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Home , Atticus (philosopher), Cicero, Philo

Carlos Lévy of vs.Descartes: An Ignored JewishPremonitoryCritic of the Cogito

The starting-point of this paper is adouble statement of fact.First,inthe transmis- sion of the sorts of tablets of the sceptic lawthat are the tropes of , our initial witness is neither aphilosopher in the narrow sense, nor adoxographer,nor an encyclopaedist,but someone who was and remains an atypical character in the world of : aJew born in Alexandria, raised in the paideia,who never abandoned the of his . Philo thoughtthat there could exist akind of complex compatibility between the Jewish Torahand Greek philosophy. Nowa- days,scholars generallydismiss the Philonian version of the tropes.¹ In my opin- ion—but it seems that Iamalmostthe onlyone to think so currently—it is an error,since Philo was, from achronological, geographical, historical, and linguistic point of view,the closest to Aenesidemus. H. vonArnim expressedthe same opinion at the beginning of the twentieth century that was, but it was shaken by Janáček’s(to my mind) unconvincing criticism, whose authority playedanimportant role in de- valuing Philo’sversion of the tropes.² Certainlytherewould be much to sayabout this question, but the main fact is thatPhilo, who livedinacity brimming with phi- losophers, quicklyidentified Aenesidemus’stropes as something very important to his own reflections on Jewish law. On this ,thereisasharp contrast between the attitudes of Ciceroand Philo. Cicerowas himself adisciple of the sceptic Academyand agood friend of Tu- bero, to whom Aenesidemus dedicated his Pyrrhonian books, yetCiceronever men- tions Aenesidemus.³ In his opinion the tradition of doubt was represented by the AcademyofArcesilaus and . Scepticism, aterm that had no precise equiv- alent in his vocabulary,was for Ciceroessentiallyanaspect of . UnlikeAe-

 On this question, see Carlos Lévy, “Philon d’Alexandrie est-il inutilisable pour connaître Éné- sidème? Étude méthodologique,” Philosophie antique 15 (2015): 7‒26.  Hans vonArnim, Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1889); KarelJanáček, “Philon vonAlexandreia und skeptische Tropen,” (1982):83‒97.  Photius says that Aenesidemus’sbook was dedicated to Lucius Tubero, who was his sunairesiōtēs (“classmate”)inthe Academy. This Tuberoiscommonlyidentified with Lucius Aelius Tubero, who was alegateofQuintus duringhis pro-consulate in Asiafrom63to58BCE. On Tubero, see John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht,1978), 118. On the debateabout the Academic identity of Aenesidemus,see the contradictory positions of Fernanda DeclevaCaizzi, “Aenesidemus and the Academy,” Classical Quarterly 42 (1992):176‒89,who denies that Aenesidemus was astudent in the Academy, and Jaap Mansfeld, “Aenesidemus and the Academ- ics,” in Thepassionate intellect. Essaysonthe transformation of Classical , ed. Lewis Ayres (New Brunswick-London: Transactions, 1996), 235‒48, whoaffirmsthat he was.

OpenAccess. ©2019 Carlos Lévy,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-002 6 Carlos Lévy

nesidemus, he never intended to removescepticism from the familyofthe Socratic doctrines. Forhim was adogmatic indifferentist.⁴ Further in this paper,inacomparative perspective,weshall deal with Augus- tine’sintellectual and spiritual itinerary.Itiswell-known that,after avery long and complex evolution, he had an illumination in the garden of Milan, in July 386.Itwas acrucial moment for his conversion.⁵ One could think that,atthis time of his life, he would have isolated himself in order to write some fresh theolog- ical . But it was not the case. He retired with his mother and some friends in Cassiciacum, in order to tackle agreat number of philosophicalthemes, the first of which was the refutation of the New Academy.Thisseems even stranger as in Con- fessions 5.25,⁶ when he speaks about his own sceptical crisis (in 384‒85), he seems to consider it as aminor episode, in the context of his liberation from along-lasting Manichaean influence. In the case of Augustine, as in thatofPhilo, dealingwith scepticism seems to have been more thananintellectual challenge, but an actual kind of emergency. Hereagain, the contrast with Ciceroistelling. Cicerowrote his when he was sixty,anage roughlyequivalent to today’seighty,given differences in life ex- pectancy.One would perhaps object that the link between Philo and Augustine is mere coincidence. But the paradoxical relation between faith and scepticism is a line which runs through the history of Western thought.The namesofMontaigne and Pascal can be mentioned here, among so many others, as carefullystudied by Charles Schmitt.⁷ The presenceofthis relation, however,does not meanthat it would be unidimensional. By exploring the cases of Philo and Augustine, we try to determine what,ifanything,they have in common. In , thingslook quite simple; Philo adopts and adapts the tropes of Ae- nesidemus, while Augustine wants to over the scepticism of the New Acad- emy. In fact,this contrast between the former,who seems to feel some attraction to- wards scepticism, and the latter,who treats it as an adversary,isfallacious. In both

 See Carlos Lévy, “Un problème doxographique chez Cicéron, les indifférentistes,” Revue des Études Latines 58 (1980): 238‒51.  On the Augustinian intellectual and spiritual itinerary,see Peter Brown, Augustine of :ABi- ography,rev.ed. (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,2000).  Augustine, Confessions 5.25: “Accordingly,after the manner of the Academics,aspopularlyunder- stood, Idoubted everything, and in the fluctuatingstateoftotal suspense of judgement Idecided I must leave the Manichees, thinkingatthat period of my scepticism that Ishould not remainamem- ber of asect to which Iwas now preferringcertain philosophers. But to these philosophers, whowere without Christ’ssavingname, Ialtogether refused to entrust the healingofmysoul’ssickness” (ita- que Academicorum more, sicut existimantur,dubitans de omnibus atque inter omnia fluctuans, mani- chaeos quidem relinquendos esse decrevi, non arbitrans eo ipso temporedubitationis meae in illa secta mihi permanendum esse cui iam nonnullos philosophos praeponebam. quibus tamen philosophis,quod sine salutari nomine Christi essent, curationem languoris animae meae committereomnino recusabam). Henry Chadwick, trans., Saint Augustine: Confessions (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1991).  Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus (Leiden: Brill, 1972). Philo vs.Descartes 7

cases, thingsare far morecomplex. In the background of both cases is aquestion to which Descartesgaveananswer he considered to be definitive:isthere something that Ican know with absolute certainty?Iwill try to demonstrate that Philo had fore- seen and refuted the Cartesian solution, while Augustine in acertain sense anticipat- ed it.

