Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses Rest aur Law PAGE ant 72
November 2010 /$4
EARN MCLE CREDIT PLUS Enforceability Bad NewsNews of Forum- for Copyright Selection Claimants Clauses page 32 page page 25
LossLoss Deductions from Wages page 10 Undocumented Personal Injury Plaintiffs page 15 Super Powers
Los Angeles lawyers Justin M. Goldstein (left) and Noah Pérez-Silverman discuss the inherent powers of courts to address litigation abuse page 18 THE SCHOOL OF LAW AND THE CENTER FOR GLOBAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AT CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY proudly announce Photograph used with permission of Creative Commons GLOBAL PROJECT FOR LGBTQ RIGHTS AND FEMINISM
PROJECT CO-DIRECTORS
Professor M. Katherine Baird Darmer served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York before joining the faculty at Chapman University School of Law in 2000. She is co-editor of the book Morality, Justice and the Law and has published several articles and spoken in legal forums across the country on matters related to Proposition 8 and LGBTQ rights. She is a founding board member and Chair of the Legal Team of the Orange County Equality Coalition
Photograph used with permission of Marta Evry and a founding board member of Lavender Bar Association. She was recently awarded a Community Bridge Award for her work on behalf of LGBTQ rights. In 2009, she served as a sabbatical visitor and senior fellow in Columbia Law School’s Gender CONFIRMED SPEAKERS FOR 2010-2011: and Sexuality Law Program in New York City. She was one of two lead authors of an amicus brief filed on behalf of numerous Chapman University and Orange County individualsand married couples June Rose Carbone – Monday, October 4, 2010 in favor of overturning Proposition 8 before the California Supreme Court. Professor Darmer received her A.B. Edward A. Smith/Missouri Chair in Law, from Princeton University, with high honors, and her Juris Doctor from Columbia University, where she was the Constitution and Society a Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar. She will teach a new seminar on Sexual Orientation in spring 2011. University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law “What Does Bristol Palin Have To Do With Professor Marisa S. Cianciarulo is the Director of Chapman’s Family Violence Same-Sex Marriage?” Clinic, in which upper-level law students represent survivors of domestic violence, rape, and other crimes in petitions for restraining orders and applications for immigration Dean Spade – Thursday, October 28, 2010 relief. She is a specialist in clinical teaching and immigration law with a human rights Assistant Professor of Law focus. Professor Cianciarulo taught in the Villanova Clinic for Asylum, Refugee and Seattle University School of Law Emigrant Services for three years prior to joining the faculty at Chapman. She previously served as a Staff Attorney with the American Bar Association’s Commission on Immigration "The End of G(LBT?) Rights Politics" in Washington, D.C., was a partner in a law firm specializing in immigration matters, Katherine M. Franke – Wednesday, January 12, 2011 and served as interim legal director of a non-profit immigration services provider in Arlington, Virginia. She publishes on the intersection of gender and immigration with an emphasis on vulnerable Professor of Law, Director of Center for Gender immigrant populations. Professor Cianciarulo received her B.A. from the Catholic University of America, her J.D. and Sexuality Law from American University Washington College of Law, and her M.A. from American University School of International Columbia Law School Service. She teaches the Family Violence Clinic, Gender & the Law, Refugee Law and Civil Procedure. "Dignifying Rights: Reflections on the Same-Sex Marriage Litigation" BOARD OF ADVISORS Catherine E. Smith – Spring 2011 Ashleigh Aitken, president of the Orange County Women Lawyers Association and former Assistant Associate Dean of Institutional Diversity and Inclusiveness, United States Attorney in the Central District of California. Associate Professor University of Denver Sturm College of Law Tiffany Chang, board member of the Orange County Equality Coalition and former president of Outlaw, Topic: TBA the Chapman law student group for LGBTQs and straight allies. Lt. Dan Choi, West Point graduate and Arab language specialist in the United States Army before being discharged after publicly coming out as being gay. MISSION STATEMENT Karyl E. Ketchum, Ph.D., assistant professor of Women’s Studies at California State University, Fullerton The mission of the Global Project for LGBTQ Rights and whose scholarship has examined the relationship between misogyny and homophobia. Feminism is to bring leading scholars and policymakers Shannon Minter, Esq., legal director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights and lead attorney in the to Chapman University to discuss a wide range of issues California marriage cases whose work led to the first-ever state supreme court finding that gays and lesbians related to family law, marriage equality, discrimination based are entitled to “suspect classification” status for equal protection purposes. Ford Foundation “Leadership on sex and sexual orientation, international human rights, for a Changing World” award recipient. and the profound impact that gender and sexual orientation have on law and society; to address the complex questions Rev. Canon Albert J. Ogle, board member of Equality California and Integrity, U.S.A., which works closely evoked by feminist theory and LGBTQ rights through an with Bishop Christopher Senyonjo of Uganda in battling the repression of LGBTQs in that country. interdisciplinary approach; and to provide an important Jeffrey A. Redding, assistant professor of law at St. Louis University whose scholarship examines family forum for international dialogue about gender and norms and family law practices across cultures. Former Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law at Yale Law School. sexual orientation.
VISION STATEMENT
The vision of the Global Project for LGBTQ Rights and Feminism is a world safe for all persons, regardless of gender, gender identification or sexual orientation. One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866 I www.chapman.edu/law EXCLUSIVELY FAMILYLAW
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42 Special Section Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses
Los Angeles Lawyer DEPARTMENTS the magazine of the Los Angeles County 9 Barristers Tips 72 By the Book Bar Association How to prepare for direct examination of The Essential Guide to California a witness Restaurant Law November 2010 BY DEVON MYERS REVIEWED BY GORDON ENG Volume 33, No.8 10 Practice Tips 76 Closing Argument COVER PHOTO: TOM KELLER The limits on employer deductions from Leveraging justice with the Justice pay in California Gap Fund BY STEVEN G. PEARL BY ASSEMBLYMEMBER MIKE FEUER, HOLLY J. FUJIE, AND REX S. HEINKE 15 Practice Tips The immigration status of plaintiffs in 73 Classifieds personal injury actions LOS ANGELES LAWYER (ISSN 0162-2900) is published monthly, BY CEDRIC M. SHEN AND HUMBERTO R. GRAY 74 Index to Advertisers except for a combined issue in July/August, by the Los Angeles County Bar Association, 1055 West 7th Street, Suite 2700, Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 896-6503. 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Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards Inc. owns the SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA CHINESE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION certification marks CFP, Certified Financial Planner and CFP (with flame logo)®, which it awards to individuals who successfully WHITTIER BAR ASSOCIATION complete initial and ongoing certification requirements. FORTUNE® magazine, March, 2008. WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES 6 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 JUDGE LAWRENCE W. CRISPO (RET.) n a prior column, I noted that “in the absence of a prece- dent stating the obvious, common sense will suffice.” I Jeffer, Mangels & Butler v. Glickman, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1432, 1439 (1991). But Jeffer, Mangels was nearly 20 years ago, long before the Internet infiltrated our homes and pockets. Now, common sense often requires confirmation via a quick Internet search. Still we often quip with irony that “it’s on the Internet, so it must be true” and joke about receiving “official request[s]” from Nigerian royalty to transfer money. Notwithstanding the scams, the availability of information on the Internet has entered our communal psyche. As a result, the vast majority of us now second-guess, or at least feel more comfortable in confirming with an Internet search, what we sim- ply knew via common sense in years past. For example, 20 years ago, who would have questioned whether there were different designs of yellow hats? At a minimum, Mediator Arbitrator there’s the Gorton’s fish stick guy, Dick Tracy, the San Diego Padres, and the Man with the Yellow Hat from the Curious George books. (I must confess that, despite reading the Curious George books as a child and to my children ad nauseam, I con- ducted an Internet search to confirm that the Man with the Yellow Hat had no proper Referee name. This was so until 1998, according to Wikipedia, when he was “Ted” in the 213.926.6665 book See the Circus and “Ted Shackleford” in the 2006 movie Curious George.) www.judgecrispo.com Finally, there is “precedent stating the obvious”—an Internet search may suffice to confirm (or demonstrate) common sense. In United States v. Bari, 599 F. 3d 176 (2d Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals considered, and confirmed in a limited con- text, the propriety of a district court taking judicial notice of Internet search results. After his imprisonment for bank robbery, Bari commenced his supervised release. At a supervised release revocation hearing the court found Bari guilty of a bank rob- bery violation and a firearms violation “on the cumulative effect of multiple items of evidence.” The judge noted that the “strongest piece of evidence” was a yellow hat worn by the perpetrator (as seen on the bank’s surveillance video footage)—the same type found in Bari’s landlord’s garage. “To emphasize the similarity between the hats, [the district judge] stated that ‘there are clearly lots of yellow hats out there,’ and that ‘[o]ne can Google yellow rain hats and find lots of different yellow rain hats.’” After noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence, except those governing privileges, do not apply in revocation proceedings, the court concluded, “Common sense leads one to suppose that there is not only one type of yellow rain hat for sale. Instead, one would imagine that there are many types of yellow rain hats, with one sufficient to suit nearly any taste in brim-width or shade. The District Court’s independent Internet search served only to confirm this common sense supposition.” Moreover, continued the Bari court, “As the cost of confirming one’s intuition decreases, we would expect to see more judges doing just that. More generally, with so much information at our fingertips (almost literally), we all likely confirm hunches with a brief visit to our favorite search engine that in the not-so-distant past would have gone unconfirmed.” The observations by the court foreshadow the impending merger of the so far distinct subparts of Federal Rule of Evidence 201 on judicial notice that address what is “(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court,” and “(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Perhaps the same fate awaits California Evidence Code Sections 451(f) and 452(g) and (h). I Michael A. Geibelson is a business trial lawyer with Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., where he handles unfair competition, trade secret, and class actions. He is the 2010-11 chair of the Los Angeles Lawyer Editorial Board. 8 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 barristers tips BY DEVON MYERS How to Prepare for Direct Examination of a Witness WHILE NO SINGLE LIST CAN ENCOMPASS all the fine points of Once the outline is fully prepared, it is time to practice with your preparing and questioning a witness at trial, the following list high- witness. You do not want your witness’s testimony to sound rehearsed, lights the important ones. The first step is to conduct a comprehen- so review your questions as needed, probably no more than once. Or sive review of the evidence that relates to the witness. Collect and you can describe the order in which you plan to ask questions and review all documents related to the witness—including declarations, the important points that need to be covered. For questions that have depositions, and exhibits—to construct a narrative, through ques- emotional impact, steer clear of them in preparation so that the wit- tioning, for the jury. Review documents, if any, that are not part of ness’s answers will be fresher for testimony. For example, I recently discovery. had the opportunity to question witnesses during trial in the challenge Once you have reviewed what you know about the witness, con- led by Log Cabin Republicans to the Don't Ask, Don’t Tell policy. My sider what you do not know and what you want to avoid. Cross-exam- first witness had an excellent answer to why he spent a lot of his time ination cannot exceed the bounds of direct examination, so unless speaking out against the policy. He did so because his best friend, who absolutely necessary, avoid topics that may be problematic. Next, talk was an excellent soldier, left the military because he could not bear to the witness about the information you do not have that may add the burden of having to lie about his sexual orientation all the time. useful detail to the testimony. Ask about any potential problems The witness, who was also an excellent soldier, spoke of how it was that the witness may not have disclosed, so you know exactly what not the country he loved that applied such a policy. It was an emo- weaknesses exist. Ask the hard questions too, which may involve facts tional answer because of how passionately he felt for his friend and that the witness may not want to discuss. all the other people who want to serve their country but cannot. The When the review is complete, it is time to create an outline of your first time I asked him that question was about two weeks before trial. questions. A witness declaration, if you have one, is a good place to I did not ask it again when we prepared for trial. When I asked him start to structure your outline. Use the declaration to create a list of that question at trial, his answer was so powerful that it felt like every- witness questions and answers. Direct examination questions cannot one else in the courtroom stopped breathing. be leading. Writing the expected answers is important in case your Hold your preparation session in an informal place, but where you witness gives an incomplete answer to a question. When this happens, will not be overheard. Take time to help the witness become more com- you will know what follow-up questions are needed to obtain the full fortable with you and the examination. Get to know the witness apart answer. When drafting your questions and answers, keep them short. from his or her testimony if you can; it will help you to elicit the story You want to help your witness move through the testimony in bite- on direct. You may also develop new questions from informal dis- sized pieces, not long narratives. cussions. Tell your witness to remain calm and composed during cross- After writing an outline of the questions and answers, review it examination and to give you time to object, if necessary, before for any questions that are not included but that could provide use- answering. Conduct a mock cross-examination of your witness or, even ful testimony. Review these potential questions with your witness. Do better, have a colleague that the witness does not know do it. You want not include any question in your outline to which you do not know your practice cross-examination to be more difficult than the one the the answer. witness will likely face. Remind your witness to always be truthful Consider possible objections to each question and how to handle and to answer the question asked. Lastly, explain to your witness where them. You can include these notations in the margins for quick ref- he or she will sit and how the courtroom is situated. If you can, let erence. Include in appropriate places in the outline those documents the witness see the courtroom ahead of time. that you want to introduce into evidence. Note in your outline next At trial, bring your binder and cheat sheet to the lectern, along with to the document what you intend to rely on to pass hearsay and rel- a blank piece of paper for notes, particularly for points you may need evance objections. Review your outline again for any gaps or subjects to circle back to in your examination. Bring a few sticky tabs too so to flesh out. If you get sidetracked during questioning, a short check- you can hold a place in your outline if you are interrupted and have list of crucial points that you want to elicit can help. to finish your examination later. If your witness gets off track, ask a Create a binder for each witness that includes the outline and leading question. You will probably get an objection, but it will exhibits. Number tabs so that they match the exhibit number. For remind your witness what testimony you need. For exhibits, lay the example, if you have three exhibits, do not use exhibit tabs 1, 2, and foundation first before you move to admit the document into evidence. 3. Instead, use the tab number that matches the exhibit list. Be sure You cannot put the document on a projector until it is admitted. Once to include a cheat sheet—a bare-bones list of all the hearsay excep- cross-examination begins, only object when necessary. Make your redi- tions, legal principles to support your relevance arguments, and rect as short as you can, and direct it to any points that require clar- objections you can make when your witness is being cross-examined. ification or explanation from cross-examination. I The cheat sheet should not be more than a page long, although you can put the objections on the back and flip the page over when your Devon Myers is an associate at White & Case LLP and practices in its litiga- witness is being cross-examined. tion department. Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 9 practice tips BY STEVEN G. PEARL The Limits on Employer Deductions from Pay in California BUSINESSES IN CALIFORNIA currently employ almost 14 million non- farm payroll employees—most of them hourly wage earners.1 With such a large number of workers, it is a safe bet that each workday, some California employees experience cash shortages, broken mer- chandise and equipment, and product theft. Equally inevitable is that many employers who have lost money or merchandise look to their employees to make up for shortages, breakage, and loss with deductions from employee paychecks. These deductions are not nec- essarily legal. Are employers legally justified in docking employee pay for the losses employees cause by negligence or suspected theft? California law does not give a clear answer. On the one hand, the Labor Code requires employers—not employees—to bear the cost of doing busi- ness; further, the code expressly prohibits employers from making deductions from pay except under very limited circumstances. In addition, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires employers, like all other creditors, to pro- vide notice and an opportunity to be heard before depriving a per- son of a property right, such as an employee’s pay for work already performed. On the other hand, the administrative regulations—specifically, the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) wage orders that implement the Labor Code—explicitly allow deductions under certain circum- stances. The IWC regulates all California employees with a system of 17 wage orders that constitute comprehensive statements of employee rights and employer responsibilities. Section 8 of all but two of the 17 wage orders covers shortages, breakages, and loss. The sec- tion states, “No employer shall make any deduction from the wage or require any reimbursement from an employee for any cash short- ers the IWC to adopt a series of wage orders prescribing the minimum age, breakage, or loss of equipment, unless it can be shown that the wages, maximum hours, and standard conditions of employment for shortage, breakage, or loss is caused by a dishonest or willful act, or all employees in California.6 by the gross negligence of the employee.”2 The IWC’s wage orders have general support in case law. In Because this provision appears to conflict with the Labor Code and Martinez v. Combs, the California Supreme Court strongly empha- the U.S. Constitution, a strong argument can be made that payroll sized the importance of the IWC’s wage orders, holding that the wage deductions for lost money or merchandise are not lawful. However, orders, rather than common law, define the employment relation- no court has decided whether the administrative regulations that ship for purposes of California’s wage and hour laws. The court held permit deductions from an employee’s pay lawfully regulate the stan- that “the IWC Wage Orders are entitled to extraordinary deference.”7 dard conditions of employment in California, unlawfully exceed the Section 8 of most of those orders, however, does not explain what administrative agency’s mandate, or violate the constitutional due procedures should be used to show whether a shortage, breakage, process rights of employees. or loss is caused by a dishonest or willful act, or by the gross neg- The history of employee rights in California goes back almost 100 ligence of the employee. The use of the passive voice—“unless it can years. After the Triangle Shirtwaist garment factory fire in 1911, a be shown”—raises questions about the burden of proof. There is wave of legislation intended to protect women and children workers no designation of the tribunal that is charged with determining swept the nation. California passed its first minimum wage law in whether the burden of proof has been met or whether the aggrieved 1913.3 The law created the IWC and empowered it to establish a min- party has a right to review of that decision. However, employers may imum wage, a maximum on hours of work, and standard conditions understandably believe that, under Section 8 of the wage orders, they of labor demanded by the health and welfare of employees.4 The leg- islature also initiated a voter-approved constitutional amendment to Steven G. Pearl is a mediator and attorney in Los Angeles whose practice confirm its new authority.5 With some exceptions, the laws defining focuses on wage and hour matters. He is a coauthor of California Wage and RICHARD EWING the IWC’s powers remain unchanged. The Labor Code still empow- Hour Law and Litigation (CEB). 10 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 Relationships are built on many things... Like providing innovative solutions. Crowe Horwath LLP takes pride in the relationships we have with our clients. In a recent client survey, our clients said we do a better job than our competitors of providing innovative solutions to meet their business needs. To learn more about our commitment to building lasting relationships, visit crowehorwath.com/clients, or contact Marc Shaffer at 312.857.7512 or [email protected]. Marc Shaffer, Partner Audit | Tax | Advisory | Risk | Performance The Unique Alternative to the Big Four® Crowe Horwath LLP is an independent member of Crowe Horwath International, a Swiss verein. Each member firm of Crowe Horwath International is a separate and independent legal entity. Crowe Horwath LLP and its affiliates are not responsible or liable for any acts or omissions of Crowe Horwath International or any other member of Crowe Horwath International and specifically disclaim any and all responsibility or liability for acts or omissions of Crowe Horwath International or any other Crowe Horwath International member. Accountancy services in Kansas and North Carolina are rendered by Crowe Chizek LLP, which is not a member of Crowe Horwath International. © 2010 Crowe Horwath LLP FW11067D6D FW11067D6D LA Lawyer Mag_Shaffer_Nov2010.indd 1 9/21/2010 10:43:39 AM have the right to deduct for shortages, break- only when one of the following three cir- ee’s rights under Section 2802 are consid- age, or loss from employee paychecks. cumstances applies: 1) the employer is ered so important that the law prohibits their required or empowered to do so by state or waiver.20 Kerr’s Catering Service federal law, or 2) the employee expressly Case Law Kerr’s Catering Service v. Department of authorizes the deduction in writing and the Industrial Relations,8 a 1962 loss deductions deduction is to cover insurance premiums, Arguably, statutory law offers no support case, dealt with an employer that operated hospital or medical dues, or other deduc- for the wage orders allowing deductions from lunch trucks. It paid its “salesgirls” mini- tions not amounting to a rebate or deduction wages for shortages, breakage, or loss. Case mum wage plus a commission based on sales. from the standard wage arrived at by collec- law, however, is less clear. In the nearly 50 The commission was “subject to reduction in tive bargaining or pursuant to wage agree- years since Kerr’s, California courts have the amount of any cash shortage attribut- ment or statute, or 3) a deduction to cover considered several additional cases in which able to the salesgirl during the month.”9 health and welfare or pension plan contri- employees have alleged that their employers The employer sued to have Section 8 of the butions is expressly authorized by a collective illegally deducted from their wages, with applicable wage order declared unconstitu- bargaining or wage agreement. mixed results. tional on grounds that it improperly regulated The compensation protected from pay- In Quillian v. Lion Oil Company,21 the matters beyond the minimum wage and max- roll deductions by Sections 221 to 223 manager of a gas station challenged her imum hours of work.10 In other words, the includes forms of compensation beyond what employer’s policy of calculating bonus com- employer argued that, as long as it paid its most employees would recognize as wages. pensation by deducting cash and merchandise employees minimum wage and overtime com- The terms used in the Labor Code are given shortages from the gas station’s sales to arrive pensation, the IWC could not regulate its broad meaning to effectuate the code’s pur- at a net profit figure from which it calcu- deductions from sales-based commissions on pose of protecting workers. Thus, as used in lated the bonus.22 This is similar to the issue account of cash shortages. the Labor Code, the term “wages” includes raised in Kerr’s, but it involved bonus com- The California Supreme Court rejected “all amounts for labor performed by employ- pensation rather than commissions. Following the employer’s challenge. First, it held that the ees of every description, whether the amount Kerr’s, the court of appeal held that because IWC has “general power” to regulate “the is fixed or ascertained by the standard of both commissions and bonuses are wages, the standard conditions of labor” beyond just time, task, piece, commission basis, or other employer’s bonus policy constituted an unlaw- the minimum wages and maximum hours of method of calculation.”15 ful deduction from those wages. There was no work.11 Second, the court held that the IWC An employee’s wages or earnings are the allegation or evidence that any shortage was had authority to prohibit deductions that are amount the employer has offered or promised caused by the plaintiff’s misconduct. The not caused by dishonest, willful, or negligent to pay, or has paid pursuant to such an offer court did not consider whether the wage employee conduct. The court held that such or promise, as compensation for that employ- order contravenes the Labor Code but did deductions affect the “standard conditions of ee’s labor. The employer takes a deduction or hold that “the bonus…is in contravention labor” and therefore fall within the IWC’s contribution from an employee’s wages or of the public policy expressed in sections 400 broad power.12 earnings when it subtracts, withholds, sets off, to 410 of the Labor Code.”23 However, despite 1) the broad constitu- or requires the employee to return a portion In another case, Hudgins v. Neiman Marcus tional and statutory authority given to the of the compensation offered, promised, or Group, Inc.,24 the court of appeal held that IWC, 2) the supreme court’s holding in paid as offered or promised, so that the an employer’s policy of deducting from its Kerr’s that the IWC can protect employees employee, having performed the labor, actu- employees’ wages for “unidentified returns”— from certain deductions, and 3) the supreme ally receives or retains less than the paid, that is, merchandise returns for which the par- court’s strong endorsement of the wage offered, or promised compensation, and effec- ticular salesperson could not be identified— orders, there are limits on what the IWC may tively makes a forced “contribution” of the violated Labor Code Sections 221 and 400 do in its wage orders. The orders are regu- difference.16 through 410.25 The court held that the pol- lations, and the law is clear that “no regu- Sections 221 to 223 are designed to protect icy allowed for unlawful deductions from lation adopted is valid or effective unless employees from fraud and deceit perpetrated wages. consistent and not in conflict with the statute by employers, who typically enjoy a superior The Hudgins court also held that the and reasonably necessary to effectuate the economic and bargaining position relative to employer had “numerous other tools for deal- purpose of the statute.”13 This strongly sug- their employees.17 These sections were enacted ing with the problem of unidentified returns,” gests that Section 8 of the wage orders, by to prevent the utilization of secret deductions, including careful training and supervision of allowing employers to deduct from employee or kickbacks, to make it appear that the its employees and investigation of employees wages under even limited circumstances, employer paid wages provided by a collective reasonably believed to be engaging in abuse conflicts with the Labor Code and exceeds bargaining contract or by statute.18 of its policies.26 “The one tool that is not the authority given to the IWC. Sections Other Labor Code provisions support the available to Neiman Marcus, however, is an 221 to 223 of the Labor Code clearly pro- view that employers cannot deduct from employment agreement by which Neiman hibit employers from collecting or receiving wages for shortages, breakage, or loss, even Marcus requires its employees to consent to earned wages from their employees and if caused by employee misconduct. Sections unlawful deductions from their wages.”27 from forcing employees to bear the employ- 400 to 410, sometimes referred to as the In Ralphs Grocery Company v. Superior er’s costs of doing business. Employee’s Bond Law, prohibit an employer Court,28 the court of appeal again considered The only statutory exception to the pro- from requiring an employee to provide a whether an employer may deduct certain hibition against payroll deductions can be bond unless certain conditions are satisfied.19 items when calculating bonus compensation. found in Section 224, which allows employ- Finally, Section 2802 requires an employer After considering Kerr’s, Quillian, and ers to withhold wages for the standard deduc- to “indemnify his or her employee for all Hudgins, the court held that the wage order tions with which most wage earners are famil- necessary expenditures or losses incurred by prohibited Ralphs from deducting cash and iar: taxes, healthcare, and union dues.14 In the employee in direct consequence of the merchandise losses from profits in calculating particular, Section 224 allows deductions discharge of his or her duties.” The employ- bonus compensation, but only for nonex- 12 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 empt employees.29 The court also noted that tive and collective contributions to the prof- due that employee.”43 Section 8 of the wage order applies only to itable performance of its stores by sharing In California State Employees’ Association those employees deemed not to be exempt with employees, in addition to their regular v. State of California,44 the First District held from the wage order’s protections. Thus, wages, a portion of the profits, if any, their that the state of California, as an employer, Section 8 does not apply to employees who efforts had produced, which Ralphs would could not deduct amounts from its employ- are deemed exempt as executive, adminis- otherwise be entitled to retain for itself.38 ees’ paychecks to repay alleged salary over- trative, or professional.30 payments. Although Government Code Section 8 and Due Process However, the court departed from ear- Section 17051 explicitly allowed the gov- lier authority in holding that the Labor Code Upholding the Ralphs plan, however, is ernment to deduct amounts owed to the gov- itself does not prohibit deductions from arguably quite different from upholding ernment from “any warrant drawn in favor employee compensation: “Nothing in the Section 8 of the wage orders. Section 8 allows of a payee,” the court recognized that Section Labor Code itself, unlike the wage orders an employer to do precisely what the Labor 17051, when applied to wages, conflicted applicable to non-exempt employees, Code prohibits: deduct for breakage, short- with the post-Sniadach wage garnishment expressly prohibits deductions from wages for age, and loss, provided that “it can be shown” and attachment laws. cash or merchandise shortages.”31 that the cash shortage, breakage, or loss was The court held that the wage garnish- On the other hand, the Kerr’s court specif- “caused by a dishonest or willful act, or by ment law and the attachment law protect ically held it was not “unjust” for inevitable the gross negligence of the employee.” This wages from creditors. The wage garnish- business losses, such as cash shortages, break- provision conflicts directly with the Labor ment law provides the exclusive judicial pro- age, and loss of equipment, to be borne as Code, and in case of conflict, the Labor Code cedure by which a judgment creditor can “expenses of management.”32 As the court governs. The wage orders present a proce- execute against the wages of a judgment reasoned in Ralphs Grocery, “By using the dural as well as a substantive difficulty. The debtor, except for cases of judgments or term ‘management,’ the supreme court sug- taking of an employee’s wages, without notice orders for support. It limits the amount of gested the legitimacy of requiring exempt and an opportunity to be heard, is a violation earnings that may be garnished in satisfaction employees to bear some burden of business of the employee’s due process rights. of a judgment and establishes certain exemp- losses and expenses.33 It would require a sig- More than 40 years ago, the U.S. Supreme tions from earnings that may not be gar- nificant extension of the supreme court’s dicta Court held that extrajudicial deductions from nished. The attachment law expressly pro- regarding the underlying spirit of the Labor wages—like the deductions apparently per- hibits any prejudgment attachment or levy of Code provisions protecting workers’ wages to mitted under the wage orders—provide cred- execution against wages.45 conclude an incentive compensation plan itors an unconstitutional self-help remedy. Citing Barnhill, the California State that determines an exempt employee’s bonus In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corpora- Employees’ Association court held that “the on a full range of revenue and expense items, tion,39 the Supreme Court concluded that a specific provisions of the attachment and including cash shortages, is unlawful.”34 Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnishment wage garnishment laws take precedence over As the supreme court later explained, statute violated a debtor’s right to procedural the general provisions of Government Code “Though Ralphs Grocery did not expressly due process by sanctioning the taking of his section 17051.”46 The court concluded, disagree with Quillian as to the rights of property without affording him prior notice “[T]his general language is superseded by managerial employees, the two decisions are and hearing. the specific provisions of the attachment and at odds on the point. Quillian involved a In 1970, the California Legislature changed wage garnishment laws protecting earnings managerial employee, and no Commission California law to conform to Sniadach.40 As from such extra-judicial seizures.”47 wage order was cited there as a source of her one California appellate court narrates, “In To date, no California appellate court has rights. Instead, Quillian held that the deduc- McCallop v. Carberry…and Cline v. Credit considered an employee’s challenge to Section tion of cash and merchandise losses from a Bureau of Santa Clara Valley…we examined 8 of the IWC wage orders as contradicting the manager’s incentive pay contravened sections the California wage garnishment statutes in Labor Code or violating constitutional due 400 through 410, and insinuated that it might light of Sniadach and, although the California process rights. However, given the ongoing also violate section 221.”35 provisions differed from the Wisconsin statute focus on wage and hour cases in the appellate In Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery in several respects…we concluded that the courts, it can only be a matter of time before Company, Inc.,36 the supreme court considered California procedure exhibited the same fun- a challenge arises. The weight of authority the same bonus compensation plan consid- damental, constitutional vice as the statute strongly suggests that employers that deduct ered in Ralphs Grocery. The court disagreed invalidated in Sniadach.”41 money from their payrolls for shortages, with Ralphs Grocery, holding that nothing in In Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Com- breakage, or loss are treading on thin ice. the relevant statutes, regulations, and deci- pany,42 the First District Court of Appeal Employers should carefully consider the risks sions suggests that an employer violates rejected an employer’s efforts to set off an compared to the rewards of following what California wage protection laws by providing, employee’s earned wages against debts may ultimately be deemed an unenforceable as Ralphs did, “supplementary compensation allegedly owed to the employer by the em- provision of the IWC’s wage orders. I designed to reward employees, over and above ployee. The court held that the setoffs violate their regular wages, if and when their collec- due process: “[F]undamental due process 1 See California Employment Development Depart- tive efforts produced a positive financial result considerations underlie the prejudgment ment, California Employment Highlights (July 2010), for the store where they worked.”37 attachment exemption. Permitting [an available at http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/lfmonth /Employment-Highlights.pdf. Under the Ralphs plan, each Ralphs store employer] to reach [the employee’s] wages by 2 Industrial Welfare Commission wage orders, available employee was paid—as full compensation setoff would let it accomplish what neither it at http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/wageorderindustries.htm. for his or her individual work—a dollar wage nor any other creditor could do by attachment Wage Order No. 16—which applies to certain on-site that did not vary with the store’s financial for- and would defeat the legislative policy under- occupations in the construction, drilling, logging, and tunes, and from which no unauthorized lying that exemption. We conclude that an mining industries—contains different language. Wage amounts were deducted. In addition, Ralphs employer is not entitled to a setoff of debts Order No. 17 does not address this issue. 3 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 324, at 632, 637, §13. sought to encourage and reward coopera- owing it by an employee against any wages 4 LAB. CODE §1182 (enacted in 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 324, Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 13 §6, at 634-35); see Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, slip op. at 12 (2010). expert4law–The Legal Marketplace 5 See Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th 35, slip op. at 18. 6 LAB. CODE §§70-74, 1171-1204; Industrial Welfare Target Your Online Search for Experts Quickly, Easily Comm’n v. Superior Court (California Hotel and Motel Ass’n), 27 Cal. 3d 690, 698 (1980). 