Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teacher's Union∗ Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Horacio Larreguy Department of Government, Harvard University 1737 Cambridge Street, Room 408, Cambridge, MA 02138
[email protected] Cesar E. Montiel Olea Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy, Columbia University 420 W118th Street, Suite 370, New York, NY 10027
[email protected] Pablo Querubin Department of Politics, New York University 19 W 4th Street, Room 428, New York, NY 10012
[email protected] JEL: D72, J51 Key words: brokers' incentives, clientelism, political machines, unions ∗This paper benefited from helpful conversations and suggestions from the editor, two anonymous referees, Christopher Chambers-Ju, Cesi Cruz, Jorge Dominguez, Andrei Gomberg, Guy Grossman, Emilio Gutierrez, Daniel Hidalgo, Nahomi Ichino, Steve Levitsky, Gwyneth McClendon, Marco Morales, Vicky Murillo, Dan Posner, Cyrus Saami, Jake Shapiro, James M. Snyder and Lauren Young. Participants at the APSA 2015, the Columbia SSDS Seminar, Harvard Positive Political Economy Seminar, MIT Political Economy Workshop, MPSA 2014, NEUDC 2013, and NEWEPS 2014 conferences provided essential feedback. We are greatly indebted to Elisa Lavore and Lucrecia Santiba~nez, who helped us with the data on the dissident local school sections. We also thank an anonymous informant, closely acquainted with Elba Esther Gordillo, who provided us with very valuable information that deeply informed our study. Alejandra Menchaca provided support and patience throughout the project. Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teacher's Union Abstract: Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them to do so.