Issue 1 (3), 2016 SYSTEM AUTHORITIES

SOCIAL violations

CONFLICT

GROUPS

ETHNIC ETHNIC ELECTIONS ANALYSIS MINSK AGREEMENTS

POLITICAL RIGHTS VISA LIBERALIZATION Security ENVIRONMENT CRIMEANTATARS VIOLATIONS ENVIRONMENT

DONBASCRIMEA HUMANAGENDA

SYSTEM RIGHTS HUMAN AUTHORITIES

• HUMAN SECURITY IMPLICATIONS • MINSK AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION • , AND ETC UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 1

Issue 1 (3), 2016 BOARD OF ADVISERS

Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Research fellow, London School of Economics and Social Science) Human Security Dr. Iulian Chifu (Romania, Director of the

Conflict Analysis and Early Warning Center) Editors Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa Dr. Hanna Shelest National University by I.I. Mechnikov) Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko Dr. Sergey Minasyan (Armenia, Deputy Director at the Caucasus Institute) Publisher: Published by NGO “Promotion of Intercultural Stephan Meuser (Germany, Director of the Cooperation” (Ukraine), Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Centre of International Studies (Ukraine), in Ukraine and Belarus)

Representation of the Friedrich Ebert James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the with the financial support of the Foundation in Ukraine. Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs)

academic/analytical journal in English Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, Director of UA: Ukraine Analytica is the first Ukrainian on International Relations, Politics and Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs) Economics. The journal is aimed for experts, diplomats, academics, students interested H.E., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador in the international relations and Ukraine in Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to particular. France)

Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, Contacts: Director Defence Transformation at The Hague website: http://ukraine-analytica.org/ Center for Strategic Studies) e-mail: [email protected] Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, Vice- ukraineanalytica Prime Minister on European and Euroatlantic Twitter: https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica Integration of Ukraine)

Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director The views and opinions expressed in of the Center for International and European articles are those of the authors and do not Studies, Kadir Has University (Turkey))

Analytica or its editors and Board of Advisors Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Research Director at the necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine Norwegian Nobel Institute)

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

WE SHOULD SPEAK ABOUT THE LIBERATION OF THE CRIMEA...... 3 Interview with Member of Parliament of Ukraine for UA: Ukraine Analytica

MINSK AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION: ART OF IMPOSSIBLE ...... 7 Hanna Shelest and Dmytro Shulga

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN UKRAINE AS A FACTOR DESTABILIZING DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE STATE ...... 23 Iuliia Tsyrfa

GUIDELINES FOR MANAGING THE CONFLICT IN DONBAS ...... 30 Mykola Kapitonenko

THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN EASTERN UKRAINE AND THE ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA...... 38 Svitlana Andrushchenko

CRIMEA TODAY: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS ...... 47 Natalya Belitser

HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING IN CRIMEA: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?...... 56 Kira Spyrydonova

ELECTORAL SECURITY AS AN ELEMENT OF PEACE-BUILDING AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT...... 64 Iuliia Serbina

DO VISA LIBERALISATION REFORMS HELP MODERNIZING UKRAINE? ...... 71 Maryana Kuzio and Iryna Sushko

2 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 WE SHOULD SPEAK ABOUT THE LIBERATION OF THE CRIMEA

Interview with Member of Parliament of Ukraine Mustafa Dzhemilev for UA: Ukraine Analytica

What, in your opinion, brought about ties” between Russia and Ukraine by stating the occupation of the Crimea and Russian aggressive intentions towards the allowed Russia to receive support Crimea. from a part of local population? Pro-Russian stance among a considerable Russia was preparing for that for a long part of the Crimean population has been time. Stating that it has no territorial quite evident and understandable – claims to Ukraine and denying any about 60% of the population are ethnic aggressive intentions towards the Crimea as provocative, Moscow, nevertheless, has continuously supported pro-Russian descendants,Russians. Most who of initially them are settled post-World in the forces in the Crimea during all years of the War 2 immigrants from Russia and their Ukrainian independence. Crimean Tatars and their representative institution – the there has never been a systemic Mejlis – have been a primary target of the Crimean policy in Kyiv, as there has Russian propaganda. They were pictured «never been a full understanding as a threat for the territorial integrity of a threat approaching of Ukraine, as extremists and radicals, capable of creating “Ukrainian Chechnya” or “Ukrainian Kosovo”. The leadership of houses and lands of the deported Crimean the Crimean autonomy, mainly comprised Tatars. That is why most of them bought of pro-Russians and even agents of Russian easily the Russian propaganda tales of special services, shared the approach. the Crimean Tatars returning to their homeland to take back their houses and same views on Crimean Tatars. Anyhow, lands and willing to separate from Ukraine thereEven somehas never officials been in Kyiva systemic still possess Crimean the or to join Turkey – a country with the same policy in Kyiv, as there has never been a religion. full understanding of a threat approaching. None of our warnings and worries were taken seriously by Kyiv. Under the rule banderovites and ultranationalists, who of President Yanukovych, Kyiv attitude Locals have also been terrified by mythical towards Crimean Tatars and the Mejlis was Ukraine to dispatch with Russians. However, roughly the same as Moscow one. itwere was supposedthe totally tocorrupted arrive government from Western of

I remember one “analytical report” from the most. They were afraid to be held responsiblethe autonomous for republicsending thattrains was (at terrified local of Ukraine to its headquarters in Kyiv, datedthe Crimean Autumn office 2011. of Itthe said Security that the Services Mejlis those, who fought against the regime of demands the denunciation of the Black Sea Yanukovychbudget cost) in withKyiv. local bandits to fight Fleet Treaty and aims at spoiling “fraternal

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 3 About 23-25% of the local population were much better and more favourable for rapid ethnic Ukrainians, but those Ukrainians economic development, especially via the who, to a considerable extent, have lost restoration of tourism. their national identity, culture, and native Certainly, economic ties with Ukraine’s mainland will be quickly restored. Sanctions revivelanguage, Ukrainian i.e. almost identity completely of those Russified. people. will be lifted and considerable investment ForOfficials example, in Kyiv among took noabout steps 950 to supportsecondary or expected, which will bring about a sharp schools in the Crimea, there were only seven increase in living standards. with Ukrainian as a teaching language, i.e. less than 1%. accordance with international norms regardingThe Crimean the statusrights willof the be definedindigenous in overwhelming majority of the Crimean people for self-determination. I am sure populationHowever, one supported cannot firmlythe occupation state that and the that Ukrainian society is mature enough for a smooth restoration of national-territorial from very reliable sources that not even autonomy in the Crimea. closethe annexation to 83% of ofpopulation the peninsula. participated We know in the so-called “referendum” of March 16, 2014. The level of participation was only What could be achieved through at 32.4%, while the Crimean Tatars almost introducing national autonomy for totally boycotted it. the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea into Ukrainian Constitution? Is it possible to reintegrate the Essentially, we are talking about restoring, Crimea? Or will it be necessary to however, in a more democratic form of a look for its new status? national-territorial autonomy, which existed in the Crimea before the deportation of the In my opinion, we should not speak so Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups by much about its integration or reintegration, but about its liberation from occupation. Later, certainly, it will be necessary to take Bolsheviks during the Second World War. all measures to correct the mistakes of the importantWe do not is even not insistthe title, that but this the autonomy essence past. I suggest that after the liberation, the ofbe the called autonomy. “Crimean The Tatar”. Constitution What is of most the composition of the Crimean population autonomy should contain articles protecting will be different from what it is now. Active basic rights of indigenous people. It should also guarantee the functioning of the responsible for the violation of rights of separatists, collaborationists, officials territory of the Crimea, as well as provide dozens of thousands of their aides will mechanismsnative language for adequate as an official representation one over the of leaveour citizens, the Crimea. thousands 7-8 thousand of FSB officers of Russian and the nation in all institutions of executive and troops will be withdrawn. Several dozens of representative power. thousands of people, who were brought to the Crimea after the occupation, will have to leave without chances to get Ukrainian rights of indigenous people on its soil, citizenship. Instead, thousands of people notWe areabout talking its dictate only aboutover others. ways to There protect is who were forced to leave the Crimea after absolutely no reason for occasional talks the occupation will come back. In short, the climate in the Crimea will become in the autonomy. over somebody being first- or second-class

4 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 The non-recognition of the Moreover, there are many countries Crimean annexation and sanctions against Russia are much talked saying that the “Crimean people” were very influenced by the Russian propaganda, about internationally. What is the much willing to join Russia and that there international community reaction to was a danger that Ukrainian nationalists would start ethnic cleansing of the violations of Crimean Tatars’ rights? Russians in the Crimea, hence Russia had What is being done about that? no other choice but to take that step (the Violations of human rights in the Crimea, especially against the Crimean Tatars, have recently become more frequent and Violations of human rights more intense. Together with attempts to in the Crimea, especially declare the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars «against the Crimean Tatars, – a representative body directly elected have recently become more by indigenous people – “an extremist frequent and more intense. organization” by the new Crimean the issue of liberation of the Crimea. annexation). If one has a look at what is Forauthorities, instance, it the has vast significantly majority of urged 24 published in those countries about Ukraine representatives speaking at the UN Security and the Crimea, it will be evident, that Council meeting in New York on March 18 those are repeated clichés of the Russian this year expressed their disturbance with propaganda. One of our steps in that actions of the occupants and stressed the direction is the participation in different necessity to take measures to liberate international forums, including Summit of the Crimea. Ukrainian diplomacy and the 55 Muslim states in Ankara on 14-15 April, 2016. efforts to push forward the issue. President are recently taking significant What does the establishment of who favour weakening or even lifting the a World Congress of the Crimean sanctionsCertainly, against there areRussia. those These in voices the West are Tatars mean? especially strong among those who conduct business in Russia. Fortunately, they are not decisive so far. 2009We summonedin , World and Congress it hosted of more the Huge informational efforts are necessary in thanCrimean 160 TatarsCrimean for Tatar the organizations first time in from May many Asian and African states. Among 82 12 countries. The main task was, of course, countries, which abstained or even were in consolidating the efforts of diasporas absent on purpose during a vote in the UN in solving problems of the people on its General Assembly on March 27, 2014, over historical motherland, strengthening ties resolution about the non-recognition of with compatriots, helping diasporas to the Crimean “referendum” and requesting preserve their national identity in their to liberate the occupied territory, the huge countries of residence. majority were Asian and African. Some followed the rule “it is better not to touch The second Congress took place last summer the gangster, least he attack you”, others in Ankara. It hosted 430 delegates from took into account their economic, rather about 200 organizations from 14 countries. than legal or moral, considerations. Occupation authorities in the Crimea took measures to not let several members of

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 5 the Mejlis and the veterans of the National Movement to get to Ankara. However, about Mustafa Dzhemilev has been a Member of the Parliament 30 delegates from the Crimea managed to of Ukraine since 1998 and a former Chairman of the Mejlis take part in the Congress. Its key issue was, of the Crimean Tatar People. He is the recognized leader of course, the occupation of the Crimea and of the Crimean Tatar National Movement and a former further actions of the diasporas given the Soviet dissident. In October 1998, the United Nations current situation. The Head of the Mejlis, R. High Commissioner for Refugees awarded Dzhemilev Chubarov, was elected the President of the the Nansen Medal for his outstanding efforts and “his Congress. That was necessary because of commitment to the right of return of the Crimean Tatars”. the need to coordinate the activities of the In 2014 Dzhemilev was awarded the Order of the Republic given the fact that Mejlis activities had by Turkish President Abdullah Gül and the Solidarity Prize World Congress and the Mejlis, especially by the Republic of Poland (being thus its first recipient). occupiers. already been significantly damaged by

6 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 MINSK AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION: ART OF IMPOSSIBLE

Hanna Shelest, PhD Editor-in-chief, UA: Ukraine Analytica Dmytro Shulga Director of the European Programmes, International Renaissance Foundation

The analysis of the Minsk agreements implementation (a common name for a package of documents adopted in September 2014 and February 2015 aiming to resolve a current crisis in the Eastern region of Ukraine) demonstrates that despite a few steps forward, the systematic violation of certain clauses as well as serious manipulation of the others by the so-called ‘Donetsk People Republic’/ ‘Luhansk People Republic’ (‘DPR’/‘LPR’) combatants and the Russian Federation has been observed and confirmed by the international community. Lifting international sanctions seems the only incentive for Russia to comply with the Minsk agreements. Its current tactic involves partial implementation, which would help to apply for easing sanctions and thus to decrease the cost of its waging war against Ukraine. At the same time, Russia preserves the possibility to re-escalate the currently low- intensity-conflict at any convenient moment.

Introduction the Ukrainian territory is controlled by the so called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ Following the military occupation and (‘DPR’) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ illegal annexation of the Crimea in (‘LPR’) combatants, not by the Ukrainian February–March 2014, Russia continued government. in Donbas, a region in the Eastern Ukraine to destabilise Ukraine. The armed conflict in immediate vicinity to the Russian border, annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 was triggered by the Russian security appearedThe first to Westernbe weak and sanctions sent a misleading after the 1. Since then message to the Kremlin. Then, however, the service officers in spring 2014 evidences of the Russian interference in territorythe conflict of the was Russian continued Federation with steady and the Ukrainian internal affairs, the violation eventuallyinflows of fighterswith a direct and weaponsaggression from by the of its territorial integrity and support of Russian regular armed forces on Ukrainian the separatist movements were too vivid soil, which was the only way to save to ignore and not to take respectful actions Russia’s proxies. At present, as a result of this, 1/3 of Donbas region (part of Luhansk democratic values and principles of the and Donetsk regions) or less than 3% of internationalto confirm the law. EU’s own adherence to the

1 Interview with I.Girkin (Strelkov), commander of the group which started the hostilities in and around the town of Slov’yansk: http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/103643/

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 7 On 27 June 2014, the European Council Russia, France and Germany negotiated presented a set of requirements that could a package of measures to alleviate the postpone the introduction of the economic ongoing war in the Donbas region of sanctions against Russia. Among these Ukraine (implementation of the Minsk requirements there were an agreement protocol dealt in September 2014). In March 2015, the European Council agreed that the duration of the economic/sectoral border,on a verification monitored mechanism by the OSCE; for athe returned cease- measures against Russia shall be linked controlfire and of for three the state-border effective control checkpoints of the to the complete implementation of the (Izvarino, Dolzhanskiy, Krasnopartizansk) Minsk agreements4, which still remain under the Ukrainian authorities; a release the principle reference documents for the of hostages including all of the OSCE observers (captured by combatants at that Eastern Ukraine. They were supported by time); a launch of substantial negotiations thepeaceful US, the settlement EU and the of UN the Security conflict Council. in the on the implementation of the President Thus, the connection of the EU sanctions Poroshenko’s peace plan2. with Minsk agreements implementation looks quite logical. Given that Russia failed to respond to these demands of the European Council (except ‘Minsk agreements’ is a common name of the OSCE monitors’ release), on 31 July for a package of documents adopted in 2014 the Council of the EU introduced a September 2014 and February 2015. package of economic sanctions (restrictive ‘Minsk-1’ refers to September 2014 measures targeting sectoral cooperation agreements – Protocol on the results of and exchanges with the Russian consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE with participation of the separatist leaders) duration of the economic/ dated 5 September 2014 and a subsequent sectoral measures against Memorandum dated 19 September 2014. «Russia shall be linked to These documents contained provisions on the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements. of the heavy weapons, the withdrawal ofestablishing the illegal a combatants, cease-fire, the a withdrawalprohibition for drones except those owned by the

Federation) with a view to increasing the 2014 was heavily violated by separatists’ costs of Russia’s actions to undermine OSCE etc. The ceasefire of September Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty the area not controlled by the Ukrainian and independence and to promoting a governmentforces, leading by toFebruary a significant 2015. increase of peaceful settlement of the crisis3. ‘Minsk-2’ commonly refers to the ‘Package In February 2015, the leaders of Ukraine, of measures for the implementation of

2 European Council 26/27 June 2014 Conclusions. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/press- data/en/ec/143478.pdf 3 Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX- :32014R0833&from=EN 4 European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – Conclusions http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/ european-council/2015/03/european-council-conclusions-march-2015-en_pdf

8 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 Minsk Agreements’ signed on 12 February remained tense with regular escalations. 2015 by the Trilateral Contact Group Among the most intensive one was ‘DPR’’s representatives (Ukraine, Russia and failed attack on the Ukrainian village of OSCE) and the leaders of the separatists5. Maryinka in June 2015. As a result of such The content of Minsk-2 was negotiated escalations, for example, 430 Ukrainian at 16 hours long ‘Normandy format’ servicemen were killed during March – summit in Minsk between the Presidents October 2015.8 of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Chancellor of Germany, who issued a declaration in In general, during the period of 15 support of the package6. February – 4 December 2015 there were only 47 days (15%) without wounded and killed from the Ukrainian side. Assessment of Minsk agreements Multi-days cease-fire without losses implementation from the Ukrainian side (except of the mine detonations casualties) happened Below is the analysis of implementation only 20–23 September, 10–19 October, of each particular clause of the Minsk 1–8 November 2015, so only these agreements:7 periods can be considered as a formal cease-fire. 1. An immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions and its strict September 2015 after the Trilateral implementation starting at 00:00 (Kiev The intensity of fighting decreased in time) on 15 February 2015. AContact crucial Group factor once was again that confirmedin September the The signing of the Minsk II agreement 2015ceasefire Russia starting started on 26preparations August 2015. for was happening at the time of the intense its military operation in Syria and temporarily refocused its attention from the ‘DPR’ and Russian forces attack. This Ukraine. If Ukraine had been the initiator fighting near Debaltseve, started due to separation line agreed in September 2014 to expect an increase of military offences attack was significantly changing the inof theSeptember–October fighting, it would have 2015, been logicalusing negotiations (11–12 February 2015), the moment of other Russia’s military Russiaby the tried conflict to postpone sides. During a date thefor cease- Minsk the battle. However, even with the date inpriorities. Donbas With from Russia’s September attention until shifted mid- fire initiating, to get the final results of Novemberto Syria, almost2015, with full Ukrainian ceasefire losses lasted caused mostly by mines. Februaryof the ceasefire 2015. Since agreed then, as 15the February,situation actual intensive fighting continued till 20

5 cio/140221?download=true 6 Комплекс мер по выполнению Минских соглашений / ОБСЕ. 12.02.2015 http://www.osce.org/ru/

Декларация Президента Российской Федерации, Президента Украины, Президента Французской www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/deklaraciya-prezidenta-rosijskoyi-federaciyi-prezidenta-ukra-34695Республики и Канцлера Федеративной Республики Германия в поддержку Комплекса мер по выполнению 7 Минских соглашений, принятого 12 февраля 2015 года / Official website of the President of Ukraine. http://

8 The text of the Minsk-2 clauses is given according to the unofficial translation: http://www.ibtimes.com/minsk- ceasefire-deal-full-text-agreement-between-russia-ukraine-germany-france-1814468 According to the unofficial ‘Memory Book’ data: http://memorybook.org.ua/indexfile/statistic.htm UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 9 Already in November 2015, shelling of the in September 2014 and has been a point 9 Usually, of communication between the military of the new wave of shelling coincides with Russia and Ukraine in Donbas). importantUkrainian dates, positions such as intensified. Independence Day, the anniversary of beginning Although the sides have declared the or a new round of the negotiations of the completion of the withdrawal of heavy Trilateral Contact Group. The new escalation weapons at the appointed time, the OSCE started in January-February 2016, noted SMM has regularly reported violations both by the OSCE SMM10 and National – heavy weapons were recorded in the Security and Defence Council of Ukraine.11 prohibited area, changing of weapons Since recently, the OSCE SMM started to occurred in places of permanent deployment, and until recently, “DPR” and “LPR” did not violations noticed by their teams.12 publish the daily reports on the cease-fire weapons to be controlled. The reason was 2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by aprovide constant identification movement of numbersweapons of “DPR” their both sides at equal distances in order to and “LPR” to the territory of the Russian create a security zone to be at least 50-km- Federation (for repair and recycling) and wide from each other for 100mm or bigger back (new and refurbished samples). calibre artillery systems, a 70-km-wide security zone for MLRS, and a 140-km- wide security zone for Tornado-S, Uragan the arms from the Russian territory can and Smerch MLRS and Tochka-U tactical beOne mentioning of the confirmations in the text of of movement the Minsk of missile systems…. The withdrawal of the agreement of the multiple launch rocket abovementioned heavy weapons shall begin systems (MLRS) “Tornado-S”, which was no later than on the second day after the added to the Russian armoury only in ceasefire and shall end within 14 days... 2012. There are more and more evidences

present only in Russia (not delivered for of the weapons ‘Control plan for export).of the For new example, weapons a heavy modifications multiple coordinationA specific document and implementation on the withdrawal of a launch thermobaric rocket system (TOS-1 package of measures to implement the Buratino, 220mm), which is produced only Minsk agreements’, was signed on 20- in Russia, never supplied to Ukraine, was 22 February 2015 by representatives spotted by the OSCE SMM observers at the of the military commanders of Ukraine, training area in LPR.13 Russia, ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’. The document was agreed at the Joint centre for control After the shift of the Russian attention to and coordination of issues regarding Syria, it was possible to sign an additional document – “Agreement on the withdrawal the contact line (this centre was created of weapons calibre up to 100 mm and alongceasefire with andthe start gradual of the stabilization Minsk process of tanks from the line of contact” (beyond the

9 Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 18 November 2015 / OSCE/ http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/201701 10 Status Report as of 10 February 2016 / OSCE/ http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/221641 11

12 www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/220571According to the daily briefings of the Administration of the President of Ukraine, presented at http://uacrisis.org/ 13 SMMOSCE OSCESpecial report Monitoring on 27 September Mission in –Ukraine: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/186276 Table of ceasefire violations as of 19:30hrs, 3 February 2016 http://

10 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 requirements of the Minsk agreements), the OSCE had been already operating in which was issued as a supplement to the Ukraine, launched in March 2014. The Minsk agreements on 29-30 September Mission started monitoring the situation in Minsk by members of the Trilateral Contact Group and the next day by the signing of Minsk agreements. From the leaders of “DPR” and “LPR”. It envisaged the veryin the beginning, conflict area Ukraine’s immediately position after on the withdrawal of tanks and artillery up to 100 SMM has been to strengthen its mandate mm for 15 km. The withdrawal process was and increase in personnel numbers. This formally completed on 12 November 2015. corresponds to the position of Ukraine to deploy a wide international mission It should be considered that ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ militants often prohibit OSCE SMM auspices of the UN or the EU, to facilitate a observers to visit some areas under their in the conflict area, perhaps under the occupation, what is regularly reported by Oncomprehensive 2 October conflict 2015, resolution.the “Normandy format” summit in Paris agreed on the ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ militants often prohibit expansion of the mission and widening OSCE SMM observers to visit some its responsibilities to demining. As of 10 «areas under their occupation. February 2016, mission members’ number has reached 1053 people, including 684 monitors, 540 of which are located in the

the Special Monitoring Mission in their the 22th OSCE ministerial conference in daily report.14 According to the Ukrainian Belgradeeast of Ukraine on 3–4 inDecember the conflict 2015, area. it was On security sources as well as volunteer group decided to extend the mission’s mandate “Information resistance”15, ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ for another year, to advance its technical avoid withdrawing of essential quantities equipment and increase the personnel of heavy weapons. Militants use industrial number. areas, especially closed plants and coalmines to hide MLRS, heavy artillery and tanks in A major question, however, continues to be close proximity to a contact line, especially the restriction of access for SMM monitors. in Donetsk, Horlivka and Luhansk Both ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ representatives and the

