The History of Knowledge and the Future of Knowledge Societies

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Dupré, S.; Somsen, G. DOI 10.1002/bewi.201900006 Publication date 2019 Document Version Final published version Published in Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte License CC BY Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA): Dupré, S., & Somsen, G. (2019). The History of Knowledge and the Future of Knowledge Societies. Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 42, 186-199. https://doi.org/10.1002/bewi.201900006

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DOI: 10.1002/bewi.201900006

TheHistory of Knowledgeand theFutureofKnowledge Societies

Sven DuprØ andGeert Somsen

Summary: Thenew field of thehistory of knowledge is oftenpresented as amereexpansion of thehistory of science.Weargue that it hasagreater ambition.The re-definitionofthe historiographicaldomain of thehistory of knowledge urgesustoask newquestions aboutthe boundaries, hierarchies, andmutualconstitutionofdifferent typesofknowledge as well as theroleand assessmentoffailure andignorance in makingknowledge. Theseissueshavepertinenceinthe currentclimate whereexpertise is in- creasingly questionedand authorityseems to lose itsground. Illustrated withexamples from recent historiography of thesixteenthtotwentieth centuries,weindicatesomefruitfulnew avenuesfor research in thehistory of knowledge.Taken together,wehopethattheywillshowthatthe history of knowledge couldbuild theexpertise required by thechallengesof twenty-first century knowledge societies, just likethe historyofscience, throughout itsdevelopmentasadiscipline in thetwentieth century,re- spondedtothe demandsposed by science andsociety.

Keywords: artisanalknowledge,history of knowledge,history of science, learned societies

Introduction1

Thenew fieldofthe historyofknowledge is oftenpresentedasamere expansion of thehistory of science. It hasbeenportrayed as nothingmorethanmakingex- plicit thebroadeningofthe scopeofthe historyofscience,which thediscipline hasundergone anyway sincethe turn to practiceinthe 1970s. On that reading, thescope of thehistory of knowledgeisessentiallythe same as that of thenew his-

S. DuprØ,Utrecht University FacultyofHumanities, Utrecht, Netherlands, E-Mail: [email protected] G. Somsen,MaastrichtUniversityFaculty of Arts andSocialSciences, Maastricht,Netherlands, E-Mail:[email protected] 1 DuprØ’s research hasreceivedfunding from theEuropeanResearchCouncil (ERC)under theEuro- pean Union’sHorizon 2020 research andinnovationprogramme(grantagreement No 648718).

2019 TheAuthors.Published by Wiley-VCHVerlagGmbH&Co.KGaA. This is an open access articleunder theterms of theCreativeCommons AttributionLicense, whichpermits use, distribution andreproduction in anymedium, provided theoriginalworkis properly cited.

186 2019 TheAuthors. Published by WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH&Co.KGaA, Weinheim TheHistory of Knowledgeand theFutureofKnowledge Societies tory of science, whichnow alsoincludes, withoutmuchcontention, forexample, non-Westernand artisanalknowledge practices. It is noteworthy that even propo- nentsofthe historyofknowledge pointout that thehistory of sciencehas been leadingthe way.Interms of thefutureprospects of thedisciplineofthe historyof knowledge, PeterBurke envisionsaglobal approach (concentratingon“knowledge on themove,”“encounters,clashes,translationsand hybridizations”), asocialapproach(whichwould entail “a historyofknowledgefrombelow”and “everydayknowledges,includingthe tacit, bodily knowledges …not only in crafts such as metal-workingbut also in fields as diverseasdiplomacy,trade,con- noisseurship,managementand sport”), andaconcernwiththe longterm(focus- ingonthe useoflanguageand theinvention of writingsystems,for example).2 Yet, whileanthropologists, archaeologists,and global historians have much to say on theseapproaches, it is fair to saythattheyneverthelessemerged from within thehistory of science(“ashas so oftenhappened,”according to Burke).Lorraine Daston observedthatthe historyofknowledge is currentlyusedfor twodifferent research agendas: onethatfocuses on “forms of knowledgethathavehistorically been denigrated as substandard” (suchasthe skills of artisans), theother on the historyoflearning andthe humanities,which is primarilypracticed by highly educated elites andhas little in commonwiththe activities of craftsmen.3 The only thingthese tworesearchprogramsseemtoshare is that they arenot about science, andthus, thehistory of knowledgeisdefined only in anegativeway. We do notdisagreewiththe broadening of thescope of historyofscience;in fact,wewelcome theexpansion of thefield of thehistory of sciencetothe humanities,toscience in non-Westerncontextsand to vernacular knowledge, and acknowledgethatthe historyofknowledge is made possible andshouldbuild upon this recent work in thefield of thehistory of science.4 However, we argue that thecarving outofthe newfield of thehistory of knowledgeservesmoream- bitiousaimsthanmereexpansion.Moreprecisely,weclaim that theseaims should be more ambitiousindirectresponsetothe challenges posedtousbypresent-day knowledgesocieties in whichexpertise,whether scientific or not, is widely con- tested,and in whichthe valueofdifferent formsofknowledge is fluid. There- definition of thehistoriographical domain of thehistory of knowledgeallowsand urges us to asknew questionsconcerningthe boundaries,hierarchies,and mutual constitution of differenttypes of knowledgeaswellastothe role andassessment of failureand ignoranceinmakingknowledge.These issues have pertinence in thecurrent climatewhere expertiseisrelentlesslyquestionedand authority often seemstoloseits ground.Asarecent exchange between Martin Mulsow andLor- raineDastonshows,the historyofknowledge, primarilydefined as being about epistemichierarchies andtheir dynamics,can offerinsights into thesecurrent so- cietal challenges.5 In this paper, we will indicate some fruitful newavenues forresearchinthe history of knowledgeillustrated by examples from thesixteenth to twentiethcentu-

