Tactical Escalation in Rural China « Escalade Tactique » Dans La Chine Rurale

Études rurales

179 | 2007 D’une illégitimité à l’autre dans la Chine rurale contemporaine

Tactical Escalation in Rural China « Escalade tactique » dans la Chine rurale

Kevin J. O’Brien et Li Lianjiang

Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/8474 DOI : 10.4000/etudesrurales.8474 ISSN : 1777-537X

Éditeur Éditions de l’EHESS

Édition imprimée Date de publication : 30 juin 2007 Pagination : 169-192

Référence électronique Kevin J. O’Brien et Li Lianjiang, « Tactical Escalation in Rural China », Études rurales [En ligne], 179 | 2007, mis en ligne le 01 janvier 2007, consulté le 12 février 2020. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/8474 ; DOI : 10.4000/etudesrurales.8474

Tactical escalation in rural china par Kevin J. O’BRIEN et Li LIANJIANG

| Editions de l’EHESS | Études rurales

2007/01 - 179 ISSN 0014-2182 | pages 169 à 192

Pour citer cet article : — J. O’Brien K. et Lianjiang L., Tactical escalation in rural china, Études rurales 2007/01, 179, p. 169-192.

Distribution électronique Cairn pour les Editions de l’EHESS. © Editions de l’EHESS. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit. TACTICAL ESCALATION Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang IN RURAL CHINA1

[Voss and Sherman 2000] that reflects a fresh approach to protest and signals a new “tactical grammar” [Ennis 1987: 531] is at work. In rural China, much like it did during the American Civil Rights Movement, revitalizing the repertoire of contention has entailed a radicalization of tactics – a move from hum- ble petitioning to the politics of disruption [McAdam 1983: 738]. In places such as Heng- yang county, Hunan, rightful resistance has become far more confrontational over the last decade, as the mediated tactics of the past are ORMS OF CONTENTION generally have a being demoted or adapted and more direct limited lifespan. Even the most creative protest routines are on the rise. F tactics tend, over time, to lose their In its basic form, rightful resistance is a ra- power to surprise opponents and stir followers. ther tame form of contention that makes use Tactical escalation offers a means to regain of existing (if clogged) channels of participa- momentum when established techniques of tion and relies heavily on the patronage of elite protest no longer create the sense of crises and backers. It is mediated in the sense that excitement they once did. As the effectiveness complainants do not directly confront their op- of familiar methods wanes, enterprising acti- ponents, but instead rely on a powerful third vists sometimes turn to more disruptive acts to party to address their claims. Activists at this demonstrate their commitment, leave their op- point always act under the sufferance of, and ponents rattled, and mobilize supporters.2 Al- energetically seek support from 1) officials as though confrontational tactics can at times high as central policy makers, 2) cadres as low alienate the public and generate a backlash as any local official other than the ones they [Rochon 1988], they can also help draw new- are denouncing, and 3) journalists (or others) comers to a cause [Jasper 1997: 248] while who can communicate their grievances to offering leverage to actors who have few other resources [Piven and Cloward 1992]. Tactical escalation typically involves dra- 1. The editors would like to thank Cambridge University Press for allowing Études rurales to reproduce this text, matic gestures and provocations that test the published as the Chapter IV (“Tactical Escalation”) of vulnerabilities of one’s foes. It may appear in the following book: Kevin J. O’Brien and L. Li, Rightful the form of a single tactic (e.g. the sit-in, the Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge, Cambridge mock shantytown, the suffrage parade) that vi- University Press, 2006. vidly symbolizes injustice and is difficult for 2. On the advantages of unruliness, see K. Andrews the authorities and onlookers to ignore. Or it [2001], W.A. Gamson [1990], M. Giugni [1999: 23-33] may arise as a cluster of related innovations and S. Tarrow [1998: 163, chap. 6].