3. Ensure effective monitoring and to have full access for monitoring purposes. verification of the ceasefire regime and the IfRussian some areasofficials are prevent not monitored the OSCE due mission to the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE from the first day of the withdrawal, with others are impossible to monitor due to the use of all necessary technical means, thesecurity deliberate reasons restrictions. (mine field, For shelling), example, so including satellites, unmanned aerial “LPR” members continue to prevent the vehicles, radar systems and so on. SMM from monitoring many areas close to the border with the Russian Federation At the time of signing the Minsk agreements, in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the Government” – as stated in one of the

14 Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 3 February 2016 http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/220581 15 Information Resistance http://sprotyv.info/en

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 11 daily reports issued by the Mission.16 Such document, to adopt a restrictions are applied not only by the resolution to specify the territory to which separatist combatants, but the Russian side the special regime applies in accordance itself. Since the very beginning, Russian with the law of Ukraine. side prevents observers of OSCE SMM to monitor Russian – Ukrainian border in And in addition to it, “the certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions”.17 12. Issues related to local elections shall be discussed and agreed with representatives Also, numerous cases of violent attitude of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk towards the observers were reported. For regions within the framework of the Trilateral example, in August 2015, the SMM reported Contact Group on the basis of the Ukrainian about an apparent arson attack on its cars law “On the special procedure of local self- in militant-controlled Donetsk.18 Direct government in certain districts of Donetsk violence committed against OSCE monitors and Luhansk regions”. Elections shall be was also being noticed, and named by held in compliance with the relevant OSCE the Deputy Chief of the Mission Hug as standards and monitored by the OSCE ODIHR. “deliberate, hostile interference with the work of the OSCE SMM that amounts to The dialogue on modalities for local censorship”.19 elections began in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group after the formal 4. On the first day following the withdrawal, announcement of the withdrawal of heavy to start the dialogue on the modalities of weapons. The positions of Russia and holding local elections in accordance with Ukraine are fundamentally different. The Ukrainian legislation and Ukraine’s law Russian leadership believes, and this view “On the special procedure of local self- is broadcast through the leaders of “DPR” governance in certain districts of Donetsk and “LPR”, that such negotiations should and Luhansk regions” as well as on a future take place at the political level between regime of these districts on the basis of this Kyiv, Donetsk and Luhansk. Russia’s goal law. Immediately, no later than in 30 days is to have the leaders of “DPR” and “LPR”, since the date of the signing of the given appointed in Moscow, legalized within

Ukraine.Ukrainian This political interpretation and legal of the field, Minsk to Proper conditions for agreementinfluence through is excessively them the politicalarbitrary life and of organisation of local elections contrary to its text. Clause 4 of the Minsk-2 «are another point of fundamental Agreement does not specify how exactly the difference between the parties. dialogue on the modalities of the elections should be conducted. From a Ukrainian

16 Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 3 February 2016 http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/220581 17 SMM OSCE report on 1 December, see “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the

18 Read more on UNIAN: http://www.unian.info/war/1109501-four-osce-smm-cars-destroyed-in-arson-attack-in- donetsk-overnight.htmlfulfillment of its mandate”– http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/205451 19 Direct violence committed against OSCE monitors, one monitor hospitalized / Ukraine Crisis Media Center. 30.07.2015 http://uacrisis.org/30171-obsye-12

12 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 point of view, the format of the Trilateral ‘DPR’/ ‘LPR’ leaders, is that the admission Contact Group is quite adequate and clearly of Ukrainian political parties, Ukrainian media and internally displaced persons to the elections is unacceptable. Properdefined conditionsby Clause 12 for of organisation the Minsk-2. of local elections are another point of fundamental In addition, the latest demand of difference between the parties. Discussions the separatist combatants is to have a momental total amnesty for all local elections in October 2015 when the ‘participants of the events in the Donetsk leadersintensified of onthe the separatists eve of the unilaterally Ukrainian and Luhansk regions’ as a precondition announced organisation of their own for holding elections. This would allow local elections on 18 October 2015 in participation in elections to all participants ‘DPR’ and 1 November 2015 in ‘LPR’ respectfully without any correspondence regardless of the type and scale of crimes to the Ukrainian legislation. Only after to the conflict from the ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ sides, ‘Normandy format’ summit in Paris on 2 October 2015, the sides managed to Oncommitted 16 September during the 2014, conflict. Parliament of persuade unrecognized ‘republics’ to Ukraine adopted the Law “On the special postpone their elections till 2016 and procedure of local self-governance in move to a substantive discussion of the some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk conditions for elections organisation. regions”.20 According to this legislation, a special status has been established for The Ukrainian position is based on the text 3 years, when the Ukrainian legislation of the Agreements where it is mentioned can be limited only by this law provisions. that these elections should be held ‘in Among others, this law guaranteed use accordance with Ukrainian legislation’ of the Russian language, exemption from and ‘in compliance with the relevant OSCE the prosecution for participation in the standards’. Thus, it means free access of events in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, media and international observers; free special procedures for appointment participation of the Ukrainian political of prosecutors and judges (with the parties; and the top authority of the participation of local authorities), a special national Central Election Committee. regime for investment and economic The organization of the elections is activities, development of the transborder also challenged by the current security cooperation with the Russian Federation situation, as it is impossible to organize regions, creation of the special militia free elections under the guns, without units to keep public order, controlled only by the local authorities. However, it was stressed that this law should be shouldceasefire consider and disarmament more than 1, clauses 5 million of implemented only after the elections IDPsthe Minsk in Ukraine agreements from the fulfilled. Eastern Also, regions, one take place according to the Ukrainian who will not have a possibility to vote legislation, with international observers under the current conditions. So, logically, and media involved. On 17 March 2015, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the proper conditions for having free and corresponding amendments to the Law fairthese elections. issues should The position be addressed presented first by as “On the special procedure of local self-

20

Закон України Про особливий порядок місцевого самоврядування в окремих районах Донецької та Луганської областей / Верховна Рада України. 16.09.2014 http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 13 governance in some districts of Donetsk and punishment of people – participants and Luhansk regions”21 as well as adopted of the events on the territory of Donetsk a resolution on the determination of and Luhansk regions,24 and the Law ‘On individual regions, cities, towns and prevention of prosecution and punishment villages of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of persons – participants of the events in where the special procedure for the local the Donetsk and Luhansk regions’. The self-government is introduced.22 only restrictions for amnesty envisaged were terroristic acts and murder, rape and plunder.25 This latter law is not yet in the Minsk agreements, leader of “DPR” force, however, due to the chronic failure of ZakharchenkoDespite fulfilment immediately of its obligations expressed under his ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ to comply with the conditions unsatisfaction, insisting that they would of the Minsk agreements. like to have control over all localities where unrecognized illegal referendum took place In general, Ukrainian position is that the in 2014.23 amnesty cannot be full, as some of the cases should be considered as acts against 5. Ensure pardon and amnesty by putting humanity due to their extreme violence and into force a law that would ban persecution intention. and punishment of individuals in connection with the events that took place in some The position of Ukraine is in line with areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of international practice and the provisions Ukraine. of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, And The Law ‘On the special procedure of Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- local self-governance in certain districts 26 of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’, which The requirement for amnesty means that provides a general condition on amnesty certainInternational crimes Armedwere committed Conflicts but of persons 1977. in Art.3 “The state guarantees according who committed them should be subjects to this law, to compound of offence, to the maximum possible exemption from criminal and administrative prosecution, punishment.

21

http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/256-19/paran2#n2Закон України Про внесення зміни до статті 10 Закону України “Про особливий порядок місцевого 22 самоврядування в окремих районах Донецької та Луганської областей” / Верховна Рада України. 17.03.2015

Постанова Верховної Ради України Про визначення окремих районів, міст, селищ і сіл Донецької та 23 Луганської областей, в яких запроваджується особливий порядок місцевого самоврядування / Верховна ua.Рада http://ipress.ua/news/zaharchenko_nezadovolenyy_zakonoproektom_pro_osoblyvyy_status_donbasu_hoche_ України. 17.03.2015 http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/252-19 bilshe_terytoriy_115222.htmlЗахарченко незадоволений законопроектом17.03.2015 про особливий статус Донбасу: хоче більше територій / iPress. 24 ‘The State guarantees, in accordance with the law, prevention of criminal prosecution, criminal and administrative liability and punishment of persons – participants of the events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The author- - criminating, prosecuting and punishment of persons in relation to events that took place in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.’ities and –their http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18 officials, enterprises, institutions, organisations of all forms of ownership are prohibited from dis 25 - proc34?id=&pf3511=52183&pf35401=313104Проект Закону України Про недопущення переслідування та покарання осіб – учасників подій на території 26 ДонецькоїProtocol Additional та Луганської to the областейGeneva Conventions / Верховна of Рада 12 August України. 1949, 16.09.2014 and relating w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/web to the Protection of Victims of - ument Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. https://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475?OpenDoc

14 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 variant of legislation to be presented at the an internal one, as Russia claims, then the Trilateral Contact Group meeting, as they amnestyMoreover, cannot if the conflictbe extended is considered to foreign as citizens, i.e. citizens of Russia who took part acts from the list of exceptions.27 in the events in the Donetsk and Luhansk definitely would like to exclude terroristic regions. In the international law, there is 6. Ensure the release and exchange of all the a clear division between the rules of war hostages and illegally held individuals on and norms adopted concerning civilians the basis of the “all for all” principle. This and combatants in the non-international process should be completed no later than on the fifth day after the withdrawal. conflicts. In case it is a recognized The implementation of this clause of Minsk-2 asinternational well as the conflictProtocol Geneva mentioned Convention above. is bound in time to the implementation Therefore,on Prisoners the of status War of1949 the prisonerswill be applied, of war of the clause 2 on withdrawal of heavy can be applied only to the arrested soldiers weapons. If withdrawal had been assessed as completed on 8 March 2015, as it was this case, Ukraine can use these norms envisaged and declared by the sides, so by and officers of the Russian Federation. In the end of April, the hostages should be Yerofeev and Aleksandrov captured on the released. However, the withdrawal has not territoryagainst, forof Ukraine example, in May Russian 2015. officers Thus, been yet announced as completed, so the considering that the Russian Federation, release of hostages is taking place on the basis of bilateral arrangements. trying to insist on their retirement and voluntarilydespite the actions words in of Luhansk the officers, region, were the In fact, negotiations on the exchange of Ukrainian state had a right to prosecute hostages and illegally detained persons have them either for spying or terrorism.

Ukrainianbeen constant estimations, since the at the conflict time of began signing in Minsk-2the spring on of 12 2014. February According 2015, to the the Russian official consideredSo, in case of as the prisoners Ukrainian of citizens,war, and fighting should authorities, ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ held more than beunder treated the “DPR”/”LPR” according toflags, the they international cannot be 2000 Ukrainian citizens. In the opinion of the humanitarian law, which limits their rights Ukrainian representative in the humanitarian as prisoners of war, but widens their rights working group of the Trilateral Contact as citizens of the state. So only this category Group Iryna Gerashchenko, the ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ has a right to amnesty. As Russian citizens representatives are understating the list of only have a right for release and repatriation hostages taken.28 As a result, there are two (Art. 118 Geneva Convention 1949). remaining in captivity by February 201629) At the same time, a DPR representative lists:and those one iswho officially named agreedas ‘missing’ (around (around 140 announced in October 2015, that their side 800 people). Among those there are not only has started the preparation of their own military, but also volunteers and journalists.

27 http://glavcom.ua/news/333940.html 28 Боевики «ДНР» хотят обсудить в Минске закон об амнистии и восстановление мостов / Glavcom. 20.10.2015 22.10.2015 http://m.mignews.com.ua/ukraine/7432385.html 29 SomeГеращенко: 140 people Боевики still heldзанижают prisoner количество by militants находящихся – Ukrainian presidentу них в плену / Interfax. украинских 1/02/1026 заложников http://en.interfax. / Mignews. com.ua/news/general/321485.html

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 15 In addition, while discussing the hostages organisations can receive accreditation list, those who are under political from the separatist ‘republics’ for prosecution in the Russian courts (such delivering humanitarian aid to the area. as Sentsov and Savchenko) are not taken Usually access is given to either Russian into account by the Russian Federation. organisations or those from private Currently there are 10 Ukrainian political foundations who had past connections hostages in the Russian Federation, trials in the region (e.g. Rinat Akhmetov’s of whom are held with violations of the law foundation). The scandal happened, when Red Cross reported of their blocking while the high-level representatives of different delivering aid, and that many of their states,and are as well also as falsified. international The statementsorganizations of representatives lost their accreditation. are happening regularly urging to release In addition, they expressed their opinion political prisoners,30 however, without any that ‘DPR’ authorities started a mass response from the Russian side. campaign to discredit representatives of the humanitarian organisations.34 Ukraine has repeatedly shown readiness for the exchange as quickly as possible on The situation is deteriorating. If before the “all for all” principle. However, Russia, the negative attitude was mostly ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ inhibit this process by witnessed against the international/ insisting on additional preconditions – foreign humanitarian organizations, so since recently the local organizations have law on a momental and total amnesty for been also appearing under attack. The first of all, the adoption by Ukraine31 This of the is recent biggest case is illegal unexplained contrary to the text of Minsk-2, as it does arrest of Marina Cherenkova, a well- allnot participantsset any preconditions to the conflict. for “all for all” known volunteer, head of the organization exchange except for the heavy weapons “Responsible Citizens”, who has worked in withdrawal. Moreover, in January-February the amount of illegally “arrested” people former Deputy Governor of Donetsk region increased including volunteers.32 33 atDonbas the sincetimes the of first President days. Marina Yanukovych. is a local, “Responsible citizens” was a completely 7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage neutral group, never associated with the and distribution of humanitarian aid Ukrainian government of pro-Maidan among those who need it on the basis of an forces, so they managed to work until the international mechanism. last days at the hottest and most dangerous places of Donetsk region, providing food The situation with the humanitarian aid to and medical assistance. In few days not only the occupied territories is not stable. The Cherenkova was arrested, but also other members of the group interrogated by the

first problem is that not all humanitarian

30 rferl.org/content/savchenko/26839247.html 31 Ukrainian Pilot Defiant In Moscow Court As Detention Extended / Radio Free Europe. 10.02.2015 http://www.

32 “ДНР” занялась подготовкой собственного проекта амнистии, поскольку украинский считают ru/articles/zhena-402745неподходящим / Mignews. 20.11.2015 http://m.mignews.com.ua/politics/8210461.html 33 В «ДНР» схватили известного историка. Жена рассказала подробности / TV Rain. 31.01.2016 https://tvrain. http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/news/27532534.html 34 Угруповання «ДНР» має звільнити затриманих Козловського та Черенкову – ОБСЄ / Radio Free. 04.02.2016 dw.com/p/1Gdv2 Хто і чому не хоче міжнародну гуманітарну допомогу в “ЛНР” / Deutsche Welle. 26.09.2015 http://

16 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 “DPR” security forces and yet three activists expelled from the territory of “DPR”. does not control this territory, cannot be responsibleconflict. Anyway, for meetingUkraine asthe a side,needs which and 8. Definition of the modalities of a complete demands of the local population. Ukraine restoration of socio-economic ties, can bear responsibility only for those including social transfers, such as pension territories returned under its control payments or other payments (receipts and where it can guarantee the security of the income, paying the utility bills on time and social-economic infrastructure. renewing taxation within the framework of Ukraine’s legal field). To meet these Nevertheless, Ukraine does take obligations objectives, Ukraine will restore control towards all Ukrainian citizens, including over the segment of its banking system in those living under occupation, among the areas affected by the conflict, and an others paying pensions and other social international mechanism to facilitate these transfers may be set up. uncontrolled territories but doing this on thebenefits territory to the controlled people registeredby the Ukrainian at the Not all socio-economic ties can be quickly government, so people need to travel restored due to the security situation. Numerous cases of attacks to the banks’ centres were created near the contact cars made them to stop money delivery linethere. with For ‘DPR’/‘LPR’ simplification, to provide special logisticalbanking to the uncontrolled territories. At present, services and goods trade for citizens. There are numerous cases when separatists currencies – Russian rubles, Ukrainian themselves or their close relatives have hryvnias‘DPR’/‘LPR’ and allow US thedollars, flow with of all prices possible in regularly received Ukrainian pensions. supermarkets mostly presented in rubles. The uncontrolled territories are not paying 9. Restoration of full control over the state their utility bills and taxes. border in the whole zone of the conflict on the part of the Ukrainian government, According to the Fourth Geneva Convention which should begin on the first day after of 1949, there is a responsibility of the local elections and finish after an all- occupying side to provide services to inclusive political settlement (local elections in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk One may debate whether separatists can regions on the basis of Ukraine’s law, and the civil population in the conflict zone. constitutional reform) by the end of 2015, providing the implementation of clause 11 Ukraine does take obligations – in consultations and with the agreement towards all Ukrainian citizens, of representatives of certain districts of «including those living under Donetsk and Luhansk regions within the occupation, among others paying framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. pensions and other social benefits to the people registered at the This clause is one of the most important uncontrolled territories but doing for the realization of the Minsk agreement this on the territory controlled and political designation of roles for the by the Ukrainian government parties involved in the crisis. The border is always a bilateral thing, so as soon as Ukrainian government is not controlling be considered as occupying side while the border due to the uncontrolled Russia, despite its military involvement, territories, another side responsible is the is not taking responsibility as a side to the

Russian Federation. As the inflow of the UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 17 illegal weapons and military personnel is provisions of the Minsk agreements on local regularly reported by the OSCE, journalists elections, delivery of humanitarian aid, the and others, in addition to the Russian restoration of the economic infrastructure, soldiers caught at the Ukrainian territory, the withdrawal of foreign armed groups one can say that the Russian Federation is etc. logically demand the restoration of either directly supporting the separatists Ukraine’s control over the border, possibly in Donbas or is not able to control its with the mediation and presence of own border. However, Russian Federation missions of international organisations like provided assurance that it was controlling OSCE. its borders,35 meaning it was just ignoring In January 2016, Russian delegation and supporting such activity. blocked an OSCE decision to expand the the fact of the weapons and fighters flow mandate of the OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian checkpoints “Gukovo” and Allowing a free flow of fighters “Donetsk” to all sections of the border and weapons should be regarded that is temporarily not under control of «as taking a side to the conflict and the Ukrainian authorities,36 thus not even supplying separatists with fighters, allowing the international mission to ammunition, finance, and even observe the border situation. regular troops, and thus be regarded as a role of an aggressor state 10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military hardware and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory under the OSCE’s supervision. Disarmament of all should be regarded as taking a side to the illegal groups. Allowing a free flow of fighters and weapons There is no sign of essential decrease of regularconflict troops, and supplying and thus be separatists regarded withas a the Russian military contingent in Eastern rolefighters, of an ammunition,aggressor state, finance, according and to even the Ukraine. Ukrainian and foreign military UN General Assembly Resolution 3314. experts say that there are a still at least 8 thousand regular Russian troops in “the The Russian Federation has already certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk expressed one of its conditions that it could regions”. Despite the regular denial of close the Russian-Ukrainian border along this fact by the Russian authorities, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions only after OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reported all other clauses of the Minsk agreements on numerous occasions the facts of the were implemented. Such statements Russian soldiers’ presence37, capturing of are quite illogical since if other clauses some of them by the Ukrainian forces and open courts happening now are the direct more or less solved. Implementation of proof. are implemented it means the conflict is

35 zn.ua/POLITICS/rossiya-otkazalas-zakryvat-granicu-s-donbassom-i-vyvodit-voyska-161550_.html 36 StatementРоссия отказалась of the Ukrainian закрывать Delegation границу at 1086thс Донбассом Meeting и выводить of the OSCE войска/ Permanent Зеркало Council недели. in Connection 11.12.2014 with http:// the Decision on Extension of Deployment of OSCE Observers to Two Russian Checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian Border. OSCE Permanent Council Nr 1086. Vienna, 21 January 2016. http://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/com- ments/4915-komentar-mzs-ukrajini-u-zvjazku-z-rishennyam-postijnoji-radi-obse-shhodo-prodovzhennya-manda- tu-misiji-sposterigachiv-obse-na-dvoh-rosijsykih-punktah-propusku-gukovo-i-donecyk 37 haber/160205/osce-reports-russian-soldiers-near-donetsk OSCE reports Russian soldiers near Donetsk / World Bulletin. 4.06.2015 http://www.worldbulletin.net/

18 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 The EU in its personal sanctions their leaders.42 Ordinary militants from such acknowledged the Russian military senior staff involvement, e.g. Deputy Minister of give up weapons. Some insight presented in Defence Anatoliy Antonov appeared in thegroups interview were forced of the toRussian join “official Major units”Vladimir or the EU sanction list with the wording: “in Starkov for Euronews in August 2015.43 that capacity, involved in supporting the His trucks with ammunition for separatists deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine”.38 “accidently” came to the Ukraine military NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg also position, where he was arrested.

At the same time, Russia considers Ukrainian Russiaconfirmed is present this information with military in Decemberpersonnel former volunteer battalions as illegal, in2015: Eastern “We Ukrainehave stated and againthat is and based again on thatour insisting on their disbandment. However, own intelligence sources”.39 Ukrainian volunteer battalions, which appeared in spring of 2014, starting from It is necessary to mention that the so-called autumn 2014 have been fully incorporated “people militia” of DPR and LPR form a 36 in the Military Forces of Ukraine, National thousand strong military structure, which Police and the National Guard. So insisting possesses hundreds battle tanks, MLRS and on disbanding the so-called volunteer 40 There are evidences that battalions, the Russian Federation is trying the main forces of the self-proclaimed DPR to prohibit an integral part of the Ukrainian fieldand LPR, artillery. are not only armed and supplied armed forces, which are fully bound by by Russia, but integrated in the Russia Ukrainian state legislation. army structure.41 They are under the direct command of the Centre of the Territorial 11. Realization of constitutional reform in Forces, established on the basis of the Ukraine, with the new constitution to enter 12th Reserve Command, Southern Military into force by the end of 2015, and assuming District of the Russia Federation. Before as a key element the decentralization (taking autumn 2014, the mosaic of the forces into account the peculiarities of certain involved had been complicated and manifold, districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as comprised of different groups, including as agreed with representatives of these uncontrolled and criminal, who used the districts), and the enactment of permanent legislation on the special status of certain – summer 2015, the Russian special services districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in dismantledconflict as a possibility.uncontrolled During separatist autumn armed 2014 accordance with the measures specified in groups using arrests and assassinations of the footnotes, until the end of 2015.