2 Burke2015, on 102–103. 3 Daston 2017,on143. 4 Forthe consequences of this expansionfor thehistory of earlymodernscience,see Smith2009. 5 Mulsow andDaston2019.

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ries.Takentogether, we hope that they will show that thehistory of knowledge couldbuild theexpertise required by thechallengesofthe twenty-first century. In itself,suchresponsivenessisnotnew.Infact, thedisciplineofthe historyofscience hasalwaysdeveloped in response to thedemands posedbyscience andsociety, eversince itsemergence in theearly twentiethcentury.Weillustrate this in thenextsection,showing howoverthisperiod, thefield evolved from acontext of belle Øpoque positivism viapost-warscientism to Cold Warmodernism and, finally,1970s relativism—alwaysinreactiontochangingsocietalcircumstances andenvironments.

HistoryofScience in Context Historyofscience wasnever established (orsustained)for its“intrinsicvalue.” From itsstart as an academic field, it received supportbecause it seemed valuable forspecificpurposesand because it seemed to offerananswer to issues of the time.Ifanyonewas awareofthis, it was thefield’s most tireless organizerinthe earlytwentieth century,GeorgeSarton. Sarton believed that history of science should exist as an autonomous discipline,worthyinand of itself,yet he knew he hadtoshowwhatthisexistence was for if he was evergoing to make this possible. Throughout hiscareerhepubliclypronouncedthe field’saims, calling attention to various raisons-d’Þtre:History of sciencecould help “humanize”the sciences by showingtheir trackrecordasahumanachievement. It couldshowthe “unity of mankind” by science’sdemonstrableuniversality. Anditcould reveal the“secret history” of steady civilizational progressthatregular historians failed to seein theirfocus on warand conquest,bloodshed andpower grab.6 Allthese reasonspointedtoageneralculturalvalue thatappealedtothe liberal positivist milieu of Sarton’s belle Øpoque Belgium.7 Butwhenhemoved to theUS in 1915, he enteredawholly differentcontext wherehis argumentsnolongerhad thesametraction. In fact,despite hissuccess running Isis andsettingupthe His- tory of ScienceSociety,Sartonreceived remarkably little material support forhis enterprise.Heowedhis position at Harvardtothe CarnegieInstitution of Wash- ington whosedirectorliked hisbroad view of science(that he missed amongthe scientists that he normally funded).8 Butthe university itself wasquite uncommit- ted, paid no salary,and provided no chair—only awindowlessspace in theWid- ener Libraryand asmall annual feefor teaching an undergraduatecourse.9 Sarton made waves, buthis vision of thefield remained unrealised for most of hiscareer. Thefirst steps toward academic institutionalization only came ageneration later, andagain notfor thefield’s intrinsicvalue,but forits educationalfunction. JamesBryant Conant,formeroverseer of theManhattan Projectand long-time

6 Sarton gave thesethree reasonsinhis manifesto“TheNew Humanism”(1924):9–42, on 16, 24 ff., 33,based on theFrenchoriginalof1918. Elsewherehemadestill differentappeals,the earli- estpromising to discover the“laws of [scientific] development” by recordingthe pace of discovery over time:“L’Histoire de la Science”, RevueGØnØrale de la Science 23 (1912):93–94,on94. 7 Wils,2005. 8 SeeSarton’scorrespondencewiththisdirector, Robert SimpsonWoodward, between1916and 1919.Harvard University,HoughtonLibrary,MsAm1803, 2045 and762. 9 Cohen1956; Conant 1956.

