Boolean and Ortho Fuzzy Subset Logics
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2.1 the Algebra of Sets
Chapter 2 I Abstract Algebra 83 part of abstract algebra, sets are fundamental to all areas of mathematics and we need to establish a precise language for sets. We also explore operations on sets and relations between sets, developing an “algebra of sets” that strongly resembles aspects of the algebra of sentential logic. In addition, as we discussed in chapter 1, a fundamental goal in mathematics is crafting articulate, thorough, convincing, and insightful arguments for the truth of mathematical statements. We continue the development of theorem-proving and proof-writing skills in the context of basic set theory. After exploring the algebra of sets, we study two number systems denoted Zn and U(n) that are closely related to the integers. Our approach is based on a widely used strategy of mathematicians: we work with specific examples and look for general patterns. This study leads to the definition of modified addition and multiplication operations on certain finite subsets of the integers. We isolate key axioms, or properties, that are satisfied by these and many other number systems and then examine number systems that share the “group” properties of the integers. Finally, we consider an application of this mathematics to check digit schemes, which have become increasingly important for the success of business and telecommunications in our technologically based society. Through the study of these topics, we engage in a thorough introduction to abstract algebra from the perspective of the mathematician— working with specific examples to identify key abstract properties common to diverse and interesting mathematical systems. 2.1 The Algebra of Sets Intuitively, a set is a “collection” of objects known as “elements.” But in the early 1900’s, a radical transformation occurred in mathematicians’ understanding of sets when the British philosopher Bertrand Russell identified a fundamental paradox inherent in this intuitive notion of a set (this paradox is discussed in exercises 66–70 at the end of this section). -
Chapter 2 Introduction to Classical Propositional
CHAPTER 2 INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC 1 Motivation and History The origins of the classical propositional logic, classical propositional calculus, as it was, and still often is called, go back to antiquity and are due to Stoic school of philosophy (3rd century B.C.), whose most eminent representative was Chryssipus. But the real development of this calculus began only in the mid-19th century and was initiated by the research done by the English math- ematician G. Boole, who is sometimes regarded as the founder of mathematical logic. The classical propositional calculus was ¯rst formulated as a formal ax- iomatic system by the eminent German logician G. Frege in 1879. The assumption underlying the formalization of classical propositional calculus are the following. Logical sentences We deal only with sentences that can always be evaluated as true or false. Such sentences are called logical sentences or proposi- tions. Hence the name propositional logic. A statement: 2 + 2 = 4 is a proposition as we assume that it is a well known and agreed upon truth. A statement: 2 + 2 = 5 is also a proposition (false. A statement:] I am pretty is modeled, if needed as a logical sentence (proposi- tion). We assume that it is false, or true. A statement: 2 + n = 5 is not a proposition; it might be true for some n, for example n=3, false for other n, for example n= 2, and moreover, we don't know what n is. Sentences of this kind are called propositional functions. We model propositional functions within propositional logic by treating propositional functions as propositions. -
Aristotle's Assertoric Syllogistic and Modern Relevance Logic*
Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic and modern relevance logic* Abstract: This paper sets out to evaluate the claim that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic is a relevance logic or shows significant similarities with it. I prepare the grounds for a meaningful comparison by extracting the notion of relevance employed in the most influential work on modern relevance logic, Anderson and Belnap’s Entailment. This notion is characterized by two conditions imposed on the concept of validity: first, that some meaning content is shared between the premises and the conclusion, and second, that the premises of a proof are actually used to derive the conclusion. Turning to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, I argue that there is evidence that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic satisfies both conditions. Moreover, Aristotle at one point explicitly addresses the potential harmfulness of syllogisms with unused premises. Here, I argue that Aristotle’s analysis allows for a rejection of such syllogisms on formal grounds established in the foregoing parts of the Prior Analytics. In a final section I consider the view that Aristotle distinguished between validity on the one hand and syllogistic validity on the other. Following this line of reasoning, Aristotle’s logic might not be a relevance logic, since relevance is part of syllogistic validity and not, as modern relevance logic demands, of general validity. I argue that the reasons to reject this view are more compelling than the reasons to accept it and that we can, cautiously, uphold the result that Aristotle’s logic is a relevance logic. Keywords: Aristotle, Syllogism, Relevance Logic, History of Logic, Logic, Relevance 1. -
