THE CHINA DREAM GOES DIGITAL: TECHNOLOGY in the AGE of XI Rather Than the Dangers of Overwhelming Control

ANALYSIS CHINA

THE CHINA DREAM GOES

DIGITAL: TECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF XI

Introduction

ABOUT by François Godement

The Chinese have long been obsessed Developments in the digital and artificial intelligence with strategic culture, power balances and arenas in China have attracted so much hype abroad geopolitical shifts. Academic institutions, that it is sobering to read more modest assessments think-tanks, journals and web-based debates from Chinese sources themselves. “Catching up” with are growing in number and quality, giving China’s foreign policy breadth and depth. the United States, whether in AI or in its military-related developments, is still the order of the day according to the China Analysis introduces European sources examined by Elsa Kania, one of the contributors audiences to these debates inside China’s to this edition of China Analysis. Bureaucratic silos and expert and think-tank world and helps the unspecified societal obstacles impede the interconnection European policy community understand how China’s leadership thinks about domestic of data, according to sources studied by Katja Drinhausen, and foreign policy issues. While freedom who also picks up on Chinese observers’ warnings about of expression and information remain the decentralised communications that social media allow. restricted in China’s media, these published They believe China should ‘copy’ international content sources and debates provide an important filtering practices. The social credit system （社会信用 way of understanding emerging trends 体系 within China. shehui xinyong tixi), according to Adam Knight’s sources, is an extension of credit rating and a purported Each issue of China Analysis focuses on a answer to the lack of trust that exists between individuals specific theme and draws mainly on Chinese in China. It introduces a nationwide 18-digit code for all mainland sources. However, it also monitors individuals who are rated according to their integrity or content in Chinese-language publications from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which trustworthiness. Like all big IT projects, the programme occasionally include news and analysis that has its glitches – you can still be punished for all sorts of is not published in the mainland and reflects social activities if the system has not correctly registered the diversity of Chinese thinking. that you have settled a debt, for example. The sources reveal among Chinese academics for streamlining the system and unifying its benchmarking. To them, the social credit programme perhaps does raise some issues about privacy. Marcin Przychodniak cites other concerns: the digital age brings worries about jobs in manufacturing and October 2018 2 ECFR/268 October 2018 www.ecfr.eu THE CHINA DREAM GOES DIGITAL: TECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF XI rather than the dangers of overwhelming control. of overwhelming dangers than the rather Even criticism. offline and then, Chinesewritersemphasisetheperilsoffreedom, online face or responsive, obligation forgovernmentauthoritiestobecomemore the spreadofinformationandonlinechatcreatesan in afunctionalsense, withsomeexpertsmentioningthat onlytension this with deal They constrained. politically remainsgovernance digital about the debate show how their verysilenceorunquestioned approvalinsomeareas familiar toothersocietiesliving throughthedigitalage, arethat dilemmas to point experts the while Thus, it.of more ask for to except unmentionable byexperts, the party-state,whosecontrolisapparentlyof true also in-house amountsofmarketingdata. Anditis, ofcourse, to bankingandsocialmedia–thereforeamasshuge several sectors–fromretailcompanies thatcutacross the forefrontofusabledata-sharing. Thisistrueofgiant big datainterconnection,despitethefactthatChinaisat Similarly, someexpertslamentthatthereisnotenough what “integrity”impliesinawidelyauthoritariancontext. of the caseforsocialcredit. Theyapprove oftheimportance clearlyThis is more controlandregulation.even for need look atthepoliticalsideofthings, theexpertspointto they when But innovations. right the finding and winners top-down planningisinadequate tothetaskofidentifying thatconcern is there Thus, exchange. regulated lightly only that socialmediaallow, seemtomilitatetowardsafreeand market forces, andthefragmentationindividualisation come fromtwoverydifferentdirections. Ontheonehand, The mainstreamofexpertslaboursundercontradictionsthat Xi Jinping, thecharacterfor“strength”appears12times. race. Inacompendiumof14shortutterancesonAIby armsa new as competition deepening Sino-American and theway under revolution compare thedigital Some governance ofcyberspaceaccordingtoitsowninterests. about China’s capacitytoshapetheinternational making China“amajorcyberpower”, anditisalso Interconnected with theChina2025strategy,thisapproachisabout heaven. under place first original its to lightly: thisisindeedanotherwayforChinatoberestored takenbe not should commentaries in trend unifying a Still, against themarket-drivenspreadofmostdigitalprocesses. advantage ofquickmobilisationresources, butitworks services; andChina’stop-downstrategicplanninghasthe chengxin –“integrity”buttheydonotexamineclosely transport. This has opened up new avenues for economic transport. Thishasopenedupnewavenuesforeconomic for information, communication, payment,e-commerce,and access mobile and technologies digital of use extensive make the population, butnumbersarerisingfastandexistingusers connected totheinternet. worldwide: morethan800millionChinesecitizensare China ishometothehighestnumberofinternetusers change. transformative of round new this in lead the take to opportunity historic a has now – revolutions agree thatChina–alatecomertothepasttwoindustrial and cyberspaceasnewareasofglobalcompetition.They economy digital the on place scholars Chinese that emphasis the will consider society, andgovernance.This chapter digital revolutionunderwayisreshapingtheeconomy, – intelligence artificial permeate almostevery aspectoflifetoday; asaresult, the and computing cloud media, new platforms, data, big as such – technologies information New trends/201709/t20170928_3655627.html 踪 ( 2 WangYufeng( at 1 “ChinaFocus:Chinahas802millioninternet users”, in establishingtherequireddigitalinfrastructureforwhat According toWang, statepoliciesalsoplayacentralrole help sustainthisdevelopmentandfurtherinnovation. new enterprises.Large numbersofwell-educatedgraduates environment andcreatedahomegrowndigitalecosystemfor this in flourished have Tencent and Alibaba, Baidu, as such and therisingnumberofinternetusersthere.Techgiants market Chinese protected partially and large the from profit factors havecontributedtothissuccess: Chinesebusinesses to China’seconomicgrowth.InWang’s view,avarietyof reduced marginalcostsandemergedasstrongcontributors payment, sharedtransport,ande-commercehave greatly platforms andthesharingeconomyinareassuchasmobile aspects oftheeconomy. into all technologies internet-based of integration the to refers digital economy( Sciences (CASS), arguesthatChinaissurgingaheadinthe at theInstituteofEconomics,ChineseAcademySocial organisations tosupporthiscase,WangYufeng, researcher Drawing ondomesticandinternationalmedia Leading thenewwaveofglobal change debate. are bothkeytopicsofscholarlyandpolitical leader to fosterstablegrowthandsecureChina’spositionasaglobal challenges. Againstthisbackdrop, strategiesandinstruments activity, butalsobroughtaboutregulatoryandpolitical 中国的数字经济与新的全球变革浪潮 ), volume68,September2017,availableat http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/21/c_137405424.htm Katja Drinhausen China's digitalrevolution 王砚峰 ), “China’sdigitaleconomyandthenewwave ofglobalchange” 数字经济 2 New business models build on digital Newbusinessmodelsbuildondigital ), shuzi jingji); “digital economy” here shuzijingji); “digitaleconomy”here MacroeconomicTrendMonitor 1 This represents just over half of Thisrepresentsjustoverhalfof . http://ie.cass.cn/academics/economic_ Xinhua , 21August2018,available . ( 经济走势跟 is essentially a new global competition in cost reduction in Nonetheless, he sees unprecedented opportunities for China communications, production, and transport. The Chinese and echoes Wang in noting the importance of government government has understood the importance of the digital plans and regulatory initiatives in consolidating this economy and included specific goals and measures for its positive development. The “Internet+” and China 2025 promotion in the 13th Five Year Plan; it has also formulated a strategies; action plans for the promotion of big data, smart number of policies, most importantly the “Internet+” strategy manufacturing, e-commerce, and AI; and regulatory steps (“互联网+”行动计划 hulianwang jia xingdong jihua). The such as the Cybersecurity Law, which came into effect in June formulation of the “Internet+” action plan was first proposed 2017, and other industry-specific regulations all help create a by Chinese premier Li Keqiang during the third session of positive environment and modern oversight system that itself the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2015, with the makes use of new technological capabilities. Although Du aim to promote the integration of mobile internet, cloud cautions against overregulation, he is confident that China is computing, big data, and “internet of things” with modern well equipped to become a “major cyber power” (网络强国 manufacturing, and support the development of e-commerce, wangluo qiangguo). By this he means that China’s exceptional internet industry and finance as well as to guide Chinese military and economic strength lend it the ability to exert its internet companies’ expansion in the international market.3 influence globally in the digital sphere. Establishing China Wang notes that this proactive approach differentiates China as global power in cyberspace has emerged as a key national from the United States and more resembles policies adopted policy in recent years, especially since the creation of the by the European Union and Germany. Not only is China Cyberspace Administration of China in 2014 (国家互联网信 leading the way in adopting new technologies as a result, 息办公室 guojia hulianwang xinxi bangongshi), headed by says Wang, but Chinese enterprises and investments in the Xi Jinping, which now oversees the development of China’s digital economy are increasingly going abroad, which in turn internet- and information-based technologies and businesses. raises China’s international influence in setting standards. In 2017 the Chinese government proclaimed its aim to reach global power status in cyberspace by 2035 by harnessing Digital economy as the driving force in economic new technologies to boost China’s economic growth and restructuring global influence, enabling the country to shape international governance of cyberspace in accordance with its interests. Du Qinghao, deputy director and senior engineer of the Office of Information Management, Department of Information Guiding public discourse in the digital sphere Technology, Chinese Academy of Governance, also believes China is at the forefront of new global developments.4 China Liu Pengfei – deputy secretary of the Public Opinion has the fastest-growing digital economy worldwide and related Monitoring Office of the People’s Daily and researcher at sectors already account for more than a third of the country’s the new media think-tank the People’s Net – and research GDP. Du sees the development of the digital economy as assistant Qu Xiaocheng discuss how the partial replacement a precondition for high value-added growth and as a key of traditional media by new media, particularly through factor in China’s economic restructuring. He believes that growing use of social media, has revolutionised the internet-based technologies are crucial in optimising transmission of information and opened up new realms production and reducing overcapacity, in rebalancing for debate.5 Online public opinion is becoming more sectors and modernising agriculture, as well as representative as both elderly and young citizens flock in stimulating domestic consumption, thereby online. Although political events, public policy, and China’s addressing China’s biggest economic weaknesses. national interests have remained hot topics of discussion in recent years, the growth of the middle class means the But China also faces challenges on its way to becoming a global focus is shifting to issues of livelihood and safety, such as leader in the digital economy. Du regards institutional and housing prices, food and medicine safety, and education. social barriers as the main impediment for the interconnection Cases of legal and social injustice can also draw immediate of data that fuels the digital economy. The progress of and widespread attention. Liu and Qu observe that this puts digitisation in different industries and sectors is uneven, as enormous pressure on social governance: even if they acted investment and development are still focused on improving in line with laws and regulations, government organs have consumption rather than enhancing efficiency in production to answer to morally and emotionally charged debates and and agriculture. Likewise, there is a stark regional imbalance initiatives, because ignoring public opinion might place them in access to and the adoption of internet-based technologies, in a weak spot and result in online and offline activism. 