Études rurales, janvier-juin 2007, 179 : 169-192 Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 170 high-ranking authorities. In this basic form, in rural China. Then we will move on to a series rightful resisters may mobilize popular action, of questions suggested by the broader literature but their main aim is to use the threat of unrest on tactical innovation, including: are these tac- to attract attention from possible mediators and tics truly new and how widespread are they? to apply pressure on officeholders at higher le- Who is mainly responsible for initiating direct vels to rein in their underlings. Protest leaders, action, newcomers or seasoned complainants? in other words, seek to bypass their adversaries And, most importantly, why is tactical escala- rather than to compel them to negotiate. tion occurring? Along the way we will alight on Direct action is quite different. In Heng- a number of explanations for tactical change, yang county, for instance, activists increa- including ones that underscore the role of prior singly place demands on their targets in person experiences with contention, resources, and and try to wring concessions from them on- popular support. the-spot. This form of rightful resistance does It is worth mentioning that studies of tac- not depend on high-level intercession, but on tical innovation usually concentrate on how a skilled rabble-rousers and the popular pressure repertoire of contention evolves rather than they can muster. Although protest organizers why certain tactics are chosen [Jasper 1997: still cite central policies, rather than sounding 234; Brown 2003]. We tread a middle path “fire alarms” [McCubbins and Schwarz 1984] here, emphasizing both external forces that they (and the villagers who join them) try to structure the options open to rightful resisters put out the fires themselves – they enforce ra- and internal factors that sometimes lead them ther than inform. In direct rightful resistance, to make tactical decisions that attention to the though activists may still view the Center as a environment alone would never predict. We source of legitimacy, a symbolic backer, and derive most of our conclusions from interviews a guarantor against repression, they no longer with rural protest organizers about actions they genuinely expect higher-ups to intervene on have taken and why they thought certain tac- their behalf. Instead, they regard themselves tics were effective or not.3 We also draw on and their supporters to be capable of resolving government reports that detail episodes of po- the problems at hand. Acting as ever in pular unrest, other written accounts, and our the name of faithful policy implementation, own earlier field research. rightful resisters now confront their targets (often face-to-face) and mobilize as much po- Three Variants of Direct Action pular action as they can to induce them to halt Mediated contention is a form of seeking grace policy violations. Direct action, in the end, from intercessors whose characteristic expres- relies on appeals to the community rather sion is group petitioning. Direct action, on the than to higher level authorities and its goal is immediate concessions. This article will begin by examining some 3. On the advantages of interviewing over after-the-fact of the forms that direct rightful resistance takes theorizing, see M.M. Brown [2003]. Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... contrary, rests on a public rallying call and a private home. A somewhat more overt 171 high-pressure methods that are designed to approach involves photocopying central or coax local leaders to revoke an illegal decision. provincial documents and then handing or sel- When employing direct tactics, protesters and ling them to interested villagers. One activist their supporters assert a right to resist (not only in Hengyang proudly explained that he expose and denounce) unlawful acts. charged his neighbors precisely what he paid In contemporary rural China, direct action the copy shop and actually lost a fair sum when has three main variants. The least confronta- some villagers walked off with photocopied tional might be called publicizing a policy. In documents without reimbursing him. the course of “studying” or “disseminating do- As their confidence mounts, rightful resis- cuments,” activists make known or distribute ters may turn to more public ways to expose materials which (they contend) show that local misconduct. An example of this is county, township, or village cadres have vio- playing tape recordings, or even using mega- lated a central or provincial directive. They do phones or loudspeakers, to inform villagers of so for the purpose of alerting the public to of- beneficial policies. In Henan, for instance, in ficial misconduct and mobilizing opposition to response to township manipulation of village unapproved “local policies.” The documents elections and increasing exactions, a young they select always relate to issues that concern man from Suiping county used a megaphone villagers greatly, be it reducing excessive taxes to acquaint his fellow villagers with the Or- and fees, decrying the use of violence, or pro- ganic Law of Villagers’ Committees (1998) moting well-run village elections. In Heng- and central directives prohibiting excessive yang county alone, activists have publicized taxes and fees [Hao and Chen 2002].5 In Heng- the following materials: President Jiang yang county, a middle-aged shop-owner went Zemin’s 1998 speech on reducing “peasant a step further and was detained and beaten by burdens,”4 Hunan Provincial Document No. 9 township authorities for his cheekiness. He (1996) on the same subject [Yu 2001: 559], rented some audio equipment, set it up on his and the 1993 Agriculture Law, especially its roof, and aired central and provincial clauses (Arts. 18, 19, 59) that forbid imposing unlawful fees, affirm the right of villagers to “reject” unsanctioned exactions, and stipulate 4. Wang Xinqing, Liu Zhenying, Wang Yanbin and that higher levels should work to halt such im- Jiang Xia, “Zhongyang nongcun gongzuo huiyi zai Jing zhaokai” (The Central Meeting on the Countryside Held positions and have them returned to villagers. in Beijing), Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 1998, Participants in direct action use a variety of January 10. methods to make beneficial policies known and to mobilize resistance to their violation. 