no vote or an abstention.60 When subsequent re-drafts moderated it, the Indonesian mission expressed fears to the Australians that the changes could make it more likely to succeed.61

In the aftermath of his Jakarta visit Fraser himself exerted a strong influence in the move towards abstention, with a departmental submission to Peacock in late

October stressing that the Prime Minister had expressed “a close interest in this matter”. The submission recommended an abstention, arguing that supporting the resolution would produce “a very sharp reaction indeed” from Jakarta. On the other hand, as there were elements in the resolution that accorded with Australia’s official position it would not be possible to vote against it without abandoning “important principles”. It advised that the Australian mission should avoid discussing the resolution until the last minute so as to eschew involvement, although it should make

58 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA: 31: Fourth Committee – Program of work and Timor. 25 October 1976. 59 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. Cable from Canberra to New York. UNGA 31: Fourth Committee: Timor. 27 October 1976. 60 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 31: Timor. 27 October 1976. 61 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 31: Fourth Committee: item 25: Timor. 1 November 1976.

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an explanation of its vote afterwards.62 A memorandum from the Department of Prime

Minister and Cabinet to the Prime Minister made similar arguments on 3 November.63

Consultations with the Suharto regime continued to be a central factor in considerations. A cable from Jakarta to Canberra of 3 November advised that while the Indonesian government hoped the resolution would be anti-Indonesian enough to enable their “friends” to oppose it, it would not be “unduly concerned” if Australia abstained. Although Woolcott recommended a no vote,64 a cable from Canberra of 8

November subsequently provided ministerial instructions for an abstention and details of an explanation of the vote.65 Harry responded by suggesting delivering the statement before the vote so as to persuade other countries to move to a more pro-

Indonesian position.66

The resolution was passed at the General Assembly on 1 December by a vote of 63 for, 17 against, with 49 abstentions. It reaffirmed the right of self-determination, rejected the Indonesian claim of integration and called upon Indonesia to withdraw its forces. It recommended the Security Council “take all effective steps” to implement its previous resolutions and advocated the dispatch of a UN mission.67

The Australian explanation of vote to the Fourth Committee was far removed from the reality of the military and humanitarian situation in East Timor. By this time there was evidence from a number of sources, including Radio Maubere, letters smuggled from the territory, Catholic sources, the testimony of José Martins and even

62 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. UNGA 31: Fourth Committee: East Timor. Submission to the Minister. Undated, probably late October 1976. 63 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. United Nations Resolution on Timor. Submission to the Prime Minister. 3 November 1976. 64 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. UNGA 31: Fourth Committee: item 25: Timor. 3 November 1976. 65 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. Cable from Canberra to New York. UNGA 31: Fourth Committee: Timor. 8 November 1976. 66 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 31: Fourth Committee: East Timor. 8 November 1976. 67 General Assembly Resolution 31/53: Question of Timor, 1 December 1976.

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statements by Lopes da Cruz, indicating a prolonged conflict, a high death toll and severe and widespread human rights abuses. This evidence, however, did not figure in the Fraser’s government’s expressed opinion at the UN. The explanation of the vote instead attempted to assert an equivalence of blame on both sides of the conflict by complaining that the resolution, in reaffirming the right of Timorese to self- determination and calling for an Indonesian withdrawal, “failed to make a balanced appeal for the avoidance of further bloodshed.” It stated that it had “reservations” about the clause rejecting integration, that it felt the call for the Security Council to implement its resolutions to be unnecessary and expressed misgivings about the practicality of dispatching a UN mission.68

Sani thanked Harry for the Australian abstention. Horta, on the other hand, told Australian diplomat Forrester that while he could accept the Australian abstention he found the explanation of vote “disgusting” in ignoring the truth of the situation on the ground in East Timor. Forrester made no reply.69

5.6 The move to a no vote

The discrepancy between the position the Fraser government took on East

Timor and on other matters at the UN was often stark. With Australia keen to burnish its credentials on the issue of decolonisation, Forrester reminded the Fourth

Committee on 8 November 1977 that it had sponsored the UNGA draft resolutions relating to the New Hebrides, American Samoa, the Gilbert Islands and the Solomon

Islands.70 In the same month Peacock instructed Harry to express Australia’s abhorrence of the actions of the government of Kampuchea and to voice concerns

68 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iv. UNGA. 31st Session. Fourth Committee. Summary record of the 27th meeting. 17 November 1976. 69 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, iv. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 31: East Timor. 17 November 1976. 70 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vi. UNGA. 32nd Session. Fourth Committee. Summary record of the 18th meeting. 8 November 1977.

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about the human rights situations in Chile and Uganda.71 With the Timor issue a threat to the manner in which the Fraser government sought to depict itself in the international arena, Australian strategy was based upon the belief that its tactic of denying evidence of abuses in the territory would be effective, and that the issue would gradually fade from the UNGA agenda.

It was also in November 1977 that DFA official G.J. Price sent a memo to

Peacock on the coming resolution on East Timor. On the assumption that Australia’s abstention would continue, he recommended Australia not intervene in the Fourth

Committee debate, but make a very brief explanation of its vote afterwards. This should state that Australia was abstaining as it considered the resolution “neither realistic nor constructive” and because it objected to the clause calling for the inscription of the issue on the UNGA agenda for 1978.72 The minister confirmed these as instructions on 9 November.73

The 1977 resolution was similar to that of the previous year, with the exception that it specifically requested a Special Representative of the Secretary

General go to East Timor to make contact with Fretilin and that both Fretilin and the

Indonesian government facilitate the entry of the ICRC.74 After its passage through the Fourth Committee on 28 November, Mochtar told Woolcott that Suharto had been disappointed by the Australian abstention as a no vote might have influenced New

Zealand and Papua New Guinea as well as other western countries.75 The 1977

Australian summary report on Fourth Committee activities noted a decline in interest

71 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vi. Cable from Canberra to New York. Human rights in Kampuchea. 9 November 1977. 72 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vi. Memorandum from Price to the Minister. East Timor-U. N. Fourth Committee vote. 2 November 1977. 73 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vi. Cable from Canberra to New York. UNGA 32: Fourth Committee: item 93-Timor. 9 November 1977. 74 General Assembly Resolution 32/34: Question of Timor, 28 November 1977. 75 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Australia/Indonesian relations- Timor. 18 November 1977.

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in the matter, with the delegations “coming to see little value” in contesting the

Indonesian claim of incorporation.76

With the Timor issue scheduled for the 1978 UNGA session, consultations with the Indonesians became a central feature of tactical preparation. DFA officials informed the Indonesian Ambassador in April that while the final decision would depend on the terms, the Australian vote would be guided by the Minister’s statement of de facto recognition in January.77 The Indonesian mission in New York raised the issue again in August, discussing which countries Australia could lobby and procedural tactics Indonesia could adopt to delay proceedings or force an adjournment.78 In Jakarta Indonesian officials discussed UN tactics with Australian diplomats and evaluated possible support from different countries. Identifying

Australia as a key country in moving the issue in their direction, they indicated a clear

Australian statement similar to the Foreign Minister’s statement of 20 January would be “helpful”.79 Peacock subsequently approved a statement to the Fourth Committee reiterating Australia’s position on de facto recognition, referring to cooperation between the two countries on family reunions and announcing a joint visit of

Indonesian and Australian officials to Dili in October.80

The Australian desire for a commencement of seabed talks was a factor in considerations, with Mochtar telling Peacock in New York on 5 October 1978 that it was “high time” to start the negotiations. Peacock agreed, stating he would also “try to help with the UNGA resolution”. He invited Mochtar to visit Australia, stating he

76 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vii. Australian mission to the United Nations. UNGA 32: Fourth Committee: summary report. 19 December 1977. 77 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vii. Record of conversation between Parsons, South East Asia and Papua New Guinea division and Nurmathias, Indonesian Ambassador to Australia. 24 April 1978. 78 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Timor: handling in the UN. 4 August 1978. 79 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. UNGA - East Timor. 12 August 1978. 80 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vii. Statement to the Committee of 24. East Timor. August 1978.

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would place more importance on such a visit than to any by a Foreign Minister in the previous ten years.81

Consistent with its de facto recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, Australia worked throughout 1978 to lobby the international community on the Timor issue.

This included Portugal, which at that time displayed little commitment on the issue. In

March Harry asked the Portuguese Permanent Representative, Vasco Pereira, what

Portugal intended to do on Timor and whether it would object to the 1978 resolution refraining from placing the item on the agenda for 1979. Pereira responded that

“Portugal would have no objection whatever” to the item disappearing and would be unlikely to actively object to Australia granting de jure recognition of incorporation.82

Indonesian diplomats regarded the Australian endeavours as valuable to their lobbying efforts and called upon Australian help. In March the Indonesian

Ambassador to Brazil cited the example of Australian recognition of de facto

Indonesian sovereignty to Brazilian officials, also visiting the Australian Embassy to encourage the Australians to lobby for his case.83 In New York, Indonesian diplomats enlisted Australian assistance in lobbying the Swedish mission. The Australians were willing to help, arguing against Swedish concerns about the situation “on the ground”, drawing their attention to Peacock’s assessment of the situation in his statement of de facto recognition and the pro-Indonesian nature of US Vice President Walter

Mondale’s communiqué after his recent visit to Jakarta. They referred to Indonesian

“movement” on family reunions and agreement to admit an ICRC representative as

“encouraging” developments and responded proactively to requests for more

81 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, viii. Record of conversation between Mochtar and Peacock. 5 October 1978. 82 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vii. Record of conversation with Vasco Futscher Pereira, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the UN. 2 March 1978. 83 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vii. Record of conversation between Sastradiredaja, Counsellor, Indonesian Embassy, Brasília, and Hillman, First Secretary, Australian Embassy. 16 March 1978.

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information on a subject on which the Swedes clearly regarded them to be an authority.84

As the December vote approached, DFA made a concerted effort on the

Suharto regime’s behalf, sending cables to missions in Vienna, Suva, Copenhagen,

Brussels, Paris, Dublin, Ottawa, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Islamabad, Madrid and

London asking them to inquire whether each country was considering changing its vote from abstention to a vote against. If asked, Australian diplomats were instructed to say Australia’s own position would be decided “in light of text”.85 Most countries indicated an inclination for a continued abstention, but like Australia stating the final decision would depend on the text.

Cognisant of the need, in an atmosphere of perceived declining interest in the issue, to weaken the resolution in order to increase its likelihood of succeeding, Horta circulated a draft in late October that was described as “very mild” by the Indonesians themselves.86 However, a later draft inserted a relatively modest clause drawing the

Security Council’s attention to “the critical situation in the territory” and recommending it take “all effective steps” for the implementation of previous resolutions. Perceiving an opportunity, DFA instructed its missions to draw the attention of the foreign ministries with which it had held discussions to this “stiffening of the text” with the hope that it would encourage a move to a no vote. Missions in nations believed to have already been so inclined were particularly instructed to lobby on the issue.87

84 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vii. Cable from New York to Canberra. Timor. 13 June 1978. 85 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, viii. Cable from Canberra to various embassies. UNGA 33: Timor resolution. 29 November 1978. 86 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, vii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. UNGA – Timor. 12 August 1978. 87 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, viii. Cable from Canberra to various embassies. UNGA 33: Timor resolution. 30 November 1978.

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Despite the government claiming as late as November not to have decided its intentions, Peacock’s statement of de facto recognition in January provided strong impetus towards a no vote. Timor Sea negotiations again provided additional momentum, with a memorandum to the Minister of 17 November suggesting that in light of the Cabinet decision regarding Australian readiness to begin negotiations it move to a no vote.88 Ambassador Critchley recommended a no vote on the grounds that the resolution was “unrealistic” and that a failure to oppose it would stale the atmosphere of Mochtar’s upcoming visit.89

A departmental submission to Peacock of 29 November recommended a no vote, arguing that circumstances had changed “markedly” since the previous year, including the extension of de facto recognition and the move towards negotiations on seabed boundaries, which it argued in effect extended de jure recognition. An abstention would be perceived very badly in Jakarta, particularly as it would be seen as influencing the votes of other nations and could even cause Mochtar to cancel his visit. A no vote, on the other hand, would improve the way he approached the visit and enhance the possibility of progress in other areas, including family reunions.90 A cable from Canberra affirmed ministerial approval for this position the following day.91 Critchley informed Canberra that Mochtar and other officials “were obviously pleased” and expressed their appreciation when told of the decision.92 After the Fourth

88 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, viii. Submission from Wilson to the Minister. 17 November 1978. 89 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, viii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. UNGA 33: Fourth Committee: item 94: Timor. 29 November 1978. 90 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, viii. Memorandum from Wilson to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Timor - UN vote. September 1978. 91 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, ix. Cable from Canberra to New York. UNGA 33: Timor. 30 November 1978. 92 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, viii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. UNGA - East Timor. 5 December 1978.

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Committee vote Mochtar described the Australian vote to the media as “very important”.93

The resolution was passed by UNGA on 13 December 1978, 59 to 31 with 44 abstentions. Stronger than that of the previous year, it again reaffirmed the

“inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence”, but in a clear reference to Fretilin resistance added “and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve that right.” It again expressed deep concern about the “critical situation” in East Timor which it attributed to Indonesia’s

“persistent refusal” to comply with previous resolutions, recommending the Security

Council take “all effective steps” towards implementing them.94

The European Economic Community (EEC) nations maintained abstentions, including Britain, which despite an inclination towards a no vote felt a need to vote with the rest of the EEC. Canada maintained its abstention. The US continued its no vote, as did the ASEAN nations, Japan, India and most Muslim majority nations. The

USSR voted in favour, as did its eastern European allies and Cuba. African nations, many with recent experiences of struggles against colonialism, largely voted in favour.

Australia’s brief explanation of vote afterwards described the resolution as

“neither realistic nor constructive.” It promoted the Australian narrative that hostilities were a matter of the past, incorporation “irreversible” and the situation in the territory improving under Indonesian rule, although contending that the Australian government remained “critical of the means” of incorporation. In a denial of the ongoing nature of the crisis, it stated Australia’s major concern to be assistance for the people of East

93 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, viii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. UNGA: East Timor. 7 December 1978. 94 General Assembly Resolution 33/39: Question of Timor, 13 December 1978.

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Timor to “recover” from the conflict, which it claimed it had “consistently held to be of primary importance.”95

5.7 1978-1981

This pattern largely continued in the following years, with most support for

East Timor coming from African and recently decolonised nations. Western European countries continued a mostly reluctant abstention, influenced by evidence of human rights abuses in the territory and lobbying from Portugal after 1980.96 The Soviet

Union continued to vote in support, although most of its eastern bloc allies moved to abstention from 1979 onwards. Indonesia’s support base continued to include ASEAN nations, the majority of the Muslim world, the United States, Australia, Japan and

India.

With the vacillations of the vote and the close outcomes the situation for

Fretilin was precarious, with a defeat signifying the removal of the issue from the UN agenda and an effective endorsement of incorporation. Fretilin and its supporters therefore saw a need to attract support by making resolutions relatively mild.97 Those from 1979 to 1981 made no direct criticism of Indonesia, instead reaffirming the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, expressing

“deep concern” about their suffering and requesting the entry of humanitarian aid. The

1980 and 1981 resolutions made reference to the affirmation of the rights of the

Timorese people made at the conferences of the non-aligned countries held in 1976 and 1979 and to the communiqué of the Portuguese Council of Ministers of 12

September 1980 reaffirming the same.

95 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, ix. UNGA 33: Fourth Committee: Item 94 – Timor: Explanation of vote by Australia before the vote. 5 December 1978. 96 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xi. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 34: Fourth Committee: Item 91: East Timor. 25 October 1979. 97 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xi. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 34: Fourth Committee: East Timor. 8 October 1979.

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Indonesia, while claiming that it was a “dying issue”, continued a diplomatic offensive. Australia continued to eschew debate on the issue with the exception of its regular explanations of vote, which defended Indonesia and continued to claim that integration was irreversible. Its 1979 explanation, for example, described the issue as

“resolved” and complained that the draft resolution did not give “due recognition” to the Indonesian decision to allow the entry of the ICRC and the Catholic Relief

Services (CRS).98 Nevertheless, Australia continued to lobby at the UN and elsewhere. At the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 1980, for example, it argued for a rejection of further activities on East Timor at the UN, citing improvements in health and nutrition brought about by international relief operations, for which it claimed Indonesia deserved credit, as well as a security situation which appeared “well in hand”. It contended that it was time for “delegates to focus on the future” and assist Indonesia in development of the territory.99

Despite some strains on the relationship, Indonesian officials regularly expressed appreciation for Australian efforts,100 and consulted with their Australian counterparts regarding tactics.101 They also used Australian sources in their own lobbying efforts. In late 1980, for example, an Indonesian lobbying document cited

Peter Lloyd, Counsellor at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, as praising Indonesian development efforts, blaming the Portuguese and the civil war for the existence of suffering, and stating that international aid was being properly used.102 Although concerns were expressed within DFA about the unauthorised use of the comments,

98 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xi. Australian explanation of vote, 1979. 99 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. IPU speech notes 1980. 100 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xi. Letter from the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia to the Department of Foreign Affairs. 20 November 1979. 101 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 35: East Timor. 15 September 1980. 102 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 35: Fourth Committee: East Timor. 15 September 1980.

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Lloyd confirmed making them and the matter was not raised with the Indonesians themselves.103

The lobbying efforts of Australia and others appears to have had some impact.

While the earlier reports by the Committee of 24 Special Committee on

Decolonisation acknowledged the role of covert Indonesian military action, the 1979 report excluded mention of it and supported the Indonesian and Australian narrative by implying the civil war had continued until the invasion.104

Particularly among western European nations, domestic pressures brought about by media reports on the situation served to discourage a move to a no vote, with the Australian Embassy in Copenhagen attributing this to a Danish push within the

EEC for continued abstention.105 The 1979 DFA report on UNGA noted that information concerning the humanitarian situation “disturbed a number of moderates” who might otherwise have voted against the resolution. This even included Singapore, although it eventually voted no.106

1980 saw a stiffening of Portuguese resolve on the Timor issue. In May that year the Portuguese Foreign Minister criticised his predecessors for inaction, drew attention to article 307 of the Portuguese Constitution which guaranteed the right of the Timorese self-determination, and stated that his government had “decided to do something” on East Timor.107 A communiqué from the Portuguese Council of

Ministers of 12 September 1980 emphasised Portugal’s “moral and judicial

103 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. UNGA 35: Fourth Committee. 25 September 1980. 104 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xi. UNGA. 34th session. Report of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. 1 October 1979. 105 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from Copenhagen to Canberra. East Timor. 23 July 1980. 106 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 34: Fourth Committee: item 91 - Question of East Timor. Undated, probably March 1980. 107 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Translation of interview given by a Foreign Minister Freitas do Amaral. 12 May 1980.

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obligations” to East Timor and criticised the “grave negligence” of previous governments. It elaborated a program which included economic and social support for

East Timorese both in Portugal and Timor, discussions with Timorese political parties and with all countries “directly interested in the resolution of the problem”, including the US, Australia, Japan, China, the Netherlands the EEC and former Portuguese colonies.108 From then on Portugal took a proactive position on the Timor issue. In a speech to the Fourth Committee on 13 October 1980 the Portuguese representative referred to his country’s “plan of action”, emphasised the importance of a UN framework and expressed a willingness to undertake negotiations with “all interested parties”.109

Growing evidence of the dire situation in East Timor led to international concerns in civil society, reflected in the number of non-government bodies and individuals who petitioned to address the Fourth Committee on the issue. In 1980 this included Michel Robert of the French Committee on Repressed People, Benedict

Anderson of Cornell University and James Dunn, then representing the Human Rights

Council of Australia.110 Maureen Berman, of the International League for Human

Rights testified that the situation in some areas of East Timor was of “disaster proportions”. Professor Roger Clark of Rutgers University told the Committee of numerous reports of torture and of rampant tuberculosis and malnutrition present in about forty prisons throughout the territory, claiming it was clear a “dramatic number” of people had been killed since 1975.111

108 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Text of communiqué of the Council of ministers on Timor. (DFA translation). 15 September 1980. 109 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 35: Plenary: General Debate: Portuguese Statement. 13 October 1980. 110 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 35: Fourth Committee: item 85: East Timor. 8 October 1980. 111 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor: Press Reports 16 October. 16 October 1980.

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5.8 General Assembly and Fourth Committee 1982

A number of elements came together in 1982 to ensure that UN proceedings on East Timor would be different in nature to previous years. Fretilin and its supporters were concerned about the precariousness of the yearly UNGA vote and the danger of a loss. A report by the Australian UN mission noted that despite a long list of petitioners alleging ongoing ABRI brutalities, these factors did not appear to have had a marked impact on the 1981 vote, which had recorded a movement of five to the

Indonesian position.112

Foreign Minister Street lobbied Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in May

1982, attributing the difficulties of East Timor largely to underdevelopment and colonial neglect and arguing that while “unpleasant things” had happened, Indonesia was making real progress in agriculture, health, education and other fields. He contended that Fretilin was “fragmented and insignificant”, that the “resettlement of villages” had been relatively benign, that there was no evidence of religious persecution and that allegations of famine were not well-founded.113

In this context Horta set the tone for a new strategy in a statement to the

Committee of 24 on 19 August. Insisting that the issue of East Timor “would not go away” as the Timorese would not give up their rights, he stated Fretilin’s willingness to “cooperate fully” with the UN, Portugal, Indonesia and other countries to find a solution to the conflict.114 This effectively paved the way for the referral of the issue to the good offices of the Secretary General to mediate a solution.

112 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 36: Fourth Committee: Item 93 - East Timor. 13 January 1982. 113 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Australian Mission to the United Nations. Record of Conversation between Street and Perez de Cuellar. 20 May 1982. 114 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Question of East Timor. Statement by Mr José Ramos Horta, member of the Central Committee of FRETILIN, before the Special Committee on Decolonisation. 19 August 1982.

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At the same time Indonesia renewed its diplomatic push to “strike Timor from the agenda”, including sending a series of diplomatic missions to European nations to push for a no vote.115 They were often well received. A West German diplomat told an

Indonesian counterpart in October 1982 that moves to remove East Timor from the

UN agenda would likely be welcomed by EEC nations,116 later explaining to the

Australians that as the FRG could not vote against such resolutions due to domestic pressures its preference was for the matter to disappear altogether.117

Portugal accordingly sought ways in which it could keep the Timor issue alive. The Portuguese Secretary of State told the media in April it would be taking

“new initiatives”, including contacting international human rights organisations, requesting intervention by the Catholic Church and the Islamic conference, calling for direct intervention by the UN Secretary General and possibly taking the case to the

International Court of Justice (ICJ).118 In an indication of the level of domestic concern, in March the Portuguese parliament also set up a commission of nineteen members to work towards a solution to the issue. In a visit to Australia in August its chairman chastised the Australian government for not applying the same standards to

Timor it did to Poland, Afghanistan and southern Africa.119 A Portuguese

Parliamentary delegation visited New York in September and lobbied Nordic nations.120 In October, Portugal appointed seven diplomats to travel to forty countries to lobby on the issue.121 The Portuguese Prime Minister addressed the Fourth

Committee on 1 October, emphasising the duty of the UN to support the right of

115 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. Giles Bertin, “Timor,” AAP Newsfeature, 23 May 1982. 116 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Indonesia/UN: East Timor resolution. 17 March 1982. 117 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Cable from Bonn to Canberra. Indonesia/UN - East Timor resolution. 27 March 1982. 118 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Timor. 5 April 1982. 119 Paul Chadwick, “Portuguese pressure Australia on Timor,” The Age, 30 August 1982. 120 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Cable from New York to Canberra. UN: East Timor: Portuguese Parliamentary delegation. 3 September 1982. 121 Jill Jolliffe, “Portugal envoys sent on E. Timor Mission,” The Age, 4 October 1982.

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Timorese self-determination, expressing concern about the violations of the rights of the Timorese people and reiterating Portuguese willingness to work with the UN on the issue.122

A draft of the proposed 1982 resolution circulated by Fretilin requested the

Secretary General to initiate consultations “with all parties directly concerned” to explore ways to achieve a settlement.123 A submission to Street noted that while the text was more “moderately worded” than in the previous year, Australia would “have difficulty” with it as Indonesia and its ASEAN partners would reject any initiative by the Secretary General which involved the question of self-determination.124 With an

Australian vote in the negative assured in any case, it is likely that DFA was also concerned that referring the matter to the good offices of the Secretary General would allow it to officially continue on the UN agenda regardless of whether yearly resolutions on the issue continued.

The Indonesian government was successful in enlisting the advocacy of former Australian Prime Minister Whitlam, who as a centre left former leader of a western nation was a substantial weapon in its armoury. As will be further discussed in Chapter Eight, on the invitation of Suharto he was taken on a four-day tour of East

Timor in March 1982. He returned to Australia praising the supposed “visibly beneficial” improvements, including school, hospital and road construction and increased food production. He attacked the Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Dili,

Monsignor da Costa Lopes, as “a liar” for his efforts to bring the situation in the territory to the world’s attention.125 The Indonesian UN mission issued the transcript

122 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 37: General debate: Prime Minister of Portugal. 1 October 1982. 123 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. UNGA. 37 Session. Fourth Committee. Agenda Item 97. Question of East Timor. 4 November 1982. 124 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. UNGA 37: Consideration of Item 97: East Timor. Foreign Affairs Ministerial Submission. 9 November 1982. 125 Gough Whitlam interview by Richard Andrews, Frontline, Radio Australia, 26 March 1982. https://timorarchives.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/eto_w-h_09.pdf

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of Whitlam’s interview as a media release and its government used his claims in their lobbying efforts. This included representations in Bonn,126 which apparently bore fruit when the West German delegate stated at the Fourth Committee that his nation was convinced that living conditions in East Timor had improved since the invasion.127

Whitlam addressed the Fourth Committee session on East Timor on 8

November, skilfully citing a number of sources to provide a misleading description of the events leading to the invasion and deny the existence of ongoing famine, while reiterating his claims concerning improvements brought by the Indonesians. He refuted the existence of ongoing human rights violations and attacked the “epistles” of

Timorese churchmen as “apocalyptic if not apocryphal”. Attacking the efforts of the

Portuguese and depicting the Indonesian intervention as a decolonisation and liberation, he stated it was “high time” the Timor issue was voted off the UN agenda.128

In a lengthy discussion over a number of hours Whitlam was attacked by a number of delegates, including those from Angola and Guinea Bissau as well as by

Horta. In response to Whitlam’s claim his visit had taken place under the auspices of the ICRC, Horta produced a letter from it denying the assertion.129 Alfredo Cabral of

Guinea Bissau told him he had “knocked at the wrong door” by apologising for colonialism at a committee dedicating to the dismantling of colonialism.130 Amongst

Whitlam’s claims during questioning was that the civil war had lasted three years, depicting the period after the invasion as a war between Timorese parties, and that the

126 Eg. NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Cable from Bonn to Canberra. FRG/Indonesia relations. 27 April 1982. 127 General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), 37th Session, Fourth Committee, 23rd meeting, Schaefer, Federal Republic of Germany, 15 November 1982, in Krieger, East Timor and the International Community, 163. 128 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. United Nations Fourth Committee. Question of East Timor. Address by Hon. Gough Whitlam, Q.C. 8 November 1982. 129 Horta, Funu, 158. 130 Horta, Funu, 131.

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results of the 1982 Indonesian elections in East Timor had vindicated Timorese support for integration.131 The Australian diplomat, Lance Joseph, defended Whitlam openly. The delegate of Vanuatu, Robert Van Lierop, questioned Whitlam closely as well as later making an impassioned speech of his own referring to the “invasion, pillage, famine and poverty” the territory had suffered and imploring the UN to “do its duty” in the face of these injustices.132

Horta recounts that Lance Joseph threatened Van Lierop regarding Australian aid to Vanuatu in response, only to retract and claim it was a joke when Horta and others threated to take it to the media.133 Horta’s claim was reported in The Age on 25

November134 and the ALP Senator Gordon McIntosh raised it in the Senate that day.135

In a cable to Canberra Joseph indignantly denied the allegation, claiming his interactions with delegates had been of a “friendly, light-hearted” manner and that

Van Lierop himself had denied it.136 Guilfoyle responded to McIntosh on 30

November on behalf of the Foreign Minister, conveying Joseph’s denials and his claim that the Vanuatu representative had refuted it.137

Senator McIntosh also addressed the committee, bringing with him a petition signed by all but three of the parliamentary Labor Party expressing concerns about the humanitarian situation in East Timor and calling for self-determination. He gave a speech comparing the situation to that of Kampuchea, citing evidence of a high death toll, torture, rape and imprisonment without trial. He concluded by playing a tape of

131 East Timor papers of Gordon McIntosh, ID: MGD-B3-1, 77. United Nations Press Release. 37th General assembly. Fourth Committee. 9 November 1982. 132 GAOR, 37th Session, Fourth Committee, 23rd meeting, Robert Van Lierop, Vanuatu, 15 November 1982, in Krieger, East Timor and the International Community, 160. 133 Horta, Funu, 131. 134 Ian Davis, “U.N. will discuss East Timor,” The Age, 25 November 1982. 135 Senate Hansard, 25 November 1982. 136 East Timor papers of Gordon McIntosh, ID: MGD-B3-1, 39. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor. 15 November 1982. Van Lierop declined an invitation from the author for an interview. 137 Senate Hansard, 30 November 1982.