6 with growth concentrated in eastern China, especially the Government and party organisations are rapidly expanding Pearl Delta, while western regions lag behind, says Du. 5 Liu Pengfei (刘鹏飞) and Qu Xiaocheng (曲晓程), “Report on the Development of Public Opinion in China’s Internet 2017” (2017年中国互联网舆论场发展报告), Blue Book 3 On 1 July 2015 the State Council issued the “Guiding Opinions of the State Council on New Media 2018 (2018年新媒体蓝皮书), 2018, pp. 52-68. on Vigorously Promoting “Internet Plus"” (关于积极推进“互联网+”行动的指导意见 guanyu jiji tuijin “hulianwang jia” xingdong de zhidao yijian), available at 6 The authors give a number of examples, including the debates surrounding “I’m http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=250823&lib=law. Fan Yusu” and “Frost Boy”. See: Manya Koetse, ““I Am Fan Yusu” – Beijing Migrant Worker’s Writing Takes Chinese Internet by Storm”, What’s On Weibo, 26 April 2017, 4 Du Qinghao (杜庆昊), “On Building a Powerful Nation in Digital Economy” (关于 available at https://www.whatsonweibo.com/fan-yusu-beijing-migrant-workers-writing- 建设数字经济强国的思考), Administrative Reform (行政管理改革), volume 5, June takes-wechat-storm/; Javier C Hernandez, “‘Frost Boy’ in China Warms Up the Internet, 2018, available at http://ex.cssn.cn/dzyx/dzyx_xyzs/201806/t20180614_4366165. and Stirs Poverty Debate”, New York Times, 13 January 2018, available at https://www. shtml. nytimes.com/2018/01/13/world/asia/frozen-boy-china-poverty.html. 3 4 ECFR/268 October 2018 www.ecfr.eu THE CHINA DREAM GOES DIGITAL: TECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF XI and-weibo-over-banned-contents-ongoing at tents inongoingcrackdown”, 9 MengJingandCeliaChan,“ChinafinesTencent, BaiduandWeibooverbannedcon June 2018,availableat 的内容过滤机制对我国互联网管理的启示 Mechanism ofOverseasSocialMediaforChina’s InternetManagement”( 8 timeline.page www.eversheds-sutherland.com/global/en/where/asia/china/services/cybersecurity- 7 “ChinaCybersecurityLawOneYearOn,EvershedsSutherland”,availableat practices filtering content domestic for support public and understanding raise to international of knowledge service providers. Inaddition, Chinashouldpromotepublic there hasalreadybeenincreasedlegalactionagainst on serviceproviders. formulate newstandardsandplacegreaterresponsibility is alreadyunderway, withnewregulationsissuedthat better that ecosystem meets theneedsofcitizens,authorsargue. Progress acommunication build to filtering China, too, shouldmovetowardsmorenuancedbutwider technology. filtering of use full make also that public the and on cooperationbetweengovernment organs, businesses, have establishedmorecomprehensivemechanismsandbuilt online, sayLiu andSun. Incomparison, Westernnations illegal advertisements, ortheinfringementofpersonalrights enough attentiontorumours,fakenews, pornography, spam, aggressive andterroristinformation,butitdoesnotpay China currentlyfocusesonstrikinghardagainstpolitically China candrawonbothtoimproveitsowncapabilities. filtering content believe authors the standards; and rules internal on non-transparent based and mechanisms, of, the which aware filtering are ofconduct public codes transparent and regulation official both as such had long have enterprises and states Western information, and expression leading cyberpower.Despitetheiradvocacyoffreedom content-focused managementtosafeguarditsrisea media users,Chinahasbecomeconcernedaboutoptimising information. highlight theirpotentialasahotbedforharmfulandillegal laud thepositiveeffectsofsocialmedia, buttheyalso and Communication, andresearchassistantSunPing, Liu Ruisheng,researcherattheCASSInstituteofJournalism of regulationssinceearly2017. a slew in place already put government has the for which technologies, of, new on, and supervision as expandlegislation analysis aswell improve predictive to is important it that believe and Qu Liu developments, complex these with can spread.Faced information from which communities virtual new creates and acrossregionalevennational boundaries. This groups rising between interaction is of speed and frequency the social mediagroups,while in decentralised fragmented is increasingly opinion. Thediscourse public and guiding have ariseninmonitoring challenges under Xi.Butnew policy media aim of is akey which discourse, in public ( in fosteringpositiveenergy effects measurable have had efforts Liu andQu,these to According issues. policies, andaddressconcernsother new promote reach citizens, media inorderto in new presence online their Liu Ruisheng( https://www.scmp.com/tech/china-tech/article/2112921/china-fines-tencent-baidu- . 刘瑞生 8 With the world’s largest number of social Withtheworld’slargestnumberofsocial ) andSunPing( http://www.cwzg.cn/politics/201805/42635.html South ChinaMorningPost 9 Under the new Cybersecurity Law UnderthenewCybersecurityLaw 孙萍 ), . World SocialistStudies ), “InspirationoftheContentFiltering 正能量 , 26September2017,available zhengnengliang) ( 世界社会主义研究海外社交媒体 . https:// - ), 7 countries, especially from the US, which results in US,whichresults fromthe countries, especially Most ofthecorethink-tanks come fromdeveloped and conciselanguage, oftenaccompaniedbyvisualaids. clear in knowledge expert this of dissemination online of currentglobalandpublicinterestissues, andeffective ontheir built independent agenda-setting,authoritative assessments is outfits these of success and The opinion policymakers. public on influence actual their with correlate think-tanks, whosestrengthsinsocialnetworksdirectly claim thatthereisatightlyconnectedcommunityofglobal viewpoints andglobalagendasetting,theysay. Theauthors play acrucialroleinthetransmissionofconceptsand Shanghai InternationalStudiesUniversity. engineer attheCenterforInformationTechnologyof of JournalismandCommunication,Zhang Wenzheng, power, stressXiangDebao, associateprofessorattheSchool In today’sworld,softpowerisjustasimportanthard Strengthening China’s softpowerin cyberspace West. the in filtering content of criticism and debate public discussion ofcitizens’rightsexpressionandtheongoing the workofLiu andQu, aswellfromLiu andSun,isany measures, Liu andSunconclude. Noticeablyabsentfrom www.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2015-01/21/c_133934292.htm guo tesexinxingzhikujianshedeyijian), Chinese Characteristics”( 11 See:“OpinionsonStrengtheningtheConstruction ofaNewTypeThinkTankwith 交网络影响力探析 global thinktanksinsocialnetworkstheera ofnewmedia”( 10 XiangDebao( industrial revolutions. two previous on inthe out missed it position leadership the claim finally to transformation toridethiswaveoftechnological China isdetermined remain, Even ifchallenges power. on China’sriseasaglobal discourse and academic agenda political the with connected are closely it presents opportunities revolution andthe digital sources, the selected from the As isevident affairs. ininternational stake China’s reflect better and international discourse, in standards new narrative, set a Chinese them toestablish think tanks. enable This would global links with media; andstrengthen social of use their improve agenda-setting; in innovation andindependent their abilities enhance should: recruitmoreexpertise; they that recommend authors the influence, global think-tanks’ content. their publicising at poor still think-tanks are generally promotion,Chinese for their a 2015Council planbytheState opinion leader.Butdespite as an its place and secure communicate itsviewpoints think-tanks tobetter high-end Zhang’s view, Chinaneeds Western dominanceoftheglobaldiscourse.In Xiang’s and 相德宝 ), Global Review ) andZhangWenzheng( 关于加强中国特色新型智库建设的意见 ( 国际展望 Xinhua ), volume1,2018,pp.129-146. 张文正 , 21January2015,availableat ), “Analysisoftheinfluence 11 . In order to increase to In order 新媒体时代全球智库社 guanyujiaqiangzhong 10 Think-tanks Think-tanks http:// - cooperation, and increases the probability of conflict. Feng China: competitor in the admits that China has reached a stage in its development global technological race that enables it to take an active part in the new round of technological revolution. But he also admits that for the Marcin Przychodniak moment this brings more challenges than opportunities, and that these challenges will be hard to overcome, for a China’sz economy may well become the world’s largest in variety of reasons. Firstly, the technological revolution the next few years, but it is facing serious challenges too. is broadly connected to the growth in digital means in One of the most pressing is how to diversify its sources manufacturing, which is an alternative to human labour of growth; central to this is the question of how to raise (which itself was formerly the basis of China’s economic internal consumption, which is a goal the Communist growth). Secondly, changes in the production process Party of China (CPC) has set. Modern Chinese consumers mean that the capacity to make rapid adjustments expect the economy to move up the value chain, with are at the core of an enterprise’s competitiveness and Chinese products becoming more sophisticated. In 2015 the also that market forces are now far more important in government published its Made in China 2025 programme, competition. The current structure of the economy and which put digitalisation and technological revolution at decision-making processes make this factor the heart of the shift it seeks to make. Made in China 2025 especially hard to overcome: the Chinese economy is set out the first programme for economic modernisation top-down in nature, with the main CPC bodies making based on internet technology and digital knowhow. Under strategic decisions made which the private sector is then the current five-year plan the government and state-owned meant to implement. This can make it difficult to respond to enterprises are implementing a dozen artificial intelligence market challenges. Thirdly, Feng says that China’s advantage and robotics projects, among other technology projects. The as a globally competitive big country, thanks to its population implementation of the programme is an important part of and territory, is also decreasing as scale is not as important academic and official discourse among Chinese researchers. as it once was. Fourthly, decision-making in the global This discourse also focuses on China’s general attitude economy is becoming more decentralised, individualised, towards the ongoing technological revolution. Xi Jinping and rapid. How can China adapt to the new situation? Feng further underlined the importance of technology during suggests stimulus in order to attract talent and human the 19th party congress in October 2017, which confirmed capital from all over the world, as well as structural changes its significance in Chinese domestic and foreign policy. He related to institutional and procedural mechanisms in the linked innovation to development, citing it as a foundation Chinese economy. He points to the 12th Five Year National for modernised economy. Strategic Emerging Industry Development Plan from 2012, which in his opinion offers a special focus on emerging A “new round of technological revolution” (新一轮技术革 industries and could, following its implementation, 命, xin yi lun jishu geming) will provide China with new significantly enhance China’s innovation capability. opportunities, according to Feng Fei, former director- general of the Research Department of Industrial Economy The current and future impact of the technological in the Development Research Center of the State Council.1 revolution (新科技革命 xin keji geming) on international He deploys a term coined by Jeremy Rifkin: the “Third relations forms the focus of the work of Feng Zhaokui, Industrial Revolution”. Feng argues that three of the most honorary academician of the Chinese Academy of Social important sectors in the Chinese economy are involved Sciences, where he was formerly at the Institute of in the changes: bio-economy, the internet industry, and Asia-Pacific Studies. He looks in particular at China-US the low-carbon economy. He explains that the “new relations, arguing from the perspective of the so-called round” contains three main elements. Firstly, there is a “Thucydides trap” (a leading power versus a rising power).2 group of emerging technologies in strong need of synergy Feng views international competition within the context between industries. Secondly – and in contrast to previous of the technological revolution through the prism of the technological revolutions – emerging industries are actively historical memory; this is particularly pertinent given in receipt of support from their host state (including the the government’s express aim to rejuvenate the Chinese United States, Japan, and the European Union). Thirdly, all nation. His article attempts to capture the elements that actors (which Feng mainly associates with states) have to may be decisive for China’s strength and power. These cope with the same challenges, which are mainly to do with are: research and development expenditure and its share resource availability, energy consumption, the environment, of GDP; technical trade surplus; the number of patents, and climate change. research papers and citations; the number of Nobel Prize-winners; and the number of innovative companies. This third factor makes the competition between the China is leading on some measures but still dealing with actors inevitable, reduces the possibility of alliances and several challenges, Feng believes. He argues for China to

