atively less significant stages in the process of 's absorption of the Hetmanate. The latter was not the entire but the lands of the Left Bank Ukraine (including Kiev), east of the Dnieper River, that remained a separate political entity under the protection and suzerainty of the Tsar of Muscovy. In the north of the Hetmanate there was Starodub, in the east, Hadiach, further to the south, Poltava, and in the west, Kiev. It did not include the lands of the of Ukraine in the southeast or the further to the south. The Hetmanate was in its origins the historical result of Hetgan Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's 1648 re- volt, the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, the succeeding wars, and the 1686 Eternal Peace which codified the division of the Ukraine between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy. The canvas of this work is one of shadow and contrast. The historical relationship of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with the Ukraine remained influential long after Khmel'nyts'kyi's revolt and the tsar's guar- antee of autonomy to the Hetmanate. The leadership of the Hetmanate- whether gentry, cossacks, clergy, or burghers-steadfastly resisted giving up the former privileges it claimed to have had in the Commonwealth to Russian hegemony, and Muscovy-Russia, at the same time, refused to ac- commodate it within its own socio-economic and legal System. While it might be expected that of the Hetmanate who claimed the sta- tus of Szlachta (nobility) or those burghers who claimed the protection of Magdeburg Law under the Commonwealth would not have wanted to re- linquish those privileges, it is more surprising that a century elapsed be- fore Russian institutional mechanisms were found to integrate a defeated people and a prosperous land into the empire. This process begins really just after Catherine II comes to the throne; yet another score of years passes before the final steps were taken. The latter appears to depend greatly on Catherine II's reaction to the Pugachev revolt, her Provincial Reform of 1775, and her Charters to the Nobility and to the Towns in 1785. In the entire process, ambitious Ukrainian elites willingly cooper- ated with Catherine II in the absorption of the autonomous Hetmanate into the . Established scholars and industrious graduate students will also be grateful to Dr. Kohut for identifying several areas and subjects in need of further investigation.

Herbert Kaplan Indiana University

Rudolf A. Mark. "Symon Petljura und die UNR. Vom Sturz des Skoropadækyj bis zum Exil in Polen," and Ernst Lüdemann. "Zur 'Lösung der Nationalen Frage' in der sowjetukrainischen Geschichts- schreibung nach 1956," Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte. Bd. 40. Berlin/Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988. 406 pp. DM 132 (paper).

Rudolf A. Mark's study of and the Ukrainian National Republic is primarily a detailed analysis of the diplomacy of the Ukrainian national revolution from the fall of 1918 until the fall of 1920. As such, it is a useful complement to such standard works as John S. Reshetar's The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920 and The Ukraine 1917-1921, edited by Taras Hunczak, which in spite of their titles treat the period investigated so attentively in Mark's monograph cursorily, almoat as an epilogue. As Mark understands the Ukrainian revolution, it started as a popular movement for social and national emancipation in the spring of 1917, but about a year later it entered a second phase, best characterized as a revo- lution from above. This second phase emerged fully formed after the over- throw of Pavlo Skoropads'kyi's regime in . The man who directed the revolution from above, Symon Petliura, was little in- terested in socio-economic transformations, as Volodymyr Vynnychenko, for example, had been; instead Petliura set his sights on - hood and placed his hopes on military and diplomatic methods. Unfortunately, Petliura was not much of a general and the diplomatic choices open to him were very poor pickings. Perhaps his greatest achievement, as cogently argued by Mark, was his alliance with Poland from late 1919 through 1920; although he had to renounce claims to the Ukrainian Piedmont of , he extended the life of his army-republic for close to a year. The Petliura who emerges from this monograph is a rather pathetic figure, devoid of military skill and political ideas, full of rhetoric, but also filled with an optimisrn so grand as to be charismatic. Mark's study is very thorough and often plodding, but there are also fine moments of characterization and analytical reflection (e.g., the sketch of Petliura's character, p. 53; the summative analysis of the Polish al- liance, pp. 163-65; the conclusions, pp. 204-09). The source base of the monograph is adequate. The only unpublished sources consulted were doc- uments from the Pilsudski Institute in New York, but many of these doc- uments have in fact been published within the last few years by Taras Hunczak. The bibliography is extensive, but stops short of being compre- hensive; it should have included, for example, Kovalevs'kyi's memoirs, studies by Frenkin, Mace and Szajkowski, revised editions of Borys and Palij. The focus on diplomacy probably excuses Mark for not consulting contemporary newspapers from Ukraine, a rich and largely untapped source for the revolutionary period. The monograph contains a useful, but very abbreviated chronological table. In sum, the value of Mark's work lies not in the presentation of new factual information or in conceptual or methodological innovation, but in solid, traditional historical analysis of a complex episode in East European history. The work will be required reading for all future students of the Ukrainian revolution as well as of ths eastern aspects of Polish diplomatic history in the period 1919-20. Lüdemann's study examines the ideology of the national question in light of Soviet Ukrainian historiography, primarily with reference to the period 1956-72. The focus is on theories and constructs rather than facts and descriptions. The presentation is at times ponderous and at times schematic. The work may hold more interest for political scientists than