7 Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th 35, slip op. at 28-29. Need an Expert? Find one here. 8 Kerr’s Catering Serv. v. Department of Indus. The Los Angeles County Bar Association’s official online referral service for Relations, 57 Cal. 2d 319 (1962). expert witnesses, legal consultants, litigation support, lawyer-to-lawyer referrals, 9 Id. at 322. and dispute resolution service providers. 10 IWC Wage Order No. 5-57 §8, 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §11380 (1962). For more information, call 213.896.6470 or e-mail [email protected] 11 Kerr’s, 57 Cal. 2d at 325; LAB. CODE §1182. 12 Kerr’s, 57 Cal. 2d at 328. 13 Bearden v. Borax, 138 Cal. App. 4th 429, 436 (2006). AVAILABLE 24 HOURS A DAY! www.expert4law.org See also Industrial Welfare Comm’n v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 690 (1980). 14 LAB. CODE §224. 15 LAB. CODE §200(a). 16 Prachasaisoradej v. Superior Court (Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc.), 42 Cal. 4th 217, 228 (2007). 17 Sublett v. Henry’s Turk & Taylor Lunch, 21 Cal. 2d 273 (1942). RECEIVERSHIP SPECIALISTS 18 Kerr’s Catering Serv. v. Department of Indus. Relations, 57 Cal. 2d 319 (1962). Court Appointed Receivers and Referees 19 Id. at 328. 19 Years of Serving the Insolvency Community 20 LAB. CODE §2804; Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., 42 Cal. 4th 554, 570 (2007) (Any agreement made by the employee is null and void insofar as it waives the employee’s rights to full expense reim- bursement under LAB. CODE §2802.). “Committed to improving the value of your client’s assets, 21 Quillian v. Lion Oil Co., 96 Cal. App. 3d 156 (1979). 22 Id. at 158-59. at the lowest cost, while disputes are resolved.” 23 Id. at 163. 24 Hudgins v Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 1109 (1995). 25 Id. at 1111-24 (citing Quillian, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 156). 26 Id. at 1124. 27 Id. 28 Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Superior Court (Swanson), 112 Cal. App. 4th 1090 (2003). 29 Id. at 1102. 30 See, e.g., IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001 §1A (“Provisions of Sections 3 through 12 shall not apply to persons employed in administrative, executive, or pro- KEVIN SINGER JOHN RACHLIN fessional capacities.”). 31 Real Estate & Business Expert Attorney At Law Hudgins, 34 Cal. App. 4th at 1119. 32 Kerr’s Catering Serv. v. Department of Indus. Relations, 57 Cal. 2d 319, 329 (1962). 33 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §11070, subdiv. 1(A) s (Exempt employees “manage” the enterprise for which Receivership, Referee & Partition Assignments they are employed.). Real Estate Management & Sales 34 Ralphs Grocery Co., 112 Cal. App. 4th at 1105-06 (citations omitted). Business Management & Sales 35 Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc., 42 Family Estate Management & Sales Cal. 4th 217, 235, n.8 (2007). 36 Id. at 217. Real Estate & Business Evaluations 37 Id. at 223. 38 Id. at 228. 39 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). s 40 See CODE CIV. PROC. §487.020(c). 41 Randone v. Appellate Dep’t, 5 Cal. 3d 536 (1971). See also McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 906, n.7 SOUTHERN NORTHERN NEVADA ARIZONA CALIFORNIA CALIFORNIA OFFICE OFFICE (1970) and Cline v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara OFFICE OFFICE Valley, 1 Cal. 3d 908 (1970). 7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd. 40 N. Central Avenue 42 Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co., 125 Cal. App. 3d 11400 W. Olympic Blvd. 795 Folsom Street Suite 300 Suite 1400 Suite 200 1st Floor Las Vegas, NV 89128 Phoenix, AZ 85004 1 (1981). Los Angeles, CA 90064 San Francisco, CA 94107 43 Id. at 6. Tel 702.562.4230 Tel 602.343.1889 44 California State Employees’ Ass’n v. State of Cal., 198 Tel 310.552.9064 Tel 415.848.2984 Cal. App. 3d 374 (1988). 45 Id. at 377 (1988) (notes omitted); CODE CIV. PROC. §§487.020(c), 706.020, 706.050-706.052. 46 California State Employees’ Ass’n, 198 Cal. App. 3d www.ReceivershipSpecialists.com at 378. 47 Id. 14 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 practice tips BY CEDRIC M. SHEN AND HUMBERTO R. GRAY The Immigration Status of Plaintiffs in Personal Injury Actions THERE ARE SEVERAL FORMS OF DAMAGES a plaintiff may seek in a reversed the trial court’s decision and determined that “whenever a civil personal injury action. Some, such as medical expenses, are plaintiff whose citizenship is challenged seeks to recover for loss of readily quantifiable. Other damages, such as emotional distress or loss future earnings, his status in this country shall be decided by the trial of future earnings, are not as easily measured. In cases involving size- court as a preliminary question of law” pursuant to Evidence Code able claims for loss of future earnings, battles are often fought con- Section 310.8 The court acknowledged that evidence relating to cit- cerning the plaintiff’s education and employment history. Given the izenship and deportation would be prejudicial to the party whose sta- speculative nature of future income claims, attorneys for both sides tus was at issue.9 Thus, the court of appeal held that the issue could will often retain economists and experts to inflate or deflate the be resolved by treating “any question regarding a plaintiff’s citizen- amount of future earnings to which a plaintiff may be entitled. ship or lawful place of residence as one of law, to be decided exclu- However, attorneys often overlook the importance of immigration sively by the trial court outside of the presence of a jury.”10 During status in civil personal injury actions as it relates to a plaintiff’s loss of future earnings. In an action involving a plaintiff who is undocu- mented in the United States, immigration sta- If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he or she is legally allowed tus may play a significant role in the amount of future earnings he or she may be awarded. Recovery for loss of future earnings is limited to work for compensation in the United States, he or she will not for plaintiffs who are in the United States ille- gally to what they would make in their coun- try of citizenship. This could mean the differ- be entitled to future earnings based on U.S. wages. ence of tens—if not hundreds—of thousands of dollars in a jury verdict. For example, consider a 30-year-old plaintiff of Mexican citizenship this hearing, the defendant has the initial burden of producing proof who is severely injured and permanently disabled. Assume that at the that the plaintiff is undocumented and subject to deportation.11 If the time of his injury he was earning $10 per hour doing manufacturing defendant is successful, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demon- work. He files a negligence lawsuit seeking, among other things, strate that he or she has “taken steps” to correct his or her deportable loss of future earnings. The plaintiff’s expert places his loss of future condition.12 earnings at $624,000 in U.S. wages ($10 per hour at 40 hours per week If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he or she is legally allowed for the next 30 years). However, if the plaintiff’s future earnings are to work for compensation in the United States, he or she will not be calculated according to Mexican wages (roughly 13 percent of U.S. entitled to future earnings based on U.S. wages. If the judge finds in wages), it would decrease the value to $81,120—a reduction of more favor of the plaintiff, all evidence relating to his or her illegal status than $540,000.1 This hypothetical example illustrates the importance “shall be excluded and his projected earning capacity may be com- in determining the loss of future earnings in the early stages of dis- puted upon the basis of his past and projected future income in the covery. A recent California case, Rodriguez v. Kline, offers practitioners United States.”13 If the judge finds in favor of the defendant, then evi- a guide.2 dence of the plaintiff’s future earnings is “limited to those he could In Rodriguez, plaintiff Jesus Rodriguez, who was illegally present anticipate receiving in his country of lawful citizenship.”14 in the United States, brought an action against defendant Samuel Kline In applying this reasoning to the plaintiff in Rodriguez, the court for injuries he sustained in a traffic accident.3 The trial court con- of appeal held that he may have been able to meet his burden in a cluded that the defendant had the burden of demonstrating the pretrial hearing.15 The plaintiff had been in the country for nearly plaintiff’s current illegal status as well as the possibility of his even- 20 years and had been a hardworking person with high moral char- tual deportation.4 The trial court also allowed evidence of the plain- acter. While it was clear that the plaintiff was subject to deportation, tiff’s projected earnings in the United States and Mexico, and then it was not clear whether the verdict of $99,000 compensated him for instructed the jury to determine whether the plaintiff was subject to his loss of future earnings and, if so, whether the award was based deportation and whether he was entitled to future loss of earnings.5 on his earning capacity in the United States or Mexico.16 Since the The plaintiff was awarded a judgment of $99,000, which the defen- jury was improperly instructed, the judgment was reversed and dant appealed.6 remanded. Upon remand, the trial court was ordered “to conduct The court of appeal decided whether a person who is in the United States illegally is entitled to be compensated for personal Cedric M. Shen and Humberto R. Gray practice immigration law in Los injuries based upon projected earning capacity in the United States Angeles. The authors wish to thank Courtney A. Morgan for her contributions or in the country of lawful citizenship.7 In doing so, the court of appeal to this article. Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 15 a hearing that would afford plaintiff an to interrogatories regarding citizenship or legal able condition. Given this, defense counsel opportunity to present proof regarding his status in the United States, the defense attor- should inquire into two general categories legal status.”17 ney should be sure to lay the foundation in a regarding the undocumented status of the meet and confer letter to compel responses. plaintiff: 1) what steps he or she has taken to Rodriguez and Civil Discovery After the written discovery is complete, the correct the deportable condition, and 2) Attorneys should apply Rodriguez to civil defense attorney will have a good idea as to whether he or she can correct the deportable actions in California by ascertaining early in whether the plaintiff is undocumented. At condition. discovery whether the plaintiff may not be this point, the defense attorney should take Correcting a Deportable Condition entitled to future earnings in U.S. wages. the plaintiff’s deposition. Prior to doing so, it Presumably, a plaintiff’s attorney knows prior is important to outline the proposed deposi- A key term in Rodriguez is whether the plain- to filing a lawsuit whether his or her client is tion examination to ensure the proper ques- tiff has “taken steps” to correct the deportable entitled to future earnings damages—as this tions are asked regarding the plaintiff’s immi- or removable condition. What constitutes would have an impact on the amount of any gration status. While the value of every case steps that would be sufficient to meet the potential verdict. Whether a plaintiff is enti- is different, it would be prudent to consult burden? No case law defines the standard. tled to future earnings in U.S. wages may with an immigration attorney to determine Merely seeking counsel is probably insuffi- not be readily apparent to a defense attorney, what questions to ask in order to assess the cient, while filing an application for immi- especially if the plaintiff is undocumented viability and legitimacy of the plaintiff’s loss gration benefits may be sufficient where the and his or her attorney attempts to withhold of future earnings claim. application is still pending. this information. Questions framed for the deposition will Taking steps to be placed in removal pro- The simplest way for a defense attorney to vary depending on the specific facts of each ceedings would certainly constitute sufficient determine a plaintiff’s immigration status via case and will require different inquiries relat- steps but is not an easy task. Usually, if an formal discovery is to propound California ing to specific immigration issues. The first undocumented person is convicted of a crime, Judicial Form Interrogatories to the plaintiff question to ask a plaintiff is whether he or she Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) shortly after the commencement of litiga- is a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resi- will initiate removal proceedings. However, tion. Form Interrogatories 2.2 and 8.0 ask for dent. If he or she is not, the defense attorney if the undocumented person presents him- the plaintiff’s date and place of birth and should ask the plaintiff whether he or she is self or herself to ICE, it has discretion to information about loss of income or earning illegally present in the United States. The commence removal proceedings. Immigration capacity. From these two interrogatories, a plaintiff’s counsel will probably object to this courts are currently backlogged, and ICE is defense attorney will get an idea as to whether question and instruct the client not to respond. usually reluctant to place people in removal the plaintiff’s immigration status will play a Understandably, the plaintiff’s counsel will not proceedings. role in any future lost earnings claim. want a client to admit to violating federal law. Even if the plaintiff demonstrates steps Obviously, if the plaintiff was born in the However, the defense attorney should not taken to correct the deportable condition, United States, there would not likely be an back down from inquiring into a plaintiff’s the defense attorney can ask questions to issue. However, if the plaintiff was born in immigration status—citing Rodriguez and determine if the plaintiff has a realistic hope Mexico, for example, and is making a loss of its relevance in determining the plaintiff’s of correcting his or her deportable status. future earnings claim, it is important to deter- loss of future earnings. If the plaintiff’s attor- There are several legal ways that an undoc- mine his or her immigration status in the ney instructs the client not to answer the umented individual can correct a deportable United States. question, defense counsel should file a timely condition. One is to immigrate through imme- After receiving these responses, defense motion to compel. diate family members. These include par- counsel should propound further interroga- Regardless of whether or not the plaintiff’s ents, children, or siblings who are perma- tories regarding the plaintiff’s immigration sta- counsel objects to questions regarding the nent residents or citizens of the United tus. Is he or she a U.S. citizen? A permanent plaintiff’s immigration status, it is important States.20 Another way to correct a deportable resident? When did he or she first come to the for a defense attorney to ask several additional condition is through employment. There are United States? Did he or she enter with a questions at the deposition. A party cannot five categories under which a foreigner can visa? If so, what type? Has he or she main- be deposed more than once absent a court seek immigration benefits.21 Even if an undoc- tained that visa? Has he or she been con- order based on a showing of good cause.18 umented individual has a family- or employ- victed of a crime anywhere in the world? Thus, if counsel objects to questions regard- ment-based option to immigrate, he or she Does he or she have any immediate family ing the plaintiff’s immigration status, defense must also be eligible to adjust status.22 members who are residents or citizens of the counsel should operate on the presumption There are also avenues in deportation United States? Has he or she applied for an that the plaintiff is undocumented or proceedings by which an undocumented indi- immigration benefit in the United States? deportable. vidual can correct his or her deportable con- While these may certainly be asked at depo- It is important to understand the term dition. These proceedings are held in front of sition, it would help the defense attorney to “deportable.” A person can be deportable an immigration judge in federal immigration know the answers beforehand in order to for various reasons, even if he or she is a per- court. Avenues of relief include asylum, with- prepare for the deposition. manent resident of the United States. Formal holding of removal, protection under the The plaintiff’s attorney may object to any grounds for deportability may be found in the convention of torture, and two types of can- questions involving the plaintiff’s immigra- Immigration and Naturalization Act.19 Some cellation of removal. However, all types of tion status—especially if the plaintiff is undoc- grounds for deportability include entering the relief are difficult to secure. For example, umented. In fact, the plaintiff’s attorney should U.S. illegally, failing to maintain legal status, under one cancellation of removal provision, object to these questions—not only to pro- and convictions for certain crimes. the person in removal proceedings must prove tect the loss of future earnings claim but to Under Rodriguez, once defense counsel that he or she has been in the United States demonstrate that the attorney has taken steps can establish that the plaintiff is deportable, for 10 years and is a person of good moral to protect the plaintiff from admitting undoc- the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove he character (no criminal convictions). In addi- umented status. If the plaintiff’s counsel objects or she has taken steps to correct the deport- tion, those in removal proceedings must show 16 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 that if they are deported, a family member future earnings in U.S. wages? An argument (spouse, parent or child) who is a resident or can certainly be made that these plaintiffs citizen of the United States faces exceptional should not be entitled to lost U.S. earnings. and extremely unusual hardship.23 The stan- On balance, it is important to remember dard for hardship is difficult. It may be sat- that assessing a loss of future earnings claim isfied if a qualifying family member has a in a civil action must be considered by attor- serious illness.24 neys for both sides from the inception of lit- Finally, it is also important to ask the igation. In personal injury actions, attorneys plaintiff his or her educational level, what type often focus on the most common forms of of work he or she did in the native country, damages, such as hospital bills, future med- and most importantly, what his or her wages ical care, pain and suffering, and emotional were there. If the judge finds that the plain- distress. Details of a loss of future earnings tiff has not met his or her burden, then future claim may often be overlooked until the par- earnings will be decided based on the wages ties reach the expert discovery phase of liti- in the native country. gation. At this time, proving these damages Rodriguez was issued more than 20 years may reveal—possibly for the first time—that ago and remains good law. Given that the plaintiff is not entitled to future earnings California courts have not further explored in U.S. dollars. If a defense attorney has not the issue of undocumented individuals and presented the case with the plaintiff’s immi- future earnings claims, the term “taken steps” gration status in mind, it may be difficult to remains murky. What steps must a plaintiff meet the burden of proof established in take to meet the Rodriguez burden? Is it suf- Rodriguez. This error may substantially ficient that a plaintiff merely consulted with increase a jury award. Conversely, a plaintiff’s an immigration attorney? Should the plain- attorney who does not make a preliminary tiff voluntarily place himself or herself into consideration of the viability of a loss of removal proceedings so that he or she can seek future earnings claim may later be put in the a cancellation of removal? Is filing an appli- uncomfortable position of asking a client to cation for immigration benefits, or being either admit his or her illegal status or to placed in deportation proceedings without the waive the claim altogether. I ability to correct the deportable condition, enough to satisfy the standard of Rodriguez 1 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl. in taking steps to correct the deportable con- 1318. dition? While there is no definitive answer, it 2 Rodriguez v. Kline, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1145, 1147 (1986). is safe to conclude that the more actions that 3 Id. the plaintiff shows he or she has taken, the 4 Id. at 1149. VIGOROUS better chance he or she has of prevailing 5 Id. at 1149-50. STATE BAR DEFENSE under the test in Rodriguez. 