1Prolegomena

Before dealing with Philo, Iwillsay something about the pagan attitude towards re- ligion, and more specificallythat of the Hellenistic schools. In the Pyrrhonian tradi- tion, passive observance of the religious tradition of the city is recommended in order to avoid the disturbance of religious dissension.⁸ We find something quiteopposite to this indifferentism in Cicero’streatise On the Natureofthe Gods (De naturadeorum). The main purpose of this treatise, in the tradition of the New Academy,istodemon- strate that the dogmatic explanations of the natureofthe gods offered by Stoics and Epicureans weredisappointingand contradictory.Ishall not insist on the arguments used by Cotta against his dogmatic adversaries, since they have been explored at length.⁹ HereIprefer to evoke apassageofthe third book, rarelyanalysed in com- mentariesonthis treatise.Atsections 11‒12 of the third book, Cotta, the exponent of the Academic refutation of , refuses to grant that gods or dead heroes could appear among mortals and be seen in some exceptional occasions,let us sayinmiracles. He adds that he prefers to believesomething more probable, namely that the souls of the great men are divine and immortal.¹⁰ In the case of Cotta, the

 See Carlos Lévy, “La question du pouvoir dans le pyrrhonisme,” in Fondements et crises du pouvoir, eds.Sylvie Franchet d’Esperey,Valérie Fromentin, Sophie Gotteland, and Jean-Michel Roddaz (Bor- deaux: ,2003), 47‒56;RichardBett, Pyrrho:his Antecedents and his Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000), esp. chap. 2; Emidio Spinelli, “,l’expérience sceptique et l’horizon de l’éthique,” Cahiers philosophiques 115,no. 3(2008): 29‒45.  See Daniel Babut, La des grecs,2nd ed. (Paris:Les Belles Lettres,2019); Jean- Louis Girard, “Probabilisme, théologie et religion: le cataloguedes dieux homonymes dans le De na- turadeorum de Cicéron (3,42et53‒60),” in Hommages àR.Schilling,eds.Hubert Zehnacker and Gus- tave Hentz (Paris:Les Belles Lettres,1983), 117‒26;JaapMansfeld, “Aspects of Epicurean ,” Mnemosyne 46 (1993): 172‒210; JordiPia, “De la Naturedes dieux de Cicéron àl’abrégédeCornutus: une nouvelle représentation des élites dans la réflexion théologique,” Camenae 10 (February 2012), http://saprat.ephe.sorbonne.fr/media/282f1da6517e2ba6025880dd887c8682/camenae-10-varia-jordi- pia-derniere.pdf.  Cicero, De Naturadeorum 3.12: “Would younot prefer to believethe perfectlycredible doctrine that the souls of famous men, likethe sons of Tyndareus youspeak of, aredivine and live for ever,rather than that men whohad been oncefor all burnt on afuneral pyrecould ride and fight in abattle ;and if youmaintain that this was possible, then youhavegot to explain how it was pos- sible, and not merelybringforwardold wives’ tales” (nonne mavis illud credere, quod probari potest, animos praeclarorum hominum, quales isti Tyndaridae fuerunt, divinos esse et aeternos,quam qui semel cremati essentequitareetinacie pugnarepotuisse; aut si hoc fieri potuisse dicis,doceas oportet 8 Carlos Lévy

Academic argumentation has adouble function: first,todemonstrate thathuman reason is incapable of elaboratinganon-contradictory doctrine about the gods; and second, to consider the possibility of aless naïve,more persuasive,and more intellectual discourse about them. There is akind of subtle connexion between Cot- ta’scritical attitude and aform of transcendence. His critique aims at demonstrating that the inability of reason to find what is absolutely true does not necessarilyimply its incapacity to detect what is false or to have an intuition of what is probable. Cotta, as an Academic, is essentiallyanevaluator.Headvances arguments in order to dem- onstrate that the theory of the immortality of the best human souls is more plausible than the naïvebelief of the visiblepresenceofgods. Implicitly, it is an extension of the TheDream of Scipio (,from book 6 of De republica)written by Ciceroten years before. It is quite difficulttodecide if this connexion between the Academic contraomnia dicere and atranscendent perspective had antecedents in the school of and Carneades or if it wasCicero’sinnovation.¹¹ At no mo- ment,however,does he presume to understand what could be the nature of this ego who, though not pretending to reach truth, thinksthat it is qualified to express a qualified opinion on opposite propositions. It can be asserted that,evenwhen he deals with philosophical themes, Cotta is unable to define his subjectivity otherwise than through his own position in the Roman tradition.¹²

2The Main Features of Philo’sScepticism

Iwill not enter into details regarding Philo’sversion of the tropes.Itmust be noted that Philo’ssceptical aspects are not limited to the tropes thatwefind in his On Drunkenness (De ebrietate). There are many other places whereheuses sceptic argu- ments in different ways.¹³ My purpose is to try to provide an answer to these two questions: whyPhilo and whyscepticism?Why does Philo frequentlyuse sceptic items,while he considers the sceptics themselvestobesophists?Heremymethod will be to revisit some conceptsofthe confrontation between sceptics and Stoics,try- ing to see what they become when they are used by Philo.