1 科学网新一轮技术革命对中国挑战大于机遇，18 January 2018 (“Science network. A new round of technological revolution brings more challenges for China than 2 冯昭奎，论新科技革命对国际竞争关系的影响 Feng Zhaokui, “On the new technologi- opportunities; interview of Economic Information Daily with Feng Fei”, http://www. cal revolution and its impact on competition within international relations”, 世界经济与 casad.cas.cn, 18 January 2018). 政治 World Economics and Politics, 2017 No.2. 5 6 ECFR/268 October 2018 www.ecfr.eu THE CHINA DREAM GOES DIGITAL: TECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF XI logical revolution”. June 2018–hereafterHuang,“Howcompetition betweenbigpowerstriggerthetechno competition betweenbigpowerstriggerthe technological revolution”, 3 narrative) and leadership’s the (echoing “humiliation” of years after international position China toregainits revolution isanextraordinarychancefor technological round of new the that hold experts war. These cold the earns comparisonswiththearms race during competition Such linked tothecurrentUS-Chinatradedispute. deeply and isalso China’s economy is crucialforrestructuring in China 2025 US). In ofMade this narrative thesuccess (mainly the countries “rising China”andother between competition the of form part economy global in the changes and structural on howtechnological debate public Chinese within prevalent trend the opinions also fit The experts’ for theleadership’scurrentpolicypriorities. base himself, thenfilltheminwithasubstantialtheoretical CPC andXi out bythe set outlines practical policy the follow China’s economictransformation: about discussion public general in the emerges that economy digital on the emphasis special from the little differ revolution. Theirarguments round oftechnological new in the engage to successfully that Chinahastheability authors stronglybelieve All these emphasis onmilitarydevelopment. a special with and technology, funding forscience increase to are obliged change, states with up is crucial.Tokeep and funding can exertthroughgovernmentprocurement it influence the with together progress on technological guidance state’s InHuang’sview,the and offence. defence balance between the current internationalorderandaffect the reshaping are already changes Major technological world.” in the change of majortechnology round a new is likelytopromote in contemporaryworldpolitics leader and as achallenger States United China andthe between states, arguingthatthe“transferofpower rivalry between trap and Thucydides stem fromthe changes technological theoriginsofglobal He alsobelieves large enterprises. involving while procurement, funding,andsubsidies, government one, prioritising asitdoes is asuccessful strategy. digital China’s current University, explains Shanghai Jiaotong at Affairs International andPublic of School the at professor Qixian, anassociate revolution? Huang technological times of be inthese China’s policy But whatshould come onstream. and unmannedaerialvehicles as robotsoldiers battlefield on the changes possible sees also conflicts. Feng future sea,andtheArcticin expanding useofspace,thedeep as the aswell military-civilian of technologies, exchanges of importance the emphasises revolution. He technological in the competition China-US wars andcurrent future connection between possible further looksintothe Feng yet. are nothighenough levels education numbers because in sufficient market isunabletoprovidespecialists domestic the from abroad,explainingthat acquire talent 黄琪轩, 大国权力竞争如何引发了技术革命， 3 Huang argues that this state-driven policy state-driven this that argues Huang 19 June2018,HuangQixuan,“How The Paper , 19 -

