Policy Narratives, Ecological Restoration, and the Government of the Rhône River ()

Joana GUERRIN and Sylvain BARONE IRSTEA (National Research Institute of Science and Technology for Environment and Agriculture) – UMR G-EAU (France) [email protected] Keywords: river management; environmental policy; interpretative analysis; policy narratives; Rhône; France

1. Introduction

The Rhône is a major river in the South-East of France, used for hydroelectricity production, navigation and agricultural irrigation, and well-known for its high environmental interest. It was long managed by a highly singular collusion between State elites and industrial actors, far from any kind of environmental concern (Pritchard 2011). Talking about environmental concerns at a time when the centralist-modernist referential was dominating policy-making in almost every policy sector (Jobert and Muller 1987, Scott 1998) is even totally anachronistic. The situation has changed over the last two decades. In 2007, in order to address past flood events and potential water-related issues linked to climate change, several actors signed a contract defining objectives and financial means to achieve a “sustainable river management” at the level of a new institutional territory: the river. This “Plan Rhône” has gathered actors with potentially conflicting rationalities and interests (the State administration, local powers, river managers) in order to allow coordination between different types of river uses and risks such as floods, energy production, irrigation, transportation, etc. But certain Plan Rhône objectives could not be reached, for example regarding floodplain restoration. The situation was explained by paradigmatic divergences (Hall 1993) about the construction of floods as a public problem as well as divergences about the relevant scale to address this problem (Guerrin 2014) This episode shows that the Rhône management is still fragmented between policy sectors, and that policy actors are more and more numerous and heterogeneous. How to govern a big river when so many heterogeneous actors are involved at different scales? Besides, in this context, what can be the place of environmental issues in the river management? If the centralist-modernist referential was clearly not favorable to environmental preservation, how can the current situation be analyzed? Focusing on the interpretative dimension of policy- making, this paper deals with how actors involved in the Rhône management interact and give meaning to public policy. We shall admit that our first hypothesis was based on the idea according to which conflicts between sectors, between organizations, and between territories were predominant on the Rhône River. Our empirical research shows that conflict is indeed not absent. But what puzzled us the most was the Rhône actors’ ability to build agreements on a certain number of topics. Ecological restoration is one of them, which is quite surprising given the role of powerful industrial actors in the Rhone governance. Based on a first analysis of the empirical data we collected, this paper aims at understanding this paradox. We expect this will give a new insight into the distribution of power and the governing of a big river like the Rhône.

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2. Analyzing Policy Narratives and Unexpected Agreements around the Rhône River

Interpretive approaches provide valuable conceptual tools with which analyzing how the Rhône River is governed. Amongst them, the concept of policy narrative seems particularly helpful. Policy narratives have been defined as "stories (scenarios and arguments) which underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for policymaking in situations that persist with many unknowns, a high degree of interdependence, and little, if any, agreement" (Roe 1994, p.34). Often taking the guise of causal stories (Stone 1989), narratives organize the world by creating order within disorder (Hajer and Laws 2006, Zittoun 2013). They condense a vast quantity of factual information and connect them to normative conceptions which lend them meaning. As such, the meaning of a public policy owes as much to the actors’ preexisting beliefs as to their interpretation of given events. In other words, beliefs evolve depending on the dilemma which policy actors come across (Bevir 2013) At the same time, narratives need to draw upon mobilization in order to counter other possible causal stories. In this perspective, what we hold as truths are first stories which have been progressively presented as plausible by "influential interpreters" (Fischer 2003, p.43). Once it has become dominant, a narrative gives power to certain actors. It redirects collective preferences. Ideas which will stray from the dominant narrative will be perceived as irrelevant or strange. In this approach, public policy is a space where competition takes place for the discursive hegemony and through which actors seek out support in their own definition of reality (Edelman 1964). Nonetheless, we share the idea that a narrative analysis only takes meaning if the narrative dimension of public policy is connected to the actors’ strategies and to power asymmetries (Radaelli 2000, Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, Feindt and Oels 2005). Narratives are all the more effective if they lend themselves to multiple interpretations (Hajer 2011). This echoes a paradox which has long been known by sociologists, that of the "power of haziness" (Boltanski 1982). The intrinsic vagueness of a narrative enables it to unite beliefs and interests which were in principle incompatible. In public policy, this haziness sometimes gives way to unexpected compromises and “ambiguous consensus” (Palier 2005). Thanks to their polysemy, some narratives are able to gather a plurality of expectations. Ambiguity allows actors with conflicting interests to join the process. But compromises and consensus also arise from translation processes, through which new agreements are built by specific actors’ networks. In that perspective, it seems that translation sociology (Callon 1986) brings interesting conceptual tools able to stimulate interpretative policy analysis (Zittoun 2013). Indeed, translation sociology is very much interested in the link between, on the one hand, interpretations, cognitive activities and categories, and, on the other hand, heterogeneous actors’ networks and strategies. We refer here to the concept of “translation” as the processes of construction of new meanings and to the actors’ networks that enable the production of agreements on these meanings (Lascoumes 2006). These processes start with a reinterpretation of the situation - “problematization” in the translation sociology language. Negotiations and alliances become then possible with “interested” partners, which identities have been stabilized. At last, new roles are assigned to actors (“enrolment” process) who can “mobilize” and commit themselves to concrete action, e. g. public policy. To conclude, we distance ourselves from the notion that narratives would be easily manipulated by policy actors. To begin with, policy narratives are embedded in wider structures of meaning and institutional frameworks, which encourage their expression. As it happens, narratives about the Rhône River management are developed in a context of national and international domination of the "integrated water resources management" (IWRM)

2 paradigm, which calls for a significant number of norms in this field. European directives such as the Water Framework-Directive (2000) give more resources to those who wish to improve environmental protection. Consequently, narratives should be examined, amongst other things, in light of the relative conformity with these dominant norms. Besides, we assume that analyzing the relationships between narratives and institutionalization (Hajer 1995, Radaelli 2000, Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, Hajer 2011) can be of great interest. This institutionalization can take various forms, such as organizational arrangements, official plans, budget priorities or territorial divisions.