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murdered journalist Greg Shackleton’s last report pleading for the international community to pay attention to East Timor.138 McIntosh recalls that after his speech

“you could have heard a pin drop in the chamber.”139

Representatives of a number of organisations testified regarding East Timor, including Amnesty International, the International League of Human Rights, the East

Timor Human Rights Committee, the New York-based Minority Rights Group and

Lord Avery on behalf of the United Kingdom Parliamentary Human Rights Group. A number of these made direct criticisms of Whitlam’s claims.140 The Australian statement of explanation contended that East Timor was “now a province of

Indonesia” and that those concerned about helping its people should concentrate on the provision of development aid, emphasising Australian contributions in this regard.141

The vote was passed in the Fourth Committee on 15 November by a margin of only six votes.142 In the wake of this close result Australia decided to advocate openly for a defeat of the resolution in plenary. The Age reported that this decision was taken after an approach to Fraser by Whitlam, although it is not clear that this factor was decisive.143

138 East Timor papers of Gordon McIntosh, ID: MGD-B3-1. Speech by Senator Gordon D. McIntosh to the Fourth Committee on Decolonisation of the United Nations General Assembly. East Timor. 8 November 1982. 139 Gordon McIntosh, (Labor Senator for Western Australia, 1974-1987) in discussion with the author, 17 August 2017. 140 East Timor papers of Gordon McIntosh, ID: MGD-B3-1. United Nations press release. 37th General assembly. Fourth Committee. Six Petitioners Express Views on East Timor in Fourth Committee. 8 November 1982. 141 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. Cable from New York to Washington. For AIS. 10 November 1982. 142 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 37: Fourth Committee - item 97 - East Timor. 15 November 1982. 143 Ian Davis, “U.N. will discuss East Timor,” The Age, 25 November 1982.

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Horta writes that he, “watched with a mixture of anger and incomprehension the frantic activities of the Australian delegation on behalf of Indonesia.”144 Street issued a media release on 20 November, contending that “it was now time for the international community to put the Timor question behind it”, praising Whitlam’s intervention and expressing the hope that the resolution would be defeated in plenary.145 With ALP policy supporting a pro-Timorese position, however, the

Opposition Spokesman on Foreign Affairs, Lionel Bowen, issued a statement on 23

November insisting that it was “imperative” the matter be kept before the UN.146

ACFOA also strongly contested Street’ s contention that the removal of the issue from the UN agenda would be in the interests of the Timorese people, arguing that the limited recent improvements in conditions had occurred due to international pressure and that ceasing such attention would greatly reduce incentives for Indonesia to alleviate suffering. A statement by Amnesty International outlined evidence of serious human rights violations and urged the Fraser government to change its position.147

DFA officials discussed strategies with their Indonesian counterparts to persuade a number of countries to change their vote, particularly those considered in the Australian sphere of influence.148 Alex (aka Ali) Alatas, then Indonesian’s permanent representative to the UN, asked Australia to particularly lobby South

Pacific capitals as well as with Burma, Sri Lanka and Ireland.149

144 Horta, Funu, 132. 145 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. Cable from Canberra to New York. UN vote on East Timor: press release. 19 November 1982. 146 East Timor papers of Gordon McIntosh, ID: MGD-B3-1. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. East Timor: UN vote: press release. 23 November 1982. 147 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. Statements by ACFOA and Amnesty International. Reported in: Cable from Canberra to New York. UN vote on East Timor. 19 November 1982. 148 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. UNGA 37: Fourth Committee: item 97: East Timor. 17 November 1982. 149 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 37: Fourth Committee: item 97: East Timor. 17 November 1982.

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DFA was happy to comply. The Australian Ambassador to the Solomon

Islands reported on 19 November that “on the basis of our representations” the nation had decided to move to a no vote.150 Western Samoa’s Secretary to Government initially responded that it was unable to move to abstention due to the principle of self-determination.151 After lobbying by Australia and Indonesia, however, the

Samoan Secretary of State announced that his nation would be changing its vote in favour of Indonesia in the following year.152 On 25 November the Fiji Herald alleged that after Whitlam approached Fraser, Fiji had been persuaded to vote against the resolution.153 Whitlam also wrote to a number of nations, including South Pacific states, urging a no vote.154

Portugal lobbied intensely during this period and despite Australian efforts

UNGA resolution 37/30 on the Question of East Timor passed on 23 November 1982,

50 to 46 with 50 abstentions.155 It reiterated the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination and independence, recognised Portugal as the administrative power and called for humanitarian assistance through international bodies. What was most significant, however, was the operative clause requesting the Secretary General to

“initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem.”

A cable from New York to Canberra after the result boasted that the support for Indonesia from Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Guatemala “was a direct result” of

150 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. Cable from Honiara to Canberra. UNGA 37: Fourth Committee, item 97: East Timor. 19 November 1982. 151 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. Cable from Apia to Canberra. UNGA 37: Fourth Committee item 97: East Timor. 18 November 1982. 152 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, xv. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. East Timor: press item November 23. 23 November 1982. 153 East Timor papers of Gordon McIntosh, ID: MGD-B3-1. Cable from Suva to Canberra. UNGA 37: East Timor - Fiji. 25 November 1982. 154 NAA: A1838, 935/29/2, ii. Cable from Honiara to Canberra. Solomon Islands: UN East Timor Resolution. Undated. 155 General Assembly Resolution 37/30: Question of Timor, 23 November 1982.

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Australian representations. It also reported that the close result was “in no small part…due to Australian efforts” and expressed a hope the following year would

“dispose of this item.”156

The issue, however, was deferred in subsequent years. Indonesia and its supporters could accordingly claim it was off the active agenda of the UN. Fretilin and its supporters, on the other hand, avoided the ongoing yearly risk of rejection. But although the issue was effectively dormant, by referring it to the good offices of the

Secretary General in a context in which Portugal continued to be acknowledged to be the administrative power, the status of East Timor remained officially unresolved and on the UN agenda. This legality would prove highly significant in future developments.

5.9 Conclusion

In his submission to Peacock in December 1975, DFA Secretary Alan Renouf contended that while Australia should not “play the role of apologist” for Indonesia at the UN, it should show “understanding of its special position and not be in the forefront of its critics.”157 In reality, the Australian efforts to display “understanding” of the Indonesian position entailed the production of arguments denying the reality of the situation in East Timor and justifying its actions there. This in turn caused

Australian policy to become what Renouf said it should not, an apologist for the actions of the Suharto regime regarding East Timor in the international arena.

Obeisance to international norms was necessary for Australia’s reputation both domestically and internationally, particularly in the context of the position the

Fraser government took in relation to a number of other issues. This required the

156 East Timor papers of Gordon McIntosh, ID: MGD-B3-1. Cable from New York to Canberra. UNGA 37: East Timor. 23 November 1982. 157 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2, iii. Submission to Peacock. 22 December 1975.

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move towards a no vote, like that of recognition, to proceed at a pace appropriate to these concerns. Throughout, however, the interests of the Suharto regime were central to this process. Australia lobbied for the interests of the Indonesian government from the invasion onwards, with the long-term aim of removing the issue from the UN agenda and achieving the international acceptance of incorporation. As in the domestic arena, this required the propagation of a ‘narrative of denial’ concerning the events which led to the Indonesian invasion and the ongoing situation in East Timor.

This was important given that many nations regarded Australia as having a particular expertise regarding East Timor.

While Australia’s lobbying efforts were clearly fruitful in changing the position of a number of nations, they were not ultimately successful in defeating the

UNGA resolutions on East Timor of this period nor in removing the matter from the

UN agenda. Nevertheless, in a context of severe human rights abuses, lobbying by the

Fraser government was a key factor in allowing the Indonesian government to continue its actions in East Timor relatively unimpeded.

Chapter Four examined how the Fraser government developed a narrative regarding the situation in East Timor as events unfolded in order to cover up the reality of what was happening there and protect the interests of the Suharto regime.

This chapter has examined how it took this position to the United Nations with the goal of minimising international attention to the situation in the territory and ultimately removing the matter from the UN agenda. The following chapter will examine how it developed this narrative in response to one particular development, the publication of the Dunn Report on East Timor, which documented ongoing abuses, and used it to counter Dunn’s claims in both the domestic and international arenas.

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Chapter 6: The Dunn Report on East Timor

6.1 Introduction

While DFA and other representatives of the Fraser government continued to question the credibility of reports concerning a humanitarian and human rights emergency in the territory, early 1977 saw the publication of The Dunn Report on

East Timor,1 a document which produced evidence, since largely verified, of the humanitarian and military situation there.2 The report’s author, James Dunn, was a former Australian military intelligence officer and a former diplomat who had been

Australian consul to Portuguese Timor in the early 1960s. He was co-author of two reports on East Timor during the decolonisation period, one commissioned by DFA in

19743 and the other by ACFOA in late 1975.4 He was arguably the foremost

Australian expert on the situation in East Timor at the time. He held the position of

Director of the Foreign Affairs Group of the Legislative Research Office of the

Parliamentary Library, although he produced the report as a private citizen. The report had a profound impact within and without Australia, gaining media attention, revitalising the Timor solidarity movement, reinvigorating the issue in the Australian parliament and placing it on the agenda of the international community. This included the United States, where the matter was raised in Congress and became subject to

1 James Dunn. “The Dunn Report on East Timor,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 7, no. 3, (1977): 409. First published as a stand-alone publication, 11 February 1977. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472337785390411 2 This matter, including material from this chapter, was first examined in the following paper: Peter Job, “The Dunn Report forty years on,” in New Research on Timor-Leste 2017: Proceedings of the 2017 Timor-Leste Studies Association Conference Vol. 1, ed. Peter Job, Antero B. da Silva, Nuno Canas Mendes, Alarico da Costa Ximenes, Mica Barreto Soares, Sara Nina & Therese Tam (Hawthorn, Vic: Swinburne University of Technology, 2018): 234. 3 James Dunn, Portuguese Timor before and after the coup. Options for the future (Canberra: Foreign Affairs Group, Legislative Research Service, Parliament of Australia, 1974). 4 James Dunn, Report on visit to East Timor. ACFOA Timor Task Force (Canberra: ACFOA, 1975).

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scrutiny by the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on

International Relations.

Chapter Four of this thesis demonstrated how the Fraser government’s decision to prioritise the Indonesian relationship above the rights of the Timorese people caused it to develop and propagate a narrative to cover up the situation in East

Timor and deflect blame from the actions of the Suharto regime. Chapter Five demonstrated how it used this narrative to defend the Suharto regime and its conduct at the United Nations. This chapter will examine how it expanded this narrative in response to the Dunn Report and used it in the wider international arena to protect the

Suharto regime, including in its interactions with countries which looked to Australia for guidance on the issue. It will further discuss how in choosing this course of action the Fraser government missed an opportunity to reassess its policy direction, recognise the reality of the situation and address it in the international arena.

6.2 The report

The report was based on interviews Dunn conducted with refugees from East

Timor in Lisbon between 5 and 23 January 1977. Dunn noted that most of the 1,500 strong Timorese refugee community in Lisbon were pro-UDT. He spoke to about 200, although only about twenty-five of the Timorese community in Lisbon had spent time in East Timor during the occupation. Of these he spoke to more than half.

Respondents provided eyewitness accounts of the invasion and occupation, including

“prominent Timorese” who had not initially opposed integration. Dunn stressed that he had urged all respondents not to exaggerate but that “without exception” they related accounts of Indonesian excesses.

These included accounts of whole villages in the mountain areas being wiped out and of families killed for actions such as giving a chicken to Fretilin soldiers or possessing a Fretilin flag. One source told him that the populations over the age of

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three of the villages of Remexio and Ailcu had been wiped out for suspicion of harbouring Fretilin sympathies. Another said that 150 men had been shot in Suai for trying to prevent the sexual assault of women. One witness reported the shooting of many Chinese in Baucau as well as widespread looting and raping of girls. Another claimed a massacre of 2000 at Lakmaras in June 1976. Others reported that it was common for Indonesian soldiers to round up Timorese girls and rape them and that torture in order to extract information about Fretilin was common. A number recounted accounts of massacres and atrocities in Dili at the time of the invasion, including a large number of unarmed civilians lined up and shot at the Dili waterfront, the killings of entire families which displayed Fretilin flags and the killing of as many as 500 Chinese in the days following the invasion. Dunn concluded that previous claims from Catholic sources of 100,000 deaths since the invasion were “credible” due to the widespread killing in the mountains. He also reported testimony regarding the fate of the Balibo Five, indicating they had been killed by Indonesian forces.

Dunn concluded that the invasion and occupation had been a “bloody operation” which “might well constitute, relatively speaking, the most serious case of contravention of human rights facing the world at this time.” He also stressed that his informants were willing to speak to foreign officials, although under conditions of confidentiality for fear of reprisals against family members.

6.3 Impact and corroboration

The challenges Dunn’s report posed to the Fraser government’s attempts to marginalise the Timor issue were magnified by the corroboration it received from a number of sources. Labor MP Gordon Bryant also travelled to Lisbon in January 1977 and interviewed refugees. He provided accounts which substantiated Dunn’s claims,5

5 Mike Steketee, “Bryant cites new evidence of war crimes in Timor,” Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 1977.

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describing the atrocities as “of the order for which we hanged people after the war” and called for a United Nations supervised inquiry.6 The report attracted the attention of the Australian section of the International Committee of Jurists, with its Australian president, John Dowd, a Liberal member of NSW parliament, undertaking a two-day visit to Lisbon in May.7 His report stated he was “reasonably satisfied” with the Dunn

Report’s accuracy and concluded that the situation showed “breaches of international covenants on civil and political rights and…allegations of serious crimes.” He called for an inquiry under UN or other international auspices.8

Dunn himself first spoke of his findings at a media conference in London on

26 January, some weeks prior to publication. Much of the initial interest in the media centred on the fate of the Balibo Five. An interview with Dunn on the ABC radio program AM on 27 January, for example, led on the Balibo angle, only to be directed to wider atrocities involving Timorese by Dunn himself. The Australian commented that Dunn had shed “horrifying new light” on the invasion and the fate of the newsmen, quoting Dunn as saying the situation could be “as bad, if not worse, as anything the Nazis ever did.”9 ABC journalist Peter Munckton noted on AM that if the allegations were confirmed it would discredit the Indonesian version of events and damage Indonesian diplomatic efforts to put the Timor issue behind it.10 Along with reports on Dunn’s comments, The Age and the Sydney Morning Herald reported that senior Indonesian officers had admitted privately that some army units had got “out of hand” in the initial stages of the invasion, but that intervention by high level officers

6 “Atrocities in Timor: survivors,” The Age, 14 January 1977. 7 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Australian ICJ visit to Portugal. 16 May 1977. 8 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, ii. Report by John Dowd, International Commission of Jurists, Australian section. Attachment to letter from John Dowd to Andrew Peacock, 13 July 1977. 9 “Indonesian atrocities ‘as bad as Nazis’,” The Australian, 27 January 1977. 10 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor Allegations: Press reports 28 January. 28 January 1977.

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had rectified the situation.11 This unverified Indonesian claim was to become a staple of the government narrative as the evidence of the early atrocities mounted in the following years, with Fraser government representatives contending that such abuses had been rectified. Building on this position, DFA officials also argued that the witnesses Dunn interviewed had only seen the early part of the invasion and were describing a situation no longer current.

The release of the report itself in mid-February brought considerable media attention, such as two articles in the Herald in late February which quoted at length allegations of massacres, torture, rape and other atrocities.12 A Sydney Morning

Herald editorial of 24 February compared the government’s proactive response to the human rights situation in Uganda to that of East Timor, asking “Why not a similar line with Jakarta?”13 The Canberra Times stated on 18 March that “the world has a conscience in Mr Jim Dunn” and called on the government to protect his right to speak out as a private citizen in the face of Indonesian criticism.14 To the chagrin of the Suharto regime and the Jakarta Embassy, Dunn’s allegations were also comprehensively reported on the ABC and on Radio Australia.15

The report’s potential to impede the government’s attempts to marginalise the

Timor issue were amplified by the initial attention it received in the broader

Australian community, with the Liberal Premier of Victoria, Rupert Hamer, for example stating he would ask Peacock what further diplomatic action could be taken.

It led to a reawakening of attention on the fate of the Balibo Five, with the former spouse of the journalist Greg Shackleton, Shirley Shackleton, calling for the

11 “‘Indon troops out of hand in E. Timor’,” The Age, 28 January 1977. 12 Peter Game, “‘Indonesians see our flag then kill’,” and “Dossier on Dili,” The Herald, 21 February 1977. 13 Editorial, “Kampala – and Balibo,” Sydney Morning Herald, 24 February 1977. 14 Editorial, “Inciting Violence,” The Canberra Times, 18 March 1977. 15 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 28 January 1977.

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Government to hold a full inquiry.16 The report was also summarised in detail in the

Timor Information Service newsletter and published in full in CIET’s East Timor

News. Dunn’s allegations were given further impetus on 1 April when Malik publicly stated that 50,000 people may have been killed in East Timor, “but what does that matter compared with 600,000 people who want to join Indonesia?”17

In an apparent belief he would favour their position, the Indonesian government allowed the Australian journalist Richard Carleton to visit the territory in

August. He was, however, to disappoint them. In an article published in The Age and the Sydney Morning Herald on 10 August, he reported how he was able to give his

Indonesian minder “the slip” and speak to independent informants. He heard eyewitness accounts of massacres that had accompanied the invasion and of people currently dying of disease and malnutrition on a daily basis. An Italian missionary told him that Fretilin forces remained active in the Baucau region, and that he passed through Fretilin regions on a regular basis to conduct mass. Carleton described the

Indonesian claim of 2000 remaining Fretilin troops as “a little silly” as he had personally witnessed 200 Fretilin, “supposedly 10 percent of their number” surrendering near Los Palos.18 In an article the following day he reported on the orchestrated nature of his visit, with children in Balibo singing patriotic Indonesian songs and banners reading Go to Hell James Dunn. He characterised this as evidence of “a full-scale Orwellian and re-education program.”19

To the annoyance of the government, such media coverage continued in the subsequent months as events unfolded in the US and elsewhere. This challenge caused

16 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor Allegations: Press reports 28 January. 28 January 1977. 17 “East Timor dead ‘50,000’,” Canberra Times, 1 April 1977. 18 Richard Carleton, “Timor - and a story of massacre,” The Age, 10 August 1977. 19 Richard Carleton, “The place of death in Timor,” The Age, 11 August 1977.

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it to develop its narrative further to defend the Suharto regime in the domestic and, increasingly, in the international arena.

6.4 The Fraser government’s response

While the Dunn Report presented the Fraser government with a challenge, it also offered opportunities. Given the increasing evidence of severe human rights abuses, sustained Fretilin resistance and the potential for the kind of prolonged conflict Fraser and others had feared, it could have facilitated the kind of reassessment of policy direction originally proposed by Renouf in the event of such a development.

Any investigation of Dunn’s claims would have been assisted by the stated willingness of his informants to talk to Australian officials.

Such a reassessment could have taken a number of directions. Most profound would have been an abandonment of a defence of the Suharto regime on the issue, an end to military aid and a proactive approach to raising the issues of Timorese self- determination and human rights in the international arena. The CAVR investigations demonstrate that following the initial stalemate ABRI found itself overstretched due to national elections in May 1977, forcing it to withdraw forces from East Timor. It concludes that early 1977 was a time of relative success for Fretilin and failure for the

Indonesian offensive.20 In these circumstances, the Fraser government had the option open to it of using evidence of the humanitarian crisis and extent of the conflict in

East Timor as an opportunity to support the involvement of the international community in efforts to achieve an alternative outcome. Such an approach would have impacted the relationship with Indonesia, probably impeded cooperation on issues such the Vietnamese refugee crisis, and would have lacked the support of the United

States. On the other hand, the proximity of the two countries and the dependence of

20 CAVR, Chega, 220-21.

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the Suharto regime on orderly relations with Western nations would have limited damage to Australian interests in the long-term. With many Western nations taking their cue from Australia regarding East Timor, Australian support for such a proposal would have had the potential for changing international attitudes towards the situation and forcing change.

Even without taking up the self-determination issue there were other options available to the government. It could have pressed the issue of human rights in the public arena both domestically and internationally, making it clear to the Suharto regime that continued good relations, including military aid, depended upon an end to the violations that were clearly taking place. Finally, the Fraser government could have raised the situation with the Indonesian government privately, preserving many elements of the “business as usual” approach while making it clear that continued support for the Suharto regime was dependent upon an improvement of the human rights situation. With the New Order dependent upon international goodwill and domestic and international aid, such an approach, if nothing else, would have been likely to have mitigated the severe abuses which were occurring there.

Instead the Fraser government chose to continue its unreserved and uncritical support for the Suharto regime, including proactively defending it in the international arena and denying evidence of abuses. Such an approach by its nature required continuing to conceal the reality of the situation and working to undermine and discredit the claims of activists, including Dunn. It also precluded any evidence-based investigation of Dunn’s allegations as any results would have risked embarrassing the

Fraser government’s position and creating pressure for a change of policy.

Responding to Dunn’s early comments in London, acting Foreign Minister

Ian Sinclair said DFA would examine it to see if an inquiry were warranted, although

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stating that at “this stage” the allegations were “no more than hearsay.”21 With the publication of the report Peacock chose to keep his public remarks to a minimum, simply stating that he “found it disturbing and was examining it closely.”22 In a wide ranging statement to parliament on foreign policy on 15 March he made no mention of allegations of abuses in East Timor, simply reiterating what he claimed to be the

Fraser government’s well-intentioned efforts on the issue while emphasising the

“close and friendly” relations between Australia and Indonesia.23 In response to a question about the report in parliament the following day he ignored the actual allegations, warned against allowing the matter to create “misunderstanding between the two countries” and emphasised the report’s unofficial status.24 Several days later he told a group of ANU students that the government had been gathering its own intelligence and was studying Dunn’s report.25 There is, however, no evidence of any serious attempt to do so, nor to take advantage of the refugees’ stated willingness to speak to Australian officials. On the contrary, the Fraser government and its foreign affairs department continued to work to support Indonesia in the domestic and international arenas in an attempt to minimise the impact of the report and discredit its claims.

DFA officials also displayed a bias towards reflexively supporting the Suharto regime and rejecting criticism of it. Despite the report being based on the accounts of eyewitnesses who had stated they were willing to testify to international inquiries, on a letter attached to an early leaked copy of the report circulated within DFA, a notation by Jakarta Embassy Minister Cavan Hogue stated that, “It seems to deal with the early period and jumps from that to the conclusion that the atrocities are still going

21 “Inquiry into ‘Timor atrocities’ possible,” Canberra Times, 29 January 1977. 22 “Ex-consul to take Timor report to US, Europe,” Sydney Morning Herald, 9 March 1977. 23 HOR Hansard, 15 March 1977. 24 HOR Hansard, 16 March 1977. 25 “Gathering own intelligence,” Canberra Times, 18 March 1977.

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on. Much of it is hearsay evidence.” A notation by Woolcott agreed, stating that while it was “grisly stuff” it would “hardly stand up in a court of law.” Amongst a number of cynical notations on the margins of the report itself is the question, “How do you loot a girl?” transcribed next to a sentence reporting “a great deal of looting and raping of girls in Baucau.”26

Such attitudes were reflected in advice to overseas missions. A cable from

Canberra to various embassies of 17 February stated that the report “contains no new evidence…and does not appear to open up any worthwhile avenues for the government to explore. It is in fact of little real value to us.”27

An insight into the Fraser government’s propensity to uncritically accept

Indonesian claims is provided in a cable to the Stockholm Embassy on 22 March in response to a pending visit by Dunn to Sweden. Based largely upon briefings by

Indonesian officials, it claimed to find “no substantial evidence” regarding the allegations of “murder…torture, looting, rape [or] maltreatment of refugees.” It acknowledged that “some indiscriminate killing of civilians occurred in Dili in

December 1975” and to a lesser extent in Baucau in January 1976, but contended that such large-scale abuses had been stopped by the military. Any abuses since then

“would have been infrequent and isolated incidents.” It did, however, acknowledge that some death and destruction was occurring, if of a nature it accepted without disquiet. Stating that while “we would expect incidents to occur in which houses had been burned, crops destroyed and civilians killed (but not deliberately)” due to the counterinsurgency nature of the conflict “we are sceptical that atrocities and abuses have occurred…on the scale he and some of his sources allege.” It labelled such

26 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Dunn, The Dunn Report on East Timor. DFA copy with annotations. This document was located by the writer in early 2016 and shared soon after with fellow researcher Kim McGrath. 27 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Canberra to Jakarta, The Hague, New York, Washington, Geneva, Lisbon. East Timor – Report by James Dunn. 17 February 1977.

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claims as the product of “hearsay and second-hand evidence” and the allegations of

100,000 deaths “probably exaggerated by a factor of ten.” Indonesian policy “as explained to us” was to avoid unnecessary bloodshed in order to encourage Fretilin to surrender and “we have no reason to doubt this.”28

With a willingness to accept a certain level of human rights abuse as a price for the pacification of East Timor, the Fraser government’s greatest concern was the potential of the report to impact on the Indonesian relationship. It would accordingly have been aware that an evidence-based approach to the issue founded upon accurate information would have run the risk of forcing it to choose between criticising the

Suharto regime or effectively abandoning the public commitment to human rights and international rule of law it professed. Despite the DFA description of the Dunn Report as “hearsay” there was therefore no attempt to take advantage of Dunn’s assurances that the refugees were prepared to speak to Australian officials, nor any concerted attempt to otherwise obtain intelligence. A small exception to this was a three day visit by Jakarta Embassy Minister Cavan Hogue and First Secretary Peter Rodgers to the territory in April. The main purposes were to prepare for an immigration team to assess candidates for family reunion in Australia and to report on the use of Australian aid, although they were also briefed to inquire regarding the Balibo Five, Roger East, the Dunn allegations and those from Radio Maubere. Once again, however, the officers’ findings were limited by a propensity to uncritically accept Indonesian claims and by a desire for findings to accord with policy goals.

The officers reported that their visit was tightly controlled and that they were met with ‘demonstrations’ with banners including Go to Hell James Dunn. They were accompanied by officials at all times. Speeches by pro-Indonesian Timorese officials emphasised Fretilin and Dunn “lies” and the joy of the Timorese people at integration.

28 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Canberra to Stockholm. Visit to Sweden of Mr James Dunn. 25 March 1977.

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Contact with Timorese was otherwise limited, and they were often followed by photographers and “little men with tape recorders.” While admitting that the highly controlled nature of the visit meant that “much of what we saw and heard must be treated with considerable caution” they were nevertheless confident enough to make a number of findings.

Their report concluded that the number of active Fretilin members was “not large” and lacked the capacity to mount major operations. While admitting that a large proportion of the population appeared to be living outside of Indonesian control, it contended that most Timorese had accepted integration and that it was “irreversible”.

It was largely dismissive of human rights allegations against ABRI, finding “no evidence of brutality” although admitting some units had “misbehaved in the early days.” Indonesian troops, the report claimed, “not only behaved themselves now” but prevented bloodshed by restraining Timorese partisans from “revenge killings” against Fretilin. It contended that it was largely fear of other Timorese which prevented Fretilin operatives from surrendering, and uncritically related the

Indonesian claim that those who did were treated reasonably and allowed to return to their villages. People in Dili “looked generally content” and children in rural areas

“looked cheerful and certainly showed no signs of being oppressed.”

The report claimed to find no evidence to support Dunn’s claims except in the

“very general sense” that there had been killings on both sides. It cited Chinese

Timorese who rejected claims of Indonesian massacres of the Chinese population and quoted foreign priests and nuns as saying that Indonesian troops were “behaving themselves well”. On the other hand, it concluded that accounts alleging atrocities by

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Fretilin “for the most part rang true.” Although the officers spoke to a number of witnesses, they found no new information regarding the Balibo Five or Roger East.29

Tellingly, however, a sentence in a cable to Canberra which preceded the main report noted that instead of engaging Fretilin, ABRI strategy was “to wait until food and medical shortages force Fretilin followers to come over.”30 This finding was not apparently considered significant enough to be elaborated upon either in the cable or in the main report. Nor, despite the acknowledgement that a large proportion of the population was living outside of Indonesian control, was there any attempt to link this strategy with any danger to the civilian population.

The findings of Hogue and Rodgers shored up the narrative perpetuated by the Fraser government which served to deny the reality of Indonesian abuses in East

Timor and deflect blame from the Suharto regime. In doing so it supported the policy goal of prioritising the Indonesian relationship by making it possible to do so without abandoning the Fraser government’s public commitment to human rights and international norms. This approach underwrote the Fraser government’s response to the Dunn Report both domestically and, as will be seen, internationally.