finally regainthepositioninworlditdeserves. that China should activelytakepartin this processand to come,and international environmentformanyyears the restructure will that is acompetition this 2049. believe They by state by 2021 society and becomingadeveloped well-off centennialgoals:theachievementofa to fulfilXi’stwo

ratings as a form of economic organisation.4 Hu points Credit: The god of to the emergence of formal credit-giving organisations China’s big data era in 19th century Britain which met individuals’ need for institutions of trust so that strangers could transact with Adam Knight one other. For Hu, more recent history has validated the need for a comprehensive approach to credit-giving. She believes that the 2008 financial crisis marked a turning The social credit system (社会信用体系 shehui xinyong tixi) point that underscored the importance of data collection is a loose collective of decentralised attempts to ascribe a and data-sharing across society and government in order credit rating to every individual, company, and government to better analyse and pre-empt risk. She goes on to argue body in China. It is unified by a common ideology and a that this need has intensified in recent years as private centralised attempt to nudge certain behaviours through companies, now with access to new internet technologies, a system of reward and punishment. If implemented fully, have offered greater access to finance outside of the the social credit system will become the world’s largest formal regulated state apparatus, such as in peer-to-peer social experiment, applying theories of behavioural science (P2P) lending. Such concerns are not unfounded. Several to a population of 1.4 billion people. Yet despite initial scandals have rocked China’s nascent P2P lending industry international media coverage, little is known about how the in recent years, including the dramatic collapse of several social credit system operates in its current form. high-profile platforms bringing down billions in renminbi of customer investments.5 An Orwellian characterisation of social credit is the favoured narrative of English-language media and Hu’s evaluation of social credit as an economic tool academia. Countless media headlines compare the system comparable to credit rating systems elsewhere in the world with Nineteen Eighty-Four or other more contemporary does not stand apart from other scholars’ work. In fact, it cultural references such as the Netflix series Black expands on a large body of Chinese literature on the subject Mirror. The underlying depiction of social credit in these from the early 2000s, spearheaded by Lin Junyue, founder instances is of ‘big data meets big brother’: a corporatist of the social credit system theory and currently chief state spying on its population, hoarding vast swathes of technical adviser at Zhongda Xinaneng Credit Management.6 personal data to be algorithmically synthesised into a However, some observers emphasise the ways in which single three-digit score that dictates one’s place in society.1 China’s social credit goes beyond pure economics, and they identify two key ways in which this happens. Firstly, Liao These analyses fail to capture the vibrant and diverse Yongan and Tan Man, respectively vice-chancellor and debate on the subject of social credit in China itself. Many dean of the School of Management, Xiangtan University, Chinese observers and policymakers see credit scoring explore social credit as a solution to the problems that the as a cure-all solution to a whole host of societal ills.2 For Chinese court system finds in enforcing judicial decisions; some, the system has been raised to a near-mythological they and many others describe these problems by using the status. Luo Peixin, deputy director of Shanghai’s Legislative phrase “difficult implementation” (执行难 zhixing nan).7 In Affairs Office, has gone so far as to label credit as the god this sense, social credit adds another form of punishment (老天爷 lao tian ye) of the big data era, a guiding hand in a that extends across society and life. And, in this longer time where society and policymaking is overwhelmed with view, social credit is just the latest in a series of initiatives cascades of data.3 to improve the efficacy of court rulings in the wake of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th party congress in 2014 and its Beyond such celestial comparisons, Chinese scholars have focus on the ‘rule of law’ (法治 fazhi). worked to dispel the notion of Chinese exceptionalism when it comes to social credit. For example, Hu Naihong, The second difference between social credit and financial deputy director of the Credit Research Centre at the credit systems in other countries is the primacy of chengxin Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, situates (诚信) – which translates loosely as “honesty”, “integrity”, social credit within the historical context of credit or “trustworthiness” – as one of the scheme’s core goals.