3. Case Study: Mapping the Rhône, Mapping the Actors

The Rhône is a major European river that originates in Switzerland, running through South of France until the (Map 1). On its French course, the Rhône was considerably modified throughout history at a national scale. After major floods in 1856, the Ponts & Chaussées State engineers undertook the construction of large dikes along the delta on the plans of Emperor Napoleon III, supposed to resist to extreme flood events (Picon et al. 2006). More recently, after World War II, the government undertook an extensive river taming project with the aim of promoting river transport and generating hydraulic power (Pritchard 2004). The public National Rhône Company CNR (Compagnie Nationale du Rhône), partly privatized in 2001, was dedicated to the development of the Rhône River. It received specific missions of public interest: developing navigation, hydroelectric power, and irrigation systems in the Rhône River basin (Giandou 1999). CNR undertook major works on the river that it partly channeled through the construction of several dams and levees. Later nuclear power plants were built on the banks of the newly channeled river. These works deeply changed the river landscape, and influenced its hydraulic regime (Pritchard 2011).

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Map 1: The Rhône River NB: this map highlights the course of the Rhône River, and underlines the Regions that are involved within the Plan Rhône contract.

In addition to CNR, other organizational actors are part of Rhône governance (Table 1):  Water Agencies are French public organizations which were established under the 1964 water law to govern six major watersheds. They collect royalties paid by water users, which are redistributed in the form of financial support to local authorities or private stakeholders. They are key-actors in the implementation of the European Water Framework Directive, which purpose is to establish a framework for the protection of water resources and to ensure that all aquatic ecosystems meet “good status”. The Rhône-Mediterranean and Corsica (RMC) Agency mainly covers six regions (Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Languedoc- Roussillon, Rhône-Alpes, Corse, Franche-Comté and part of Bourgogne) and plays an important role as far as water and environmental issues are concerned.

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 The State influence is important on the Rhône River, in particular through the DREAL (Regional Direction for Environment, Agriculture and Housing). These entities are the result of the devolution process of the Ministry of the Environment at the Regional level. Some of them are labeled “water basin DREAL”, and play a coordinating role over the implementation of water policy between State entities at the water basin level, but also in relation to private actors, local powers and citizens. The Rhône Water Basin DREAL is based in (Rhône- Alpes Region, upstream of Rhône).  The DREAL (a technical administration) is working in close relation to the Prefect, the general State representative at the Regional level. Some Prefects are also called “Water Basin Prefect”, which is the case of the Prefect based in Lyon. Its role is again to coordinate the implementation of, among others, water policy at the water basin level.  Another State service active on the Rhône is the Voies navigables de France (VNF, Navigable Waterways of France). This navigation authority is responsible for the management of State-owned inland waterways network, and the associated facilities. It is a public body, under the control of the Ministry of the Environment.  Whereas the Rhône River Hydropower is mainly developed by CNR, its direct concurrent EDF (Electricité de France) is owning and managing a hydropower plant downstream Lyon. It is also managing the nuclear power plants located on the Rhône. It is the first electricity provider company in France and one of the biggest in the world.  Local powers are numerous in France, and therefore on the Rhône. Keys players in the Rhône governance are the Regions. Three main Regions are directly concerned with the Rhône River: Rhône-Alpes, Provence-Alpes Cote d’Azur, and Languedoc-Roussillon. Two other Regions are concerned by the main of the Rhône, namely the Saone River: Franche-Comté and Bourgogne. Those five Regions are involved within the Plan Rhône governance.  Other local powers are indirectly participating to Rhône governance, such as Cities, federations of municipalities, and Departments. They are the potential beneficiaries of Plan Rhône financing through projects development. They are also involved, but more punctually, within Plan Rhône strategy.

Main organizational actors Main issues/interests regarding the Rhône

CNR (Compagnie Nationale du Rhône) Energy; transport; irrigation State representatives (Water Basin prefect Floods; energy; environment and DREAL) Water Agency (Agence de l’eau) Environment EDF (Electricité de France) Energy VNF (Voies navigable de France) Transport Regional Councils Floods; tourism Table 1: Main organizational actors and issues on the Rhône River

Since the 1990s, several dramatic floods have occurred on the Rhône: in 1993, 1994, 2002, and 2003. This troubled period urged the State to take measures. In 2004, the Prime Minister asked the Prefect to design a new flood management strategy for the Rhône River. The Prefect and the elected presidents of the Regional Councils drew up a contract called ‘‘Plan Rhône”. This contract, which concerns the period 2007–2013, financially linked the French State, the European Union, CNR, and the main Cities as well as the Regions bordering the Rhône in order to create a concerted and integrated river management program at the scale of the river. It aimed at gathering around the same table all the actors, conflicting interests, and

5 policy sectors. The Plan Rhône was addressing several themes such as flood management; tourism; water quality; energy production; transport; culture. The action of the Plan Rhône regarding flood management was analyzed through an in-depth doctoral study (Guerrin 2014) that focused more particularly on a floodplain restoration program. This previous work analyzed the reasons why Plan Rhône failed to address its floodplain restoration objectives (Guerrin 2015, Guerrin, Bouleau, and Grelot 2014). Going beyond this initial focus on flood management, this paper intends to carry an analysis of the narrative dimension of public policy and of unexpected agreements produced by different kind of actors (State representatives, CNR representatives, local authorities, etc.) about the Rhône River. To do so, we collected empirical data from several sources. We conducted 20 additional semi-structured interviews between 2014 and 2015 with the main actors mentioned above. We also reviewed the gray literature (experts’ reports, official schemes, budgetary documents, etc.) and attended thematic seminars and colloquiums. We then started conducting a qualitative analysis of this empirical material. This work is still in progress, but preliminary results can be highlighted and discussed.