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Harvardpresident (aswellasSartonstudent)madehistory of sciencethe core of thegeneral scienceeducation programme.10 All students,especiallythose not ma- joringinthe naturalsciences, must acquireanunderstanding of what scienceis andwhatit“can andcannotaccomplish.”11 Andtheyshouldlearn this via“case histories,”historicalvignettes showingaspectsofthe scientific method.InCon- ant’shands,the fieldsuddenlyacquired acentral position on thepost-war campus,and this waspossiblebecause it cateredtohis widely shared conviction that sciencewas what definedthe modern world, andthatinorder to understand that world, andtakealeadingpositioninit, onehad to grasphow sciencefunc- tioned.History of sciencecould providethatgrasp. Elsewhere, leadinghistoriansofscience also managedtoinstitutionalize their fieldbut usually throughadifferentapproach. Alexandre KoyrØ in Parisand Her- bertButterfield in Cambridge, UK, sought to understand modernitynot through (essentially timeless)casestudies butbylocatingitinasingle historical moment, ashift in mentality, an “intellectual‘mutation’ofwhich modern physical science is at once theexpressionand thefruit.”12 This BigBang, of course, wasthe Scien- tificRevolution, aconcept that they launched andmadethe focusoftheir newly professionalized field. Butwhatsustained that fieldand itsprofessionalizationwas thesameconvictionthatConant hadcatered to:thatthe modern worldwas made by science, andthathistory of sciencewas thekey to grasping this. What made thelatterapproachprevail,however,was anotherasset:its stress on theintellectualcharacter of thehistory of science. This stood in contrast to aconceptionofscience as aproblem-solver, an instrument servingthe practical needsofsociety.Suchaview hadbeenpromotedbyMarxistscience historians like BorisHessenand J. D. Bernal whousedhistorical argumentstoadvocate Soviet-style scientific planning.Thishad hadappealduringthe GreatDepression andthe waryears,but itscommunist connotations quicklymadeitsuspect during theColdWar.AsAnnaMayer hasshown,the appointmentofthe firsthis- tory of scienceprofessor at Cambridgefollowedprecisely this path:promotedby Marxistscientistsinthe 1930s,the chairfinally fell to an intellectualhistorian afterthe war. Historyofscience nowservedanti-communist ends.13 Forthe span of theirgeneration, then,the firstprofessionalhistoriansofscience taught that sciencewas aparticularway of thinking,bornout of theScientific Revolution,layingthe foundationsofthe modern world. Butthismodernity was strictly of aWestern kind.Charles Gillispieopenlyworried aboutwhatwould happen if science’s“instruments” (read:the atomic bomb)would fall into the handsof“mennot of theWest.”14 AndHenry Kissingerconcluded that nations whohad missed the“impact of Newtonianthinking” were geopolitically second- rate.15 Thefield’s master-narrativehence fitaCold Warperspective with science as aunique mentality, markingthe difference betweenWestand East,developed andundeveloped.

10 Hamlin 2016. 11 Conant 1957,onvii;Jewett2012, on 256ff. 12 KoyrØ 1989,on120. 13 Mayer2000. 14 Gillispie1960, on 9. 15 Kissinger1966, on 528.

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This perspectivewas never without itscritics, butinthe courseofthe 1960s and70s doubts startedtodominate. ThomasKuhn, teaching on Conant’scase- historyprogramme,began to wonder whetherWestern sciencewas reallysodif- ferent from Sovietindoctrination.16 Scholars around Joseph Needhamgave aMarxist interpretation to theriseofWestern scienceitself. Andmoreand more studentsbecamecriticalofthe notion of scienceaspurethought,tending to what vaguelybecameknown as a“social historyofscience.” Something like it wasinsti- tutionalized in theUniversityofPennsylvania’s History andSociology of Science programme (startingin1970),inthe new Social StudiesofScience journal (1975), andfor instance in the maatschappelijkeaspecten movement in theNetherlands.17 Thesenew sensibilitiesfound theirmostsystematicand critical elaborationinthe fieldofSociology of Scientific Knowledge(SSK)launchedinBritain. What sustainedthisshift wasnot an anti-science sentimentbut agrowing aver- sion to viewingscience as singular, exalted, andrarefied. Much of thestudent revolt of 1968 andafter was directed againstthe “ivorytower”(even though such academic isolation rarely existedinreality)and claimedthatscientistshad a“social responsibility”.18 In history of sciencethe newbuzzwords were “practice” and“context,”shiftingfocus to what scientists did(oftenmanually)and howthey relatedtotheir world.19 Such “loweringthe tone”had theeffectofrelativizingthe powerofexpertise,evenifnot denyingit—oneofSSK’s founders, HarryCollins, wouldlater callfor more trustinexperts.20 But, as hisfellow-founderDavid Bloor pointedout,the newapproachwas like biblical criticism: it didnot necessarily underminebeliefinscience butits sacred aura.21 Over thecourseofthe twentiethcentury,then, historyofscience evolved in response to changing circumstances: from belle Øpoque positivism viapost-warscientism to Cold Warmodernism and, finally,1970s relativism. Today, we live in differenttimes again. Thereisnoneedtorejectour field’slastshift—the focuson practiceand contextand subsequent developmentshavemadeitasrichasitis now. Butwehavetoacknowledge that thecircumstances in whichweoperate have markedly changed. Insteadofasacralizationofscience we find itsregular (if qualified) denouncement;instead of thevenerationofexpertise we find it being incessantlyquestioned. This does notmeanthatwewanttoreturn to theviews of ourfield of theCold Warperiod. Norshoulditbeour task to defend science.22 Rather,wesuggest that thenew fluidity of cognitiveauthority raises questionsas to thehierarchy of knowledgeand itshistoricaldevelopment.How have different kindsofknowledgedefined each other, beenvalued, contrasted,and ranked? How hasthe epistemological mapchanged?Whataccountsfor theseshiftsand their(temporary) stabilization? In otherwords:Whatdoesahistoryofknowledge look like?