4 Hu Naihong, “加强信用体系建设” “Strengthening the Construction of a Credit System”, Guangming Daily, 12 June 2018, available at http://ifb.cass.cn/wzxd/201806/ 1 Rachel Botsman, “Big data meets Big Brother as China moves to rate its citizens”, t20180612_4362049.shtml. Wired, 21 October 2017, available at http://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-govern- 借贷宝回应不雅照泄露事件：系少数用户与第三方私下交易产生 ment-social-credit-score-privacy-invasion; Mara Hvistendahl, “Inside China’s Vast New 5 Zhou Yanyan, “ ” Experiment in Social Ranking”, Wired, 14 December 2017, available at https://www. “Jiedaibao Responds to Obscene Image Leaking Incident: Small number of users wired.com/story/age-of-social-credit/. affected by improper third-party behaviour”, The Paper, 1 December 2016, available at https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1571689; Hu Weitong, “e租宝案惨淡落 2 Zhan Zheng (Peking University China Credit Research Centre Director ), “Building 幕：涉案762 亿，投资100元最多拿回25元” “Gloomy End to the Ezubao Saga: Of the Societal, Commercial, Governmental and Judicial Integrity in City Credit will Bring 76.2 Billion RMB involved, only 25 Yuan for every 100 Yuan will be returned”, Caijing, About Great Change to Citizens’ Lives” (‘通过社会诚信、商务诚信、政务诚信以及司法公 28 May 2018, available at http://finance.caijing.com.cn/20180528/4459893.shtml. 信等城市信用领域建设，带给市民生活、企业成长、城市发展诸多改变, Credit China, 社会信用体系原理 9 August 2018, available at http://www.creditchina.gov.cn/xiaoyuanchengxin/chengx- 6 Lin Junyue, “ ” “Principles of a Social Credit System”, China injiaoyuxunhui/chengxinjianshetesehuodong/201808/t20180809_122995.html. Fangzheng Press, 2003. 以信用立法推进社会信用体系建设 3 Luo Peixin, (2017) “社会信用与依法治国”, “Social Credit and Ruling the Country in 7 Liao Yongan and Tan Man, “ ” “Furthering the Accordance with the Law”,’ International Symposium on Rule of Law & Credit System, Construction of the Social Credit System through Credit Legislation”, Guangming Shanghai Jiaotong University, 26 September 2017. On file with author. Daily, 19 February 2018, available at http://fund.cssn.cn/skjj/skjj_jjyw/201802/ t20180219_3852710.shtml. 7 8 ECFR/268 October 2018 www.ecfr.eu THE CHINA DREAM GOES DIGITAL: TECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF XI ready?”. 11 ObservingtheSocialCreditSystem:The Societyiscoming,areyou http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-06/17/content_9858.htm Numbers forLegalPersonsandotherOrganisations”, StateCouncil,2015,availableat Commission andotherDepartmentstoConstruct aSystemofUnifiedSocialCredit 知 10 “ Society iscoming,areyouready?”.). 06/04/c_1122931164.htm People’s Daily Credit System:TheSocietyiscoming,areyouready?”, 9 LiHaiyun,“ t20180612_4362049.shtml System”, 8 HuNaihong,“ in punishment one areawithotherjurisdictions,resulting in blacklisted individuals orcompanies of details the share 单 industry, ministerial,andprovincial ‘blacklists’ ( xian). thecreationofdozens In practice,thishasseen ( areas” all across punished area goes in one credit of “loss ensuring aim of the with scheme, across the compliance encourage to of incentives of ajointsystem establishment pillar isthe as 31provincialbodies. ministries, aswell and departments 16.5 billion datapointsfrom44different some repository. Sinceitslaunch, the platformhascollated central in one data credit-related all social and connect ( in October2015. islands” Its goalistobreak up “isolated Information’ Sharing ofCredit ‘National Platformforthe launch andexpansionofthe the comprises The second manner. record inastandardised credit individual’s social new information to append to abusinessor departments government different allows code 2015, 18-digit this NDRC inJune in China. Launched bythe persons legal natural and card –forall identity credit – asocial score credit regulation. People’s Daily the 2020.with by Inaninterview credit social of rollout for the responsible formally body government the and ReformCommission(NDRC), National Development the at official a senior is question. Chen the to thought considerable Chen Hongwanhasdevoted but mean feat, no is credit social of mechanics the of Making sense and rulings. individual laws of if notthousands hundreds way, through decentralised inalargely has takenplace of socialcredit implementation interpretations, the and conceptual macro-level contextual such Beyond the Chinesesocialcreditsystemunique. of codification the morality through into regulation. ontrustworthiness customs Chinese formalisation of Party social creditasa of China. describes Hu herself the ( state of thetraditionalChinese governance virtue-based the linear pathbetween distinct draw a to seek commentators Many Chinese congress. 19 promotion atthe on its for agreateremphasis inrecentyears, additional attention withXiJinpingcalling One ofthe12 socialist corevalues, 孤岛 ” “NoticeonaGeneralPlanfortheNational Development andReform hei mingdan) across the country. Onejurisdictionwill heimingdan)acrossthe 关于转批发展改革委等部门法人和其他组织统一社会信用代码制度建设总体方案的通 chengxin gudao) of information held byindividualministries gudao)ofinformationheld Guangming Daily 观察社会信用体系:信用社会来临，你准备好了吗 , 4June2018,availableat 一处失信，处处受限加强信用体系建设 culture re-emphasised by today’s Communist by re-emphasised culture , Chen identifies three key pillarsofsocial three , Chen identifies 8 Inhermind, it isthisbindingoflawand 9 (hereafter,ObservingtheSocialCreditSystem:The The first is the creationofaunifiedcredit Thefirstisthe . , 12June2018,availableat ” “StrengtheningtheConstructionofaCredit http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2018- yi chu shixin, chu chu shou chu shixin, chu chu yi 以德治国 chengxin http://ifb.cass.cn/wzxd/201806/ chengxin

yi de zhiguo) and yide ” “ObservingtheSocial 11 hasreceived Chen’sfinal . that makes that