6.5 The Indonesian reaction

While Australian officials, eager to placate the Suharto regime, were reluctant to engage in even minor criticisms of it, senior elements of the New Order displayed no such reticence in their behaviour towards Australia. This undoubtedly reflected in part real fears about the potential of the Dunn allegations and the activities of other activists to damage Indonesia’s international image and impact upon relations with the

US and other countries. Nevertheless, the willingness of Woolcott and others to

29 NAA: A 10463 801/13/11/11, i. Cavan Hogue and Peter Rodgers, Report on visit to East Timor, 26 to 30 April, 1977. 3 May 1977. 30 NAA: A 10463 801/13/11/11, i. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: visit by Hogue and Rodgers. 2 May 1977.

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defend the Suharto regime and the propensity of many within the Australian government to react with heightened sensitivity to any Indonesian slight would have put Indonesian officials in a strong position to use criticism of Australia as a tool to further their policy objectives.

Woolcott, who had always been at the forefront in arguing for the importance of mollifying any Indonesian concerns, was also proactive in advocating for the

Indonesian position that Dunn should be as far as possible silenced. In a memorandum of 9 March he accused Dunn of “seeking to stir up hostility towards Indonesia in third countries of importance to them.” As the Indonesians regarded Dunn to be an employee of the Federal Government, he stated, they believed it was the duty of the

Australian government to constrain him, predicting that a parliamentary enquiry into the allegations would be likely to “undo much of the good done by the Prime

Minister’s visit last October.”31 He reported that in a meeting with Murdani, Murtopo and intelligence chief Yoga Sugama on 9 March, a decision had been taken to “go on the offensive” with Australia over Dunn’s activities and those of a number of

Australian parliamentarians, citing a perception of Australian government reluctance to disassociate itself from them. Woolcott argued that “we...need to avoid the situation in which the Indonesians cast us in the role of weak, fair weather friends given to rhetoric but not action” in support of the Indonesian relationship.32

When it became apparent that Dunn would be testifying to the Committee on

International Relations of the US House of Representatives, Indonesian officials became particularly proactive. On 14 March the Director General of Political Affairs,

Darusman, called Woolcott in to express deep concern about Dunn’s activities. He informed the Ambassador that the relationship would be damaged unless the

31 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Memorandum from Woolcott to Parkinson. 9 March 1977. 32 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Woolcott to the secretary. For the secretary from Woolcott. 11 March 1977.

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Australian government took action against an Australian public servant acting contrary to Australia’s stated policy and against Indonesia’s interests in relation to friendly third countries. The potential of Dunn’s activities to jeopardise US military assistance was of particular concern, as was the risk that the Dutch Government would reconsider the planned delivery of three corvettes to Indonesia. Assurances from the

Prime Minister that Australia wanted to put the Timor issue behind it, he insisted, did not appear to be followed “when hostile groups were seeking to keep the issue alive.”

Woolcott commented to Canberra that “if we do not curtail Dunn’s activities, or at least if we are not seen to be trying to help them deal with the situation, then we can expect a strong Indonesian reaction.”33

The following day, in a public attack that was reported widely in both the

Indonesian and Australian media, Foreign Minister Malik threatened to unleash

“demonstrations and other mass actions” against the Australian Embassy unless agitation against Indonesian actions in East Timor was stopped.34 Asking whether

Australia wished to sacrifice its good relationship with Indonesia “only for the sake of a single man named James Dunn”, he stepped beyond normal diplomatic protocols to ask “whether Australia wishes the Indonesian people to begin to question how many

Aboriginals have been killed and what business the Europeans have in the continent.”35 Indonesian officials also expressed exasperation about the activities of

Australian parliamentarians, telling Hogue on 18 March that as far as many

Indonesian leaders were concerned the “subtle distinction” between parliamentarians and the Australian government was lost on the Indonesian leadership. The petition by ninety-four members of Australian Parliament to President Carter was particularly

33 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Australian- Indonesian relations-Timor. 14 March 1977. 34 Hamish McDonald, “Indonesia warns Aust over Timor protests,” Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1977. 35 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Hogue, Jakarta, to Canberra. Timor press reports of Dunn. 16 March 1977.

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seen as expressing the views of the Australian government. They suggested that

Australia could act to defuse the situation by strongly repudiating the Dunn Report before Dunn appeared before the committee in Washington.36

However, the acquiescent attitude of the Australian government towards the

New Order was not shared by all sections of the Australian media. On 16 March the

Sydney Morning Herald editorialised that it was “strange and unacceptable” that

Australia was not pressing Indonesia on the “brutal murder” of the Balibo Five, characterising Woolcott’s reprimand by Darusman as “a measure of the easily predictable failure of the policies of appeasement” pursued by Whitlam and Fraser.37

The following day The Age editorial labelled Malik’s threat of demonstrations against the Australian Embassy as “blackmail” and, while stating that some of Dunn’s evidence might be “inaccurate, inconclusive and biased”, nevertheless stressed that

Indonesian intimidation based on the actions of a private individual was a “sorry commentary” on the Australian-Indonesian relationship.38 The Herald editorialised the same day that only Indonesian compliance with UN resolutions and the court-martial of commanders guilty of atrocities would cure the “Timor sickness” which afflicted its relations with Australia, the US and the Netherlands.39

Paradoxically, the uncritical attitude and behaviour of the Australian government towards the Indonesian actions in East Timor and its continual public emphasis on the importance of good relations may have increased the intensity of

Indonesian criticisms, with the Suharto regime well aware that the nature of

Australian government sensibilities made such reproaches a strong tool in its arsenal.

Indonesian criticisms and actions against Australia continued, with a delegation from

36 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Hogue, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor: Dunn Report. 18 March 1977. 37 Editorial, “Our horizons,” Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1977. 38 Editorial, “Mr Malik don’t be so rude,” The Age, 17 March 1977. 39 Editorial, “Timor still won’t go,” The Herald, 17 March 1977.

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the Indonesian National Youth Committee, accompanied by members of the

Indonesian press, calling on the Australian Embassy on 21 March to present a petition protesting Dunn’s activities.40 Indonesian officials also kept up pressure through inaccurate claims of Australian support for Fretilin, such as reports circulated by the

Indonesian intelligence community of supposed attempts to re-supply Fretilin with arms from the north of Australia.41 In the face of such criticism DFA officials, particularly in the Jakarta Embassy, continued to see it as their role to assist Indonesia in dealing with international criticisms and allegations of atrocities. On 1 February, for example, Woolcott advised Malik that he could dampen censure of Indonesian actions by stating that while some Indonesian “volunteers” had “misbehaved” in the early stages of the invasion, they had since been disciplined.42

The impact of Indonesian reproaches and their effectiveness as a strategy was underlined by a lengthy assessment of Australian Indonesian relations prepared by

Woolcott in May. Citing the “appreciable deterioration in our relations with

Indonesia”, he bemoaned the fact that the “growth of suspicion and hostility towards

Indonesia” in the Australian community had caused many “influential Indonesians” to see Australia as “a disruptive influence on Indonesian interests rather than as a helpful neighbour.” He argued for a cessation of all public statements critical of Indonesia, the extension of de facto recognition and a statement in parliament recognising

Indonesian control to “counteract some of the more inaccurate myths about Timor which have gained ground in Australia, even in parliamentary debates.” Such a statement, he argued, could be further supported by a “friendly personal” message

40 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Hogue, Jakarta, to Canberra. Protest delegation. 21 March 1977. 41 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor-Arms Supplies. 4 April 1977. 42 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Australian/Indonesian relations. 1 April 1977.

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from Fraser to Suharto, made public by mutual agreement, emphasising the importance of close relations and inviting Suharto to visit Australia.43

With Woolcott and others conveying such sentiments to Indonesian officials on a regular basis, it would have been clear to them that attacking Australia was an effective tool in pushing Australia to neutralise the Timor issue and advocate for

Indonesia in the international arena. The Suharto regime continued to use the tactic in the following months and years as a vehicle for achieving such objectives.

6.6 The parliamentary response

The Indonesian propensity to convolute parliamentary criticisms of its actions with the position of the Australian government ensured that the response to and use of the Dunn Report by pro-Timorese parliamentarians was amongst the key impacts the report had in frustrating the Fraser government’s efforts to marginalise the Timor issue and normalise the relationship with Indonesia. This was particularly so given that those most critical of Indonesia included parliamentarians from the government benches. In this context it is not surprising that other government members sought to mitigate the impact of such criticisms with defences of Indonesia and attacks on

Dunn. In an international climate of Cold War rhetoric some also viewed the issue primarily in such terms.

On 15 March South Australian Liberal Senator Harold Young questioned whether Dunn’s public activities were “basically designed to encourage Indonesians to resist the present government” and whether Dunn “is now a political activist?”44 On

18 March Western Australian Liberal Senator John Sim told the Canberra Times that

Dunn’s accusations would severely worsen “an already serious rift” with Indonesia,

43 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, ii. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. For Parkinson from Woolcott. 19 May 1977. 44 Senate Hansard, 15 March 1977.

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and that he had submitted a report to Peacock and DFA stressing Australia’s “special relationship” with Indonesia.45 National Country Party MP Mac Holten complained of a “communist organised campaign to denigrate Indonesia in the eyes of the world,” commending Indonesia for its “actions against communist aggression in our general region” and alleging “the murder of thousands of East Timorese people by the communist supported Fretilin forces.”46 In April Senator Brian Harradine attempted to widen the terms of reference of the proposed Senate enquiry to encompass communist links to Fretilin and the solidarity movement as well as the sponsorship of Dunn.47

Pro-Timorese parliamentarians on both sides of politics, meanwhile, attempted to use the report to pressure the government on the Timor issue and call for inquiries. Senators Wheeldon, Primmer and Gietzelt urged the Australian government to investigate Dunn’s allegations and take the matter up with Indonesian authorities.48

Senator Macintosh raised the issue of Australian military aid to Indonesia and its use in East Timor,49 while Western Australian Labor Senator Ruth Coleman asked whether the government would reconsider its provision of naval vessels to

Indonesia.50 On the conservative side of politics Liberal MP Michael Hodgman called for a “full and impartial international enquiry” into the allegations as well as of the deaths of the Balibo Five.51 The report itself was tabled in the Senate on 23 March, the same day that Senator Macintosh asked if the government was prepared to send an all- party delegation to speak to the refugees in Lisbon.52

With the newly elected Carter administration in Washington claiming to prioritise human rights in its foreign policy goals, amongst the parliamentary

45 Arthur Gray, “Indonesian rift ‘could widen’,” The Canberra Times, 18 March 1977. 46 HOR Hansard, 23 March 1977. 47 Senate Hansard, 21 April 1977. 48 Senate Hansard, 16 February 1977, 22 February 1977, 23 February 1977. 49 Senate Hansard, 9 March 1977. 50 Senate Hansard, 17 March 1977. 51 HOR Hansard, 10 March 1977. 52 Senate Hansard, 23 March 1977.

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outcomes of the Dunn Report, as discussed, was a petition signed by ninety-four members from both sides of parliament calling on Carter to seek assurances from

Indonesia that it would adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in East

Timor and allow access to the ICRC.53 The degree of collaboration between the

Jakarta Embassy and Indonesian intelligence was demonstrated when Hogue complied with an OPSUS request and handed Harry Tjan a list of the parliamentarians who had signed the petition.54

Prompted by the Dunn Report, the Federal Opposition moved for the establishment of a Senate Select Committee to enquire into the situation in Timor, including the ongoing conflict, the human rights situation, the plight of refugees, the fate of the Balibo Five and communications between Australia and East Timor.55

Moved by Senator Gietzelt on 24 March, the motion was strongly supported by

Liberal Senator Alan Missen, who argued for the necessity of “probing for the truth behind the allegations of massacres” and the fate of the Balibo Five.56 In speaking in support, QLD Liberal Senator Bonner provided a detailed account of his visit to

Timor in late 1975, arguing for the moderate nature of Fretilin and stating that its leaders “were no more communist than I am.”57

Debate on the proposed select committee revolved intermittently in the following months. Pro-Timorese senators spoke in favour of the rights of self- determination and cited evidence from the Dunn Report and other sources regarding human rights abuses. Others defended the government position, such as NSW

National Country Party Senator Douglas Scott, who argued that incorporation was a matter of the past, that cooperation with Indonesia was the best way to help the

53 Senate Hansard, 24 February 1977. Tabled in HOR Hansard, 10 March 1977. 54 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Letter from Hogue to Tjan. 7 April 1977. 55 Senate Hansard, 10 March 1977. 56 Senate Hansard, 24 March 1977. 57 Senate Hansard, 31 March 1977.

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Timorese people and that strained relations between Australia and Indonesia “can do no good to Australia.” Scott belittled the attention to human rights, stating that

“atrocities occur in any of a dozen countries” and asking why they were not “seeking to investigate the things that are happening…in Cambodia, Laos, Angola or in any of a number of other countries?”58 The motion was eventually defeated on 26 May along party lines, but with Liberal Senators Missen and Bonner crossing the floor to vote in favour of it.59

The position taken by a number of Liberal parliamentarians continued to undermine the Fraser government’s attempts at “business as usual”. Michael

Hodgman was amongst the most active, leading an effort in July to establish an unofficial three-member House of Representatives delegation to East Timor. In writing to the Indonesian Ambassador on 26 July requesting visas, Hodgman was forthright regarding the aims of the proposed delegation, citing allegations of “the slaughtering of innocent civilians”, the Balibo Five, distribution of Australian aid and the importance of a genuine act of self-determination.60 With no response forthcoming, on 25 August Hodgman led a six-person delegation to the Indonesian

Embassy to present a protest note signed by eighty members of parliament.61

The incident produced sharp reactions from Indonesian officials, with

Indonesian Ambassador Adenan complaining to Woolcott that Hodgman “had no special right or status to make ‘demands’ on the Indonesian Embassy”, citing “cost of organisation” for refusal.62 An Indonesian foreign affairs official told Antara the refusal was because East Timor was “already part of Indonesia” so any investigation

58 Senate Hansard, 24 March 1977. 59 Senate Hansard, 26 May 1977. 60 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, ii. Letter from Hodgman, to His Excellency, Mr Nurmathias, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia. 26 July 1977. 61 HOR Hansard, 25 August 1977. 62 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, ii. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 25 August 1977.

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would be an “interference in our security affairs.”63 On 29 August the official Golkar newspaper Suara Karya, carried an open letter from CSIS operative Dr Daoed Joesoef which complained that the Australians had “forgot…that Indonesia is a sovereign country”, and that the request for visas had come from “arrogant, conceited and impolite people” who claimed a higher moral standard but had been silent about East

Timor under Portuguese rule. It cited the situation of Australian Aboriginals and the history of the White Australia policy, stating that “the arrogance of Australian politicians” could cause Australia to be treated as “a supreme white racist state in

Asia.”64 Hodgman remained unrepentant, telling the media on 2 September that

Australian parliamentarians “would not be silenced or intimidated” from speaking about East Timor, and citing reports of a forthcoming Indonesian offensive.65

Within Australia the pro-Timorese politicians, particularly the Liberals, were also attacked by the conservative Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke Peterson, who accused them of supporting communists. Hodgman and others were defended by

NSW Liberal MP Maurice Neil, who on 6 September foreshadowed a motion to refute the Premier’s statement and debate the visas.66 With Labor moving to debate the motion, government backbenchers Hodgman, Neil and South Australian Liberal

Geoffrey Giles walked out of the chamber to avoid voting with the government against the Labor move.67 Their position earned the ire of pro-Suharto regime elements on their own side. In a clear reference to Hodgman, on 14 September

Senator Sim asked whether the Federal Government would disassociate itself from

63 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, ii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: Proposed visit by members of parliament. 29 August 1977. 64 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, ii. Cable from Allen, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor: MP’s visit. 29 August 1977. 65 “MPs won’t be silenced on Timor, says Liberal,” Sydney Morning Herald, 2 September 1977. 66 HOR Hansard, 6 September 1977. 67 Bruce Juddery, “Keeping the pot boiling on the Timor issue,” Canberra Times, 7 September 1977; “More troubles for the government,” The Australian, 7 September 1977.

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“the immature antics of these government supporters which are unnecessarily harmful to Australian-Indonesian relations.”68

The activities of pro-Timorese parliamentarians in the community also remained an irritant to the Fraser government’s goals, particularly the intensity of the rhetoric used by some. Bonner criticised the Timor policies and human rights priorities of successive Australian governments to the ANU Liberal Club in October.69

Fry spoke alongside Dunn at a public meeting in Canberra on 16 October which passed a resolution condemning Ali Murtopo as a war criminal and deploring the acquiescence of the Fraser government regarding the Balibo Five.70

In the context of the nature of the ongoing Indonesian military campaign and the degree of human rights violations in East Timor, the extent of protests and attention in parliament was very far from excessive. Nevertheless, or perhaps because of this fact, the Suharto regime remained acutely sensitive to criticism on the issue. In a discussion with Woolcott on 31 August, Murdani told him that strained relations between the two countries were inevitable unless the ongoing situation could be

“arrested in some way”. Depicting himself as a friend of Australia, he nevertheless insisted that developments that year relating to Dunn, Dowd, Carleton and Hodgman had made senior Indonesians “jittery” about Australia, and he was unable to constrain the “hard liners”. The mood was one of “exhausted patience” with Australia, which was perceived as showing “weakness” in the face of the campaign on the Timor issue.

It was particularly difficult, he said, for even the most sophisticated of Indonesians to draw a distinction between the activities of individuals like Hodgman in the governing party and the Australian government Itself. Claims of atrocities, he said, were mostly unsubstantiated, and if people had been shot on the wharf on the first day of the

68 Senate Hansard, 14 September 1977. 69 “Bonner hits at Timor policy,” The Age, 13 October 1977. 70 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, ii. AETA Press Release, 16 October 1977.

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invasion it was because “war is war”. He was, he insisted, no longer willing to “stick his neck out” for Australia.71

With such complaints becoming a regular theme of relations between the two countries, the contention that activism on the Timor issue was damaging the relationship with Indonesia caused the Fraser government to intensify its efforts to ingratiate itself with it. This spurred it to expand the narrative of denial further and work against the influence of Dunn and other activists in the domestic and international arenas.

6.7 The Fraser government, Dunn, and the international

community

In early 1977 Dunn took his message to a number of European countries, including France, Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands and Portugal as well as to the

United States. In each he gained some media attention and was received at a high level, including meeting the Dutch Foreign Minister, high level Foreign Ministry officials in France and Sweden, concerned parliamentarians in Britain and their counterparts in the US Congress.72

As discussed in Chapter Five, with Australia seen at the time by many countries as having a certain knowledge of the Timor issue due to its proximity, the

Fraser government used this position to defend the Indonesian government and its conduct at the United Nations. In the wake of the Dunn Report it also chose to use this influence in the wider international arena to actively defend the regime against such allegations. It is ironic that by doing so the Australian government, while continuing

71 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, ii. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. (5?) October 1977. (Date obscured on NAA document). 72 James Dunn (former Consul to Portuguese Timor, Director of the Foreign Affairs Group, Legislative Research Service, Australian Parliamentary Library) in discussion with the author, 1 April 2017.

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to insist that it was not a “party principal” to events in East Timor, positioned itself as a key actor on the issue, one dedicated to denying evidence of abuses, taking the matter off the international agenda and working to suppress efforts to investigate the situation or find an alternative solution.

Australian missions in the countries Dunn visited were provided with instructions as to how to discredit his report. As discussed, a cable to the embassy in

Sweden, for example, outlined the Australian contention that while some Indonesian troops had “got out of hand” in the early days, such abuses had been corrected and that there was “no information to substantiate allegations of rape or of the deliberate maltreatment of refugees and civilians.” The mission was also instructed to convey the

Australian belief that “the scale of Indonesian atrocities…have been highly exaggerated”, the death rate “probably exaggerated by a factor of ten” and the evidence of Dunn’s eyewitness informants “hearsay and second-hand evidence coming from persons who would have had no opportunity to make even a cursory check through the whole of the territory of East Timor.”73

Dunn’s allegations had a significant impact in the Netherlands, a nation which retained strong ties to Indonesia as a legacy of its colonial past. The allegations were reported widely, including the airing of overseas filmed interviews with Dunn before his arrival. On 10 March the second chamber of Dutch parliament voted in favour of two motions, supported by the governing Labour Party although not the Foreign

Minister himself, calling for an international investigation into the human rights and humanitarian situation in East Timor and into the forthcoming sale of three naval

73 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Canberra to Stockholm. Visit to Sweden of Mr James Dunn. 25 March 1977.

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corvettes to Indonesia.74 The Dutch Minister of Overseas Development also called for a suspension of military sales to Indonesia.75

In the wake of these developments the Dutch Government approached the

ICRC to enquire about the viability of an investigatory mission to East Timor.

Apparently respecting its expertise in the area, it also requested the Australian government to supply its own assessment of the Dunn allegations.76 In response,

Australian officials on both sides of the world used their influence to protect the

Indonesian actions from scrutiny. In a conversation in Canberra with the Dutch

Ambassador on 18 March, First Assistant Secretary for South East Asia, Alfred

Parsons, stated that “very little would be achieved” by an investigation, and that it would be deeply resented by the Indonesians.77 On 21 March the Australian

Ambassador in The Hague took a similar position, disparaging the Dunn Report as

“hearsay” to Dutch Foreign Minister Van der Stoll, discounting its claims of a high death toll and describing broadcasts by Radio Maubere as containing “great distortion of facts”. The ambassador was pleased to report that the Foreign Minister “indicated general agreement”.78

Like Australia, the Netherlands had a substantial “Jakarta Lobby”, with Dunn reporting in a conversation with the author that “some were very angry” about the problems he created with an important relationship.79 An article in the mass circulation De Volkskrant on 22 March took a strongly pro-Indonesian line, uncritically citing claims of Fretilin massacres, while disparaging allegations of

74 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from The Hague to Canberra. Indonesia: East Timor. 11 March 1977. 75 Dunn, Timor. A people betrayed, 333. 76 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from The Hague to Canberra. East Timor. 17 March 1977. 77 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Canberra to The Hague. East Timor and other issues. 18 March 1977. 78 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from The Hague to Canberra. Dutch Foreign Minister: East Timor etc. 21 March 1977. 79 James Dunn in discussion with the author, 1 April 2017.

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Indonesian atrocities and claiming that the situation had greatly improved since

Portuguese rule.80

The Australian efforts appear to have had some impact. On 28 March, Dutch

Director General of Political Affairs, Charles Rutten, told the Australian Ambassador that his government “greatly appreciated” the Australian attitude to East Timor

“which was very close to that of the Dutch.” Citing a version of the events leading to the invasion which was very similar to the narrative propagated by Australia, he said that key elements in his government had become convinced that aid to Indonesia should continue even though this was opposed by elements of the ruling Labour

Party’s left.81

When Dunn visited in April he received considerable media coverage, with his report published in the Amsterdam weekly De Groene. However, in a meeting with the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the head of the Asian desk, Iwan Verkade, was sceptical of Dunn’s claims, pressing him about the discrepancy between his estimated death toll and a considerably smaller one made by the US government.82 With the

Dutch parliament divided on the Timor issue, the Netherlands continued its own

“business as usual” approach to its relationship with Indonesia in the following years, including a continuation of aid.

6.8 US Congressional hearings

Arguably the most significant impact of the Dunn Report was in the United

States. On 24 February a group of Australian parliamentarians, led by the Deputy

Leader of the Opposition Tom Uren, wrote to US Congressman Donald Fraser of the

80 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Hans Beyon, “Mass murder in East Timor positively denied,” De Volkskrant, 22 March 1977. DFA translation. 81 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from The Hague to Canberra. East Timor. 29 March 1977. 82 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from The Hague to Canberra. East Timor: James Dunn. 6 April 1977.

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House Committee on International Relations enclosing a copy of the report and urging him to take up the issue.83 A notation by Hogue on a cable summarising press reports of this development stated, “This is bad news. U.S. Embassy has said that they were a bit worried that Congress might take up the arms question.”84

Such fears were vindicated, with committee hearings on 23 March entitled

Human Rights in East Timor and the Question of the Use of US Equipment by the

Indonesian Armed Forces.85 Despite the Carter administration’s purported stance on human rights the relationship with Indonesia took precedence, with State Department official Robert Oakley telling Australian diplomats it believed neither the hearings nor testimony by Dunn to be in their interests.86 Dunn recalls Assistant Secretary of State

Richard Holbrooke stressing strongly to him the importance of Indonesia due to its strategic position and insisting that “there is no way we would destabilise the regime.”87 Australian and US officials therefore saw a common interest in working together to minimise the impact of the hearings and of Dunn’s testimony.

Complaining that the testimony could have a “very serious impact” on America’s relations with Indonesia, particularly the American Defence Assistance Program,

Newsom told Woolcott on 16 March that anything the Australian government could do to put it into “proper perspective” would be helpful.88

83 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Letter from Tom Uren, Deputy Leader of the Opposition and five other MPs to Donald Fraser, Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. 24 February 1977. 84 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor: Press reports. 22 February 1977. 85 United States Congress. Hearing before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Asian Pacific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session, 23 March 1977. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754077263915;view=1up;seq=1. 86 NAA: A10463 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Washington to Canberra. Timor. 9 March 1977. 87 James Dunn in discussion with the author, 1 April 2017. 88 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor-Dunn Mission. 16 March 1977.

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Despite their complaints Indonesian officials also sought Australian help, with

Indonesian diplomat Zahar Arifin calling on Harry at the UN to ask if Australia could

“do more in Washington”. Harry suggested representation might prove counterproductive as Congressman Fraser and others “felt very strongly on human rights issues.” However, in an indication of DFA’s close liaison with its US counterparts on the issue, he softened this by giving him the news that the State Department was working to have the hearings held jointly with the House Asian and Pacific Affairs

Subcommittee, which was more sympathetic to Indonesia and more likely to “defuse criticism of Indonesia on human rights.”89

In dealing with their US counterparts DFA officials continued to reiterate the

Australian supported narrative and were pleased that State Department officials held similar views. A cable from Canberra to Washington of 16 March expressed

“gratitude” to the State Department for keeping in touch on the issue, repeated the mantra that Dunn’s allegations were “hearsay” and claimed that a “thorough study of all the information on East Timor available to us” had failed to corroborate his claims of large scale killings by the Indonesian military in the mountain areas.90 Given that

Australia had not substantially investigated such claims nor even interviewed the refugees, the basis of this claim is unclear.

The government’s agenda was exposed by sections of the media. On 18

March AM reported a leaked DFA cable instructing the Washington Embassy to support moves to have hearings held jointly by the two subcommittees in order to soften criticism of Indonesia on human rights.91 The Sydney Morning Herald reported efforts by Newsom to assist the Indonesians to put their case before Congress.92 The

89 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Washington to Canberra. Timor. 15 March 1977. 90 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Canberra to Washington. East Timor. 16 March 1977. 91 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Canberra to Washington. Timor: media report on cable "leaks". 19 March 1977. 92 “US invites evidence from Indonesia,” Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1977.

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visit by Peacock to Washington was depicted as an effort to counteract Dunn’s testimony.93 An editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald on 4 April accused the

Federal Government of appeasement.94

Dunn’s testimony on 23 March was preceded by that of Robert Oakley, who presented a distorted outline of the history and situation in East Timor similar to the

Australian supported narrative.95 He depicted the civil war as continuing until

December and omitted any mention of Indonesian covert military activities, while portraying Indonesia during the Fretilin administration as an innocent party seeking negotiations between Timorese factions. He presented the UDI out of context and painted a picture of a reluctant Indonesia intervening in a dangerous and destabilising situation not of its causing. He even claimed that Indonesia had incorporated East

Timor “following a referendum” which had been accepted by the previous administration. Under questioning from Fraser he acknowledged that some individual

Indonesians may have entered East Timor prior to the full-scale invasion, but stated that “no large formal units were utilised at that time”, a contention in contradiction to

CIA intelligence briefings later leaked to the media.96 He also stated that civilian casualties in the past year appeared “to be low” and insisted there was “no search and destroy operation.” Echoing the Australian and Indonesian narrative, he admitted

“some ill-discipline, indiscriminate behaviour” by ABRI troops in the early stages after the invasion for which they had been allegedly disciplined, but attributed most civilian casualties to Fretilin fighters using women and children as human shields.97

93 “Peacock to diffuse Timor issue,” Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1977. 94 Editorial, “The Appeasers,” Sydney Morning Herald, 4 April 1977. 95 United States Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, 9-13. 96 Dale van Atta and Brian Toohey, “The Timor Papers, part two,” Entry for September 8, National Times, 30 May-6 June 1982. 97 United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, 23.

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Dunn tabled his report as a prepared statement.98 Under questioning he indirectly corrected some of Oakley’s distortions, including Indonesian intervention prior to December 1975, Fretilin tactics regarding civilians, the ongoing conflict and the status of the “act of free choice”. He repeated accusations of atrocities committed against the Chinese community and gave a vivid second-hand account of the killings on the Dili waterfront. He insisted that his informants “fully support my presence here” and were hopeful of talking to the committee themselves. He met with hostility from some, including William Goodling of Pennsylvania, who told Dunn that he

“wish[ed] you had not been invited because of the political implications”, and

Congressmen Herbert Burke of Florida who asked why he had been called to testify when he only represented one Australian view.