5. On an activist posting copies of a State Council directive (which warned local governments against the il- They may begin by showing government legal use of land) on the walls of his Zhejiang village, papers they have acquired to their neighbors. see J. Yu [2003]. The man claimed that “all [he] did was The most inconspicuous way to do this is in tell people what their legal rights were.” Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 172 documents about easing peasant burdens to his effort. They can stay indoors, open their win- entire village. dows and listen, or simply walk outside and Disseminating policies need not employ watch what is going on. One variety of dis- even the simplest technology and can occur at semination that involves a more direct (if unexpected times, as is seen when resourceful surreptitious) effort to attract a crowd is pre- activists appropriate apolitical rituals or cele- senting a movie and then publicizing benefi- brations and turn them to their own ends. In cial policies moments before the show begins. rural Hengyang for instance, rightful resisters In Henan, as early as 1993, a villager did this hijacked a traditional dragon dance during with a State Council regulation that limited Spring Festival (three consecutive years) to pu- township and village fees [Yu 1993]. Activists blicize central documents granting villagers a may also inform villagers about poor imple- right to reject unreasonable burdens and (on mentation at rural markets. This again, in- the sly) to solicit donations for their cause. volves taking advantage of a ready-made While parading up and down every lane, they audience. According to several Hengyang pro- summarized the “spirit of central documents” test organizers, on market days they sometimes in rhymed verse, chanting in unison as they simply set up a loudspeaker in the town center wound their way from home to home. and read out documents concerning tax and fee Many efforts to make beneficial policies reduction that were issued by the Center, known are limited to a single village; others Hunan province, or Hengyang city [Yu 2001: expand the field of action. An example of the 555]. In such cases, even though rightful re- latter is employing “propaganda vehicles” or sisters may do their best to minimize confron- putting up posters throughout a township cri- tation, clashes frequently occur after local ticizing excessive fees or rigged elections. One officials appear. Township cadres, when they activist in Hengyang, already famous for or- heard the Hengyang activists disclosing fee li- ganizing a road blockade in 1999, rented a mits on a busy market day in 1998, first cut truck and used it as a mobile broadcasting sta- off electricity to their loudspeaker. But a sym- tion to transmit provincial directives limiting pathetic restaurant owner stepped in and sup- rural taxation to a number of small hamlets plied the villagers with a generator. Then, a scattered throughout his township [Johnson number of officials came out of their offices 2004: 63, 67, 71]. Another protest leader, after and ordered the protesters to disperse, only to participating in an expensive and fruitless col- find themselves upbraided for impeding the lective complaint to the Hunan provincial go- lawful dissemination of central policies. vernment in 1996, copied excerpts of central Although they usually shy away from phy- documents calling for tax and fee reductions sical confrontation with their adversaries, po- on large posters and had a group of young licy disseminators sometimes publicize villagers paste them up around the county. policies in ways that cannot help but lead to For many of these tactics, the intended au- conflict. One technique sure to produce offi- dience does not have to make any special cial ire is distributing documents near a Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... government compound. A Hengyang activist organizers planned to detain and deliver to the 173 for example, excerpted central directives limi- city authorities any township official who ting peasant burdens on large, red posters and ventured to interfere. In another widely-re- plastered them on several buildings in the ported episode in Ningxiang county, Hunan, township government complex. Protest orga- after a multi-village band of “Volunteer Pro- nizers in Jiangxi have likewise sold pamphlets pagandists for the Policy of Reducing Bur- about Beijing’s fee reduction policies directly dens” used tape recorders and hired a in front of a Party office building [Ding 2001: loudspeaker truck in 1999 to tell villagers 433-434]. In both cases, these tactics cornered about their rights, protest organizers assem- township officials, heightened their fears that bled 4,000 people outside the town govern- further popular action was imminent, and led ment complex to demand adherence to central to a swift (and negative) response. In Heng- and provincial directives that capped taxation yang, township cadres removed the posters; in and opposed corruption. But before the spea- Jiangxi, the book sellers were arrested. kers could say a word, the assembled villagers By far the most assertive form of publici- rushed into the compound. Over 1,000 police zing policies involves both deliberate confron- and 500 soldiers dispersed the demonstrators, tation and undisguised mass mobilization. using clubs and tear gas. Many villagers were One common tactic employed in Hengyang is arrested or injured, and 1 man was killed to trail behind township tax collectors as they [Bernstein and Lü 2003: 128-129]. try to collect fees, all the time loudly quoting Publicizing documents does not always tax reduction directives. This practice not only lead to repression; it can