4. Results

Our preliminary results show that whereas the Rhône is still a river very much governed by the State, its governance is rather multifaceted (4.1). Several actors have power onto the river governance, with diverging interests and strategies. Within this context, a quite surprising agreement was built around the ecological restoration of the river (4.2), mainly promoted by the Water Agency (4.3). 4.1. Who Governs the Rhône?

4.1.1. The Rhône Development as a Symbol of National Identity “The Rhône at the service of the Nation”: his sentence, written on the wall of the Seyssel major dam built in 1951 by CNR, illustrates the role of the Rhône River as a symbol of national identity. After the Second World War, the Rhône River was used by the French Nation to reconstruct its identity and legitimacy. In her thesis, Sara Pritchard (2011) showed how the State, through the construction of hydropower plants, produced a new river, taming a “furious bull” within a “canal” (Pritchard 2011, p. 59 & 70). The “Rhône Formula”, as CNR called it, consisted in fostering energy generation, navigation, and agriculture simultaneously through what was called the “diversion approach” (Map 2). Between 1936 and 1986, CNR1 constructed 19 dams and 19 hydropower plants, out of which 13 were designed through the following approach: the main water flow is rerouted through the construction of a dam and an artificial and separate “diversion canal” and turbined through an hydroelectric plant. Then, the canal rejoins the river (called the “former Rhône” before being diverted again downstream) – see Illustration 1.

1 At the time, CNR was a public company, created to manage the development of hydropower on the Rhône. 6

19 dams 14 locks 19 hydropower plants Artificial canal

Map 2: The “Rhône Formula”: map representing Illustration 1: CNR hydroelectric plants the type of hydroelectric plants located on the located on the Rhône Source : CNR, from middle and low Rhône (13). Source : CNR, from Bravard J.P, Clémens A., « Le Rhône en 100 Bravard J.P, Clémens A., « Le Rhône en 100 questions », ZABR. questions », ZABR.

But above all, through the production of discourses over the development of hydropower on the Rhône, the State produced a symbol of its national identity and legitimacy. State representatives and engineers, but also local powers, associated to construct a discourse built on references to the power of the Nation (CNR was, at the moment, public-owned) to tame a furious river, thanks to a massive technological investment. Sara Pritchard showed how the State constructed a discourse linking its legitimacy to the idea that technology could master nature on the Rhône (Pritchard 2004). Soon after, the development of nuclear plants along the Rhône River by the State achieved to build a national identity over the energy production on the Rhône (Hecht 1998). At the time, energy production was the major policy sector to be developed on the river, but CNR was also in charge of improving waterway transport conditions and of providing water for irrigation to farmers. The income generated by hydropower was supposed to cover the navigation and irrigation investment costs, and this three-mission system was thought to conciliate national interest of favoring energy self-sufficiency with local interests of economic and agricultural development (Bethemont 1997). Between 1936 and 2003, the management of the Rhône was mainly centralized by one public actor, CNR, used to negotiate and deal with local powers along the river. The composition of its capital, until 2003, reflected this centralization: 25% was owned by the City of Paris; 25% was owned by local

7 authorities; 25% was owned by the public society of railway (PLM then SNCF) and the last 25% by the (at the time) public-owned electricity provider EDF. However, this situation of monopoly was challenged in 2003. In accordance with European Union competition rules, CNR opened its shares to private sector. The international group GDF-Suez acquired 49.97% of its shares, while the 50.03% remained in the hands of public organizations (33%) and local powers (16%)2. CNR, that was formerly obliged to sell its energy to EDF through a fixed-price, obtained its independence, and was confirmed as an independent energy provider. This evolution challenged the company, which developed a new service to sell energy on the European market, following the daily economic fluctuations. This evolution was translated into organizational change, opening the company to new workers from the sector of international economy and trade. Moreover, the entrance of private interests into CNR capital was associated to a new mission given by the State to CNR. In 2003, CNR obtained a fourth compulsory type of missions to deliver on the Rhône: the “Missions d’Intérêt Général3” (General Interest Missions - MIG). This evolution is due to the willingness of the Rhône deputies to secure an obligation for CNR to reverse a part of its economic benefit to local territories. As such, since 2003, CNR is obliged to use 10% of its net income to develop activities that sustain local economic development and environmental protection. This evolution has favored changes of the company towards « green » activities and careers. A large part of the MIG budget was dedicated to the environmental restoration of the “former Rhône”, parts of the river that were diverted and slowly blocked by sediment and low water flows (see Section 4.2).

4.1.2. A Multifaceted Governance The year 2003 was rich in changes for the Rhône. Massive and destructive floods were the starting point of a new policy instrument that aimed at gathering several types of actors along the Rhône: Plan Rhône. If the first Plan Rhône contract (2005-2013) was created to answer the flood issue, this scheme was aimed at creating a new institutional territory to target local economic development through a cross-sectors policy action (Guerrin 2014). The policy sectors and the actors mainly involved in Plan Rhône appear in the following table:

2 From then on, 33.20% of the capital has been owned by the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignation (Deposits and Consignments Fund, a public financial organization part of the government institutions under the control of the Parliament) and 16.83% owned by local and regional authorities 3 Décret n° 2003-512 du 16 juin 2003 approuvant les nouveaux statuts de la Compagnie nationale du Rhône et modifiant le décret n° 59-771 du 26 juin 1959 relatif à l'organisation et au fonctionnement de la Compagnie nationale du Rhône, Article 48. 8