quo modo,nec fabellas aniles proferas). Cicero, On the Natureofthe Gods. Academics, trans. H. Rack- ham (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press), 1933.  On the relation between the New Academyand the Platonic legacy, see Carlos Lévy, “La Nouvelle Académie a-t-elle été antiplatonicienne?”,inContre Platon I. Le platonisme dévoilé,ed. Monique Dix- saut (Paris:Vrin, 1993), 139‒56.  Cicero, De Naturadeorum 3.9: “Formypart asingle argument would have sufficed, namelythat it has beed handed down to us by our forefathers” (mihi enim unum sat erat, ita nobis maioresnostros tradidisse).  On this point see Carlos Lévy, “La conversion du scepticisme chez Philon d’Alexandrie,” in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy,ed. Francesca Alesse (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 103‒20. Philo of Alexandria vs.Descartes 9

2.1 Philo and Stoic Epistemological Concepts

First sunkatathesis (assent), katalēpsis (perception of reality), and epochē (suspen- sion of assent). Briefly, since for the Stoics -nature is both God and Providence, it generouslyoffers true representations of the world to human beings. They are said to be freetoaccept or to refuse them, since assent depends on us. They can also sus- pend this assent.Atthe coreofthe confrontation between Stoics and sceptics is the fact that for the former, it is normaltogiveassent to natural representations,while for the latter no representation is adequatelyclear and unambiguous to be believed. Both schools agree, however,thatthe relation (or the absence of relation) between representations and assent is the central concern of the philosophyofknowledge. Philo’soriginality was chieflydue to his refusaltoadmit even the terms of the problem. Within his corpus,onlytwice does he use sunkatathesis,aterm which was specificallyStoic,since it wascoined from an electoral metaphor by Zeno,the founderofthe school.¹⁴ Forthe Stoics,human life is akind of permanent electoral process, in which representations are the candidatesand the subject atireless voter.Sensory representations are almostsure to be elected, since most of them are phantasiai katalēptikai (“cognitive representations”), whereas intellectual propo- sitions need amore accurate examination. In Philo’shugecorpus,the near-absence of one of the main conceptsofStoic vocabulary—and more generallyofthe philo- sophic lingua franca of this time—can hardlybeconsidered amere coincidence. It would be temptingtoprovide astylistic explanation, since Philo generallyavoids ne- ologisms and non-classical concepts too narrowly connected to aprecise philosoph- ical context.But,atthe same time, he often uses katalēpsis,another central concept of Stoic . In Stoic doctrine, katalēpsis is akataleptic, i.e., naturallyevi- dent representation, to which assent has been given.¹⁵ We know that Philo wasfamil- iar with these kinds of scholastic definitions, since in the De congressu,hegives sev- eral Stoic definitions with great accuracy,among them the concept of katalēpsis which he includes in the more general concept of science, epistēmē.¹⁶ It is true that Philo’svocabulary is often much more exegetical thanphilosophical and gener- allynot particularlyinclined towards terminological innovations.Atthe sametime, it is quiteprobable that he did not want to accept aconcept so clearlybelongingtothe Stoic system, which expressed the autonomyofthe human subject inside aperfectly

 See Carlos Lévy, “Breakingthe Stoic Language: Philo’sAttitude towards Assent (sunkatathesis) and Comprehension (katalêpsis),” Henoch 32 (2010): 33‒44.  Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians (Adversus mathematicos)8.396(=SVF 2.91).  Philo, On the PreliminaryStudies (De Congressu eruditionisgratia)141: “Knowledge on the other hand is defined as asureand certain apprehension which cannot be shaken by argument” (ἐπιστή- μης δέ· κατάληψις ἀσφαλὴςκαὶβέβαιος, ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου). Philo, On the PreliminaryStudies, in On the Confusion of Tongues. On the Migration of Abraham. WhoIsthe HeirofDivine Things?On Mating with the PreliminaryStudies (Philo vol. 4), trans. F.H. Colson,G.H. Whitaker (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press),1932. 10 Carlos Lévy

determined nature. By contrast, katalēpsis had Platonic and Aristotelian antece- dents.¹⁷ Ihope thatthe process of Philo’sterminological preferences will become clearer by examining one of the twooccurrences of sunkatathesis in his corpus. On the Life of (De vita Mosis)shows Moses in astate of great perplexity about the date of ,avery complex religious problem.¹⁸ On one hand,the date of the festival was set at the fourteenth dayofthe first month, but on the other hand, certain mem- bers of the group wereplungedinto mourning by the death of relatives. Due to their ensuing of ritual impurity,they could not attend the ceremonies of Passover and were quitedisappointed. Forthis reason, they asked the prophet to change the date. Philo reports that Moses was torn between contradictory sentiments, be- tween admitting or rejecting these protests. Theinclination of aStoic philosopher probablywould have been to reject them, since grief wasone of the four fundamen- tal negative passions. An Academic belongingtothe Carneadean tradition would have suspended his assent,while trying to see which of the two solutions would be the most persuasive.APyrrhonian would have said that they wereperfectly equiv- alent.But when Mosesdoes not know what to do, he asks God to give him asolution. Subsequently,God emitsanoracle preservingboth the Lawand loyalty to family. We suggest,therefore, that Philo refused to use the concept of sunkatathesis because it was aself-sufficient concept,namelyaconcept withoutany opening to transcen- dence. The Stoic conception of assent was the most elaborate expression of confi- dence in the sovereignty of the reason, both individual and universal, adoctrine that Philo could not accept.That is whyheprefers to use the term boulē (deliberation and decision), much less connected to an immanentist context.