16 Reisch 2012;Reisch2019. 17 Ripand Boeker 1975. 18 Shapin 2012. 19 Golinski 1990. 20 Shapin 2010;Collins andEvans 2007. 21 Bloor1991, on 183–185. 22 Fordiscussions on thesametopic within STS, seeaseries of articles in Social StudiesofScience 47 (2017),on3–6and4(2017) on 580–586, 587–592, and593–599.

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In thefollowing twosections, respectively focusing on earlymodernand modern history, we show thepotential of such questions, tappingour ownexper- tise andresearchaswellasemerginghistoriographiesinthe historyofscience and relatedfields. We focusonsuchcategoriesasignorance,failure,pseudoscience, anddisciplinebecause they allowustoraise questions around theboundaries, hierarchies, andmutualconstitutionofdifferent typesofknowledge which have pertinence in ourpresent-day societies, whereexpertise andauthority arerelent- lessly questioned.

Failureand Ignorance Giventhe currentfluidityofcognitiveauthority,one importantpointoffocus of attentionfor thehistory of knowledgeisthe role andassessmentoffailure andig- noranceinthe production of knowledge. Failureand ignorancepoint to less highly valuedforms of knowledgeaswellasweaknessesinwaysofknowing.Yet, historians of knowledgewould arguetheyare inherent to processesofknowledge- making,evenifitconcernstypes of knowledgewhich,historicallyspeaking, at onepoint in time andinone place, were considered to be atthe topofthe ever- shifting hierarchy. Thehistory of knowledgehas emergent historiographies of pre- carity andignorance in theearly modern period to buildupon. Martin Mulsow hasarguedfor theimportanceofthe category of precarious knowledge; he has shownhow therecognition of theprecarity of knowledgeleads to questions aboutthe security andlossofknowledge as wellastoresearchonstrategiesof preservation.23 Likewise,hehas pointedtothe significance of strategies of howto deal with notknowing,beitdeveloped by aruler at theearly modern courtin Gothainrelationtoinvestments in alchemicaltransmutation,orduringimperia- list andcolonialventuring into unknowndistant lands.24 Ahistory of knowledge pays as much attentiontothe“dark sideofknowledge”; it explicitly deals with historical typologiesofignorance andhistoricalstrategiesofdealing with un- knowns.25 Here we will brieflydiscuss failure, whichhas recently received quiteabitofat- tention(andmedia coverage)although, or perhapsjustbecause,contemporary scienceand societyare obsessed with success. Johannes Haushofer, Princetonpro- fessor of psychology,published hisCVoffailures, andother scholars have fol- lowedhim in this to show howimportant failure hasbeentotheir careersand processesoflearning. Helsingborg, Sweden,ishometoaMuseum of Failure, whichhousesacollectionofmorethanahundredfailedproductsfromsomeof theworld’sbest-knowncompanies.Amuseum like this onewants to convey that failureisessential to innovation andbusinesssuccess,aconviction whichisshared by theMaastrichtUniversityInstitute of BrilliantFailures.26 In thehistory of science andtechnologyfailure plays aratherminor role.GraemeGooday hasaptly observedthatinthe historyoftechnology,failure hastypically been used to cate-