6 Id. at 1147. Rodriguez also poses a dilemma for attor- 7 Id. 8 JAMES R. DIFRANK neys who represent undocumented plaintiffs. Id. at 1149. 9 Id. at 1148. A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORP. Should the attorney proceed with a loss of 10 Id. TEL 562.789.7734 future earnings claim, knowing that a client 11 Deportation is also known as removal. The court of www.BarDefense.net is illegally present in the United States? Doing appeal in Rodriguez uses the term “deportable.” E-MAIL [email protected] so may subject the plaintiff to admit—in depo- However, “deportable” and “removable” are inter- sition or written discovery responses—that changeable. “Removable” is a broadly used term that encompasses certain grounds of inadmissibility and • Disciplinary Defense he or she is in the country illegally. Or should deportability found in Immigration and Naturalization • Reinstatements the plaintiff’s attorney waive the claim, thereby Act §212, 8 U.S.C. §1182, and Immigration and protecting his or her client’s privacy but fore- Naturalization Act §237, 8 U.S.C. §1227. The term • Bar Admissions going the potential for a larger verdict? Before “removable” encompasses §212(a) grounds of inad- • Moral Character commencing litigation, a plaintiff’s attorney missibility and §237(a) grounds of deportability, and it may ordinarily be used in place of either term. See • Criminal Defense should confer with the client about the client’s Rodriguez, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1149. • Representation within the immigration status and whether he or she 12 Rodriguez, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1149. wishes to make a claim for future earnings. In 13 Id. State of California doing so, the attorney should also advise the 14 Id. client that he or she may be entitled to future 15 Id. FORMER: 16 Id. at 1150. earnings in U.S. wages, but that doing so may 17 Id. State Bar Sr. Prosecutor require him or her to divulge his or her ille- 18 CODE CIV. PROC. §2025.610. Sr. State Bar Court Counsel gal immigration status. 19 See 8 U.S.C. §§1227 et seq. It is also interesting to see whether the test 20 8 U.S.C. §1154. in Rodriguez will be expanded to include non- 21 8 U.S.C. §1153. 22 U.S. citizen plaintiffs in different immigration See 8 U.S.C. §1255i. To qualify, the individual should be the beneficiary of an application filed before categories. For example, should plaintiffs in April 30, 2001. nonimmigrant temporary status who verify 23 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b). Home of Sir Winston their intent to return to their home country 24 Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001); Pictured Above upon expiration of their visas be entitled to Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002). Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 17 by JUSTIN M. GOLDSTEIN and NOAH PÉREZ-SILVERMAN SUPER POWERS California courts have broad inherent powers to redress litigation misconduct CIVIL LITIGATION is not always civil. Never- Act identifies categories of conduct that can the exercise of all others.”4 These powers are theless, there is a line between fighting hard justify sanctions and sets forth specific mea- “not confined by or dependent on statute”5 and cheating. sures a court can impose against “any party and include the power to “fashion[] proce- Imagine a party materially altering or fab- engaging in the misuse of the discovery dures and remedies as necessary to protect lit- ricating evidence and presenting it as authen- process.”2 igants’ rights.”6 tic, or surreptitiously reviewing and copying But what of litigation misconduct that California courts agree and have found documents from the opposing party’s brief- cannot be categorized as a “misuse of the dis- occasion to flex their inherent powers when case, or threatening witnesses. These scenar- covery process”? As one court has observed, confronted with litigation abuses. The inher- ios may seem far-fetched, but each was raised “[I]t is impossible to establish a rule of law for ent powers of California courts include not and addressed in a published decision.1 every conceivable situation which could arise only precluding evidence and issues but also, Litigation abuses undermine the fairness in the course of a trial…[or] in the discovery as confirmed recently, the power to terminate of the judicial system for the participants, process.”3 It seems inconceivable that there and more broadly, do the same for the pub- would be no remedy for a party issuing death Justin M. Goldstein, a counsel in the litigation lic’s perception of the courts as a fair venue threats to witnesses, wiretapping the opposi- department of O’Melveny & Myers, specializes in for resolving disputes. It is therefore no sur- tion’s attorneys, or the like. entertainment, intellectual property, and complex prise that legislatures have empowered courts The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed business disputes. He was a member of the to redress misconduct. that courts possess certain inherent powers O’Melveny defense team led by Daniel M. Petrocelli Remedies for misconduct are often found that “necessarily result…from the nature of in Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Company. in procedural discovery rules. California is their institution, powers that cannot be dis- Noah Pérez-Silverman is an associate in the liti- no exception. Chapter 7 of the Civil Discovery pensed with…because they are necessary to gation department. MICHAEL CALLOWAY 18 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 cases to redress litigation misconduct when power to dismiss an action or dismiss a com- notion that due process of law entitles a lit- justice requires. plaint as to a defendant.”15 igant to present certain evidence after it has The notion that courts possess inherent The California Supreme Court has rec- compromised its opponent’s ability to counter powers—powers separate and apart from ognized two types of inherent powers: 1) that evidence with the sort of litigation abuse those specifically granted to courts by legis- “courts’ equitable power derived from the his- found in this case.”23 When a party seeks to latures—is rooted in English tradition.7 toric power of equity courts,” and 2) “super- take unfair advantage or “the integrity of Norman monarchs possessed absolute sov- visory or administrative powers which all the judicial system” is at risk, the Peat, ereignty, which they used to assign adminis- courts possess to enable them to carry out Marwick court affirmed that judges are trative and judicial tasks to personal minis- their duties.”16 The latter powers, in partic- empowered to act.24 ters and advisers: “Through these councils, the ular, enable a court to “control litigation The Peat, Marwick decision drew heavily king exercised his vast prerogative authority, before it, to prevent abuse of its process, and from prior California decisions addressing which included guaranteeing justice and pre- to create a remedy for a wrong even in the California courts’ inherent powers to respond serving the peace.”8 As these councilors absence of specific statutory authority.”17 to “the many vagaries of the litigation evolved into more formal judges and courts, process.” These include Conn v. Superior Redressing Litigation Misconduct they were entrusted with judicial duties and Court, in which a court exercised its inherent given certain powers essential to the efficient Over the last century, there has been no short- powers to require the return of documents functioning of the courts. However, these age of reported decisions describing a court’s wrongfully taken by an employee from his early English judges were merely the king’s exercise of inherent powers to redress litiga- former employer’s office.25 The Peat, Marwick representatives; all their powers stemmed tion misconduct. For approximately the last decision has been cited on numerous occa- from the king’s absolute authority. 20 of those 100 years, arguably the most sions by courts assessing whether and how to The Magna Carta affirmed for the first important decision in California on the inher- apply their inherent powers to redress litiga- time that there existed laws even the king ent authority of courts was Peat, Marwick, tion abuses.26 However, until recently, no must obey. Over the next several centuries the Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court.18 In Peat, published decision had directly tackled the notion of a constrained monarch became Marwick, the state of California sued account- question of whether the arsenal of inherent more potent. As judges gradually became ing firm Peat, Marwick for having negligently powers includes the authority to terminate a more independent, a shift took place from performed an audit. The state retained the case for litigation misconduct. Enter the long- allegiance to a particular king to allegiance to accounting firm Main Hurdman as an expert. standing Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney the impersonal concept of “the Crown” and, Shortly after its retention, however, Main Company royalty dispute concerning the ultimately, to “the law.”9 As a result, judicial Hurdman began secretly negotiating with Winnie the Pooh children’s stories.27 powers once merely derivative of the mon- Peat, Marwick over a potential merger. In 2004, the trial court imposed a termi- arch’s supreme power became viewed as the Neither Main Hurdman nor Peat, Marwick nating sanction against Stephen Slesinger, “inherent powers” of the court.10 informed the state of the intended merger. In Inc., based on its finding that SSI engaged in The U.S. Constitution established the fact, when news of the merger prematurely severe and irremediable litigation miscon- American judiciary as a separate branch of leaked to the press, Main Hurdman assured duct.28 Among its findings, the court con- government with even greater autonomy. As the state that there was no truth to the cluded that SSI had 1) hired an investigator early as 1812, the U.S. Supreme Court “rumors.” Formal announcement of the who wrongfully obtained Disney documents, acknowledged that Article III federal courts merger came almost a year later. 2) reviewed privileged and confidential Disney possessed inherent powers: “Certain implied The court exercised its inherent power to papers, and 3) materially altered evidence in powers must necessarily result to our Courts sanction Peat, Marwick for having interfered an effort to conceal its possession of confi- of justice from the nature of their institu- with the state’s expert relationship—conduct dential Disney documents.29 In granting the tion.…[O]ur Courts no doubt possess pow- that the court deemed an “abuse of the liti- terminating sanction, the trial court made ers not immediately derived from statute.” gation process.”19 To “prevent the compro- clear that it was “[e]xercising its inherent The Court described those powers as ones mise of confidential information and to pre- powers to preserve and protect the integrity that “cannot be dispensed with in a Court, serve the integrity of the judicial process,” the of the judicial process.”30 This gave the court because they are necessary to the exercise of court precluded Peat, Marwick from pre- of appeal an opportunity to address whether all others.”11 senting any evidence controverting certain trial courts have the inherent power to dismiss The same is true of California courts. elements of the plaintiff’s case.20 Beyond its litigation based on misconduct—a question They were created by the California Constitu- core holding, what made the Peat, Marwick the court described as one of “first impres- tion12 and are deemed to have inherent pow- decision so influential was its thorough treat- sion.”31 ers “not confined by or dependent on ment of the reach of courts’ inherent powers. Although no published California decision statute.”13 Moreover, the California Legisla- The Peat, Marwick court recognized that had affirmed a court’s exercise of inherent ture has expressly recognized these powers. inherent powers “have been flexibly applied power to grant a terminating sanction to For example, in addressing the issue of dis- in response to the many vagaries of the liti- redress litigation abuses, California courts missing cases for failure to prosecute, the gation process” and reasoned that there is no have long-recognized inherent powers to ter- legislature stated its clear intention not to “intrinsic limitation” that would justify minate cases for other reasons. If a litigant interfere with the courts’ inherent powers: restricting their application to redressing only unreasonably delays in prosecuting its case, “This chapter does not limit or affect the specific types of litigation abuse.21 Invading or pursues a “sham, frivolous or wholly vex- authority of a court to dismiss an action or or damaging a party’s unique relationship atious” claim or defense, California courts impose other sanctions…under inherent with its expert, the court found, is funda- have the inherent power to dismiss the entire authority of the court.”14 The legislature was mentally no different from disadvantaging a action.32 similarly cautious in its general guidelines party by destroying evidence.22 Nor did the California courts also have given strong for handling the dismissal of cases: “The pro- court find due process considerations to be an indications that the inherent power to dismiss visions of this section shall not be deemed to insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of should be extended to redressing litigation be an exclusive enumeration of the court’s inherent powers: “We cannot accept the misconduct. For example, one court of appeal 20 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 upheld the exercise of dismiss an action inherent authority by when a party has will- a peer review panel to fully deceived the terminate an admin- court and engaged istrative proceeding in conduct utterly based on findings of inconsistent with the discovery delays, vio- orderly administra- lations of orders, and tion of justice.”43 disruptive behavior.33 Had the court explic- The court likened the itly adopted another inherent powers of jurisdiction’s stan- administrative officers dard, decisions from to those of judges, and that jurisdiction found that “hearing would have become officers must have the more relevant. power to control the Finally, the Sles- parties and prevent inger court explicitly deliberately disruptive made dismissal an and delaying tactics. appropriate remedy The power to dismiss only when no lesser an action and termi- remedy would guar- nate the proceeding is antee fairness. This an important tool that criterion sets Calif- should not be denied ornia apart from them.”34 During the many jurisdictions— pendency of the Sles- including federal inger appeal, another courts—which seem division of the Cal- to allow room for ifornia Court of courts to exercise the Appeal affirmed that inherent power to dis- trial courts “have miss even when it is inherent authority to not absolutely neces- dismiss an action,” sary to do so. Dismis- even though the dis- sals for misconduct in missal in that case was other jurisdictions based on statutory may explicitly serve authority.35 as a form of punish- Courts from other jurisdictions have also preserve the fairness of trial. Thus, the court ment or deterrence. According to the U.S. found that their inherent powers extend to ter- concluded that dismissal was warranted under Supreme Court, for example, “The most mination. Federal courts have regularly exer- its new standard. severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided cised inherent powers to terminate cases for The standard is notable for several reasons. by statute or rule must be available to the dis- all manner of litigation misconduct, includ- First, it sets the bar. No prior court in Cal- trict court in appropriate cases, not merely to ing the manufacturing of evidence,36 perjury ifornia had articulated what conditions would penalize those whose conduct may be deemed in discovery responses,37 and bad faith delay.38 justify exercising the court’s inherent power to to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those The same is true of state courts around the dismiss a case for misconduct. Until Slesinger, who might be tempted to such conduct in the country.39 no appellate court had reason to do so. absence of such a deterrent.”44 A number of Second, the Slesinger court did not state courts have concluded likewise.45 Three-Part Standard expressly adopt a standard articulated by Slesinger is the only published California In the end, the Slesinger court concluded that courts from other jurisdictions. For example, state court appellate decision upholding the California courts necessarily must have the Florida courts have ruled that dismissal is invocation of inherent powers to dismiss a power to dismiss cases for pervasive litigation appropriate when the conduct of the litigant case based on litigation abuses. Still, abuse. The court established a three-part shows “[a] deliberate and contumacious dis- California courts have recognized and applied standard for determining when a court may regard of the court’s authority,…bad faith, the three-part standard.46 exercise its inherent power to terminate. A willful disregard or gross indifference to an One court even intimated that the stan- party’s misconduct during the course of liti- order of the court, or conduct which evinces dard may apply to any exercise of inherent gation must: deliberate callousness.”41 In Maryland, a dis- power to sanction based on litigation mis- 1) Be “deliberate.” missal for litigation misconduct is “warranted conduct.47 In New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior 2) Be “egregious.” only in cases of egregious misconduct such as Court, the trial court imposed an evidentiary 3) Render “any remedy short of dismissal willful or contemptuous behavior, a deliber- sanction after finding the defendant destroyed inadequate to preserve the fairness of the ate attempt to hinder or prevent effective security camera footage despite having trial.”40 presentation of defenses or counterclaims, received a request for its production. The In Slesinger, the court found that SSI’s or stalling in revealing one’s own weak claim court of appeal reversed because the destruc- abuses were sufficiently deliberate and egre- or defense.”42 The Ninth Circuit has stated tion of video footage was deemed not to con- gious, and no remedy short of dismissal could that federal courts “have inherent power to stitute “egregious misconduct.”48 The court Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 21 Engineering Just Resolutions for the also did not consider the sanctions to be tions authorized by statute.”58 World’s Most Complex Disputes “necessary to ensure a fair trial.”49 Based on Driving this determination were due those findings, and relying on Slesinger, the process concerns about fee awards without Reginald A. Holmes, ESQ. court reversed the lower court’s use of inher- statutory safeguards, as well as the prospect Mediator • Arbitrator • Private Judge ent powers to sanction.50 Only time will tell of a chilling effect on attorneys’ zealous advo- Business • Intellectual Property • Franchise whether the three-part standard will emerge cacy. According to the court, “The use of Employment • International as the yardstick for California courts to assess courts’ inherent power to punish misconduct • Superb judicial temperament all nonmonetary sanctions for litigation abuse. by awarding attorneys’ fees may imperil the • Fiercely fair and impartial independence of the bar and thereby under- Limitations on Inherent Judicial Powers • Orderly party driven process mine the adversary system.” Tempered by • Deep subject matter knowledge Although broad, courts’ inherent powers are procedural safeguards, courts already have not limitless. They can, for example, be cir- “ample power to punish the misconduct by cumscribed by legislation. In McMahon v. contempt.”59 Superior Court, the court of appeal reversed That the Bauguess court spoke