2.2 The transcendent epochē

The decision to foregothe term sunkatathesis maybethought to implythe same at- titude towards epochē,defined as suspension of assent.However,thingsare perhaps alittle more complex. Actually, epochē is usedonlyonce in the whole of Philon’scor- pus.¹⁹ This seems to createanalmost perfect symmetry with the treatment of sunka- tathesis. At the sametime, it is worth noting that in the abstract of Aenesidemus’s book Pyrrhoneioi logoi,written by the Patriarch Photius, the term epochē,which

 , ,445c; 526d; Laws 830c; , Sleep and Waking (De somno et vigilia) 458a29;Pseudo-Aristotle, De spiritu 484b33.  Philo, On the Life of Moses (De vita Mosis)2.225‒32.  Philo, On Flight and Finding (De fuga et invetione)136: “Forthe best offeringisquietness and sus- pense of judgement,inmatters that absolutelylack proofs” (ἄριστον γὰρ ἱερεῖον ἡσυχίακαὶἐποχὴ περὶὧνπάντως οὔκεἰσι πίστεις). Philo, On Flight and Finding,inOn Flight and Finding.Onthe ChangeofNames.OnDreams (Philo vol. 5), trans. F.H. Colson, G.H. Whitaker (Cambridge,MA: Har- vardUniversity Press),1934. Philo of Alexandria vs.Descartes 11

will become so frequent in Neopyrrhonist philosophy, especiallyinSextus Empiri- cus, is never used.²⁰ LikePhilo, Aenesidemus (at least in Photius’sreport), frequently uses katalēpsis, katalēptos, akatalēptos,but he carefullyavoids sunkatathesis. In- stead of epochē,heprefers to use aporia. Of course, Photius’sreport is toobrief to allow for aperfectlyclear conclusion. The reliability of areport written so manycen- turies after the book in question can be contested. But it cannot be excluded that one of the characteristics of Aenesidemus’sinnovations would have been to relinquish the traditionalproblematic sunkatatheis/epochē and emphasise instead the Pyrrho- nian idea of isostheneia,the equal strength of opposite realities,leadingtoaporia.²¹ Therefore, it is not impossible thatwhat we see in the Philonian corpus,namely the almostcompleterejection of the terms sunkatathesis and epochē,originatedinAene- sidemus himself. When Sextus giveshis own version of Pyrrhonian modes, he says in his introduc- tion that “the usual tradition amongst the older sceptics is that the ‘modes’ by which suspension (epochē)issupposedtobebrought about are ten in number.”²² In Philo’s version of these modes, we find the verb epechein three times. The use of the term epochē expressed something strongerthan the verb epechein. The verb had afunc- tional meaning, while the noun had become the keystone, the motto of Academic thought, from which Aenesidemus tried to depart. In anycase, the onlyPhilonian occurrence of epochē deservesconsideration. It refers to one of the most famousepisodes in the , the of Isaac. When Isaac asks his father wherethe lamb for the holocaust is, Abraham answers that God himself will provide the lamb for the burnt offering.Inhis allegoricalcommentary, Philo explains thatthe victim is the suspension of our judgement on points where evidence cannot be found.²³ God accepts the epochē as the sacrificial offering,in the place of Isaac. epochē is not onlythe recognition of the limits of the human mind, but also the expression of the Patriarch’sfaith in the infinite capacities of God Almighty,able to surpass the limits of nature,for example by bringingupex ni- hilo alamb in adesert. In Philo’sexegesis, the lamb is bothahistorical reality,since he never excluded the literal sense of the sacred word, and the metaphor of the ep- ochē,which in his perspective is meaningless if not referred to God.

 Photius, Bibliotheca 212.  On these concepts,see Jacques Brunschwig, “L’aphasie pyrrhonienne,” in Dire l’évidence,eds. Carlos Lévy and Laurent Pernot (Paris:L’Harmattan, 1997), 297‒320;Bett, Pyrrho,14‒59;Harold Thorsrud, “Arcesilaus and Carneades,” in TheCambridgeCompanion to Ancient Scepticism,ed. Ri- chardBett (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2010), 58‒81.  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of ,trans. R.G. Bury (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1933), 1.14.  Philo, On Flight and Finding 136. 12 Carlos Lévy

If we exclude the dubious testimonyofEpiphanius,²⁴ no pagan Sceptic had sug- gested this kind of interpretation. ForaSceptic or aStoic, the understandingofthe meaning of epochē needed athorough comprehension of main intellectual processes. ForPhilo, it wasnecessarilybasedonthe hermeneutic of the divine Word, in apas- sageapparentlywithout relation to the suspension of judgement. Herewemuststress acrucial point.The main differencebetween Pyrrhonian and Academic philosophers was that for the former all presentations and opinions werebasically equivalent,while for the latter the impossibilityofreaching certain truth did not prevent the world from offering some semblance of plausibility. ForAr- cesilaus, the first scholarch of the New Academy, the eulogon,though produced by a fallible reason, was the best mean to act in anon-undifferentiated way. ForCar- neades, his most brilliant successor,the pithanon,the impression of plausibilitypro- duced by certain representations, allowed limited progress in knowledge and ac- tion.²⁵ Usually Philo shows great hostility towardsthe pithanon,perhaps because in his Platonic it had toomanysophistic associations. He has asomewhat more nuanced attitude towards eulogon,but also some negative views. In Allegorical Interpretation (Legum allegoriae)3.229, he says that it is unreasonable to believein logismois pithanois,anexpression which means here something like sophisms.²⁶ At 3.233itissaid that the pithanon involves no firm knowledge with regard to the truth. We find one of the most eloquent instances of this rejection in On the Life of Moses 1.174. When the prophet sawthat the Hebrews hesitatedtofollow him and to fight the Egyptian army, he asked them: “whydoyou in the specious and plausible and that only?” (τί μόνοις τοῖςεὐλόγοις καὶ πιθανοῖςπροπιστεύετε;). At the same time, in On the Special Laws (De specialibus legibus)1.36‒38 he develops the hierarchyinwhich the eulogon and the pithanon can find asense different from the one they had in Arcesilaus’sorCarneades’sphilosophies. Even if it is not possibletohaveperfect knowledge of the truth of God, Philo says,the research in itself is asourceofjoy: “Fornothing is better than to search for the true God, even if the discovery of Him eludes human capacity,since the very wish to learn, if earnestlyentertained, produces untold joys.” Actually, even if God is unknowable, it is possibletoact “like the athlete who strivesfor the second prize since he has been disappointed of the first.Now second to the true vision stands conjecture and theorising and all that can be brought into the category of the reasonable.”