23 Mulsow 2012. 24 Mulsow andDaston2019, on 168–169. 25 Zwierlein2016. 26 Iske 2018.

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gorize “pathological”technologiesthatclearly demarcatethemfromsuccesses.27 Nevertheless,ahistoriography of failure, andrelated concepts andwords such as “error”and “mistake”, is emerging.The building of ahistoricaltypology of failure in theearly modern period is part of this ongoingendeavour.Itcould demarcate errors from mistakes,for example, alonglines of distinctionbetween thoughtand action,orbetween theabsence or presence of rulesornorms,while recognizingat thesametimethat, historically, thedistinctionbetween errorand mistakeisfluid andthatdifferent word categorieswereusedinvarious ways.28 Ahistory of knowledgecan payattention to errorand failureifitiswritten from theperspec- tive of epistemicvirtues.Klara Vanekhas shown, forexample,how avoidanceof errorwas tied to thedefinitionofthe bonus chirurgus in theearly modern period andhow this waslinkedtodebates aboutthe valueofanatomical, surgical,and medicalknowledge as well as epistemichierarchies of hand andmind.29 Another approach,perhaps even more relevant in lightofcurrent debates,might be to his- toricize theepistemic valueoffailure.One of us hastracedelsewhere theriseof a“poeticsoffailure”inthe earlymodernsciences.30 Such an approach to thehistory of knowledgecan take recourse from much older historiographies in otherdisciplines,which regain currency,or, like some of MichaelPolanyi’snotions,havenever been absent from thehistory of scienceand technology sincethe 1970s.Another historiography, that of crafttheory, treats failureasamundaneoccurrenceintechnologicaldesign. In histheoryonthe nature of design andcraft, woodworker andprofessor at theRoyal College of Art, DavidPye argues that design cannot be failure-free.31 Atechnologycannotmeet all requirements,and is alwaysbased upon acompromisebetweendesignrequire- mentstobefulfilledinorder to create an idealobject. AccordingtoPye,such acompromiseisalwaysasort of failure. Failureisthenunavoidably ubiquitous in all design andtechnology. Even if it werepossiblefor atechnologytosucceed at anymoment, laterusers wouldcomewithdifferent requirements,again making failureinevitable. DifferentfromPye,Michael Polanyiseesfailure as an inevitable step towards success. In connection to “rules of skilland connoisseurshipwhich comprise importanttechnical processes,”Polanyispeaksof“theusual processof unconscioustrial anderror by whichwefeelour waytosuccess andmay continue to improveonour success withoutspecifiably knowinghow we do it.”32 Histori- callyspeaking,early modern artisans knew that onecould only learnbydoing, andthatthismeant making mistakes.Itisthisepistemicvalue of errorand failure whichthe French potter BernardPalissy andsomanyothersvoicedwhenexpress- ingscepticismaboutthe didactic value of theirown writings.Famously, Palissy made an allegoric figure called “Practice”reluctant to tell “Theory”the secret of whiteenamel. Palissyhad “Practice” saythatthiswas notarefusalfor economic

27 Gooday 1998. 28 Aselection whichdealswiththe issueoftypology: Rigolot2004; Neumaier 2010;Gadebusch Bondio andParaviciniBagliani2012. 29 Vanek2014. 30 Thenextparagraphssummarize an argument more fullydeveloped in Epple, Müller,and Warner, forthcoming. 31 Pye1978, on 70. 32 Polanyi 2005, on 65.