of mone- a trial court’s exercise of inherent authority tary awards as a way to “punish” misconduct to shorten the statutory notice period for a helps reconcile this decision with other deci- summary judgment motion.51 The court held sions giving trial courts broad inherent pow- that even when legislative acts bear directly ers to dismiss and impose evidentiary sanctions on inherent judicial powers, lawmakers may to redress litigation abuse.60 In California, exercise “a reasonable degree of regulation” courts have the inherent power to impose of the judiciary—so long as the statutes do not nonmonetary sanctions to remedy threats to “materially impair the constitutional functions the judicial system and rebalance the process AAA National Roster of Neutrals • College 52 of Commercial Arbitrators • Association of the courts.” This ruling is consistent when one party takes unfair advantage. It for International Arbitration • Academy of with the California Supreme Court’s general makes sense to exclude monetary sanctions Distinguished Neutrals caution that “inherent powers should never from the court’s inherent powers to the extent The Holmes Law Firm be exercised in such a manner as to nullify they are viewed solely as a form of punish- existing legislation or frustrate legitimate leg- ment. This analysis helps explain why 1.877. FAIR.ADR (t) • 1.626.432.7223 (f) islative policy.”53 California courts do not have the inherent [email protected] The inherent power of federal courts are power to impose monetary sanctions to www.theholmeslawfirm.com subject to even greater legislative control. redress misconduct but federal courts do.61 That is because the U.S. Supreme Court is the Federal courts are permitted to use their only constitutionally created federal court. All inherent power to impose sanctions to pun- other federal courts are “ordained and estab- ish or deter.62 lished” by Congress.54 Thus, for example, Nevertheless, this analysis is not entirely BOYKOFF INVESTIGATIONS even though the power of contempt is con- satisfying because courts could conceivably CA. State Lic. # 14388 • Since 1979 sidered “inherent in all courts [and] essential award nonpunitive monetary sanctions—for to the preservation of order in judicial pro- example, if the sanction were designed merely We are a full service investigative agency ceedings,” the Supreme Court held that to compensate a party for fees incurred as a specializing in: Congress could nevertheless regulate that direct consequence of misconduct by the • Skip Traces power’s application in circuit and district opposing party. California courts have not • Asset Searches courts because those courts’ “powers and carved out an exception to permit the exer- Witness Statements • duties depend upon [Congress] calling them cise of inherent powers to grant purely • Surveillance into existence.”55 restorative monetary sanctions. • Service of Process • Celebrity Stalkers The judiciary itself also can set limits on At least three explanations for this inac- its inherent powers. California courts have tion seem to emerge from California decisions. imposed one important doctrinal limitation The first is a concern about abuse, absent Please ask about our other services, or visit us on the web at with implications for parties confronted with statutory safeguards. The Bauguess court www.BoykoffInvestigations.com litigation misconduct. In Bauguess v. Paine, commented that if it “were to hold that trial the California Supreme Court ruled that trial courts have the inherent power to impose David Boykoff is the co-founder and courts lack the inherent power to award sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees for past president of Professional 56 Investigators of CA (PICA) attorneys’ fees based on misconduct. The alleged misconduct, trial courts would be supreme court recognized the American Rule, given a power without procedural limits and 818-718-8000 which makes each party responsible for its potentially subject to abuse.”63 Second, courts own fees, absent an agreement or statutory seem to view the inherent power to impose basis.57 But that point did not prove dis- nonmonetary sanctions to redress miscon- positive. The court observed that even when duct as more “necessary.” The Slesinger court no agreement or statute exists, a trial judge observed that the Bauguess decision described has inherent supervisory power to “take the inherent power to impose monetary sanc- appropriate action to secure compliance with tions as “unnecessary” in light of courts’ its orders, to punish contempt, and to con- contempt power.64 In contrast, the court trol its proceedings.” However, the court described the inherent power to terminate concluded, “It would be both unnecessary litigation when deliberate and egregious mis- and unwise to permit trial courts to use fee conduct renders any lesser sanction inade- awards as sanctions apart from those situa- quate to be “essential for the court to preserve 22 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 the integrity of its proceedings.” This power, according to the court, “restores balance to Judge Michael D. Marcus (Ret.) the adversary system when the misconduct of one party has destroyed it.”65 Finally, the Mediator Arbitrator Discovery Referee California Legislature has “expressly acknowl- EXPERIENCED PERSUASIVE EFFECTIVE edged the inherent power of courts to dis- miss,” but has not done so with respect to Daily Journal Top 50 Neutral 2009 monetary sanctions.66 Daily Journal Top 40 Neutral 2007 In fact, since the Bauguess decision, the Employment Legal Malpractice legislature took a number of steps to ensure • • Business Real Property that trial courts have statutory authority to • • impose monetary sanctions for different forms • Personal Injury • Intellectual Property of misconduct. For example, the legislature Century City Downtown Los Angeles Orange County enacted Code of Civil Procedure Section tel: 310.201.0010 www.marcusmediation.com Available exclusively at 128.5, giving courts broad authority to email: [email protected] impose monetary sanctions for “bad faith actions or tactics.” The legislature specifi- cally observed that this power was “now not presently authorized by the interpretation of the law in Baug[u]ess v. Paine.”67 Section 128.5 was later superseded by Section 128.7, which was modeled after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and remains in place today. Section 128.7 grants more limited authority to impose monetary sanc- tions than Section 128.5 and also provides greater procedural safeguards by allowing an offending filing to be withdrawn without A. J. Hazarabedian Guillermo A. Frias consequence. This and other authorities like Glenn L. Block Bernadette M. Duran Section 177.5 and Rule 2.30 of the California Artin N. Shaverdian Rules of Court (formerly Rule 227), which authorize imposition of monetary sanctions for certain forms of litigation impropriety, fur- ther underscore “the Legislature’s acceptance of [the Bauguess court’s] core holding that trial courts may not award attorney fees as a sanction for misconduct absent statutory authority (or an agreement of the parties).”68 The inherent powers of California courts provide an important check on litigation American of abuses. Recent decisions underscore this Institute Mediation fundamental fact, even as the contours of the courts’ inherent powers continue to World Class Training for the Complete Mediator I evolve. RESOLVING CONFLICTS AT WORK 1 See, e.g., Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F. 2d 1115 —with Ken Cloke— (1st Cir. 1989); R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Friday-Saturday • November 12-13 Ltd., 75 Cal. App. 4th 486 (1999); Perna v. Electronic 10 MCLE Hours Data Sys. Corp., 916 F. Supp. 388 (D. N.J. 1995); Cummings v. Wayne County, 533 N.W. 2d 13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). MEDIATING AND NEGOTIATING COMMERCIAL CASES 2 Civil Discovery Act, ch. 7, CODE CIV. PROC. —with Lee Jay Berman— §§2023.010-2023.040. See CODE CIV. PROC. §2023.010 Tuesday-Saturday • January 25-29 (listing specific discovery abuses potentially justifying Meets the 40-hour Court Requirement – 30 MCLE Hours sanctions); CODE CIV. PROC. §2023.030 (catalogue of remedies). 3 Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). MEDIATING DIVORCE AGREEMENTS 4 Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 155 Cal. —with Jim Melamed— App. 4th 736, 758 (2007) (quoting United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (internal Tuesday-Saturday • January 25-29 quotations omitted)). Meets the 40-hour Court Requirement – 30 MCLE Hours 5 Walker v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 257, 267 (1991). See our complete listing of courses and dates at: 6 Slesinger, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 762. 7 See Robert J. Pushaw Jr., The Inherent Powers of www.AmericanInstituteofMediation.com Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001) (providing historical overview 213.383.0454 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 23 of courts’ inherent powers). 32 See, e.g., Estate of King, 121 Cal. App. 2d 765, 774 (unpublished). 8 Id. at 800. (1953); Karras v. Western Title Ins. Co., 270 Cal. 47 See New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. 9 Id. at 806. App. 2d 753, 757 (1969). App. 4th 1403 (2008). 10 Id. at 810. 33 Mileikowsky v. Tenet Health Sys., 128 Cal. App. 4th 48 Id. at 1434. 11 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 531 (2005). 49 Id. (1812). 34 Id. at 561. 50 Id. The court also concluded that a court order vio- 12 CAL. CONST. art. VI, §1. 35 Del Junco v. Hufnagel, 150 Cal. App. 4th 789, 799 lation was required to impose evidentiary sanctions 13 Walker v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 257, 267 (2007). under the relevant statute. Id. at 1431-34. (1991). 36 Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F. 2d 1115, 1118- 51 McMahon v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 4th 112, 14 CODE CIV. PROC. §583.150. 22 (1st Cir. 1999). 118 (2003). 15 CODE CIV. PROC. §581(m). 37 Martin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 251 F. 3d 691, 52 Id. at 117. 16 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court, 694-95 (8th Cir. 2001). 53 Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 654 (1971) (cit- 200 Cal. App. 3d 272, 287 (1988) (internal quotations 38 Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F. 3d 1406, 1417-18 ing Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289 (1917)). omitted). (5th Cir. 1995). 54 U.S. CONST. art. III. 17 Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v. RMI, Inc., 176 39 See, e.g., Schultz v. Sykes, 638 N.W. 2d 604, 610 55 Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1873). Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1116-17 (1986). (Wis. Ct. App. 2001); Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78 56 Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 637-39 (1978). 18 Peat, Marwick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 272. For the fac- (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Rockdale Mgmt. Co. v. 57 Id. at 634; CODE CIV. PROC. §1021. tual background of the case, see generally id. at 276- Shawmut Bank, N.A., 418 Mass. 596 (1994); 58 Bauguess, 22 Cal. 3d at 637. 83. Cummings v. Wayne County, 210 Mich. App. 249 59 Id. at 638. 19 Id. at 289. (1995). 60 See also Andrews v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 4th 20 Id. at 275. 40 Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 155 Cal. 779, 782 (2000) (observing that the Baugess court 21 Id. at 287-89. App. 4th 736, 764 (2007). “made it clear that a punitive monetary sanction” is not 22 Id. at 289. 41 Tramel, 672 So. 2d at 83. authorized under inherent powers of the court). 23 Id. at 290. 42 Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 202 (1999). 61 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 24 Id. at 289. 43 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distribs., (1991). 25 Conn v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 3d 774 69 F. 3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995). 62 NHL v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, (1987). 44 NHL v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). 26 See, e.g., Silvestro v. Bondex Int’l, Inc., 2005 WL 643 (1976). 63 Bauguess, 22 Cal. 3d at 638. 2435833, at *2-4 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2005); Hilton v. 45 See, e.g., Tramel, 672 So. 2d at 84 (Florida); Abtrax 64 Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 155 Cal. Bressler, 2008 WL 2526241, at *4 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Pharms. v. Elkins-Sinn, 139 N.J. 499, 517-18 (1995) App. 4th 736, 760-61 (2007). 2008). (New Jersey). 65 Id. at 761. 27 Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 155 Cal. 46 In re Sepuya, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6173, 66 Clark v. Optical Coating Labs., Inc., 165 Cal. App. App. 4th 736 (2007). at *13-14 (July 30, 2009) (unpublished); In re Marriage 4th 150, 165 (2008). 28 Id. at 755-56. of Jayraj & Bindu Nair, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. 67 Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v. Jelinek, 29 Id. at 741-56. LEXIS 1658, at *12-13 (Mar. 9, 2010) (unpublished); 60 Cal. App. 4th 352, 367 (1997) (quoting 1981 Cal. 30 Id. at 756. Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court, 2010 Cal. Stat. ch. 762, §2, at 2968). 31 Id. at 740. App. Unpub. LEXIS 326, at *16-17 (Jan. 15, 2010) 68 Clark, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 164. 24 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 MCLE ARTICLE AND SELF-ASSESSMENT TEST By reading this article and answering the accompanying test questions, you can earn one MCLE credit. To apply for credit, please follow the instructions on the test answer sheet on page 27. by Julie J. Bisceglia Location Location Location In the enforcement of forum-selection clauses, courts will distinguish between mandatory and permissive language A WELL-WROUGHT forum-selection clause, where a dispute that arises between them owner sued the towing company in Florida. with or without a companion choice-of-law will be litigated. Such a clause is usually, The Florida district court and the Fifth Circuit clause, can have a profound impact on a law- though not always, paired with a choice-of- refused to enforce the forum-selection clause, suit. Because California law requires—and law clause that specifies which law will gov- on the usual “ousting” and public policy federal law permits—a defendant seeking a ern their dispute.1 grounds. The appellate court added that the change of forum to do so early in litigation, In simpler times, courts often refused to plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be dis- a forum-selection clause can make an action enforce forum-selection clauses, perceiving turbed. Applying a straight inconvenient- grind to a halt before it even gets underway. them as attempts by private parties to “oust” forum analysis—one that would be applied in As these clauses become more commonplace the court’s jurisdiction and also as contrary the absence of a forum-selection clause—the in commercial contracts, counsel need to be to public policy.2 In 1972, however, the U.S. appellate court found that the crucial events familiar with the governing law. Indeed, Supreme Court, in The Bremen v. Zapata took place in U.S. waters, potential witnesses searching for and evaluating a forum-selection Off-Shore Company,3 took a decidedly more clause should be one of the top items on a lit- hospitable view. The case concerned a con- Julie J. Bisceglia is a research attorney for California igation checklist—right alongside insurance tract to tow an oil rig. A clause within the con- Court of Appeal Justice William Bedsworth, Fourth coverage. tract appointed the London Court of Justice District. She wrote this article as a civil litigator A forum-selection clause represents an as the forum for any dispute. When the oil rig practicing at the Los Angeles office of Payne & agreement between contracting parties about was damaged in the Gulf of Mexico, the Fears, LLP. Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 25 were nearby, and London had no interest in Court focused on the economic realities, both California Supreme Court decided Smith, the matter.4 commercial and judicial, underlying Carnival’s Valentino & Smith v. Superior Court.19 The The Supreme Court, however, took the clause. Holding that the lack of bargaining Smith court cited The Bremen and the “mod- opposite view. Signaling a major shift in the power between the passenger and the cruise ern trend” of enforcing these clauses,20 con- law, the Court remarked that “far too little line did not render a forum-selection clause cluding that “forum selection clauses are weight and effect were given to the forum unenforceable, the Court ticked off the reasons valid and may be given effect, in the court’s clause in resolving this controversy.”5 The that a cruise line would insist on having one: discretion and in the absence of a showing Court instead held that forum-selection First, a cruise line has a special inter- [that] enforcement of such a clause would clauses “are prima facie valid and should be est in limiting the fora in which it be unreasonable.”21 The court even helpfully enforced unless enforcement is shown by the potentially could be subject to suit. defined “unreasonable”: “[T]he forum select- resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under Because a cruise ship typically carries ed would be unavailable or unable to accom- the circumstances.”6 This rule assisted Amer- passengers from many locales, it is not plish substantial justice.”22 Moreover, the ican commercial interests by enforcing the unlikely that a mishap on a cruise court placed the burden of demonstrating California hopped on the forum-selection-clause bandwagon in 1976 when the California Supreme Court decided Smith, Valentino & Smith v. Superior Court. The Smith court cited The Bremen and the “modern trend” of enforcing these clauses, concluding that “forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court’s discretion and in the absence of a showing [that] enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable.” sanctity of contracts and holding parties to could subject the cruise line to litiga- unreasonableness on the party opposing their bargain.7 If English law—assumed to tion in several different fora.…Addi- enforcement.23 apply in the absence of a choice-of-law tionally, a clause establishing ex ante Since the decision in Smith, forum-selec- clause8—was less favorable to the American the forum for dispute resolution has tion clauses have generally encountered rig owner than to the German towing com- the salutary effect of dispelling any smooth sailing in California courts. pany, that was part of the bargain and not confusion about where suits arising Arguments that they appear in adhesion con- grounds for refusing to enforce the clause.9 from the contract must be brought tracts,24 or that it may be more expensive to The Court also made short work of the and defended, sparing litigants the litigate in the selected forum,25 or that the law “ousting” notion, implying that overworked time and expense of pretrial motions of the selected forum may be unfavorable or federal district court judges would be happy to determine the correct forum and even hostile to the plaintiff’s claims,26 or that to be “ousted” from having to hear a com- conserving judicial resources that oth- the plaintiff did not read the clause,27 have all plex maritime case.10 Although the Court’s erwise would be devoted to deciding been held to be insufficient to overcome the holding in The Bremen applied to “federal dis- those motions.