 Epiphanius, Panarion, De fide 9.33‒34;fragment132 in Simone Vezzoli, Arcesilao di Pitane (Turnhout: Brepols,2016).  On these concepts see the oppositeinterpretations of PierreCouissin, “Le stoïcisme de la Nou- velle Académie,” Revue d’HistoiredelaPhilosophie 3(1929): 241‒76;Anna Maria Ioppolo, Opinione eScienza (Napoli: Bibliopolis,1986), esp. 121‒217.  In Philo, Allegorical Interpretation (Legum allegoriae)3.41, pithanotēs is evokedwithin the logoi sophistikoi. Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes 13

Like the Academics and the followers of Aenesidemus, Philo emphasises the continuity of research. Forexample, just before describing the sceptic modes at On Drunkenness 162, he says thatthe worse kind of ignorance is that which accentuates the lack of science, the belief of having reached science.The best waytoavoid this kind of ignorance is to indefatigably pursue inquiry,apoint on which Philo agrees with all the sceptics.There is, however,anessential and paradoxical difference. In his case, the research is not the pursuit of awhollyoralmost whollyunknown truth, but of the one that God Himself revealed to human beings.

2.3 The Status of ScepticisminPhilo: The EssentialRoleof Decency and Shame

How,then, to explain the rather heavy presenceofscepticism in Philo’scorpus?Ishis aim to merelydissipate the false illusion of knowledge,inorder to make the path towards the revealed truth easier? In my opinion, thereisamuch deeper connexion between theologyand philosophy. To understand it,let us go back to the primitive scene, i.e., the meetingofAdam and Eveinthe garden of Eden, ascene for which Philo givestwo interpretations. In the On the Creationofthe World (De opificio mundi)Philo takes some distance with respect to the biblical verse. He stresses aidōs (respect,decency), atranscenden- tal in his , since it is the onlyone that is mentioned in the Paradise. The version is somewhat different in the Allegorical Interpretation wherehegives his own interpretation of the biblical “and they werenot ashamed.” There he distin- guishesthree concepts: anaischuntia,shamelessness, which is the sign of ; aidōs,decency, characteristic of virtuous people; and the lack both of decencyand of shamelessness.²⁷ The sageishere characterised by his aidōs,anidea which is ab- sent from our Stoic testimonies. Of course, in Stoicism aidōs is asubdivision of eu- labeia,one of the three eupatheiai (positive passions), but Stoics never stressed aidōs as afundamental virtue of the .²⁸ As if he felt himself how surprising

 Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 2.65: “The words suggest threepoints for consideration: shame- less,and shamefastness,and absenceofboth shamelessness and shamefastness.Shamelessness, then is peculiar to the worthless man, shamefastness to the man of worth, to feel neither shamefast- ness nor shamelessness to the man whoisincapable of right apprehension and of dueassent thereto and this is at this moment the prophet’ssubject.For he whohas not yetattained to the apprehension of and evil can not possiblybeeither shameless or shamefast” (τρίακατὰ τὸντόπον ἐστίν· ἀναι- σχυντία, αἰδώς, τὸ μήτε ἀναισχυντεῖνμήτε αἰδεῖσθαι·ἀναισχυντίαμὲνοὖνἴδιον φαύλου, αἰδὼςδὲ σπουδαίου, τὸ δὲ μήτε αἰδεῖσθαι μήτε ἀναισχυντεῖντοῦἀκαταλήπτως ἔχοντος καὶἀσυγκαταθέτως, περὶ οὗ νῦν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ὁ γὰρμηδέπω κατάληψιν ἀγαθοῦἢκακοῦ λαβὼνοὔτε ἀναισχυντεῖν οὔτε αἰδεῖσθαι δύναται).  Laertius 7.116: “Andaccordingly,asunder theprimarypassionsare classedcertain others subordinatetothem, so too is it with theprimary eupathiesorgoodemotional states.Thusunder wish- ingtheybring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness,respect,affection; undercaution,reverence 14 Carlos Lévy

this promotion of decencywas,asanessentialvirtue,and of shamelessness as the strongest expression of evil, Philo asks:

Whythen, seeingthat results of wickedness aremany, has he mentioned onlyone, that which attends on conduct that is disgraceful, saying “they werenot shamed,” but not saying “they did not commitinjustice,” or “they did not sin” or “they did not err”?The reason is not far to seek. By the only true God, Ideem nothing so shameful as supposing that Ithink and that Ifeel. My own mind the authorofits exertion?How can it be? (μὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ μόνον θεὸνοὐδὲνοὕτως αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι ὡςτὸὑπολαμβάνειν ὅτι νοῶἢὅτι αἰσθάνομαι. ὁἐμὸςνοῦςαἴτιος τοῦ νοεῖν; πόθεν;) Does it know as to itself, whatitisorhow it came intoexistence? Sense-perception the origin of perceivingbysense? How could it be said to be so, seeingthat it is beyond the keneither of itself or of the mind?Doyou not observethat the mind which thinks that it exercises itself is often found to be without mental power, in scenes of , drunkenness,folly? Where does the exercise of mind show itself then?And is not perceptive sense often robbedofthe power of perceiving?²⁹

This text is in my opinion essential to understand Philo’sattitude towardsscepticism. We must first notice the extreme solemnity of the affirmation, since he swears by God: “By the onlytrue God.” The most shameful thing one can imagine is to think that one is the subject of one’sthoughts and sensations. In the most common perception of the history of philosophy, the cogito is the one assertion that even the most radical sceptic cannotruin. Philo seems to have antici- pated the Cartesian responsetoscepticism and to have avantlalettre elaborated an objectionwhich is much more ethical than epistemological. To affirm that it is me who thinks is to discard the onlyvirtue evoked about human beingsinParadise, the virtue of decency, to ignore and to betray the content of . But it also raises aproblem of philosophical methodology: what kind of truth can we access by isolating knowledge from ?InsomanyPhilonian texts, aidōs is the capacity to control the desire for absoluteindependence and superiority.For Philo, the cogito is not the solution of the problem of knowledge,but the supreme fallacy,since it ar- tificiallyseparates knowledge from ethics and metaphysics.More exactly, it supposes that the problem of truth is onlyepistemological. In Philo, as, manycenturies later in another Jewishthinker,EmmanuelLevinas, the main route to transcendenceisethics,not epistemology.What is essentialismy relation to others, not my relation to the representations of the world. Sceptical argu- ments displaythe permanent fallibilityofthe human mind and sensations, but in Philo’sthoughtepistemological arguments are onlymeanstoassert something far more essential: the impossibility of considering ahuman being as the autonomous