sometimes further challenges the legality of an exaction, it also protesters’ ends. By reading out or distributing often draws scores of onlookers and encou- central policies, activists expose unlawful ac- rages less daring villagers to withhold their tions, shatter information blockades, and de- payments. Another highly provocative form of monstrate (both to officials and interested propagating policies involves calling so-called bystanders) that it may be possible to muster “ten thousand-person meetings” in a govern- large-scale resistance to local misconduct.6 In ment compound to study policies that exco- so doing, rightful resisters assert their right to riate corruption or limit fees. Such gatherings know about beneficial measures and to can rapidly turn into melees when township communicate their knowledge to others. Ordi- or county officials intervene. In Hengyang, a nary villagers may be emboldened to join protest leader organized a mass meeting to force a rollback in taxes and fees. To sym- bolize the activists’ willingness to challenge 6. For urban workers in China who “are no longer simply the township head-on, the speaker’s podium presenting their grievances to those in charge, but publicizing them,” see A. Kernen [2003a: 5]. On their being was placed just steps away from the main go- “not only concerned with handing over a petition to the vernment office building. Hundreds of villa- authorities, but also with inserting their claims into the gers were invited to attend the rally and the ‘public arena’”, see A. Kernen [2003b: 9]. Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 174 them, or at least support them, not simply be- invited them often encourage onlookers to cause they have been made aware that central come, support them, and watch the drama un- directives have been neglected, but because fold. In one such incident in Hengyang, the they have seen fellow community members lead activist requested a face-to-face meeting take the lead in standing up to unlawful local with the head of a township middle school. In actions. As we will see in the next chapter, front of a large assembly of local residents, he when a campaign of dissemination unfolds, displayed documents issued by the city and formerly-uninvolved villagers sometimes be- county education bureau that fixed fees at a come much less timid insomuch as they ob- certain level and told the schoolmaster item by serve new “peasant leaders” emerging and a item how much more students had been weakening of the local government’s usual charged. The presence of nearly 20 hardened stranglehold over political life. “burden reduction representatives,” as well as The second variant of direct action is “de- over 100 bystanders, led to a round of intense manding a dialogue.” Activists and their sup- bargaining, after which the schoolmaster porters, often after collective petitioning or agreed to return about 80% of the illegal publicizing a policy fails to budge their foes, charges. may insist on face-to-face meetings with local But events do not always unfold so peace- officials (or their proxies) to urge immediate fully. On another occasion also in Hengyang, revocation of unlawful local measures. a school head postponed a scheduled dialogue Rightful resisters have used this tactic in Heng- so that he would have time to hire a group of yang most notably to fight mounting school local toughs to scare off the “burden reduction fees. Since many townships can no longer col- representatives.” But when the meeting began lect as much revenue as they used to (owing and the schoolmaster signaled his men to make both to pressure from above and resistance their move, an elderly bystander came to the from below), and many poorer districts are fi- defense of the representatives. He said he ad- nancially-starved in the wake of the 1994 fiscal mired their altruism and would protect them reforms, township leaders have frequently to the end. allowed local schoolmasters to increase edu- “Demanding a dialogue” has also been em- cational fees on their own.7 Self-styled ployed against far more powerful targets than “burden-reduction representatives,” usually local school heads. In Qidong county, Hunan, after hard-pressed parents come to them for a riot occurred in July 1996 in which hundreds help, may demand that all overcharges be re- of people attacked township and village offi- turned. Instead of lodging a collective cials and smashed the signboards of the complaint, which would have been more common in the past, a group of representatives 7. Beginning in 2001, the Center began increasing rural may proceed directly to the school. The arrival education funding significantly [Bernstein 2003]. Whe- of these “peasant heroes” typically attracts a ther this defuses conflicts between school masters and large crowd, not least because the parents who villagers remains to be seen. Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... township government. (Destroying the pla- down. At this stage, negotiation and compro- 175 cards that identify government offices is a mise are still possible, even desired by acti- symbolic denial of their legitimacy, much like vists. Cool bargaining and face-saving burning a flag or effigy.) The county Party se- concessions become distinctly less feasible cretary rushed to the area to look into what had when protesters turn to the third variant of caused the unrest. At the urging of hundreds direct action: face-to-face defiance. of villagers, he agreed to have an unlawfully- Activists who use this tactic confront local collected education surcharge rescinded. The officials on the job and try to halt any illegal incident ended, but news of the successful pro- acts. They, for example, flatly reject unautho- test spread rapidly. Upon learning of it, villa- rized impositions and loudly encourage others gers in other parts of Qidong county were to follow suit. In Hengyang in 1998, one par- inspired to rise up and demand dialogues. In ticularly feisty rightful resister followed early September 1996 3 activists arranged a township tax collectors wherever