38 List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Council of the European Union. 15.09.2015 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/pdf/150915- sanctions-table---Persons--and-entities_pdf/ 39 Putin denies Russian troops are in Ukraine / Yahoo news. 17.12.2015 http://news.yahoo.com/putin-denies-regu- lar-russian-troops-ukraine-170221107.html 40 Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. Defence Intelligence of Ukraine Public Affairs Service. http://gur.mil. gov.ua/en/content/russia-armed-aggression-against-ukraine.html 41 About reorganization of the 12th Reserve Command, Southern Military District into the Center of the Territorial Forces. Defence Intelligence of Ukraine Public Affairs Service http://gur.mil.gov.ua/en/content/shchodo-reorhani- zatsii-12-komanduvannia-rezervu-pivdennoho-viiskovoho-okruhu-u-tsentr-terytorialnykh-viisk.html 42 wolves-hundred-ukraine-russia-cossack/ 43 Meet the Cossack ‘Wolves’ Doing Russia’s Dirty Work in Ukraine / Time. 12.05.2014 http://time.com/95898/

Caught red-handed: the Russian Major fighting in Ukraine / Euronews. 13.08.2015 http://www.euronews. com/2015/08/12/caught-red-handed-the-russian-major-fighting-in-ukraine/ UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 19 It is clear that Russia does not want to Agenda. However, the ‘special status’ for annex Donbas in the same way as the the occupied areas has provoked a serious Crimea. Instead, Moscow wants Donbas to political divide. Still, these changes were remain a part of Ukraine to be used as a leverage on Kyiv. The Kremlin would like support (US Assistant Secretary of State to see ‘federalisation’/‘Bosnianisation’ of Victoriaapproved Nuland’s under the presence risk of losing in the Western Rada Ukraine as a result of the constitutional during the vote was seen by Ukrainians as process, i.e. turning it into a dysfunctional open pressure). divided state. In such a scenario, Moscow would remain in full de facto control over legitimised autonomous separatist pressure on Kyiv to implement clause 11 on ‘republics’ with their own ‘people’s militia’, constitutionalIn the eyes ofchanges many ahead Ukrainians, of implementing Western i.e. de facto military, and local executive and judicial authorities. Moreover, Ukraine looks like “appeasing” Russia for aggression andceasefire assisting and other it to urgent achieve clauses its ofgoals Minsk-2 of reconstruction of the destroyed Donbas ‘Bosnianisation’ of Ukraine. It is widely seen (and probably the West) would pay for the that Kyiv can have a meaningful dialogue important, these separatist enclaves could on the future constitutional devolution of gaineconomy the vetoand infrastructure.power over major What national is more powers only with legitimately democratically political decisions in Ukraine. Russian elected representatives of the Donbas pressure for a special constitutional region, i.e. it can be possible after the proper status for Donbas heavily complicated implementation of the clauses 4 and 12 of the constitutional process of the general Minsk-2 (see above). decentralisation reform in Ukraine. At the same time, “DPR” representatives Still, on 31 August 2015 the Parliament of stated their propositions on the constitutional reform of Ukraine, which draft of constitutional amendments on go far beyond the Minsk Agreements and decentralisationUkraine adopted for in Ukraine the first together reading with the a standards of the international law and provisional article on the special procedure practice on decentralization. For example, in addition to the request to have quota for their members in the Parliament of Ukraine, The Kremlin would like to see to use Russian language and have close ‘federalisation’/‘Bosnianisati economic ties with Russia, they insist on «on’ of Ukraine as a result of the granting the right to coordinate all adopted constitutional process, i.e. turning it laws as well as the right to veto decisions in into a dysfunctional divided state foreign policy and granting the right to form their own police, security services, judiciary, prosecution, border guard service, and other agencies without an approval by the Kyiv of local self-governance in certain districts authorities.44 of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Actually, the decentralisation of Ukraine is generally 13. Intensification of the activities of the supported by the public and has been a Trilateral Contact Group, including by means priority of the Ukraine-EU Association of establishing working groups to fulfil the

44 “DPR” offers special view of amendments to Ukrainian Constitution / Cencor. 27.01.2016 http://en.censor.net.ua/ n371293

20 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 respective aspects of the Minsk agreements. separatists’ regions representatives, agreed They will reflect the composition of the by four leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine Trilateral Contact Group. and Russia, and only later presented to the leaders of “DPR” and “LPR”, that was quite a The Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine Russian Federation in the decision-making format meeting in June 2014 to facilitate processvivid confirmation and negotiations. of the decisive role of the thewas dialogue set up followingbetween the governments first Normandy of diplomatic resolution to the war in Donbas. Conclusions TheUkraine Group and originally the Russian was Federationcomposed ofto highfind representatives from Ukraine, the Russian The analysis of the Minsk agreements Federation, and the OSCE. Representatives implementation demonstrates that of separatists (‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ despite few steps forward, the trend of a and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’) take part systematic violation of the certain clauses in the discussions of the Group. Currently, as well as serious manipulation of the the Group is supported by four thematic others by the so-called ‘Donetsk People working groups: on security issues; on Republic’/‘Luhansk People Republic’ political issues; on humanitarian issues; on (‘DPR’/‘LPR’) combatants and Russia can socio-economic issues. be observed.

The work of the Trilateral Contact Group For the time being, the main violations and should not be underestimated, and it is the non-conformity lay in the security domain, stable platform for a constant communication which should be considered as a basic prerequisite for the political settlement. issuesbetween and the more parties general to management conflict, which of is important to find solutions for daily asWithout well as full permission implementation of the full-access of the cease- to all high level of the representatives involved, fire, and withdrawal of the agreed weapons, includingthe conflict. heads Taking of the into working consideration groups, it the is possible to conclude the level of attention For the time being, the main violations and non-conformity to make decisions but not just to have talks «lay in the security domain, aboutand amount talks. of influence these people have which should be considered as a basic prerequisite for Recently, a special representative of the the political settlement Russian President B. Gryzlov stated, that in his opinion, Russia is not a part to the Minsk Agreements45. Moreover, he insists that any decisions, including Constitutional negotiations or practical implementation of changes should be negotiated with the theterritories clauses for regarding the OSCE, reconstruction it is difficult to of start the representatives of “DPR” and “LPR”. destroyed territories or local elections – in However, it is worth mentioning, that case these elections are expected to meet the Minsk talks in February 2015 took the international standards. place almost without the absence of the

http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2895197 45 «Мы можем серьезно продвинуться в реализации Минских соглашений» / Kommersant.ru. 17.01.2016

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 21 Minsk agreements implementation has control is a clear single responsibility been taking place with different speed of the Russian Federation. Continuing for different clauses. From the very prevention of the OSCE’s monitors to beginning, it was a problem due to the observe the situation at the uncontrolled territory reveals both the attitude towards implementation as well as a sequence for the international obligations and desire to implementationlack of defined deadlines of the individual for all the clauses hide non-conformity to them. in the list, resulting in serious disputes

insists on the simultaneous start of Dr. Hanna Shelest, Editor-in-chief of UA: Ukraine implementationbetween the parties.of all clauses, While the UkraineRussian Analytica, member of the Board at the Foreign Policy Federation manipulates with few clauses, Council “Ukrainian Prism” and curator of the Ukrainian for example insisting that full control of Peacebuilding School. Previously H.Shelest served as the Ukrainian border by the Ukrainian a Senior Researcher at Odessa branch of the National authorities can be restored only after local Institute for Strategic Studies and a Visiting Research elections and Constitutional changes. Fellow at the NATO Defence College (Italy). She has a PhD in International Relations, specializing in conflict At the same time, there must be certain resolution and security issues. She has more than 50 logic in implementation of the agreed academic and more than 100 media articles on conflicts actions. Free and democratic elections as well as reconstruction of the destroyed and security. H.Shelest is a Rotary Peace Fellow (2010), towns are not possible while security John Smith Fellow (2012) and Marshall Memorial Fellow situation remains fragile. However, (2016) provision of a secure environment Dmytro Shulga, Director of the European Programs at the International Renaissance Foundation (Ukraine). also effective control over the Ukraine- Studied International Relations in Ukraine and European Russiademands state not border only aand steady stop ceasefireof the illegal but Integration Law in Germany, since 2005 has worked for IRF. Mr. Shulga’s primary interests include Ukraine- uncontrolled territory. If other clauses EU-Russia relations, Black Sea region, and European caninflow be presented of weapons as a and responsibility military to of the Neighbourhood Policy. self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk’ and ‘Luhansk’ ‘People’s Republics’, the effective border

22 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN UKRAINE AS A FACTOR DESTABILIZING DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE STATE

Iuliia Tsyrfa Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University

Since 2014, the Ukrainian state has been suffering from the economic, political and social crisis, which has deepened due to constant warfare conducted by the pro-Russian terrorist groups in the Eastern Ukraine and the Kremlin annexation of the Crimean peninsula. These factors permanently influence the internal political stability of the state and personal security of its population. The latter cannot be fully guaranteed by official authorities, as a significant number of people are subjected to pressure of purely humanitarian nature. Today, the humanitarian crisis is amplified by the fact that many people from the East of Ukraine still reside in the military operations area or struggle for their lives having acquired the status of internally displaced persons. This situation leads both to a significant imbalance in implementation of the internal policy and brings humanitarian issues to the foreign policy domain. Thus, this article aims to explore a grade of impact and a role of the humanitarian factor in the implementation of domestic policy of Ukraine, as well as in the realization of its diplomatic activities in the world political arena.

Military and political crisis that erupted Russian Federation, harbouring plans in Ukraine two years ago and continues to restore its former power, ideologized now, is assuming new shapes today and an idea of political revenge and began to is rapidly expanding the range of aspects realize the foreign strategy of ‘gathering in public life to have the overwhelming lands’, which had always been considered as the modern history, three key processes the Ukrainian society and its political startedinfluence developing thereon. Forsimultaneously the first time and in elitea direct went Russian through ‘zone the of influence’.transformational Thirdly, processes, which consequently forced development of the Ukrainian state and becameinfluencing the theprimary formation driving andforce further for a the formation of the Ukrainian nation. beginning of the crisis. Firstly, leading However, the possibility of existence of a actors of the global political scene to make its conscious choice in favour of unified national community, being able renew the world order and validate their domestic and foreign policy courses of rolesintensified in a new their and activities well-formed in order system to its state, triggered provoked the Russian of international relations. Secondly, the Federation.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 23 Russian Policy and Humanitarian Complex Emergency be separated from humanitarian issues. Thepolitical Russian activities politicians as a specificactually sphereconsider to Initially, manipulating the issues of cultural ‘protection of the population’ as a slogan to cover aggressive military actions1. and Eastern regions of Ukraine, as well as Therefore, a permanent threat to health theaffiliation idea ofof the‘historical population necessity’ in the Southernto unite the Slavic peoples, the Russian authorities restriction of rights, personal restraint, managed to quickly shake all the vital and manipulation life, deprivation of ofconsciousness material benefits, make mechanisms maintaining the existence of only a short list of challenges faced by the the Ukrainian state. The internal disruption residents in Donbas and the Crimea.

Among other things, international manipulating the issues of cultural humanitarian law obliges Russia, as the affiliation of the population in occupying power, to maintain law and order, «the Southern and Eastern regions respect human rights and provide food and of Ukraine, as well as the idea of medical care to the population under its ‘historical necessity’ to unite the control2. It also obliges Russia to facilitate Slavic peoples, the Russian authorities assistance by relief agencies should it be managed to quickly shake all the unable to provide for the population itself. vital mechanisms maintaining the However, the Russian actions prove adverse: existence of the Ukrainian state by worsening the critical situation, Moscow received another ‘card’ that can be played an unlimited number of times destabilizing of social and economic stability of the state domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine. a priori leads to its depravation from within: in this case, the military intervention was a Therefore, the humanitarian crisis, which mere tool for achieving this goal. As a result, seized the Ukrainian state two years ago regressive processes in the Ukrainian has transformed into a disaster of the other society are intensifying daily and reaching scale, i.e. into the post-Bipolar complex new dimensions. They do not take place emergency. This phenomenon of the post- only in the areas of domestic policy, social and economic public administration. They where a situation of violence causes human also cause a kind of hysteria in the society fatalities,Cold War eraforced is known displacement, as a man-made epidemics crisis as a whole, starting from the soldiers’ post- and famine.3 However, in Ukraine it is war syndrome and ending with problems of combined with the weakening of economic and political structures, the reduction of social unity and a considerable deformation Thiscivilians strategy remaining of inattrition the conflict cannot zone. be of public morality. From the academic considered unreasonable, even more, standpoint, complex emergencies differ from so as Russia understands military and crises as they are more prolonged, political

1

Военная доктрина Российской Федерации: Указ Президента РФ № Пр-2976 от 25 декабря 2014 г. 2 http://archive.mid.ru//bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd/2a959a74cd7ed01f432569fb004872a3org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtectionOfCivilianPersons.aspx 3 HumanitarianGeneva Convention Emergencies relative toand the Humanitarian Protection of Action, Civilian Alert Persons 2010, in p. Time 111 ofhttp://escolapau.uab.cat/img/progra War, 12 August 1949 http://www.ohchr.- mas/alerta/alerta/10/cap04i.pdf

24 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 consistent humanitarian policy becomes an de-structuralizing impact on all spheres of life.at root4 As and a result, have athe significant response destructive to these crises and and preservation of the state’s sovereignty. usually involves a large number of players, Thus,important by stirring factor influencinghumanitarian both disaster, formation the as well as those exclusively involved in Russian Federation affected considerable humanitarian work, including peacekeeping the internal situation in the country and Ukraine’s position in the international arena as well. Despitemissions, politicalthe changes and diplomatic in Government figures. leadership, the political and economic reorientation, and the emergence of a Within the frameworks of internal vibrant civil society dedicated to the policy, humanitarian problems implementation of the changes, Ukraine «are not only the primary cause of remains far from achieving political and social instability, but also a litmus economic stability and internal security test to determine the unity of elites sought by supporters of the Euromaidan. In fact, 2016 has already proven to be a very unsettling time for the Government as frustration have mounted over the Humanitarian Impact on Internal slow pace of political reforms, economic Stability progress and international negotiations

humanitarian problems are not only the on conflict resolution. primaryWithin the cause frameworks of social of instability,internal policy, but population; internally displaced persons also a litmus test to determine the unity of faceThe conflictshortages continues in food, affecting health services, resident elites. An increase in tensions between the basic household items and shelter, state authorities has proved a lack of their and suffer from psychological distress internal legitimacy. The regional elites are after more than two years of warfare. gradually maximizing their importance According to the European Commission’s in the country, and could require more Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection extensive rights to funding and self- government of the regions in future. over 3.7 million people, out of which 3.1 The lack of social support, overweight millionDepartment, are estimated the conflict to be has in need affected of of political and economic mistakes, humanitarian assistance.5 and absence of reforms, multiplied by the changed political balance, turned However, during all the years of its the humanitarian crisis and all the independence Ukraine remained uncertain opportunities to overcome it into a bargaining chip in the internal political could unite the Ukrainian society (including game of various subjects and parties. This humanism,about universally patriotism, significant freedom, valuesspirituality, that respect for human rights, and the state’s the political system itself; its players are responsibility to society). Just now, the completelyincreases thedeprived conflict of public intensity support, within and

4 Humanitarian Emergencies and Humanitarian Action, Alert 2010, p. 111 http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/progra- mas/alerta/alerta/10/cap04i.pdf 5 European Commission: Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection: ECHO Factsheet – Ukraine, March 2016, p. 2

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/ukraine_en.pdf UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 25 as the core objective of the Orthodoxy decreasing. Taking into consideration that consists in protecting humanistic ideals quitesocial consistentconfidence informationin their acts isand constantly cultural and human persons and condemning policy of the Russian Federation led to any encroachments on their welfare. By the reformation of consciousness among a manipulating the humanitarian factor, the considerable number of citizens, to take a Church is able to form the worldview of back seat to humanitarian issues means to Ukrainians and, therefore, provide support split the Ukrainian society. to certain political positions. The rubber stamp UOC – MP has become an important The delivery of humanitarian aid convoys instrument of ideological and spiritual to the so-called ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ allows intervention, since it is permanently Russia to create the illusion of supporting destabilizing the political situation in Ukrainian citizens that becomes quite Ukraine and supporting its territorial real in crisis. In addition, the settlement fragmentation. For its part, the Russian of humanitarian crisis is increasingly Orthodox Church MP disseminates its affected by various pro-Russian national slogans and judgments at the international and regional actors, which often handle level: this discredits the Ukrainian extremely painful political issues. The Orthodox community and, consequently, church may be positioned as the primary one. The Russian occupation of some the eyes of the faithful worldwide. Ukrainian territories has established a undermines the prestige of official Kyiv in strict line of demarcation between the The Ukrainian representatives in the religious communities in Ukraine using a Trilateral Contact Group, which is criterion of their attitude to the processes responsible for negotiations to settle the of national state-building. The Catholic an idea that the humanitarian crisis the Pope Francis, tends towards the conflict in Donbas, increasingly promote internationalcommunity, followinglegal settlement edifications of the of 7 This essentially contradicts those basicshould European influence values, the elimination which have of been this humanitarian crisis in the territory of determinedconflict. by Ukrainians as major ones. Ukraineconflict 6 and. Alternatively, the fastest the resolution faithful of the Humanism has a universal positional Ukrainian Orthodox Church – the Moscow Patriarchate express their opposing perspectives. Not all but just a few countries political viewpoints as they openly arenature; able itto isreach possible such perspectives, from some reflexive as their support the Russian invaders. Making leaders often conceive modern life in terms allowance for the fact that 50% of the of social, political, economic or cultural Orthodox centres in Ukraine stay under ideologies. As a result, the trite disregard of the Moscow Patriarchate’s jurisdiction, social needs divides the population into two one can argue that the religious factor can opposition camps, which are no longer able be determined as a powerful leverage to to defend the national identity of the state make the Ukrainian state dependent on to be really necessary for the protection of Russia. The Orthodox canons may easily its sovereignty. Under these conditions, the shape public opinions of the majority, society loses its moral and ethical principles.

6 Pope Francis meets with the President of Ukraine, 20 November 2015 http://en.radiovaticana.va/ news/2015/11/20/pope_francis_meets_with_the_president_of_ukraine/1188323 7 - nia.com/2016/01/16/gerashhenko-slid-sprostiti-peresuvannya-cherez-kordon-iz-separatistami/ Геращенко: Слід спростити пересування через кордон із сепаратистами. – 16 січня 2016 р. http://novynar

26 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 Their integration into the segmental society The Ukrainian state generally receives does not make any sense – neither social nor humanitarian assistance in the course of political. Morality dies. Conventional wisdom activities carried out by the international maintains that most of the population is governmental and non-governmental organizations. Despite that, the effective who primarily require supporting their lives. control of this process is placed at the end of deprived of their daily benefits by persons the agenda of international negotiations on Ukrainians who are originally from different the Ukrainian issue. regionsIn fact, an of internal the state social arises. conflict between the Diplomatic Consideration of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, there areAccording about to1.6 the million Office ofinternally the United displaced Nations Nowadays, the system of international relations is critically overloaded with thousandpersons, whoand 1 have million fled IDPs their are homes living due in and activities of different quasi-states territoriesto the conflict controlled in Ukraine. by the BetweenGovernment, 800 resultinglocal conflicts from palliative, of various temporary intensity and where some continue to face discrimination in accessing public services. OHCHR has Key actors of the international arena strive observed that some IDPs are returning to maintainingincomplete solutionsthe fragile to status these quo conflicts. when their homes, while others are unable to do the international system does not undergo so due to the destruction or military use radical transformations and cannot become of their property.8 According to the UN uncontrollable. Today, changes in the status of its actors are not allowable either to the Ukrainians are seeking asylum or protection United States or to the European Union. abroad,and Russian with officialthe majority sources, going over to1 millionRussia However, Russia tries acting at cross- and Belarus9. purposes. Responding to criticism regarding the inactivity while implementing an Such conditions advance the further transfer international mechanism for humanitarian of issues regarding the internal humanitarian assistance to be envisaged in the Package crisis in Ukraine to the international level. of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, Moscow considers the situation as an opportunity to implement establishment of the common economic and aWhereas coordinated Ukrainian humanitarian authorities policy,consider other this humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the actors of the international relations strive using it to review their commitments to through the convergence of the European Russia, including not only political, but andPacific Eurasian Ocean, integration which could processes. be implemented10 also legal, financial, and energy ones.

8 Ukraine, 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, p. 7 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ Ukraine_13th_HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdfOffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Report on the human rights situation in 9 Ukraine, 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, p. 7 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ Ukraine_13th_HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdfOffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Report on the human rights situation in 10

Выступление Постоянного представителя Российской Федерации при ОБСЕ А. К. Лукашевича на id/2134250совместном заседании Постоянного совета ОБСЕ и Форума по сотрудничеству в области безопасности. – Вена. – 9 марта 2016 г. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 27 Regrettably, the Russian approach to negotiations makes sense. The movement International discussions on in the wake of foreign policy of its partners the internal structure of the «Ukrainian state do not only interests in Ukraine. The main one is an undermine its sovereignty, but also increasinglycauses specific clear risks desire for of the Ukrainian national significantly harm the effectiveness partners to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic interaction. of relations with Russia with no regard to Ukraine’s position or even at its account. To determine an actual position of the the population of the Eastern regions undermining the unity and power of the RussiaWestern have countries already on become the Ukrainian burdensome issue Ukrainian state. Moscow could continue foris muchthem, more and difficult:the current sanctions immigration against building up its military presence near crisis sidelines even an opportunity to Ukrainian borders and in the Crimea. resolve the issue on the Ukrainian IDPs. In return, the issue on de-occupation The Kremlin quite successfully uses the of the Crimean Peninsula would be put humanitarian factor while playing its beyond the diplomatic negotiations with foreign policy game. Suffering from social and economic problems, the Ukrainian would continue persuading the world authorities are simply unable to realize all toforeign recognize partners: its illegal the officialannexation Moscow and the transformations required within the neutralize all the attempts of the Ukrainian implementation of the Minsk Agreements side to shift the issue on return of this in time. The pressure on the Ukrainian territory in its favour.

crisis is making a sharp comeback. International discussions on the internal officials is growing, but the humanitarian structure of the Ukrainian state do not The primary reason for such a situation is only undermine its sovereignty, but one of the main drawbacks of the Minsk negotiations caused by the placement of of diplomatic interaction. Diplomacy fundamental issues of the internal policy isalso particularly significantly forceful harm thein a effectiveness sphere of of Ukraine on the agenda of these talks. foreign and international policy, but its

negotiation process will be ineffective of domestic policy. Internally, Ukrainians andUp untilarrangements this weakness to be isreached not fixed, will not the needeffectiveness a moral is much consensus lower in thebetween field be legitimate. However, the status of the authorities and citizens regarding the key Eastern regions of Ukraine is a top priority issues of the foreign policy, especially when they relate to the national sovereignty and The Russian diplomacy managed to turn the territorial integrity of the state. State itsnot ownonly forgoal Russia, into thebut alsopurpose for theof West.most leaders should receive a considerable

the ‘hybrid’ return of the Donbas to the in turn, should know that the authorities jurisdictionWestern partners. of the TheUkrainian main objectiveauthorities of defendvote of confidenceits security. from Such the public,relationships which, is maintenance of the so-called ‘grey zone’ allow ensuring the existence of a stable of instability in the East of Ukraine. This political system and a monolithic social formal ‘return’ may guarantee Russia the platform, which altogether form the basis removal of economic sanctions imposed of foreign policy. At the international level, narrowing the scope of negotiations

by the West and the ability to manipulate

28 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 and their focus on foreign policy, security majority of the EU countries with Ukraine and humanitarian aspects may become are still considered through the prism of a logical step made in the nearest future. their ties with Russia. The preservation The consideration of humanitarian of the European security system and the respective positions of the EU leaders authority of the Government inside of the therein is their primary task while solving countryissues could and, significantlyconsequently, strengthen improve the credibility of the state in the international arena. Thethe Ukrainian-Russian humanitarian crisis conflict. in Ukraine has become a problem to be exclusively Conclusions tackled by the national authorities. Its solution is the path to political, economic Ukraine has managed to have the political and social reconstruction of the country. support of the US and the EU regarding However, the narrow agenda of the the pressure put on Russia in order for international negotiations to settle the the Minsk Agreements to be implemented. Nevertheless, it failed to put forward new political initiatives to accelerate their politicalconflict, assituation well as inthe Ukraine, Russian bringsreluctance the realization and to create new mechanisms importanceto lose a keyof these leverage issues influencing at the world the for monitoring its compliance with the political level almost to nought. In fact, the commitments. In contrast to the Ukrainian resolution of the humanitarian crisis in tactics, the Kremlin is quite successfully Ukraine is dissonant with the objectives of the foreign policy of the leading actors of international relations. opponentsforming its with ‘flexible energy alliances’ and information with the factors.EU and The NATO establishment members influencing of the status some quo in the Donbas region, rather than the social Iuliia Tsyrfa, Ph.D. in Political Sciences, Assistant and humanitarian aspects of its further Lecturer at the Institute of International Relations of development, remains the underlying issue. Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University. In 2010- The United States stands up for the norms 2013, she worked as a junior research fellow at the and principles of international law and tries Foreign Policy Research Institute of the Diplomatic to preserve the established world order. Academy of Ukraine under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Thus, Germany and France strive preventing harmful effects of the Ukrainian crisis on of Ukraine. Research interests: Foreign Policy Identity the political, economic and humanitarian Theories, World Humanitarian Politics, European and relations between Europe and the Russian North American Country Studies. Federation. The relationships of the vast

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 29 GUIDELINES FOR MANAGING THE CONFLICT IN DONBAS

Mykola Kapitonenko Center of International Studies (Ukraine)

The article focuses on the on-going conflict in the East of Ukraine. Two years after its beginning, it has become a challenge for both national and regional security. By now, it carries the features of the so-called “frozen” conflicts, typical for post-Soviet political space. Managing these conflicts is specifically difficult due to strong impact of the Russian policy, to which these conflicts are instruments for strengthening control over immediate neighbourhood. On the other hand, the conflict resembles other militarized internal disputes (MIDs) of the post- bipolar world. They encompass numerous issues, including identities, resources, symbols, and narratives. They also often result from structural factors, triggered by weakness of states. Most of these conflicts are hard to manage and/or resolve. So far, there is no defined strategy for Ukraine to apply for settling the conflict. We argue that theoretical guidelines for internal conflict management combined with the critical analysis of similar conflicts’ trajectories could help elaborate a more precise approach.