…Finally, it stands to plaintiff’s heavy burden of showing unrea- trict courts sitting in admiralty,”11 other reason that passengers who purchase sonableness. As courts and dockets become courts, federal and state, soon gave it a much tickets containing a forum clause like more crowded, no one even bothers to make broader application,12 and so did the Court that at issue in this case benefit in the “ousting” argument anymore.28 itself.13 the form of reduced fares reflecting In California state court, the mechanism The Bremen dealt with a unique, care- the savings that the cruise line enjoys for enforcing a forum-selection clause is a fully negotiated contract concerning inter- by limiting the fora in which it may motion to dismiss or stay for forum non con- national commerce between American and be sued.17 veniens under Code of Civil Procedure Section foreign businesses.14 In Carnival Cruise Lines The Court also noted the lack of any evi- 410.30.29 This motion must be filed within the v. Shute, the Court examined a forum-selec- dence that Carnival had picked Florida for an time to plead to the complaint, unless the tion clause in a form contract between an untoward purpose, such as discouraging law- court extends the time for good cause.30 American company and its customers.15 Shute suits, or that Carnival had gained the Shutes’ Section 418.10 provides directions for review involved a clause on a ticket purchased by a agreement by “fraud or overreaching.” Finally by writ of an order denying the motion.31 A couple, the Shutes, for a cruise vacation, dur- the Court observed that the Shutes did not defendant who does not make this motion at ing which Mrs. Shute was injured. The Shutes have to go on the cruise if they objected to the the proper time waives any objection on lived in Washington. The forum-selection clause. They failed to satisfy the “‘heavy bur- inconvenient forum grounds.32 clause specified Florida—Carnival’s home den of proof’” required to render the clause In federal court, a defendant has more state. When the Shutes sued in Washington, unenforceable.18 options for enforcing a forum-selection clause, Carnival moved to enforce the clause.16 California hopped on the forum-selec- depending on the circumstances and on which As it had in The Bremen, the Supreme tion-clause bandwagon in 1976 when the circuit’s law applies. A defendant can make 26 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 MCLE Test No. 197 MCLE Answer Sheet #197 LOCATION LOCATION LOCATION The Los Angeles County Bar Association certifies that this activity has been approved for Minimum Name Continuing Legal Education credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1 hour. Law Firm/Organization 1. Under federal and California law, the nonmoving 11. The fact that a forum-selection clause is accessible Address party bears the burden of showing why a forum-selec- only by a link on the defendant’s Web site does not ren- tion clause should not be enforced. der the clause unenforceable. City True. True. State/Zip False. False. E-mail 2. Smith, Valentino & Smith v. Superior Court—the only 12. A service-of-suit clause expressly allows a defen- Phone California Supreme Court decision addressing forum- dant to be sued in more than one jurisdiction. State Bar # selection clauses—refers in passing to the distinction True. between mandatory and permissive clauses. False. INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBTAINING MCLE CREDITS True. 13. If a federal court finds that a forum-selection clause 1. Study the MCLE article in this issue. False. is permissive, it will determine the correct forum using 2. Answer the test questions opposite by marking 3. When the U.S. Supreme Court decided The Bremen the standard forum non conveniens analysis employed the appropriate boxes below. Each question v. Zapata Off-Shore Company in 1972, it was following in the absence of a forum-selection clause. has only one answer. Photocopies of this answer sheet may be submitted; however, this the “modern trend” of enforcing forum-selection True. form should not be enlarged or reduced. clauses. False. True. 3. Mail the answer sheet and the $15 testing fee 14. A California court will enforce a forum-selection ($20 for non-LACBA members) to: False. clause that selects a particular California county or Los Angeles Lawyer 4. Under California law, proper forum is jurisdictional city only if venue is otherwise proper under California’s MCLE Test and cannot be waived. venue statutes. P.O. Box 55020 True. True. Los Angeles, CA 90055 False. False. Make checks payable to Los Angeles Lawyer. 5. Federal law provides several procedures for enforc- 15. An order denying a motion to enforce a forum- 4. Within six weeks, Los Angeles Lawyer will selection clause is an appealable order. return your test with the correct answers, a ing a forum-selection clause; California law provides rationale for the correct answers, and a True. only one procedure. certificate verifying the MCLE credit you earned True. False. through this self-assessment activity. False. 16. The standard of review for an order enforcing a 5. For future reference, please retain the MCLE test materials returned to you. 6. Which of these findings is not one that would pre- forum-selection clause is de novo. clude enforcement of a forum-selection clause in the True. ANSWERS False. Ninth Circuit? Mark your answers to the test by checking the A. The clause was obtained by fraud or overreaching. 17. A forum-selection clause that specifies a federal dis- appropriate boxes below. Each question has only B. The clause is contained in a contract of adhesion. trict court is not enforceable unless the parties also meet one answer. C. The clause deprives the nonmoving party of a day in federal subject-matter jurisdiction requirements. court. True. 1. I True I False D. The clause contravenes a strong public policy of the False. 2. I True I False forum. 18. Under California law, a forum-selection clause is 3. I True I False 7. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the law of deemed unreasonable if the forum is unavailable. 4. I True I False the state in which it sits when deciding whether to True. 5. I True I False enforce a forum-selection clause. False. True. 6. I A I B I C I D False. 19. Under California law, a motion to enforce a forum- 7. I True I False selection clause may be made by summary judgment, 8. 8. I True I False If the out-of-state forum’s law is unfavorable to the so long as the defendant pleads improper forum as an I I California plaintiff, a California court will not enforce an affirmative defense. 9. True False out-of-state forum-selection clause. True. 10. I True I False True. False. 11. I True I False False. 20. Under the Ninth Circuit test for forum-selection 12. I True I False 9. A properly drafted forum-selection clause can pre- clauses, the district court must resolve all factual con- 13. I True I False clude removal to federal court. flicts in favor of the nonmoving party. 14. I True I False True. True. I I False. False. 15. True False I I 10. A California statute that prohibits out-of-state 16. True False forum-selection clauses precludes enforcement of such 17. I True I False a clause. 18. I True I False True. 19. I True I False False. 20. I True I False Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 27 a motion under 28 USC Section 1404 for a intentions, while remaining mindful of other The Smith court did not address, or even change of venue “in the interest of justice,”33 issues that may bear on the choice of forum. mention, mandatory and permissive clauses. a motion to dismiss or transfer under 28 Thus, in one case, the disputed clause stated, The California Court of Appeal intro- USC Section 1406, or, in some circuits (includ- “For the purpose of resolving disputes regard- duced the concept of mandatory and per- ing the Ninth Circuit), a motion to dismiss ing this Agreement…the Government [of missive forum-selection clauses into California under Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Guyana], ATN and GT&T shall submit them- law in Berg v. MTC Electronics Technologies Civil Procedure.34 Federal law, rather than the selves to the jurisdiction of the courts of Company, Ltd.53—a case that abounds in law of the state in which the district court sits, Guyana.”41 The court combined this clause difficulties. Berg involved a series of share- governs whether the motion is granted.35 It with a waiver of sovereign immunity by the holder class action lawsuits, most of which is also possible to enforce a forum-selection government of Guyana and a choice of were consolidated or coordinated in the clause through summary judgment, as the Guyana law and held that litigation had to Eastern District of New York. After these cruise line did in Shute.36 A plea of improper take place in Guyana’s courts.42 In another cases were safely berthed in New York, the forum must, however, be asserted as an affir- case, however, the clause “The courts of Cali- Berg plaintiffs filed another shareholder action mative defense.37 If the opposing party has fornia, County of Orange, shall have juris- in Los Angeles, alleging substantially the already launched a lawsuit in another forum, diction over the parties in any action at law same theories as those alleged in the New the party seeking to enforce the clause may relating to the subject matter or the inter- York cases. Not surprisingly, the California move for an antisuit injunction.38 pretation of this contract” was held not to court granted the defendants a stay.54 require litigation in Orange County.43 The Berg plaintiffs argued that a state- Terminology and Enforcement If a federal court decides that the clause is ment in the MTC prospectus—not in any Counsel in both state and federal courts must mandatory, it will enforce it unless the plain- agreement—required the defendants to liti- confront the vexed question of what kind of tiff can show that enforcement would be gate in Los Angeles. According to the sen- forum-selection clause they are dealing with— unreasonable or unjust.44 In the Ninth Circuit, tence in the prospectus, “‘The company mandatory or permissive. Mandatory clauses the court has identified three circumstances [MTC] has expressly submitted to the juris- usually will be enforced in both California and under which a forum-selection clause would diction of the State of California and United federal courts. In federal court, however, per- not be enforced: fraud or overreaching, States Federal courts sitting in the City of Los missive clauses face an uphill battle. To com- depriving nonmoving parties of their day in Angeles, California, for the purpose of any plicate matters further, forum-selection clauses court, or contravening a strong public policy suit, action, or proceedings arising out of are sometimes expressed in terms of juris- of the forum.45 The court has further held that this Offering.’”55 diction or venue instead of court location if a motion to dismiss is based on controverted The Berg court identified this sentence as and type. All these refinements have generated facts, “the trial court must draw all reason- a “service of suit clause,” a particular type voluminous and confusing case law. Minute able inferences in favor of the non-moving of clause developed for insurance policies.56 changes in terminology are deemed sufficient party and resolve all factual conflicts in favor A service-of-suit clause provides that an to differentiate two clauses that look indis- of the non-moving party.”46 Even under this insurer “‘will submit to the jurisdiction of any tinguishable to the untutored eye. test, however, the nonmoving party still car- court of competent jurisdiction and will com- Ideally, a mandatory forum-selection ries a heavy burden to establish that the ply with all requirements necessary to give clause addresses court location and type clause is unreasonable or unjust. Inconven- such Court jurisdiction.…’”57 The court (state, federal, or both) and jurisdiction sep- ience, even a substantial amount of it, is not observed that service-of-suit clauses oper- arately and in unmistakably exclusive terms: enough to “deprive” the nonmoving party of ate to “confer personal jurisdiction on the “Exhibitor…expressly agrees that any and all a day in court.47 selected forum, but not to mandate resolu- disputes arising out of or in connection with If the clause is permissive, one of two tion of the dispute in that forum regardless this Agreement shall be litigated only in the results can occur. Either the court will ignore of other considerations.”58 Superior Court for Los Angeles, California the clause and proceed with a standard analy- While this is true enough, it is irrelevant (and in no other), and Exhibitor hereby con- sis based on forum non conveniens,48 or the to the analysis of a forum-selection clause. By sents to the jurisdiction of said court.”39 In court will take the clause into account as definition, service-of-suit clauses do not reality, however, many clauses are not drafted one factor in a standard forum non conve- “select” a particular forum. In an earlier so tidily. niens analysis.49 This latter alternative is case, the court in Appalachian Insurance The most troublesome clauses are those much more likely if the defendant has moved Company v. Superior Court identified the phrased in terms of jurisdiction rather than for a transfer rather than for outright dis- key difference between the two kinds of court location and type. Although a permis- missal. Here too, courts differ. Some courts clauses: sive forum-selection clause hardly seems give “substantial” weight to a permissive The difference between The Bremen worth the trouble to print, a permissive juris- clause,50 while others simply regard it as one and the case at bench [which dealt diction clause makes sense. For example, a of the interests reviewed as part of the stan- with a service of suit clause] lies in buyer agrees to be subject to the jurisdiction dard forum non conveniens analysis.51 the type of forum selection clause of the seller’s home state, with no arguments involved. In The Bremen selection of California’s Legal Wrinkle about minimum contacts, although other the specific forum in London was states may also have jurisdiction over the The published California state court opinions “clearly a reasonable effort to bring buyer. Agreeing to be subject to the home on forum-selection clauses are mercifully vital certainty to this international state’s jurisdiction, however, is not necessar- fewer than the federal cases and far more uni- transaction and to provide a neutral ily the same as agreeing to litigate disputes in form. California, however, has its own legal forum.…” Given the strong evidence the home state’s courts.40 wrinkle that makes the distinction between that the clause was an important part When faced with this kind of ambigu- mandatory and permissive troublesome. of the agreement, the parties must have ity—does “jurisdiction” mean “jurisdiction” The California Supreme Court has not conducted their negotiations with the or does it mean “forum”?—courts will do issued an opinion on forum-selection clauses clause prominently in mind.…59 what they can to give effect to the parties’ since 1976, when it decided the Smith case.52 By contrast, the service-of-suit clauses 28 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 served an entirely different purpose. Lloyd’s be enforced.74 And some California statutes cases, litigation in a distant forum is simply used them to make its products more attrac- explicitly forbid enforcement of out-of-state impractical for one reason or another. tive to American businesses, which might forum-selection clauses. For example, Business Counsel for defendants in state court otherwise have hesitated to contract with an and Professions Code Section 20040.5 pro- must be particularly alert to the presence insurer that could not be sued in the United hibits out-of-state forum-selection clauses in and nature of a forum-selection clause States.60 Rather than providing “vital cer- franchise agreements involving a California because of the short time period provided by tainty” or protection “from being confronted franchise.75 California law for asserting it. When defense by a myriad of different state, provincial, Still other statutory schemes have been counsel receive a lawsuit based on a contract, and national forums”61 afforded by The interpreted to forbid enforcement of an out- especially a commercial or boilerplate con- Bremen-type forum-selection clauses, a typ- of-state forum-selection clause indirectly. In tract, the terms should be checked immedi- ical service-of-suit clause invites lawsuits in America Online, Inc., v. Superior Court,76 the ately for an out-of-state forum-selection multiple jurisdictions. court of appeal interpreted the nonwaiver clause. If the complaint involves e-commerce, Having confused two types of clauses provision of California’s Consumer Legal counsel should review the terms and condi- with very different purposes, Berg launches Remedies Act77 to prohibit enforcement of a tions posted on the defendant’s Web site. into a discussion of mandatory and permis- Virginia forum-selection clause. Because These terms and conditions have been held sive forum-selection clauses, a discussion that Virginia did not afford consumers the same enforceable, even if they are only accessible has no bearing on service-of-suit clauses. The rights that they would have under the CLRA, by a link.79 If the contract includes a forum- cases cited in Berg regarding mandatory and the court reasoned that enforcement of the selection clause and the client wishes to permissive clauses are, without exception, forum-selection clause would be tantamount enforce it, counsel should then determine as federal cases applying federal law.62 to a waiver of the CLRA’s provisions.78 best they can whether a court is likely to Since Berg, the fate of a permissive forum- Realistically, a successful motion to dismiss regard it as mandatory or permissive. A deci- selection clause has been extremely murky or stay for forum non conveniens in state sion must be made quickly whether to move under California law. On the one hand, Berg court or to dismiss or transfer in federal court for dismissal or stay for forum non conven- states that the clause is to be given substan- often signals the end of a lawsuit. In many iens. Finally, counsel should become famil- tial weight.63 On the other hand, Berg says that the “traditional” forum non conveniens analysis, such as that set forth in Stangvik v. Mandatory or Permissive? Shiley,64 applies.65 The Stangvik analysis, however, was devel- Counsel for clients faced with a forum-selection clause must predict whether a court will oped for torts. It makes no allowance for a find the clause mandatory or permissive. Each of the following clauses appeared in a forum-selection clause at all. The traditional federal case. The endnotes reveal how the clauses were categorized. California forum non conveniens analysis causes a forum-selection clause simply to dis- 1. “I agree and consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Vermont, with venue appear, as if it had never existed.66 Moreover, in Windham County, Vermont or the United States District Court for the District of the defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the Vermont for the resolution of all legal matters concerning this agreement.…”1 burden of proof.67 In practice, however, 2. “This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the although published opinions since Berg have State of California and the parties agree that in any dispute jurisdiction and venue shall cited it for the distinction between mandatory be in California.”2 and permissive clauses,68 no published 3. “A decision of the Board of Adjustment…or the decision of a permanent arbitrator shall California appellate court decision has held be enforceable by a petition to confirm an arbitration award filed in the Superior Court a forum-selection clause unenforceable on of the City and County of San Francisco, State of California.”3 the grounds that it is merely permissive.69 4. “The parties hereunto consent to jurisdiction in the State of Nevada and the terms of In state court practice, a forum-selection this agreement to be interpreted pursuant to the laws of said State.”4 clause should not be confused with a true 5. “Jurisdiction: Each party expressly submits to the jurisdiction of the State of New York, venue-selection clause.70 A clause that selects U.S.A. and the federal courts situated in New York City and to service of process by reg- a California county in which a dispute must istered mail.”5 be litigated will run into trouble if the county 6. “The undersigned further acknowledges and agrees…that Michigan is a mutually is not otherwise appropriate.71 California reasonably convenient place for any trial concerning disputes arising from this Agreement courts will not allow private parties to over- and further agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Michigan with ride the legislature’s determination as to which respect to claims arising out of the agreement.”6 California county should host an action.72 If 7. “The undersigned further acknowledges and agrees…that Michigan is a mutually the clause selects a county or city in some reasonably convenient place for any trial concerning disputes arising from this Agreement other state, however, California courts will and further agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Michigan with enforce it, assuming, no doubt, that the other respect to claims arising out of the agreement.”7—J.J.B. state’s courts can sort out their own venue problems.73 1 Paster v. Putney Student Travel, Inc., No. 99-2062, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9194, at *2 (C.D. Cal., June 17, California courts usually regard forum- 1999) (mandatory). 