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Many aspects of social credit currently exist only in the form exist onlyinthe of socialcreditcurrently Many aspects system. work onthe first istoprioritisefurtherlegislative success. credit’s social to key areas ofimprovement four national congressinMarch2018, Zhang suggested 13 at the held to fruition.Atapressconference system bring the to government’s efforts central the heart of at the sits NDRC, he of the director than ZhangYong.Asdeputy credit for social priorities future on the comment to placed in Chinaarebetter individuals few However, perhaps forecast forthesystemovernext12months. Reference journal inthe yearly ‘Outlook’report,published Wu Jingmei’s being influential most two the credit, social of progress on the reports regular and think-tanksproduce on whereitshouldgofromhere. Various research centres as speculation aswell implementation, current system’s on the commentary and intense significant been has there With somuchatstakewiththefullrolloutofsocialcredit, blacklisting somewherewithinthesocialcreditsystem. tickets onaccountoftheir plane from buying blocked been had 11 millionindividuals to year, close this By April of suchblacklisting. of theeffects examples well-reported and immediate most board. Travelbansarethe across the 03/06/c_129823589.htm Xinhua Important AreastoStriveFourintheConstruction ofaSocialCreditSystem”, 13 “ pZXdfYWNjZXNzAAAH4gAAAAQAAAAeAAAACwAAAB8AAAAc t20180530_116867.html?randid=0.7735649642064721&sign=ABZ0cnNfd2NtX3ByZXZ cn/xiaoyuanchengxin/chengxinjiaoyuxunhui/chengxinjianshetesehuodong/201805/ author. A summary of the report’s findings can be found at Forecasts for2018”,PekingUniversityChinaCreditResearchCentreOnfilewith 2018年展望 Breakthroughs”, CreditReference,2018(1);“(2018)2017 12 WuJingmei,“2018 of subsidisedutilitiesandfreeaccesstopublictransport. form in the stick carrot overthe the emphasise to schemes launching cities of dozens with level, local the root at take wayhasalreadystarted to social creditin this morepositive promotion of the through message Zhang advocatesamoreoptimistic system, the of perceptions on public emphasis his maintaining Finally, nationwide. credit social of adoption block forthe stumbling as apotential coverage negative such Zhang cites their dues. having paid despite blacklisting peril of continued at the find themselves and thus distance or geographic delays to time due record updated their credit have nothad of individualswho reports numerous featured media have months, the Inrecent blacklist isupdated. a of membership their extension, and, by record credit way inwhichanindividual’s improvement ofthe specific ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviour. Interestingly, Zhang also callsfor for incentives cross-jurisdictional proper achieve to as so and blacklistsrequiresexpansion out through“redlists” meted punishments and rewards joint of system Thirdly, the to improve, not onlyintermsofquantitybutalsoquality. needs government of levels across all data-sharing that Zhang argues laws. Secondly, and ratified fledged as fully of “guidingopinions”( 张勇：社会信用体系建设下一步主要在四个方面着力 , 6March2018,availableat ” “2017ReviewofChineseSocialCreditSystemConstructionand , andPekingUniversity’sannualreview chengxin 年展望：征信面临突破 . culture. Framing and implementing Framing andimplementing culture. 指导意见 http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018- ” “Outlookfor2018:CreditIndustryFaces zhidaoyijian)ratherthan ” “ZhangYong:Four 中国社会信用体系建设的回顾与 https://www.creditchina.gov. . 12

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Furthering many of Zhang’s points, Liao and Tan summarise the challenge of the coming years for social credit as one Enthusiasm and challenges in that requires significant centralised coordination above all China’s embrace of AI else.14 They call for the establishment of a national Credit Management Office to direct data-sharing efforts, as well as Elsa B Kania greater legislation to encourage a market for private credit services. Like many other Chinese observers of social credit, Liao and Tan remain bullish. They do, however, also raise In China, enthusiasm for innovation in artificial the question of personal privacy, warning that the system’s intelligence starts at the highest levels.1 In his remarks success relies on its ability to balance functionality and data to the 19th party congress, Xi Jinping called for China to protection. “promote the deep integration of the internet, big data, and AI with the real economy.”2 His 2018 new year’s Liao and Tan consider this just one of many contradictions address saw two books on AI positioned on the bookshelf that make social credit such a uniquely complex topic. behind him, another indication of the extent of his As a policy priority, they argue, social credit must offset interest.3 China’s leaders evidently recognise the advent both public and private rights to information, sitting at of AI as a strategic opportunity for China to achieve the intersection between law and morality. As a holistic first-mover advantage by forging ahead in the development system, it requires both top-level planning and bottom-up of potentially revolutionary technologies. The New/Next cooperation. Its success rides on its assimilation with local Generation AI Development Plan (新一代人工智能发展规 conditions, while also maintaining a broader outlook. The 划 xin yidai rengong zhineng fazhan guihua), released in debate around social credit’s future direction is likely only July 2017, captured headlines by boldly declaring China’s to intensify in the coming months and years as it reaches ambition to “lead the world” and to emerge as the “world’s into ever deeper corners of Chinese society. premier centre of innovation” in AI by 2030.4 China’s ‘rise’ in AI – and potential emergence as an “AI superpower” – continues to command headlines, while the remarks of China’s policy and business leaders indicate a keen awareness of continued challenges and shortcomings.5

China’s innovation imperative

Xi launched a national strategy for “innovation-driven” (创新驱动发展 chuangxin qudong fazhan) development in 2016, recognising innovation as an essential engine for future economic dynamism and military capabilities.6 This innovation imperative is at the core of his strategy to advance the “China Dream” (中国梦 zhongguo meng) of national rejuvenation. China’s leaders believe that their country’s historical technological backwardness resulted in weakness and vulnerability to foreign powers. This reinforces their belief in the importance of science and technology in enhancing China’s power today. Under Xi, China aims to emerge at the forefront of innovation by 2030 and as a global powerhouse, even superpower, in innovation by the middle of the century.7 China may indeed

1 “How Can AI Empower a New Age? Xi Jinping Speaks Thusly” [人工智能如何赋能新时代？习近平这样说], 81.cn, 18 September 2018, available at http://www.81.cn/ jwgz/2018-09/18/content_9289494.htm. 2 “Xi Jinping’s Report at the Chinese Communist Party 19th National Congress” [习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告], Xinhua, 27 October 2017, available at http://www.china.com.cn/19da/2017-10/27/content_41805113_3.htm. 3 “The Two AI Books on Xi Jinping’s Bookshelf” [习总书架上两本人工智能书], Tencent, available at https://cloud.tencent.com/developer/article/1067180. 4 “State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知], State Council, 20 July 2017, available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm. 5 See: Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018. 6 “CPC State Council Releases the “National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy Guidelines” [中共中央国务院印发《国家创新驱动发展战略纲要》], Xinhua, 19 May 2016, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-05/19/c_1118898033.htm, 14 Liao Yongan and Tan Man, “以信用立法推进社会信用体系建设” “Furthering the (hereafter, “CCP State Council Releases the “National Innovation-Driven Development Construction of the Social Credit System through Credit Legislation”, Guangming Strategy Guidelines”). Daily, 19 February 2018, available at http://fund.cssn.cn/skjj/skjj_jjyw/201802/ 7 “CPC State Council Releases the “National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy t20180219_3852710.shtml. Guidelines”. 9 10 ECFR/268 October 2018 www.ecfr.eu THE CHINA DREAM GOES DIGITAL: TECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF XI Consultation Symposium”). CPPCC’s “ArtificialIntelligenceDevelopment andCountermeasures”Bi-weekly cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2018/04/24/ARTI1524530864901945.shtml 会 Bi-weekly ConsultationSymposium”[ 10 “NationalCPPCC’s“ArtificialIntelligence DevelopmentandCountermeasures” thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2448320 致2018世界人工智能大会的贺信 9 “LetterfromXiJinpingtothe2018WorldArtificialIntelligenceConference”[ AI” ( by era empowered “new of a theme conference’s the its leadingcompanies.Xilauded of some of achievements the 2018, showcasing September in Shanghai Conference first World Artificial Intelligence to enhancesocialcontrolandstability.China convened the about. YetthisispairedwithanemphasisontheuseofAI positivetransformation on that AI the potential can bring perspective an almosttechno-utopian reflects healthcare and enthusiasm forAIinenhancingeducation of level the social constructionandgovernance.Incertainrespects, ofAIincontributingto utility recognition ofthe and the concerns these reflects China. onAI therefore The emphasis Communist Partyof of the legitimacy to the challenge even anexistential pose could ingrowth A slowdown increasing productivityandnationalcompetitiveness. intoChina’seconomicdevelopment, energy” kineticnew as awayto“inject cultivation andexpansionofAIindustries 8 transformation stage. of China’s economy atthis“decisive” the to enable AI as auniqueopportunity recognises government Chinese imply, the and policies plans its As infrastructure. and enabling revolution, particularlythrougheducation technological a new lead in AIto have auniqueopportunity at [ 8 “StateCouncilNoticeontheIssuanceofNewGenerationAIDevelopmentPlan” the have influenced and may agenda, policy this of supportive broadly have been leaders technology Chinese infrastructure. inplace therelevantsupporting and put to achievemajororiginalresults need particularly onthe countries– namely,theUS. major It focused developed of that to in Chinarelative AI development level of the between gap the on concerns about centred discussions in academia andindustry. There, relevant leaders with government engagement to facilitate symposium convened aconsultation Conference Political Consultative People’s Chinese 2018 the For instance,inApril States. United the with up catch striving to China isstill that consensus is ageneral in AI, there track China’strajectory theright metricsto eventoidentify While itisdifficult advanced researchincentralandlocalplanspolicies. and in talent gaps acknowledging including candidly, quite these and policyleadersoftendiscuss technology Chinese shortcomings incertaincoretechnologies. and persistent challenges continued the of an awareness by AI inChinaistempered about excitement general The Challenges andopportunities AI “forthebenefitofmankind.” promotion of for the and called xin shidai) funeng zhineng China’s New Generation AI Development Plan describes the Plan describes Generation AIDevelopment China’s New 国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知 ], People’sPoliticalConsultativeConference, 24April2018,availableat http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm ], The Paper 全国政协“人工智能的发展与对策”双周协商座谈 . , 17September2018,availableat 人工智能赋能新时代 9 ], StateCouncil,20July2017,available (hereafter,“National http://www. rengong . https://m.