they went. movie presentation in order to read out a With two other “burden reduction representa- Hunan provincial document that reduced pea- tives” at his side, he brandished a copy of a sant burdens, to organize villagers to resist ex- central directive and contested every effort to cessive education apportionments, and to collect even a yuan (12 US cents) too much. gather signatures for a petition to present to The tax collectors dared not challenge him in the township. After the video ended, just be- public, but one of them muttered an insult after fore a group of indignant movie-goers set out he refused to get out of their way and let them for a nearby government compound, a skir- do their job. A scuffle broke out and hundreds mish broke out with township officials who of villagers came to defend the fee resister, had come to dissuade the protesters from de- eventually pinning the beleaguered taxman in monstrating. Two days later, over 600 villa- his jeep. That same year a similar incident oc- gers, carrying banners and flags, beating drums curred in another township in Hengyang and gongs, and setting off fireworks, paraded county. Two “burden-reduction representa- down the busiest street in the township to the tives” had locked horns with township revenue main office building to insist on a meeting with collectors when they tried to prevent the col- the Party secretary and government head. Over lection of several unauthorized fees. When the the next three days, hundreds of villagers from officials struck one of the representatives with four other townships in Qidong marched to a flashlight, a shoving match broke out. Again, their township seats and demanded dialogues angry villagers responded, this time overtur- with Party and government leaders [Yu 2001: ning two jeeps the township cadres used for 558-560]. their work. If publicizing a policy aims to remind er- Rightful resisters may also use face-to-face rant cadres that they are vulnerable to rightful defiance to challenge rigged elections. In one claims, demanding a dialogue is directed at dramatic episode in the early 1990s, a group of unresponsive targets who refuse to back villagers in Hubei successfully disrupted a Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 176 villagers’ committee election in which nomina- Zhoumo) [Gilley 2001; Yang 2001: 39; Wang tions were not handled according to approved 2002: 6; O’Brien and Li 2004: 78]. procedures. Just as the ballots were being dis- The three variants of direct action described tributed, one villager leapt to the platform here are interrelated and often appear together. where the election committee was presiding, In addition, rightful resisters sometimes em- grabbed a microphone and shouted: ploy them in sequence, starting by publicizing policies and then moving on to demanding dia- Xiong Dachao is a corrupt cadre. Don’t logues or face-to-face defiance. Whatever vote for him. form it takes, direct action marks a significant Immediately several of his confederates break from mediated contention. Its appea- stood up and started shouting words of support, rance leads local cadres (and protesters them- seconding his charges. To further dramatize selves) into uncharted territory and introduces their resistance, the assembled protesters then new uncertainties, especially when activists tore up their own ballots as well as those of lose control of their followers or officials other villagers who were milling about waiting panic. It also opens up the possibility that to vote.8 rightful resisters will continue to escalate their Public-minded intellectuals sometimes urge tactics (perhaps toward out-and-out violence) on direct action. The following episode in- while embracing broader and deeper claims volved both disseminating policies and face- [Rucht 1990: 171-172] – claims that are ge- to-face defiance. In Jiangxi, the deputy editor neral and ideological rather than concrete and of a rural affairs journal published 12,000 co- specific [Tarrow 1989; Mueller 1999: pies of a Work Manual on Reducing Farmers’ 530-531], claims that challenge the legitimacy Tax Burdens. He later said: of local government rather than the lawfulness of particular decisions. Iwasjustcarryingoutmydutytohelpfar- mers personally monitor arbitrary fees, and How New? at the end of the day, central government Techniques of protest are seldom invented out policies are not enough to help the farmers. of whole cloth. More often, they appear at the They need to be able to help themselves. edge of an existing repertoire of contention as The book had a section advising farmers how to seek redress and its subtitle was “The imperial sword is in your hands, farmer 8. “Zhongguo Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshe Yanjiuhui,” in friends, hold on tight!” Although the editor ul- “Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju timately lost his position and the provincial go- yanjiu baogao” (Research Report on Rural China’s Vil- vernment dispatched the police to confiscate lagers’ Committee Reelections). Beijing, Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1994. On six villagers seizing stuffed as many copies of the book as they could lo- ballot boxes, see “Six Chinese Farmers Jailed for De- cate, the story received national attention in the nouncing Fixed Elections,” Agence France Presse, 1999, newspaper Southern Weekend (Nanfang September 4. Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... “creative modifications or extensions of fami- been enjoying only limited success. In parti- 177 liar routines.” [Tilly 1993: 265-266; McAdam, cular, they have established a “radical flank” Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 49] Innovations, in this [McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 14] at a way, signal a broadening of tactics and a gro- time when it has become clear that the media- wing strategic flexibility by activists who are tors they put their faith in are often ineffective generating a multi-pronged strategy that can and local opponents are largely impervious to be deployed on many fronts [McCann 1994: half-hearted pressure from above. 