2 Sterling Forest Assocs. Ltd. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 840 F. 2d 249, 251-52 (4th Cir. 1988) (mandatory). selection clauses with a benign eye. 3 Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F. 3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995) Nevertheless, a court will refuse to enforce (permissive). even a mandatory clause if enforcement 4 Kachal, Inc., v. Menzie, 738 F. Supp. 371 (D. Nev. 1990) (permissive). would compromise some important 5 Central Coal Co. v. Philbro Energy, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 595, 596 (W.D. Va. 1988) (mandatory). 6 California public policy. An unconscionable Furrey v. First Nat’l Monetary Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6, 8 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (mandatory). 7 First Nat’l Monetary Corp. v. Chesney, 654 F. Supp. 649, 654 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (permissive). forum-selection clause, just like any other unconscionable contract provision, will not Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 29 iar with any statutes, such as those protect- but see Carnival Cruise Lines v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1027 (1991) (lack of notice renders ing consumers, that could directly or indi- clause unenforceable). ERISA rectly affect enforcement. 28 States differ, however, in their acceptance of forum- In federal court, the pace need not perhaps selection clauses. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court LAWYERS be quite so hectic, as a defendant may be in Stewart Organization, Inc., v. Ricoh Corporation able to assert improper venue as an affirma- alluded to the hostility of Alabama state courts toward these clauses. Stewart Org., Inc., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 LONG TERM DISABILITY, LONG tive defense and make a motion for sum- TERM CARE, HEALTH, U.S. 22, 24, 30 (1988). mary judgment at its leisure. But counsel 29 Olnick v. BMG Entm’t, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1286, EATING DISORDER, AND LIFE must be careful to follow the dictates of Rule 1294 (2006); Cal-State Business Prods. & Servs., Inc., INSURANCE CLAIMS 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure v. Ricoh, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1666, 1680 (1993). If the regarding motions to dismiss to avoid inad- plaintiff is a California resident, the court will almost always stay, rather than dismiss, the case. See, e.g., ERISA & BAD FAITH vertently waiving the issue.80 Furda v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 418, 425 MATTERS Plaintiffs’ counsel also should be looking (1984). for forum-selection clauses while litigation is 30 CODE CIV. PROC. §418.10(a). 31 California state and federal courts being considered. A client who suddenly finds CODE CIV. PROC. §418.10(c). The standard of review More than 20 years experience out that he or she will have to litigate in a dis- for enforcement of a forum-selection clause is all over Settlements, trials and appeals tant state—and perhaps under different and the map. See Intershop Commc’ns, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 198-99 (substantial evidence, abuse of discretion, de less favorable law—will likely be annoyed, at novo). The standard chosen will most likely depend on Referral fees as allowed by the very least, with counsel for failing to how the trial court arrived at its decision. For exam- State Bar of California bring this game-changer to the client’s atten- ple, if it interpreted contract language as a matter of tion before filing. I law, then the appellate court will probably review de novo. Id. Kantor & Kantor LLP 32 CODE CIV. PROC. §418.10(e)(3). 1 818.886.2525 TOLL FREE The choice-of-law clause usually specifies the law of 33 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29. If there is no enforceable the state selected as the forum. But see Vogt-Nem, choice-of-law provision, the law of the state in which 877.783.8686 Inc. v. M/V Tramper W. African Shipping Co., N.V., the original court sat will still apply—even if the motion www.kantorlaw.net 263 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231-32 (N.D. Cal. 2002) is granted and the case is moved. Van Dusen v. Barrack, (Netherlands forum, Dutch and American law applied). 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964). 2 See, e.g., Carbon Black Export v. The SS Monrosa, 34 Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F. 3d 320, 324 254 F. 2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958). (9th Cir. 1996). It is important to check the law of the 3 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 circuit in which the motion is made. In the Sixth (1972). Circuit, for example, a FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3) motion 4 Id. at 6, 7. will be denied if the suit was originally filed in a court 5 Id. at 8. in which venue would be proper. Kerobo v. 6 Id. at 10. Southwestern Clean Fuels Corp., 285 F. 3d 531, 536 7 Id. at 11. (6th Cir. 2002). If the case is transferred for improper 8 Id. at 14 n.15. venue under 28 U.S.C. §1406, the law of the new 9 Id. at 15. forum will apply in the absence of an enforceable 10 Id. at 12. choice-of-law provision. Nelson v. International Paint 11 Id. at 10. Co., 716 F. 2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983). 12 See, e.g., Pelleport Investors, Inc., v. Budco Quality 35 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 32. Although the court has dis- Theaters, Inc., 741 F. 2d 273, 279 (9th Cir. 1984), dis- cretion to dismiss the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. approved on other grounds by Powerex Corp. v. §1406(a), it will usually transfer the case if the selected Reliant Energy Servs., 551 U.S. 224 (2007). forum is domestic and if it perceives that a dismissal 13 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); may cause limitation problems. See, e.g., Roberson v. see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Norwegian Cruise Line, 897 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). (C.D. Cal. 1995). 14 A Team Of Experts The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9, 10. 36 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), 15 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), superseded by statute, 46 U.S.C. §30509; see also John At Your Service... superseded by statute, 46 U.S.C. §30509. Boutari & Sons v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs., Inc., 22 F. 16 Id. at 587-88. 3d 51 (2d Cir. 1994). 17 ______Id. at 593-94. 37 American Home Assurance Co. v. TGL Container 18 Id. at 595. Lines, Ltd., 347 F. Supp. 2d 749, 765 (N.D. Cal. 19 Smith, Valentino & Smith v. Superior Court, 17 Realtors® with experience in 2004); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h). Cal. 3d 491 (1976). 38 Applied Med. Distrib. Corp. v. The Surgical Co., 587 20 Divorce Id. at 494-95. In his dissent, Justice Mosk wrote in F. 3d 909 (9th Cir. 2009); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Trust favor of the traditional view. Id. at 497-98. Andina Licores S. A., 446 F. 3d 984 (9th Cir. 2006). 21 Id. at 496. This procedure is also available in state court, but an Probate 22 Id. at 494. injunction is granted only in exceptional circumstances. 23 ______Id.; see also Benefit Ass’n Int’l, Inc. v. Superior Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th Court, 46 Cal. App. 4th 827, 835 (1996). An incon- 697, 707-08 (2002). venient-forum analysis operating in the absence of a Providing complimentary 39 Pelleport Investors, Inc., v. Budco Quality Theaters, forum-selection clause places the burden on the party Inc., 741 F. 2d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1984), disapproved Property evaluations advocating dismissal or stay (usually the defendant) to on other grounds by Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Pre-marketing counsel & coordination show that the chosen forum is not the right one. Servs., 551 U.S. 224 (2007). The court held that this Century Indem. Co. v. Bank of Am., 58 Cal. App. 4th Nationwide agent referral network clause defeated removal to federal court. Pelleport, 741 408, 411 (1997). F. 2d at 280. Parties may not, however, “contract” 24 Intershop Commc’ns AG v. Superior Court, 104 themselves into federal court. They must still satisfy the Cal. App. 4th 191, 201-02 (2002). subject-matter jurisdictional requirements of federal 25 Smith, 17 Cal. 3d at 496. question or diversity. A clause that specifies a federal dis- 26 310.230.7373 CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. National Hockey League trict court as the exclusive forum will be unenforceable DRE# 00902158 Players Ass’n, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1356-57 (1995). if the jurisdictional requirements are not met. 27 Intershop Commc’ns, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 202; 30 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 40 See Hunt v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 4th 901, veniens case. Federal Arbitration Act when the forum-selection 908 (2000). 70 Federal courts do not need to be concerned about clause purports to regulate the forum for an arbitration. 41 Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc. v. Inter-American Dev. enforcing clauses that specify a particular location Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F. 3d 884, 890 Bank, 251 F. Supp. 2d 126, 133 (D. D.C. 2003). within a state. In addition, the terms “venue” and (9th Cir. 2001). 42 Id. at 134. “forum” are often used interchangeably in federal 76 America Online, Inc., v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 43 Hunt Wesson Foods v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F. 2d practice. See Sterling Forest Assocs., v. Barnett-Range 4th 1 (2001). 75, 76 (9th Cir. 1987). Corp., 840 F. 2d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1988). 77 CIV. CODE §§1750 et seq. 44 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 71 CODE CIV. PROC. §§392 et seq. 78 America Online, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 15; see also Hall (1972). 72 Alexander v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 4th v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 411 (1983) (anti- 45 Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F. 3d 1133, 723, 731-32 (2003); see also General Acceptance Corp. waiver provision of California securities law prevented 1140 (9th Cir. 2003). v. Robinson, 207 Cal. 285, 289 (1929). enforcement of forum-selection clause). 46 Id. at 1138. 73 See, e.g., Smith, Valentino & Smith v. Superior 79 Net2phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 4th 47 See, e.g., Sharani v. Salviati & Santori, Inc., No. C Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491 (1972) (court enforces clause 583, 588 (2003); see also Schlessinger v. Holland Am., 08-03854 SI, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105685, at *6-11 (N.D. requiring litigation in Philadelphia). N.V., 120 Cal. App. 4th 552, 555 (2004) (sample Cal. Dec. 29, 2008) (Oakland couple did not provide 74 Bolter v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. App. 4th 900, contracts available on cruise line Web site). enough evidence to establish that requiring them to lit- 909-10 (2001). 80 See, e.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. TGL igate in London would deprive them of their day in 75 This statute has encountered some difficulties. The Container Lines, Ltd., 347 F. Supp. 2d 749, 765 (N.D. court.). Ninth Circuit has held that it is preempted by the Cal. 2004). 48 See, e.g., Utah Pizza Serv. v. Heigl, 784 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Utah 1992). 49 See, e.g., Kachal, Inc., v. Menzie, 738 F. Supp. 371, 374 (D. Nev. 1990); Softwareworks Group, Inc., v. IHosting, Inc., No. C06-04301, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75989, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2006). 50 See, e.g., Unisys Corp. v. Access Co., Ltd., No. C05- 3378, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31897 (N.D. Cal. Nov. It’s More Than Just a Referral 23, 2005). 51 See, e.g., Kachal, 738 F. Supp. at 374. It’s Your Reputation 52 The state supreme court repeatedly referred to the Smith decision in its Nedlloyd Lines choice-of-law case. The court did not, however, add to the Smith Make the Right Choice analysis in Nedlloyd. Nedlloyd Lines, B.V. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 459 (1992). 53 Berg v. MTC Elecs. Techs. Co., Ltd., 61 Cal. App. Personal Injury • Products Liability 4th 349 (1998). Medical Malpractice • Insurance Bad Faith 54 Id. at 355. 55 Id. at 357. 56 Id. at 352-53. 57 Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 35 Cal. Referral Fees per State Bar Rules App. 4th 604, 608-09 (1995). These clauses were inserted into insurance policies for marketing pur- poses. As one insurance company executive explained, www.cdrb-law.com the clause “‘was voluntarily developed by Lloyd’s of London many years ago, as a response to competitor’s 310.277.4857 arguments that Lloyd’s was not amenable to process in the United States and that the potential customer should therefore place its business with a domestic The More You Know About Us, company that was subject to service [of] process.’” The Better Choice You Will Make Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 427, 432 (1984). 58 Berg, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 353. 59 Appalachian Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d at 439. 60 Id. at 432. 61 CQL Original Prods., Inc. v. National Hockey League Players Ass’n, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1355 (1995). 62 Berg, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 359-60. 63 Id. at 359. 64 Stangvik v. Shiley, 54 Cal. 3d 744, 751 (1991). 65 Berg, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 359. 66 See, e.g., Hemmelgarn v. Boeing Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 576, 584-85 (1980). 67 Century Indem. Co. v. Bank of Am., 58 Cal. App. 4th 408, 411 (1997). 68 See Olnick v. VMG Entm’t, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1294 (2006); Intershop Commc’ns AG v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 4th 191, 196 (2002); Hunt v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 4th 901, 907 (2000). 69 The trial court in TSMC North America v. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation found that a forum clause was permissive, following Berg, but this was only one factor in the 10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 2460, Los Angeles, California 90067 court’s analysis of whether to grant an antisuit injunc- 310.277.4857 office I 310.277.5254 fax tion prohibiting litigation in China. TSMC N. Am. v. Semiconductor Mfg. Int’l Corp., 161 Cal. App. 4th www.cdrb-law.com 581, 588-89 (2008). TSMC was not a forum non con- Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 31 By STEVEN T. LOWE DEATH OF COPYRIGHT Copyright infringement may be the only remaining area of law in which courts seem increasingly willing to decide material facts on summary judgment COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT claims against As a result, the determination of each case sibility and a ‘reasonable’ possibility of access motion picture studios and television net- now rests almost entirely in the unfettered dis- is difficult to draw.”6 If the work has not works, for all intents and purposes, are dead. cretion of trial judges, who have consistently been widely disseminated—which is usually Of the 48 copyright infringement cases against dismissed plaintiffs’ claims. Unless the current the case for unpublished screenplays—“a studios or networks that resulted in a final trend changes, longstanding principles once particular chain of events” must be established judgment within the Second and Ninth favorable to creators may be eclipsed by an between the plaintiff’s work and the defen- Circuits (and the district courts within those evolving body of law so unfavorable to them dant’s access to that work.7 circuits) in the last two decades,1 the studios that the studios and networks are essentially Early cases outside of the Ninth Circuit and networks prevailed in all of them—and immunized from liability except in cases of found access even when the plaintiff could not nearly always on motions for summary judg- identical copying and conceded access to the actually place the work in the hands of the ment. (See “Perfect Storm,” at 34.) In fact, in plaintiff’s work. defendant. For example, in the First Circuit the last 20 years, only two publicly avail- Since direct evidence of copying rarely is case of Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Com- able copyright infringement cases (published available in a copyright infringement suit,3 pany, the plaintiff offered evidence that he had or unpublished) against studios or networks plaintiffs typically must establish that the mailed his copyrighted work to the defen- proceeded to jury trial—with verdicts for the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work dant’s principal office. The court held that this defendants.2 and that the two works are substantially sim- mailing created “an inference that the letter Were all these cases without merit, or did ilar.4 Proof of access requires only a “rea- reached its proper destination,” and to require the studios and networks simply have far sonable possibility” to view or copy the plain- the plaintiff to show that the “particularly superior counsel in each case? These suppo- tiff’s work.5 However, courts commonly cite sitions are very unlikely. The case law gov- to the countervailing principle that “mere Steven T. Lowe is a principal of Lowe Law, a bou- erning these actions simply has become so speculation or conjecture” is insufficient. tique entertainment litigation firm in Los Angeles. amorphous that for almost every principle of Because the analysis of a reasonable possibility He wishes to thank Daniel Lifschitz, Chris Johnson, law favorable to creators, the courts have necessarily includes some conjecture and and Michael Salvatore for their assistance in the preparation of this article. endorsed and applied an opposite principle. speculation, the “line between a ‘bare’ pos- AMANE KANEKO 32 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 H T responsible employees had received his com- access but the facts do not fall into one of the summary judgment has been granted for munication” would have been unfair.8 court’s enumerated categories.13 defendants, the courts simply presumed that Similarly, in 1971, a New York district court The Meta-Film court also recognized sit- access existed.21 This is because “even mas- held in Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys- uations in which a third-party intermediary sive evidence of access cannot by itself avoid tem, Inc., that corporate receipt could be not of the same business enterprise as the the necessity of also proving the full measure “sufficient to raise a triable issue, despite alleged infringer may be found to have passed of substantial similarity.”22 And this full mea- plaintiff’s inability to show receipt by the along the plaintiff’s work.14 The court limited sure has become virtually impossible to estab- responsible employee,”9 because it would be such situations, however, to instances when the lish under recent case law. unfair to “saddle a plaintiff with disproving third-party intermediary “provided creative To determine whether substantial simi- non-access within a corporate structure for- suggestions and ideas” concerning the larity exists between works at the summary eign to him and with witnesses not his own.”10 allegedly infringing work, and “the dealings judgment phase, the Ninth Circuit has Unfortunately for creators, the Bevan between the three entities (plaintiff, defen- instructed that courts perform an “extrin- holding was rejected by some courts.11 For dants, and [intermediary])…related to the sic” analysis of the works’ objective elements, example, in Meta-Film Associates, Inc. v. identical subject matter.”15 Although Meta- focusing on “articulable similarities between MCA, Inc., a 1984 case, the Central District Film’s effect in the Ninth Circuit has been the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, of California identified only three circum- limited to several district court cases16—and pace, characters, and sequence of events.”23 stances that would meet the type of close the Ninth Circuit has not adopted its hold- In application, however, this analysis has relationship between coworkers necessary to ing17—Meta-Film has been influential in the been unpredictable and has resulted in wildly give rise to a reasonable opportunity of access. Second Circuit, which expressly relied on the conflicting case law and results. In addition, The person who received the plaintiff’s work case when it overruled the Bevan holding.18 in recent years, the Ninth Circuit has ignored must 1) be “a supervisor with responsibility Thus, Meta-Film remains a prominent exam- established case law that requires the court to for the defendant’s project,” or 2) “part of the ple of why commentators note that “many not only include “unprotectable elements” in same work unit as the copier,” or 3) have courts set an unrealistically high bar as to its analysis24 but also exclude dissimilarities “contributed creative ideas or material to what constitutes a close relationship” for between the two works.25 the defendant’s work.”12 By limiting, as a establishing access.19 A long line of copyright infringement matter of law, the instances in which a plain- cases holds that a plaintiff and defendant’s Substantial Similarity tiff can prove access within a corporate struc- works should be compared in their entirety, ture, the Meta-Film court effectively pre- Even when access is established, the path to including both protectable and unprotectable cluded plaintiffs from establishing access in a favorable judgment remains perilous for elements,26 to determine whether a qualita- numerous scenarios in which there is actual plaintiffs.20 In fact, in many cases in which tively (or quantitatively) significant portion of Perfect Storm In the last 20 years, in the Second and Ninth Circuits and the lower courts within those circuits, 48 copyright infringement cases against studios or networks were litigated to final judgment. In all 48 cases, the victors were the studio and network defendants. Most of the cases were determined by a grant of summary judgment. Arden v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 908 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. N.Y. mary judgment for defendant) (Bringing Down the House). 