Budget Theme Pilot Objective (million €) Flood Ministry of the Improve flood management, reduce 233.9 environment at the vulnerability to floods, develop risk (35% by Regions, Management regional level (DREAL) culture 48% by the State) Reconstruct the Rhône as a common 12 Rhône-Alpes Region Culture heritage (50% by Regions) 83 Water Rhône-Méditerranée- Improve water quality and protect the (54% by the Water Corse Water Agency resource Quality Agency) Reconciling the development of energy Agency for the production and respect for the 76 Energy Environment and Energy environment, exploiting the wind Control (ADEME) potential, reduce vulnerability to floods (98% by CNR) of energy networks Voies Navigables de Manage the exponential demand for 159 Transport France (French inland travel in the Rhone , encourage (43% by Regions, waterways) modal shift to the waterway 36% by the State) Improve the living environment of Ministry of the Economy inhabitants and enhance territories by 78.5 at the Regional level Tourism tourism, develop structuring activities (DIRECTE) (62% by CNR) along the river Table 2: Governance of Plan Rhône 2007-2013 This table shows that, beyond the aim of organizing a “cross-sectors” organization, Plan Rhône governance appears to convey separations between policy sectors. Nearly each theme is led by a public institution, which has legitimacy over its sector. If Plan Rhône leaders had the objective to associate all actors along the Rhône to build a new governance scheme, actually this contract was dominated by the State and its organizations (Guerrin 2014). This is illustrated by the declarations of these State representatives: “One of the biggest challenges was to involve eight partners: the State, a provider of technical culture, the basin committee - water parliament across the basin of the Rhone - the five Regions, each having specific interests and CNR, State concessionaire and industrial player that pays special attention to the territories. The State had a real unifying role to mobilize around common goals4.” “The Rhône has the particularity of being quite complex since it is administratively in several regions and departments. What does it mean? It means that in administrative terms, the Rhone River basin is carried by the Prefect of the Rhône-Alpes Region, called the prefect basin coordinator. And the Basin Coordinator Prefect has legitimacy, by law, to deal with all the problems of the basin and especially the Rhone River and relies for that, in terms of services, on the DREAL Rhône-Alpes5”. At the end of the first Plan Rhône contract, the Regions (Regional Councils) claimed their intension to be associated more inclusively into the partnership. They denounced the lack of power they had within the strategic decision, and created a specific position to allow interregional coordination to be able to face the “State hegemony” within Plan Rhône:

4 Interview of the Water Basin Prefect, published within the Water Agency journal, “Sauvons l’eau!”, July 2014, p.12. 5 Interview with a State official at the Regional level, Provence-Alpes Cote d’Azur (March 2015) 9

“After the 2007-2013 contract, the Regions realized they did not have enough space, they were not heard enough by the State, and they needed to build a common position to gain influence over the partners and the State. We had to think interregional governance in the privacy of the 5 regions […]. Decisions within Plan Rhône are on the will of the pilot, the State. There is no clear and formal vote; the minutes of meetings are drafted by the State, which is problematic. […] The State has a hegemonic position, a top-down culture. For meetings, they impose us their dates6.” The Rhône governance changed through time and sectors. Even if the Plan Rhône contract had the aim of going beyond the traditional policy sectors and the fragmented territorial organization, this policy tools convey and reproduce those separations. The energy sector is still dominated by CNR, the environmental protection is led by the State and Water Agency along with the financial participation of CNR (through its compulsory General Interest Missions), and tourism and culture are under the responsibility of the Regional authorities. Beyond time and policy sectors, the Rhône governance is changing through spaces. In specific areas, local powers organized within joint associations and realized projects financed by Plan Rhône partners. In others, there is little coordination between local powers, and the State keeps de facto a leading position. So, is the Rhône still the “State River” analyzed by Pritchard? The answer to that question remains largely positive. The State is more fragmented than before, although the State-CNR system has been progressively replaced since the 1990s by a more subtle balance between State services and representatives, public institutions like Water Agency or VNF (not completely the State but not completely something else), CNR which has been partly privatized, and Regional authorities which have difficulties to play a role in the Rhône governance. We presented a brief panorama of the Rhône governance. Now, how is this panorama affected by the emergence of a narrative on ecological restoration of the river? 4.2. The Ecological Restoration of the Rhône: Anatomy of a Policy Narrative Ecological restoration has been quite simply defined as “the process of repairing the damages caused by humans to the diversity and dynamics of indigenous ecosystems” (Jackson, Lopoukhine, and Hillyard 1995). The Society for Ecological Restoration has defined it as “the process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged, or destroyed”7. These definitions are mentioned to give some clues to non-specialists. We do not need, here, to discuss what is (and what is not) ecological restoration. What interested us regards how was built a policy narrative underlining the necessity to undertake the ecological restoration of the Rhône and how emerged – quite surprisingly – an agreement around the idea of restoration. To understand that, we will begin with analyzing the words, causal links, and symbols that are mobilized in the narrative’s building. This narrative is based on a largely shared interpretation according to which the Rhône is “a living, a dynamic river”8, which used to be “an extremely turbulent, non-navigable river”, but which has been “completely modified […], and this domestication led to major floods”9. For this reason, it is necessary, according to actors such as the Water Agency, to restore the river’s naturalness (Illustration 2). Beyond the ecological interest of the restoration policy, the link between floods and the loss of naturalness is one of the most common - and powerful - causal stories mobilized among Rhône governance actors.

6 Interview with two Rhône-Alpes Region officials (May 2015) 7 http://www.ser.org/resources/resources-detail-view/ser-international-primer-on-ecological-restoration 8 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 9 Interview with a State representative at the Regional level - Provence-Alpes Côte d’Azur (March 2015). 10

Illustration 2: the Rhône River is taking a new form (Source : RMC Water Agency, Sauvons L’Eau !, juillet 2014, p.10).

The RMC Water Agency, which is the main author of the ecological restoration narrative, promotes quite a particular conception of restoration: “We live in a global context of heavy restorations of major western rivers. We send bulldozers into the Rhone, which we had not done for a century [...] It means we stop being timid. We know that the Rhône River is an absolutely frightening powerful machine […] And I find quite impressive the courage we have, which is an industrial courage [to say] we cannot do things by half. We realized that the half measure does not work. Finally we have the courage to change what we must call the ecological demolition of the Rhone”. Following the 1840 floods and to ease navigation, a program was issued to tighten the Rhône within a channel, raising submersible embankments. The chief engineer of navigation Girardon developed the system of "Girardon dykes." Nowadays, those dykes are no longer used since they are located on the former Rhône (not used anymore for navigation), and are criticized for increasing sedimentation of the river and worsening flood impact. However, some environmentalists defend the biodiversity interest of these dykes while others defend their cultural interest. The debates around the Girardon dykes reveal the Water Agency’s conception of ecological restoration: “So we stop saying: ‘in the 19th century, they made the Girardon dykes, so we cannot touch them. They always have an appearance of naturalness. But if you’re not an expert, you're missing something. Some are saying: ‘it is wild’. In fact, not at all, at all. [...] And so, it was a bold move but we sent some mechanical shovels, snatching dykes to put water in the lônes10. It needed important scientific intelligence because if not, you can make beautiful nonsense11”.