192 Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 42 (2019):186 –199 TheHistory of Knowledgeand theFutureofKnowledge Societies reasons, butsimplybecause wordswereanineffective waytolearn acraft.“Even if Iusedathousand reamsofpaper to writedownall theaccidents that have hap- penedtomeinlearningthisart,” Practicesays, “you must be assured that,however good abrain you mayhave, you willstill make athousandmistakes, which cannot be learnedfromwritings, andevenifyou hadtheminwriting you wouldn’t believethemuntil practice hasgiven youathousand afflictions.”33 Only longand sustainedexperience, includingthe making of mistakes inherent to the apprenticeship,leads to theacquisition of knowledge. However,while artisans recognized theepistemic value of failure, this didnot necessarilytranslate to allgenresofartisanal writings.Infact, apoeticsoffailure characterizesthose artisanalwritingswhich we mightcall “manuals”, in thesense that they claimtoserve learning acraft,whether it be surgeryorgoldsmithing, in opposition to (mostfamously) the EncyclopØdie,inwhich Diderotfollowed alogicofrepresentationinhis descriptionofthe arts,and whichwas notintended to be used in thecontext of instruction. Oneexample of such amanualisthe eighteenth-century Guidebook forUpcomingGold- and Silversmiths (1721) by the DutchsilversmithWillemvan Laer.Van Laer’sguide presents itself as asortof structured curriculum forthe apprentice,althoughitisinnoway intended to re- place, butrathertocomplement, hands-on educationonthe workshop floor.34 VanLaerwrote down hisinstructionsand descriptionsoftechniquesinways sug- gesting alternativehistories of hisown failures.Atypicalpattern is that vanLaer suggests that acertain way of proceeding wouldfailand theresultcould be poten- tially disastrous.One exampleishis suggestion that,without thepreparation of theBrusselssand to make themould,the cast will be undesirably“rough”.Inhis book, failures areubiquitous, andheregularly includes extensivetrouble-shooting sections,for example in hisdiscussionofsoldering.Asamaster silversmith, van Laer describesfailuresonlytosuggest howtocorrect them,but it is clearthatthe failures he describes arebased upon hisown workshop experience. At thebeginning of theseventeenth century, theepistemicvalue of failure becamerecognizedinthe worldofscholarship, from themathematicalsciencesto naturalhistory.The dissatisfactionwiththe waysofwriting down knowledge hiding theimperfectionofthe processofknowledgeproduction, in conjunction with abeliefinthe open-endedness of processesofknowledge-making, became widely shared.JohannesKepler’spoetics of science,35 forinstance, is in fact apoeticsoffailure.Inseveral of hisbooksinthe broaderfield of mathematics, Kepler presentedhis knowledgeasanarrativeofthe historical developmentofhis own pathsofinquiry.One exampleishis presentationinthe “Paralipomena” of hisin- vestigationofthe measureofrefraction(or what came to be knownasSnell’s law) takenfromhis Optics. Kepler’s narrativeofhis research into refraction consists of threeapproacheswhich he triedout and, in theend,all failed to differentdegrees. Kepler startedwiththe data whichhehad received from themeasurementsofat- mosphericrefractionbyTycho Braheand ChristophRothmannand thetablesof refractionwhich he gathered from medieval optics.Thisapproachfailed, he tells

33 Palissy, 1957. 34 Hagendijk2018. 35 Hallyn 1990.

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hisreader, andcharacterizinghis firststrategyofdiscoveryofthe measure of re- fractionas“an almostblind plan of enquiry,”heswitched gear andmoved on to asecondmethod.His second path of investigationwas fuelledbyanalogies be- tweenrefractionand reflection,which howeverproductive, also failed in deliver- ingthe measureofrefractionthatKeplerhad hopedfor.Hemoved on to his thirdpathofinvestigation in whichhethought throughhis considerations of the causes of refraction. This thirdway allowedKeplertodiscover aconstantrelation between angles of incidenceand angles of refraction,which only held forangles smallerthanthirtydegrees,and thus also fell shortofhis objectiveofthe discovery of themeasure of refraction. In sum, Kepler’s historical accountofhis pathsofinvestigation,characterizing them as failures,was astrategytocopewiththe imperfectionsofknowledge- making,opening it up forcorrectionand improvement. Keplerrecognizedthe significance of learning from failure. Onecould arguethatitwas thevalue of fail- urewhich thelikes of Kepler,developingnew ways of knowinginthe sciences at thebeginning of theseventeenth century, adoptedfromthe worldofartisans.Itis telling that recentworkonmedical ethics—on howtodealwitherrorsinmedical practice—explicitly harksbacktothe work of Albrecht Dürerasasource of inspi- ration andamodelofthe recognitionofthe imperfectionsofknowledgeand the idealofopenness.36 It thus seemsthatartisanalknowledge remains asourcefor therecognition of theepistemic value of failuretothisday,inthe same waythat it wasaroundthe year 1600. As such,ahistoryofknowledge, eveninthe early modern period,gives significancetocurrent concerns in scienceand societyabout thevalue of variouswaysofknowing.

Late-ModernCartographies of Knowledge Whilehistory of knowledgesheds newlight on early-modernknowledge-making, andits pertinence forcurrent practices,its approach is no less fruitful forlater pe- riods. Some recent historiography (advertently or not) sustains that view.What sets theperiodfromthe nineteenth centuryonward apartfromearlier eras is that thecartography of knowledgewas more firmly institutionalizedinsystems of dis- ciplines andprofessions.But this does notmeanthatsucharrangementswere fixed—infacttheykeptchanging, andwerenever all-inclusive, uncontested, or withouttension.Epistemichierarchies became more entrenched yetcontinued to shift. Perhapsthisismosteasilyvisible in theouter boundaries of science, which were once seen as setortaken forgranted.37 Butclaimsofwhat is andwhatisnot sciencehavealwaysbeensubject to debate.ThomasGieryn hascalledthiscon- testation“boundary work”and hisown case studiesare vintagehistory of knowledge.38 Onething they show is how ambiguousscientificbordercontrol couldbe.