1995) (summary judgment for defendant) (Groundhog Day). Flynn v. Surnow, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26973 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (sum- Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 607 F. 3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010) mary judgment for defendant) (24). (summary judgment for defendant affirmed) (The Last Samurai). Funky Films v. Time Warner Entertainment, 462 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. Benjamin v. Walt Disney Company, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91710 (C.D. 2006) (summary judgment for defendant) (Six Feet Under). Cal. 2007) (summary judgment for defendant) (Sweet Home Alabama). Gable v. NBC, 2010 WL 2990977 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (summary judgment Bethea v. Burnett, 2005 WL 1720631 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (summary judg- for defendant) (My Name Is Earl). ment for defendant) (The Apprentice). Gilbert v. New Line Productions, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27134 (C.D. Cal. Blakeman v. Walt Disney Company, 613 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D. N.Y. 2009) 2010) (summary judgment for defendant) (Monster in Law). (summary judgment for defendant) (Swing Vote). Gregory v. Murphy, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4893 (9th Cir. 1991) (sum- Burns v. Imagine Films Entertainment, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24653 mary judgment for defendant affirmed) (Coming to America). (W.D. N.Y. 2001) (summary judgment for defendant) (Backdraft). Grosso v. Miramax Film Corporation, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26199 (C.D. Brown v. Perdue, 177 Fed. Appx. 121 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary judg- Cal. 2001) (summary judgment for defendant) (Rounders). ment for defendant affirmed) (The Da Vinci Code). Historical Truth Productions v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, 1995 U.S. Bunick v. UPN, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35536 (S.D. N.Y. 2008) (summary Dist. LEXIS 17477 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) (summary judgment for defendant) judgment for defendant) (South Beach). (Universal Soldier). Cabell v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54667 Hudson v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (summary judgment for defendant) (You Don’t Mess with 11508 (E.D. N.Y. 2004) (summary judgment for defendant) (Life). the Zohan). Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d (C.D. Cal. 2001) (summary Cox v. Abrams, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6687 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (summary judgment for defendant) (The Peacemaker). judgment for defendant) (Regarding Henry). Kodadek v. MTV Networks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20776 (C.D. Cal. 1996) Flaherty v. Filardi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22641 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) (sum- (summary judgment for defendant) (Beavis & Butthead). 34 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 a plaintiff’s work was appropriated.27 This one of only two copyright infringement cases be protected separately).35 In the years since comports with basic principles of copyright against a studio or network in the last 20 its publication, however, the analysis of law and is known as the “selection and years that proceeded to trial. (The other is Metcalf has proven to be the exception and arrangement” test.28 Shaw v. Lindheim.31) In Metcalf, the plaintiff not the rule. In the seminal 1991 case Feist Publications offered evidence that the defendant had mis- The 2003 case of Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Company, the appropriated many elements of the plain- Company may have played the heaviest hand U.S. Supreme Court held that when dealing tiff’s screenplay to create a television series for against the use of the selection and arrange- with works largely (or even entirely) com- NBC. The court recognized that “the simi- ment test. The Rice court stated that “simi- posed of unprotectable elements, “choices larities proffered by [the plaintiff] are not larities derived from the use of common ideas as to selection and arrangement, so long as protectable when considered individually; cannot be protected.”36 This assertion ignored they are made independently by the com- they are either too generic or constitute ‘scenes the holdings and rationales of the cases that piler and entail a minimal degree of creativ- a faire.’”32 However, “the presence of so the court cited, including Metcalf, but the ity, are sufficiently original.”29 Transposed to many generic similarities and the common Rice court attempted to distinguish Metcalf the literary arts, the test provides that patterns in which they arise help satisfy the by stating that it was “based on a form of although copyright law does not generally extrinsic test.”33 The court memorably com- inverse ratio rule analysis” (i.e., the rule protect basic plot premises in literary works pared the elements of literary works to those whereby more access requires less substantial or commonly used expressions that flow nat- of musical compositions: similarity and vice versa) and seemed to imply urally from those premises (“scenes a faire”), The particular sequence in which an that the selection and arrangement test is the original selection and arrangement of author strings a significant number of only applicable when access is conceded.37 these elements can constitute a protectable unprotectable elements can itself be a This implication, which limits Metcalf to its work in and of itself.30 Therefore, the whole- protectable element. Each note in a facts, overlooks that nowhere in Metcalf (or sale exclusion of all “unprotectable” ele- scale, for example, is not protectable, any case prior to it) is the inverse ratio rule ments improperly limits the scope of copyright but a pattern of notes in a tune may required for the application of the selection protection. The Ninth Circuit has recognized earn copyright protection.34 and arrangement test.38 Nevertheless, Rice’s this principle on numerous occasions but The court did not strip the works of their misinterpretation of Metcalf has been repeat- has spent the better part of the past decade unprotectable elements before diving into an edly followed by the Ninth Circuit in subse- aggressively denying its use to plaintiffs in extrinsic analysis of substantial similarity, quent opinions. copyright infringement cases against studios consistent with the general purpose of the Indeed, in the 2006 case of Funky Films, and networks. selection and arrangement test (that is, to Inc. v. Time Warner Entertainment Company, Metcalf v. Bochco, decided in 2002, is protect in combination that which cannot L.P., the Ninth Circuit once again ignored the Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 16 F. 3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1994) Pelt v. CBS, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20464 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (sum- (summary judgment for defendant affirmed) (Honey, I Shrunk the Kids). mary judgment for defendant) (Listen Up! Young Voices for Change). Kretschmer v. Warner Bros., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7805 (S.D. N.Y. 1994) Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Company, 330 F. 3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (sum- (summary judgment for defendant) (Defending Your Life). mary judgment for defendant affirmed) (The Mystery Magician). Lane v. Universal City Studios, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23769 (9th Cir. Robinson v. Viacom International, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9781 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (summary judgment for defendants affirmed) (Kojak: Fatal N.Y. 1995) (summary judgment for defendant) (Hi Honey). Flaw). Rodriguez v. Heidi Klum Company, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80805 Laskay v. New Line Cinema, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23461 (C.D. Cal. (S.D. N.Y. 2008) (summary judgment for defendant) (Project Runway). 1998) (summary judgment for defendant) (Don Juan DeMarco). Rosenfeld v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9305 Lassiter v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 238 Fed. Appx. 194 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (summary judgment for defendant) (Robots). (9th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed) (Drumline). Shaw v. Lindheim, 809 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (upon remand, Mallery v. NBC Universal, Inc., 331 Fed. Appx. 821 (2d Cir. 2009) (sum- judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant studio) (The Equalizer). mary judgment for defendant affirmed) (Heroes). Stewart v. Wachowski, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (sum- Merrill v. Paramount Pictures Corporation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45401 mary judgment for defendant) (The Matrix). (C.D. Cal. 2005) (summary judgment for defendant) (Crossroads). The Sheldon Abend Revocable Trust v. Steven Spielberg, 2010 WL Mestre v. Vivendi Universal U.S. Holding Co., 273 Fed. Appx. 631 (9th 3701343 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (summary judgment for defendants) (Disturbia). Cir. 2008) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed) (Billy Elliot). Thomas v. Walt Disney Company, 337 Fed. Appx. 694 (9th Cir. 2009) Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F. 3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (jury verdict in favor (defendant’s motion to dismiss affirmed) (Finding Nemo). of defendant studio), aff’d, Metcalf v. Bochco, 200 Fed. Appx. 635 (9th Walker v. Viacom International, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 1475 (9th Cir. 2006) (City of Angels). Cir. 2010) (summary judgment for defendant) (SpongeBob SquarePants). Milano v. NBC Universal, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (C.D. Cal. 2008) Weygand v. CBS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19613 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (sum- (summary judgment for defendant) (The Biggest Loser). mary judgment for defendant) (Charlie). Mowry v. Viacom International, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15189 (S.D. Williams v. Crichton, 84 F. 3d 581 (2d Cir. 1996) (summary judg- N.Y. 2005) (summary judgment for defendant) (The Truman Show). ment for defendant) (Jurassic Park). Novak v. National Broadcasting Company, 752 F. Supp. 164 (S.D. N.Y. Willis v. HBO, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17887 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (summary 1990) (summary judgment for defendant) (Saturday Night Live). judgment for defendant) (Arli$$). Ostrowski v. Creative Artists Agency, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23732 (9th Cir. Zella v. E. W. Scripps Company, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2007) Cal. 1994) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed) (To Forget Palermo). (defendant’s motion to dismiss granted) (Rachael Ray).—S.T.L. Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 35 selection and arrangement test, holding that: arrangement test, comfortably stripping all favored on the substantial similarity issue in [Courts] must take care to inquire only unprotected elements from the works and copyright cases,”54 the overwhelming major- whether the protectable elements, ultimately using the new Funky Films dis- ity of copyright cases are dismissed on exactly standing alone, are substantially sim- similarity analysis as a basis to rule against the that issue. Admissible expert testimony nor- ilar. In so doing, [courts] filter out and plaintiffs on their copyright claim.49 mally can defeat summary judgment against disregard the non-protectable elements In the end, the Benay plaintiffs only were the party it supports.55 When two expert in making [their] substantial similarity able to continue to pursue their state law witnesses reasonably contradict one another, determination.39 claim of breach of implied contract.50 Though the contradiction should create a material Moreover, in one flourish of its pen, the this claim can be satisfied when copying does issue of fact that a jury is required to resolve.56 Funky Films court created a whole new not rise to a level of substantial similarity, it However, courts inexplicably have carved defense for alleged infringers where none requires a higher level of access to establish out literary analysis as an exception to this previously existed and which has been heav- an implied contract, as well as privity between rule. Courts have become more willing to Not only has the ad hoc use of substantial dissimilarity and the refusal to acknowledge selection and arrangement stripped creators of the doctrines that once protected them, but it also effectively endorses creative theft whenever the elements of an implied contract are not satisfied. ily relied upon in subsequent court opinions. the parties.51 Furthermore, even if estab- dismiss expert witnesses to screenplay copy- The court stated that a “reading of the two lished, the remedies available in a breach of right infringement claims and analyze the works reveal[ed] greater, more significant dif- implied contract claim are not as broad as works themselves.57 ferences” than similarities.40 In essence, the those for copyright claims.52 Overall, the In 2001, the Central District of California court constructed a brand new test of “sub- state claim is a poor substitute for the once stated in Fleener v. Trinity Broadcasting stantial dissimilarity” in the context of copy- robust protections offered to creators under Network (a case that was not against a major right infringement, one that completely con- copyright law. The claim also has been lim- studio), “There is abundant case-law estab- travenes the well-established principle that ited extensively by the application of the lishing that expert testimony is particularly dissimilarity is irrelevant as long as the plain- preemptive effect of federal copyright law— appropriate in summary judgment motions tiff makes a showing of the defendant work’s the very law creators hoped it would sup- under the copyright ‘extrinsic test.’”58 similarity to a substantial element of the plement.53 However, judges have become comfortable plaintiff’s work.41 with disregarding this type of testimony when Phasing Out Experts and Juries It appears that the old Learned Hand they believe they can do their own compari- chestnut that “no plagiarist can excuse the The outcome in Benay is emblematic of just son, regardless of how it comports with well- wrong by showing how much of his work he how far copyright decisions have strayed established legal standards.59 did not pirate” may no longer be true.42 The from maintaining a balance between the inter- Many troubling questions arise from this result of this shift in copyright law is that third ests of creators and the interests of produc- trend. Why do judges believe they can per- parties now have the freedom to steal from ers. Not only has the ad hoc use of substan- form the extrinsic analysis of literary works screenplays with impunity, provided they tial dissimilarity and the refusal to better than plaintiffs’ experts?60 An extrinsic cover their tracks by creating sufficient dis- acknowledge selection and arrangement analysis is no easy feat. A judge who dis- similarities in what is, in reality, a “derivative stripped creators of the doctrines that once misses an expert witness, believing the sub- work.”43 The recent case of Benay v. Warner protected them, but it also effectively endorses ject matter within his or her grasp, effec- Bros. illustrates this point.44 creative theft whenever the elements of an tively acts as a self-appointed expert. This is In Benay, decided in June 2010, the plain- implied contract are not satisfied. If more a disservice to the creators of literary works. tiffs’ agent pitched and provided a copy of juries were exposed to the facts of these cases, It implies that writing a screenplay is a less their screenplay The Last Samurai to the creators might hope to reverse the imbal- complex and involved undertaking than writ- president of production at Warner Bros.45 ance. However, the determination of appro- ing a song or a software program. Moreover, The studio declined to proceed further with priation has time and again been allocated to the judge essentially deprives plaintiffs of the screenplay but later produced and released the presiding judge of each case instead. their constitutional right to a jury trial. a film with the exact same title and premise Indeed, copyright infringement may be the Nevertheless, this is the current state of copy- as the plaintiffs’ work.46 Despite compelling only remaining area of the law in which right law for literary works, with no signs of evidence that actual copying of the plain- judges seem increasingly willing to decide rebalancing anytime soon. tiff’s screenplay occurred,47 the court deemed material facts on summary judgment, effec- In copyright infringement cases, judges it “insufficient to overcome the overall lack tively removing both experts and juries from are supposed to play the role of gatekeeper to of similarities between protected elements of the process entirely. the jury. Their task in analyzing substantial the works.”48 The Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic While courts repeatedly cite the proposi- similarity is supposed to be extrinsic—that is, analysis once again ignored the selection and tion that “summary judgment is not highly objective.61 If a plaintiff can show objective 36 Los Angeles Lawyer November 2010 SAVE THE DATE LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR L A C B FOUNDATION The Bar Foundation is the fundraising partner of the Los Angeles County Bar Association. The Association’s own public service projects rely heavily on the Foundation for funding, as do many other very worthwhile programs serving our community. 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