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Overview of Ukrainian Reforms During Zelenskyy's First Year of Presidency

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Overview of Ukrainian Reforms During Zelenskyy's First Year of Presidency Overview of Ukrainian Reforms during the First Year of Presidency of Volodymyr Zelenskyy By ECEAP Senior Research Fellow Aap Neljas ABSTRACT The analysis presents an overview of Ukraine’s reform process during the first year of Presidency of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and two Ukrainian Governments (Honcharuk and Shmyhal cabinets). Overwhelming victory in presidential elections and the victory of his party in parliamentary elections placed Zelenskyy originally in the unprecedented position of controlling both the executive and legislative branches. Due to the control of President’s Servant of People party of Parliament and activity of Honcharuk Government (that was composed mostly from young apolitical specialists) at the beginning of this period some important reforms were effected (law regarding the lifting of immunity of the members of the parliament; law on the procedure for impeaching the president; new electoral law; Naftogaz unbundling; land reform law and banking law; progress with digitalisation of government services using ProZorro and Trembita platforms etc.). However, soon this initial reform drive subsided due to the fractioning of the ruling Servant of People Party decision to replace pro-reform Honcharuk Government and some pro-reform key officials who led independent institutions with more managerial type politicians and officials has created questions how reforms will proceed. Besides that, the analysis points out that some key reforms, especially anti-corruption reforms, were passed also because of pressure from international donors (IMF, EU and USA). The New Shmyhal Government has promised to continue with conducting of reforms, although in practice the speed of reforms has subsided at least for a moment. In general, however, it’s expected that Ukraine continues with reforms in the same speed as earlier governments – moving forward, even if at a pace slower than 1 Western expectations. In the foreign policy Ukraine’s course will be to continue its policy of integration with NATO and the EU (although some recent protectionist legislative initiatives in parliament could complicate the situation). Regarding the relations with Russia and ending the war in the east there has been no breakthrough either, although Zelenskyy could claim some successes (exchange of prisoners, gas transit agreement). However, Ukraine has not achieved the agreement to end the Russian occupation of Crimea and eastern Donbas regions yet notwithstanding the Ukrainian agreement to adopt the Steinmeier formula that regulates the parameters of the future local elections in the occupied areas. INTRODUCTION 2019 was an important election year for Ukraine, whose citizens elected a new President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in April and a new Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) in July 2019. A significant international election observation presence in the country assessed these elections as competitive and that they were held with respect for fundamental freedoms. As result of those elections an unique situation in modern Ukrainian history occurred where President with strong electoral support (Zelenskyy won the election with 73.22% of the vote in the second round) had also his party dominating the Parliament (the election result was the one-party majority for President Zelenskyy's Servant of the People Party won with 254 seats from 450, and 226 seats were needed for majority). As result of this election two months after taking up the presidency, Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party became the first party in Ukraine’s history to secure a parliamentary majority without forming a coalition. This placed Zelenskyy in the unprecedented position of controlling both the executive and legislative branches. The Rada became a “voting machine”. Legislation passed through at breakneck speed. However, this is no longer the case since spring 2020. Today, Zelenskyy often has trouble getting sufficient support from his own party to pass bills. They are often sent back to be amended, resulting in long delays.1 Originally situation of complete control over Parliament created better preconditions for pushing through reforms promised by Zelenskyy during electoral campaign than never before in Ukraine’s modern history. The first Government, led by Oleksiy Honcharuk (Prime Minister of Ukraine from 29 August 2019 to 4 March 2020) started with an ambitious reform programme that stated that the strategic goal is for Ukraine is to meet the criteria for membership of the European Union. However, soon differences emerged between President and Prime Minister. Ukrainian media outlets reported during the beginning of the 2020, that Zelenskyy had lost confidence in Honcharuk due to the slow speed at which his government was carrying out reforms. This led to dismissal of Honcharuk cabinet in March 2020 and appointment of the current Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal Government who was sworn in on 4 March 2020 and new Governmental Programme were 1 – Amanda Paul. One year of President Zelenskiy: Did “Ze” bite off. – EPC Commentary. 19.05.2020. http://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/One-year-of-President-Zelenskiy-Did-Ze-bite-off-more-than-he-could~333948 2 adopted 12 April 2020 2. Shmyhal’s government on 15 June 2020 also published Action Programme in response to a number of problems facing Ukraine, namely: Russian aggression; Pandemic Covid-19; and economic crisis. The document also provides that the government will continue to digitalize public services. Plans are to introduce 200 public services available online. The programme also includes activities aimed at the reintegration of temporarily occupied territories. The document declared the continuation of European integration by strengthening the course of cooperation within the framework of the Eastern Partnership and ensuring Ukraine meets the criteria for EU membership.3 POLITICAL REFORMS Thanks to the clear victory of his Servant of the People Party in the snap parliamentary election held in July 2019 and the establishment of the government of Honcharuk the following month, Zelenskyy swiftly gained full power. The plan for the declared repair of the country and an end to the war in the Donbas involved the appointment of apolitical specialists for key positions in the government to immediately process legislation in the parliament and to conduct informal diplomacy. This strategy brought certain successes. Partial organisational changes were introduced in the prosecutor’s office and courts; the constitution was amended in the area of the rights of the members of the Verkhovna Rada and the president, and a summit – the first in three years – in the Normandy Format was held in Paris in December 2019.4 When taking power, Zelenskyy declared that he would remain in office for one term only and that his goal was to carry out fast and thorough reforms. In the beginning, his modus operandi consisted in transferring draft laws from the Presidential Office (as the former Presidential Administration had now been renamed) to the parliament. The draft laws were immediately passed, often without appropriate assessment from the members of the parliament and in breach of the parliamentary regulations. The author of this mode, described as the ‘turbo-regime’, was Andriy Bohdan, the head of the Presidential Office and one of Zelenskyy’s aides who had experience in politics and administration. Due to the model of governing with the Office of the President as the decision hub and the principle of basing the government on professionals from outside the realm of politics, the government 2 – Програма діяльності Кабінету Міністрів України. 12.04.2020. https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-zatverdzhennya-programi-diyalnosti-kabinetu-ministriv-t120620 3 – Ukrainian Cabinet published draft updated action programme. 15.06.2020. – 112 International https://112.international/politics/cabinet-of-ministers-has-published-draft-updated-program-of-its-activities-52220.html 4 – Tadeusz Iwański, Sławomir Matuszak, Krzysztof Nieczypor, Piotr Żochowski. Neither a miracle nor a disaster – President Zelensky’s first year in Office. – OSW Commentary nr. 334. 20.05.2020. https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Commentary_334.pdf 3 has been reduced to the role of a contractor enacting the will of the president.5 This was the idea behind the appointment of Oleksiy Honcharuk as prime minister. He was a specialist in deregulation but did not have much experience in administration or any political independent support base. Most foreign observers regarded the Honcharuk cabinet as honest and pro-reform, albeit young and relatively inexperienced. The new cabinet set ambitious reform goals. During the first few weeks of the work of the new Verkhovna Rada, a series of new laws was successfully passed, among them the laws which had traction in society but which were in fact difficult to implement. One example is the law regarding the lifting of immunity of the members of the Verkhovna Rada and the law on the procedure for impeaching the president. The new election law, which entered into force at the beginning of 2020, can also be counted as one of the greatest achievements of the Zelenskyy administration. Due to the new election law, the parliamentary and local elections will be held in a proportional system (many electoral districts were introduced to replace the nationwide district). The former mixed system, allowed for half of the members of parliament to be elected in single- member constituencies. This was, in the context of Ukraine, a source of abuse and political corruption for years.6
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