36 GadebuschBondio2012, on 295–296. 37 Forexample,universalizinghistories of science, such as Sarton’s or Needham’s, hadtofix what was andwhatwas notscience. Their“many rivers,one sea” pictureofcontributionstothe global stock of knowledge hinged on sharpdelineationsofwhatcould countassuchacontribution. 38 Gieryn1999.

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In hisdefence of professional science, forexample,JohnTyndall stressed itsem- pirical characteragainst theologyand itstheoretical nature versus themechanical arts.39 Tyndall’sflip-floppingsuggeststhatdemarcatingwas less aboutdefining sciencethanabout identifyingits ‘Others’.Other work reveals howpermeable the outerboundarycould be (see forexample arecentset of studiesonthe surprising- ly manifold relationsofthe sciences to thehumanities).40 Nordid only binary juxtapositions exist. Mid-twentiethcentury philosophers of science, forinstance, claimeditwas their task to distinguishscience from non-science, creating atriangle of disciplinaryrelations.History of knowledgeinvites us to askwhatwas at stake in such rearrangements,and whytheyhappenedwhentheydid. Recently, MichaelGordinhas enriched thestudy of boundaryworkbyanaly- sing andhistoricizing thephenomenonof“pseudoscience”.41 Always acontested category (nopseudoscientist everidentifiedassuch),its meaninghas oftenclosely followedscience’s self-understanding.AsGordin’scaseofImmanuelVelikovsky’s controversialcosmographyshows,inits attempts at recognitionsuchwould-be sciencetends to take on thetrappings of therealthing:falsifiability, peer review, naturalistic explanations, whatever counts at themoment. Butprecisely because of this imitation, pseudosciencecan never be presumed identifiable on thebasis of itsown distinguishing characteristics.42 Pseudoscienceisnot an alternativeto regularscience,itisits shadow,following it,resemblingit, andnever disappear- ing. Boundary-drawingofscience versusother categories of knowledgeisnot only aboutprofessionalrelationships,itcan also have geopolitical implications.Inan eye-openingstudy,Marwa Elshakry investigated wherethe notion of scienceas Westernhas come from.43 NotmerelyfromCold WarAnglo-Saxonhistorians, sheargues, buttoalargeextent also from scholars “not of theWest.”Innine- teenth-century Egyptand China, sheshows,bitsofknowledgeand news of discovery from Europe werereadily absorbed into local traditions of scholarship withoutmuchdistinction.The Chineseterm gezhixue included both,asdid the Arabic ‘ilm. Only with rising reservations aboutthe blessingsofthe European im- ports, andSpenglerian notionsofadeclineofthe West,did ajuxtaposition of “traditional”to“modern,” andof“Arab”and “Chinese” to “Western,” science emerge,this“Westernscience”being considered at thesametimelocal in origin anduniversal in aspiration. Elshakry adds to heranalysisthatshe couldnot have made it within theconfinesofanunproblematized historyofscience preciselybe- causethe definition of itsobjectitselfisatstake.But ahistory of knowledgeper-

39 Gieryn1999, on 37–64. 40 Krämer2018. 41 Gordin 2012. 42 Steven Shapin hassuggested onepotential identifier:tryingtoo hard.“Beware of hyperscience.It canbeasign that somethingisn’t kosher.Aruleofthumb forsound inferencehas always been that if it lookslikeaduck,swimslikeaduck andquackslikeaduck,thenitprobablyisaduck.But there’sacorollary:ifitstrutsaroundthe barnyard loudly protesting that it’s aduck, that it possesses thevery essenceofduckness,that it’smoreauthentically aduckthan allthose otherorange-billed, web-footed,swimming fowl,thenyou’vegot aright to be suspicious:thisduckmay be aquack.” SeeShapin2012, on 38. 43 Elshakry 2010.