Moreover, as long as there is an ongoing a strong external intervention in the Eastern war on its territory, Ukraine continues to UkraineManaging is a an full-fledge extraordinarily internal hard conflict task with for be an unstable state, not only undermining the Ukrainian leadership. Together with the its own chances for a successful European integration, but also generating far- reaching risks for regional security everannexation for the of thecountry. Crimea, Its the negative Donbas conflictimpact already undermined by revisionist Russian coversis the both most hard significant and soft security security challengeareas. As policies. a result of the annexation of the Crimea by

East of the country, Ukraine has lost control consequences has been on top of Ukraine’s overRussia approximately and an on-going 7% armed of its conflict territory. in theIts politicalAddressing agenda the for conflict’s about two immediate years. real GDP fell about 19% in recent two years1. At the same time, there is a clear lack of The country suffered over 9,000 casualties vision of ways and strategies of resolving and more than 20,000 injured since April

Commissioner for Human Rights2. highthe conflict.stakes from Considering Russia and the secessionist experience 2014, according to UN Office of the High of other regional conflicts, involving

1 - doc/2015/10/34131444107623273/UA-MacroeconUpdate-Oct-2015-en.pdf, Retrieved Jan., 8, 2016. 2 The World Bank Ukraine Economic Update, October, 5, 2015 // http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/public

Ukraine Conflict Has Left More than 9,000 Dead, Says UN, The Guardian, December 9, 2015. 30 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 movements supported by Moscow, chances structural factors. They are, in short, about and keeping its development under distribute social goods: security, justice, are high for freezing the conflict in Ukraine prosperity,state’s efficiency, high i.e.level ability of income, to generate and and so will examine whether other options are on. If a state is functioning properly, there possiblecontrol, Russianand how control “transnistrization” by all means. Weof are usually enough ways, institutions, and procedures for solving disputes security agenda. within society. On the contrary, if a state the Donbas conflict will affect broader Theory: Managing Internal Conflicts an ineffective state becomes vulnerable to a structural security interests within a state, which for several «dilemma. Like in international reasonsMost internal cannot conflicts be addressed result fromproperly. clash All of politics, this dilemma is about the uncertainty over intentions and while some are handling them peacefully lack of any security guarantees in andstates effectively, experience others internal are falling conflicts, victims but relations among several actors to a large-scale violence, uncontrolled escalation, and war.

There are several factors determining the is corrupted, ineffective, and lacking well- and escalation. They could be divided harmony, division lines among different intoprobabilities structural of internaland discriminative. conflict initiation The groupsdefined start mechanisms to accumulate for keeping distrust, social fear, latter are about social groups within and hatred. states, which can be – and, in fact, are – extremely different in terms of national identity, religion, ideology, gender, age, becomes vulnerable to a structural security and alike. There is no state free of societal dilemma.When that Like happens, in international an ineffective politics, state differences, although in some rare cases this dilemma is about the uncertainty over intentions and lack of any security instance, in Norway or Japan ethnic guarantees in relations among several minoritiesthey can beconstitute significantly less than reduced. 5% of total For actors. A normally functioning state can population. In the former Soviet Union, exercise its sovereignty to provide security like in most planned socialist economies, for all subjects, while a weak state can no diversity in income has been minimized. longer do that. Thus, relations among In these rare cases, differences become religious, national, ideological or other less evident, but nevertheless present. groups in such a state turn into hostility, The level of discrimination, concentration of differences, history, and sometimes and then in a way they act. Pressed by the geography determine the scope and absencefirst in aof way security they perceiveguarantees, each due other to the weakness of the state, they are taking preventive measures in an environment, Onstrength the other of potential hand, internalthere are conflicts. conditions which looks so much like anarchy in the under which imagined lines among various international system. society groups are turning into frontlines. The ability of a state to manage differences and create a favourable environment for states,The conflict but at inthe Ukraine same time carries it is different features common for all internal conflicts in weak preventing violent conflicts is reflected by UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 31 from most of them because of a strong impact produced by participation of a applied in Ukraine to manipulate identities neighbouring great power. It could be andThe provide “Russian an World” alternative mythology for the European has been argued that the weakness of the Ukrainian values. But it is Russia that had to meet state triggered structural mechanisms of the reality it used to speak about so much when criticizing American foreign policy: factors have been weak or absent. Russia any coercion or violence is extremely internal conflict; however, discriminative unfavourable for soft power politics.

Accordinghad to introduce to 2001them artificially.census, Russians have been the biggest ethnic minority in different from almost all other internal Ukraine, of about 17% of total population This is how the conflict in Donbas is and decreasing.3 At the same time, differences at heart, in Donbas there is only in one of Ukrainian regions – the Russianconflicts. policy. While inIt mostis formally cases, thereinternal, are Autonomous – they however managing it requires not were the majority. After the annexation harmonizing the relations among the of the Crimea by Russia in March 2014, groups within the society, but handling Ukrainians present ethnic majority in every region of the country. There are time, one cannot completely discard neither ways of discriminating inhabitants Russia’sthe Russian manipulations factor first ofwith all. identity. At the same The of Donbas, nor differences in identity between them and the rest of Ukrainians. identity. Not only identity differences dynamics of violent conflict transforms

The “Russian World” mythology theircan lead identities to a conflict, splitting the apart,opposite and is alsothat has been applied in Ukraine to wouldpossible. eventually Ukrainians become in Donbas an important may find «manipulate identities and provide an alternative for the European values dimension of the conflict. requires several key steps. First, the In theory, managing internal conflicts been drawn through speculations over language,Thus, artificial history, dividingand national lines identity. have environment of the conflict should be economic,modified. Thereand aregeographical always third – partieswhich mix of historical interpretations, Orthodox as well as specific conditions - political, religiousWrapped policy, under and “Russian rhetoric World” of the Russian- title, a environment, one could enhance the speaking minorities in the neighbouring chancesimpact thefor conflict.settlement. By The improving Ukrainian the countries has been labelled Russian “soft crisis is a part of a broader geopolitical power” and applied with the view to competition, a solution, which may alone enhance Moscow’s control over the near abroad. Contrary to Kremlin’s emphasis of values, resources, and power, altogether “softness”, this was a subordinated element constitutingbring the conflict the issue to at an stake, end. should Secondly, be of Russia’s unusually hard policy. broadened as much as possible. No matter how warring parties’ positions may seem,

3 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, The All-Ukrainian Population Census // http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/ accessed: March 20, 2016.

32 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 there are always interests behind them. Assessing interests rather than sticking long-lasting confrontation, establishment to positions is the key to broadening the orfirmly strengthening set. The process of the wasstate markedinstitutions, by a should be introduced: it there is something and the presence of problems related to inconflict how groups issue. coexist Thirdly, – structuralbe it asymmetry changes of responsible for dealing with the conflict, interests or power, structural violence or political agenda. These are markers of the anything alike – that generates tension and the conflict at the very top of the country’s turning it into an important element of everydayso-called institutionalizationlife in the society. Atof thisa conflict, stage, conflict, it should be changed. to manage. There are always two strategic long time, which poses the second most alternatives:Internal conflicts either are to eliminatenotoriously differences difficult importantconflicts maychallenge exist for for Ukraine an indefinitely next to or to manage them. The former is usually the violation of its territorial integrity. done through the separation of a state, while the latter is most often carried out through democratization. Both strategies its neighbourhood would be by far the have numerous setbacks and weaknesses, bestFor Russia,possible another outcome. frozen Kremlin conflict knows in as well as both have an impressive record of failures in recent 25 years. Nevertheless, responsibility, and manipulate parties. there are no viable alternatives. At some how to operate these conflicts, avoid point, Ukrainian leadership will have to probably demand more investment, take a decision over which way to follow. leadership,Although a and conflict overall in effort Ukraine than would any So far, mixed rhetoric over elections in the other, it will suit Moscow more than any Donbas and prospects of implementing other alternative. the Minsk agreements indicates the lack of both a clear strategy and the understanding of making an inevitable choice ahead. is still favourable for Ukraine, although tendsThe international to become less context so in future. of the Russia’s conflict Preserving the territorial integrity of revisionist policy challenges the existing Ukraine (excluding the Crimea) will require political efforts aimed at managing damaged the system of regional security inworld Europe. order Thus, and hasboth already the annexation significantly of are so actively manipulated by the Kremlin. the Crimea and the crisis in Donbas have Theartificially task will constructed be even differences,harder given which that become a part of a broader issue, which the differences have been created not strongly demands reaction from the for reconciling, but for exerting political world’s major stakeholders in security pressure on Kyiv. In short, unlike other area. So far, this reaction has been painful for the Kremlin and it is most likely to problem in managing Ukrainian crisis remain so in the near future. internal conflicts, the most challenging between Kyiv and Donetsk/Luhansk, but It has been conventional wisdom within betweenwill be finding Kyiv and a political Moscow. compromise not Ukrainian political discussion that time is playing on our side; however, that is an Conflict Management Strategy for open question. Ukraine is certainly paying Ukraine in its territory, both in absolute and relative In 2015-2016, conditions for “freezing” terms,the heaviest and thus price is getting for an weakeron-going and conflict more dependent on external support over time. the conflict in the East of Ukraine were UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 33 It should be noted, that such a high price is escalation seems equally unlikely so far being paid for just preserving the current due to the lack of political background. status quo. Any move away from it will presumably cost even more. At the same the equilibrium point and preserving its time, Russia is also getting considerably currentCurrently features the conflict and seemsstructure to remainseems toat weaker. Given Moscow’s broader foreign be the most likely mid-term scenario. Both policy agenda and the asymmetry of goals Ukraine and Russia are heavily paying for its continuation, but both are afraid of losing even more in case it ends contrary itswith goals Kyiv in over Ukraine the conflict, increasingly it could more be to their expectations. After injecting a assumed that Russia may find obtaining large portion of realpolitik into European ambiguity over which side the time is on, security environment, Russia is now paying whichdifficult, certainly risky, and makes costly. strategic There is planninga certain the price for that itself, being locked within a classic security dilemma. As before, the parties’ zones of possible agreement are much more difficult. not intersecting, and that makes freezing there is still a probability of re-escalation, it is getting «smaller due to rising costs Inthe an conflict ideal world, even more Ukraine probable. would certainly and the lack of political issues, which could be resolved by the integrity restored, and independence direct application of force like to see the conflict ended, its territorial set of goals in mind is always helpful, mostfrom probably, Russia regained. they will While not be having achieved this simultaneously in either short or mid- term perspective. If this is the case, there theThe latterconflict is is often asymmetric described in almostas superior every is a clear need to specify the priorities and tactics,sense, as implied well as notoriouslyby Russia “hybrid”.4, the former While start approaching the crisis with building provides Ukraine with good options for a hierarchy of interests.

of asymmetry and “hybridness” of the Given those circumstances, Ukraine further conflict management. The impacts should build its strategy, preferably a long- probability of a large-scale war and make conflict are mixed; they together reduce the end soon. Like in other cases of the post- The accurate management of asymmetry term one, since the conflict is unlikely to ina frozenrelations conflict with Russia scenario may most help probable. Ukraine will be the lack of leverage against Russia’s reduce its vulnerability and prevent Russia manipulationSoviet frozen with conflicts, secessionist there mostterritories. likely from making use of its advantages. On the other hand, Ukraine should build upon that experience as well, learning Although there is still a probability of from mistakes and taking a closer look at re-escalation, it is getting smaller due to what had been achieved. rising costs and the lack of political issues, which could be resolved by the direct Foreseeing the future is close to impossible, application of force. At the same time, de- but one could follow the trajectory of

4

March,Michael 21, Kofman, 2016. Mattew Rijansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s “Hybrid War”, Kennan Cable, No.7, April, 2015 // https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf accessed

34 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 would require innovative approaches, in the East of Ukraine. The Transnistrian broadening the issues at stake, and conflicts similar to the one we are having improving the environment. Given the protracted, institutionalized, asymmetric current interests and positions of the conflict is certainly one of them. It is a parties, the last two would be especially a mediator and a supporting side. The internal conflict, to which Russia is both a century after being “frozen” in 1992 with difficult to achieve. theconflict view has to permanently been running impact for a quarterMoldova’s of seem from a formally legal point. It foreign policy choices and internal agenda. carriesPolitically the the features conflict isof nota asmilitarized it would For Moscow, it is not as important to win internal dispute and may seem to be about autonomization, self-government, are high that events in Donbas will follow or secession of certain territories in the athe reinforced conflict asand to more keep violent it going. version Chances of that scenario, counting that Kremlin’s bet itself is an instrument for Russia to in Ukraine is much higher. exertEast ofpressure Ukraine. over However, Ukraine and the keep conflict its sovereignty limited. Thus, the main issue Another experience could be taken from at stake is de facto the independence of wars in the former Yugoslavia, in particular Ukraine, including the right to determine its foreign policy. On the other hand, there That was a relatively short intensive are Russian interests in keeping Ukraine the Croatian War of Independence. of a hybrid war and active engagement is perceived in the Kremlin as the most ofasymmetric third parties. conflict, The latter featuring brought elements about importantwithin its element sphere of of ainfluence, more general since task it of reinstalling Russia’s “greatness” and Croatia’s territorial integrity restored. hegemony over most of the post-Soviet Thisde-escalation scenario andwould conflict be the settlement best possible with space. The issue gets more complicated due scenario for Ukraine and yet the least to the high importance Moscow attaches probable. It will require major changes in level of threat it feels in case of losing it. radical transformation of the Russian Into itsthe influence end, there over are Ukraine two existential and to a non-high attitude.the environment of the conflict, including divisible interests of Ukraine and Russia

Finally, one should not discard cases through broadening the issue, seems to be like Indo-Pakistani war – an asymmetric closein the to conflict. impossible. Reconciling them, including decades. It is marked by occasional Besides, there are certainly other interstate conflict lasting for several issues, mostly concerning the future in both countries, and the securitization of a of the regional security arrangements, broadescalation, range significant of issues militaryin bilateral expenditures relations. undermined by Russian revisionism, The rivalry has got geopolitical, normative, and religious dimensions and shapes the and more internal Ukrainian topic of stance of a regional security system. This thebut alsoso-called touching “decentralization”. upon a more specificThese is a description, which would possibly are areas where a compromise could resemble bilateral Russian-Ukrainian be found a little bit easier, although relations for years to come. since they are linked to both parties’ primary interests, this “little bit” will be Along with setting goals and attempts to Russian ones, there are other bets in the insignificant. Along with Ukrainian and foresee the future, managing the conflict UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 35 over the Crimea, in the end, chances for architecture, generating numerous risks that should be kept as minimal as possible. forconflict. neighbouring It challenges countries European and the security EU as a whole. Thus, Europeans are willing to Ukraine has to take care of its sovereignty. In particular, it should avoid any possible, to restore Ukrainian territorial erosion of sovereignty as a result of integrity,put an end at toleast the overconflict Donbas. and, asThe fully US asis reinforced decentralization through driven by similar considerations, added granting particular regions a right to with global security management, which veto important foreign policy or security requires the restoration of basic principles of the world order and, preferably, of the more favourable for Ukraine to engage as status quo ante bellum. It should be kept manydecisions. international Conflict’s mediators asymmetry as makespossible. it in mind that even if positions of Ukraine Reference to international law should also become the everyday practice of Ukrainian concerns the former’s territorial integrity, diplomacy. Hybrid wars require hybrid thereand the is Westquite arean asymmetry almost similar of interests in what responses. Ukraine should get used to behind them. That discrepancy will make effectively imply multi-track diplomacy and rely on non-governmental institutions. over time. the coordination of efforts more difficult Dealing with Russia will in any case be the Ukrainian strategy should proceed from the assumption, that changing the Generally, Moscow should be persuaded environment is crucial for solving the most important and difficult challenge. rather than a solution for the Russia’s policy is of utmost importance for securitythat the puzzle. conflict To in do Donbas this, Kyiv is has a problem to take transformingconflict. In turn, the changingcontext. At the the Russian same extra measures to specify the interests that drive Kremlin’s decision-making, to Ukraine should avoid the linkage of go beyond simple demonization of Putin’s issues,time, due i.e. to of the the asymmetry Donbas and of the the Crimeanconflict, intentions, and try to see more fundamental problems. Any interconnection like that issues than temporal madness or gambling. will enable a stronger state to use its That would hopefully open some space for power advantage more effectively. Even if political compromise. Moscow wants to exchange Donbas issue At the same time, any measures worsening Kremlins BATNA (Best alternative to a for an official recognition of its sovereignty negotiated agreement) should be taken. Ukraine has to take care of its This is exactly where Ukraine should rely sovereignty. In particular, it should on allies, international organizations, «avoid any erosion of sovereignty as and informational policy. Only after the a result of reinforced decentralization through granting particular regions it will be possible to create and exploit a a right to veto important foreign zoneRussia’s of possibleposition isagreement significantly thus modified moving policy or security decisions reconstruction stages. into conflict settlement and post-conflict

36 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 Conclusion considerable effort. It should be also kept in mind that following the end of the Cold There are no simple or easy solutions for deescalate after a long path of mutual agreements.War only about In many a quarter cases, ofit is all even internal hard concessionsthe conflict inand Ukraine. compromises, Most likely, which it will so toconflicts say whether ended they up actually with formal“ended”. peace far looks distant and unclear. It is also very much likely that compromises will be often broken, while the level of mutual trust among the parties will remain low. Mykola Kapitonenko, PhD, Co-Editor-in-chief of UA: Modifying Russia’s position will be the key, Ukraine Analytica and Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations of Kyiv National considerable efforts in introducing power Taras Shevchenko University. He is also a Director in the while post-conflict settlement will require sharing, democratization, and economic Center of International Studies, an NGO, specializing in regional security studies and foreign policy of Ukraine. He has also been invited as a visiting professor to the Thereefficiency. will also be other obstacles for University of Iowa, and was teaching at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Dr. moremanaging likely. the There conflict. are Economicand will certainlydownfall Kapitonenko’s main research focus is in conflict studies will make repetition of internal conflict and Ukrainian foreign policy. He is regularly presented as a commentator in Ukrainian media. In 2012, he was intervention,be social groups which benefitingshould be fromadded theto awarded the National Prize of Ukraine in science. conflict. There are strong signs of external Overcoming all that would take time and potential spoilers in conflict management.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 37 THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN EASTERN UKRAINE AND THE ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA

Svitlana Andrushchenko Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations at Kyiv National University

The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that lack of trust between major regional security players like NATO and Russia overshadows most regional disputes and conflicts. The article’s main argument is that problems in the two parties’ relations stem from NATO’s and Russia’s existential search for a new role after the end of the Cold War, when their roles and sets of strategies used to be clearly defined. The clash between NATO’s liberal logic and Russia’s realist logic shows that the two players are acting in different systems of coordinates and the minimal common denominator is still to be found.

The contemporary concept of human 1. the necessity for Ukraine to incorporate security consists of a combination of the existing and possible environmental social, economic and environmental dimensions of a human being. Issues such Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of as access to water, food security through theconsequences Crimea into the of state armed environmental conflict in access to arable lands, clear air and spread concept on the basis of its commitments of infectious diseases in combination may according to the Ukraine`s Intended create conditions that call into question the National Determined Contributions basic fabric of communities and nations, (INDCs) to Paris Agreement on Climate and challenge their security in a very Change 2015; tangible way. Environmental insecurity 2. the issue of responsibility for the livelihood, wellbeing and integrity of environmental impact as a result of entireas a result societies, of armed prolonging conflicts the threatensperiod of military actions and damages on the instability. territories out of Ukrainian control;

This article is aimed at the analyses 3. constant access to environmental of the existing environmental impact monitoring with the participation of international community and the annexation of the Crimea for the development of response strategies of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and for possible environmental disasters areas but also in Ukraine and Europe as a whole.environmental security not only in conflict Ukraine; influencing the whole territory of This issue of environmental security is 4. environmental peace-making on the multifaceted with several aspects, some of basis of ‘society-to-society’ models. them are as following:

38 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 a result, volunteers remain the main source Ukraine, in May 2014, the environmental of data regarding the pollution level in the situationPrior to thewithin armed this conflictregion inwas Eastern in a air pollution by approximately 5300 Oneregion of ofthe military important conflict. results of this is the enterprisesdifficult condition, in coal due industry, to the intensiveferrous impossibility to make a reliable estimation metallurgy, chemical industry and power of the trans-border transfer of toxic stations. In particular, the most methane substances in case of emergency disaster. emissions were registered in places Thus, it can lead to international claims for with coal extraction enterprises location Ukraine and restrict actions on localization that is equal to 70% of total amount of of accidents. The same concerns the emissions.1 This situation was multiplied environmental accidents on the territory with the total low level of attention to the of the annexed Crimea, and Ukraine ecological situation all over Ukraine: the bears responsibility for environmental lack of comprehensive approach to the degradation here in case of transborder air environmental degradation in Eastern or sea pollution. Ukraine, low level of environmental consciousness, unsatisfying level of waste cleaning, overpollution of surface and Armed conflicts result in underground waters, lands and air. some negative impacts on «land and landscapes, plants, surface and underground waters. actions in this part of Ukraine, the situation Military actions directly lead to degradedWith the beginningdramatically. of The the activemain problem military risks of accidents at industrial is the lack of proper environmental enterprises and infrastructure. monitoring. The analysis was generally made on the basis of the NGO “Ecology – Law – Person”2, Eastern Ukrainian Environmental Institute3 and Ecological The experts from the organization “Envi- network Zoi4 research. The work of the ronment – Law – Person” propose to renew Ukrainian State ecological inspections in and to develop the system of environmental Donetsk and Luhansk regions is paralyzed, monitoring, including the Earth satellite dis- out of 39 posts in the department of water - resources in Donetsk region and out of 24 - ential international partners. The task for in Luhansk region only 20 and 6 respectively Ukrainiantance probes government with the participation in cooperation of influwith are acting. Out of 25 only 11 in Donbas and 4 out of 11 in Luhansk stations of air of coordinating efforts for regular collection pollution measuring operate at present. As ofinternational environmental organizations data.5 Moreover, is to such find wayscom-

1

2 Кравченкр О., Василюк О., Войціховська А., Норенко К. Дослідження впливу військових дій на довкілля на Сході України // Схід. - 2015. - № 2. - С. 118-123. – http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Skhid_2015_2_23 3 - Воєнні дії на Сході України: цивілізаційні виклики людству // Львів: ЕПЛ, 2015. — 136 с.