The Indonesian position was supported by Mario Carrascalão who testified as a leader of UDT and Dr José Goncalves, a former Fretilin Minister who spoke as a former member of the provisional government. Carrascalão described Dunn’s allegations as “hearsay evidence for political purposes” from refugees he claimed had left East Timor in August to October 1975. He gave an account similar to the

Australian narrative, if one with more emphasis on alleged Fretilin atrocities and allegations against Australian activists, including that some were smuggling arms to

Fretilin. He strongly denied claims of Indonesian abuses, characterised the claims of

100,000 deaths as “ridiculous”, and praised Indonesian efforts to develop East

Timor.99 Goncalves’ testimony was similar.100

Amongst the outcomes of the hearings were visits to East Timor by five members of Congress in April. Even one of their American Embassy escort officers characterised the visit as a “snowjob”, describing a highly structured affair, with

98 United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, 23. 99 United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, 47-52 100 United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, 52-56.

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streets lined with crowds singing Indonesian patriotic songs, plentiful speeches and abundant praise for Indonesia. The congressional visitors, however, were apparently disposed to persuasion, claiming that “widespread anti-Fretilin sentiment was obvious and seemed genuine”, and that they tended to believe Murdani’s claim that the

Indonesians were restraining Timorese from taking stronger action against Fretilin.101

Newsom told Woolcott “that Indonesia came out pretty much on top”, that all five now accepted East Timor as part of Indonesia and that he was now more confident that civilian and military aid would not be affected. Even Donald Fraser’s human rights staff consultant Salzburg, he said, now “acknowledged” that the situation that had led to the Indonesian intervention had been “more complicated” than he had thought.102 In Jakarta after her 24-hour visit Helen Meyner of New Jersey told the

Indonesian press she was “impressed by the enthusiastic spirit of the people” in expressing their desire for integration, and said there was no issue with the use of US supplied weapons as what had happened was “not an aggression”.103

However, even during such a short, controlled visit the situation could not be entirely sanitised. In Bobonaro one of Congressman Goodling’s party was told by three Spanish nuns that Fretilin forces were in “desperate shape”, that ABRI had cut off medical supplies to the area to prevent them going to them, that tuberculosis and malaria were rife and that ABRI “did not control very far out…at night.”104 Despite

DFA access to this information it, once again, made no link between it and any perceived danger to the Timorese population.

101 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Hogue, Jakarta, to Washington. U.S. visits to East Timor. 18 April 1977. 102 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/11, i. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. United States relations with Indonesia. 20 April 1977. 103 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. “It’s logical that East Timor becomes part of Indonesia,” Kompas, 18 April 1977. DFA translation. 104 “It’s logical that East Timor becomes part of Indonesia,” Kompas, 18 April 1977.

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The congressional hearings had no immediate impact on US policy, with

Holbrooke telling Suharto in April that the US accepted East Timor as part of

Indonesia and that he did not want it to become an issue in United States/Indonesia relations.105 United States military aid to Indonesia continued and benefited

Indonesian operations in Timor. Nevertheless, they had a significant longer-term impact, gaining a reasonable amount of media attention, galvanising the US Timor solidarity movement and bringing the issue to the attention of many in the US. It spurred a series of further congressional investigations in the following years that worked to keep the Timor issue alive and became significant factors in future developments, including the international response to the famine.

6.9 Conclusion

Chapter Four demonstrated how the Fraser government, in choosing to tacitly support the Suharto regime’s invasion and occupation of East Timor, found it necessary as a consequence to create a narrative which justified its position and actions and make them appear compatible with its stated commitment to human rights and the international rule of law. Chapter Five examined how it applied this to its actions at the United Nations. This chapter built on this further by demonstrating how the publication of the Dunn Report in 1977 and the growing body of evidence that severe human rights were occurring in East Timor forced it to expand the narrative in a number of ways and propagate it in the international arena, causing the Fraser government to become an effective apologist for the Suharto regime on the world stage.

When it became increasingly difficult to deny evidence from multiple sources that serious abuses, including mass killings, had occurred immediately after the

105 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/10, i. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. United States relations with Indonesia. 16 April 1977.

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invasion, the Fraser government responded with the unverified claim that such abuses had been carried out by rogue elements of the Indonesian military whom had since been disciplined by ABRI itself. When allegations were made concerning serious ongoing abuses, the response was simply to question the evidence without investigation and disparage those who made them. Sometimes this was done by a careful use of language, such as claiming that “a thorough study of all the information…available to us” had failed to verify certain allegations, in a situation where detailed investigations had not been made and the information on which DFA based its conclusions was, to some extent by design, very limited.

Part of the disparagement of the Dunn Report itself was the oft repeated claim, made to domestic and international audiences alike, that the evidence it contained was “hearsay”. In fact, as will be discussed in the following chapter, internal DFA legal advice confirmed that the testimony of such eyewitness informants met international evidentiary standards.106 Dunn’s assurance that the witnesses were willing to speak underlined his credibility, and if the Fraser government had been interested in determining the truth it had the option of turning to them. However, an evidence-based approach would have had consequences. Had the results of any investigation yielded evidence of abuses the Fraser government would have been unable to reconcile its Timor policy with its stated commitment to human rights and international norms. This would have created a strong impetus for policy change, especially as it would have been very difficult to keep such evidence from the public eye.

The Fraser government therefore had an interest in refraining from investigating the situation in order to continue in a situation of public denial. In doing

106 NAA: A1838, 1506/34, i. D.F. Stoop, Head, General Legal Section, DFA. Report of International Commission of Jurists: Situation in East Timor. 15 July 1977.

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so it chose to discredit or ignore not only the Dunn allegations, but an increasing body of evidence, including from Carleton, Dowd and elements of the Catholic church. This narrative, supported by the authority of DFA, senior diplomats, compliant academics and journalists and elected representatives of the Fraser government itself, clearly did have some impact. The repeated contention that incorporation was irreversible and a matter of the past was plainly an element in diminishing the Timor issue in the domestic sphere and causing much of the Australian community and the media to largely ignore it. The Fraser government’s efforts to counteract Dunn’s impact in the international community effectively constituted a propaganda campaign on behalf of the Indonesian government. These efforts appear to have had a significant impact on the Dutch. With the Carter administration propagating essentially the same narrative, it constituted a powerful tool in marginalising the Timor issue in the international arena.

As the cable to the Stockholm Embassy made clear, the Fraser government regarded a certain level of human rights abuses as an acceptable consequence of the pacification of East Timor. The cable, the report by Hogue and Rodgers, and other factors indicate a willingness to accept Indonesian claims regarding human rights and the humanitarian situation largely at face value. Even when Indonesian sources themselves confirmed abuses it rarely elicited a response. Murdani’s assertion that the massacres on the Dili wharf were because “war is war” were not a cause for consternation or protest, despite Australia’s official adherence to international norms regarding human rights. Paradoxically, the Fraser government’s refusal to protest abuses along with the hypersensitivity it displayed to Indonesian complaints may have increased the intensity of criticism from the Suharto regime, with Indonesian officials aware that such an approach was an effective way in which to encourage the

Australian government to work to protect it.

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Far from diminishing, as the Fraser government’s Timor narrative asserted, the humanitarian crisis in East Timor was accelerating as the Dunn Report was published and discussed. The ABRI campaign of “encirclement and annihilation”, with the destruction of rural resources and the relocation of the Timorese population into camps, would quicken in the following years and with it the famine that would take the majority of the lives lost under the Indonesian occupation.

Yet the position chosen by the Fraser government was not inevitable. As discussed, the Dunn Report and other information regarding the situation in East

Timor could have been used as a catalyst for a policy reassessment. The Fraser government had a number of alternative options available to it, including taking a public stand in support of self-determination and human rights, taking the issue to the international community and supporting a UN inquiry. It could also have used this increasing body of evidence to raise human rights concerns with the Suharto regime publicly or privately. Alternatively, any investigation carried out by the Australian government would have put the Timor issue on the international agenda, at the very least making the unrestrained use of violence and terror by ABRI more problematic and curtailing abuses. Instead, by declining to instigate or support any investigations, including a Senate inquiry, the Fraser government closed off options for change, facilitating the continuation of the ABRI offensives and the humanitarian crisis which accompanied them.

Nevertheless, the impact of the Dunn Report was significant. It did not in the short term change Australian government policy nor galvanise a significant protest movement. It did, however, revive the issue in the media and parliament and provide activists with a valuable evidence-based tool which would afford valuable perspectives as increasing evidence of the humanitarian crisis in East Timor emerged in the following years. By taking his evidence to the US Congress Dunn put the issue

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on the agenda of US politicians and activists, facilitating subsequent congressional investigations and ensuring it would continue to be an issue of low key but continuing attention in the following years and decades.

This chapter demonstrated how the Fraser government rejected the opportunities provided by the Dunn Report to pursue an alternative approach, causing it instead to expand its narrative of denial concerning the situation in East Timor and propagate it in the domestic and international arenas. The following chapter will demonstrate how it continued to expand this narrative in the following years as evidence emerged of the famine in East Timor and the humanitarian crisis which accompanied it. Chapter Eight will expand this further with an examination of how the Fraser government responded to developments in East Timor during the post famine period.

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Chapter 7: The Fraser government and the famine

7.1 Introduction

Previous chapters examined how the Fraser government’s commitment to protecting and supporting the Suharto regime caused it to develop and propagate a narrative which deflected blame from it by misrepresenting the situation in East

Timor. This includes how it distorted the narrative of events leading to the invasion, how it ignored and denied increasing evidence of a humanitarian crisis in East Timor and how it took this narrative to the United Nations to protect the Indonesian government in the international arena. This chapter examines how, as Indonesian actions caused the humanitarian crisis to deepen into a severe famine, the Fraser government adapted the narrative further to counteract moves towards international action on the issue as information coming from the territory made the extent of the crisis increasingly apparent.

7.2 The developing situation

The Indonesian campaign of “encirclement and annihilation” intensified from

1977 to 1979 with the deliberate destruction of food stocks, crops, livestock and agricultural facilities in Fretilin held areas aimed at forcing surrenders and the relocation of the civilian population into transit and resettlement camps.1 Airpower was a key part of strategy, bolstered by the supply by the US of OV-10 Bronco aircraft in mid-1976.2 Operations made use of biological and chemical weapons, including napalm, causing the poisoning of water and food supplies and leading to many deaths.3 Taylor documents that in one action in early 1978 the entire population

1 CAVR, Chega, 1343. 2 CAVR, Chega, 218. 3 CAVR, Chega, 1747-49.

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of a village was killed for supporting Fretilin. He cites a number of refugees testifying to a strategy of extensive bombings over a period of days followed by the entry of

ABRI forces into the area and subsequent “executions, imprisonment, deportation to…Atauro and the relocation of the population in camps away from its original village.”4 Loney reports informants describing being forced to abandon crops and flee on a regular basis, with many civilians dying from hunger, exhaustion and disease and people having to abandon the bodies of family members as they travelled.5

Within Fretilin there were divisions between those supporting a continuation of the strategy of “people’s war” and those, led by President Xavier do Amaral, who advocated allowing the civilian population to surrender, leading to a violent internal struggle and Amaral’s overthrow and arrest in August 1977. The latter half of 1978 proved pivotal for the resistance, with the increasing destruction of food resources in

Fretilin areas, the extinguishment of the radio link and the death in combat of

President Nicolau Lobato on 31 December.6 The resistance strategy based on people’s war came to a forced end, leading to an increased exodus of people.

As discussed in Chapter Four, by the end of 1978 between 268,644 and

318,921 people were in camps, in a situation without adequate food, shelter or medical support. Restrictions on movements out of the camps curtailed cultivation further, leading to a major famine and a high death toll.7 The Indonesian government’s refusal to allow entry to the ICRC or other international relief bodies during this period further exacerbated suffering.

4 Taylor, East Timor, 85-87. 5 Loney, In Women’s Words, 53-54. 6 CAVR, Chega, 225-28. 7 CAVR, Chega, 1173-74, 1338.

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7.3 The Fraser agenda

In the face of these developments the priority of the Fraser government remained the “business as usual” approach to the Indonesian relationship. Efforts to improve relations with it led to the government to continue to advocate for the Suharto regime domestically and work to protect it internationally on the Timor issue. The famine in Timor coincided with a number of significant international developments, including the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The Fraser government was outspoken on both, but in particular on Cambodia on which it viewed itself as a voice of the

Western alliance in the region. It also sought cooperation with the Indonesian government on regional issues, such as Indo Chinese refugees and Cambodia after the

Vietnamese invasion, on Fraser’s broader Cold War agenda and towards its desire to improve relations with the pro-Western ASEAN nations.

Prioritisation of relations with the Suharto regime therefore remained the order of the day. Efforts to strengthen the relationship continued, as did the provision of military aid. Nomad aircraft provided through the program were used in East

Timor, with an Australian diplomat sighting one on Komoro airfield during a visit to the territory in January 1979.8 A desire to finalise a seabed boundary to facilitate the development of oil resources provided a further impetus, with talks commencing on the issue at the height of the famine in February 1979, a development which, as discussed, also signalled de jure recognition.

With Fraser projecting himself in the international arena as a strong supporter of the Western Alliance, a Cold War realist, a supporter of human rights and a dedicated upholder of the international rule of law, the position his government took

8 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vi. Geoffrey Allen, Visit to East Timor, 27 to 29 January 1979.

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on East Timor was in stark contradiction to rhetoric on the human rights, national sovereignty and opposition to the use of military force it used elsewhere. Nullifying the Timor issue through denial rather than seeking a solution to it therefore became a priority. With the Suharto regime continuing to react strongly to criticism of it in

Australia, the solidarity movement proved a considerable hindrance to the strengthening of the relationship the Fraser government deemed necessary to its foreign policy agenda.

7.4 The Timor lobby and public opinion

Ironically, public concerns regarding East Timor had progressively fallen since the invasion despite the worsening conditions. Activist and editor of the AETA newsletter John Waddingham recalls that “things were declining in terms of support from late 1976” and that “1978 was a particularly lean year.” This was accelerated by the difficulty of “finding out what was going on” after the loss of the radio link in late

1978. He recalls that the partisan split within Fretilin stymied things further and that by 1979 the Timor solidarity movement had “lost the support of the mainstream.”9

Nevertheless, the solidarity movement remained active in a manner capable of thwarting the Fraser government’s objective of neutralising the Timor issue. The publications of CIET and AETA declined in frequency after 1978 but continued, using a variety of sources to highlight the developing crisis. In February 1980, for example, the TIS newsletter published an article by John Waddingham, East Timor: how many people are missing? Using a combination of church, Indonesian, pre-invasion

Portuguese, reports from refugees and other sources it concluded that reports of a high

9 John Waddingham (editor of Timor Information Service newsletter and Timor activist) in discussion with the author, 16 November 2017.

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death toll due to Indonesian military actions and the famine were supported by the available evidence.10

Small groups of activists around the country targeted the Indonesian airline

Garuda for protests on a regular basis. In mid-1978 activists in Darwin received nationwide publicity when activist Robert Wesley-Smith announced he would burn a dog at a demonstration in central Darwin to protest Australian government inaction.11

At the protest, attended by a contingent of media and a crowd of around 500, he produced a toy dog, which he did not burn, and above the heckles from the crowd appealed for people to protest the use of napalm and the humanitarian catastrophe in

East Timor.12 Solidarity activists held a three-day conference in Adelaide in January

1979 in which they called upon the Australian and Dutch governments and the trade union movement to impose boycotts upon Indonesia.13

The solidarity movement had one win. The Age reported on 6 November

1978 that Fraser had invited Suharto to visit.14 At the Adelaide conference activists strongly condemned the proposed visit and made it clear it would face protests.15 East

Timor News of 3 May 1979 declared STOP SUHARTO’S VISIT! with the subheading,

BUT IF HE COMES GIVE HIM HELL!16 Harry Tjan continued to express hope for a

Suharto visit in November 1979, as did DFA officials.17 However, the visit never eventuated, almost certainly due to Suharto’s fear he would be met by demonstrators.

Suharto never returned to Australia after his Townsville meeting with Whitlam.

10 “Timor: how many people are missing?” TIS Newsletter, no. 28, February 1980. 11 “Protesters: ‘We’ll still burn dog’,” Northern Territory News, 3 July 1978. 12 “Fluffy toy dog no fire victim after all,” Courier Mail, 5 July 1978. 13 “Calls for bans on Indonesia,” The Advertiser, 30 January 1979. 14 “Fraser hint of Timor agreement,” The Age, Monday 6 November 1978. 15 “Calls for bans on Indonesia,” The Advertiser, 30 January 1979. 16 “Stop Suharto’s visit!” East Timor News, no. 53, 3 May 1979. 17 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvii. Record of conversation between Tjan and Wilson. 16 November 1979.

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In October 1978, in his capacity as a researcher for the parliamentary library,

Dunn produced a report entitled Notes on the present situation in Timor. It belied the narrative propagated by the Fraser government to document the nature of Indonesian offensives, the targeting of food supplies, the extent and nature of human rights abuses, the abuse of Australian aid, the nature of the internal refugee crisis and the extent of the death toll.18 John Dowd of the Australian section of the International

Commission of Jurists called for a UN inquiry in October 1979 in response to Dunn’s report.19 Dunn also continued to advocate in his capacity as Chairman of the Human

Rights Council of Australia,20 and in this capacity testified at the UN Fourth

Committee in October 1980.21 He later recalled that he was generally well received at the UN but that “our main problem was with the Australians and their allies.”22

As other sections of the Timor solidarity movement declined, ACFOA, which obtained information through the Catholic Church, became increasingly active.23 In

July 1979 it produced the report Aid and East Timor, which noted the large-scale movement of people from the mountains to the “administrative areas” under

Indonesian control. It described the conditions in the overcrowded camps as dire, with insufficient food, housing and medical supplies and with people prevented from leaving or cultivating crops beyond the camp perimeters. It cited an Indonesian official as saying that hundreds of villages had been “wiped off the face of the earth”

18 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvi. James Dunn, “Notes on present situation in Timor”, The Parliamentary Library, Legislative Research Service, 12 October 1978. 19 “Call for U.N. inquiry: Indonesian killings in East Timor alleged,” Canberra Times, 29 October 1979. 20 James Dunn, “A disturbing report on the situation in Timor today”, letter to the editor, Canberra Times, 18 July 1979. 21 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xii. United Nations General Assembly. Thirty-fifth session, Forth Committee, Agenda item 85. Question of East Timor. October 1980. 22 James Dunn (former Consul to Portuguese Timor, Former Director of the Foreign Affairs Group, Legislative Research Service, Australian Parliamentary Library) in discussion with the author, 8 October 2017. 23 Bill Armstrong (Chairman ACFOA East Timor Sub-committee) in discussion with the author, 18 December 2017.

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by the bombing. It presented evidence of widespread human rights abuses and misuse of Australian and international aid. It also accused successive Australian governments of concealing their “extensive knowledge” of the situation.24

Not all ACFOA interventions were effective. In 1977 it established an independent inquiry into the situation in East Timor, choosing the Queens Counsel

John Traill to head it. Traill quickly came under the influence of the pro-Suharto ANU academic Heinz Arndt. While ACFOA hoped for a response in early 1978, it waited two years without receiving a report. When it was finally provided in 1980 it failed to make any substantive criticism of Indonesia and propagated a narrative similar to that of DFA. The chairman of the ACFOA East Timor subcommittee, Bill Armstrong, criticised it in the introduction, citing its lateness, its “major gaps” in the gathering of evidence, its attempt to justify the Indonesian intervention, its rejection of a number of sources, its labelling of those critical of the Indonesian intervention as irresponsible and pro-Fretilin, and its assertion that ACFOA’s criticisms of Indonesia had led to a denial of aid to Timor by Indonesia.25

Nevertheless, ACFOA’s position as a mainstream aid organisation gave it a certain credibility. It lobbied for the admission of the ICRC to East Timor and for an expansion of its mandate once it was there, as well as for witnesses to come to

Australia to testify about the situation.26 It protested recognition of incorporation and regularly accused the Australian government of acting as an apologist for the Suharto regime.27 It was often effective in achieving media coverage which the broader solidarity movement could not, such as in August 1979 when its representative Pat

Walsh accused the Fraser government of ignoring the crisis, pointed out that hundreds

24 ACFOA, “Aid and East Timor” (Canberra: ACFOA, 1979). 25 ACFOA. East Timor: Commission of Inquiry. Report by an Independent commission (Melbourne: ACFOA, 1980), Introduction. 26 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvii. ACFOA Council Motion Re: East Timor, November 1979. 27 “Conference condemns East Timor decision,” The Examiner, 23 January 1978.

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were dying of starvation per day, contended that Australian aid was not getting through and called on Indonesia to accept international agencies.28

A small group of parliamentarians from both sides of the house continued to keep the Timor issue alive in Parliament. The level of understanding of the situation displayed by them contrasted strongly with the flawed nature of the narrative propagated by the government. MP Michael Hodgman and senators Missen and

Bonner from the Liberals continued to be active, as did MPs Fry, Uren and Senator

Primmer from the ALP. However, the endeavours of this relatively small group were the exception. Peacock demonstrated his disregard for the lobby when he described parliamentary activity on East Timor as a “dying spasm” to Indonesian Foreign

Minister Mochtar in October 1978.29 A ministerial submission in November 1979 described parliamentary debate on the issue as “relatively limited”.30

7.5 The Media Response

The Timor issue continued to receive coverage in the “alternative” press such as Nation Review. Once again, the insights they provided often contrasted with the distorted narrative propagated by the government. A Nation Review article of 24

November 1978, for example, painted a reasonably accurate picture of the high death rate, widespread starvation and ongoing atrocities.31 The mainstream media directed most of its limited coverage of East Timor to developments that influenced Australia, such as the visit of the ambassadors, the activities of parliamentarians, the claims of

ACFOA, the commencement of Timor Sea negotiations and the moves towards

28 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor: ABC Report 6 August. 6 August 1979. 29 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Record of conversation between Mochtar and Peacock. 5 October 1978. 30 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/15, xiv. Humanitarian assistance to East Timor. Submission from Allen to the Minister. 9 November 1979. 31 “Remember East Timor,” Nation Review, 24 November 1978.

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recognition. However, while some elements were critical of Indonesian actions and of the Fraser government’s position, the overall approach was one of caution.

The ABC morning radio program AM was amongst the most active. On 6

August 1979 its compere referred to East Timor as “an island prison”, citing ACFOA and other sources as claiming that hundreds were dying of starvation and illness every day and that Australian aid was being appropriated by the military.32 On 15 November

1979 the program reported a Portuguese missionary who had spent time with Fretilin accusing ABRI of using starvation as a weapon and describing bombing attacks and destruction of crops. It also cited officials of the newly admitted ICRC comparing the situation to Cambodia and Biafra and, in an apparent rebuff to the Australian supported narrative, emphasising that conditions had not been so in 1975.33 Citing analysis of the death toll published in the TIS newsletter, an AM broadcast of 20

February 1980 unfavourably compared government reactions to the situations in

Afghanistan and Indochina to that of East Timor.34 To complaints from the

Indonesians and the consternation of DFA, ABC and Radio Australia news bulletins reported claims from the Radio Maubere link while it was operating, including military operations and Indonesian abuses.35

The Fairfax press was at times critical of the government’s acquiescence to

Indonesian pressure. An editorial in The Canberra Times of 20 December 1978 accused Mochtar of blackmailing the Australian government on issues such as family reunions, complaining that Indonesian generals needed to only “hint” at criticism to receive a “gratifying response from Canberra.”36 It and other Fairfax publications gave

32 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor: ABC Report 6 August. 6 August 1979. 33 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. A.M. Report – 15 November 1979. 15 November 1979. 34 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Broadband, ABC radio, broadcast 20 February 1980. Transcript. 35 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvi. Australian/Indonesian Relations. December 1978. 36 Editorial, “Stop Bowing to Jakarta,” Canberra Times, Wednesday, 20 December 1978.

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coverage to Dunn’s claims and to Dowd’s calls for an international enquiry.37 Several

Fairfax publications cited a representative of the Freedom from Hunger campaign describing the situation in in Timor as “as bad as Biafra” in November 1979.38 The

Australian also at times gave sympathetic coverage, such as an article of 26 October

1979 citing Noam Chomsky’s testimony to the United Nations.39 On the other hand, a considerable amount of media commentary was supportive of the government’s position. An article in the Financial Review in December 1978 stated that the government had “gone as far as it can go” in criticising Indonesian actions, “short of seriously disrupting its most important regional diplomatic relationship.” Citing

“enormous” potential riches, it advocated a speedy move towards negotiations on a seabed boundary in the Timor Sea.40

It is also clear that the government narrative had a certain impact. On 24

October 1979 the Herald accused Dunn of “reckless use of dubious information”, depicted the Indonesian military as confronting a difficult situation not of its making and blamed the humanitarian situation on the underdeveloped nature of the territory.41

An article by David Jenkins in the Far Eastern Economic Review in November 1979 largely attributed the “current suffering” to the civil war and emphasised the difficulties faced by Indonesia in dealing with a backward and recalcitrant region. It even blamed Fretilin for delaying the entry of the ICRC by demanding it at the UN, thus discouraging Indonesian cooperation.42

37 Jonathon Green, “Indonesia blamed for East Timor deaths,” The Canberra Times, 15 October 1979. 38 “East Timor ‘as bad as Biafra’,” Sydney Morning Herald, 29 November 1979. 39 “Genocide in East Timor. 200,000 Dead since Invasion, UN body told,” The Australian, 26 October 1978. 40 “Facing reality on East Timor,” The Australian Financial Review, 18 December 1978. 41 “Flare up over Aid to Timor,” The Herald, 24 October 1979. 42 David Jenkins, “A new ordeal for East Timor,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 November 1979.

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The Chairman of the ACFOA East Timor Sub-committee during this period,

Bill Armstrong, recalls that:

I went to Jakarta a few times and came back with information on East Timor, but it

was just about impossible to get the media to take it up. They wanted to know the

source, which was impossible, and they wanted to check with DFA, and DFA always

said it was not happening.43

The Timor issue competed against a considerable number of other international issues, including developments in Cambodia, Vietnam, Iran, South

Africa, Rhodesia and Afghanistan, most of which attracted more coverage. Interest in

East Timor by the Australian public was consequently not great. At the height of the famine in May 1979, Dowd informed DFA official Hogue that his report would “play up” the fate of the Balibo Five as it was “the only way you can get publicity.”44 Even

Hogue complained, if for different reasons, about a lack of media interest in an

Australian Red Cross visit to East Timor in December 1979.45 This lack of media or public interest was partly a consequence of the lack of images or television coverage, even when actual evidence of the extent of the crisis was strong. Walsh recalls that the response to the ACFOA appeal for East Timor was “dismal” as “we were not able to provide much in the way of mobilising evidence.”46 The issues of white minority rule in Rhodesia and Apartheid in South Africa, both covered extensively on television, caught the attention of a greater section of the activist left than did East Timor during this period.

43 Bill Armstrong (Chairman ACFOA East Timor Sub-committee) in discussion with the author, 18 December 2017. 44 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vi. Record of conversation between Dowd, Lewis and Hogue. 2 May 1979. 45 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vi. Australian Red Cross visit to East Timor. 19 December 1979. 46 Pat Walsh (ACFOA spokesperson and Timor activist) in discussion with the author, 29 November 2017.

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7.6 The Fraser government’s use of information

By 1978, evidence from a variety of sources would have made clear to any neutral investigation the extent of the crisis in East Timor and the Suharto regime’s responsibility for it. However, it is clear that the Fraser government did not regard an interrogation of the evidence from a humanitarian perspective to be in the interests of its policy goals. While it plainly had access to ample knowledge regarding the situation, determining the extent to which this was internalised by DFA officials and other policy makers, including Peacock and Fraser, is problematic. Actual analysis pertaining to the welfare of the Timorese people is nearly absent from their statements, cables and correspondence. It is clear priorities were almost solely built around protecting the Suharto regime. The Fraser government therefore not only failed to interrogate information from a humanitarian perspective, but continued to discourage investigations by others, while at the same time working to produce a narrative which provided cover for the Suharto regime’s actions.