andmodesty;under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness” (καθάπερ οὖν ὑπὸ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη πίπτει τινά, τὸναὐτὸντρόπον καὶὑπὸτὰςπρώτας εὐπαθείας· καὶὑπὸμὲντὴνβούλησιν εὔνοιαν, εὐμένειαν, ἀσπασμόν, ἀγάπησιν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴνεὐλάβειαναἰδῶ, ἁγνείαν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴνχαρὰντέρψιν, εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμίαν). Diogenes Laertius, LivesofEminent Philosophers, Volume II:Books 6‒10,trans. R.D. Hicks,Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1925.  Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 2.68‒69,emphasis added. Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes 15

subjectofhis or her thoughts. Philo’sposition is exactlythe contrary of Descartes’s. Descartes’srefutation of the sceptic arguments provides him access to the cogito. God is then called upon for help, in order to reconnect the thinking subject with the world. Philo’sitinerary is exactlythe reverse. He first absolutelyrejects the cogito as an absurd pretension that ignores the metaphysical situation of the human being.Itispreciselythis rejectionthat legitimatises the use of the sceptic tropes. Philo would have probablyconsidered Descartes’smethod as an artificial manipula- tion. To disconnect the human mind from intersubjectivity and from arelation to God was, for him, simplyimpossible.

2.4 From the Negation of the Self to an Ethic of Responsibility

This transfer of the problem from knowledge to ethics and metaphysics implies adif- ficulty.IfIam not the author of my thoughts, how could Ibeconsidered responsible for my acts?This is something close to the objection expressed by the Stoics in order to refute their sceptic adversaries. How could Iberesponsible for my actionsifIdo not give my assent?Philo’ssolution to this difficulty is ingenious and original. When God tells him to go and see the Pharaoh, Moses, the most perfect man in Philo’sopin- ion, initiallytries to evade this obligation. He pretends thatheisnot gifted in speech and he suggests that God could choose somebodyelse. But God, who however under- stands the process of Moses’s aidōs,answers:

Dost thou not know whoitisthat gave man amouth, and formed his tongue and throat and all the organism of reasonable speech?ItisIMyself (autos eimi egō): therefore, fear not,for at a signfromMeall will become articulateand be brought over to method and order,sothat none can hinder the stream of words from flowingeasilyand smoothlyfromafountain unde- filed. And, if thou shouldst have need of an interpreter,thou wilthaveinthy brothera mouth to assist thyservice,toreport to the people thywords, as thou reportest those of God to him.³⁰

Philo wants to make clear that aidōs,ofwhich in his opinion scepticism is but a shadowyand perverse figure, cannot be an argument to avoid responsibilities. The human being is not the subject of his or her thoughts and actions, but he or she is responsible for them. That is the central paradoxofPhilo’sthought,something close to what willbeexpressed by Levinas through the expression difficile liberté. Afinal remark on Philo. If it is an errortothink that the human being is the real subjectofhis or her thoughts,the logical consequenceisthat the sceptic, in order to be coherent with himself, must disappear as author of his scepticism. In an entirely different philosophical context,itisthe conclusion at which Pyrrho arrived, though

 Philo, On the Life of Moses,inOn Abraham. On Joseph. On Moses (Philovol. 6), trans. F.H. Colson (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1935),1.84. 16 Carlos Lévy

he could not prevent his main disciple Timon from creatingafervent cult of person- ality.³¹ Philo never mentions the philosophersorthe rabbis whose work he followed. He rarelyquotes philosophers, and those he does cite are not always thoseyou might expect. But he is especiallyharsh with sceptics, whom he faults for theirarrogance and aggressiveness. In Questions and AnswersonGenesis (Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin)3.33they are compared to professional warriors, for they believethat phi- losophyisapermanent attack against otherdoctrines, without having anyidea of the causes and consequences of these fights. His main explanation of thataggressive- ness is that it givesthem real . Ismael is bothasceptic and asophist in his allegorical explanation, since it is said about him in Genesis 16.12that “‘His hands shallbeagainst all men, and all men’shands against him’;for this is just the ’sway,with his pretence of excessive open-mindedness, and his loveof arguingfor the sake of arguing.This character aims his arrows at all the representa- tivesofthe sciences, opposing each individuallyand in common. He is also their common targetsince they naturallyfight back, as though in defenceoftheir own off- spring,that is, of the doctrines to which their soul has givenbirth.” Neither is the function of scepticism to allow intellectual victories through asystematic critical at- titude. In Philo’sopinion, if it is usedcorrectly, i.e., in away quite different from that of the sceptics themselves, its main aim is to lead one towardmetaphysical , of which the first and definitive expression must be found in Genesis.

3FromPhilotoAugustine 3.1 The Problem of the Self in the ContraAcademicos

Is it legitimate to saythat Philo openedthe waytoamonotheistic refutation of the cogito,anattitude founded on the idea of the impossibilityofisolating knowledge from ethics and transcendence? It would be arrogant to presume to provide acom- plete answer to such acomplex question, but it can be of some interest to examine if the transition from to Christianity entailedadeep modification of Philo’sin- tuition. Herewewill tackle onlyone case, but avery weighty one, thatofAugustine, achoice that can seem somewhat paradoxical, since he did not know enough Greek to read Philo and probablyfelt little empathyfor Philo’sexegetical method. On the other hand, he could not ignorehis existence,since he certainlyheard his master speak about athinker whom he plagiarised so frequently. Forall these rea- sons, the confrontation between Augustine and Philo can perhaps help to differenti- ate what is structural in the monotheistic relation to scepticism and what depends on the culturaland the personal characteristics of the different thinkers.