4 Аверін Д., Денісов М. Війна на Сході України: бойові дії та екологічні наслідки // http://euaeco.com/?envi industriesronmental-consequences-fighting/ua // http://www.climateinfo.org.ua/content/viina-v-ukrajni-zalishae-dovgii-slid-zabrudnen-khvo - rob-ta-zruinovanoj-promislovostiDenisov Т., Simonett О., Weir D., Averin D., Ukraine war leaves a long shadow of pollution, ill-health and ravaged 5 -

Аверін Д., Денісов М. Війна на Сході України: бойові дії та екологічні наслідки // http://euaeco.com/?envi ronmental-consequences-fighting/ua UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 39 mon implementation of international pro- Slaviansk, Luhansk and Kurakhiv, Azot grams may facilitate to estimate the levels plant in Severodonetsk and Stirol plant of damage and harm to infrastructure and in Horlivka. For example, according to the report produced by the Zoï environmental reparations. At the same time, this proposal network, we can follow the impact of the isnature hard ofto Donbasrealize considering with a view the on restricted defining use of heavy weaponry in close proximity possibilities for access on the ATO territo- to industrial facilities, often directly ries. Nowadays the probes by volunteers against them.6 mainly are the biggest source of information about the scale of the environmental impact. electrical supply has been temperamental, Industrial Disasters systematicallySince the conflict cut-off began by in the region,heavy bombardment of key infrastructure. This results in the intermittent collapse of impacts on land and landscapes, plants, ventilation systems and water pumps in surfaceArmed conflictsand underground result in waters. some negativeMilitary the hundreds of coalmines in the region. actions directly lead to risks of accidents at industrial enterprises and infrastructure. shut down, harmful gases accumulate Usually the main reason for pollution is not andWhen are the released electricity when stops systems and ventilators restart. In March 2015, a release and explosion of infrastructure (oil, gas and ammonium methane in the Zaysadko mine in Donetsk pipelines,fighting itself water but thesupply damage systems) of industrial and killed 33 of the 200 miners underground disorganization of daily economic activity as to occur at the mine, the chair of the mine’s caused by the emergency stop of big boardat the time.attributed While that it is incidentnot the first to the accident heavy enterprises,a result of fighting. the lack Environment of raw materials pollution and shelling nearby Donetsk airport. Similarly, energy resources for their uninterrupted activity is a dangerous consequence of and waterlogs in adjacent areas, causing groundwaterflooding in minesto be polluted. damage7 installations the emergency releases of toxic substances, infighting some casesin Donbas. the consequence In some cases, is prolonged it leads to Air Pollution negative effect on environment through the Air quality has also declined because of quality raw materials. lack of adequate filtering or use of low- by Eastern Ukrainian Ecological Institute, Among numerous damages of big supplythe conflict. chains According to coal power to the stations study made have enterprises there are Yasynivskyi, been disrupted, and thus power stations Avdiivskyi, Yenakiyevskyi coke plants, have been forced to use lower-grade coal, Yenakievskyi ferrous metallurgy plant, which is much more polluting. The data from the only operating air monitoring chemical plant, and power stations in station, located in the town of Shchasttya Lisichanskyi oil refinery, Donetskyi

6

The Ukraine Conflict’s Legacy Of Environmental Damage And Pollutants / Sustainable Security. 21.04.2015 http:// 7 sustainablesecurity.org/2015/04/21/the-ukraine-conflicts-legacy-of-environmental-damage-and-pollutants-2 2 industriesВоєнні дії //на http://www.climateinfo.org.ua/content/viina-v-ukrajni-zalishae-dovgii-slid-zabrudnen-khvoСході України: цивілізаційні виклики людству // Львів: ЕПЛ, 2015. — 136 с. - rob-ta-zruinovanoj-promislovostiDenisov Т., Simonett О., Weir D., Averin D., Ukraine war leaves a long shadow of pollution, ill-health and ravaged

40 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 in the Luhansk oblast shows a marked was the case when conditions allowed.10 However, this statement needs more began. However, peak concentrations of detailed studies and regular measuring, pollutantsincrease in in pollutantsthe air do not since correlate the conflict with which is complicated at present. Air periods of heavy combat, but rather with pollution monitoring station in Shchasttya the reduction in supply of high-grade coal for the Luhansk power plant. After high growth of toxic chemical substances a key bridge in Nova Kindrashivka was (explosives(Luhansk region) remittances fixed on-line – sulphur data dioxide, with a destroyed, the railroad supply of coal to nitrogen etc.) at the periods of intensive the power plant stopped, and destroyed shelling up to 5-8 times from maximum electric power lines isolated Luhanskap allowable level. power plant from Ukraine`s electric power system. As a result, the electric power station that supplies about 90% Land degradation is another of regional energy consumers was forced important impact of fighting to increase production while turning «in the Eastern Ukraine conflict. to lower-grade coal, resulting in a clear One aspect is the pollution of arable deterioration of the air quality.8 In May lands by heavy metals and nitrates 2015, as a result of shelling, Avdiivskyi after shells explosions, flooding of land by mine waters, spill and of coke gas with a high content of benzol, burning of fuels and lubricants. toluene,plant was naphthalene, on fire, and this hydrogen resulted sulphide, in a leak ammonium and methane9.

At the moment, relatively little is known Land and Natural Landscape about the direct chemical impact of the war Degradation on the environment and people. Limited sampling by the NGO Environment- Land degradation is another important of some ‘war chemicals’ from the use of conventionalPeople-Law confirmed weapons thein expectedimpact zones.range arableimpact landsof fighting by heavy in the metals Eastern and Ukrainenitrates Similarly, large quantities of damaged conflict. One aspect is the pollution of military equipment and potentially by mine waters, spill and burning of fuels hazardous construction waste will require andafter lubricants. shells explosions, In case of floodingareas of military of land disposal. The Ukrainian Ministry of actions in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Defence also raised concerns that depleted the concentration of titanium exceeded uranium weapons may have been used 150 times permitted levels and contained vanadium (free in normal state). It should and proposed to determine whether this be noted that the alloys of titanium and in the fighting around Donetsk airport,

8 -

9 Аверін Д., Денісов М. Війна на Сході України: бойові дії та екологічні наслідки // http://euaeco.com/?envi industriesronmental-consequences-fighting/ua // http://www.climateinfo.org.ua/content/viina-v-ukrajni-zalishae-dovgii-slid-zabrudnen-khvo - rob-ta-zruinovanoj-promislovostiDenisov Т., Simonett О., Weir D., Averin D., Ukraine war leaves a long shadow of pollution, ill-health and ravaged 10 - bas-stav-poligonom-dlya-viprobuvannya-zbrojnimi-silami-rosijskoi-federaczii-novitnogo-ozbroennya-ta-zaboroУкраїнський Донбас став полігоном для випробування Збройними силами Російської Федерації новітнього- nenih-boepripasiv/озброєння та заборонених боєприпасів // http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2014/10/05/ukrainskij-don

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 41 vanadium are usually used in aviation and rocket industry.11 The result is that arable using precision sensing data, which requires lands in Donetsk region (about 64% of field studies. Such a task could be solved by total lands in the region) cannot be used Ukrainian state lacks at the moment. for agricultural purposes for a long period substantial financial resources that the of time and it may lead to a dramatic Moreover, within ATO area there is decline in agricultural production. expanded open extraction of natural resources, mainly coal. According to the Military actions on the territories of Donetsk experts of the National Environment Centre and Luhansk regions led to the breach of Ukraine, the area of illegal extraction of landscapes of natural reserves parks. of coal under the presidency of Viktor Multiple Donbas` natural reserves parks, Yanukovich (2010-2014) grew at triple, such as Ukrainian state steppe natural and equalled to the 57 sq.km with the main reserve park “Khomutovskyi steppe”, orientation for it illegal export to Russia.14 National natural reserves “Meotyda” and Nowadays, with the absence of controlling “Sviati hory”, regional landscape parks and bodies, this open coal extraction takes reserves “Donetskyi kriazh”, “Zuievskyi”, about two thirds of natural reserves lands. “Kleban-Byk”, “Provalskyi steppe”, “Triohizbenskyi steppe”, “Stanychno- The cultivation of arable lands and Luhanske” suffered as a result of building agricultural production is also complicated

12 ordnance. Combined with the lack of fortifications, deforestation, steppe and irrigationalby new mine waters, fields these and factors unexploded lead to forest fires. the impediments in agriculture and may factor for the natural environment. deepen food and humanitarian security Uncontrolled fires are yet another dangerous problems within ATO territories.

(accordingAccording toto thethe studyNASA ofsatellites the influence data), in of Water Security thefire onsecond natural half landscapes of 2014, onmore ATO than territories 3000

arable lands (three times more compared of Eastern Ukraine is another important tofires the happenedsame period in of forests, 2013) and steppes destroyed and issue.The issue The of highest water security risks among in conflict different areas about 14% of total ATO territory, namely emergencies and damage of water supply 18% of forests areas, 23,19% of steppes, systems in combination with long periods 14% of arable lands within ATO territory.13 of cut-offs in water supply, led to the poor The main reason for the rapid growth of quality of water for local population. High mineralization level of local waters, caused protection bodies. The exact esteem of the by pollution of local rivers should be taken fired areas is the restricted activity of forest into account. Emergencies on plants and pump stations with usage of active chlorine toareas check damaged satellite by data fires by directly means as of a full-scale result of resulted in poor level of drinking water and fighting is complicated by the impossibility

11

12 КравченкрPro dolu zapovidnykiv О., Василюк v zoniО., Войціховська ATO // http://pryroda.in.ua/blog/pro-dolyu-zapovidnykiv-u-zoni-ato А., Норенко К. Дослідження впливу військових дій на довкілля на Сході України // Схід. - 2015. - № 2. - С. 118-123. – http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Skhid_2015_2_23 13

14 ProКравченкр dolu zapovidnykiv О., Василюк v zoniО., Войціховська ATO // http://pryroda.in.ua/blog/pro-dolyu-zapovidnykiv-u-zoni-ato А., Норенко К. Дослідження впливу військових дій на довкілля на Сході України // Схід. - 2015. - № 2. - С. 118-123. – http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Skhid_2015_2_23

42 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 Some experts also point out a problem Surface waters of the Eastern Ukrainian region suffer from «the threat of emergencies at of flooded mines in Donbas. The waters enterprises and flooded mines. groundfrom flooded waters. mines17 At present in combination 35 mines with are mine gases present danger first of all for Comunar mine in Yenakiyvo is at the high levelflooded, of andrisk. one Poisoned nuclear and charge sometimes in Yunyi use of surface waters. This is the basis for radioactive waters can get into the the spread of intestinal infections, especially waters of Siverskyi Donets River and the in spring-summer periods. For example, Azov Sea and further strontium isotopes Siverskyi Donets – Donbas channel`s pump get into the Black Sea. Obviously, such stations that supplied most of Donetsk radioactive pollution is dangerous not region with water were damaged and it led only for the territories of Donbas region but also for the neighbouring territories for population15. of Ukraine and Russia, not mentioning to the supply of unrefined technical water trans-border sea pollution in the Azov and Surface waters of the Eastern Ukrainian the Black Seas.18 region suffer from the threat of emergencies waters from mines is an urgent issue for preventing the mix The ofpumping these toxicof flooded ones damage of dams on cesspools of industrial with ground waters. This is dangerous for enterprisesat enterprises because and flooded of shelling mines. Possibleor any drinking water and irrigation. other military activity threatens to create an environmental disaster not only for Chemical Weapon Issues the territory of the ATO area. The highest level of environmental threat belongs to the Azovstal plant, which is situated on for debates over the issue of using these the territory under the control of Ukraine, territoriesThe conflict as in probe Eastern grounds Ukraine for ischemical known with some branches on the coast of the Azov Sea and within the ATO zone. In case appeared in connection with the massive of dam damage, which separates the Azov shellingweapons. near At Donetsk first, airport this informationin summer Sea from slag and ash collectors of the 2014 and was mentioned by the Ministry power station, as well as from slap heap of Defence of Ukraine as well as in the OCSE of martin and convector production, an report in September 201419. As it was environmental disaster is inescapable.16

noted above, this information needs field

15 Dombas na porozi ecologichnoi catastrofy // http://www.climateinfo.org.ua/content/donbas-na-porozi-ekologich-

16 - noj-katastrofi

17 Аверін Д., Денісов М. Війна на Сході України: бойові дії та екологічні наслідки // http://euaeco.com/?envi industriesronmental-consequences-fighting/ua // http://www.climateinfo.org.ua/content/viina-v-ukrajni-zalishae-dovgii-slid-zabrudnen-khvo - rob-ta-zruinovanoj-promislovostiDenisov Т., Simonett О., Weir D., Averin D., Ukraine war leaves a long shadow of pollution, ill-health and ravaged 18 - ryv-vody-na-yenakiyivskij-shahti-zag 19 KyivСнегірьов verifying Д. Проривreports that води militants на Єнакіївській used chemical шахті weapons загрожує at DonetskПричорномор’ю airport // // http://www.kyivpost.com/article/ https://psb-news.org/pro content/ukraine/kyiv-verifying-reports-that-militants-used-chemical-weapons-at-donetsk-airport-378241.html

uk-and-europe/2015/01/23/were-chemical-weapons-used-in-donetsk-airports-last-stand Goltsmith J. Were Chemical Weapons Used in Donetsk Airport’s Last Stand? // https://www.bellingcat.com/news/

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 43 probes of land and air as soon as possible gases of G Group (GV - sarin, GD - because of rapid volatility of gases. soman) and VX Group (extremely toxic substances) are being carried out in those

information appeared regarding Russian substances with code-named “beginners” intentionsIn September to use 2015, Eastern in WesternUkraine pressas a thatscientific were centres. synthesized Also, the in development1980th in the of testing ground for the newly developed Soviet Union is carried out and chemical chemical weapons. The matter is in so- properties of this substance are still called “non-lethal toxic compounds” for authentically unknown. These programs subversive and terrorist activities. Though, “non-lethality” of such substances is open according to Convention on Prohibition to question. Since the corresponding tests ofmust Development, be finished Production, till the end Stockpiling of 2015 were not carried out, so, the nature of signed by Russia. The term is prolonged tilland 2020. Use of Thus, Chemical we can Weapons suppose dated that in1993 the explored.influence 20 of This these information substances appeared to humans in conditions of the changed international connectionand further witheffects Russia’s of such renewed influence activities are not situation, Russia is not ready to refuse from the chemical weapon development. Chemical Troops at Saratov and beginning Moreover, the participation in the military thein construction the Scientific near Research the Ukrainian Institute border of (in the city of Pochepna in the Bryansk ample opportunity to carry out tests of region on the territory of one military conflict in Ukraine provides Russia with base) the Centre for restoring chemical conditions.22 weapon models.21 The demonstrative fact the newest chemical weapons in fighting is that the new development and opening of The basic danger of carrying out chemical testing ranges occur against suspending all weapon testing is that consequences will be programs of chemical weapon recycling by extremely unpredictable for environment the Russian Ministry of Defence. and human beings. It is also necessary to consider that it is happening on densely According to the experts’ estimations, populated territories practically in the centre of Europe. Therefore, such secret chemical weapon testing in Eastern Ukraine currently some tests of fighting poisoning can cause one of the greatest anthropogenic, The basic danger of carrying out humanitarian and ecological accidents from chemical weapon testing is that which not only Ukraine, but also Russia «consequences will be extremely and Europe, will suffer.23 According to the unpredictable for environment and human beings. It is also necessary to consider that it is happening inChemical Ukraine Weapons demands Convention the most of 1993,steadfast any on densely populated territories attentioncases of chemicaland careful weapon investigation use in conflictat the practically in the centre of Europe. highest international level especially in circumstances of the lack of access to the ATO areas.

20 Eastern Ukraine as testing area of Russian chemical weapons // http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1268960 21, 22 Eastern Ukraine as testing area of Russian chemical weapons // http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1268960 23 Eastern Ukraine as testing area of Russian chemical weapons // http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1268960

44 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 Another pressing issue for Ukraine of weapons yet to test on the territories is the issue of responsibility for the of the ATO. High levels of pollution in environmental impact of activities of industrial and agricultural enterprises shortages in agricultural production and on the territory of the annexed Crimea combination with minefields may lead to with a view of Ukraine`s INDCs to Paris lack of access to the area for urgent on Agreement on Climate Change 2015. This sitefood probes crisis in within order the to adequately conflict area. analyse The is unclear how to estimate damage in the data requires immediate international case of natural and industrial disasters. cooperation, including satellite data Moreover, Russian Federation`s plans of collection. militarization and nuclearization of the Crimean peninsula and the Black Sea There is an urgent necessity to analyse the Fleet as well as any other military bases24 threaten the environmental security not Ukraine for the environment of the rest only in Ukraine without any hopes for ofimpact the ofUkrainian the military territory conflict in inorder Eastern to compensations and reparations but for all develop short- and long term strategies of Black Sea states and should be addressed minimizing air, water and land pollution at the international level. and its consequences for the whole Ukrainian population. Conclusions The issue of reparations for environmental damages in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea is to take into account the environmental outdated at present because of the non- Any contemporary military conflict has recognition of any illegal actions by the Russian Federation as well as search for includeimpact asa a ratherresult ofunsatisfying fighting and levelshelling. of international assistance for industrial environmentSpecifics for Eastern in Eastern Ukraine Ukraine environment prior to rebuilding and ecological modernization of Eastern Ukraine. The urgent issue is character of the region with outdated systemsthe conflict of environmental caused by highly protection. industrialized strategy for the whole of Ukraine with an energy efficiency and environmental The main environmental impact of military actions in Eastern Ukraine are Theaccent environmental on conflict-bordering impact areas. of military damages of industrial enterprises in chemical production, metallurgy, coal annexation of the Crimea are not only mining, coke industry, power stations theconflict issue in of Eastern environmental Ukraine andsecurity the and industrial infrastructure (gas, oil, for Ukraine, it has a wider context of ammonium pipelines), accompanied environmental security in Europe and the with extraction of toxic substances into Black Sea area that stipulates the necessity air; land and water pollution, as well as for regional cooperation formats. damages of natural reserves parks. These More than two years have passed since the of use of some chemical or other types occupation of the Autonomous Republic of dangers are intensified with the possibility

24 content/article/26920825.html Мілітаризація Криму: чим відповідатимуть країни Причорномор’я на виклик Росії?// http://ua.krymr.com/- form.ua/rubric-politycs/1966090-militarizacia-krimu-zagrozue-se-j-pivnicnij-africi-ta-blizkomu-shodu-elcenko.html Мілітаризація Криму загрожує ще й Північній Африці та Близькому Сходу – Єльченко // http://www.ukrin

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 45 Crimea (ARC) by the Russian Federation Svitlana V. Andrushchenko, PhD is the Associate (RF) that was immediately followed by the Professor at the Institute of International Relations at illegal annexation of this part of Ukraine’s Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University. She is also a director territory by its neighbour. These events of the International Centre for Progressive Research, – unprecedented in the history of post- which assists the development of the geopolitical and violation and breach of international law, other innovative research. The main research focus is butWWII also Europe a dramatic – signalled change not inonly the a brutalwhole geopolitics, environmental and energy security, and architecture of the European and global foreign policy of Ukraine. security system.

46 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 CRIMEA TODAY: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Natalya Belitser Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy

The paper analyses some aspects of the situation in and around the Crimea after the two years of its occupation and illegal annexation by the Russian Federation. The first part addresses the situation regarding human rights, especially those of the most vulnerable Crimean Tatar indigenous people and ethnic Ukrainians. It also covers some other negative trends resulting from changing the status of the territory. The second part provides the analysis of the most important responses of the international community, whereas the third one deals with the national context of the Crimea-related issues.

Crimea: current situation under the name of the ‘Anti-Terror Operation’,While the bloodyor ‘ATO’) Donbas for some war time (disguised averted Many international and national human national and international attention rights (HR) organisations are alarmed by from the occupied peninsula, the current the sharply deteriorating HR situation in situation in the Crimea and its perception, the peninsula. The access of monitoring accompanied by heated debates in mainland bodies is generally hindered by the de Ukraine and abroad, have become more facto authorities in the Crimea. topical over the last few months, especially after the beginning of the ‘civic blockade’ Since the beginning of the occupation of the Crimea and other developments that and up to date, only ‘unofficial’ Turkish refocused the attention of the national and delegation attended the Crimea in April international media to the Crimea1. 2015;2 there were also two visits by

1 Protesting Tatars Block Roads to Ukraine from Crimea, ”Transitions Online”, 21 September 2015, [http:// www.tol.org/client/article/24998-protesting-tatars-block-roads-to-ukraine-from-crimea.html?utm_ source=TOL+mailing+list&utm_campaign=4ceb2b299c-TOL_newsletter_21_11_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_ term=0_35d0a711b5-4ceb2b299c-298180421 access: 22 September 2015]; Food Products Blockade Of Crimea: Belated Action Or A Challenge To The Grand Designs Of The Kremlin’s Foreign Policy? “Democratic Initiatives Foundation”, 21 September 2015, [http://dif.org.ua/en/publications/focus_on_ukraine/ prodovolcha-bl-zadumam-kremlja_.htm access: 25 September 2015]; P.Goble, Crimean Tatar Blockade of

[http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/10/crimean-tatar-blockade-of-russian.html access: 20 OctoberRussian-Occupied 2015]; M. HomelandKovalenko, ‘Doomed Month of to Crimea Fail,’ Shekhovtsov blockade, “UNIAN”, Says, “Window 28 October.2015, on Eurasia”, [http://www.unian.info/ 15 October 2015, economics/1166244-month-of-crimea-blockade.html access: 30 October 2015]. 2 “The Situation of the Crimean Tatars since the Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation”. Report prepared

on 27-30 April 2015, 5 June 2015, [http://www.aa.com.tr/documents/AA/haber/crimea_report.pdf access: 10 Juneon the 2015]. basis of information obtained during interviews conducted by an Unofficial Turkish Delegation in Crimea

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 47 the Council of Europe representatives.3 Regular monitoring by international The recorded cases include forced organisations is not yet possible, whereas disappearances, murders, arrests, activities of the Crimea Field Mission on «unlawful searches, interrogations, HR consisting of Ukrainian and Russian seizures of property, intimidation, human rights groups were stopped in June and entry bans for political leaders 2015 after this NGO had been included by and civic activists, in addition to the Russian Federation into the so-called brutally enforced Russian citizenship ‘patriotic stop-list’.4 Nevertheless, reports based on the information collected from different sources clearly reveal brutal violations of all kind of human rights, Tatar people (the main self-governing body targeting pro-Ukraine-minded people, of Crimean Tatars democratically elected and particularly, members of the two most by the delegates of Kurultay, the National vulnerable ethnic groups – Crimean Tatars Assembly) on charges of being an ‘extremist and ethnic Ukrainians: “Ethnic Ukrainians organisation’.6 This move may lead to a new and Crimean Tatars who espouse pro- wave of repressions targeting over two Ukrainian views on the status of the Crimea or manifest a will to uphold their with the network of local Mejlises. There identity, especially their religious, cultural arethousands also grave members concerns and personsover the affiliated newly or linguistic rights, appear increasingly perpetrated detentions and arrests of vulnerable, and are in urgent need of Crimean Muslims on suspicion of belonging to the Hizb ut-Tahrir – an international foremost by the authorities exercising de organisation recognised as ‘terrorist’ and factoprotection control – anin theobligation Crimea”. borne 5 first and banned in Russia but not in Ukraine.