The Fraser government’s Timor narrative simply excluded information inconvenient to it, including that from its own intelligence agencies. Throughout the period classified JIO studies, although not prioritising humanitarian concerns, were often in direct contradiction to the government’s public statements. In contrast to the claim that Indonesia intervened reluctantly in a chaotic situation not of its making, for example, a 1978 JIO report accurately described the origins and outcome of the UDT coup, portrayed the civil war as of short duration and the Fretilin victory as

“complete”. It credited Fretilin with re-establishing essential services and for calling for a Portuguese return and a resumption of the decolonisation process. It accurately described the nature of Operation Flamboyant, discounted claims such forces were

Timorese in composition and described as “grossly exaggerated” claims of advances by them. It nevertheless noted that these false accounts were regularly carried

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uncritically by leading newspapers in Australia and the region. In an apparent swipe at its own government’s narrative, it even accused “political leaders” in neighbouring countries of falsely referring to the conflict as a civil war, thereby buttressing

Indonesian misinformation. It correctly set the UDI in the context of a failure of outside powers to deter Indonesian aggression, citing the failure of the Australian government to respond to the deaths of the Balibo Five as discounting “any prosects”

Australia would to deter Indonesia.47

Sections of the report pertaining to “misconduct and atrocities by Indonesian and Fretilin troops” are largely redacted in the version publicly available at the time of writing. Nevertheless, the report noted the unexpectedly strong Fretilin resistance after the full invasion and the difficulties ABRI encountered in extending its control.48

Significantly, it noted that a developing food shortage was starting to impact on

Fretilin operations.49 In an indirect indication of ABRI abuses, it expressed scepticism about Indonesian reports of Fretilin casualties because they failed to distinguish between deaths of Fretilin fighters and unarmed civilians. It noted the large numbers surrendering from Fretilin areas although, at least in the non-redacted sections, it did not interrogate the humanitarian implications.50

As mentioned in Chapter Six, legal advice sought by the Department in response to the accusations by the International Commission of Jurists also contradicted the government’s narrative. A memorandum from the DFA General

Legal Section in July 1977 agreed with Dowd’s contention that the 1975 invasion was a clear breach of international law, as would be the alleged atrocities were they confirmed. It contended that the testimony of available witnesses would reach

47 NAA: A13685, 1/1978. Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO), The Indonesian Integration of East Timor, 1978, 62-4. 48 JIO, The Indonesian Integration of East Timor, 81-2. 49 JIO, The Indonesian Integration of East Timor, 88. 50 JIO, The Indonesian Integration of East Timor, 103-4.

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international evidentiary standards and stated that an international inquiry “into massive breaches of human rights” would not constitute a breach of Indonesia’s domestic jurisdiction.51

In the face of repeated evidence that large sections of the territory remained outside Indonesian control and that ABRI was employing tactics which sought to deny

Fretilin access to food, DFA officials consistently failed to link these factors to any risk to the Timorese people. A DFA memorandum to Peacock in March 1978, for example, stated that much of the territory, “is a sort of ‘no man’s land’ in which the

Indonesian forces can go…and where Fretilin can make raids for food.”52 A cable from Critchley in May 1978 reported with approval that the military situation was moving in Indonesia’s favour, with Fretilin suffering a lack of ammunition and food, and the recently surrendered “in very poor physical condition”.53 DFA’s disinterest in humanitarian concerns is demonstrated by its dismissive attitude towards a letter by

Governor Araujo to Suharto alleging severe ABRI abuses.54 Without any evidence based evaluation of this significant information coming from the Indonesian appointed governor himself, the memorandum to Peacock simply conjectured that some of the claims “were probably true although he may have exaggerated them.”55

Evidence from a variety of other sources was either ignored or deliberately downplayed. In mid-1979 ACFOA representative Pat Walsh gained media attention by citing Catholic Church reports that people continued to starve to death while

Australian and international aid was misused.56 The Jakarta embassy disparaged the

51 NAA: A1838, 1506/34, i. D.F. Stoop, Head, General Legal Section, DFA. Report of International Commission of Jurists: Situation in East Timor. 15 July 1977. 52 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Lv. D. G. Wilson, For the minister: East Timor. 23 March 1978. 53 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Lv. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor family reunions. 25 May 1978. 54 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Lv. Letter to President Suharto from Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, Chief Executive of the Provisional Government of Timor Timur. 12 June 1976. DFA translation. 55 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Lv. D. G. Wilson, For the minister: East Timor. 23 March 1978. 56 Peter Goldie, “Timor aid ‘sold to traders’,” Canberra Times, 1 June 1979.

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source as “an individual priest or group of priests” rather than the church itself and asserted that reports by “reliable” visitors had been more favourable,57 thus privileging those selectively permitted fleeting tours by the Indonesian authorities above residents with a depth of knowledge of the country and society.

7.7 Indonesian briefings

During this period the Indonesians continued to provide regular briefings to

Jakarta Embassy officials on East Timor. Although they remained a mixture of information and disinformation aimed at achieving the goals of the Suharto regime, the candour of much of the content provides an indication of the confidence representatives of the New Order held that Australia would continue to support its actions and goals. The descriptions of the dislocation of large sections of the population and the dire food situation would have left little doubt concerning the developing humanitarian catastrophe and the Indonesian responsibility for it had the

Australian government been seeking to understand and act on the real situation.

However, Australian officials had a strong tendency to interpret information in accordance with policy goals.

Indonesian General Dading Kalbuadi told an embassy official in early 1978 that only 500,000 people in East Timor could be accounted for, that a large number may have been already dead, and that refugees coming down from the mountains were in “very bad shape”.58 In June 1978 the Indonesian Minister for Defence told the acting Australian defence attaché that one of the largest problems was “the 270,000 women and children…who have become separated from their menfolk.”59 An

57 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Timor: aid: Action for World Development. 1 June 1979. 58 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Conversation with General Dading. May 1978. 59 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Lv. Record of conversation between Whitten and Yusuf. 30 June 1978.

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Indonesian foreign intelligence liaison officer cited a figure of 50,000 civilians outside of government control in August 1978, explaining the necessity to “clean up the situation” to stop Fretilin resistance from going on “forever”.60 An Indonesian defence intelligence officer told the Jakarta Embassy Counsellor in September 1978 that an estimated 40,000 people remained outside government control and that military tactics were concentrating on isolating insurgents from the population.61 Even the Indonesian media at times provided evidence of the seriousness of the situation, with the newspaper Sinar Harapan reporting on 4 December that 184,000 had come down and

“reported to Indonesian authorities” in the previous month.62 Such information should have provided clear evidence of the danger Indonesian actions posed to the civilian population. During none of these discussions, however, is there evidence that

Australian officials pressed their Indonesian counterparts on the humanitarian situation nor that recommendations were made to Canberra in this regard.

As the Indonesian campaign of encirclement and annihilation continued,

Australian officials were kept well informed regarding military tactics, the use of transit and resettlement camps, and even the use of military hardware. In March 1979

Indonesian military officers informed them that with the destruction of the Fretilin leadership the American supplied Broncos were no longer being used “as intensively”, the role now being limited to ground support strafing. They were told that Fretilin leaders who surrendered were being “looked after”, a claim though in contradiction to other sources they did not seek to question.63 In mid-1979 the IRC supplied them with

60 NAA: A1838, 3006/4/3, xxiv. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor. 9 August 1978. 61 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Allen, Jakarta, to Canberra, East Timor. 8 September 1978. 62 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Allen, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 6 December 1978. 63 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Allen, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 27 March 1979.

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a detailed breakdown of the number of people in camps by region, with the obvious knowledge their Australian accomplices would not use the information against them.64

7.8 DFA Visits

While publicly disparaging claims from organisations such as ACFOA as unsubstantiated, DFA was in fact receiving very similar information from church and other sources. In addition to the visit of Ambassador Critchley in September 1978, discussed below, there were a number of brief DFA visits to West and East Timor during 1978 and 1979. Although short, orchestrated and limited in nature, the evidence they produced should nevertheless have provided an unmistakable signal of the deepening catastrophe and, had the principles the Fraser government asserted in other international issues been consistently applied, a catalyst to action and a reassessment of policy.

Jakarta Embassy diplomats D. Campbell and P. Alexander visited West Timor in mid-August 1978 to assess an aid proposal. Although they did not enter East Timor, they travelled close to the border and conferred with church contacts. They assessed the situation in East Timor as “severe”, citing Dutch priests that resettlement areas were being “flooded” with women and children, many very sick and malnourished.

One priest told them the Indonesian authorities were “doing almost nothing” to help, estimating that at least one and a half percent of the populations was dying monthly, and in some areas as high as eight percent. They contended the Indonesian military had alienated much of the population, driving it to support Fretilin. Alexander reported that it was clear that the Indonesian government was “not coming to grips” with the critical situation and that without firm action more would die. There is no

64 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. List of persons returned in whole of East Timor-per last December 1978. Undated.

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indication that these conclusions were taken up in any substantial way by DFA or even reported to the Minister.65

Jakarta Embassy Counsellor Geoffrey Allen visited East Timor in January

1979 to hand over a consignment of aid. After visiting a refugee camp at Metinaro he reported 61% of families in the camp to be without fathers. He was told that this was typical of other camps and that most had died of malnutrition, although he speculated that they may have been killed in the fighting. He reported major problems with malnutrition and disease, although the distribution of food aid appeared to be well organised. He described new arrivals as being in “very poor condition”.66

The Jakarta Embassy Second Secretary A.R. Blythe visited West Timor in

February 1979 and spoke to the same priests Campbell and Alexander had conferred with. They reported that ten to thirty people continued to come to the hospital seeking medical treatment daily after walking long distances from different parts of East

Timor. All were suffering from varying degrees of malnutrition, some extremely serious, and had no resources or food to tide them over while they attempted to re- establish their fields.67

7.9 Indonesian pressure and its impact

Aware of the perceived importance of the Indonesian relationship to

Australia, Indonesian officials continued to use this as leverage on the Timor issue. A key grievance was the Fraser government’s failure to clamp down on the Timor solidarity movement. Foreign Minister Mochtar was particularly adept at applying pressure and was willing to use the issues of family reunion and the Timor Sea as

65 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Alexander, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 15 August 1978. 66 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vi. Visit to East Timor. Attachment to, Cable from Allen, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 15 March 1979. 67 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Situation in East Timor. Memorandum from Blythe. 19 February 1979.

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clout. In January 1978 he told Woolcott that senior Indonesian government figures held increasingly negative attitudes towards Australia, with some believing it secretly wanted a weak and divided Indonesia and gave moral support to Fretilin for this purpose. On the other hand, if relations improved he would like to see settlement of a seabed boundary. He also said that family reunion was hampered by suspicions of

Australian motives and concern they would be exploited by Fretilin supporters in

Australia.68

In November 1978 intelligence chief Murdani told Hogue that officials were

“fed up” by Australia’s failure to “do something” about criticism of Indonesia, and that unless it took action no progress would be made in the relationship.69 In

December 1979 Mochtar complained to Critchley that the Australian press reports had

“greatly exaggerated” the starvation in East Timor and misrepresented the use of

Australian aid, emphasising that this “paternalistic attitude” caused great resentment in Indonesia.70 The official Indonesian news agency Antara was also a source of pressure. Several days before the December 1978 visit of Mochtar to Canberra it accused the Australian government of orchestrating a media campaign against

Indonesia over East Timor and of duplicity on the family reunion issue.71

Such strategies proved successful throughout the Fraser years. After a visit to

Indonesia in August 1978, for example, Furlonger reported “disenchantment and disillusionment” by Tjan and others who had previously been favourably disposed towards Australia.72 With the Indonesian dissatisfaction seen to conflict with the

68 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Lv. Cable from Woolcott, Jakarta, to Canberra. Relations with Indonesia. 17 January 1978. 69 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Hogue, Jakarta, to Canberra. Indonesian Australian relations. 30 November 1978. 70 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/15, xiv. Cable from Critchley, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 3 December 1979. 71 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor family reunion. 12 December 1978. 72 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvi. Richard Furlonger, “Visit to Indonesia,” Office of National Assessments, 10 August 1978.

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government’s foreign policy objectives, on 12 September Prime Minister Fraser convened a meeting with senior ministers to address the perceived “serious deterioration” in the relationship. They agreed to a number of measures, including the expansion of defence cooperation and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs seek a meeting with the Chairman of the ABC to emphasise the “extreme sensitivity” of both

Radio Australia programs and regular ABC domestic broadcasts.73

7.10 The ongoing construction of the narrative of denial

Despite the Indonesian entreaties, the Fraser government was of course unable to entirely suppress the Timor solidarity movement nor mute all criticism of

Indonesian actions. As events progressed, its efforts to placate the Suharto regime therefore required an updating of the narrative to incorporate new developments, counter the efforts of the solidarity movement and facilitate Australian lobbying on the behalf of the Suharto regime in the domestic and international arenas.

Like his predecessor, Ambassador Critchley was active in this regard, cabling

Canberra with recommendations about how ongoing developments should be spun to the public. This process was assisted by academics such as Heinz Arndt and Jamie

Mackie from ANU who provided an academic veneer to the narrative in their articles and statements, and by journalists such as Peter Hastings, David Jenkins and the diplomat turned journalist Peter Rodgers, whose writings purported to responsibly depict the situation while in reality lending credence to Indonesian and Australian fallacies. At the same time the Fraser government sought to depict its own policy position in a principled manner by avoiding discussing the humanitarian crisis while claiming be engaging with the Indonesian government in the interests of the Timorese people.

73 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvi. Australian/Indonesian Relations. December 1978.

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In July 1977 DFA officials prepared a series of notes to assist Peacock during parliamentary debate on the Indonesian refusal to grant visas to the Hodgman initiated parliamentary delegation. It recommended he state the Australian government “neither opposed nor supported” the application, that it had no evidence regarding any new

Indonesian offensives and that the information available to it suggested that Fretilin control was limited. Making no reference to the humanitarian situation, it recommended the minister stress that the Australian government’s opposition to the use of force was “well known” and that it saw no reason to pursue allegations in press reports. The Australian government supported the return of the ICRC and was working to facilitate family reunions. It is efforts regarding Balibo were also “well known”, and it considered that no new avenues had been opened up to justify a further enquiry.74

Of course, both Peacock and Fraser preferred to avoid the Timor issue as far as possible when discussing Indonesia, and instead concentrate on improving the relationship. In a press conference at the end of the visit by Foreign Minister Mochtar in December 1978 Peacock elaborated on the importance of the bilateral relationship, defence co-operation, ASEAN, co-operation regarding developments within the region, efforts by both countries to “give more substance to the relationship” and to coordinate policies. He announced that they had discussed family reunions, seabed negotiations and the issue of Indochinese refugees and that they had agreed to more high-level exchanges. He only addressed the issue of recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor when asked by a journalist, replying that commencement of seabed negotiations would entail recognition. He did not address the military or humanitarian situation, nor was he asked about it. There is no evidence that in his meeting with Mochtar Peacock applied any pressure regarding the human rights or

74 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, v. Notes on East Timor for possible matter of public importance debate. 1 September 1977.

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humanitarian situation, nor, despite his public position, that he made any substantial effort regarding the entry of the ICRC.75

With JIO intelligence and other sources differing from the Fraser government’s public narrative, accounts of the situation in East Timor propagated by

DFA officials were of necessity self-serving and duplicitous. When in a meeting with

Taylor in August 1978 Traill expressed doubts whether the radio Maubere broadcasts were actually coming from East Timor, Taylor made no effort to correct him despite

DFA’s clear knowledge of its nature. Only weeks after the circulation of Alexander’s report within DFA, Taylor merely told Traill that there were “reports” of food shortages in parts of East Timor and that some of the people coming down from the mountains “may have been partly motivated by hunger.” He asserted, also in contrast to Alexander, that the Indonesians were making “a considerable effort to rehabilitate and begin to develop East Timor.”76

The government spun its narrative so as to both avert criticism of the Suharto regime and avoid acknowledging the reality of the developing situation, while presenting its own position as both principled and realistic. A memorandum to

Peacock of 7 November 1978 suggested that in addressing his own joint party meeting he explain that the government continued to remain critical of “the means” of incorporation, but that in order to pursue the welfare of the Timorese people Australia needed to deal with the Indonesian government and accept it. An “atmosphere of understanding and cooperation” was necessary for progress on aid, family reunions

75 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Visit of Indonesian Foreign Minister. 19 December 1978. 76 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Record of conversation with Traill. East Timor. 24 August 1978, 6.

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and maritime boundaries and the government therefore wished to “put the difficulties arising from East Timor behind us” to strengthen the bilateral relationship.77

The contention that “constructive”, or uncritical cooperation with a fundamentally well-intentioned Suharto regime was in the interests of advancing the welfare of the Timorese people, and that criticism was conversely counterproductive, became a mainstay of the Australian supported narrative as the humanitarian crisis came to light in the following years. After his visit to East Timor in September 1978

Critchley cabled that, “the sooner the situation in East Timor is depoliticised the easier it will be to organise relief.”78 This argument was used to justify the Fraser government’s uncritical stance and to disparage criticism by others. In response to a parliamentary question from Labor MP Gordon Bryant in May 1979 asking what efforts the government had made to press the Suharto regime to ameliorate the suffering of the Timorese people, Fraser himself responded that:

It is certainly my understanding that Indonesia will be going to very significant

lengths to advance the cause and the wellbeing of the people of what was formerly

Portuguese Timor...I would have thought that the honourable gentleman, for all his

concern in this matter, would well recognise that the future purpose of both Australia

and Indonesia will be advanced by working together in a constructive manner. I

cannot say that I see anything constructive or anything that could be achieved from

the thrust of the honourable gentleman's question.79

In November 1979, in an atmosphere of continuing pressure on the issue both domestic and international, DFA prepared a series of points as to how then acting

77 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvi. For the Minister: Timor and Australia’s Future Role. 7 November 1978. 78 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, v. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Visit to East Timor. 14 September 1978. 79 HOR Hansard, 22 May 1979.

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Minister of Foreign Affairs Michael MacKellar should respond in the media.80 As a document of some length produced for an inexperienced acting foreign minister, it provides an overview of the Fraser government’s effort to neutralise domestic and international campaigns on the crisis by fabricating an explanation as to its nature and causes. This entailed denying the extent of the crisis itself, portraying the Indonesian government as a largely benevolent entity working in a difficult situation not fundamentally of its own making and depicting the Fraser government’s own position in a principled and ethical light.

It recommended that press guidance be directed to two main ends. Firstly,

MacKellar was advised to concentrate attention on the “positive” question of what should be done for the Timorese and to “steer them away from sterile analysis of past errors”, “body counts” and blame. He should explain the population decline by citing the civil war and the thousands who had left East Timor, refute comparisons with

Kampuchea due to “obvious”, (although unstated) differences, and emphasise the need to “help the Indonesians handle their problem” by offering assistance.

Secondly, he should balance the supposedly “anti-Indonesian” tone of comment by stressing “Indonesia’s positive efforts and the difficulties they face.” This in practice entailed a blatant falsification of the causes of the crisis and a flagrant denial of the reality and consequences of Indonesian military actions. MacKellar was advised to present Indonesia as an essentially munificent power doing its best in a

“very backward” territory emerging from centuries of Portuguese colonial neglect. He should draw attention to the money Indonesia was spending on health, education and roads and, in an effort to depict the famine as of largely natural causes, refer to

Indonesian efforts to combat famine in neighbouring provinces. He should cite the

80 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/15, xiv. Cable from Canberra to Seoul. East Timor-press guidance. For the Minister. 2 November 1979.

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reports of the Australian journalists who had recently been permitted to visit East

Timor to refute the “more extreme accusations…such as ‘genocide’ and deliberate ill- treatment of the Timorese.” In response to calls for an inquiry he should respond that

East Timor was a province of Indonesia and that it had the right to decide who came and went there, while blunting criticism of Australia’s position by pointing out the aid it provided.

In Parliament the usual government tactic was to deny allegations of

Indonesian wrongdoing as far as possible. In November 1979 Senator Primmer asked whether those outside “security villages or concentration camps” were being given access to Australian supplied aid. Despite the government’s knowledge of ABRI’s policy of denying food to areas beyond its control, Senator Carrick replied on behalf of the minister that he had no reason to believe there was any restriction other than that of “geography and ordinary access to the hill tribes.”81 When asked regarding reports of Indonesian atrocities in March 1980, Carrick replied, “I am not aware, in more recent times, of allegations of atrocities.”82

7.11 The visit of the Ambassadors

The Fraser government’s public strategy on East Timor until the latter half of

1978 was to present a picture of growing normalisation. While acknowledging some disruption and “reports of hunger”, this largely entailed underplaying claims of widespread humanitarian suffering and disparaging those who claimed otherwise.

However, this approach was challenged by a visit from 6 to 9 September 1978 to East

Timor by a group of ambassadors and foreign journalists, including representatives of

Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, the United States, Japan, Canada, South Korea,

81 Senate Hansard, 23 November 1979. 82 Senate Hansard, 26 March 1980.

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India, Egypt and Bangladesh, as well as the Australian Ambassador Tom Critchley.83

Critchley was accompanied by three selected Australian journalists who had passed the Suharto regime’s screening process, Peter Hastings from the Sydney Morning

Herald, Richard Gill from the Melbourne Herald and David Jenkins from the Far

Eastern Economic Review.84

Although careful not to lay the blame on the Suharto regime, the US

Ambassador, Edward Masters, cabled Washington that a group of 200 men, women and children he encountered were “emaciated and in pitiful condition”.85 The

Canadian Ambassador, Glenn Shortliffe, termed it a major humanitarian problem, describing the refugees as emaciated, without enough food or medical care and only the basic rudiments of clothing. The Ambassador for Papua New Guinea told the media he had never seen people in such a bad state. Most of the ambassadors agreed that only an international relief effort could prevent more deaths.86

While the visit led to an increased international recognition of the severity of the crisis, this realisation did not come from Australian sources. Indeed, Critchley’s preliminary report of 8 September made only limited mention of humanitarian concerns. It stated that Dili was calm and Fretilin no longer a serious security threat, cited alleged Fretilin atrocities and stressed the difficulties of “economic development” facing the Indonesian authorities, of which the “rehabilitation of refugees” was one.87 On 10 September The Canberra Times even cited Critchley as

83 Citations as to the exact number of ambassadors vary. Chega cites eleven on page 232, but nine on page 1347. This list of ten is from the DFA media release after the visit. (NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, v. East Timor: Visit by Australian ambassador to Indonesia. Undated.) It also accords with the initial report by the US Ambassador cited below. 84 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, v. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Visit to East Timor. 31 August 1978. 85 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Foreign Service of the United States. Telegram from Jakarta to Washington. The Ambassador's visit to East Timor, September 6-8, 1978. 9 September 1978. 86 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, v. AM, 11 September 1978. Transcript. 87 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, v. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Visit to East Timor. 8 September 1978.

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saying that he was impressed by the extent of development and progress made under

Indonesian rule.88 However, with the media giving substantial coverage to the dire situation cited by other ambassadors, on 11 September Critchley cabled to Canberra a series of recommendations as to how the now undeniable humanitarian crisis could be spun to the public.

The crux of Critchley’s approach was to blame the crisis on the historical poverty and underdevelopment of the territory exacerbated by the irresponsible actions of the Timorese themselves, and to depict the Suharto regime, once again, as dealing as best it could with a difficult situation not of its making. Government representatives, he recommended, should say that the people of East Timor had always been poor and lived barely above subsistence level, with infrastructure practically non-existent, the land poor, literacy rates low, and with very few skilled workers. Any reference to the humanitarian situation should stress, “that the problem is not, repeat not, of Indonesian making.” They should argue instead that the civil war had greatly exacerbated the problem of underdevelopment, with the Indonesians faced with dealing with large numbers of people leaving Fretilin control suffering from malnutrition and disease. The Indonesian government was attempting to normalise the situation by keeping people in camps and providing them with essentials before returning them to their homes.89 Critchley also provided an interview to radio

Australia along these lines on 11 September 1978.90

The assertion the humanitarian crisis was caused by the “poor conditions” and underdevelopment that had always existed in East Timor rather than by the Indonesian invasion and its accompanying abuses became a mainstay of the Australian supported

88 “Tour of E. Timor impresses foreign envoys,” The Canberra Times, 10 October 1978. 89 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, v. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Humanitarian assistance to East Timor. 11 September 1978. 90 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvi. Memorandum from Wilson. Timor. 11 September 1978.

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narrative as the humanitarian situation continued to come to light in the following years.

However, within secure circles that did not reach the public, Critchley’s assessments were challenged by JIO and the Department of Defence. A letter from a senior Defence official to DFA Secretary of 3 October using JIO intelligence described information provided to Critchley as “misleading”. It also declared that the large number of people Indonesian sources estimated to be outside of government control led credence to claims of very high death rates.91 The following year the ICRC also diplomatically but firmly challenged the claim that the conditions had existed prior to the Indonesian invasion.92

Nevertheless, the Fraser government quickly incorporated the Critchley recommendations into its propaganda offensive. A media release by Peacock of 12

September emphasised that the “very poor” subsistence conditions of the territory had been worsened by the fighting, depicting an apparently responsible Indonesian administration dealing as best it could with a situation it had unwillingly inherited. It rejected claims that Australian aid was not getting through and stated the Australian government was willing to respond to further requests.93 The government Senate spokesperson on foreign affairs, John Carrick, also used language very similar to that of the Critchley cable when putting the government position in the Senate.94

This narrative was adopted by much of the media in the following months and years. In this regard, the three selected journalists invited on the tour met their host’s

91 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, v. Letter from D.G Coley (? name unclear), for First Assistant Secretary, Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defence, to The Secretary, DFA. 13 October 1978. 92 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. A.M. Report – 15 November 1979. 15 November 1979. 93 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvi. “East Timor: Aid”. Media release by Andrew Peacock, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 12 September 1978. 94 Senate Hansard, 12 September 1978.

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expectations by buttressing the Indonesian and Australian public narratives. On 11

September 1978, Peter Hastings depicted a responsible Indonesian administration struggling to save refugees suffering from severe malnutrition caused by being driven from their homes by Fretilin, citing a “Red Cross official” as his source without explaining that the Indonesian Red Cross would inevitably parrot Indonesian distortions.95 Richard Gill attributed the crisis to fighting between Fretilin and UDT in the civil war, citing claims of Fretilin abuses but raising no such concerns about the

Indonesian military.96 David Jenkins also took a consistently pro-Indonesian position in his articles. All three journalists were later cited by the government to support its position.

In an indication that this narrative was the likely outcome of consultations with Indonesian officials, Fernandes documents how US Ambassador Masters also informed Congress upon his return that the situation in East Timor was due to “the extreme backwardness of the economy” and retrograde agricultural practices. This narrative, however, was challenged in Congressional hearings the following year by

Indonesian expert Benedict Anderson of Cornell University, who documented evidence of the true situation and called for Masters’ recall for lying to Congress and corrupting the function of Ambassador.97

In responding to the new revelations, pro-Timorese parliamentarians in both parties in Australia also displayed an obvious disdain for the Australian government’s narrative. On 12 September Hodgman referred to the deaths of 30 or 40,000 East

Timorese from starvation “clearly caused” by defoliants and napalm.98 Ken Fry blamed the Suharto regime for the “terrible deprivation” in East Timor, accusing DFA

95 Peter Hastings, “Battle to save thousands of Timor Refugees,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September 1978. 96 Richard Gill, “Timor 5000 Starve in Hills,” The Sun News Pictorial, 11 September 1978. 97 Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor, 60-61. 98 HOR Hansard, Tuesday 12 September.

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of knowing of the situation but going along with Indonesian lies.99 On 2 October 1978 parliamentarians from all parties signed a petition calling for the admission of the

ICRC.100

7.12 The Rodgers pictures

Peter Rodgers, who was First Secretary to the Jakarta Embassy until 1978, changed career that year to become the Jakarta ‘stringer’ for the Sydney Morning

Herald. As a figure trusted by the Suharto regime he was granted permission to visit

East Timor in October 1979, soon after the entrance of the ICRC and CRS. He photographed severely malnourished children in the village of Laga, near Baucau and, when he was refused access to satellite facilities, arranged to have the photographs smuggled to Australia.101

The photographs were published on the front page of the Sydney Morning

Herald on 1 November 1979, under the heading Agony on our doorstep. Indonesia didn’t want you to see these pictures.102 The accompanying article cited Rodgers as saying that 100,000 people may have died since 1975 from fighting, starvation and disease. However, in an article on page seven Rodgers lent support to the government’s narrative by iterating the argument of historical Timorese underdevelopment exacerbated by fighting and describing claims of genocide as

“fantasy or mendacity”.103 For his coverage, Rodgers was awarded the Graham Perkin

99 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Timor: press reports 12 September. 12 September 1978. 100 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Press reports: Timor. 3 October 1978. 101 Peter Rodgers, interview by Michael Wilson, 29 August 2006, Bib ID 3770941, National Library of Australia. 102 Peter Rodgers, “Agony on our doorstep. Indonesia didn’t want you to see these pictures,” Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November 1979. 103 Peter Rodgers, “East Timor: Where are all the people?” Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November 1979.

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Award for Journalist of the Year for 1979. Also as a consequence, Rodgers was told in

1981 that his Indonesian visa would not be renewed.104

Nonetheless, Rodgers’ take on the situation proved useful to the government.

In a media statement of 6 November, Peacock cited Rodgers’ dismissal of the term

“genocide” and of “deliberate Indonesian ill-treatment of Timorese”, claiming

Indonesian authorities were “working actively” to alleviate suffering.105 Nevertheless, as the first visual evidence of the East Timorese famine, the photographs had a significant impact. They were published in all major newspapers, heightening the public consciousness of the severity of the situation, and used by the solidarity movement in posters, leaflets and articles in the following years.

7.13 The Timor issue in the international area

In the wake of the visit of the ambassadors, the Rodgers photos and other revelations, international interest in East Timor increased in late 1978 and in 1979.

Dedicated as it was to lobbying for the Suharto regime’s agenda in the international arena, the Fraser government was increasingly challenged to respond.