10 A lône is an arm of a river that remains behind the main bed. It is disconnected from the river, but supplied with water by from the alluvial aquifer or directly by the river during floods. On the Rhône River, the lônes designate parts of the “former Rhône” disconnected from the main channel through CNR dams. The term has Franco-Provençal origins. It was only used for Rhône originally but then spread to other rivers. 11 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 11

So the conception of ecological restoration which is put forward and dramatized here is very singular: determined, daring, based on expertise and on the use of industrial means, so as to rebuild, in a proactive way, part of what history has destroyed. However, this normative discourse quickly find its limits. The Rhône has been so much channeled that ecological restoration can only concern parts of the river: In concrete terms, ecological restoration projects do not concern the main canal, but rather some still partly preserved sections of the river: “We are not on the 500 kilometers of the Rhône; we are on particular zones with a high ecological interest. We only talk about the ‘former Rhône’. On the canal, we have absolutely no ambition”12. In this perspective, ecological restoration will not totally change the face of the Rhône: “We are not going to come back to the navigation uses, to the channel digging, etc. We will not dismantle the whole system, just a part of it…”13. The fact remains that this policy narrative is the one around which the Water Agency tries to interest, enroll and mobilize other major actors of the Rhône governance, as we show in the next section. This policy narrative partly owes to the personal contribution of the Water Agency director. The latter is a State engineer graduated from Polytechnique and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He belongs to the “Corps des Ponts, des eaux et des Forêts”. He exerts a strong leadership on the Agency. His personal interpretations, normative conceptions and style of argumentation clearly have an influence on the institutional discourse. Ecological restoration is coherent with most international and national norms in environmental and water management. In particular, restoration projects allow the Agency to get closer to the 2000 European Water Framework Directive objective of good biological status. Those restoration projects also allow to implement European objectives of floodplain restoration supported by the 2007 Flood Directive14. Beyond, this restoration policy is a kind of “showcase” for the Agency: “The Rhône joined the group of world class large rivers like the Danube or the Colorado, which since the late nineteenth century, had undergone many modifications altering their biodiversity and the quality of their waters. They now refuse any concessions on these values and engage in major restoration programs”15 Indeed, this policy narrative about the necessity of restoring the naturalness of the Rhône River proves to be hegemonic among actors’ of Rhône governance. However, beyond its showcase presentation, this restoration is undertaken through a very interventionist and engineering method. Moreover, it only concerns some parts of the river, of the “former Rhône”, and does not oppose the main Rhône development interest - hydropower – produced within the artificial canal, where the Rhône keeps being artificial and channeled.

12 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 13 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 14 Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks 15 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 12

4.3 Policy Narratives as Translation Tools Despite tensions and conflicts between the actors involved in the Rhône governance, the narrative on the necessity to restore the Rhône River seems rather consensual. How has this apparent general consensus been built among the fragmented actors taking part in the Rhône governance? This is the result of a discursive enterprise mainly led by the Water Agency, which translated several interests and conceptions a priori not convergent and thus managed to build quite unexpected alliances and agreements

4.3.1 Ecological Restoration in Support of the CNR Interests? As developed in Section 4.1, the State is still very much governing the Rhône. However, State representatives at the regional level are submitted, to a certain extent, to choices made at the national level. Indeed, the Rhône River is first technically managed by CNR, who owns a delegation contract granted by the State between 1934 and 2023. CNR company is above all an energy producer and supplier. Even if the company is developing “green” activities, it remains interested, in the first place, in the efficiency of hydropower production. This stake is not necessarily compatible with ecological restoration of the Rhône. However, the Water Agency produces a narrative that conciliates economic interest of CNR with ecological restoration of the Rhône: “You have dams, we will not remove them, but acknowledge, at least we will tell you, that it still has a negative impact on the ecology of rivers. We can do whatever layout, there is always a residual negative impact. The solution of removing the dam represents a huge economic loss […] And we have environmental gain, let's say equivalent, to much much cheaper. So it's obviously intelligent16. Beyond producing a narrative that translates economic objectives of CNR into environmental ones, the Water Agency positions itself as the key actor in this translation process: “To make this transfer, here is the Water Agency. […] In its [CNR] relation to the Water Agency, you need you to understand, it is a relation of negotiations that we have. It is not: you have good ideas, so we finance your projects. We finance 50%, we consider that CNR is the owner, but we have our say17”. The Water Agency and CNR diverged on several points regarding which form the ecological restoration of the Rhône should take. CNR and the Agency were not in phase regarding the level of effort asked to CNR infrastructure to let the fishes run up the river through fish passage structures installed within dams. Moreover, another point of divergence regarded the level of implication of CNR within the effort led by the Water Agency towards the restoration of the River. For the Water Agency, CNR must participate financially in the ecological restoration of the river since it takes its benefit from the river itself. Beyond this (quite weak) argument, the Water Agency highlighted the strategic interest of CNR to follow an innovative and proactive position on the Rhône River to make the difference in the fate of its competitors in the perspective of the 2023 contract renewal: “CNR must be original, and make the Rhône River the best of all, because it has a challenger [EDF]. The State must fulfill its objective with CNR. Collectively, this thing earns plenty of money on the Rhône, if it is not to invest its money on the River. Damn! There is a kind of right of return to the Rhône18!”