习近平

attract topAIexpertsfromaroundtheworld. Meanwhile, government isactively seekingtocreateincentives of talentinAIasaseriousshortcoming, theChinese supplystill-limited and demand stronger ever between and entrepreneurship. Sinceitviewsthedisparity resources widelyavailabletoenablemassinnovation focus onmakingsoftware, hardware, andcomputing open andopen-sourceplatformsforinnovation. They on providingnow concentrating are authorities local of instance, thecentralgovernmentandagrowingnumber development. accelerate its to infrastructure and mobilise resourcesto ability government’s to the thanks argued thatChinahasapotentialpolicyadvantageinAI providing strongstatesupport. Li Yanhonghaspreviously market-oriented approachtoadvancingAI, whilealso among Westerners, Chinais,infact, undertakingamore primarily state-drivenremainsacommonmisconception While thenotionthatitsapproachtoAIdevelopmentis leaders andexpertsalsohelpedformulatetheplan. technology Chinese developed. later government Chinese were notdissimilarfrom AI the planthat development on Li Yanhong,in2015 foraplanfocusing Baidu’s CEO leaders, notably technology instance, thecallsofChinese mechanisms. For such through government’s owndirection Bi-weekly ConsultationSymposium”). 13 “NationalCPPCC’s“ArtificialIntelligence DevelopmentandCountermeasures” Bi-weekly ConsultationSymposium”). 12 “NationalCPPCC’s“ArtificialIntelligence DevelopmentandCountermeasures” http://pic.people.com.cn/n/2015/0303/c1016-26627781.html [ 11 capability formulti-languagespeechrecognitioninorder symposium arguedthatChinashouldprioritisethe to China’sglobalgeopoliticalobjectives. Othersatthe linkedclosely also is AI in leadership of pursuit This that mightenablefuturedominanceinthesetechnologies. Doing sowillenableittoachieve afirst-moveradvantage and capacityforcoordinationwithinitsmassivemarket. policytowards approach active an using China for support for anewleapfrogginginChinesedevelopmentindicate callsSuch world. the around standards of development the dominance tosetandshapestandards,thusinfluencing that Chinashouldleadbyleveraging China’smarket technology. frontier” ofthisemergingthe “global at in innovation lead” 2018 consultationsymposiumthatChinashould“dareto Aprilduring the argued who participants those for priority ( For China, theconceptof“takingaturnsharplytosurpass” opportunity notonlytocatchupbutalsoovertaketheUS. US inAI, ChineseleadershavearguedthatChinahasan Although thereremainsagapbetweenChinaandthe of AIasafirst-leveldisciplineinhighereducation. between academiaandindustrytotheestablishment from trainingprogrammesthatleveragepartnerships educational opportunities,expanding rapidly also it is 李彦宏委员建议设立“中国大脑”计划弯道超车 See: DelegateLiYanhongRecommendsthe Establishment ofa‘ChinaBrain’Plan” wandaochaoche)–implicitly, theUS–isacore 13 Chinesepolicymakershavealsoargued ], People’s Daily, 3March2015,availableat . 11 12 For

to advance its “One Belt, One Road” initiative.14 The Risks and security concerns establishment of a data centre with a corpus adequate for the advancement of natural language processing across China’s quest to advance AI includes looking at these new multiple languages is integral to this area of development. technologies through a national security and defence lens, This debate reveals that China’s much-touted data following concerns about other militaries’ activities and advantage, based on the amount of data generated within investments. Unsurprisingly – and not unlike the US and its own economy and society, has limitations as Chinese Russian militaries – the Chinese People’s Liberation Army AI looks to go global. For instance, there can be very (PLA) has actively pursued and supported AI research and specific requirements for data in different contexts and development. The contributions of the Chinese defence applications. Chinese tech companies are contributing industry, along with military research institutes and a to China’s advancement of a “digital silk road” (数字丝绸 limited but growing number of tech companies, are integral 之路 shuzi sichou zhilu) under the aegis of this strategy.15 to this endeavour. The perspectives of engineers and This could further reinforce their competitiveness leadership alike reflect awareness of particular challenges through providing opportunities for new access to data of this sector. For instance, AI developed for commercial and markets worldwide. applications often cannot be directly applied to military equipment, as Wu Ximing, deputy director of the Aviation Such an aspiration is accompanied by an acute awareness Industry Corporation of China’s Science and Technology among Chinese technology leaders and policymakers that Committee, has pointed out.19 China’s national strategy China still faces major obstacles to indigenous innovation of military-civil fusion (or civil-military integration, 军民 in core technologies. For example, in response to a violation 融合 junmin ronghe) sets AI as a priority. It aims to serve of sanctions by telecommunications company ZTE, the as a framework for efficient exchange and cooperation US introduced a temporary ban to prevent it from buying across sectors to advance the development of the relevant American technology. The move brought ZTE to the brink technologies. of collapse.16 This was a harsh awakening at a time when enthusiasm about the Made in China 2025 innovation China’s defence industry is organising to build capabilities in plan was reaching a new peak. It also highlighted how the anticipation of future “intelligentised” (智能化 zhinenghua) US might deny China the technology it needs, especially warfare, in which AI will be integral to military power. As given the backdrop of a new era of confrontation and a a result, major players in the Chinese defence industry are potential decoupling in the bilateral relationship. In the drafting and promoting a plan to guide the development aftermath of the incident, Xi highlighted the imperative of AI in aviation and aerospace. This new initiative, which of self-reliance and indigenous innovation (自主创 is to guide these sectors over the next 15 years, reflects a 新 zizhu chuangxin) in “core technologies”.17 Indeed, candid recognition of current challenges and impediments the ZTE crisis may prove in retrospect to be a pivotal to progress, which has motivated the Chinese defence moment as China’s comes to grasp the importance of industry’s call for greater support from the government. chips as a core foundation for information technology – At present, China suffers from several disadvantages and AI. For instance, commentary in the People’s Daily in applying AI to aerospace research and development, has highlighted the perceived humiliation of this ban, including bottlenecks in theory and technology and shortfalls while arguing that the dangers of depending on foreign in the availability of talented researchers, according to Liu sources for such technologies should catalyse even Qiang, a researcher with the China Aerospace Science and more extensive investments in the chip industry.18 This Industry Corporation.20 At a basic level, the dispersal of the traumatic moment is likely to spur on a redoubling of key data across different units in industry, the military, and research and development into the hardware dimension even universities has remained an impediment to sharing of AI development. This includes the funding of multiple and development of aerospace applications. projects aimed at new types of AI chip, which is now starting to pay off in the emergence of a flurry of start-ups. Despite this enthusiasm for military applications of AI, Chinese leaders also recognise the risks that might result from it. A recent China Institute of Information and