Interest continued in the Netherlands, with Dutch parliamentarians protesting

Australian de facto recognition in January 1978, Dutch activists taking up the Timor issue and government ministers lobbying the Dutch Foreign Minister to pressure

Indonesian and Australian governments about reports of daily bombings in the territory.106 A visit by Ken Fry to Sweden and the Netherlands in June 1979 brought attention in the media, including reports in the Swedish media of entire villages being wiped out, a high death toll and an ongoing humanitarian crisis.107 Although Fry’s

104 Peter Rodgers, interview by Michael Wilson. 105 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/15, xiv. Humanitarian situation in East Timor. 6 November 1979. 106 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Lv. Cable from The Hague to Canberra. Relations with Indonesia. 25 January 1978. 107 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvii. “East Timor: ‘Swedish guns wipe out villages’,” Dagens Nyheter, 27 June 1979. DFA translation.

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claims were treated sceptically by the Swedish Foreign Minister he nevertheless told the Australian First Secretary that the publicity had delayed moves to normalise economic relations with Indonesia.108 In Britain the Indonesian focused human rights group Tapol continued to publish information about East Timor and to lobby parliament on the issue.109 Concern was not confined to western democratic nations.

Parliamentarians of the military government of Brazil lobbied their Foreign Minister on the issue in November 1979, describing it as “one of the most dreadful instances of genocide in modern history”.110 Even in communist Poland articles alleging atrocities by Indonesian forces were published in late 1979.111

Activists in Portugal plastered buildings in Lisbon with Solidarity with Timor posters and DRET flags in November 1978, organised a week of activities on East

Timor and held a photographic display at the National Academy of Fine Arts.112 The

Committee of Timorese Refugees outlined continuing human rights violations and condemned the Portuguese government’s failure to act.113 Mainstream Portuguese media reported on the issue throughout 1979, comparing the situation to Cambodia and using terms such as “holocaust”.114

In the US there was continued attention by Congress, with the Timor issue considered by the House Committee on International Relations on a number of occasions in 1978 and 1979. These often involved an interaction between the claims

108 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvii. Cable from Stockholm to Canberra. East Timor and Irian Jaya: visit of Mr Ken Fry MP. 4 July 1979. 109 Eg, TAPOL Bulletin, no. 36, October 1979. 110 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Brasília to Canberra. Brazil-attitude to the Timor issue. 14 November 1979. 111 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. “Hunger Calamity in Timor,” Sztandar Modych, 19 December 1979. DFA translation. 112 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. East Timor. 24 November 1978. 113 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Timorese refugee groups: recent press statements. 20 October 1978. 114 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Timor: press coverage in Portugal. 16 November 1979.

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of the US State Department and those of activists, witnesses and academic experts. On

15 February 1979, for example, Benedict Anderson described State Department statements on East Timor as “a farrago of self-serving contradictions” and US arms deliveries to Indonesia as “clear violations” of agreements. State Department official

Robert Oakley, in contrast, described Timorese as escaping from Fretilin areas to where they could be “protected” by the Indonesian government and, while conceding that US arms, including Bronco aircraft, were being used in Timor, contended that it was not a violation of agreements as incorporation was an “established fact”. 115

Congressman Tom Harkin of Iowa took up the issue, stating in the House in

July 1979 that up to half the population may have died “as a result of the barbaric actions of the Indonesian army.”116 In late 1979 Senator Edward Kennedy compared the issue to that of Cambodia,117 and it received editorial attention from both The

Washington Post and The New York Times, respectively critical of the Carter administration’s “complicity”118 and “acquiescent silence”.119

7.14 Australian lobbying

It was in this context that the Fraser government continued to cooperate with the Suharto regime by working to keep the Timor issue as far as possible off the international agenda. With Australia seen as possessing expertise on the issue by much of the international community, the Suharto regime, despite its criticisms, clearly considered it an ally in its propaganda efforts, as demonstrated by its

115 Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations. US House of Representatives, 95th Congress. 2nd edition, February 15, 1978, 10-26, 66-78. 116 US Congressional Record – Extension of Remarks, September 27, 1979, 4820. 117 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/15, xiv. Cable from Washington to Canberra. Senator Kennedy statement on East Timor. 20 November 1979. 118 Jack Anderson, “Island losing a lonely, infamous war,” The Washington Post, 8 November 1979. 119 Editorial, New York Times, 24 December 1979.

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encouragement of senior Fraser government representatives to visit East Timor.120

Nevertheless, regardless of its concerns about the Indonesian relationship, there was nothing inevitable about the intensity with which the Fraser government went about its lobbying.

The Australian government’s own actions, particularly the extension of recognition, in themselves acted as an example to others and as a tool for those advocating on behalf of the Suharto regime. The former US ambassador to Indonesia, for example, cited Australian de facto recognition as an example at Congressional hearings in February 1978.121 When, as it regularly was, Australia was asked to provide information on the situation, it inevitably took the opportunity to temper concerns, discredit claims of a crisis and discourage further investigation. In February

1978, for example, Alan Taylor assured the counsellor for the Swedish Embassy, in response to an inquiry due to Swedish parliamentary agitation, that Fretilin claims were “wildly exaggerated”, Fretilin a spent force and that large numbers of people were returning to areas of Indonesian control.122 In response to a request for information from the ICRC in September 1978, a DFA memorandum painted a largely positive picture of refugees being provided with food, land, agricultural assistance, clothing and help with housing. It contended that East Timor had always been poor and, while noting that Indonesian responses had varied in different areas, stressed Indonesian long-term efforts to develop the territory under difficult circumstances.123

120 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Eg, Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Visit of Minister of Defence to Indonesia. 27 October 1978. 121 Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations. US House of Representatives, 95th Congress. 2nd edition, February 15, 1978, 50. 122 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Lv. Conversation with Mr L. Watz, Counsellor, Swedish Embassy. East Timor; Irian Jaya. 13 February 1978. 123 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Canberra to Geneva. ICRC: Timor. 5 September 1978.

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The Australian lobbying had some success. In November 1978 the Dutch

Foreign Minister cited “information obtained in Canberra and Jakarta” to discredit concerns raised by activists. Describing reports of widespread starvation as

“unverified” and disparaging claims of defoliation as “pointless from a military point of view” he parroted the Australian narrative of the difficulties facing an Indonesian administration dealing with people in a “poor condition” fleeing Fretilin controlled areas.124 His government sought further Australian assistance in response to the visit by Ken Fry in July 1979, eliciting a predictably similar response.125 Australian diplomats lobbied the Swedish Foreign Ministry the same month in a similar manner,126 as they did in Brazil in November 1979 in response to claims of genocide in East Timor raised by parliamentarians.127

7.15 Aid and the ICRC

Despite continued allegations of misuse of aid provided through the

Indonesian Red Cross, the Fraser government remained publicly dismissive of such claims. Although it organised several short visits by DFA officials to oversee initial deliveries of Australian aid, it did not overall demand high standards of accountability, nor is there evidence it pressed the Suharto regime on the issue when evidence of abuses became apparent. Similarly, while Foreign Minister Peacock sometimes called for the entry of the ICRC, there is no evidence that his government pressed the Indonesians in any consistent or robust manner, and even less that it made this a policy priority.

124 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from The Hague to Canberra. East Timor: question in Dutch Parliament. 14 November 1978. 125 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvii. Cable from Canberra to The Hague. Timor: Political situation. 12 July 1979. 126 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1 lvii. Cable from Stockholm to Canberra. East Timor and Irian Jaya: Visit of Mr Ken Fry MP. 4 July 1979. 127 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Brasília to Canberra. Brazil-attitude to the Timor issue. 14 November 1979.

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The Indonesian government agreed “in principle” to the entry of the ICRC as early as August 1977.128 However, with the Suharto regime regarding the presence of neutral foreign observers as a threat to its agenda in East Timor, in practice it stalled and obstructed throughout the height of the famine. In January 1978, for example,

Mochtar informed Jakarta embassy officials that while it agreed “in principle” to an

ICRC visit, it would not assent to any “in the context of a UN resolution.”129 On 8

September 1978, Colonel Soebiakto of Indonesian military intelligence told Jakarta embassy officials that entrance of the ICRC was “not opportune” as the Timorese still recalled the role it had supposedly played in supporting Fretilin during the civil war.130

There is evidence within DFA of some “understanding” of this obstruction. In August

1978 Critchley contended that the Indonesians did not want foreigners administering aid, as that if the Timorese were to become “loyal Indonesians” they must get the credit for relief and development work.131

These manoeuvres and hinderances went almost completely unchallenged by the

Fraser government. Along with its lobbying in the international community, this contributed to the delay of the start of ICRC and CRS operations until ABRI considered its main strategic objectives achieved in October 1979, extending privation for years and considerably increasing the death toll.

7.16 Conclusion

Australia was not the only nation which propagated a distorted narrative regarding the situation in East Timor in the international arena during the famine.

128 NAA: A1838, 935/17/3, xxiii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor-I.C.R.C. 17 August 1977. 129 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, Lv. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Relations with Indonesia. 17 January 1978. 130 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Allen, Jakarta, to Canberra. East Timor. 8 September 1978. 131 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, v. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Humanitarian assistance to East Timor. 11 September 1978.

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Many elements of it were similar to those disseminated by Indonesia itself, and it is clear both governments cooperated in this respect. This worked both ways, as when

Woolcott advised the Indonesians to respond to accusations of abuses by arguing that troops had “got out of hand” in the early days, but had since been brought into line.

With the issue less prominent for it, the US government was less forthright in projecting such a narrative, but the State Department nevertheless presented a distorted account in the interests of the Suharto regime. However, it is clear that as a close neighbour to East Timor seen to possess expertise on the issue and a democracy other nations assumed to respect the international rule of law, Australia held a particularly significant and influential position. Its advocacy gave the Suharto regime’s claims regarding its actions in East Timor a legitimacy they would not have otherwise attained.

The Fraser government’s commitment to supporting the Suharto regime’s position in East Timor required the development and updating of its narrative as events progressed and new information came to international attention. As discussed in previous chapters, the narrative had previously involved presenting a supposedly responsible Indonesia reluctantly intervening in chaotic events not of its making, asserting that the situation was “irreversible” and beyond the power of Australia to change, dismissing claims of a humanitarian crisis and attempting to discredit those claiming otherwise. When from late 1978 onwards it became increasingly difficult to deny the reality of the crisis, it entailed the development of the narrative further by blaming it on the historical poverty and underdevelopment of the territory exacerbated by the civil war and the irresponsible actions of the Timorese themselves. This was supplemented by the oft expressed contention that de-politicisation, cooperation with, and a display of an uncritical “understanding” of the position and actions of the

Suharto regime was required to facilitate the entry of aid and that the Fraser

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government was acting in a “realistic” and responsible manner by uncritically engaging with it.

This public narrative was not evidence based, nor the product of research or analysis. Indeed, as discussed, any evidence-based investigation, such as an analysis of information from refugee or church sources, would have run the danger of challenging the Fraser government’s policy goals. The selective mixture of information and disinformation provided by Indonesian briefings was accepted largely unquestioningly as it was what the Australians wanted to hear. This successful

Indonesian strategy was, once again, built on Australian compliance and complicity.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the publicly supported narrative was in contradiction to the weight of evidence then available, including that, as discussed, from the Australian government’s own intelligence services.

While the Australian tactics were not in the long-term effective in completely stymying domestic and international agitation, in the shorter term they met with considerable success. During the famine years evidence was sufficient to allow those interested to determine the reality of the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe occurring in East Timor. Nevertheless, the isolation of the territory, the restricted amount of information coming out of it and the lack of visual images created the circumstances under which a distorted narrative propagated by a seemingly responsible and internationally respected democratic government would have appeared to many observers to possess a high degree of credibility. In the domestic arena this is indicated by the impact DFA denials had on the attempts by activists such as Bill

Armstrong to persuade the mainstream media to publish what should have been regarded as credible and significant information on the crisis. In the international arena it is demonstrated by the impact Australian advocacy had on the positions of the

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governments of countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands, as well as the legitimacy it gave to the Carter administration’s Timor position.

By asserting that the crisis originated from long-term historical conditions rather than the action of the Indonesian invaders and by presenting the Suharto regime as a fundamentally responsible entity dealing with a difficult situation not of its making, the Australian government protected it from blame, thereby diminishing international attention and pressure of the kind that would have forced it to moderate its actions and curtail its abuses. This includes the nature of the “encirclement and annihilation” campaign, the scope and ferocity of military operations, the use of napalm and defoliants, the use of detention and resettlement camps, the treatment of surrendering Fretilin combatants, the use of torture and detention and the overall treatment of the civilian population. These abuses were able to continue in a situation of continued isolation and lack of international scrutiny, at least in part facilitated by proactive lobbying by the Australian government.

Perhaps most significantly in this period, the Australian lobbying and subsequent lack of international pressure allowed the Suharto regime to continue to deny the entry of international aid. The contention propagated by the Fraser government that a de-politicisation of the Timor issue, a display of “understanding” of the Suharto regime’s position and a failure to hold it responsible for its actions would produce cooperation from it in the form of humanitarian and human rights relief for the Timorese people was not vindicated. Far from facilitating the entry of relief or a curtailment of abuses, the lack of international pressure provided the space in which the Suharto regime was able to continue its operations unimpeded and deny the ICRC entry until the end of 1979, a factor which certainly cost many lives.

This chapter examined how the Fraser government responded to the growing evidence of a humanitarian catastrophe in East Timor, not by prioritising the

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humanitarian needs of the Timorese people, but by expanding its narrative in order to continue to deny the reality of the events unfolding in the territory and protect the

Suharto regime in the domestic and international arenas. The following chapter will examine how the Fraser government continued these policies in the period after the worst of the famine.

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Chapter 8: Policy after the famine

8.1 Introduction

Chapters three to seven demonstrated how the Australian government responded to developments in East Timor in the years 1975 to 1979 by developing a

‘narrative of denial’ about the situation in order to address its policy goal of supporting the Indonesian relationship. These chapters examined how this narrative was developed from the pre-invasion period to the famine and the way in which it was deployed to neutralise the issue domestically, as well as to campaign on behalf of the

Suharto regime internationally.

This chapter explores how the narrative was further expanded in response to developments following the entry of the ICRC and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in

October 1979 until the end of the Fraser government in March 1983. It examines how the Suharto regime exploited the Australian desire for good relations to pressure it on the Timor issue by contending the relationship was at risk because of it, causing the

Fraser government to intensify its efforts to neutralise the issue domestically and internationally. It explores how the Fraser government responded to news of developments in East Timor that reached the outside world, including the Fence of

Legs, the Lacluta massacre and the DPRD petition. It also examines how it worked to divert blame from the invading forces for the humanitarian situation by attributing it to the historical underdevelopment of the territory and the actions of Timorese themselves, depicting the occupying regime as a responsible entity and portraying its actions in a positive light. This includes depicting the devastating relocation of the population undertaken to separate people from Fretilin as a fundamentally benevolent program implemented for humanitarian reasons. It examines how elements of civil society, including, academics, journalists and former Prime Minister Whitlam worked

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to discredit those advocating on the Timor issue, and to support the government narrative in the public mind as the supposedly responsible and evidence-based position.

8.2 The ICRC and CRS

In October 1979, after years of negotiations, and with ABRI believing its primary military objectives to have been met, the ICRC and the US based CRS were at last allowed to commence emergency relief operations in East Timor. Nevertheless, an ICRC official later testified to CAVR that ABRI was unsupportive and created many obstacles. Chega concludes that given the extent of the crisis the aid package was relatively small, came “too late for many people” and that Indonesian control over distribution proved a major obstacle to relief efforts. The programs of both organisations were subject to strict military control, which worked to ensure that aid resources did not fall into Fretilin hands. As a result, distribution, which was controlled by the IRC, was limited to Indonesian controlled areas, allowing the ABRI strategy of starving out people in remote rural areas to continue.1 Taylor also cites

Timorese reports and letters from this period describing aid being misappropriated and sold by ABRI as well as used as a tool to enforce compliance.2 Other organisations, such as UNICEF, failed to gain access in the following years, due to the “complicated internal politics” of the occupying forces and their fears of outside scrutiny.3

While the evidence indicates that both the ICRC and CRS worked with

“vigour and efficiency” the cultures of both precluded direct criticism of Indonesian policies or actions. They were further limited by a need to cooperate with Indonesian

1 CAVR, Chega, 233. 2 Taylor, East Timor, 120-21. 3 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Indonesia – East Timor – UNICEF involvement. 31 December 1981.

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authorities to extend their programs, and neither was proactive in taking issues to the international arena.4 Nevertheless, while deaths due to hunger and disease continued in the following years, the work of both organisations alleviated the worst of the famine.5

Given the scale and proximity of the catastrophe, the Australian contribution was modest. Federal Cabinet approved $2 million to the ICRC emergency relief fund for East Timor on 5 November 19796 and a further $1 million on 12 May 1980.7 The memorandum which accompanied the former inaccurately described the situation as having been “caused by civil war” as well as Indonesian military operations, and reported that those returning to government control were being “cared for” in 130 resettlement areas. This denied the nature of the ABRI encirclement and annihilation campaign, misrepresented the purpose of the camps and the situation in them, and yet again erroneously depicted the Indonesian government as a responsible entity dealing with a situation not of its making. It noted that the Indonesian government was “very sensitive” about Australian aid due to the “sensational” way in which the Timor issue was discussed in the media, recommending caution in the way the contribution was delivered and discussed.8

By late 1979 the population in internment camps exceeded 300,000 and may have exceeded 370,000. However, in 1982 to 1983 many were allowed to leave the camps. Instead, the Indonesian military implemented a major resettlement program aimed at isolating the civilian population from Fretilin by replacing the traditional

4 CAVR, Chega, 233. 5 The first stage of the ICRC program officially ended on 15 April 1981, with the consolidation program coving period to the end of 1981. However, in December the ICRC reached an agreement to extend the program until 30 June 1982. 6 NAA: A12909, 3598. Cabinet Minute. Decision No. 10184. Humanitarian Aid for East Timor. 5 November 1979. 7 NAA: A12909, 3998. Cabinet Minute. Decision No. 11553. Humanitarian Aid for East Timor. 12 May 1980. 8 NAA: A12909, 359. Humanitarian aid for East Timor. For Cabinet. Michael MacKellar. Department of Foreign Affairs. 1979.

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mountain population areas with coastal villages along major roads. Although considerably reduced, Fretilin retained a certain offensive capacity, making a surprise attack in Dili in June 1980, to which ABRI responded with severe repression. The military continued to play a dominant role in all aspects of Timorese society. Despite the improvements brought by the relief efforts, considerable privations continued, including a constant if reduced loss of life due to disease and hunger. Severe political repression also continued, including the use of Atauro Island as an internment camp for those, including whole families, thought sympathetic to Fretilin.9

Taylor notes that as the location of resettlement villages were governed by strategic concerns, they were often located in lowland areas previously avoided due to malaria, poor water supplies and a considerably hotter climate. Movement of people continued to be controlled, with permits required for travel outside the settlement boundaries, leading to reduced opportunities for the cultivation of crops and leading to subsequent food shortages. Taylor observes that while foreign delegations sometimes commented that the unworked fields and ensuing hunger this produced appeared irrational, from the ABRI perspective it was highly rational in providing the conditions for a “massive transformation of Timorese society”, including the establishment of “model plantations” and livestock ranches for the export of produce.10

In this context, key ABRI figures asserted increased control of the Timorese economy during this period. Murdani and other senior generals, along with the

Indonesian entrepreneur Robby Sumampouw, established the company PT

International Denok Hernandes Indonesia (P.T. Denok) soon after the invasion and

9 CAVR, Chega, 229-37, 1262-76. 10 Taylor, East Timor, 92-94.

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used it to gain increasing control of the exportation of coffee and other cash crops, using the power of the military to enforce their monopoly.11

8.3 The Indonesian relationship and the ongoing

disinformation effort

Prime Minister Fraser set the tone for policy during this period by stating in parliament on 7 June 1979 that “past difficulties between Australia and Indonesia are now firmly behind us and we are determined to look to the future constructively and realistically”, adding that the Indonesians were “placing considerable emphasis on the economic development of East Timor.”12 The veracity and realism of this position, however, continued to be challenged by information regarding the humanitarian situation reaching the outside world, by attention in parliament and the media and by the small domestic and international solidarity movement. The Fraser government therefore continued to pursue its undeclared policy of protecting the Suharto regime by depicting it as a responsible entity dealing as best it could in a chronically underdeveloped territory whose situation had been exacerbated by Timorese irresponsibility.

While encouragement of the ICRC and CRS programs was seen as in accordance with policy goals, this was not accompanied by pressure either public or private on human rights issues, nor did it entail any questioning or criticism of

Indonesian actions. The agenda for Peacock’s meeting with Mochtar in September

1979, for example, included Indochinese issues, refugees, maritime boundaries and

11 CAVR, Chega, 2203; Taylor, East Timor, 125-27. 12 HOR Hansard, 7 June 1979.

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Timorese family reunions, but entailed no mention of ABRI abuses in East Timor despite ample evidence of them from multiple sources.13

Indonesian admonishments that the relationship was being damaged by the

Timor issue continued to motivate policy. Consultations with OPSUS and Tjan continued, built around the perceived needs to both address Australian public opinion and placate elements of the Indonesian leadership expressing displeasure about supposed anti-Indonesian rhetoric in Australia.14 Peacock assured Mochtar in

December 1979 that his government shared the Indonesian government’s concerns about “sensational and distorted” media reports about East Timor and wanted to work with it to improve its image in Australia.15 Murdani was particularly adept at employing the tactic of admonishing Australia in his government’s interests, telling

Critchley that Indonesia could “no longer regard Australia as a friend” and that senior government figures saw the Australian press as waging “an anti-Indonesian campaign.”16 Critchley’s successor, Rawdon Dalrymple, who became Ambassador in late 1981, described Murdani to the author as “difficult”, unfriendly and very critical of Australia.17 These efforts proved effective, with Critchley adamant throughout his ambassadorship that the relationship was in a crisis caused by the irresponsible behaviour of parliamentarians, activists and the media on the Timor issue. Senator

Primmer told the Senate in December 1980 that Critchley had criticised Senators Sim,

McIntosh and Primmer during a parliamentary delegation to ASEAN for doing

13 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Your conversation with Professor Mochtar Kusamaatmadja. Foreign Affairs Ministerial brief. 27 September 1979. 14 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, lvii. Record of conversation between Wilson and Tjan. 16 November 1979. 15 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, lvii. Cable from Lyon, Canberra, to Foreign Affairs, Melbourne. Minister’s conversation with Drs Radius Prawiro: Talking points re Mochtar. 6 December 1979. 16 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Meeting between Critchley and Departmental Officers. General bilateral relations, the Media, Family Reunions, The Walsh/Munster book, Minister’s visit to Timor, Visit of Soeharto to Australia. 27 February 1981. 17 Rawdon Dalrymple (Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, 1981-1985) in discussion with the author, 17 July 2018.

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“irreparable damage to Australia’s relationship with Indonesia because of our attitude on East Timor.”18

With the humanitarian situation in East Timor by then more widely known to the outside world, the provision of aid accompanied by a sympathetic account of

Indonesian intentions became a necessary part of public policy and the narrative which accompanied it. Pro-Timorese activism continued to be seen as a threat, and the need to counter it appears to have superseded humanitarian concerns as a motive for keeping the Foreign Minister informed about Timorese matters. A DFA cable to JIO and the Office of National Assessments (ONA) on 16 October 1979 noted that with the “military effort” winding down the “anti-Indonesian lobby” would be paying more attention to the humanitarian situation, and it was therefore necessary to provide the minister details of it.19 In seeking to do so it privileged the Indonesian narrative, requesting the Jakarta Embassy to ascertain the Indonesian government’s rehabilitation and development plans to allow the minister to counter adverse claims.20

The government continued to utilise its established narrative regarding the causes of the Indonesian intervention to counter accusations of hypocrisy. At a media conference in February 1980 Peacock refuted a contradiction between the government’s positions on East Timor and Afghanistan by speciously claiming the former had been to quell a destabilising civil war in a territory “with no central administration whatsoever”, while the latter had involved the invasion of a nation with a functioning government.21

18 Senate Hansard, 4 December 1980. 19 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, lvii. Cable from Canberra to JIO, Canberra: ONA, Canberra. East Timor: The Dunn report on the humanitarian situation. 16 October 1979. 20 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. East Timor – Humanitarian assistance and development. 19 October 1979. 21 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1, lvii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Minister’s visit: Press summary on 2 February. 2 February 1980.

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With intelligence concerning the humanitarian situation itself not a priority, in

December 1979 Cavan Hogue, then First Assistant Secretary of the South East Asian

Division, suggested Ambassador Critchley make a visit to East Timor to allow him to cite alleged Indonesian achievements from firsthand experience in response to requests for information from parliamentarians and the media.22 The Ambassador accordingly paid a highly orchestrated visit from 19 to 23 May 1980.

Both his preliminary cable and report reflected the willed blindness regarding the situation and the patronising attitude towards the Timorese people that characterises much DFA documentation of this period. He depicted a responsible

Indonesian administration attempting to develop a recalcitrant and underdeveloped region, referring to, “the primitiveness of the people” and attributing privation to

“slash and burn agriculture…ingrained by tradition and animistic beliefs.” He expressed admiration for the quality and dedication of ABRI personnel, contending that the bulk of the population would, “clearly accept whatever authority exists at the time.”23 He described the relocation program as standard Indonesian policy used in other areas for social, educational, economic and security reasons.24 In this context he was supportive of the Indonesian position to the point of the fanciful, insisting to the media that the “tribal relocation program” was being undertaken to improve the

“miserable living conditions” and the “destructive habits of the migratory tribes” in order to develop a “stable agricultural area” and provide “a proper application of government authority.”25

22 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Letter from Hogue to Critchley. 17 December 1979. 23 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Visit to East Timor. 3 June 1980. 24 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Ambassador’s visit to East Timor, 19-23 May 1980. 9 June 1980. 25 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Media coverage of reports on East Timor. 25 November 1980.

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From 8 to 11 December 1981, soon after his appointment, Ambassador

Dalrymple visited the territory along with representatives from the US, Canadian and

Philippine embassies. His assessment was more circumspect than that of Critchley, less defensive of Indonesian actions and, in contrast to his two predecessors, also reflected some apparent concern for the humanitarian situation. He described resettlement as large scale and well organised, claiming that attention was being paid to agricultural development and education. He reported evidence of “excesses” by troops, while contending those involved were being reprimanded. He enquired about the situation in Atauro and was told that 4500 people were still there. He claimed to have “no impression one way or the other” regarding how onerous resettlement had been, at the same time contending that the process of extending Indonesian political control had “no doubt…involved much hardship.” He cited “evidence for political and social indoctrination” through the school system and elsewhere. His report nevertheless perpetuated DFA fallacies, such as referring to the need to replace cattle slaughtered for food during the “civil war”. He claimed to see no sign of famine, but noted children with brown hair, a result of malnourishment. He was careful to emphasise the limited nature of his visit, stating that his comments “cannot support definite or detailed conclusions” and stressing that the food situation “may well be different in remote areas.”26 Like Critchley, he drew a link between the relocation program and the provision of schools, medical facilities and other government services, although in 2018 he stated that it was “obvious” the main aim of the program was surveillance and control of those “seen to be disloyal to the government.”27

In spite of the relatively cautious tone of Dalrymple’s report, a memorandum from the Secretary outlined how the Department should spin his findings in support of

26 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Visit to East Timor. 15 December 1981. 27 Rawdon Dalrymple in discussion with the author, 17 July 2018.

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policy, including to the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee enquiry into

East Timor. These included contending that the situation “appeared to be normal” and

Fretilin no more than nuisance value, that the Indonesian authorities appeared committed to development, with major efforts being made in roadbuilding, schools, housing and medical facilities and that the resettlement program was resulting in people having access to these resources. Continuing its narrative of a responsible

Indonesian administration dealing with a backward territory, it stressed Indonesian efforts to “develop people away from slash and burn agriculture,” and to combat widespread medical issues. It emphasised that the ambassador had seen no evidence of current serious malnutrition or food shortages.28 The Department subsequently released a statement along with selective sections of the report to support these positions.29

The result was media attention largely favourable to the government narrative.

Despite Dalrymple’s provisos, the Sun News Pictorial reported there were “no signs of famine” in East Timor, emphasising the supposed Indonesian commitment to development of roads, schools, housing and medical services.30 The Age cited the

Ambassador’s contention that resettlement had given people access to schools and medical facilities.31 The ABC program Australian Insight incorrectly claimed he had

“effectively discounted the suggestions of famine” made by Catholic sources and cited

Dalrymple’s claims about the benefits of resettlement and progress in roads, schools and hospitals.32

28 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Exclusive for Ambassador from Secretary. Visit to East Timor. Undated. 29 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Ambassador’s Impressions Following Brief Tour of East Timor in December 1981. Undated. 30 “‘No signs of famine in Timor,” The Sun News Pictorial, 13 January 1981. 31 “Fretilin only a nuisance, says Indons,” The Age, 13 January 1982. 32 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Australian Insight, 14 January 1982. Transcript.

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The Indonesians clearly regarded the visit as supportive of their goals, with

Mochtar citing it to Dalrymple as a precedent for ambassadorial visits from other countries. However, Mochtar also used the habitual DFA fear of Indonesian disfavour as a lobbying tool, pressing the Ambassador about the depiction of the Timor issue in

Australia and equating “anti-Indonesian attitudes” in Australia to racism.33 The

Indonesians nevertheless used the Dalrymple report in their own publicity offensive.