The recorded cases include forced Regarding the general dynamics on the disappearances, murders, arrests, occupied peninsula, it should be noted that unlawful searches, interrogations, seizures the absence of reliable sociological data and of property, intimidation, and entry bans for political leaders and civic activists, exchange of information in both directions in addition to brutally enforced Russian makethe problems an objective with ensuringand unbiased free flows analysis and citizenship. The situation of the Crimean Tatars is further exacerbated by the intention to ban the Mejlis of the Crimean networksan extremely and difficult e-mail communications,task. Mixed and often and conflicting signals are coming via social

3 Kyiv, Moscow and Crimea from 7 to 12 September 2014. Strasbourg, 27 October 2014, [https://wcd.coe.int/ com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2624575&SecMode=1&DoReport by Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe Following His Mission in - cId=2197556&Usage=2 access: 20 February 2916]. The second mission, led by Swiss diplomat Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, visited Crimea on 25-31 January 2016 to assess the human rights and rule of law situation. They had over 50 meetings in the peninsula, including with imprisoned Vice Chairman of the Mejlis Ahtem Chiygoz, as well as meetings in mainland Ukraine; the report is not yet published. 4 rights mission changes format of its activity because of the threats), “Ru.Crimea”, 09 September 2015, [http:// ru.krymr.com/content/news/27235360.htmlКрымская полевая миссия по правам человека access из-за 20 Septemberугроз меняет 2015]. формат деятельности (Crimea human 5 Institutions and Human Rights & High Commissioner on National Minorities”, 17 September 2015, p. 7-8; see also Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015). “OSCE Office for Democratic (OHCHR), [http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/ENACARegion/Pages/UAReports.aspx access: 02 March 2016]. first monthly and then quarterly reports published by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

48 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 a more or less comprehensive ‘portrait’ on the territory of the peninsula. This remains elusive. process, having a distinct negative impact on economic and social life and on the fragile On one hand, it is evident that growing prices ecology of the Crimea, constitutes also a on food and other products, corrupt and incompetent management by the de facto global security.8 significant threat to regional, European and have resulted in the evaporation of earlier Crimea and international community illusionsauthorities, and inefficient high expectations medical ofservices those who etc. hoped for much better life under Russia’s Although the decision to prolong sanctions jurisdiction than under Ukraine’s. On the imposed on Russia in 2014 after the illegal other hand, the paternalistic Soviet-type annexation of the Crimea was reached in mentality typical for many local residents 2015-2016 without serious debates or directs their dissatisfaction and irritation at objections, the position of the international either local or Ukrainian authorities. These community on the Crimean issues is still people invest their hopes into attracting far from unanimous. To some extent, the attention of almighty President Putin by leading politicians of the European and sending him individual or collective letters Euro-Atlantic space bear a certain degree requesting intervention to solve all of their of responsibility for the Crimean ‘Anschluss’ problems (along the lines of ‘good Tsar, bad that obviously breaches the ‘Budapest nobles’). Memorandum’ of 1994 signed by the US and Great Britain which guaranteed Ukrainian The demographic situation on the peninsula security and territorial integrity in exchange is also a matter of concern because numerous to its nuclear status rejection. Also, it could data shows a process of replacement of its be recalled that at the very beginning of the inhabitants by the newcomers from the occupation, President Obama, as well as mainland Russia – something similar to what heads of a number of the EU member states, sent messages to Kyiv recommending to Crimean Tatars deportation by the Soviet avoid military confrontation with Moscow. authorities.was already This done trend, once if after continued, the WW will II leadand Although the lessons drawn from the Russia- to the changes in the ethnic composition Georgia war of 2008 may partly justify such of the population, quite unfavourable for advice, the hopes to temper in such a way realising any plans of its reintegration.7 the Russian aggression have vanished in a course of further developments.9 Last but not least, is the problem of further militarisation of the Crimea accompanied by Moreover, the presence of the members of Russia’s threats to deploy nuclear weapons both European far right and extreme left

6 to persecute the whole people for extremism), “Ru.Crimea”, 04 March 2016, [http://ru.krymr.com/content/arti- cle/27589168.htmlPashayev, «Это нонсенс access: – преследование 05 March 2016]. целого народа за экстремизм» – правозащитница (It’s a nonsense, 7 Crimea: why there become more Russians and less Ukrainians), “Ru.Crimea”, 23 March 2015, [http://ru.krymr. com/content/article/26916490.htmlE. Dostim, Перепись населения в Крыму: access: почему 25 March русских 2015]. стало больше, а украинцев – меньше (Census in 8 I. Kabanenko, The Crimean Knot: Untying or Cutting? Presentation at the International conference “Militarisation of the Occupied Crimea as an International Security Threat”, 14 March 2016, Kyiv. 9 J. Rogin, E. Lake, U.S. Told Ukraine to Stand Down as Putin Invaded, “Bloomberg”, 21 August 2015, [http://www. bloombergview.com/articles/2015-08-21/u-s-told-ukraine-to-stand-down-as-putin-invaded access: 22 August 2015].

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 49 parties and organisations as ‘observers’ basis of the 16 March referendum “and during the illegal ‘referendum’ in the Crimea to refrain from any action or dealing that of 16 March 2014 demonstrated the splits might be interpreted as recognizing any existing between the pro-Putin lobbyists such altered status.”10

Leaving aside numerous evidence of further All subsequent reports by the UN, the infringementsin the West andby individuals the mainstream and companies politics. Council of Europe and the OSCE contain from different countries of the embargo rules references to this important document. and Ukraine’s legislation concerning the However, little attention has been paid to occupied territory, it seems reasonable to pay its wording, which never uses the terms more attention to the less overt disagreement ‘occupation’ or ‘illegal annexation’ and between the major geopolitical actors does not name Russia as an aggressor and stakeholders – namely, international state directly responsible for all of those intergovernmental organisations – surfaced breaches of international law. Instead, due to the Crimean crisis. the resolution “Urges all parties to pursue immediately the peaceful resolution of the The UN reacted to the Russian invasion of situation with respect to Ukraine through direct political dialogue, to exercise the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) restraint, to refrain from unilateral actions andthe Crimeathe city of and the official as subjects recognition of the of RF by adopting on 27 March 2015 UNGA increase tensions, and to engage fully with resolution 68/262). This non-binding internationaland inflammatory mediation rhetoric efforts.” that11 may document appeared after seven sessions of the UN Security Council (UNSC) convened Moreover, in the last report on human to discuss the situation in Ukraine, and rights violations in Ukraine prepared by an eighth meeting when Russia, one of the UNSC permanent members, blocked on Human Rights (OHCHR)12 the section action by voting against a draft resolution theon Officethe Crimea of the contains UN High Commissionersome entries that would have urged countries not to that could be perceived as an implicit recognize the results of the referendum in recognition of Russia’s de facto authority the Crimea. over the Crimea. For example: “e) Ensure due process and fair trial rights for Although there were 100 votes in favour Crimean Tatars detained in relation to versus 11 against, there were a remarkable the February 2014 demonstration” or “g) number of abstentions – 58 out of the Ensure respect for freedom of religion 193-member of the UN. The resolution or belief and ensure that all procedures called on all States, international for registration are accessible, inclusive organizations and specialized agencies and not unduly burdensome” (thus not to recognize any alteration of the encouraging religious organisations on the status of the Autonomous Republic of peninsula to seek registration according to Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the the legislation of the occupant state).

10 Backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, UN Assembly declares Crimea referendum invalid, 27 March 2014, [http:// www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47443&Cr=ukraine&Cr1=#.Vt2FEH2LTMx access: 7 January 2016]. 11 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March A/RES/2014 68/262 “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”. [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262 access: 03 March 2016]. 12 Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights”, [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_13th_ HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdfReport on the human rights situation access: in Ukraine 10 March 16 November2016]. 2015 to 15 February 2016, “Office of the United

50 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 At the same time, the document severely reiterate the EU’s strong commitment to criticises the ‘civic blockade action’ without the sovereignty and territorial integrity any analysis of the underlying reasons of Ukraine within its internationally or possible consequences – particularly, recognised borders, but also: “1. …recalls in terms of the de-occupation. It also its severe condemnation of the illegal annexation by Russia of the Crimean peninsula and the commitment of the EU, Regrettably, the OHCHR report its Member States and the international does not emphasise any specific community to implement fully the policy «(collective) rights of the of non-recognition of the illegal annexation indigenous Crimean Tatar people, of the Crimea; highlights also that the focusing on individual rights only. restoration of Ukrainian control over the peninsula is one of the prerequisites for re-establishing cooperative relations with the Russian Federation, including the recommends to the Government of Ukraine suspension of related sanctions”.14 to “n) Investigate all claims of human rights abuses committed during the ‘civil blockade’ Apart of this very important point and on the administrative boundary line welcoming the Ukraine’s initiative to between mainland Ukraine and the Crimea, establish international negotiation and arrest perpetrators” (while never mechanism on the Crimea in the ‘Geneva referring to the 4th Geneva convention of plus’ format, the resolution unequivocally 1949 and its Art.55 which clearly states emphasises (three times) that Crimean that: “…the Occupying Power has the duty Tatars are the indigenous people of the of ensuring the food and medical supplies Crimea whose rights should be strongly of the population; it should, in particular, protected.15 Its p. 3 also “…calls for bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical respect for the Mejlis as the legitimate stores and other articles if the resources of representation of the Crimean Tatar the occupied territory are inadequate”).13 community, and for avoidance of any harassment and systematic persecution Regrettably, the OHCHR report does not of its members,” whereas p. 11 “Deplores the actions of the de facto administration of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people, to hinder the functioning of the Mejlis of focusingemphasise on anyindividual specific rights (collective) only. rights the Crimean Tatar People, the highest executive and representative body of the In contrast to this trend, the EU formulates Crimean Tatars, through the closure of its documents in a much more decisive its headquarters and seizure of some of way. In this context, the resolution of its properties and through other acts of the European Parliament of 4 February intimidation.” These points have become deserves special attention. It does not only increasingly relevant with regard to the

13 www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5?OpnDoc- umentConvention access: (IV) 14 relative August to 2015]. the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, [https:// 14 European Parliament resolution of 4 February 2016 on the human rights situation in Crimea, in particular of the Crimean Tatars (2016/2556(RSP)), Strasburg, 4 February 2016, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-0043&language=EN&ring=P8-RC-2016-0173 access: 21 February 2016]. 15 [http://minorityrights.org/2016/02/11/a-window-to-europe-for-crimean-tatars/ access: 12 February 2016]. O. Loode, A Window to Europe for Crimean Tatars, “Minority Rights Group International”, 11 February 2016,

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 51 attempts of the occupying power to ban related to Crimea’s declaring ‘independence’ the Mejlis as an ‘extremist organisation’. from Ukraine and becoming a ‘grey zone’ or another unrecognised self-proclaimed Concerning the economic blockade of the pseudo-state like those emerging in the areas Crimea, although not mentioning directly the actions undertaken either by civic alarmingly vulnerable situation of Ukraine activists or Ukraine’s government, p. 5 of preventedof ‘frozen timely conflicts’. elaboration Initial shockof any coherent and the the resolution “Recalls that the Russian strategy in dealing with the occupied territory Federation as an occupying power has the and its own citizens remaining there. That responsibility to ensure the safety of the was followed – too soon – by the bloody war whole population [of the Crimea]”. in the east of Ukraine distracting national and international attention from the issues As seen from this brief comparative of the Crimea. The only decisive step taken analysis, there is a serious discrepancy by the Verkhovna Rada (VR, Parliament of between the wording used, on one hand, Ukraine) was the adoption on 20 March 2014 by the UN, and on the other – by the EU. of the Decree that recognised, eventually, the Crimean Tatars as the indigenous people deeper controversy regarding the future of of Ukraine and the Mejlis and Kurultay as theThis Crimea, difference and further may actually steps to reflectbe taken a their main organs of self-government. This – or not taken – for the termination of the document also stressed Ukraine’s joining the illegal annexation of the peninsula and UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous returning it back to Ukraine. Peoples.16

Crimea and the mainland Ukraine In general, the state policies of Ukraine towards the Crimea remain rather The occupation and immediate illegal inconsistent, often confusing and stirring annexation of the Crimea in 2014 caught up severe criticisms and acute responses Ukraine’s interim government and society at of civil society. A few state agencies large (as well as the international community) responsible for the Crimean issues are completely unprepared for such drastic usually understaffed and underfunded; turns. The worst anticipations of that time legislation activities are also unimpressive.

rights and freedoms of persons on the occupiedIn particular, territory the firstadopted bill definingon 15 April the the state policies of Ukraine 2014 could be recalled: its initial version towards the Crimea remain rather was so weak, full of different kind of «inconsistent, often confusing and shortages and non-compliances with the stirring up severe criticisms and international standards that over the time acute responses of civil society passed, it was subjected to consecutive amendments as many as seven times.17

16 - teeingПостановa the rights № 4475 of the “Про Crimean Заяву TatarВерховної people Ради within України Ukrainian щодо State), гарантії 20 March прав кримськотатарського2014, [http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/ народу у print/89891.htmlскладі Української access: Держави” 25 March (Decree 2914]. # 4475 “About the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on guaran 17 (On securing the rights and freedoms of citizens on the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine), Verkhovna Про забезпечення прав і свобод громадян та правовий режим на тимчасово окупованій території України access: 10 June 2014]. Rada of Ukraine, Law № 1207-VII, 15 April 2014, [http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18/paran81#n81

52 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 The most telling example of the blockade’ by civic activists, lasted until the inadequate Ukrainian policy is a story end of 2015 when the term of the contract of the law on Free Economic Zone expired. Many national and international ‘Crimea’18. This bill, adopted with much HR activists and politicians then accused Ukraine of violations of the international with strong resistance of the human rights humanitarian law and bringing suffering anddifficulties other andcivic irregularities,activists who wasclaimed met to the population of the Crimea. After that it actually recognises the Russia’s the contract for 2016 was not resumed jurisdiction over the Crimea, creates comfortable conditions for big businesses in its text the Crimea as Ukraine’s territory continuing trade relations with subjects (unacceptablebecause of the Ukraine’sfor the RF), proposal those tocharges define located on the occupied territory, and calmed down. Remarkably, a decision is very unfavourable for the internally to reject the renewal of the electricity displaced persons (IDPs) from the Crimea supplies was taken by Kremlin after a – in particular, designating them as ‘non- rush ‘sociological poll’ conducted among residents’ that resulted in many negative Crimean residents on December 31, 2015. consequences.19 Despite the promises of According to its data published already on the several MPs and President Poroshenko the next day, the overwhelming majority of to cancel or amend it fundamentally, this the respondents expressed their willingness law is still formally in force. to sustain the respective inconveniences until energy supplies from Russia and own The societal outrage was also caused by sources would be available.21 the contract on energy supplies from the mainland Ukraine to the occupied Crimea concluded between Ukraine and the national political agenda. A number of Russia and signed on 29 December 2014; newRecently, initiatives Crimean were issues put forward,firmly returned including to according to it, presumably, the peninsula the idea of establishing a ‘Geneva +’ format mentioned above, also compiling the territory.20 The turmoil, following the ‘Chiygoz list’ (after the name of the arrested waslaunch officially on 12 October recognised 2015 as of the the Russian‘energy Deputy Chair of the Mejlis) analogous to

16 - teeingПостановa the rights № 4475 of the “Про Crimean Заяву TatarВерховної people Ради within України Ukrainian щодо State), гарантії 20 March прав кримськотатарського2014, [http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/ народу у print/89891.htmlскладі Української access: Держави” 25 March (Decree 2914]. # 4475 “About the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on guaran 17 (On securing the rights and freedoms of citizens on the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine), Verkhovna Про забезпечення прав і свобод громадян та правовий режим на тимчасово окупованій території України access: 10 June 2014]. 18 Rada of Ukraine, Law № 1207-VII, 15 April 2014, [http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18/paran81#n81 19 For more details, see H. Coynash, Legislative Stab in the Back for Crimeans, “Human rights in Ukraine”, 03 October 2014,Law of [http://www.khpg.org/ru/index.php?id=1412082838 Ukraine № 1636-VII of 12.08.2014, [http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1636-18 access: 15 October 2014]. access: 03 March 2016]. 20

occupiedДепутаты Crimea). Логвинский “Censor.net”, и Джемилев 19 November требуют 2015, разорвать [http://censor.net.ua/news/361470/deputaty_logvinskiyi_i_ контракт на поставку электроэнергии в djemilev_trebuyut_razorvat_kontrakt_na_postavku_elektroenergii_v_okkupirovannyyiоккупированный Крым (MPs Logvinskyj and Djemilev demand to cancel the contract access: on electricity 20 November supply 2015]. to the 21 Ukrainian electricity), “Ru.Crimea”, 01 January 2016, [http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/27461731.html access: 12For January more details, 2016]. see See K. also: Vepritsky, Poroshenko Крымская Says No«химия» More Power с украинским For Crimea электричеством Until Rejoins Ukraine, (Crimean “Radio ‘chemistry’ Liberty”, with 15 January 2016, [http://www.rferl.org/content/poroshenko-says-no-more-power-for-crimea-until-rejoins- ukraine/27488931.html access: 16 January 2916].

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 53 that of ‘Savchenko list’ and using as an example ‘Magnitsky list’ approbated in the as a subject not an object. US. In 2016 – in contrast to the previous one and any format as a full-fledged participant; – the second anniversary of the occupation The ‘Geneva+’ format, proposed by the Ukrainian President Poroshenko and February 2014) was marked by numerous supported by the resolution of the European events(defined at all by levels the – VR from as the started governmental on 20 Parliament of 4 February 2016, has a chance and parliamentary events to informal street to be established and make progress only if the Russian federation is somehow forced or persuaded to participate. Therefore, Resistanceactions and (to flesh the mobs; occupation). 26 February is now officially recognised as the Day of Crimean and used (like a prospect of sanctions Conclusions additional leverage might be identified

The Crimean peninsula is rapidly becoming Inintensified view of a instead new wave of abolished). of repressions in the a territory of lawlessness where human Crimea targeting primarily Crimean Tatars rights of all pro-Ukraine minded persons and Muslims of Crimea, Ukraine should and members of ethnic and religious insist on not only continuing Crimea- minorities are brutally violated. The related sanctions against the RF and indigenous Crimean Tatars are subjected representatives of the Crimean occupational to especially hard pressure threatening to ‘squeeze’ them out of the peninsula and well. Arguments focusing on the rights of assimilate any remaining loyalists. Crimean‘authorities’ Tatars but ason thetheir indigenous intensification people as of the Crimea – in particular on the right to self-determination in their homeland – In view of a new wave of should be used more assertively. For this repressions in the Crimea to occur, the support of the UN Permanent «targeting primarily Crimean Forum on Indigenous Issues must be Tatars and Muslims of Crimea, Ukraine ensured. should insist on not only continuing Crimea-related sanctions against The issue of further militarisation of the the RF and representatives of the occupied Crimea has become increasingly Crimean occupational ‘authorities’ topical. This process converts the peninsula but on their intensification as well into the military base threatening regional, European and global security, instead of a tourist destination with another kind of ‘peaceful’ infrastructure. Unambiguous Taking into account everything said above, warning signals have to be sent to as well as the deteriorating atmosphere responsible international organisations of fear, frustration, mutual distrust and and leaders of the democratic countries. suspicions spreading on the peninsula, all formats of international negotiations/ Ukraine’s own policy towards the occupied meetings on Ukraine should address not Crimea and the occupying state still lacks only the major problem of terminating a strategic vision and practical steps the Donbas war (‘ATO’) but also issues for implementing previously adopted relating to the de-occupation of the Crimea. decisions; this weakens Ukraine’s position The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, as a main self-government body of the demands and calls addressed to the outside indigenous people, should be engaged in all world.in the international arena and inflates

54 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 By developing a coherent strategy of the de- Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to the occupation of the Crimea, Ukraine should situation in the Crimea (primarily the most demonstrate a political will not only aimed relevant Articles 49, 51, 55, and 70). at ‘punishing’ the perpetrators but also to act on behalf of its citizens remaining on the occupied territory. Dr. Natalya Belitser, Full Doctor of Biology, Professor, is currently a researcher at the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Efforts should also be undertaken to Democracy, Kyiv. Her area of expertise includes interethnic harmonise and bring closer together views relations, minorities and indigenous peoples’ rights, and and approaches of the main actors – the UN, separatist conflicts. She is author of publications on the the EU, the US, Council of Europe and the Crimea, post-Soviet “frozen conflicts” and related issues, a including recognising the fact of occupation contributor to collective monographs. The last of them is andOSCE. annexation A more clear-cut as such, and will unified facilitate vision, the “Frozen Conflicts in Europe”, 2016. application of the specific articles of the 4th

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 55 HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING IN CRIMEA: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?

Kira Spyrydonova Kyiv Taras Shevchenko National University, Ukraine

Human rights situation in Crimea has deteriorated dramatically during the two years of peninsula’s illegal annexation by the Russian Federation. Numerous cases of grave violations of fundamental rights and freedoms of ethnic Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and civil society activists attract the attention of the international community that looks for a way of ensuring respect for human rights in the region. More active engagement of international organizations with both Ukraine and Russia’s participation and the establishment of permanent monitoring of the situation could become a key to this problem.