16 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 17 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 18 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 13

Indeed, the Water Agency director argued the interest of CNR was to be in the right line of national environmental policy. After 2023, the delegation contract linking the State and CNR is supposed to be renegotiated, and eventually opened to CNR competitors (such as EDF or others European groups). The on-going debates about the possibility to grant (or not) a prolongation of this contract to CNR illustrates the decisive power of this structure on the Rhône, but also at the national level. The National Assembly adopted an amendment onto the Energy Transition law, at present discussed within the Senate19, extending the delegation contract beyond the 2023 and avoiding, therefore, to open the competition onto the Rhône management. This position was supported by local deputies and regional powers20. During the negotiation period between the Government and the National Assembly regarding the Energy Transition Law, the Water Agency used the uncertainty as a lever to increase CNR contribution to the Rhône ecological restoration: “We were at loggerheads with CNR. We had to sign an agreement a year ago, in February. [...] The Energy transition law began to be negotiated and luckily ... CNR could not present a bad environmental copy. What I said is very simple. The Minister has just communicated: I launch energy transition law on hydroelectricity; I want to revisit the principle of privatization and competitive tendering, etc. But by and large, I will not compromise on the environment - a normal stuff for an environment minister. Now, will I tell the Minister, who personally supports the CNR model for its environmental qualities, that you [CNR] refuse to implement things that are feasible today, at a pace we were able to bear? And I have proof that it is necessary for the potential of the Rhône. Do you really play for your camp? So they seriously improved their proposal21”. Beyond the capacity of the Agency director to ”rephrase” the CNR interest in terms of support to environmental restoration, the former developed a storyline in which the strategic commercial interest of CNR was in phase with the objectives of the Water Agency, for several reasons. For him, CNR has interest to develop its environmental missions to maximize its chances to renew its concession contract. Moreover, CNR has interest to finance the Water Agency to gain an influence power over the decisions made within the Water Basin Committee22. Last, CNR has interest to be close to the Water Agency because it makes it closer to local powers, which is important to develop its activity and to gain local support in front of potential European competitors to the renewal of the concession contract: “CNR needed to break with EDF model to grant the renewal of its concession, to keep the cheese they consider to be an extraordinary gift not to let go. So they know very well that they have to be more innovative. In the 2009 law, there are three criteria for concession renewals, which are set to equality under the law: energy potential, financial return to the state, and the environment, free figure! [...] And they thought, oh joy, a Water Agency that finances our projects up to 50%! So, certainly, we [Water Agency] have our say, but they are very happy to share their happiness because the model ‘I do all alone and I'm right' they know very well that it is a lot of money anyway,

19 Article 28, « Projet de loi adopté par l’assemblée nationale en nouvelle lecture relatif à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte », Amendement n°2398, adopté le 25/09/2014 (http://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/14/amendements/2188/CSENER/2398.asp) 20 Press release, « Jean-Jack Queyranne welcomes the extension of the concession to CNR beyond 2023”, 2014/10/11. 21 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 22 The Basin Committee is an assembly where all the water stakeholders at each major river basin’s level (such as Rhône-Méditerranée) meet to decide on the water policy and develop the agencies’ actions plans, andcoordinate on behalf of the French State the implementation of the European Water Framework Directive.

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and not much return. And finally, by paying a fee to the water agency - that was increased by six between what they were paying historically and now - [...] CNR gives a return to the territories through the Water Agency, all these small projects that are beyond its control radar. It has no idea where they were, how she could support them. The Water Agency actually favors CNR. By making CNR pay, the Water Agency allows CNR to make a return service to territories, to the great Rhône territory, that ultimately knows it owes its projects to a water basin solidarity in which one of the important contributors is CNR.” The Water Agency technique of negotiation illustrates its capacity to use the hazardous period of concession negotiation in order to improve CNR investment in the environmental sector. However, the State has also interests in the prolongation of the CNR concession. According to DREAL officials, CNR prolongation contract allows to have a prospective vision on the future investments regarding the Rhône, in particular in the environmental sector. “The interest of the 90-year CNR concession is that it allows to plan investments on the long term. The restoration of the river represents many operations, and it is useless to carry them one by one. It supposes a strategic view. We are within a rather complicated period, when we are unable to give long-term visibility to the concessionary company. It does not encourage the latter to invest [...] CNR mission of general interest might dry up because if they have no long-term visibility they will not invest23.”

4.3.2 Ecological Restoration in Support of Local Economic Development and Flood Protection? One of the issues faced by the State on the Rhône consists in motivating local powers to develop projects around the River. According to State actors, local powers around the river have little capacity - and willingness - to carry planning projects in particular in the field of ecological restoration, because of the CNR domination. The presence of major infrastructures (dams and dikes built and managed by CNR), as well as the CNR monopoly on expertise about the River, would lead to a disinterest of local powers from the river management (Guerrin 2014). However, the participation of local authorities is crucial for the State and the Water Agency, because they act as fund providers, but cannot implement projects by themselves. They need local powers to be the armed wing of their financial power to enable environmental protection of the river. They must interest them to carry operations of restoration they can partly finance. However, interesting local powers to river restoration is not an easy task. The latter are more interested in protecting their population from floods as well as promoting local economic development (Barthélémy 2006): “Since the 1980s, this is the sense of history, nothing can be done without the local powers take the lead, since they are responsible for many things, of course the State but also to a lower level local representatives, local authorities and also citizens. Therefore, we created the Rhône River culture through Plan Rhône. This was largely built on flood issues. It was an electroshock. And then little by little we tried to open this culture to externalities such as tourism, the economy, water management, we tried to make the Rhône... not only dangerous, but also attractive24.” To do so, the Water Agency has produced a storyline towards local powers by presenting water protection as a lever to enhance local economic development. This storyline is well summed up and illustrated on the front cover of the journal realized by the Water Agency, that says “water as a source of employment”:

23 Interview with a State representative at the Water Basin Regional level – Rhône Alpes (March 2015). 24 Interview with a State representative at the Regional level (Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Region), 2015/03/12. 15

Illustration 3: front page of Water Agency Journal, Sauvons l’Eau!, December 2014.