Its UN mission issued a news release claiming that Dalrymple’s assessment

“completely refuted” allegations of food shortages, that he had “praised the resettlement policy”, that he had given the Indonesian authorities “high marks” for road building, schools, housing and health, and had stated that the Indonesian government was committed to the “formidable task” of developing East Timor.34 The

Indonesian mission in Canberra used the report in a similar way.35

Foreign Minister Tony Street, who succeeded Peacock in 1980, also cited

Dalrymple’s report to refute claims of food shortages and as evidence of the endemic problems facing the Indonesians, contrasting their supposed commitment to the development of East Timor favourably to Portuguese rule.36 Throughout his period as

Foreign Minister Street reinforced the Australian supported Timor narrative to his parliamentary colleagues and the public. In a letter to the Labor MP Ross McLean, for example, he contended that food supply had “traditionally been precarious”, denied

Indonesian responsibility for the crisis and stressed the need to work with them to alleviate deprivation as part of a normalisation and acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty. He claimed allegations of atrocities were “generalised and always

33 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Indonesia: meeting with Foreign Minister Mochtar. 24 December 1981. 34 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Cable from New York to Canberra. East Timor. 8 February 1980. 35 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Visit to East Timor. 11 January 1982. 36 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Letter from Street to Missen. 18 February 1982.

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difficult to check” but that when his Department had done so “we have found that they were often exaggerated or based on insubstantial information.”37

8.4 Civil society and the Timor issue

The Timor solidarity movement continued to decline after the closure of the radio link in late 1978. Nevertheless, after a gap of more than a year the TIS newsletter recommenced publishing in February 1980, providing information gleaned from refugees, Catholic and ACFOA sources and elsewhere. This included a reasonably accurate analysis of the death toll, details of ongoing Indonesian military operations, the June 1980 Fretilin attack in Dili, details of Australian military aid to

Indonesia and on the human rights situation and continuing privation in the territory.

ACFOA published a “development dossier” in 1981 alleging atrocities and a high death rate.38 Its continued advocacy on the issue caused frustrated DFA officials to accuse its representative Pat Walsh of dishonesty and “distortions”.39

The parliamentary Timor lobby continued to raise the Timor issue, making comparisons to Australian policy on Cambodia and Afghanistan. With the official

Labor position supportive of self-determination, opposition leader Bill Hayden raised issues of human rights, complaining that Australia’s “servility towards Indonesia seems to know no bounds, despite that country's appalling record in Timor.”40

The Australian government responded evasively. In response to a question about Indonesian offensives in East Timor, Defence Minister James Killen replied in

May 1981 that “Matters relating to security in the Indonesian province of East Timor

37 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Letter from Street to McLean. Undated, probably January 1982. 38 Patrick Walsh, ed., ACFOA Development Dossier 1: East Timor Today (Canberra: ACFOA, 1981). 39 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Media coverage of reports on East Timor. 25 November 1980. 40 HOR Hansard, 26 February 1981.

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are the direct domestic responsibility of the Indonesian Government, and it is not for me to speculate on Indonesian government intentions.”41 Denial of evidence of abuses continued to be a standard government position. Using a tried formula Foreign

Minister Street contended that his government had “no evidence to substantiate” reports of Indonesian Army atrocities but that the Australian government’s position on

“internationally accepted standards of human rights” was “well known” to the

Indonesian government.42

The group of academics, officials, politicians and journalists known as the

Jakarta Lobby continued to defend the Suharto regime and to vigorously attack those raising concerns about East Timor. In an article in the journal Quadrant in December

1979 ANU academic Heinz Arndt accused the CIET, the AJA, elements of the

Catholic Church and sections of the media of waging a “no holds barred propaganda war against Indonesia” and of making “extreme allegations” and unsupported claims regarding human rights abuses. There is no evidence in the Timor solidarity archives of racism. Nevertheless, Arndt also accused the CIET of reawakening “culture-bound prejudices against Asians in general and Indonesia in particular.”43 In contrast to the frustration experienced by activists regarding what they viewed as a lack of coverage of the catastrophe unfolding in a territory close to Australia, the lobby insisted that

East Timor was receiving too much attention. Peter McCawley, the head of the

Indonesia Project at ANU, bemoaned on ABC radio in January 1982 the supposed damage done to the Australian/Indonesian relationship by “a lot of publicity in the

Australian media” about East Timor. Contending that the Indonesian government was

“sick and tired of the Australian media” he argued that, “we are relatively unimportant

41 HOR Hansard, 26 May 1981. 42 HOR Hansard, 25 August 1981. 43 Heinz Arndt, “Timor Vendetta against Indonesia,” Quadrant 23, December 1979, 13.

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in Indonesia’s eyes”, and that displaying an understanding of the Indonesian position rather than criticising it would be more likely to bring positive results.44

In the media journalists such as Peter Hastings and Peter Rodgers in the

Fairfax press and David Jenkins of the Far Eastern Economic Review propagated a position similar to that of the government narrative and were openly critical of the

Timor lobby. In November 1979, for example, Rodgers attacked Dunn for allegedly misusing his position in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Legislative Research

Service, claiming his objectivity should be questioned for citing anonymous sources and engaging in “exaggeration” with the use of terms such as “genocide”. Accusing him of exacerbating tensions between the two countries, he argued that “getting aid in needs cooperation with Indonesia.”45 In May 1980 David Jenkins painted a portrait of a largely responsible Indonesian administration working hard to deal with “a sullen suffering populace” which had failed to identify with the invaders. Echoing the DFA narrative, he claimed that “Jakarta moved promptly” to remedy the “initial brutality” of the invasion and contended that the “sweeping allegations” made by refugees referred to “events that took place three or four years ago.”46 Jenkins also attacked

Dunn, claiming he had been guilty of “gross exaggeration” and relied upon “hearsay and evidence of the most dubious kind.”47 In late 1981 Hastings, then Foreign Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, accused ACFOA of irresponsibly alleging Indonesian atrocities for the purpose of influencing the coming annual General Assembly vote on

East Timor.48

44 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Peter McCawley, interviewed by Bill Nicol, Australian Insight, 14 January 1982. Transcript. 45 Peter Hastings, “East Timor: Fact and supposition,” Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November 1979. 46 David Jenkins, “Death of a dream of freedom,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 May 1980. 47 Quoted in testimony of E.G. Whitlam, 14 May 1982, Senate Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence. 1982. Reference: East Timor – Human Rights and Condition of the People, Vol. 1. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 75. 48 Quoted in “Hastings, Newsweekly toe the line,” TIS Newsletter, no. 33, November/December 1981.

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Such advocacy was welcomed by the Fraser government which was able to position them as “realistic” and “responsible” commentators and observers who had actually visited the territory in contrast to the supposedly “anti-Indonesian” critics it depicted as relying upon anonymous informants, unverified claims and emotional appeals. While the government narrative was not evidence based, the combination of these factors, seemingly respected academics arguing a position also espoused by apparently responsible professional journalists with eye-witness experience, gave considerable credence to the government’s claims and a strong if misguided sense that this was the evidence based, non-sensational and responsible position. It was accordingly accepted as such by a considerable number of politicians, journalists, academics and members of the community.

8.5 The Timor issue in the international arena

While the Timor solidarity movement declined in Australia, as the principal propagandist for the occupation in the international arena, the Fraser government was increasingly challenged as evidence regarding the situation in the territory brought growing international concerns. The Portuguese media reported widely on the situation in late 1979, leading to increased pressure on the Portuguese government to act.49 On 11 January 1980 Prime Minister Carnero told Portuguese parliament that

Portugal, “cannot abdicate its responsibilities toward East Timor and will fight…for self-determination and for the human rights of the Timorese whose moral and physical suffering deserves our full solidarity.”50 As examined in Chapter Five, this instigated a new phase of diplomatic activity on the issue by Portugal.

49 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxx. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. East Timor. 28 February 1980. 50 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Lisbon to Canberra. Portugal: Program of Sixth Constitutional Government. 14 January 1980.

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The Timor issue received considerable media attention in Denmark, supported by a Timor solidarity lobby which pressured the government to withhold aid to

Indonesia. An editorial in the daily Politiken on 15 July 1980 accused Indonesia of using starvation as a weapon and Australia and the US of having “kept quiet” about it.

The Australian Embassy in Copenhagen reported that attitudes “critical” of Indonesia were also found in the Foreign Ministry. Denmark subsequently worked to hold the nine European Economic Community (EEC) members to abstention on the yearly

General Assembly Timor resolutions.51 When Denmark took the presidency of the

EEC in May 1982, the Danish representative on the working group on Asia identified

East Timor as a priority.52

As noted in Chapter Seven, parliamentarians in Brazil lobbied their foreign ministry on the Timorese “genocide”.53 The French daily Le Monde editorialised in

April 1980 that “the Timorese are undergoing a slow death” and blamed Australia and the US for backing Jakarta.54 At the 68th conference of the International Parliamentary

Union (IPU) in Havana in September 1981 the Portuguese delegation was successful in inserting a clause in the resolution on non-self-governing territories reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and urging

Indonesia to withdraw its forces.55 In April 1982 Timor solidarity activists in London and Europe condemned the EEC’s embargo on sales of arms to Argentina over the

Falklands dispute as “hypocritical” due to its failure to oppose Indonesia over East

Timor.56

51 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xix. Cable from Copenhagen to Canberra. East Timor. 23 July 1980. 52 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. Cable from Copenhagen to Canberra. Danish Presidency of the EC – Asian affairs. 18 May 1982. 53 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Brasilia to Canberra. Brazil – Attitude to the Timor issue. 14 November 1979. 54 “Remember the Timorese,” Le Monde, 9-10 March 1980. Republished in English in the Guardian Weekly, 16 March 1980. 55 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xix. Cable from New York to Canberra. Inter-Parliamentary Union: Indonesia and East Timor. 29 September 1981. 56 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. “Falkland: Timor,” AAP, 20 April 1982.

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Interest continued in the United States, including prominent articles in the

Washington Post,57 the New York Times58 and the Wall Street Journal.59 The issue spawned a three-member Congressional delegation to East Timor in January 1980, which after a highly managed two-day visit produced conclusions largely in

Indonesia’s favour that could be used to allay critics.60 Nevertheless, the issue continued to receive attention in Congress, with the President of the International

League for Human Rights testifying in February 1980 that Indonesia had one of the worst human rights records in the world and that large numbers of people had died in in East Timor “unnoticed or uncriticised by the State Department.”61 In early 1982

Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts and the House member for Ohio, Tony Hall, introduced an unsuccessful Congressional resolution calling for freer access by journalists and aid agencies and an Indonesian withdrawal and self-determination for

East Timor.62 As documented by Fernandes, when Suharto visited the US in October

1982, the activist Arnold Kohen worked with Tsongas and Hall to coordinate a congressional response on the Timor issue, with the result that 18 senators and 66

House members of both parties wrote to President Reagan calling on him to press

Suharto on food, security and human rights issues and to allow international observers into the territory. This in turn led to nation-wide media attention, including the New

York Times, the Washington Post, the New York Post, the Christian Science Monitor

57 Jack Anderson, “Island losing a lonely, infamous war,” Washington Post, 8 November 1979. 58 Editorial, “An unjust war in East Timor,” New York Times, 24 December 1979. 59 Editorial, “Cambodia and Timor,” Wall Street Journal, 6 February 1980. 60 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: Visit by U.S. congressmen. 17 January 1980. 61 Graeme Beaton, “Timor slaughter ‘ignored’ by U.S,” The Australian, 6 February 1980. 62 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Cable from Washington to Canberra. East Timor - United States Congressional hearing. 22 October 1982.

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and elsewhere, including accusations of a large death toll and comparisons with Biafra and Cambodia.63

The Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, an international Rome based civil society human rights entity, held hearings on East Timor in Lisbon from 19 to 21 June 1981, taking submissions from Fretilin representatives, lawyers, academics, politicians, journalists, church representatives and activists from fifteen countries.64 Fretilin representatives accused the Indonesian government of violations of East Timorese rights to self-determination, repression of Timorese culture and nationality, war crimes and economic exploitation. Australian citizens James Dunn, Jill Jolliffe, Pat

Walsh, Dennis Freney and Ken Fry also testified. In a forty-page report the tribunal found the government of Indonesia guilty of violations of international law in relation to acts of aggression, war crimes, genocide, crimes against international peace and the rights of peoples. It also found “every government organisation which has aided and assisted the government of Indonesia” guilty of complicity in the act of aggression. It found the US guilty of complicity by supplying military equipment and singled out

Australia for the provision of $35 million of military aid.65

Walsh provided an extensive verbal and written submission on behalf of

ACFOA, challenging the government narrative, scrutinising the roles of the Whitlam and Fraser governments, examining the role of Australian military aid, as well as that of the pro-Jakarta lobby.66 When the written submission was later circulated Walsh recalls that, “Whitlam went right over the top”, writing to the Catholic Archbishop of

63 Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor, 67-68. Fernandes provides an overview of the growth of pro-Timor activism and attention in Congress and the media in the US during this period. 64 CAVR, Chega, 719. 65 Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal Ruling no.7, Lisbon, 19-21 June 1981. Original in Italian. Republished in English in East Timor News, no. 71-73, Summer 1981-1982. 66 Patrick Walsh, Australia’s support for Indonesia’s takeover of East Timor. Testimony of Patrick Walsh before the Permanent Peoples Tribunal, Lisbon, 19-22 June 1981.

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Sydney, Cardinal Freeman, threatening to sue the church and demanding an apology.

Freeman responded with a written apology without consulting Walsh.67

8.6 Australian lobbying

In this context the Australian government continued to see it as its responsibility to lobby internationally on behalf of the Suharto regime on the Timor issue. As examined in Chapter Five, Australia continued to work in an organised and determined manner in support of Indonesian efforts to remove the matter from the UN agenda. In the lead up to the 1980 General Assembly vote this included lobbying nations as diverse as Belgium, West Germany, South Korea, Syria, Austria, Mexico,

Algeria, Nauru, Swaziland and Botswana.68

Australia continued to be regarded as an authority on the Timor issue and was consulted as such. Sweden, for example, regularly sought information and was provided with materials which supported the Australian position.69 The US and

Australia continued to cooperate on the issue.70 DFA officials assisted their Dutch counterparts in responding to Timor activists in the Netherlands.71 The Department also cooperated with West German officials who were hoping to persuade their EEC partners to change their collective General Assembly vote to a no.72 The Australian government continued its strategy of depicting the Indonesian government as a

67 Patrick Walsh (ACFOA spokesperson and Timor activist) in discussion with the author, 11 September 2017. 68 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xix. Various cables in, Portuguese Timor-external relations-foreign policy-other countries assessment. 27 September 1978 to 21 December 1981. 69 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vii. Cable from Stockholm to Canberra. East Timor: Swedish interest. 3 October 1980. 70 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, vii. Cable from Washington to Canberra. East Timor. 20 November 1980. 71 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from The Hague to Canberra. East Timor – replies to questions in Dutch parliament. 13 November 1981. 72 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. Cable from Bonn to Canberra. Indonesia/UN – East Timor resolution. 27 March 1982.

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responsible entity dealing with a problem of acute historical underdevelopment it had inherited. In response to the 1981 IPU resolution, for example, a DFA media release stressed that “the efforts of the Indonesian government” in cooperation with the ICRC had had “considerable success in improving the physical and health conditions” of the

“very undeveloped area” of East Timor.73

It is significant that in these cases Australia was consulted with the purpose of comparing Indonesian claims with those of a country also geographically close to East

Timor which was perceived to have expertise on the issue and seen to be an internationally responsible democracy which valued human rights. It is also significant that Indonesia was internationally vulnerable during this period, expressing a wish to resolve the issue in order to improve its ability to play a role on the world stage, including in the non-aligned movement.74 There was also some international movement, primarily by Portugal but also by others such as Denmark, to investigate the situation further and hold the Suharto regime responsible to a greater extent. A different approach by Australia may well have led to the kind of international pressure which at a minimum would have lessened the extent of the ongoing repression in East

Timor.

8.7 The Fence of Legs

The Australian government’s propensity to ignore information regarding severe human rights abuses, as well as its increasing effectiveness in marginalising the

Timor issue, was demonstrated by its reaction to the ABRI Operation Keamanan

(Operation Security), or what became known as Fence of Legs. Between June and

September 1981 large numbers of Timorese, including women, children and the elderly, were forced by ABRI to march in human “fences” across the country in an

73 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. East Timor. 17 March 1982. 74 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. Giles Bertin, “Timor,” AAP Newsfeature, 23 May 1982.

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effort to flush out remaining Fretilin forces. Chega reports that “hunger, sickness and ill-treatment” were widespread and that many died. It also reports that it took many away from their fields during the planting season, increasing their vulnerability to famine. The attempt to eliminate Fretilin was unsuccessful, although 4,000 people were detained in Atauro Island and elsewhere as suspected Fretilin sympathisers.

Chega also documents “a large massacre of civilians” arising from the operation in the village of Lacluta in September, with an undefined but high death toll including women and children.75

The initial response by Foreign Minister Street in August when information regarding the operation came to light was to stress that Australia accepted Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, that Fretilin guerrilla remnants remained “actively hostile towards the authorities” and that it consequently was “for the Indonesian government to decide” how to deal with the situation.76

The issue was, however, taken up by sections of the media and civil society.

An item in The Australian on 3 October cited church sources to allege major abuses, including that many of the conscripted were being maltreated and ill fed, causing many deaths, that Indonesian forces were “stripping the land like a plague of locusts” to deny food stocks to Fretilin, that suspected Fretilin sympathisers were being summarily executed or herded into camps, and that the absence of people from their fields was likely to lead to a famine.77 Several days later the ACFOA chairman,

Richard Alston, who was also State President of the Victorian Liberal Party, called for the Senate to establish a committee of enquiry into the Federal government’s Timor policy.78 An opinion piece by former Whitlam government Minister John Wheeldon in

75 CAVR, Chega, 235-9. 76 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xx. Statement by Foreign Minister Street. Indonesia: Operations against Guerrillas in East Timor. 12 August 1981. 77 “Indonesia starves out East Timor,” The Australian, 3 October 1981. 78 “Canberra slammed on fate of Timor,” The Australian, 6 October 1981.

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The Australian on 8 October referred to “uniformly horrifying” news coming from

East Timor, contended that the Australian position “has not raised our standing in

Jakarta” and called for an end to military aid to Indonesia.79 An editorial in The

Australian on 10 October accused the government of ignoring the “chronicle of brutality” emanating from East Timor and demanded a strong protest.80

Street’s response remained unchanged.81 Nevertheless, he informed the media that he would be seeking information regarding the matter from the Jakarta

Embassy.82 The result yielded ample evidence of severe human rights abuses and ongoing risk to the civilian population. A confidential briefing from a CRS representative indicated that between 80,000 and 100,000 had been involved in the operation and that “the almost total failure of the August planting” due to it would likely result in severe food shortages by January.83 Indonesian General Dading told embassy officials the operation had been aimed at “remnant criminal and disruptive elements”, contending its timing posed no risk to the harvest. He described it as a success, attributing killings to civilians seeking revenge on Fretilin.84 The ICRC representative in Jakarta claimed that a local military commander had “boasted” that

500 Fretilin had been killed. He referred to “the Lacluta incident”, as a shootout between Fretilin and ABRI forces resulting in a large number of casualties and the remainder of the village being relocated. He also warned of the danger of a critical food shortage.85 A West Timor based Dutch priest read a letter to an Australian

79 John Wheeldon, “Why don’t we get hot over Timor?” The Australian, 8 October 1981. 80 Editorial, “The need for quick action on East Timor,” The Australian, 10 October 1981. 81 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xx. Statement by Foreign Minister Street. Indonesia: Operations against Guerrillas in East Timor. 13 October 1981. 82 “Street calls for Timor report,” The Australian, 14 October 1981. 83 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xx. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Indonesia: East Timor. 28 October 1981. 84 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Current military situation in East Timor. 6 November 1981. 85 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: ICRC/UNICEF/Family reunions. 13 November 1981.

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embassy official from a Timorese priest describing surrendered Fretilin in Lacluta being shot in front of the village and “horrific killings of pregnant women and their babies.”86 These revelations were not made public, nor is there any indication that they led to any expression of concern to the Indonesian authorities. There is no evidence they led to any policy document, departmental discussion, detailed briefing to the Minister nor any extensive analysis of the humanitarian situation or risk to the

Timorese people. The information was apparently simply reported confidentially and ignored.

Media attention continued in the following months. On 13 January The

Australian ran a story citing church sources that malnutrition was common, the mortality rate high, and there was a risk of a famine as crops had not been planted.87

The situation was also reported in Europe, including in Britain88 and in West

Germany.89 The TIS newsletter published an account of the operation, citing the testimony of individual Timorese and quoting the Apostolic Administrator of Dili,

Monsignor da Costa Lopez, that 500 had been killed in Lacluta.90

There is no evidence that any of this information led the Australian government to change its accustomed complacency regarding human rights in East

Timor or raise the matter in any significant way with Indonesian officials. Despite the media attention, the government was able to shrug off the limited pressure that was exerted on it due to the Fence of Legs operation without repercussions. By this time the public reaction to reports of atrocities in East Timor was minimal, despite the

86 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: recent events. 30 November 1981. 87 Elizabeth Johnston, “Indonesians ‘forcing children to attack rebels’,” The Australian, 13 January 1982. 88 “East Timor: New offensive, mass arrests,” Tapol, 47, September 1981. 89 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. Cable from Bonn to Canberra. Indonesia/U.N.: East Timor resolution. 31 March 1982. 90 “Operasi Keamanan – East Timorese tell their story,” TIS newsletter, no. 36, May/June 1982.

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efforts of activists. The government’s strategy of downplaying allegations and insisting that events in East Timor were an internal matter for Indonesia was largely successful in achieving its objective of marginalising the Timor issue during this period.

8.8 The DPRD petition

The Australian government’s reaction to evidence of abuses in East Timor continued to demonstrate that human rights were not a policy consideration. This was further demonstrated by its response to a petition by members of the Indonesian appointed regional assembly of East Timor (DPRD) to Suharto and the events that surrounded it. Addressed to “Bapak President of the Republic of Indonesia” on 3 June

1981, it expressed “immeasurable feelings of joy” at integration. It also made allegations of “great brutality”, accusing the Indonesian administration of ignoring the customs of the people of East Timor, abusing power, torture, murder and impunity.

These included allegations of murder by named ABRI battalions at specified places and times, detailed descriptions of torture and specific allegations of the sexual assault and torture of women. It alleged misuse of development assistance due to nepotism and corruption, providing specific examples. It named the army-controlled company

P.T. Denok as responsible for monopolising the coffee, sandalwood and other rural industries and claimed their viability of was being threatened by over exploitation. It also contained complaints about the undermining of the Timorese provincial governor,

Guilherme Goncalves.91

The petition was leaked and circulated in English translation in Timor solidarity circles, leading to questions in parliament.92 A confidential DFA assessment

91 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xx. Regional People’s Representative Assembly of the First-level Province of East Timor, Report of the Development of Government Affairs in East Timor. To Bapak President of the Republic of Indonesia, 3 June 1981. 92 Senate Hansard, 13 October 1981.

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verified the document as authentic and the translation accurate, while expressing surprise it that came from a body “hand-picked by the Indonesian military.” It described the claims as “probably a little exaggerated, though not entirely inaccurate” while underplaying or failing to examine the most serious of the allegations of murder, torture and sexual assault. It conjectured that the petition might have been partly motivated by the frustrations of Timorese leaders at the dominance of the military, and as a “political exercise” in support of the Governor who was under threat of replacement.93

Under pressure from parliament, DFA requested the Jakarta Embassy to press the Indonesian government to verify the document, with the probable hope it would disparage it as unrepresentative of the assembly. It told the embassy it would meanwhile stress to the public that its status was unclear and its purpose politically motivated.94 News several days later that the petition had resulted in the arrest of a number of DPRD members brought little consternation within DFA or the Fraser government.95 The affair, did, however, indicate that divisions existed within high levels of Indonesian legal and parliamentary circles. The Jakarta Legal Aid Board wrote to the Vice President of the Indonesian Parliamentary Commission in December requesting it assist in investigating the arrests, attributing them to the reporting of

“malpractice within the East Timor regional government.”96 The parliamentary speaker subsequently publicly criticised the arrests, stressing authorities should “abide by the procedures and law of the government.”97 That such divisions played out

93 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. D.J. Fisher, East Timor: Regional Assembly document dated 3 June 1981. Undated. 94 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from Canberra to Jakarta. Indonesia – East Timor – DPRD document. 20 November 1981. 95 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: recent events. 24 November 1981. 96 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Indonesia: East Timor – arrests. 18 December 1981. 97 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Agence France-Presse, Jakarta, December 23, 1981.

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publicly indicates that pressure from the Australian government on human rights issues, either public or private, may well have yielded positive results.

A submission to the Minister of 11 January 1982 noted that the Indonesian response had been unsatisfactory and advised there was little point in pursuing the matter. It recommended that if asked he should emphasise the political motivations of the document.98 Once again, there is no indication that the allegations brought about the slightest expression of concern to the Indonesian authorities. With the continued emphasis on a supposed “political motive”, the prospect that the petition may have been driven by real humanitarian concerns at a time when grave abuses were evident does not appear to have been deemed worthy of consideration by DFA or the Fraser government.

8.9 Whitlam, da Costa Lopes and the government narrative

The efforts of the Fraser government to position its narrative as responsible, realistic and evidenced based was aided by the efforts of former Prime Minister

Gough Whitlam. After his resignation from parliament in 1978 Whitlam continued to strongly defend his legacy and lobby for the Suharto regime on the Timor issue. On 1

November 1979, for example, he accused the media of conducting “a vendetta” against Indonesia since the deaths of the Balibo Five.99 In October 1979 he visited

CSIS figures in Jakarta, lamenting to them the “misunderstandings” between the two countries on the issue, bemoaning the “vehement” Australian press and advising

Indonesia to work to improve its image in Australia and internationally.100 In a letter to the Canberra Times of 22 October 1981 he defended his Timor record in

98 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. East Timor – Regional Assembly report. Foreign Affairs Ministerial Submission. 11 January 1982. 99 “Vendettas by journalists: Whitlam,” The Canberra Times, 1 November 1979. 100 NAA: A10463, 801/13/11/1, xxxi. Letter from Alexander to Hogue. 16 October 1979.

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government, criticised the actions of ACFOA and rationalised the Indonesian invasion by providing a distorted account of the events leading to it.101

In contrast to Whitlam, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, the Apostolic

Administrator of East Timor from 1977 to 1983, lived in Dili in daily contact with the suffering brought by Indonesian actions. He used his position to protect Timorese, such as intervening on behalf of girls abducted by the military and protecting others endangered by ABRI. In 1980 he wrote to the Vatican supporting a plebiscite on self- determination. He openly challenged General Yusuf with specific information about disappearances and worked to document the evidence of abuses that were brought to him. At a bishop’s audience with Suharto in November 1981 he challenged the

President with evidence of the disappearance of the newly surrendered.102

In November 1981, da Costa Lopes received a letter from Bishop John Gerry, the Secretary of the Australian Episcopal Conference and the Chairman of Australian

Catholic Relief, inquiring about the situation in East Timor and asking what channels of communication would be available in the case of “the expected famine over the new year.”103 Da Costa Lopes responded by outlining the abuses during the Fence of

Legs and the atrocities at Lacluta, requesting funds “for the survival of the people” and stating that in the event of the “expected famine” the best channel for aid from

Australia would be by sea.104 On 6 January 1982 Australian Catholic Relief issued a press release claiming that food shortages in East Timor were serious, citing da Costa

Lopes’ request for assistance, and contending that “people will face famine” in 1982 due to disruption caused by the Fence of Legs operation unless outside assistance

101 E.G. Whitlam, “Takeover in Timor,” letter to the editor, Canberra Times, 22 October 1981. 102 Rowena Lennox, Fighting Spirit of East Timor: The life of Martino da Costa Lopes (Annandale: Pluto Press, 2000): Chapters 10-12. 103 Letter from Bishop J.J. Gerry to Mgr. Da Costa Lopes. 11 November 1981. https://timorarchives.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/tis_box13-02_10.pdf 104 Letter from Martino da Costa Lopes to Mgr. J.J. Gerry, 19 November 1981. https://timorarchives.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/tis_box13-02_10b.pdf

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were forthcoming.105 The contents of da Costa Lopes’ letter were remarkably restrained, with the abuses he outlined since verified and the reference to famine a citation of Bishop Gerry’s letter. Warnings the risk of an impending food shortage also came from other sources, including the ICRC.106 Nevertheless, it was da Costa

Lopes who incurred the ire of Whitlam.