Two years after the illegal annexation of the Crimea is gradually becoming a “grey zone” Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) the that with time may turn into the source of most dangerous situation on the peninsula instability on the continent and the cause of is developing around one of the core security dimensions – human rights. The between Ukraine and Russia. At the same impossibility of permanent and qualitative time,a potential the human military rights escalation situation, of the especially conflict monitoring of the situation in this area in relation to representatives of national leads to massive violations of human rights minorities – namely Crimean Tatars and and fundamental freedoms of the local ethnic Ukrainians, – becomes a precedent, population. Such conditions cannot but widely used by the Russian Federation for attract the attention of the international claiming the primacy of the principle of non- community: it represents a direct security interference in its internal affairs1. From threat to Europe as it bears irreversible the other side, even not taking into account consequences due to close interlinking of non-recognized Russia’s sovereignty over all security dimensions – politico-military, Crimea by the world, such references to non- economic, ecological, and human. In this regard, the negative situation in one ensuring respect to international norms dimension leads to the appearance of new andinterference standards, reflect where Russian human difficulties dignity withand threats in others. Systematic human rights wellbeing are of the utmost importance. violations may cause political instability Ethnic Ukrainians, civil society activists, neighbouring countries and regional and Crimean Tatars are targets for securityand internal in general. conflicts that threaten disappearance and abduction by the current

1 Address by chief Russian delegate, Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights Anatoly Viktorov at the opening session of the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting,

cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1760315, access: 23 March 2016]. Warsaw, September 21, 2015 [http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/

56 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 Russian authorities. Crimean Tatars’ leaders are banned to enter the peninsula2. on National Minorities (HCNM), was Crimea “prosecution” institutions have operatingand the office in the of ARC the upon High the Commissioner invitation of started the process of prohibiting the Mejlis Ukraine. HRAM’s report, released in May activity, which has been the main organ 2014, presents a clear picture regarding representing the interests of the Crimean the root causes of human rights violations Tatars in the country since 1991. All these and their perpetrators3. It mentions such are awful symptoms of the unhealthy gross human rights violations, as murder situation in the ARC. and physical assaults, as well as cases of intimidation and enforced disappearances Since March 2014, a number of international organizations has been trying to get access “authorities” of the Crimea that exercise to the territory of the Crimea in order to de-facto(first of all,control). from the The side victims of the so-calledof these acquaint themselves with the situation on were primarily pro-Maidan activists and the ground and create an objective vision journalists, Ukrainian military personnel of the environment. The most prominent still present on the peninsula and members ones among them are the Council of Europe of the Crimean Tatar community. (CoE), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the The HCNM in that report made a prognosis United Nations (UN) represented by the that the new focus of concern in Crimea would be put on national minorities Rights (OHCHR). All these organizations – the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. takeOffice into of the consideration High Commissioner both Russia’s for Human and Hasty decisions on sensitive issues, Ukraine’s participation and thus appeal to such as language and other matters of both parties’ commitments and obligations direct concern to national minorities, undertaken within organizations and under without consulting the latter (that is yet international law. to be realized by the Russian occupation authorities), were creating an atmosphere OSCE’s engagement in which intercommunity relations and trust in the authorities would be strained and tensions would be heightened4. the future negative effects for human rights situationThe OSCE wasin the the peninsula first to assess just at while that time the In one year – in July 2015 – the OSCE made formalization of the annexation of Crimea another attempt to evaluate the human by the Russian Federation was taking place. rights situation by sending the second In March-April 2014, the Human Rights HRAM – this time without direct access Assessment Mission (HRAM), consisting to the Crimea as Russian authorities did not react to OSCE’s intention to visit the Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) peninsula5 of experts from the Office for Democratic . While numerous meetings and

2 Crimean Tatar leader banned from entering Crimea, Kyiv Post, 22 April 2014 [http://www.kyivpost.com/article/ content/ukraine/tatar-leader-banned-from-entering-crimea-344577.html access: 23 March 2016]. 3 Human Rights Assessment Mission in Ukraine. Human Rights and Minority Rights Situation, OSCE: The Hague /

4 Human Rights Assessment Mission in Ukraine. Human Rights and Minority Rights Situation, OSCE: The Hague / Warsaw 2014, 132 p. 5 - temberWarsaw 2015, 2014, p. 132 4. p. Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015), OSCE: The Hague / Warsaw, 17 Sep

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 57 audiences: to the Russian Federation, the While Ukraine does not de facto authorities in the Crimea and exercise effective control over «the territory, considering does not exercise effective control over numerous human rights violations the Ukrainianterritory, authorities.considering While numerous Ukraine documented in the report, it is human rights violations documented in important that it is the ODIHR that the report, it is important that it is the monitors the implementation of ODIHR that monitors the implementation recommendations by the Russian of recommendations by the Russian Federation in order to ensure respect Federation in order to ensure respect for for human rights and fundamental human rights and fundamental freedoms freedoms on the peninsula. on the peninsula. However, OSCE efforts in this direction have not only been ignored by Russian politicians but also were blamed as interviews on the territory of mainland prejudiced and biased. Ukraine with civil society actors, Ukrainian authorities (as the Russian ones did not As for the HRAM activities up to now, they respond to HRAM’s requests), IDPs from do not have a real effect on changing the Crimea and average travellers, Mission situation on the ground. The Ukrainian received a lot of “credible, consistent and side continues to insist on the engagement compelling accounts of human rights of other possible mechanisms within the violations and legal irregularities in the Organization. These could be a direct visit Crimea”6. In general, such “post-annexation to the peninsula of the High Commissioner period” was characterized by the OSCE as for Human Rights Astrid Thors or a period with the essential restriction of human rights under the conditions of “a operating in the country, whose mandate steady consolidation of control by the de coversrepresentatives the territory of the of OSCE Ukraine field (according operation facto authorities”7. In the sphere of civil and to the Ukrainian point of view) – the OSCE political rights, those restrictions violate Special Monitoring Mission. At the same mainly such vital and fundamental human time, it appears to be almost impossible rights and freedoms as freedom of assembly due to security reasons and the necessity and independence of media. In the sphere to obtain permission from the authorities, of minorities’ rights, the OSCE particularly which de facto exercise control over the mentions the vulnerable position of the peninsula. possibility of education in the native language and repressions towards the Council of Europe efforts Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians who openly supported the territorial integrity of CoE in practice appears the only Ukraine. or less viable solutions to gain at least a The key feature of the OSCE institutions’ possibilityinternational to monitor organization the respect to find of human more methodology in this regard is providing rights in the Autonomous Republic of recommendations to three target Crimea.

6 - tember 2015, p. 5. 7 Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015), OSCE: The Hague / Warsaw, 17 Sep- tember 2015, p. 40. Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015), OSCE: The Hague / Warsaw, 17 Sep

58 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 From the formal point of view, in line with Mission to Crimea in January 2016 headed by Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, ex- to the abovementioned OSCE that still Director of the OSCE ODIHR, Jagland’s doesthe official not possess status oflegal the personality CoE (compared and Special Representative for Organizational which commitments’ implementation Development and Reform of the CoE. depend on the political will of the state) and its legal obligations, the advantage It is not surprising that the whole stay of of the engagement of this international the CoE mission in the Crimea – from 25 to organization is that the population of 31 of January 2016 – was regulated by the the Crimea is covered by the European Russian authorities. From the other side, Convention on Human Rights and should despite the plan dictated by the Kremlin and multiple Potemkin villages shown by the occupying power, Mr. Stoudmann Itbe was able CoE to benefitCommissioner from it. for Human Rights could not only meet selected people, but also political prisoners, in particular with the access to the ARC in September Akhtem Chiygoz, other representatives of 2014Nils Muiznieks,by the Russian who Federation. was first His granted visit the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and was not quite successful in the sense of pro-Ukrainian activists (at the same time, further improvement of the human rights another evidence of the Russian control of situation on the peninsula, however, it the visit is the fact that the meeting of the brought important attention to numerous mission with Mr. Chiygoz was facilitated cases of violations. In his report, Mr. by the interpreter provided by the Russian side and not by the mission itself9 – thus, HRAM regarding the facts of enforced there is no guarantee of an accurate disappearancesMuiznieks reiterated in the findings Crimea, of the the illegal OSCE translation of the conversation). activity of the “self-defence” forces, the vulnerable position of the Crimean Tatars Under those circumstances, the main and Ukrainians in the context of preserving objective of Mr. Stoudmann’s visit was the multiculturalism and multilingualism to guarantee that the relevant human of the region, media restrictions etc.8 rights bodies of the CoE can carry out their monitoring activities unimpeded The latest successful (again, mostly in on the peninsula. At the same time, this terms of obtaining the Russian permission ad hoc mission cannot substitute regular to visit Crimea) initiative was suggested activities of the CoE’s Commissioner for by the CoE Secretary General Thorbjorn Human Rights and other relevant human Jagland, when he put on the table the rights bodies in the Crimea (that have proposal to send a Special Representative a clear and agreed mandate of all CoE for Human Rights to the Crimea (later also member states, thus being much more welcomed by one of the resolutions of recognizable on the international stage), the European Parliament). Such visit was but only to coordinate and complete conducted in the form of Human Rights them.

8 Report by Nils Muiznieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his mission in Kyiv, Moscow and Crimea from 7 to 12 September 2014, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 27 October 2014, [https:// wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2624575&Sec- Mode=1&DocId=2197556&Usage=2 access: 10 March 2016]. 9 Council of Europe mission visits Akhtem Chiygoz, Human Rights Information Center, 29 January 2016 [https:// humanrights.org.ua/en/material/misija_radi_jevropi_vidvidala_ahtema_chijgoza?cl=en access: 23 March 2016].

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 59 In this sense, the report being prepared by The presence of such structures in the Mr. Stoudmann10, regardless of its content, peninsula will quickly reveal the real cannot be considered as a comprehensive situation in the region and consolidate the document evidencing human rights international society with the opinion that situation in the occupied Crimea. At the all events that took place in the Crimea same time, the simple fact of Mission’s after its annexation are absolutely illegal deployment and even one-off presence and ensure Crimean citizens that they are on the ground may serve for further steps not forgotten.

fact that any CoE activities in the Crimea UN assessment musttaken incomply this direction. with all With decisions regards of to the CoE Committee of Ministers regarding The UN, which theoretically should be the situation in Ukraine, it will be the the most prominent and active body Committee that will determine the future involved into resolving crisis situations development of the CoE’s engagement in the situation in the Crimea. as they represent a threat to international peace(including and security, in the field stays of aside human the rights), direct These examples of efforts aimed to create participation in the peninsula’s life. The an image of control over the state policy in

occupied territory, if there is political will The absence of physical ofthe at field least of humantwo confronting rights exercised neighbours, in the access to the region makes can convert into establishing a more «the first-hand acquaintance permanent institution to be present with the situation impossible.

on the ground. While the deployment of a long-term field operation in the absence of physical access to the region partyCrimea to (such exercise as OSCE the sovereignty or CoE office) over is theimpossible region, the without introduction clearly of defining a position the of a Special Representative in the Crimea, themakes High the Commissioner first-hand acquaintance for Human Rights with whose mandate will be strictly accorded (OHCHR)the situation represented impossible. by Thus,the Human the Office Rights of by all sides and the Council of Europe as Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) a whole, seems a more or less achievable limits itself with documenting facts upon goal within the Organization. As Ukraine interviews and obtaining information has no opportunity, while simultaneously confronting Russian armed aggression in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, to Thefrom HRMMU, verified sentand totrustful Ukraine sources. in March 2014 help the local population in the Crimea, upon the request of the Ukrainian side, is the only thing that our authorities can tasked to monitor and report to the UN and realize (and they realize it indeed) is to its bodies on the human rights situation facilitate the access to the Crimea for in Ukraine. In line with the UNGA 68/262 human rights defenders and organizations resolution “Territorial integrity of Ukraine” with special “human mandate” – such as Mission’s mandate covers not only the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights. mainland part of the country but the territory

10 Still not presented for the moment of writing of the article.

60 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 of the Crimea as well. Up to now, the OHCHR Other initiatives presented thirteen HRMMU reports that include special parts devoted to the human International governmental organizations rights situation in the Crimea. In these (IGOs) are not the only remedy for reports we observe the continuing trends of conducting human rights monitoring in the documenting violations of abovementioned human rights and freedoms – such as the does not accept Crimea’s adherence to freedom of opinion and expression, the Russiacountry. (and While in this the way international does not recognize society freedom of religion and belief, enforced the right of the Russian and “local” disappearances of civil society activists, ombudspersons to protect and represent discrimination towards ethnic Ukrainians rights of the Crimean population), there and the Crimean Tatars etc.11 They also is still hope for normal functioning of the contain chapters with recommendations civil society in the region. to Ukrainian authorities, the de facto authorities of the Crimea and to the Russian In fact, it is done through the engagement Federation, which are more detailed than of non-governmental organizations the OSCE’s recommendations. However, the main demand remains the same – to “permit with the situation. Among such NGOs’ OHCHR and other international organizations activity,(NGOs) andinternational their first-hand ones familiarityrepresent to access Crimea in order to ensure the the most trustful and impartial vision of 12. international attention was brought effectiveTherefore, fulfilment UN efforts of its appear mandate” to be not as the situation. Within the last two years, effective as the endeavours of other regional organizations. On one hand, denied access to mainly to reports of Human Rights Watch the Crimea to different UN institutions is a (HRW) and Amnesty International. sign of perceiving this universal organization Reports 2015 and 2016 evidenced the as a more endangering one compared to unlawfulHuman Rights transfer Watch of sovereignty in both itsto Russia, World regional ones by the Russian Federation. On its status of an occupying power in the the other hand, it is another evidence of the Crimea under international law, and the UN’s ineffectiveness in situations where one repressive human rights climate in the of the P5 members (permanent members Crimea under the Russian occupation13. of the UN Security Council that possess the us to the conclusion that practical use of theMoreover, report based Rights on thein fieldretreat: research Abuses in thein theveto UN right) in crisis is a party situations in the where conflict. there It brings is no Crimea, whichHRW in detailsNovember describes 2014 thepresented human peacekeeping activity (even if it is not needed rights consequences of the extension of the or is impossible due to the veto right) is very Russian law and policy to the peninsula limited and has to be strengthened.

since the annexation. HRW states that Russia

11 -

Ukraine_13th_HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdfReport on the human rights situation in Ukraine, access:16 November 10 March 2015 2016]. to 15 February 2016, Office of the United Na 12 tions High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 2016 [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/-

Ukraine_13th_HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdfReport on the human rights situation in Ukraine, access:16 November 10 March 2015 2016]. to 15 p. February 53. 2016, Office of the United Na 13 tions High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 2016 [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/

World Report 2015: Ukraine. Events of 2014, Human Rights Watch [https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/ country-chapters/ukraine access: 23 March 2016]; World Report 2016: Ukraine. Events of 2015, Human Rights Watch [https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/ukraine-0 access: 23 March 2016]. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 61 has violated multiple obligations it has as The delegation concentrated on the rights an occupying power under international of this national minority and indicated humanitarian law – in particular in relation the incidents of suppressing and violating to the protection of civilians’ rights14 rights to life and bodily integrity, rights to containing recommendations analogous privacy of information and communication, to those presented in IGOs’ reports,. While the freedom of expression and religion, etc. In the meetings and interviews carried out now unaddressed by the Russian Federation with the members of the Mejlis, activists, andrecommendations IGOs themselves. of theThe HRWUkrainian stay evenside, and community members, the delegation concluded that these crucial problems were proposed to recognize the jurisdiction of mainly related to transition to a new legal theby theInternational way, in Crimean Criminal HRW Court report that was system, foreign to the local population, and later realized in 2015 by the Government of the repressive policy of the authorities de Ukraine15. facto exercising control over the Crimea17.

Amnesty International prepared a Hereby we see that the international comprehensive report for the “anniversary” society tries to use all possible mechanisms of the Crimean annexation. Besides documented facts of human rights violations Russian Federation itself that either in the peninsula, the strongest appeal organizesto draw attention, repressions first with of all,the thatpopulation of the in the report goes to the international of the occupied peninsula or turns a blind community. The NGO encourages everyone eye, to what is happening on the ground. to “monitor and report all cases of human rights violations and key human rights developments in the Crimea, report all ordinaryNGOs’ and people other do unofficial not stay involvement indifferent toin the monitoring grave human the situationrights situation testifies in thatthe the Russian authorities at any bilateral and Crimea, which should be addressed as soon multilateralfindings, and forums” raise these16. in discussions with as possible.

Another evidence of the grave situation in Conclusion

Present-day human rights situation in Turkishthe field delegationof human rightsin April in 2015 the Crimea to the ARCwas the Crimea leaves much to be desired. (whenpresented relations after between the visit Turkey of the and unofficial Russia Enforced disappearances, kidnappings, were still not so problematic and Turkey tortures, injustice, repressions towards had not yet imposed sanctions against political undesirables, censorship, erosion the Kremlin). Its main task consisted in of Ukrainian and indigenous Crimean evaluating the situation of the Crimean Tatars’ identity and culture are evidence Tatars since the invasion and the annexation of establishing an authoritarian political of the Crimea by the Russian Federation. regime on the occupied territory of the

14

15 Rights in retreat: Abuses in Crimea. Human Rights Watch 2014, p.3. andIssue war of thecrimes ratification committed of the since Rome the Statute beginning is still of theon theRussian table aggression. in the Parliament of Ukraine. However, since the 16 Oneformal year notification on: Violations in September of the rights 2015 to Ukrainefreedom recognizes of expression, the assemblyjurisdiction and of associationthe ICC for crimesin Crimea. against Amnesty humanity Inter - national Publications. International Secretariat, London 2015, p.24. 17 Crimea Report: The Situation of the Crimean Tatars since the Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

Report of the Unofficial Turkish Delegation to Crimea, 5 June 2015. 62 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 Crimea where international standards are by Amb. Stoudmann in January 2016), do far from being respected and implemented. not create a broad picture of the situation Systematic and large-scale violations of as they are controlled by the Russian fundamental freedoms and human rights occupation authorities, at the same time attract attention of the international society, being limited in time and scope of access. which attempts to reach out to the Russian Federation at least with recommendations For the sake of the general attention regarding the improvement of the situation and liquidation of the “grey zone” on the on the ground. European continent, the question of access to the region should not be politicized.

Enforced disappearances, remain being useless in this regard, the kidnappings, tortures, injustice, CouncilWhile the of OSCEEurope and appears the UN institutionsto have a «repressions towards political possibility to engage more actively in the undesirables, censorship, erosion of Ukrainian and indigenous succeeded in reaching the Crimea were sent Crimean Tatars’ identity and culture underpeninsula’s the auspices life: both of theofficial CoE. missions that are evidence of establishing an authoritarian political regime on the Permanent international presence in the occupied territory of the Crimea region may become a soft power instrument that with time can lead to formation of a new climate of respect and cooperation in the local society between different ethnic Under current circumstances, when communities and national minorities and Ukraine cannot but appeal for respecting preserve multiculturalism and uniqueness human rights, not having other leverage of the Crimea, being eroded by the Russian over the situation, the constant presence Federation up to now. Unfortunately, of international organizations, where whether this mission is impossible or not is up to political readiness and willingness members – such as OSCE, Council of Europe andboth the Ukraine UN – andis necessary Russia are to full-fledgedensure the Ensuring proper respect for human rights minimum level of permanent monitoring of andof onefreedoms state would to fulfil have itscontributed obligations. to the situation. strengthening regional peace and security.

Ad hoc visits of different international Kira Spyrydonova is a PhD student at the Institute missions to the annexed Crimea, allowed by of International Relations of Kyiv Taras Shevchenko the Russian Federation, as shows practice, National University. She also serves at the Ministry of semi-annually (abovementioned visits of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine covering issues of Ukraine’s CoE Commissioner for Human Rights N. participation in international organizations. Ms. Spyrydonova main research focus is regional security Turkish delegation in April 2015 and CoE studies and foreign policy of Ukraine. HumanMuiznieks Rights in SeptemberMission to 2014,Crimea unofficial headed

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 63 ELECTORAL SECURITY AS AN ELEMENT OF PEACE-BUILDING AND SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT Iuliia Serbina Board Member, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

The concept of electoral security as one of the prerequisites of post-conflict transformations is becoming widespread in operational documents of international organizations (UN) and some national agencies (USAID), expressing the responsibility to promote peace-building activities in a fragile political environment. In the context of human rights based approach, this concept assumes a special meaning for democratic transformations and reforms. It is strongly connected with such concepts as electoral conflict, electoral justice, electoral integrity, and transitional justice. The broad international experience of electoral security implementation enables the search of strategies for a consistent electoral reform in Ukraine and capacity building for elections at the uncontrolled districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions after the end of the conflict.

Electoral security in the light of human electoral security with regard to electoral rights based approach: main concepts management bodies, law enforcement, and definitions military and other security entities, peace building initiatives, women, community The concept of electoral security is one of leaders, and robust formal and alternative the main dimensions of human security dispute resolution mechanisms are not factored into plans”.1 Meantime, the human human security does not only mean the rights based approach enables a focus related to civil and political rights. While on environment where all citizens can also the protection of people and their exercise their fundamental right to vote fundamentalabsence of a conflictrights and or direct freedoms, danger, in but a or be elected. In this regard, we may agree broad sense, it is both a prerequisite and with the position of the analysts, who insist that HRBA to election-related issues “can peace building and peacekeeping. help inform the type and scope of security a consequence of conflict reconciliation, planning undertaken. It helps crystallize Meantime, contemporary understanding of exactly what must be protected, which in human security and ensuring sustainable turn can shape how this protection should development needs to bear in mind the be provided. This approach demands that human rights based approach as one of the when we look at the integrity of elections we consider the ability of people to exercise scholars consider such a “young” term as their rights to ensure that “the will of the leading paradigms. While the majority of

1 Best Practices in Electoral Security. A Guide for Democracy, Human rights and Governance Programming / USAID,

2013 https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/Electoral_Security_Best_Practices_USAID.pdf 64 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 people shall be the basis of the authority of electoral integrity tools and electoral government,” as stated in the UDHR”.2 electoral security is based on a statement Broad understanding of electoral security thatconflicts elections mitigation. might Such serve understanding either as an of comes from such milestone human rights documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant additional conflict trigger or as a tool of on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Regardlesspost-conflict the reconciliation. type of political systems, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms electoral security is closely related to an

Convention on the Rights of Persons withof Discrimination Disabilities Against(CRPD) Women and other (CEDAW), UN/ electoral conflict, which is an intermediate international instruments such as Security Depending on each political Council Resolution 1325, and Helsinki Final system, the necessity of Act on Security and Cooperation in Europe. «conflict prevention and/or These core stone human rights documents reconciliation process, the cycle of include articles guaranteeing all people the conflict, electoral security is often right to security of person (Article 3); the represented through electoral justice right to periodic and genuine elections, by measures, electoral integrity tools universal and equal suffrage, and through and electoral conflicts mitigation. secret vote (Article 21); and the right to assemble and associate peacefully (Article 20).3 issue between electoral integrity approach In a narrower sense, electoral security is a part of the international framework of International agencies (UN, USAID) operate and conflict prevention and mitigation. and path to sustainable development. This resultstandards is usually that govern the same: elections. disenfranchised While types subjectwith these matter terms can forbe introduced conflict prevention through voters,of electoral loss insecurityof trust in themay electoral change, theprocess, final and lack of electoral integrity. Electoral insecurity also represents a failure to a trio of fundamental definitions: protect the rights of citizens to take part in and 3) electoral justice. Electoral security the electoral process.4 1) electoral security; 2) electoral conflict; development challenge; and electoral Depending on each political system, the justiceis the end-state;is one of the electoral key mitigating conflict factors. is the These three concepts are closely related because they collectively embody electoral electoralnecessity security of conflict is preventionoften represented and/or 5 throughreconciliation electoral process, justicethe cycle ofmeasures, conflict, conflict dynamics.