A Note on Indicator-Functions
proceedings of the american mathematical society Volume 39, Number 1, June 1973 A NOTE ON INDICATOR-FUNCTIONS J. MYHILL Abstract. A system has the existence-property for abstracts (existence property for numbers, disjunction-property) if when- ever V(1x)A(x), M(t) for some abstract (t) (M(n) for some numeral n; if whenever VAVB, VAor hß. (3x)A(x), A,Bare closed). We show that the existence-property for numbers and the disjunc- tion property are never provable in the system itself; more strongly, the (classically) recursive functions that encode these properties are not provably recursive functions of the system. It is however possible for a system (e.g., ZF+K=L) to prove the existence- property for abstracts for itself. In [1], I presented an intuitionistic form Z of Zermelo-Frankel set- theory (without choice and with weakened regularity) and proved for it the disfunction-property (if VAvB (closed), then YA or YB), the existence- property (if \-(3x)A(x) (closed), then h4(t) for a (closed) comprehension term t) and the existence-property for numerals (if Y(3x G m)A(x) (closed), then YA(n) for a numeral n). In the appendix to [1], I enquired if these results could be proved constructively; in particular if we could find primitive recursively from the proof of AwB whether it was A or B that was provable, and likewise in the other two cases. Discussion of this question is facilitated by introducing the notion of indicator-functions in the sense of the following Definition. Let T be a consistent theory which contains Heyting arithmetic (possibly by relativization of quantifiers). -
Advanced Discrete Mathematics Mm-504 &
1 ADVANCED DISCRETE MATHEMATICS M.A./M.Sc. Mathematics (Final) MM-504 & 505 (Option-P3) Directorate of Distance Education Maharshi Dayanand University ROHTAK – 124 001 2 Copyright © 2004, Maharshi Dayanand University, ROHTAK All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means; electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the written permission of the copyright holder. Maharshi Dayanand University ROHTAK – 124 001 Developed & Produced by EXCEL BOOKS PVT. LTD., A-45 Naraina, Phase 1, New Delhi-110 028 3 Contents UNIT 1: Logic, Semigroups & Monoids and Lattices 5 Part A: Logic Part B: Semigroups & Monoids Part C: Lattices UNIT 2: Boolean Algebra 84 UNIT 3: Graph Theory 119 UNIT 4: Computability Theory 202 UNIT 5: Languages and Grammars 231 4 M.A./M.Sc. Mathematics (Final) ADVANCED DISCRETE MATHEMATICS MM- 504 & 505 (P3) Max. Marks : 100 Time : 3 Hours Note: Question paper will consist of three sections. Section I consisting of one question with ten parts covering whole of the syllabus of 2 marks each shall be compulsory. From Section II, 10 questions to be set selecting two questions from each unit. The candidate will be required to attempt any seven questions each of five marks. Section III, five questions to be set, one from each unit. The candidate will be required to attempt any three questions each of fifteen marks. Unit I Formal Logic: Statement, Symbolic representation, totologies, quantifiers, pradicates and validity, propositional logic. Semigroups and Monoids: Definitions and examples of semigroups and monoids (including those pertaining to concentration operations). -
Soft Set Theory First Results
An Inlum~md computers & mathematics PERGAMON Computers and Mathematics with Applications 37 (1999) 19-31 Soft Set Theory First Results D. MOLODTSOV Computing Center of the R~msian Academy of Sciences 40 Vavilova Street, Moscow 117967, Russia Abstract--The soft set theory offers a general mathematical tool for dealing with uncertain, fuzzy, not clearly defined objects. The main purpose of this paper is to introduce the basic notions of the theory of soft sets, to present the first results of the theory, and to discuss some problems of the future. (~) 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords--Soft set, Soft function, Soft game, Soft equilibrium, Soft integral, Internal regular- ization. 1. INTRODUCTION To solve complicated problems in economics, engineering, and environment, we cannot success- fully use classical methods because of various uncertainties typical for those problems. There are three theories: theory of probability, theory of fuzzy sets, and the interval mathematics which we can consider as mathematical tools for dealing with uncertainties. But all these theories have their own difficulties. Theory of probabilities can deal only with stochastically stable phenomena. Without going into mathematical details, we can say, e.g., that for a stochastically stable phenomenon there should exist a limit of the sample mean #n in a long series of trials. The sample mean #n is defined by 1 n IZn = -- ~ Xi, n i=l where x~ is equal to 1 if the phenomenon occurs in the trial, and x~ is equal to 0 if the phenomenon does not occur. To test the existence of the limit, we must perform a large number of trials. -