86, 145; Rochon 1998: 202-203; Tarrow 1998: 37, 104; Andrews 2001: 77]. How Widespread? This is very much the story in rural China We can only speak with confidence, at this point, today. Mediated tactics continue to be used about tactical escalation in Hengyang and a while direct, confrontational forms of conten- handful of other counties. Moreover, there are tion have also become more common. Espe- good reasons to believe that protest forms spread cially in locations where the old ways have slower in China than in more open polities where been found wanting again and again, nearly the media deems dramatic, innovative tactics contained acts are being augmented by deci- newsworthy [Rochon 1988: 102-104; della Porta dedly boundary-spanning or even transgres- and Diani 1999: 186] and rapidly transmits ac- sive acts, as protesters begin to enforce central counts of them nationwide [Soule 1997: 858]. In directives themselves and literally use policies China, tactical diffusion still depends on word- as a weapon in their battles. As a researcher of-mouth and informal social networks.9 from the Development Research Center of the Complainants, in the course of lodging State Council put it: complaints at higher levels (i.e. using mediated tactics), encounter one another in reception “Contention within the system” (such as rooms, outside Letters and Visits Offices, and in petitioning) is still the main feature of “petitioners’ camps,” and share stories of their peasant action, but “contention outside the system” (such as violence) is also ob- frustration with the old forms and victories with 10 viously increasing [...] Peasants start by the newer ones. Telephones enable protest lodging complaints at the county level or higher, and doing so at the province or in Beijing is also fairly common [...] If the 9. On the limited reach and generality of “diffusion” petitions fail, they often turn to “direct” compared to “brokerage,” see D. McAdam, S. Tarrow resistance [Zhao 2004: 213, 221]. and C. Tilly [2001: 335]. On “contagion effects” in rural China, see T.P. Bernstein [2003]. The repertoire of contention, in other words, has expanded and some of the newer tunes are 10. On finding, at any given time, about 50,000 ag- becoming quite popular. Protest leaders in grieved individuals in a petitioners’ camp outside one of the largest of Beijing’s complaints’ offices, see H. Beech places such as Hengyang are “stretching the [2004]. “Training classes” run by some public intellec- boundaries” of rightful resistance and are trying tuals in Beijing have also provided opportunities for rural to breathe life into a form of contention that had complainants to meet and discuss their experiences. Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 178 organizers in different counties to stay in touch Jiangxi. Furthermore, direct tactics in Hunan and carry tales of inventive tactics far and have appeared not only in Hengyang, but also wide.11 Migrant workers bring word of popular in the counties of Lianyuan, Ningxiang, action in distant locales. Successful tactics Qidong, Taoyuan, Xiangyin, and Yizhang. often draw a stream of activists from the surrounding area to confer with “peasant heroes” Origins of Direct Tactics who have achieved what had seemed impos- It is only a start to say that tactics wear out sible. Much as it has in other authoritarian “in the same way that rote speech falls flat” settings, “low-intensity forms of communica- [McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 138]. New tion [...] enable rural agitators to learn their tactics are not a “blind reflex” [della Porta and trade, share experiences, and develop common Diani 1999: 185] or an automatic response to identities” away from official scrutiny and anything. They must be created through an in- interference [Euchner 1996: 150-151]. teractive process [Jasper 1997: 295; Tarrow Direct rightful resistance spreads by imita- 1998: 102] that entails “incessant improvisa- tion; it can also become more common owing tion on the part of all participants” [McAdam, to contemporaneous creation. Broadly similar Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 138] and “a series of grievances and experiences with contention reciprocal adjustments” [della Porta and Diani can help forge a collective identity when limited interpersonal contact establishes mi- nimal identification between transmitters and 11. According to a Chinese researcher, “some leading figures among the peasantry have close ties with dozens adopters [McAdam and Rucht 1993], or even or even a hundred peasant complainants inside and out- without any direct, relational ties [Strang and side the province. Sometimes they even assemble to dis- Meyer 1993; Soule 1997: 861].12 And this col- cuss important matters.” [Zhao 2004: 7] On the “elaborate lective identity can inspire a wave of a similar organization” of many protests, including having desi- protests when a tactic becomes modular gnated leaders, public spokespersons, underground core groups, as well as hired lawyers and invited journalists to [Tarrow 1998] and adroit practitioners either cover their events, see M.S. Tanner [2004: 141]. import it wholesale or reinvent it (with perhaps a local twist) to fit their particular situation 12. Collective identities can be strengthened on the basis [Scalmer 2002]. of little more than a snippet of news. After the 1996 To this point, Chinese researchers have un- protests against education surcharges in Hezhou town, Qidong county, Hunan, news of success spread rapidly covered evidence of direct action in the pro- and other activists argued that elite solidarity was not as vinces of Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Jiangxi, great as it seemed, that villagers elsewhere should not Henan, Shaanxi, and Hebei [Yang 1999; Ding suffer more than those in Hezhou, and that other town- 2001; Yu 2001; Hao and Chen 2002; Xiao ships were also vulnerable to direct tactics. One protest 2002; Zhao 2004]. Our interviews suggest that leader rallied his followers with the words: “We are all citizens of the People’s Republic. We live under the same direct rightful resistance may be particularly blue sky. Why do we have to pay this unlawful appor- well-developed in Dangshan county, Anhui, tionment if our fellow citizens in Hezhou don’t?” Gushi county, Henan, and Fengcheng county, [Yu 2001: 558-560] Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... 