14 “National CPPCC’s “Artificial Intelligence Development and Countermeasures” Communications white paper on AI safety and security Bi-weekly Consultation Symposium”). (人工智能安全白皮书 rengong zhineng anquan baipishu) 15 See: “Standards China Unicom Joint Construction ‘One Belt, One Road’ Action Plan” (标准联通共建“一带一路”行动计划) (2018–2020) released by the Standardisation characterised AI as a “double-edged sword,” observing, “AI Administration of China (中国国家标准化管理委员会), Xinhua, 22 December 2017, can be used to construct a new type of military strike force, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-12/22/c_1122155113.htm. 21 16 See: Claire Ballentine, “U.S. Lifts Ban That Kept ZTE From Doing Business With directly threatening national security.” Future intelligent American Suppliers”, New York Times, 13 July 2018, available at https://www.nytimes. weapon technologies may result in warfare becoming com/2018/07/13/business/zte-ban-trump.html. 17 “Xi Jinping: Seize the Opportunity to Confront Difficulties and Construct a Global 19 “National CPPCC’s “Artificial Intelligence Development and Countermeasures” S&T Superpower” [习近平：抢占先机迎难而上建设世界科技强国], Bi-weekly Consultation Symposium”). Chinese Academy of Sciences, 28 May 2018, available at http://www.cas.cn/tt/201805/ 20 “National CPPCC’s “Artificial Intelligence Development and Countermeasures” t20180528_4647453.shtml. Bi-weekly Consultation Symposium”). 18 “People’s Daily Commentary on ZTE Crisis” [人民日报评中兴危机], People’s Daily, 21 “AI Security White Paper” [人工智能安全白皮书], China Institute of Information and 18 April 2018, available at http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0418/c1003- Communications , September 2018, available at http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/ 29935319.html. bps/201809/P020180918473525332978.pdf. 11 12 ECFR/268 October 2018 www.ecfr.eu THE CHINA DREAM GOES DIGITAL: TECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF XI available at Ethical BottomLine”[ 23 ZhuQichao[ bps/201809/P020180918473525332978.pdf Paper” [ 22 ChinaInstituteofInformationandCommunications (CAICT),“AISecurityWhite technology isreceiving. the intenseattentionthatthisstrategic process reflect policy in the and engagement uncertain, activedebates way. trajectory inAIremains While China’s the future along and securitythatwillemerge new questionsofsafety and confronting in coretechnologies capabilities bolstering questions around about futurechallenges.This includes and reasonsforconcern remain realobstacles reveal, there stakeholders and thought-leaders Chinese of perspectives and viewpoints in innovation. the However, as leader as atrueglobal emerge China could its development, enhance AI to of potential full the in leveraging successful prove revolutionary.Ifitis could AI technologies these that leaders and technology by bothpolitical assessment and expectation growing a AI reflects of China’s embrace from atechnicalperspective. government’s greaterengagementwithAIsafety/security Chinesethe motivated have AI the risksof concerns about the relationshipbetweensecurityanddevelopment. Such Center, havecalledfortheappropriatemanagementof scientist withtheChinaInformationSecurityEvaluation some Chinesesecurityexperts,suchasWuShizhong, chief dynamically, asthewhitepaperhighlights. Consequently, in society, thesesecurityrisksarelikelytoincrease deployment ofAIexpandsandbecomesmoreubiquitous in AIthatcreatethepotentialforriskyfailures. Asthe perspectives. Therearestillarangeoftechnicallimitations technology mightpresentfromtechnicalandpolicy policymakers alsorecognisethesafetyissuesthat Chinesedevelopment, active AI’s of backdrop the Against may arisefromAIinwarfare. risks that the Technology, havealsohighlighted Defense PLA’s Professor ZhuQichaoofthe National Universityof including andstrategists, academics race. defence Chinese capabilities, therearereasonsforconcernaboutanewarms processes.” of to anintelligentisation andlead battlefield, of the in striking, controlled, preciseaminiaturisation “remotely 人工智能安全白皮书 https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1700214 朱启超 22 As militaries worldwide start to pursue these start topursue Asmilitariesworldwide 人工智能介入军事或冲击人类道德底线 ], “AIIntervenesinMilitaryAffairsorAssaults Humanity’s ], September2018, 23 .

http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/ ], The Paper . , 23June2017,

Notes

13 14 ECFR/268 October 2018 www.ecfr.eu THE CHINA DREAM GOES DIGITAL: TECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF XI Notes About the authors

François Godement is director of ECFR’s Asia and China Angela Stanzel is editor of China Analysis and a senior programme and a senior policy fellow at ECFR. He is a policy fellow on the Asia and China Programme at the non-resident senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment European Council on Foreign Relations. Before joining for International Peace in Washington, DC, and an outside ECFR, she worked for the BMW Foundation and the consultant for the Policy Planning Staff of the French International Affairs Office of the Koerber Foundation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. in Berlin. Prior to that, Angela worked in Brussels for the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Asia Marcin Przychodniak is a China analyst on the Asia-Pacific Programme) and in Beijing at the German Embassy programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. (cultural section). Her research work focuses on the His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy and internal foreign and security policy of east Asia and south affairs (party-state relations). In 2012 he received a PhD Asia. You can reach her at [email protected]. in political science at Warsaw University. Between 2012 and 2016, he was a diplomat at the Political Section in the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Beijing.

Katja Drinhausen is a freelance researcher and translator. This paper does not represent the collective views of After studying Sinology at the University of Leipzig and the ECFR, but only the views of its authors. University of Erlangen, she worked as a research assistant for the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Beijing, analysing the Copyright of this publication is held by the European development of China’s legal, political, and civil society. In Council on Foreign Relations. You may not copy, Beijing she studied international and Chinese law at the reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content China University of Political Science and Law, with a focus from this publication except for your own personal on public international and Chinese public law, especially and non-commercial use. Any other use requires prior civil rights protection in criminal and administrative written permission. law, regulation of non-governmental organisations, and regulation of cyberspace in China. You can reach her at © ECFR 2018 [email protected]. Contact: [email protected] Adam Knight is a freelance researcher and journalist focusing on the intersection between public and private actors in the regulation of China’s online sphere. He holds a BA in Chinese Studies and an MSc in Social Science of the Internet, both from the University of Oxford.

Elsa B Kania is an adjunct fellow on the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Her research on Chinese military innovation in emerging technologies contributes to the Artificial Intelligence and Global Security Initiative at CNAS, where she also acts as a member of the research team for the Task Force on Artificial Intelligence and National Security. She is an independent analyst, consultant, and co-founder of the China Cyber and Intelligence Studies Institute. Elsa was a 2018 Fulbright Specialist at, and is a Non-Resident Fellow with, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Centre. Currently, Elsa is a PhD student in Harvard University’s Department of Government, and she is also a graduate of Harvard College.

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