An Elementary Approach to Boolean Algebra
Eastern Illinois University The Keep Plan B Papers Student Theses & Publications 6-1-1961 An Elementary Approach to Boolean Algebra Ruth Queary Follow this and additional works at: https://thekeep.eiu.edu/plan_b Recommended Citation Queary, Ruth, "An Elementary Approach to Boolean Algebra" (1961). Plan B Papers. 142. https://thekeep.eiu.edu/plan_b/142 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Plan B Papers by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact [email protected]. r AN ELEr.:ENTARY APPRCACH TC BCCLF.AN ALGEBRA RUTH QUEAHY L _J AN ELE1~1ENTARY APPRCACH TC BC CLEAN ALGEBRA Submitted to the I<:athematics Department of EASTERN ILLINCIS UNIVERSITY as partial fulfillment for the degree of !•:ASTER CF SCIENCE IN EJUCATION. Date :---"'f~~-----/_,_ffo--..i.-/ _ RUTH QUEARY JUNE 1961 PURPOSE AND PLAN The purpose of this paper is to provide an elementary approach to Boolean algebra. It is designed to give an idea of what is meant by a Boclean algebra and to supply the necessary background material. The only prerequisite for this unit is one year of high school algebra and an open mind so that new concepts will be considered reason able even though they nay conflict with preconceived ideas. A mathematical science when put in final form consists of a set of undefined terms and unproved propositions called postulates, in terrrs of which all other concepts are defined, and from which all other propositions are proved. -
On the Relation Between Hyperrings and Fuzzy Rings
ON THE RELATION BETWEEN HYPERRINGS AND FUZZY RINGS JEFFREY GIANSIRACUSA, JAIUNG JUN, AND OLIVER LORSCHEID ABSTRACT. We construct a full embedding of the category of hyperfields into Dress’s category of fuzzy rings and explicitly characterize the essential image — it fails to be essentially surjective in a very minor way. This embedding provides an identification of Baker’s theory of matroids over hyperfields with Dress’s theory of matroids over fuzzy rings (provided one restricts to those fuzzy rings in the essential image). The embedding functor extends from hyperfields to hyperrings, and we study this extension in detail. We also analyze the relation between hyperfields and Baker’s partial demifields. 1. Introduction The important and pervasive combinatorial notion of matroids has spawned a number of variants over the years. In [Dre86] and [DW91], Dress and Wenzel developed a unified framework for these variants by introducing a generalization of rings called fuzzy rings and defining matroids with coefficients in a fuzzy ring. Various flavors of matroids, including ordinary matroids, oriented matroids, and the valuated matroids introduced in [DW92], correspond to different choices of the coefficient fuzzy ring. Roughly speaking, a fuzzy ring is a set S with single-valued unital addition and multiplication operations that satisfy a list of conditions analogous to those of a ring, such as distributivity, but only up to a tolerance prescribed by a distinguished ideal-like subset S0. Beyond the work of Dress and Wenzel, fuzzy rings have not yet received significant attention in the literature. A somewhat different generalization of rings, known as hyperrings, has been around for many decades and has been studied very broadly in the literature. -
Theorem Proving in Classical Logic
MEng Individual Project Imperial College London Department of Computing Theorem Proving in Classical Logic Supervisor: Dr. Steffen van Bakel Author: David Davies Second Marker: Dr. Nicolas Wu June 16, 2021 Abstract It is well known that functional programming and logic are deeply intertwined. This has led to many systems capable of expressing both propositional and first order logic, that also operate as well-typed programs. What currently ties popular theorem provers together is their basis in intuitionistic logic, where one cannot prove the law of the excluded middle, ‘A A’ – that any proposition is either true or false. In classical logic this notion is provable, and the_: corresponding programs turn out to be those with control operators. In this report, we explore and expand upon the research about calculi that correspond with classical logic; and the problems that occur for those relating to first order logic. To see how these calculi behave in practice, we develop and implement functional languages for propositional and first order logic, expressing classical calculi in the setting of a theorem prover, much like Agda and Coq. In the first order language, users are able to define inductive data and record types; importantly, they are able to write computable programs that have a correspondence with classical propositions. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Steffen van Bakel, my supervisor, for his support throughout this project and helping find a topic of study based on my interests, for which I am incredibly grateful. His insight and advice have been invaluable. I would also like to thank my second marker, Nicolas Wu, for introducing me to the world of dependent types, and suggesting useful resources that have aided me greatly during this report. -
John P. Burgess Department of Philosophy Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006, USA [email protected]