1999: 186-187]. This depends on strategic de- For many long-time complainants, the 179 cisions by protest leaders and their foes, as bitter truth is that protectors at higher levels well as newly-available resources and changes have too often shown themselves to be all in the external environment. Most of all, in talk and little action. Anticipated backers fre- rural China, it hinges on activists who reflect quently turn out to be little more than a sym- on their earlier experiences with mediated tac- bolic source of legitimacy, who intervene tics, learn from their successes and failures, only when egregious wrongs threaten poli- and come up with perhaps brilliant, perhaps tical stability (such as after village cadres in ill-advised ways to pursue their ends the next Henan killed a villager who persisted in pur- time around.13 suing complaints). In less incendiary cir- In the following pages, we discuss four fac- cumstances, rightful resisters who employ tors that have contributed to tactical escalation mediated tactics are commonly ignored, in the Chinese countryside: 1) past defeats, 2) given the run-around, or harassed. Even if information about government policies and as- they do receive a favorable response from so- surances obtained during mediated contention, meone in power, their antagonists at lower le- 3) advances in communications and informa- vels often ignore “soft” instructions from tion technology, and 4) popular support for above or delay endlessly in implementing disruptive protests. them [O’Brien and Li 1999; Wedeman 2001; Edin 2003; Whiting 2004: 119]. DEFEATS Defeats arise first and foremost because mediators do not mediate. Delegations Defeat sometimes drives protest leaders underground or spurs them to give up. It may also, however, motivate them to up the ante and 13. On tactical virtuosi, see J.M. Jasper [1997: 301, touch off a round of tactical escalation. Recur- 319-320]. ring failures can trigger thoughts about jetti- 14. In Hengyang in 1998, thirteen “burden-reduction re- soning ineffective tactics [Beckwith 2000; presentatives” were whittled down to six by threats le- McCammon et al. 2001] while the harsh poli- veled by a township government. Backed into a corner, cing often associated with defeat may usher the remaining activists felt they either had to accept de- moderates into private life, leaving the stage feat or change their course of action. They decided to to those with more militant inclinations press on and engage in direct action by publicizing the Center’s effort to reduce farmers’ burdens to every [Tarrow 1998: 84-85, 150, 158, 201; della household in the township [Yu 2001: 555]. Porta 1999: 89-90; della Porta and Diani 1999: 211].14 In rural China, a growing realization of 15. Our 1999 survey of 1,384 villagers in 25 pro- the inadequacy15 and riskiness of mediated tac- vinces included 190 participants in collective complaints. Of these 190, 3% were very satisfied with the tics has undermined the faith some activists outcome of their action, 18% relatively satisfied, 24% had in lodging complaints and has induced neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 31% dissatisfied, and them to take direct action. 23% very dissatisfied. Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 180 languish for weeks waiting for an appointment INFORMATION AND ASSURANCES with leaders who never emerge. Oral sym- Despite its frequent failure to produce much re- pathy is not backed up with written instruc- dress, mediated contention can generate re- tions. Complainants are treated politely in sources and create openings that promote direct person and then undercut behind their backs. contention. Activists, most notably, have ob- The appearance of many open doors in Bei- tained copies of authoritative “red-headed docu- jing (e.g. Letters and Visits Offices at the ments” via mediated contention that confirmed Central Committee, the Party Discipline Ins- policy violations were taking place. In Hengyang, pection Committee, the National People’s for instance, Hunan Provincial Regulation No. 9 Congress, various ministries, People’s Daily, (1996) on limiting exactions has played a large Farmer’s Daily) and at lower levels can keep part in helping activists pinpoint misconduct by hopes of mediated rightful resisters alive for local officials. Such documents can be shown to a while, but only intensifies their resentment potential supporters to prove, in detailed and when they receive no response, are referred to clearly-worded language, that township and yet another office, or a complaint ends up in county cadres have betrayed their superiors. the hands of the official charged with mis- Some of these measures even authorize direct conduct (on “Letters and Visits”, see action when central directives are ignored. A 1991 T.P. Bernstein and X. Lü [2003: 177-190], State Council Regulation, for example, states: X. Chen [2003], L.M. Luehrmann [2003], I. Thireau and L. Hua [2003], Y. Cai [2004]).16 It is the obligation of farmers to remit According to a researcher from the Hunan taxes to the state, to fulfill the state’s pro- Organization Department: curement quotas for agricultural pro- ducts, and to be responsible for the various fees and services stipulated in People who visit higher levels to lodge these regulations. Any other demands on complaints very rarely obtain justice. Jus- farmers to provide financial, material, or tice for them is like a carrot dangling in labor contributions gratis are illegal and front of a donkey. The donkey walks for farmers have the right to reject them many kilometers but can never eat the [cited in Bernstein and Lü 2003: 48]. carrot [Cai 2003: 664, 679].