It is based on the idea that investing in water protection produces employment. Water protection is presented as a lucrative investment since it is presented as creating more income than invested by the Agency. Moreover, this argument is used to oppose the actual trend of the State to remove part of the Water Agency budget in order to supply its own general budget, for other purposes than water protection: the money deducted from the Water Agency reduces its capacity to create jobs and therefore income. The promotion of this storyline is part of the general communication strategy of the Water Agency to justify its missions: “The [European Water] Framework Directive, the objective of achieving a good ecological status, as well as the Water Agency programs, support job creation. Saving water and public funding allow promoting employment. [...] The Water Directive […] has given rise to a new sector: the preservation and restoration of natural environments. "By reorienting its further intervention program in this sense, the Water Agency has increased its leverage effect on the economy and generates more employment," says [a Water Agency economist], which assessed this impact: with 3.6M€ aid during 6 years, the program of action "Save water" 2013-2018 created an investment of 9M€, representing 14,000 permanent jobs in the basin, including 10,000 in the construction sector25”. The 2015 Finance Act has, for the second consecutive year, decided the removal of 42 million Euros on our next budget to the benefit of the national accounts. This is money that does not go to companies. Reducing our ability to support investments in the field of water reduces our ability to support employment26” This narrative matches a current liberal-trend in environmental policy according to which environmental protection needs to demonstrate its congruence with economic activities (as Cini (1996) pointed out through the case of the European Commission) and has even to show that it can be economically efficient. Applied to the ecological restoration of the Rhône, this

25 Rhône Water Agency Journal, Save Water!, December 2014, page 10. 26 Interview of a Senator and city councilor of Annecy, member of the Water Basin Committee, within the Journal de The Rhône Basin Water Agency, Save Water! December 2014, p. 11 16 narrative is used to “interest” local powers to support, and implement, river restoration projects: “We carried a satisfaction survey about our action among local representatives […] when we arrive on the subject of the environment, 80% say ‘we are not interested’. […] Put it that way, representatives go back to their territories, not eco-friendly at all, even scared to be accused of being ecologist. In every Plan Rhône meeting we heard: ‘men may die, the fish are saved!’. We must be able to answer to that. […] it's as subtle thing, but when you time it right, you manage to make them carry rather good projects. […] We have plethora of arguments, but among others, local investment. ‘Mr. Mayor, I think there is one of your business, the local construction companies, they did not tell you they were looking for business? If we invest 1 euro, it means 3 Euros for local investment. And I have better! For the environmental sector, we can help up to 80%, to launch operations. You invest 1, you get 5! Find another place where your euro is more useful economically!’27” According to the Water Agency, this argument enables the support of local powers to environmental projects, which usually lacks local political support. But this interpretation is likely to be shared only because the kind of ecological restoration realized on the Rhône River is rather specific. As we developed in Section 4.2, this ecological restoration “style” is intensive in civil engineering, labor force and machinery, and can therefore be seen as a factor of economic development. Another kind of ecological restoration that would just bring nature back would be much less consistent with a narrative based on economic development and jobs creation. Another storyline used to foster local powers support of ecological restoration is based on a causal link between river restoration and floods protection. The history of the first Plan Rhône contract is linked to the occurrence of major and repetitive floods. If Plan Rhône was designed to tackle several policy sectors around the river, the investment was in majority concentrated on flood issues. Flood protection is the main preoccupation of local powers around the river. To interest local powers to river restoration, CNR and Water Agency use a narrative linking ecological restoration to flood protection. Restoring parts of the river would increase water storage in case of floods. If this argument is scientifically funded, the importance of this link is reified in order to grant local power supports to ecological restoration. This storyline matches the interest of some local representatives, such as the President of an association of flood victims, who supports the actions of ecological restoration in front of its members by justifying it through hydraulic purposes. The congruence of this storyline is nuanced by a representative of an association of two municipalities federated to manage floods. The post of this representative is partly financed by CNR and the Water Agency, and part of the mission of the post-holder is to allow participation of the public to ecological restoration projects led by the funders: “Restoring lônes presents challenges. The local municipalities are not very concerned with the river, quite the opposite. For them, the Rhône primarily represents floods. The Former Rhône restoration program is built on hydraulic restoration issues, that is the idea that restoring the river will improve storage for small floods, and environmental issues. But we should not deceive people. The main objective is environmental, not hydraulic. It might improve things for small floods, it will absorb the overflow. Mr. X [President of a famous association of flood victims on the Rhône] presents first the hydraulic objective to its members, but it has to build its own legitimacy.28”

27 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 28 Interview with a representative of an association of municipalities on the Middle Rhône (May 2015). 17

4.3.3 When Environmental Associations Promote “Bulldozer Restoration” The way environmental restoration is thought on the Rhône River is rather interventionist. Digging the former Rhône with bulldozer does not instantaneously match the classical vision of river ecology. A priori, we could think that this method opposes the conceptions of environmental associations, who usually promote “softer” options about ecological restoration. However, quite surprisingly, on the Rhône River, environmental association support the river restoration led by the Water Agency. “-Do the environmental associations agree on the idea of restoring the river with bulldozers? -[ Water Agency director:] They cannot ask for more! We will not completely undo the channel digging navigation. Well, it's true that this is not a strong claim of associations, it is rather a claim of scientists[…] In fact, if you want, when you do the technical demonstration that the Rhône has a huge ecological potential and it is just frustrated with these things, and that by removing two, three stuffs you bring the stuff in good shape… that is to say, the fish community explodes, because suddenly, the juvenile fishes have somewhere to hide and grow and then return to the main flow, because they have places to shadow […] when we see the potential, we say: why not doing it?29” Today, the environmental associations support the action of the Water Agency and even the one of CNR: “Our relation with CNR is getting better because the mentality and ethics of CNR has changed significantly. It is still a business that needs to do its economic benefit. They must generate income, to which our association is absolutely not opposed to, but there is a real consideration to the environment from CNR engineers. They really believe in what they do, believe in this restoration, and believe in the possibility of letting hydropower plants while ensuring a biological minimum flow that allows the circulation of the fishes, in order they are not chopped through turbines, and that lets enough flow so that their living conditions are optimal30.” This position can be explained by the fact that these associations are historically close to the scientific community associated to the river restoration projects led on the Rhône River (Bouleau 2013). Moreover, they are looking for recognition and are benefiting from the financial support of the Water Agency. They are also convinced that it is not possible to make the Rhône return to its “original” natural conditions, but that ecological improvement is possible at the margins of the hydropower plants: “The Rhône is a financial windfall, development has been made anyway, we will not ask CNR to dismantle and remove all those plants, especially because CNR takes the environment into account. Our association has a fairly realistic view on the Rhône. We will never return to an idyllic vision, meandering rivers, it will not happen, it's too late. There are CNR hydropower plants, and they are not the worst… The worst has been the Girardon dykes built for navigation, that completely disfigured the river. Now, what we want is to find some relict ecosystems of that time, with restored lônes, which are not representative of the entire river anymore but that exist in some places where we find a very rich biodiversity. Our association has a fairly realistic view of the Rhône. This is not where we will put our most important energy31.”