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spective allows hertoask thekinds of questionswhere “science”isbut oneofsev- eral categoriesofvarying meaningand translatability. Ahistory of knowledgedoesnot need to limititselftothe delineationof“science,” however. Maps of knowledge have many borders, provinces, andregions, in andout of science, andchangingovertime. Specialization hasnaturally in- creasedthe number of fiefdoms,but mergershavealsooccurred, such as solid- statephysics (combiningexistingbranchesinaninterdisciplinaryway)and evolu- tionarybiology(addinganumbrella).Moreover, some fields of knowledgehave dwindled or disappearedaltogether(thinkofphrenologyorcolloid chemistry), some have become“servicedisciplines”(statistics,nursing), andstill otherbranch- es areofanotfully scientific status (physiotherapy,car mechanics).There is noth- ingfixed aboutthese cartographical hierarchies(nurses used to aspire to thestatus of doctores medicinae,but simply lostthisbattle),atleast forthe time being. His- toricizing thedynamicsofsuchinterdisciplinaryrelations is preciselywhatahisto- ry of knowledgecan do. Such aproject canveryfruitfully borrowfromthe sociologyofprofessions,par- ticularlyapproachesdeveloped sincethe 1980s by AndrewAbbottand subsequent scholars.44 Abbott sees professionsinpermanent competitionfor what he calls “jurisdiction”overcertain tasks, that is,the righttoperform them.Onlysurgeons canlegally performoperations, forinstance, yetophthalmologists have come to sharetheir monopoly on eyemeasurement with opticians. In Abbott’s frame, bat- tles over jurisdiction arefoughtout in differentarenas(public media, thecourt- room,the work floor), they employ differentstrategies(such as reducing weather forecasting to physics),and they lead to varioussettlementoptions.Abbott’sturf wars arenot all-or-nothing.Theycan alsoleadtocooperation,divisionofterrito- ry,subordination,ordiarchy.Thisrichnessmakes hisapproachextremely fruitful forhistoriansofknowledge,particularlythose workingonthe system of disci- plines that governsmodernmapsofknowledge. Anotherangle on epistemichierarchies andtheir changinginstitutionalization involves looking at bricks andmortar. Alreadyinthe 1980s Sophie Forgan point- ed outwhatthe architecture of learnedsocieties canrevealabout theirexternalre- lations. In Victorian Britain, aneoclassicaldesignwas oftenchosentoconferau- thorityand permanence,while aTudor style invokedopennesstoworking class participation.45 In contemporaneousDutch contexts, neo-Renaissancewas the style of thelearned liberalelites, whereasneogothic signalledattemptstorecon- nect sciencewiththe (newly emancipated)Catholictraditionsofknowledge.46 Butthe system of disciplinesperhaps findsits most direct mappinginthe lay-out of university campuses. Lorraine Daston hasrecentlysuggestedtotakethe cen- tralityof, say, theInstitute of Philologyseriously,ortoconsiderthe relative dis- tancebetweenbuildings forhistory andnatural history. 47 Severalscholars in Ger- many andthe Netherlandsare nowlooking into campusesasmapsofknowledge setinstone creating atopographical historyofknowledge.48

44 Abbott 1988. 45 Sophie Forgan haswritten an entire oeuvre on thesubject.The piececited here is Forgan 1986. 46 Weerdenburg1994. 47 Daston 2017,on146 –147. 48 ForthcomingworkbyFabian Krämer, Ab Flipse andAbelStreefland.

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Finally,history of knowledgedoesnot need to be confined to epistemiccartog- raphy. It can equally fruitfully askwhatconstitutes knowledgeinthe firstplace andhistoricize that question.Inarecent book Alex Csiszardoesexactly that,seek- inganswers,fascinatingly,inthe historyofscientificpublishing.49 Todaythe stan- dard form of alegitimateclaim to knowledgeisthe scientific research article. Dis- coveries mayalsobecommunicatedbyemail, pressrelease,orPowerPointpresen- tation,but none of thesesettles both claimand author as firmly as ajournal publication.Yet this wasn’t always so.Beforethe 1830s,itwas academy proceedings andbook-length treatisesthatcarried this weight,while journalswerepartofthe loudand unruly worldofthe popularpress.Whenthisformatpreference changed, so didthe locationofepistemic authority, as well as conceptionsofau- thorship andscientificproductivity. Allcametogetherinthe changing definitions of thebasic building blocks of knowledge. Hence, Csiszar’sworkcan very wellbe read as ahistory of knowledge, andatimely oneatthat. As theauthoriswell aware, questionsofformat, control, andauthority arehighlytopical againnow that subscription journalsare losingcontrol andscientificnewsand data arein- creasingly shared acrossnew platforms. Such fluidity of epistemiccategoriescalls forahistory of knowledge.

Conclusion Historyofknowledge does notjustexpandthe boundariesofhistory of science, it investigatesthose very boundaries, between scienceand otherforms of knowledge,and between differentforms of scienceand differentforms of otherknowl- edge,inall possible combinations.Moreover,itasksquestions about basic episte- miccategories, theirinterrelationsand mutual constitution,again both within andoutside of science. What is acontributiontoknowledge? What is afailedat- temptatsuch? How is such failureevaluated?How does knowledgerelatetoig- norance? Historyofknowledge historicizes such questionsand asks whyparticu- laranswersweregiven at particular times. At thesametime, historyofknowledge responds to currentconcerns, just as historyofscience hasdonethroughoutthe twentiethcentury.Intoday’sclimate of fluidcognitiveauthority,contestedexper- tise,and changingforms of knowledgeproductionand communication, history of knowledgecan provideadeeper understanding. It is thefield forthe twenty- firstcentury.Itishistory that matterstothe future of knowledgesocieties.

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