 See Diogenes Laertius 9.64;fragment60inFernanda DeclevaCaizzi, Pirrone. Testimonianze (Na- ples:Bibliopolis,1981). Philo of Alexandria vs.Descartes 17

It is impossible here to enter into the very complex details of these three books of dialogue. Our aim is rather to try to understand how Augustine himself presented this strangeanti-sceptic emergency,apparentlymorephilosophical thantheological, that led him from Milan to Cassiciacum. Actually, Augustine evolvedinhis successive presentations of the Contra Academicos.His first letter to Hermogenianus offers manyexplanations in aquite surprising and somewhat confused way. He says noth- ing about his conversion, but he uses manyphilosophical items.Like Cicerowho, in aletter to Atticusparadoxicallyrecognised thathis refutation of the Stoic gnoseolog- ical doctrine was less persuasive than the defence of that doctrine proposed by Anti- ochus,³² he admits that he was unable to succeed in overcomingdoubt.³³ At the same time, he seems proud of having acted against the New Academy,since he says that in the search for truth, people were paralysed by the idea that aman as subtle as Car- neades had been unable to locate it.Last but not least,heagain expresses his theory of an esoteric teachingofadogmatic Platonism in the Academy. He recognises that there wasnocertaintythere, but asserts that it was riskier to let people think that the philosophers of the New Academy werereallysceptics, abelief that he presents as a cause for philosophicalapathy. He says that to affirmthat the Academics weresecret- ly dogmatists was away,perhaps not entirelyconvincing,tocreate adesire to seek out the truth.³⁴ In this letter,scepticism has an ambiguous status. It is an adversary but also an object of admiration and even of imitation. Imitatus sum,hesays, since like them he reacted to asituation: they tried to fight naturalist dogmatisms,while he wanted to break the intellectual inertia of his contemporaries. Fighting scepticism is presented by Augustine as an unavoidable mission if he had anyhope of inciting the inquisitio veri in them again. It must be noted thatfor him scepticism is also represented by the Academy, and in fact,solelybythe Acad- emy. The easiest explanation of the omission of neo-Pyrrhonism would be to saythat Cicero, his main source, had himself ignored Aenesidemus and his followers.But it can be objected that , Favorinus, and probablymanyothers had tackled the neo-Pyrrhonist innovations.That Augustine never heard about them is rather im- probable. It seems more plausible that he limited himself to the New Academybe- cause he was interested less in scepticism itself than in the strangeconnection be- tween transcendentalist Platonism and Academic philosophythathepresents as

 Cicero, Letters to 13.19.5: suntenim vehementer πιθανὰ Antiochia (“Forthe views of Anti- ochus are strongly persuasive”;mytranslation).  Augustine, Letters 1.3: “my chief delight is not your havingsaid—with moreaffection than truth— that Ihaveoutdone the Academics, but the fact that Ihavebroken amost hateful bond by which I was held back from tastingthe sweetness of philosophybydespair of attainingtotruth. And truth is the food of the soul” (non tam me delectat, ut scribis,quod Academicosuicerim, scribis enim hoc amantius forte quam verius, quam quod mihi abruperimodiosissimum retinaculum, quo aphilosophiae uberedesperatione ueri, quod est enim animi pabulum refrenabar). Augustine, Letters: Volume 1(1‒ 82),trans. Wilfrid Parsons (Washington,D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1951).  On the Augustinian myth of the secret dogmatism of Arcesilas, see Carlos Lévy, “Scepticisme et dogmatisme dans l’Académie: ‘l’ésotérisme’ d’Arcésilas,” Revue des Études Latines 56 (1978): 335‒48. 18 Carlos Lévy

the expressionofthe desperatioueri that created adistance between himself and philosophy. Manyelements here differ from what we found in Philo. First of all, Augustine is reallyconcernedbythe problem of the of the Platonic school, aproblem that for Philo is meaningless. Thismajor Latinconcept is present from the beginning of the letter,whereAugustine expresses his reverencetowards the Platonic school, without excludingthe sceptic Academy. But it is also interesting to notice that for him these philosopherswerenot people in permanent search of truth but people who discouraged others from finding it.Onthis point Augustine at least uncon- sciouslyagrees with neo-Pyrrhonists, who accused the philosophers of the New Academyofpractising anegative dogmatism while themselvespretendedtobeseek- ers of truth. But Augustine, as the great reader of the Ciceronian Academica that he was, could not ignore that Cicerohad refuted this charge in advanceinthe 109‒10.Antipater the Stoic said that “Carneades should at least allow that this prin- ciple itself is apprehended, thatthe wise person holds that nothing is apprehensi- ble.” And the Ciceronian answer is: “but just as he holds those as persuasive rather than apprehended principles, so with this one, that nothing is apprehensible.”³⁵ There wasnonegative dogmatism in the Academy, at least in his Ciceronian version. In order however to fight his own desperatio ueri,Augustine needs to counterbalance the negative dogmatism he attributes to the Academics by his assertion of an esoteric dogmatism. Augustine presents himself bothassomeone who wants to make the most of philosophyand someone who feels responsible for the fate of philosophy among his contemporaries. It was asortofpastoralfunction inside the field of phi- losophybefore the religious pastoral functions. Hereweare very far from Philo. The similaritybetween the two thinkers is, however,thatinadifferent way, both hold that the sceptics werenot really people in search of the truth.

