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Chapter Eight Socrates on the Impossibility of Belief-Relative Sciences*

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Chapter Eight Socrates on the Impossibility of Belief-Relative Sciences* Chapter Eight Socrates on the Impossibility of Belief-Relative Sciences* by Terry Penner This lecture is dedicated to Joan Kung, friend and gifted co- worker of many of us in the field of Greek Philosophy. Joan died February 7, 1987 It is well known that the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues (hereinafter: Socrates)1 holds that, although numbered * This paper, given at the College of the Holy Cross on April 2, 1987, was originally entitled "Socrates and Fregean Psychological States: Socrates and Plato on the Impossibility of Neutral Sciences of Rhetoric, Logic, and Literary Criticism"; and it was on the draft of the present paper with this title that Dan Shartin wrote his original comments. Logic has been dropped out of the subject matter of this paper: but see n. 15 below. 1 I will here follow, without defense, one normal practice of identifying the historical Socrates with the Socrates of the early dialogues of Plato. I count as early (and so, 'Socratic') dialogues Apology, Crito, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Ion, Protagoras, Euthydemus, Lesser Hippias, Menexenus, Euthyphro, Book I of the Republic, and most of the Gorgias (though excepting the myth), and most of the Meno (though excepting the recollection experiment and the theoretical discussion of hypothesis). The exceptions in the Gorgias and the Meno I assign to a period where the Socratic agnosticism—not undisputed—about the immortality of the soul (Apology 40c ff.) has been lost, perhaps under Pythagorean influence, brought about by Plato's visit to Sicily. On the question what dialogues are early, see, for example, E.R. Dodds's edition of the Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), pp. 18-30. amongst the sciences2 you will find medicine, navigation, arithmetic, geometry, cobblery, horse-training, and boxing, you will not find the science of rhetoric. (At least you will not find the science of rhetoric practised by Gorgias.)3 Nor will you find cookery, cosmetology (Gorgias 464-5), or the science of interpre- ting Homer that Ion lays claim to in the Ion. But it is seldom asked in any detail why Socrates denies that these pursuits are sciences. On the contrary, it is usual to act as if Socrates is merely abusing these pursuits rather than giving arguments against them. No doubt this is because Socrates' denials seem on the face of it not to have any rationale. But surely we should look for some rationale and some arguments. Surely it is not enough for a phiiosopher to hate what rhetoric is doing to his or her society, and, on that basis, call it, in effect, a 'pseudo- science.' Are there not sciences of persuasion? Do we not teach rhetoric in our universities, as we teach courses on advertising and on reasoning? Does rhetoric not have a coherent goal, namely, persuasion? And does it not propose generally effective means for achieving that goal? Does it not provide training that is as generally effective for achieving its ends as is the training provided by medicine or navigation or the manly art of fisticuffs? If we look for a rationale and for arguments for denying that the pursuits Gorgias and Ion engage in are sciences, one thing that strikes us immediately is the way in which Socrates contrasts these alleged arts or sciences of rhetoric and of inter- preting Homer with those more specialized sciences into whose fields these alleged sciences seem to be interlopers. How can rhetoric be the science of speaking well simpliciter, given that the science relevant to speaking well on arithmetical matters seems to be the science of arithmetic? How can Ion's science be 2 For the most part, I use the English words 'science,' 'knowledge,' and 'art' interchangeably in this paper, in conformity, I believe, with Socrates' usage of E1ncr't"ÍlI.lT1 and Texvri. 3 For the qualification, see p. 272 and n. 12 below. .
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