2 Vasu Mohan, A Rights-Based Approach to Electoral Security / The International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 24 Apr 2014, http://www.ifes.org/news/rights-based-approach-electoral-security 3 Universal Declaration on human rights // http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf 4 Vasu Mohan, A Rights-Based Approach to Electoral Security / The International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 24 Apr 2014, http://www.ifes.org/news/rights-based-approach-electoral-security 5 Vasu Mohan, A Rights-Based Approach to Electoral Security / The International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 24 Apr 2014, http://www.ifes.org/news/rights-based-approach-electoral-security

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 65 registration data, and campaign material; by numerous reasons of systemic and electoral facilities such as polling stations occasionalAs a rule, electoral character. conflicts The canmain be causedfactors and counting centres; and electoral events such as campaign rallies against death, follows: damage, or disruption”.6 influencing electoral conflicts can be as • The absence of public trust in elections as a process and political institutions; Electoral justice can be described as follows, “…the adjudication of civil • challenges to the electoral process candidates’ nomination and ability to performThe conflicts passive electoral of political rights, especially parties/ contestants. These civil challenges could stipulated by the law on elections; concernwhich can eligibility, be filed by disenfranchisement,voters and political • Challenges to election results campaign practices, irregularities, and disputed outcomes among others.” resolution, timelines of election-related complaints(significance lodging); of electoral disputes Electoral integrity is a tool for shaping the sustainable development of political • Challenges related to campaign institutions, strengthening of democratic institutions, engagement of citizens and detailed monitoring during all in political participation (including phasesfinancing, of which electoral need cycleprecise while attention the vulnerable groups).7 irregularities pose the serious reason for political corruption; The choice of measures for electoral • Election related criminal offences and security components implementation their implication for ensuring electoral depends on the context, but the necessity integrity; of citizen’s full protection is without doubt. • The sociocultural context itself may pose The role of international community in electoral security acknowledgement • the ground for electoral conflicts; civic raising awareness on election- Like in many other issues concerning human The absence of capacities for sufficient related issues. security, the role of international community in electoral security implementation is According to the “Best Practices in Electoral Security Guide for Democracy, assist may vary as follows: significant. The responsibility to protect and Human Rights and Governance • Electoral supervision (Namibia and Programming” report produced by the Bosnia and Herzegovina). Through a International Foundation for Electoral UN resolution or peace agreement, the international community is requested to as “…the process of protecting electoral supervise elections or referendum; stakeholdersSystems, electoral such securityas voters, can candidates,be defined poll workers, media, and observers; • Electoral Administration (Cambodia, electoral information such as vote results, East Timor, Kosovo);

6 Best Practices in Electoral Security . A Guide for Democracy, Human rights and Governance Programming / USAID,

7 Best Practices in Electoral Security . A Guide for Democracy, Human rights and Governance Programming / USAID, 2013 https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/Electoral_Security_Best_Practices_USAID.pdf

2013 https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/Electoral_Security_Best_Practices_USAID.pdf 66 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 • Angola, El Salvador); management, human rights, humanitarian Electoral Verification (Nicaragua, • developmentthat directly linkand security democratization and conflict d’Ivoire). Through a UN resolution, efforts into a common country-level plan. peaceElectoral agreement, Certification or invitation(East Timor, by Côte the Electoral security is provided through the host country, the UN evaluates each UN Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD), stage of the electoral process and UN Department of Peace-Keeping assesses its compliance to international Operations (UN DPKO) that includes both good practices; international military and civilian police to provide election security and overall • Electoral Assistance (the cases of mission management; UN Development Bosnia, Macedonia) is a feature for new Program (UNDP) that provides project democracies. Through an invitation funding and may manage multi-country from a domestic electoral stakeholder, the international community can be entities of the UN in the context of requested to assist sovereign domestic elections.trust funds common to find the following institutions with the conduct of elections or referendum or the adjudication of the Electoral security for Ukraine: results; dimensions of constitutional reform and • Electoral Monitoring. The purposeful strengthening electoral institutions gathering of information about an electoral process and public assessment Strengthening electoral institutions, of that process against universal implementing good practices in election- standards for democratic elections by related issues, and a comprehensive responsible foreign or international constitutional reform may serve as a tool organizations committed to neutrality and to the democratic process for of existing potential tensions especially the purpose of building public and infor transitionalconflict prevention countries. and Leaving transformation behind

election’s integrity or documenting and exposinginternational the ways confidence in which the about process the Strengthening electoral falls short; institutions, implementing good • Electoral Mediation (Nicaragua, Kenya) - «practices in election-related issues, a form of electoral engagement whereby and a comprehensive constitutional an impartial third party employs non- reform may serve as a tool for conflict 8 prevention and transformation of existing potential tensions official election dispute. especially in transitional countries. organization providing the full-scale volumeThe mostof electoral influential security internationalmeasures is the UN, which has played an instrumental role in electoral security since 1989. the discussions towards the type and In the last several years, the UN has nature of Ukrainian democracy (either moved toward more integrated missions it is electoral democracy or it is on the

8 Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook // IDEA, 2010 http://www.idea.int/publications/electoral_jus- tice/upload/electoral_justice_chapter_2.pdf

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 67 way to participatory democracy), it is compromise between leading political obvious that sustainable development of forces drafting a law. This increases the political institutions needs reforms and lack of trust in elections transparency harmonization. In this regard, the electoral and leads to public disappointment in reform, which has been broadly discussed transparency of elections. for almost a decade in Ukraine, can be a •

resolution measures. groups,While the they majority represent of Ukrainian mainly media the part of conflict prevention and conflict positionsbelongs toof thetheir leadersowners ofin electoral financial process. It is very often that public districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, outreach campaigns for Ukrainian theMeantime, annexation military of conflict the Crimea in uncontrolled by the journalists, provided by domestic civil Russian Federation have their implications society organizations and international for other regions of Ukraine, which, in donors, are focused on technical aspects their turn, need special approaches to of newly adopted electoral legislation promote electoral security. Some elements and its’ implementation. Meantime, the of international assistance as a tool for broader perception of elections as one electoral security implementation are of the core civil and political rights is left practiced in Ukraine. Among them, there behind. are electoral monitoring and electoral • Campaign and political parties assistance.

moneyfinancing laundering. for a long It timeshould remain be noted in a the most essential risks for electoral thatshadow the thatLaw createsof Ukraine a large on fieldFighting for securityIn the light inherited of existing by each electoral electoral conflicts, cycle against Political Corruption (State in Ukraine are as following: • in 2015, creates certain conditions for Electoral system of Ukraine functions combatingfinancing ofpolitical Political corruption Parties) adoptedand, in inSpecifics the context of of “institutional “institutional memory”.heritage” its turn, strengthening electoral security. and institutional memory where the Meantime, the continuing process of the order of performing certain functions National Anti-corruption mechanisms is replaced by personal, regional, inter- creation is a serious obstacle for the groups relations. comprehensive implementation of this • Electoral legislation in Ukraine measure. remains non-harmonized. Elections • The ambiguous system of electoral to the bodies of different levels and disputes resolution, which allows different institutions are conducted implementing bodies (election under different laws. Each new law, in management bodies, courts of different spite of permanent recommendations levels) to adopt completely different of international organizations and decisions in similar cases of electoral recommendations of the Code of Good irregularities. This issue creates Electoral Practice (Venice Commission concerns for elections to the bodies of Code) is always adopted in less than one different levels and is inherited in each year before elections take place. new law on national or local elections. • Constituency delimitation changes each • Avoidance of responsibility for electoral electoral cycle. Very often borders and law violations, which, on one hand, is the number of voters are the matter of the caused by the level of electoral culture,

68 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 but, on the other hand, leads to the held under acting Ukrainian Law on local growth of mistrust in elections as a tool elections or the new special law should of elites’ rotation. be elaborated and adopted. Furthermore, the necessity of amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine concerning the attention and consistent tackling through special status of Donetsk and Luhansk formalThese and challenges, informal rules, without create the sufficient threat of “soft” electoral security in a transforming society and creates ground for human society breaking its trajectory on the path insecurity.regions provokes conflicts in Ukrainian of reforms. Meantime, obvious obstacles for “hard” electoral security may exist in such elections bring? Leaving behind the legalWhat basis challenges of the crediblefor electoral electoral security process, may Electionsconflict-affected as a areas.tool for peace-building it should be noted that electoral security activities: is electoral security possible is guaranteed entirely only through on the uncontrolled territories of free and competitive elections without Ukraine? intimidation. Is it the proper context in the occupied regions to act in line with the principles stipulated by the Helsinki Final process, the issues of local elections and Act, International Covenant on Civil and participationWith a start of of representatives the Minsk negotiation of the Political Rights and other principal human uncontrolled districts of Donetsk and rights documents? Luhansk regions in the government at the central level have been one of the points. It is obvious that direct threats to physical security of all participants of this process February 2015, consider elections as a part disable compliance with the international ofWhile peace-building Minsk Agreements tools, modalities signed of on such 15 standards and conducting of true elections. The primary concerns are resumption of border control by the Ukrainian It is obvious that direct threats to government, demining the bordering physical security of all participants territories, consistent resumption of safe «of this process disable compliance environment. Violations of basic human with the international standards and conducting of true elections. organizations monitoring, do not leave therights, space confirmed for performing by the international civil and political rights.9 Particularly, an effective electoral campaign is impossible without elections are discussed at each new round competitive outreach campaigns of of Minsk negotiations. Meantime, there Ukrainian political parties, free presence is no clear vision of such modalities, it is of Ukrainian and international media, unclear either these elections should be administration provided by trained

9 United Nations Human Rights Council (2014) Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human

HRC/27/75 // http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A-HRC-27-75_ en.pdf;Rights and Report reports on the of thehuman Office rights of the situation High Commissioner in Ukraine (16 and August the Secretary-General, to 15 November 2015) Twenty-seventh // http://www.ohchr. session, A/ org/Documents/Countries/UA/12thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 69 election management bodies, monitoring Conclusions by domestic and international observers, and effective electoral disputes resolution. Though, elections remain one of the tools

maintained at the occupied territories, peace-building, the promotion of electoral electoralWhile these security minimal remains conditions a arerather not securityof conflict as a reconciliation prerequisite andof electoral further theoretical issue, which must be followed integrity and legitimacy needs consistent by the basic human rights guarantees. implementation and inclusion both in

As European (Bosnia and Herzegovina, negotiations, and reconciliation process. Kosovo) and world (East Timor) Disregardinga general political the general agenda context, and conflicthuman experience of electoral justice shows, rights based approach and effective it is more essential to create a safe strategies of electoral security promotion environment for elections to prevent should be the core of electoral process. The security inconveniences. Only restoration choice of the strategy, which guarantees of control over Donetsk and Luhansk electoral integrity, the level and type of regions’ territories, followed by international agencies’ involvement in transitional justice measures, under the electoral reforms vary and depend on state international community assistance or capacities to promote electoral security. In supervision could be prerequisites for the worst scenarios, the risks of electoral free and democratic elections. insecurity, which may lead to further

escalation is highly credible. insist that “in a fragile or divided political human rights violations and conflict environment,We may agree withit may those be scholars politically who desirable to start with local elections and Iuliia Serbina coordinates Human Rights Program as a Board Member of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian build over time to provincial and national Prism” and Socio-Political Programs at the NGO elections as the infrastructure and political “Promotion of Intercultural Cooperation”. Prior to this, situation allow - as has been proposed Ms Serbina served as a Senior Researcher at the National in Sudan. If such a strategy is chosen, Institute for Strategic Studies (Odesa Branch) where she it is important that the system is both contributed to drafting policy papers for state and local designed to meet political requirements of authorities. In 2014, Iuliia Serbina served as a National the local elections and feasible to organize Human Rights Officer in the UN Human Rights Monitoring given the timetable”.10 Mission in Ukraine. The spheres of Ms Serbina’s interests are human rights, democratization process, election- related issues, civil society development, peace building and conflict resolution.

10 IDEA’s Handbook on Electoral System Design / IDEA 2004, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/ stm103%20articles/IDEAs%20Handbook%20of%20Electoral%20System%20Design.pdf

70 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 DO VISA LIBERALISATION REFORMS HELP MODERNIZING UKRAINE?

Maryana Kuzio and Iryna Sushko Europe without Barriers

Though Ukraine has never been so close to getting a visa-free regime with the EU, till recently the process could still be delayed or even disrupted. The EU has been taking the final decision not only based on technical criteria envisaged by the Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP)1 but also taking into account the factors of security and migration risks, raised from the latest refugee crisis in the European Union and due to the conflict in the east of Ukraine. The VLAP appeared to be one of the most effective stimuli for Ukraine to advance reforms in the sphere of fight against corruption, security of documents and migration management. The result of an independent survey, conducted by the Civic Organization “Europe without Barriers” (EWB) revealed that the three abovementioned issues appeared to be in the focus of the EU policy makers and NGOs with regard to the abolition of the visa regime with Ukraine. Overall, interviewees saw corruption as the key problem, acknowledging that it is much harder to fight corruption than to introduce new laws or passports. Corruption is seen as the factor undermining success in many different parts of the VLAP: “The best border control does not help if the guards are not earning enough money or view their service as something they can sell.”2 The armed conflict in the east of Ukraine brought into the focus the issue of document security. EU countries express their concern regarding the entry of terrorist and armed radical groups to the territories of EU with Ukrainian passports3. The visa liberalization mechanism gives the opportunity to enhance documents’ security by introducing biometric data for the travel and identification documents. As found during EWB external survey4, some migration stereotypes about Ukraine circulating in the European Union’s Member States could come up as a threat to the political support of visa liberalisation to Ukraine. It is thought that this would lead to more poverty and an increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine, motivating more Ukrainians to try to get to the European Union. Also, the high number of approximately 1.6 million IDPs may lead to the conclusion that they will not be able to return to their homes anytime soon, making emigration an interesting option for them. In this context, Ukraine’s progress in reforms within the visa liberalization process appeared to be under the close look of the EU. Ukraine needs to demonstrate real steps towards fighting corruption as well as regulating the security situation and migration flows.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 71 How has Ukraine benefited from the achieved in establishing the anti- implementation of VLAP so far? corruption legislative and institutional frame. At the same time, Ukraine settled The vast majority of decision makers in the for rather modest advances in ensuring the EU member states believe that if Ukraine full operability of institutions, responsible implements all the benchmarks, the for the implementation of anti-corruption positive decision towards visa abolition legislation. The Ukrainian parliament will be taken.5 The most relevant area where measurable progress is expected is The VLAP appeared to be one of the most effective stimuli for Thethe fight visa liberalizationagainst corruption. process has created «Ukraine to advance reforms an ideal policy environment where the in the sphere of fight against public visibility of the reward produced corruption, security of documents and migration management

reforms.significant The pressure government on Ukraine’s has succeeded decision- in introducingmakers to implement major legislative a series changes of difficult and approved the State Program on Anti- setting up key institutional mechanisms Corruption Strategy Implementation for to tackle corruption. Their practical 2015-2017, which is the guiding document implementation is the next challenge for government efforts in this area, and a that requires careful monitoring from set of critical anti-corruption legislation, civil society, media, and international such as the laws on the access to public

a proper system for issuing passports and the establishment of an asset recovery andcommunity. other ID Having documents, finally Ukraine introduced now information, financing political parties, has to ensure its smooth operation on a 2015, the European Commission’s Final nationwide scale. Finally, the government Reportand management on Ukraine’s office. progress On December in VLAP 18, has shown a good grip on the IDP crisis, though movements between the occupied as being in line with EU standards and territories and the rest of the country requirements.implementation6 classified this legislation remain a weak spot. On October 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Anti-corruption activities

Ukraine’s implementation of key anti- lawUkraine determines adopted status Law «Onand thegoals National of the NationalAnti-corruption Anti-corruption Bureau ofBureau Ukraine». (NABU), The the Revolution of Dignity in February the rights and duties of its employees and 2014.corruption Considerable activities hasprogress intensified has sincebeen other issues concerning its operation.

1 On 22 November 2010, Ukraine received from the European Union an Action Plan on visa Liberalization (VLAP). The document is divided into the “legislative” and “implementation” phases. 2

3 Results of EWB’s in-depth interviews in 11th European Union’s Member States (EU MS). 4 Results of EWB’s in-depth interviews in 11th European Union’s Member States (EU MS). 5 Results of EWB’s in-depth interviews in 11th European Union’s Member States (EU MS). 6 The Report is available at the web: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-905- EN-F1-1.PDFResults of EWB’s in-depth interviews in 11th European Union’s Member States (EU MS).

72 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 After a competitive selection process, on The Specialized Anti-Corruption April 16, 2015 the President of Ukraine appointed Artem Sytnyk7 as Director of the in December 2015, the General Prosecutor National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU). appointedProsecutor’s the Office SAP (SAP) Head was and established its two Since June 2015, NABU has been carrying deputies9. The recently hired anti- corruption prosecutors have started their for detectives and administrative staff. It activities in cases initiated by the NABU. isout planned an open to competition hire 506 employees to fill vacancies for the On November 11, 2015 the Parliament adopted a package of draft laws on creating shall be detectives. a special Agency for Assets Recovery Bureau’s central office, 242 out of which and introducing necessary changes into Selection process has been conducted Civil, Criminal and Criminal Procedure with the participation of the Civil Control Council, approved by the Presidential and management of stolen assets. This Decree8. The Council aims at carrying legislativeCodes regarding package seizure,will make confiscation it possible out civic control over the activities of the Bureau, facilitating its interaction with assets back to Ukraine. civic organizations, participating in the to return disclosed and confiscated illicit formation of the competition commission Document security improvements

The visa liberalization process prodded 70for detectives selecting was candidates selected - toon fillSeptember vacant much needed reforms in Ukraine’s system 15,positions 25 detectives in the Bureau. started Thetheir first work. group There of is a separate budget line set for the NABU passports issued by Ukraine did not meet activities in the State Budget 2016. theof documentinternational identification. industry requirements In the past, set out by the International Civil Aviation The National Agency for Prevention of Organization (ICAO) as they were not Corruption (NAPC) was created according suitable for the most common systems to a Directive of the Cabinet of Ministers of electronic reading and did not provide of Ukraine dated March 18, 2015. Five protection against counterfeit and members of the NAPC have been selected. fraudulent use. The system of document The selection process took longer due to integrated into other national databases. committee. The problem was solved identification was not transparent and well thanksa conflict to regardingthe Ministry forming of Justice the selection efforts. The situation changed for the better after The Cabinet of Ministers approved the Euromaidan. Ukraine started the issuance Selection Committee on September 2, of a new type of biometric passport. 2015 and the Committee started selection Both types of passports in Ukraine: ID process of the NAPC members, which has card and biometric passport are being currently issued. The e-passport contains budget line for the NAPC in the State a contactless chip that stores the photo, Budgetbeen finished 2016. by now. There is a separate

two fingerprints and the signature of the

7 See his bio at the web: http://nabu.gov.ua/en/kerivnyctvo/artem-sytnyk 8 The Decree of the President of Ukraine from May, 2015, #272. The Civil Council 9 http://www.gp.gov.ua/# (but web is under construction, there are just links )

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 73 holder. According to the technical analysis between State Migration Service, State conducted by the French border police Border Guard Service, Ministry of Social laboratory10, the security features of this Policy and Ministry of Interior and Ministry new model of passport comply with the of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in organizing ICAO recommendations. At the date of 16 analytical and prognostic maintenance of February 2015, 610 working stations for migration processes in Ukraine. the collection of the applications were deployed in 25 territorial directorates of On 5 November 2015, the parliament the State Migration Service (SMS), which adopted a new law on labour migration correspond to regional level (oblast), that stipulates the legal and organizational and in 209 territorial units of the SMS principles of state regulation of labour corresponding to district level. Also, migration and social protection of the necessary equipment in order to Ukrainian citizens abroad (migrant conduct the checks at the borders have workers) and their families. The been deployed and the border police recently voted legislation on refugees and individuals who need temporary VLAP document security requirements by or additional protection is a step in the introducingstaff trained. biometric Hence, Ukraine foreign fulfilled passports the right direction as it improves the process in May 2015 and national ID cards in of issuing documents to such persons. January 2016. Experts believe the new ID However, a lot of work is still ahead as the documents are well protected and prevent parliament needs to bring additional laws the abuse of personal data.11 and regulations12 into compliance with the newly adopted legislation. Migration Management Despite the catastrophic economic situation, Ukraine has made progress towards Crimea’s annexation, and Russian hybrid reorganizing its migration management warfare in the east, over the last two years the authorities. The State Migration Service government has been successful in keeping streamlined its human resources by the situation around internally displaced reducing the overall staff by 600 persons persons (IDPs) under control. This is no and establishing a unit for combating small feat. According to the Ministry of Social irregular migration. In pursuance of p.11 Policy of Ukraine, more than 1.6 million of the Action Plan to implement the EU people are considered to be IDPs as of late January 2016. Their registration is managed report of the EC on Ukraine’s progress in by local authorities and coordinated by the VLAPrecommendations implementation contained approved in theby fifththe Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine. The Prime Minister of Ukraine on 16.05.2015, the State Migration Service of Ukraine created by the Cabinet of Ministries, deals established Contact information and withInteragency documentation Coordination and social Office security on IDPs, for analytical centre to monitor migration. Ukrainian citizens who were forced to move The work of the mentioned Centre is based from the Crimea and the occupied territories on the intergovernmental cooperation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

10 Visa liberalisation dialogue Ukraine closed Expert Report on document security (Block 1, on document security). 11 Interview with experts is available at the web: http://24tv.ua/biometrichni_pasporti_chi_mozhna_yih_zlama- ti_n604352 12

This list includes the labor and tax codes, laws on social insurance, disability benefits, and pensions. 74 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 Technical assistance programs supported Conclusions by the United Nations and other foreign donors have helped the government address Since last summer, the European Union IDPs’ re-settlement and livelihood. Although the parliament adopted the Law on the of refugees from the Middle East. In Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied addition,has been thefacing number the unprecedented of refugees from influx the Territory of Ukraine in April 2014, the entry increased substantially. between the Ukrainian government and pro- Western Balkans, in particular Kosovo, has Russianand exit separatists procedures are on far the from line being of conflict well This situation negatively affects the established. In particular, the Government prospects of visa liberalization with introduced a Temporary Order requiring that all individuals, vehicles and cargo travelling the European Union society and decision makersUkraine. as First, well, as see EWB’s the surveyhigh number shows, Donbas must hold a special permit. into and out the conflict area within the Balkans as a direct consequence of visa Many features of the permit system, liberalization.of asylum seekers This creates from the the Westerngeneral including complicated and cumbersome public perception that “the boat is full” with more voices demanding “new fences” obtaining necessary documentation in rather than liberal visa policies. application requirements, difficulties in and services are no longer present, It is also seen as risky that Ukraine inconsistentconflict areas whereapplication, state administrations and the currently does not control large parts of impossibility of travelling to permit issuing its border with Russia. At the same time, ability of civilians to leave the Donbas. noted that the eastern border does not Theseauthorities limitations have significantly have further impaired prevented the mattersome high-level if the western European border Unions’ is officials under essential aid and services to be provided to those communities most in need. the vast majority of EU decision-makers believecontrol. that EWB’s if Ukraine survey implementsalso indicated all that the benchmarks within the visa liberalization would produce a large wave of Ukrainian process, it would obtain a positive decision. refugeesFears in the to the EU Unionthat the have conflict proven in theentirely east The most relevant area where they expect unfounded. Given the high scale of internal displacement, the number of Ukrainians corruption. who applied for an asylum in the EU measurable progress is the fight against remains very low. At 22,055 people in The Visa Liberalization Action Plan 2015, it accounted only for 1.7 percent (VLAP) for Ukraine proved to be a key of all asylum seekers in the EU (1.32 mechanism for implementing further million). Only 4,570 Ukrainians applied structural reforms in the area of migration for the asylum status in Germany, which accounts for 1 percent of all applications document security. However, there are (441,800)13. fewmanagement, outstanding fight issues against for corruptionthe completion and

13 The data is available at the web: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/data- base.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 75 of all the benchmarks within the VLAP. The full operation of the Anti-Corruption Maryana Kuzio is a European integration and Visa Liberalisation expert at the NGO “Europe without Bureau and the Agency for Prevention of Barriers” (September 2011- April 2016). She holds Corruption shall be ensured in 2016. an MA in International Relations, from Ivan Franko National University in Lviv, specialising in European Politics and MA in five Universities of Europe (Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary research and Studies on the support of the EU member Eastern Europe) at the University of Bologna. Main states for granting a visa free fields of her activities are: research and monitoring «regime is very important for the aimed at providing independent expertise of domestic Ukrainian society. It will encourage reforms in the areas of document security, migration and the citizens of Ukraine to demand readmission, public order and security and fundamental from its government a continued rights. She has practical experience of advocating and implementation of the reform agenda lobbying necessary internal reforms in Ukraine, as well as carrying out advocacy campaigns in the European Union’s Member States directed at abolishing the EU visa requirements for Ukraine and the whole Eastern Partnership region. Hence, the decision regarding the introduction of the visa free regime for Iryna Sushko, has been the Head of the NGO “Europe Ukraine depends, on the one hand, on without Barriers” EWB since its registration in 2009. Ukrainian authorities to stick to their From 2006 until 2011 Iryna has worked as a lecturer of obligations taken in the framework of history and ethnology at the Kyiv University of Economics the VLAP and, on the other hand, on the and Law (KROK) and at the Kyiv Business Lyceum. Parallel to her occupation as a teacher she was involved as a political willingness of the EU Council to project manager and the analyst at the Center for Peace, vote in favour of visa free regime once the Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine. Iryna was legislative proposal is introduced by the the leader of numerous international and all-Ukrainian European Commission to the EU Council. research and advocacy projects aimed at supporting the European integration of Ukraine. She managed all EWB At the same time, the support of the EU monitoring projects. She is the author of policy papers member states for granting a visa free dedicated to the development of the movement to support regime is very important for the Ukrainian civic liberties, in particular, freedom of movement and society. It will encourage the citizens of human contacts. Since 2011, she is an expert on the Ukraine to demand from its government international research projects such as the European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries and a continued implementation of the reform the Eastern Partnership Visa Liberalization Index in the agenda as this leads the country closer to spheres of justice, freedom and security. European standards.

76 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016 NOTES Issue 1 (3), 2016

78 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 1 (3), 2016