29 Interview with a Rhône Water Agency official (March 2015) 30 Interview with a federation of environmental associations active on the Rhône River (March 2015) 31 Idem 18

Finally, these associations’ representatives have the willingness to change their image. They want to show that, beyond oppositional positions, they are able to participate in the environmental policy-making process: « I think we should get rid of this image: the environmental protection associations who oppose everything and remain eyes on their goals. My idea is to develop a global vision of our association, and trying to be the maximum in a consultative process.32”

5. Conclusions

The ecological restoration of the Rhône is not the single narrative being deployed on the Rhône. Several stories have been produced about this river, depending on time, places, and stakes. However, the current narrative about ecological restoration does have impacts on the river governance. The construction of a story about the need to restore the ecology of the river occurs within a specific context. The Rhône River was almost entirely channeled. Its governance gathers actors with divergent interests and diverse representations of the general interest. However, those actors are highly interdependent – Plan Rhône institutionalizing this dependency. Last, scientific uncertainties are high within the ecological restoration sector. In consequence, restoration actions are potentially very different, from the restoration that consists in letting nature evolve by itself to the interventionist restoration that consists in re- creating artificially what is defined as “natural” conditions. On the Rhône, an agreement could be reached around a specific definition of ecological restoration: based on human intervention and engineering processes to re-create “natural” conditions and functions, in line with the “ecological modernization” paradigm (Hajer 1995). This conception matches the expectations of the institutions that finance this type of actions, in particular the State and the European Union, which are keen on financing environmental actions based on engineering and infrastructure. As often in public policy, symbols play a key-role (Edelman 1977, Yanow 1996, 2008, Hajer 2011). They “tell stories”(Stone 2012: 158). On the Rhône, the symbol of the bulldozer used to re-create natural conditions is particularly meaningful. The Water Agency is the key player of this narrative construction. It built its own interpretation (“problematization”) of the situation and then translated the interests of several actors in order to interest them to its cause, and to enroll and mobilize them in various actions and projects. However, this translation process occurred within a favorable context, since this storyline coincided with the aims of those actors. The aims of the Ministry of the Environment’s representatives at the river basin level are consistent with the Water Agency’s narratives, which has to achieve the objectives of the European Water Directive on the Rhône River. As we saw, CNR is interested in developing its “green” image, above all now that it represents a lever to keep its industrial monopoly on the river. Since local powers are aware that the protection of the environment is rather important for the institutions that finance local development, and also because it is consistent with their objective of stimulating economic development and of protecting their population from floods. The environmental associations share this narrative because the restoration of the Rhône represents their common denominator with the Water Agency, the main funder and organizer of water policy on the Rhône. They need the Water Agency support to legitimate their action and to be able to contribute to the environmental policy-making process. Moreover, this conception matches the conceptions and interests of further actors, such as the authority that manage fluvial

32 Idem 19 transport on the Rhône (VNF)33. VNF, for example, has developed the concept of “sustainable river transportation”. Finally, it is around the ecological restoration of the Rhône that major actors, with a priori divergent objectives and interest, agree upon. Beyond the “style”’ of the narrative promoted by the Water Agency, it was able to present objective (scientific) “facts” (Majone 1989), and to accommodate diverse interests. In so doing, it contributed to modify the identity (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2001) of the actors involved within the ecological restoration policy: for instance, CNR appears a little “greener”, whereas environmental associations appear in phase with the “ecological modernization” paradigm. This confirms: 1/the interest of mobilizing jointly and in a complementary manner interpretative policy analysis (and in particular the concept of policy narrative) and translation sociology; 2/the idea that the narrative dimension cannot be understood without referring to interests, power asymmetries, negotiations, and actors’ strategies (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). To conclude, it seems that we are not facing a narrative which force is based on its blurry character and its polysemy (Hajer 2011). On the contrary, here things are presented quite clearly. Choices are assumed and policy options are ranked. The result of those translation operations is a partially ambiguous consensus (Palier 2005). Actors agree upon the interest of investing in the ecological restoration of the river. The effect of the Water Agency’s discursive enterprise is increased given that Plan Rhône enabled a process of discussion between actors, allowing a mutual understanding of each others’ expectations and constraints. But this consensus is partially ambiguous because each actor supports the ecological restoration of the Rhône for reasons that are – of course - partially different, and match their own interests and strategies. This agreement’s construction occurs in a context where environmental directives, laws and objectives provide resources to the ecological restoration supporters. But it does not totally oppose the “old” modernization narrative produced at a time when hydropower and nuclear power were major national stakes. The ecological restoration narrative promoted by the Agency brings ecology and fishes back to the Rhône River, but in a quite marginal way, and without challenging the main sectoral operations on the river. In that perspective, the agreement around ecological restoration is certainly not that paradoxical…

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