John P. Burgess Department of Philosophy Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006, USA [email protected] LOGIC & PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY Introduction For present purposes “logic” will be understood to mean the subject whose development is described in Kneale & Kneale [1961] and of which a concise history is given in Scholz [1961]. As the terminological discussion at the beginning of the latter reference makes clear, this subject has at different times been known by different names, “analytics” and “organon” and “dialectic”, while inversely the name “logic” has at different times been applied much more broadly and loosely than it will be here. At certain times and in certain places — perhaps especially in Germany from the days of Kant through the days of Hegel — the label has come to be used so very broadly and loosely as to threaten to take in nearly the whole of metaphysics and epistemology. Logic in our sense has often been distinguished from “logic” in other, sometimes unmanageably broad and loose, senses by adding the adjectives “formal” or “deductive”. The scope of the art and science of logic, once one gets beyond elementary logic of the kind covered in introductory textbooks, is indicated by two other standard references, the Handbooks of mathematical and philosophical logic, Barwise [1977] and Gabbay & Guenthner [1983-89], though the latter includes also parts that are identified as applications of logic rather than logic proper. The term “philosophical logic” as currently used, for instance, in the Journal of Philosophical Logic, is a near-synonym for “nonclassical logic”. There is an older use of the term as a near-synonym for “philosophy of language”. -
Abstract Algebra: Monoids, Groups, Rings
Notes on Abstract Algebra John Perry University of Southern Mississippi [email protected] http://www.math.usm.edu/perry/ Copyright 2009 John Perry www.math.usm.edu/perry/ Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 United States You are free: to Share—to copy, distribute and transmit the work • to Remix—to adapt the work Under• the following conditions: Attribution—You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licen- • sor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Noncommercial—You may not use this work for commercial purposes. • Share Alike—If you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the • resulting work only under the same or similar license to this one. With the understanding that: Waiver—Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission from the copy- • right holder. Other Rights—In no way are any of the following rights affected by the license: • Your fair dealing or fair use rights; ◦ Apart from the remix rights granted under this license, the author’s moral rights; ◦ Rights other persons may have either in the work itself or in how the work is used, ◦ such as publicity or privacy rights. Notice—For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of • this work. The best way to do this is with a link to this web page: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/legalcode Table of Contents Reference sheet for notation...........................................................iv A few acknowledgements..............................................................vi Preface ...............................................................................vii Overview ...........................................................................vii Three interesting problems ............................................................1 Part . -
What Is Fuzzy Probability Theory?
Foundations of Physics, Vol.30,No. 10, 2000 What Is Fuzzy Probability Theory? S. Gudder1 Received March 4, 1998; revised July 6, 2000 The article begins with a discussion of sets and fuzzy sets. It is observed that iden- tifying a set with its indicator function makes it clear that a fuzzy set is a direct and natural generalization of a set. Making this identification also provides sim- plified proofs of various relationships between sets. Connectives for fuzzy sets that generalize those for sets are defined. The fundamentals of ordinary probability theory are reviewed and these ideas are used to motivate fuzzy probability theory. Observables (fuzzy random variables) and their distributions are defined. Some applications of fuzzy probability theory to quantum mechanics and computer science are briefly considered. 1. INTRODUCTION What do we mean by fuzzy probability theory? Isn't probability theory already fuzzy? That is, probability theory does not give precise answers but only probabilities. The imprecision in probability theory comes from our incomplete knowledge of the system but the random variables (measure- ments) still have precise values. For example, when we flip a coin we have only a partial knowledge about the physical structure of the coin and the initial conditions of the flip. If our knowledge about the coin were com- plete, we could predict exactly whether the coin lands heads or tails. However, we still assume that after the coin lands, we can tell precisely whether it is heads or tails. In fuzzy probability theory, we also have an imprecision in our measurements, and random variables must be replaced by fuzzy random variables and events by fuzzy events.