3.2 From Augustine to Philo?

Thingsbecome still more divergent in the Enchiridion,written in 422. There is no mention of this kind of pastoralfunction. Now Augustine essentiallyspeaks about himself. Retrospectively, the Contra Academicos becomes the means for fighting the doubts which assailedhim, at the moment when he was,hesays, tamquam in ostio,hesitating in embracing faith. There is no more mention of an uncertain hy- pothesis about the sceptical Academy,but he stresses the obligation of removing the desperatio veri,ofwhich the Academics are said to have been the champions, by all means(utique). The strength of this wordproves that he passed the stage

 Cicero, Lucullus 110: sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum nihil posse percipi. nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, trans. Charles Brittain (Indianapolis/Cambrige:Hackett,2006). Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes 19

wherehebelieved himself obliged to furnish ajustification of his attitude towards the Academy. Now he presents himself as the one who will find asolution to the problem for which the Academics wereunable to find asolution. And perhaps most important in the Enchiridion is the assertion that if thereisnoassent,there is no faith: At si tollatur assensio,fides tollitur;quia sine assensione nihil creditur.³⁶ The opposition is now radical, between scepticism—founded on the desperatio ueri—and faith, which is truth and . No more mention of the auctoritas of the Platonic school. In letter118, written in 410, Augustine says that if Stoics and Epicur- eans wereclearlywrong, the Academics could not assume the role of embodying true reason, since they werelacking humility, humilitas,anequivalent of aidōs and a bridge between Philo and Cicero. At the end of his life, in the Retractationes,Augus- tine will saythat he wasted much time in refuting philosophers who werebut impi- ous pagans.³⁷ Actually, Augustine seems to have moved from apre-Cartesian attitude to apost- Philonianone. In Against the Academics (Contra Academicos), he is in search of the proposition that will escape the sceptic systematic criticism and, as has been

 Augustine, Enchiridion 20.7: “Nor do Ipropose to solve avery knotty question which perplexed the subtle thinkers of the Academy: whetherawise man should give his assent to anythingatall, con- fronted as he is by error,should he approvewhatisfalse; for according to these men all things are obscureoruncertain. That is whyduring the earlydaysofmyconversion, Iwrote threevolumes,that my progress might not be hindered by objectionsblocking, so to speak, the doorway. Certainlyitwas necessary to removethat sense of the hopelessness of attainingtotruth which apparentlyfinds sup- port in the arguments of the Academics.Now,among them every error is considered to be asin, and this they contend can be avoided onlybywithholding assentaltogether.Infact,they say, whosoever assents to things uncertain commits an error.Nothingiscertain in human experience because of the impossibility of seeingthrough the sham that falsehood puts on. And even if one’sassumption should happen to be true, they will disputeits truth by arguments extremelysubtle but at the same time shameless. However,amongusthe just man liveth by faith. But take away assent,and youtake away faith, since without assent one can believenothing. And there aretruths which maynot be understood, but unless they arebelieved, it will be impossible for us to attain to the happy life, which is no other tant life eternal. But Idonot know whether we should arguewith people whoare unawarenot onlythat they aretoliveforever,but that they arealive now” (Nec quaestio no- dosissima, quae homines acutissimos,Academicos torsit, nunc mihi enodanda suscepta est; utrum ali- quid debeat sapiens approbare, ne incidat in errorem, si proveris approbaverit falsa, cum omnia, sicut affirmant, vel occulta sint, vel incerta. Unde tria confeci volumina in initio conversionis meae, ne imped- imento nobis essent, quae tanquam in ostio contradicebant. Et utique fuerat removenda inveniendae desperatio veritatis,quae illorum videtur argumentationibus roborari. Apud illos ergoerror omnis puta- tur esse peccatum, quod vitari non posse contendunt, nisi omnis suspendatur assensio.Errarequippe dicunt eum quisquis assentitur incertis:nihilque certum esse in hominum visis propter indiscretam sim- ilitudinem falsi, etiamsi quod videtur,forte sit verum, acutissimis quidem, sed impudentissimis conflic- tationibus disputant. Apud nos autem, Justus ex fide vivit [Rom. I, 17]. At si tollatur assensio,fides toll- itur; quia sine assensione nihil creditur.Etsunt veraquamvis non videantur,quae nisi credantur,ad vitam beatam, quae non nisi aeterna est, non potest perveniri. Cum istis vero utrum loqui debeamus ignoro, qui, non victuros in aeternum, sed in praesentia se vivere nesciunt). Albert C. Outler,trans., Au- gustine: Confessions and Enchiridion (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1955).  Augustine, Retractationes 13. 20 Carlos Lévy

stressed by manyscholars, he approaches the cogito.³⁸ In the following years, he dis- covers the autonomyoftheological thought in relation to philosophy. Gradually, he realised that the main aim for aChristian was not to achieveanego with aperfect certitude but to give,through the concept of humilitas (a concept rather rare in Cic- eronian philosophy),amerelylessimperfect evaluation of the human being’sonto- logical situation. It is atask of which Philo would not have disapproved, since he would have interpreted humilitas as the equivalent of aidōs. To conclude. Augustine uses the word moles to describe scepticism.³⁹ A moles is ahugeblock, something massive,impressive,that youcannot avoid. At the same time, if youbreak the moles youcan make manythingswith its fragments.The mon- otheisticRevelation changed everything in the frame of the debate established by Academics and Stoics:truth was no more an object of research, but aconcrete text transmitting the wordofGod. Faith, pistis,deprivedrational logic of its primacy. But at the same time, monotheism, at least in its principle, does not allow faith to be onlyapassive orthopraxy.Onthe contrary,itimplies acrucial interrogation of the status of the subject him- or herself. Philo and Augustine—the Augustine of the works laterthan Against the Academics—evidentlydisagree on manythings, but they agree on one point: the epistemological problem cannot be the central one; it cannot have aperfectlyautonomous existence. Actually, the main problem is that of humilitas/aidōs,thatistosay the attitude of the individual in front of God and in relation with other human beings.

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 See Emmanuel Bermon, Le cogito dans la pensée de Saint Augustin (Paris:Vrin, 2001), 405: “Si l’on ressaisit les principaux traits de cette pensée, le cogito revêttrois significations fondamentales: la prise de de l’ego cogito,leretour de l’homme intérieur et enfin ce que l’on peut appeler l’‘orientation transcendantale.’”  Augustine, Against the Academics 3.30: “It is enough for me to cross this huge obstaclebyall the means” (mihi satis est quoquo modo molem istam transcendere). Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes 21

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