As discussed in Chapter Five, Whitlam, along with the foreign editor of the

Sydney Morning Herald, Peter Hastings, made a short, orchestrated visit to East

Timor from 28 February to 4 March 1982. In his press conference in Jakarta at the conclusion of the visit Whitlam fiercely attacked da Costa Lopes, asserting that the claims in his letter were “without basis in fact” and stating he could not understand

“how the Monsignor came to send that misleading and cruel letter or…perpetrated this wicked act.” Asserting that “there was not a person we met” who believed in a looming famine he went on to praise the supposed progress brought by the

Indonesians in construction, schools, agriculture and diet. He described da Costa

Lopes’ claims of 500 dead at Lacluta as “absurd” while attributing “some deaths” to crossfire in a clash between Fretilin and the military. He attributed reports of abuses from Catholic sources to a “crisis in identity” amongst Portuguese educated priests.

He even referred to the initial Indonesian takeover as a “liberation”, praising the authorities for their tolerance of Timor’s heritage.107 He doubled down on his assertions in an ABC radio broadcast several weeks later, denouncing da Costa Lopes as a “liar” and a “mendacious and malicious correspondent”, disparaging ACFOA and

105 Australian Catholic Relief. Press Release, Serious situation in East Timor, 6 January 1982. https://timorarchives.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/tis_box13-02_09.pdf 106 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. East Timor: ICRC/UNICEF/Family reunions. 13 November 1981. 107 Transcript of a press conference by the Honourable E.G. Whitlam, AC, QC, on Friday March 5, 1982, at the CSIS building, Jakarta, Indonesia. https://timorarchives.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/eto_w-h_12.pdf

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describing Dunn as a spokesperson for Fretilin.108 He continued to make similar assertions in the following months and years.

Hastings was also largely supportive of the Indonesian position, claiming to have seen no sign of famine, emphasising that the situation had “improved immeasurably” since his 1978 visit and attributing the change to the efforts of the

ICRC in partnership with the IRC and the Indonesian government.109 He described claims in da Costa Lopes’ letter as “inaccurate and mischievous” and attributed

Indonesian anger in response to it as having jeopardised the distribution of Australian aid.110

Da Costa Lopes was working in a situation of isolation. The extensive pressure he was subject to by Indonesian authorities was enhanced not only by the hostile lobbying of Whitlam, but by enmity from the Indonesian Catholic Church and the Vatican, which encouraged cooperation with Indonesian authorities. In July 1981

Lopes co-signed a statement criticising the Indonesian Catholic Church and the

Vatican for their silence on East Timor.111 In this context DFA conferred with the

Church in Jakarta and the Vatican to further their mutual goals. On 2 December 1981 the Indonesian Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Puente, told Ambassador Dalrymple that he believed significant improvements were underway in East Timor and that he had a

“real problem” with the Administrator of the diocese who exaggerated the situation, made unfounded allegations of atrocities and courted the international media. Citing

Murdani’s “word of honour the allegations were not true” he told the Ambassador that on instructions from Rome he had directed the Administrator to desist from further

108 Gough Whitlam interview by Richard Andrews, Frontline, Radio Australia, 26 March 1982. https://timorarchives.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/eto_w-h_09.pdf. 109 Peter Hastings, Timor: “Aid needed, but there’s no famine,” Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March 1982. 110 Peter Hastings, “Priest’s tale of woe could cost Timor aid,” Sydney Morning Herald, 8 March 1982. 111 CAVR, Chega, 679.

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involvement in politics or the making of controversial statements.112 In June 1982 the

Vatican Deputy Foreign Minister made it clear to the head of the Australian Mission to the Holy See that the Vatican favoured Puente’s claims over those of da Costa

Lopes, contending some accounts of abuses had been “grossly exaggerated” and that

“two zeros could usually be subtracted” from the casualties claimed by critics of

Indonesia.113 This attitude was reflected in the Vatican’s public position, with John

Paul II referring to the crisis in East Timor incorrectly as a “drought”.114 Under pressure from the Indonesian administration and the Vatican, da Costa Lopes resigned in August 1983.115 Fernandes documents how a Chilean diplomat described a beaming

Puentes as telling him in response that, “We have just got rid of that troublemaker…One headache less.”116

As a former Prime Minister viewed by many as an elder statesman, but at the same time a non-government figure lacking official status, it was in the interests of the

Fraser government to keep Whitlam’s advocacy on behalf of the Suharto regime at arm’s length so as to allow it to lend standing to the government position independently. It was, however, happy to use the claims by Whitlam and Hastings in support of its agenda both domestically and internationally. Australian diplomats drew the attention of West German officials to Whitlam and Hastings’ articles in response to material based on claims by da Costa Lopes circulating in the West German media, and were pleased to report that they “tended towards accepting the Whitlam/Hastings view.”117 The former Australian representative to the UN, Ralph Harry, told a Rotary

112 NAA: A1838, 3038/2/1, xxi. Rawdon Dalrymple, Conversation with Papal Nuncio on East Timor, 2 December 1981. 113 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. Cable from the Embassy to the Holy See to Canberra. Holy See: attitudes to East Timor. 1 June 1982. 114 Lennox, Fighting Spirit of East Timor, 163. 115 CAVR, Chega, 678. 116 Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor, 72. 117 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. Cable from Bonn to Canberra. Indonesia/U.N.: East Timor resolution. 31 March 1982.

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conference in Albury in April 1982 that Indonesia intervened after a request from

“political elements in East Timor” and that the majority of the UN accepted that the

East Timorese “did not want a Fretilin regime” and were not opposed to integration.

He cited Whitlam and Hastings in response to allegations of abuses, contending that,

“we cannot accept at face value the statements of individual priests or refugees or protagonists. We have to try to arrive at objective facts.”118 In a discussion with the

Australian representative of the Holy See, a senior Vatican official referred to the

“fairly reassuring statements” of Whitlam which he saw as countering claims of

“genocide” made by some sections of the church.119 Murdani was also pleased with the Whitlam/Hastings advocacy and cited the visit as an example of the kind of controlled tour by selected observers he favoured in support of Indonesian propaganda goals.120

8.10 The Senate inquiry

In the context of the publicity surrounding the Fence of Legs and the DPRD petition, and with Labor policy officially in support of self-determination, on 26

November 1981 the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, Senator John Button, successfully moved a motion for an inquiry by the Standing Committee on Foreign

Affairs into the “human rights and the condition of the people of East Timor.”121 The development brought a predictable reaction from Jakarta, with a senior official warning that it would arouse hostile comment in Indonesian media and possible retaliation regarding Australia’s treatment of Aboriginals.122 Nevertheless, the

118 NAA: A1838, 3038/9/1, xv. Albany Rotary Conference. 6 April 1982. 119 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. Cable from the Embassy to the Holy See to Canberra. East Timor. 6 July 1982. 120 NAA: A1838, 3038/7/1, xx. New Zealand Department of Foreign Affairs. Cable from New York to Wellington. Talks with Indonesian DFA officials. 7 April 1982. 121 Senate Hansard, 26 November 1981. 122 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/11/2, viii. Cable from Jakarta to Canberra. Senate Standing Committee into East Timor. 24 December 1981.

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subsequent inquiry, which lasted into the Hawke government, served to shine a light into the situation in the territory, the policies of the Fraser government and the culture of DFA.

Those giving evidence included ACFOA, the AETA, Timorese refugee groups, the Monash University academic Herb Feith, activists David Scott and

Richard Tanter, the journalist Peter Rodgers, Gough Whitlam as well as DFA officials. In his written submission and testimony on 14 May 1981 Whitlam reiterated the findings of his visit, repeated his attack on da Costa Lopes, strongly attacked

ACFOA and Dunn and defended the Indonesian government’s record on human rights and humanitarian concerns.123

The DFA written submission provides an overview of the Australian government’s Timor narrative at that stage.124 It emphasised the poor and underdeveloped nature of the territory under the Portuguese, describing “slash and burn” agricultural practices, poor transportation, high illiteracy rates and endemic health problems. While contending the 1975 civil war and “subsequent military intervention” by Indonesia “upset East Timor’s precarious agricultural pattern”, it downplayed the number of deaths caused by the famine, making no reference to

ABRI’s encirclement and annihilation campaign while emphasising Indonesian efforts to alleviate the situation in conjunction with the ICRC and CRS. It claimed the territory was receiving more on a per capita basis than other Indonesian provinces and uncritically cited official Indonesian statistics on health, education and housing.

Its depiction of the human rights situation was equally duplicitous. Citing a

“small number” of “actively hostile” Fretilin guerrillas, the submission contended that

123 Senate Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence. 1982. Reference: East Timor – Human Rights and Condition of the People, Testimony of 14 May 1982, Vol. 1. (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 2-123). 124 DFA. “Submission on East Timor to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence,” In Senate Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence 1982, Vol. 1, 480-520.

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it was “to be expected” that security operations against them would disrupt the lives of

East Timorese. It depicted the “resettlement centres” as a responsible program to provide security, relief and rehabilitation and enable greater access to schools, health and other facilities. It labelled “allegations about infringements of human rights” as

“generalised”, claiming the Department was “unable to prove or disprove them.” It noted, however, that the Indonesian government had informed the UN Commission on

Human Rights that it was doing its best to prevent excesses, which it attributed to

“Fretilin terrorist actions” and revenge by the local population against Fretilin. It cited

Peter Hastings to contend that most of the deaths on Atauro had been caused by severe gastroenteritis and that people there had been provided with housing, agricultural support and medical facilities. It repeated the DFA mantra that the “alleged DPRD report” was politically motivated.

However, while the Australian government narrative was by that time well- practiced, it did not derive from an extensive evidence base, nor did it entail a sophisticated understanding of the history or situation of East Timor. This became apparent under questioning by the committee, when DFA officials, through reasons of political expediency or lack of knowledge, proved deficient in a number of areas.

While insisting there was no risk of famine due to adequate food supplies, First

Assistant Secretary Gerald Nutter attributed recent crop failures to climatic factors and rodents, making no mention of the Fence of Legs. He described the figure of 100,000 deaths as “exaggerated”, but was unable to elaborate other than to claim without evidence that the 1974 Portuguese population figures were not accurate. Despite the

DFA emphasis on the civil war as a prime cause of Timorese woes, he claimed to have no knowledge about what proportion had died in it compared to in the post invasion period. He appeared uninformed about opposition to Indonesian rule other than by referring to “armed dissident groups.” He replied to questions about freedom of speech and assembly by reading from the Indonesian constitution. He insisted that

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the Australian delegation at the UN was not working for the defeat of the East Timor resolution.125

Under questioning, officials were unable to elaborate on their claim that there was little economic development before the invasion, while insisting things had improved since the takeover. One inaccurately claimed that there were practically no

Timorese in low or middle administrative roles before 1975. They were unable to name the army-controlled company P.T. Denok, mentioned in the DPRD petition and cited regularly in the Australian press, which monopolised the lucrative army- controlled coffee industry. They did not know which languages were used on radio and television.126

In an article in the TIS newsletter John Waddingham recorded these failings, also reporting that one officer, “spent the entire session on the edge of his seat, nervously scuffling his feet” and how members of the press exchanged “quiet sniggers or glances of incredulity” at some of the responses. It contended that, “information on the East Timorese claims and aspirations” was not collected or not accorded importance as it was unnecessary to the policy goal of supporting the Indonesian takeover.127

The committee reported in September 1983, during the first year of the

Hawke government. Its report was highly critical of Indonesian rule, concluding that the Timorese people had been “denied the most fundamental of human rights” and recommending that the Australian government “reassert this country’s commitment to the right of self-determination for all peoples.” The three Coalition Senators on the

125 Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 1982, Testimony of 10 June 1982, 542-3, 587. 126 Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 1982, Testimony of 10 June 1982, 521-87. 127 “Department of Foreign Affairs: What does it know about East Timor?” TIS Newsletter, no. 37, July/August 1982.

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committee, however, produced a minority report contending that, “the excesses of the past have largely been eliminated” and recommending Australia liaise with Indonesia to support development.128 In anticipation of the report the Hawke government, which wished to reverse ALP Timor policy, organised a parliamentary delegation to East

Timor led by MP and former diplomat Bill Morrison. Its report was supportive of a pro-Indonesian position, but was itself challenged by a minority report by delegation member Gordon McIntosh.129

8.11 Conclusion

As former Ambassador Dalrymple made clear in his conversation with the author in July 2018,130 during the Fraser years Suharto was seen to be well entrenched and support for him determined Australian policy. The Indonesian relationship was prioritised to the detriment of other factors, including the welfare of the Timorese people. Indonesian officials were well aware of this and used it for their advantage.

Pressure from the Suharto regime, particularly the OPSUS/Murdani group, was effective in convincing DFA officials that the relationship was in a parlous state due to the activities of pro-Timorese solidarity activists, aid groups and parliamentarians.

This spurred the Fraser government further in its efforts to protect the Suharto regime, cover up and deny the reality of ongoing abuses and position the Timor issue as far as possible in public perception as a matter of the past.

This involved continuing to portray the occupying regime as a fundamentally responsible entity working in a “primitive” and recalcitrant territory to rectify a

128 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Human Rights and Conditions of the People of East Timor (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1983). 129 Commonwealth of Australia. Official report of the Australian parliamentary delegation to Indonesia, led by the Hon. W.L. Morrison, M.P, July-August 1983. (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1983). 130 Rawdon Dalrymple in discussion with the author, 17 July 2018.

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problem of acute underdevelopment exacerbated by events not of its making. It involved continuing to distort the historical narrative regarding the civil war, the covert Indonesian military intervention and the invasion. It involved inaccurately depicting the traditional food and infrastructure situation so it could be disproportionately blamed for ongoing difficulties, as well as portraying the

Indonesian administration as working responsibly with international organisations to address such issues. Responding to new developments, it involved inaccurately depicting the nature and impact of the transit and resettlement camps and the relocation program. It involved downplaying and denying the nature and extent of ongoing atrocities, such as the Lacluta massacre, while feigning concern about human rights by the use of stock phrases. It involved denying the extent and nature of the

Fence of Legs operation and the brutalities that accompanied it. It involved ignoring the evidence of the abuses outlined in the DPRD petition while advancing a political explanation for the document in public. It also involved ignoring the extensive evidence of abuses apparent from its own sources.

The government’s efforts to shape the popular narrative continued to entail undermining the efforts of the remaining solidarity movement. It entailed legitimising

ABRI repression, with Australian recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East

Timor used to justify a refusal to condemn “security” actions by the military, regardless of the impact on the wider civilian population. In the international arena the

Fraser government supported Indonesian propaganda efforts by disseminating a pro-

Indonesian narrative and lobbying nations around the world to remove the Timor issue from the UN agenda. It downplayed evidence of the extent of the crisis to countries which regarded Australia as an authority and discouraged them from taking action, as well as assisting countries such as West Germany and the Netherlands in their efforts to counter their own Timor solidarity movements.

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The support provided by the Jakarta lobby was of valuable assistance in establishing the government narrative as the supposedly “responsible” position broadly accepted by the Australian community and the media. Despite the effort of

Herb Feith and a small number of others, with a critical approach to the Suharto regime likely to lead to exclusion of scholars from Indonesia, there was no pro-

Timorese academic equivalent of Arndt, Mackie, McCawley and others associated with the lobby. This was compounded by the irresponsible and inaccurate reporting by what were largely perceived by the public to be responsible, professional journalists who were provided privileged access to East Timor by the Indonesian government, enabling them to assert expertise on the issue. These factors assisted the Fraser government in asserting that its position was realistic, responsible and, as Ralph Harry put it to the Albury Rotary Club, based upon “objective facts”, in contrast to the supposedly unverified claims of “priests or refugees or protagonists.”

The attacks on Dunn, ACFOA and other Timor activists by pro-Suharto journalists and academics furthered the government’s efforts to depict them as marginalised radicals using hearsay, anonymous sources and unverified claims in support of an irresponsible, ideologically based campaign against the Indonesian government. Whitlam, a former Prime Minister of a Labor government and a respected figure to many on the left of politics the world over, abetted this further. His energetic, unrestrained and aggressive lobbying on behalf of the Suharto regime and his denigration of individuals and organisations bolstered the Fraser government’s ability to position its narrative as the responsible one. It also created mistrust concerning the veracity of information deriving from Timorese Catholic sources, from where a great deal of the evidence about the situation in the territory was then coming.

As the testimony of DFA officials at the Senate inquiry demonstrated, the propagation of the government narrative did not require a sophisticated understanding

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of the situation, particularly concerning the humanitarian plight of the Timorese people. On the contrary, it required purposely ignoring evidence available to DFA officials and the government. With evidence of the actual situation apparent for those willing to look for it, even from the Department’s own investigations, a genuine attempt to understand the humanitarian and human rights situations would have conflicted with key Fraser government foreign policy goals. Interrogating the evidence available to the Department, such as that obtained by the Jakarta Embassy concerning the Fence of Legs and the Lacluta massacre, would have worked against the government’s ability to disparage evidence and sources, or for Foreign Minister

Street to claim that allegations of abuses were “unverified”, “generalised”,

“exaggerated”, or the product of “insubstantial information”. In taking this position the Minister was not speaking through ignorance so much as purposefully ignoring evidence readily available to him.

Writing in the context of the information available to it at the time, the TIS article on the Senate inquiry contended that, “information on East Timorese claims and aspirations” was not collected or not accorded importance as it conflicted with the policy goal of supporting the Suharto regime’s takeover of East Timor. However, the failure to act upon, or even effectively analyse the information obtained by the Jakarta

Embassy indicates an expediency based on purposely putting aside evidence in the interests of policy goals, including that obtained through its own sources on instructions from the Minister. Like the evidence regarding OPSUS actions before the invasion or the JIO report discussed in Chapter Seven, inconvenient evidence was simply put aside and ignored, with the Department and the government acting and speaking as if evidence in contradiction to its preferred narrative did not exist.

In the domestic arena the Fraser government’s efforts to marginalise the

Timor issue were reasonably successful. Although a small solidarity movement

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continued, it was ineffective in mobilising any large-scale expression of concern within Australian society. Although a parliamentary Timor lobby continued to raise the issue, it was of limited size and impact. Although official ALP policy continued to support East Timorese self-determination during this period, the matter was not accorded a high priority and certainly not deployed as a campaign issue. While events such as the Fence of Legs led to some media coverage and criticisms, this did not constitute a major impediment to the government’s Timor agenda and certainly not its electoral prospects.

In the international arena the situation was mixed. Indonesia, Australia, and other like-minded nations were ultimately unsuccessful in removing the issue from the

UN agenda, with the continued success of Timor resolutions and the referral of the issue to the offices of the Secretary-General in 1982 ensuring it would remain officially unresolved in the following decades. On the other hand, as the Suharto regime’s main propagandist on the Timor issue and a country others often turned to as an authority on the issue, Australian efforts were undoubtedly influential in tempering international concerns and preventing scrutiny. This lobbying helped ensure that the

Timor issue remained unresolved in this period, prolonging the period of occupation and the suffering which accompanied it. The limited nature of the ICRC mandate, its failure to deliver aid outside of government-controlled areas and the refusal of the

Indonesian government to allow UNICEF and other organisations to operate in the territory also undoubtedly considerably exacerbated suffering. Severe human rights abuses continued, such as the Fence of Legs and the Lacluta massacre, despite information about them reaching the outside world from a variety of sources. With the

Suharto regime seeking a role on the world stage and susceptible to international pressure, this situation was able to continue due to a lack of international scrutiny and action, to a considerable extent facilitated by Australian lobbying.

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Chapter 9: Conclusion

In his book on mass violence in East Timor, Joseph Nevins poses the question as to why “we pay greater heed to some atrocities and not others?” He identifies

“social difference” as a key reason.131 East Timor was little known by most

Australians before the invasion, and its people socially distant in culture, language, ethnicity, economic situation and political aspirations. The concept of mass violence is sufficiently removed from the experience of everyday Australians that when they hear of it happening in a territory socially distant to their own, they do not respond to it in a meaningful way. East Timor’s physical proximity to Australia was not sufficient to bridge this gap or allow the suffering of the Timorese people to provoke the same sense of outrage as did, for example, the disappearance of Azaria Chamberlain near

Alice Springs in a similar period.

In taking the decision to prioritise the Indonesian relationship over the rights and welfare of the Timorese people the Fraser government was motivated by its own conception of the national interest and the role the Suharto regime played in its policy goals. This was multifaceted in nature, spurred by Fraser’s pro-Western and anti- communist agenda, amplified by the unification of Vietnam and the coming to power of Marxist regimes in Laos and Cambodia in 1975, as well as by a desire for stronger relations with ASEAN nations and the region. Although the contention it was the primary driver of policy is not supported, a desire for a settlement of the Timor sea boundary added further impetus to this position. Good relations with the pro-Western and anti-communist Suharto regime were therefore important to the Fraser government’s concept of the Australian national interest. The welfare of the Timorese people, in contrast, was never a substantial consideration.

131 Joseph Nevins, A not-so-distant horror. Mass violence in East Timor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 11-12.

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As discussed, it was during the Fraser years that the majority those who died in East Timor due to the occupation lost their lives. Despite the extent of this crisis, however, East Timor never became an issue of major importance to the majority of

Australians, nor did it spawn a movement comparable to the Vietnam war protests or even the anti-apartheid campaign. Nevertheless, with evidence of the humanitarian crisis emanating from East Timor on a regular basis, the work of the smallish but energetic solidarity movement, the Timor parliamentary lobby, ACFOA, Dunn and others was successful in keeping the issue in the public eye to a reasonable extent for most of the Fraser years.

With strong relations with the Suharto regime seen as necessary to its international policy agenda, the Fraser government and its foreign affairs department reacted with consternation to suggestions that the Indonesian relationship was being damaged by the Timor issue. With Indonesia seeking a more prominent position on the international stage the Suharto regime undoubtedly saw any criticisms of its actions in East Timor, including those from domestic elements in Australia, as a threat to its ambitions. Nevertheless, it is clear that Indonesian officials used the Australian government’s propensity to react strongly to criticisms by them as a tool for achieving their objectives. Their continued admonishments that the strength of the relationship was at risk due to the activities of solidarity activists, parliamentarians and others spurred the Fraser government further in its attempts to neutralise the Timor issue both domestically and internationally.

The position the Fraser government adopted in relation to other matters, its criticism of the Soviet Union and the forthright position of opposition it took in regard to the invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan required it to adapt an official position in support of international law, including the rights of nations to self-determination.

At the same time the Fraser government sought to project itself as an advocate for

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liberal democratic ideals, opposing apartheid in South Africa and working to end white majority rule in Zimbabwe. The obvious contradiction between its position on these issues and the one it adopted towards East Timor caused it to deny the consequences of its policy position and cover up the reality of the situation in the territory. The Fraser government worked to neutralise the Timor issue both in the interests of its relationship with the Indonesian government and in order to enable it to continue to depict itself as an upholder of international norms and liberal democratic ideals.

In 2013, in response to revelations that it had knowledge of the unfolding calamity in East Timor in 1978, Fraser told an ABC journalist that “in retrospect many mistakes were made” and that his government should have responded sooner.132

Yet the Fraser government did far more than simply ignore the situation. While

Woolcott couched his arguments in favour of integration in Kissingerian realist terms, this was not the position that the Fraser government put to the Australian people nor the international community. It instead sought to propagate a narrative that denied the reality of the ongoing situation, protect the Suharto regime from scrutiny and depict its own position as principled and realistic.

This thesis has demonstrated how this ongoing ‘narrative of denial’ evolved through a number of stages as events progressed and information regarding the situation came to the attention of the outside world. In the first year of the Fraser government it entailed an expression of official regret at the use of force and support for self-determination, while distorting the historical narrative to depict the invasion as a reluctant Indonesian intervention in a chaotic and destabilising situation of

132 James Bennettt, “New evidence suggests Australia was warned about humanitarian crisis in East Timor and failed to act,” ABC News, 3 October 2013. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-03/new-evidence-suggests-australia-failed-to-act- soon-enough-to-he/4996412

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Timorese origin. In following years the government attempted to depict a situation of increasing normality in the closed territory, while responding to claims of abuses with denial and disparagement. When from late 1978 increasing evidence made the extent of the crisis impossible to completely deny, it attempted to neutralise international pressure on the issue by attributing the situation to the historical poverty and underdevelopment of the territory exacerbated by the irresponsible actions of the

Timorese themselves, depicting the Suharto regime as a largely responsible entity dealing as best it could with a situation it had unwillingly inherited. This was complemented throughout by the assertion that the interests of the Timorese people were best served by engaging in a “constructive” or uncritical manner with a supposedly well-intentioned Indonesian administration, that criticism of its actions would be counterproductive, and that the Fraser government’s approach was accordingly both realistic and responsible.

This narrative was not evidence based, nor was the Fraser government driven to an objective assessment of the nature of the occupation. It was not in the interests of its policy goals to engage in an impartial evaluation of the situation of the Timorese people nor of the ongoing abuses committed against them. To do so would have risked exposing the contradictory nature of its Timor policy and creating public pressure for change. The denigration of the evidence that Dunn obtained from

Timorese refugees as “hearsay” and the disparagement of others seeking to publicise evidence regarding the situation can be understood in this context. These efforts were aided by the Jakarta lobby, which added substantially to the credibility of the Fraser government’s position in the public eye. While the lobby’s assertions were neither evidence-based nor the product of research or analysis, the proactive position taken by a number of prominent academics, journalists and diplomats was effective in convincing many that the government’s Timor narrative was realistic, responsible and evidence-based.

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As demonstrated, the Fraser government was in possession of considerable evidence indicating the extent of the humanitarian crisis, much of it obtained from

Indonesian sources. Evaluating the extent to which Fraser, Peacock, Street, Woolcott,

Critchley and others believed in the fundamentals of the narrative themselves is problematic given their propensity to subjugate understanding and analysis to their desire that conclusions support policy goals. The Indonesian strategy of pressuring the

Australians regarding the stability of the relationship while providing a selective mixture of information and disinformation regarding the situation in East Timor was largely successful as it accorded with the Fraser government’s conception of the

Australian national interest. As discussed, however, it is clear that the narrative that the government propagated to the Australian people and to the international community was in contradiction to the weight of evidence available to it, even that provided by JIO.

At the United Nations the Fraser government attempted to convince other countries that incorporation was irreversible, the Timor issue a matter of the past and allegations of a crisis exaggerated. From before the invasion it provided a distorted account of the events leading to it in order to make Indonesian actions appear more reasonable. In moving to abstention and then a no vote it lobbied other nations to do the same in an attempt to remove the issue from the UN agenda. In the broader international arena it sought to persuade its international allies that information regarding a humanitarian crisis was without foundation or was not the fault of the invaders. It responded to the Dunn report by working actively to disparage the assertions within it, assisting the US State Department in countering the testimony of

Dunn, lobbying the Dutch, the Swedes and other nations and denigrating the evidence in the report without investigation. It responded to the revelations from the visit of the ambassadors by propagating a narrative which incorrectly attributed the situation to

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historical Timorese underdevelopment exacerbated by the reckless actions of the

Timorese themselves.

In taking such a position, the Fraser government shut down alternatives available to it. The early advice of Renouf that policy be reassessed in the event of a prolonged conflict was ignored. To paraphrase Woolcott,133 Australian policy was impaled on the hook of the relationship with Suharto’s New Order, unwilling to move beyond its vision of the Australian national interest or the primacy the relationship with the regime played in it. So deeply was it fearful of offending the Suharto regime that regardless of the evidence the Fraser government proved incapable of attempting to steer Indonesia away from its course of action or itself from its support for it.

Australia was far from the only country which supported Indonesia on the

Timor issue or propagated a distorted narrative regarding it. As discussed, however, with Australia seen by many countries as possessing expertise on the situation in East

Timor, the Fraser government was in a particular position to influence events. Despite its repeated contention that it was not a “party principal”, any stance it took would have had a significant impact. It used this position to deny the reality of the humanitarian crisis and work to allow the Indonesian government to continue its operations in East Timor largely unimpeded. The prioritisation of the Indonesian relationship and the willingness of the Fraser government to protect it from criticism caused it to become the key propagandist for it on the Timor issue in the international arena. It provided the Suharto regime’s claims regarding the situation with an apparent credibility which they would not otherwise have attained.

Like the Suharto regime itself, the Australian government was not in the long- term effective in its goal of entirely neutralising the Timor issue nor ensuring the long-term integration of East Timor into Indonesia. During the Fraser years, however,

133 NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/1, ii. Letter from Woolcott to Whitlam. 2 April 1975. (Way, 241).

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its efforts appear to have had a considerable impact, dampening domestic and international concerns and discouraging other countries from taking up the issue. A precise assessment of the impact of the Fraser government’s actions on events in East

Timor throughout its period of government is problematic. However, Indonesia was seeking a larger role on the world stage, and as such was vulnerable to international criticism. An exercise in counterfactual history is not required to determine that

Australian lobbying on behalf of the Suharto regime was a significant factor in protecting it from the kind of scrutiny that would have forced it to at a minimum moderate the extent of its abuses.

The Fraser government’s contention that it was acting in the Australian national interest, however, proved incorrect. Far from producing the desired stability in the Australia/Indonesia relationship, the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia proved in the long-term unviable, and a continuing source of friction between the two countries throughout the occupation. The efforts by successive Australian governments to protect the Suharto regime on the Timor issue culminated ultimately in the INTERFET intervention and the strained relations with Indonesia that accompanied it. Even in its own terms, the Fraser government’s Timor policy ultimately proved a failure.

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