In the end, many veteran activists have 16. Complainants are often rounded up and sent home come to doubt the capacity of the Center to during annual People’s Congress sessions and at other ensure faithful policy implementation, and times when officials are busy announcing their achieve- some even think of it as a clay Buddha that ments or showing off their city [Beech 2004]. Before the local officials must bow to but can ignore with 2004 National People’s Congress, for example, the Mi- impunity [Li 2004]. All this has led to growing nistry of Land and Resources issued an urgent circular instructing local officials to use “firm and effective” mea- frustration among protesters who had relied on sures to handle long-time complainants who were dispu- mediated tactics and has encouraged some of ting land requisitions, and to “do everything possible to them to find new ways to pursue their goals. stabilize the masses in their locality.” Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... Even more authoritatively, the 1993 Agri- reassured them that they had the right to block 181 culture Law (Art. 18) explicitly grants villa- the purchaser from taking over the land. Acting gers the right to refuse to pay illegal on a belief that they had located a “guarantor impositions. It is true that these acts offer little against repression” [Tarrow 1998: 79], each of protection if rejecting a demand leads to de- these protest leaders then transformed a few tention, a beating, having one’s home torn kind words (in fact, the only politically correct down, or having one’s valuables or livestock response) into permission to pursue a broad- confiscated. Nor do they spell out punishments based campaign of publicizing policies. In the for cadres who flout the limits. But this incom- Fujian case, villagers also went a step further: pleteness has only stimulated some protest lea- they took the official’s advice literally and phy- ders to devise their own ways to make these sically blocked the land buyer’s men when they rights real. Among other initiatives, activists came to claim the property. in various provinces have organized mass mee- Strictly speaking, there is no law that al- tings to study and publicize the Agriculture lows Chinese citizens to publicize Party poli- Law and provincial caps on taxation, and they cies and state laws. But this is an act whose have openly challenged officials who fail to correctness no one can legitimately challenge. comply with them [Ma 2000]. While an official who scrawls on a letter of Participants in mediated contention also so- complaint “disseminating policies is protected metimes obtain oral or written assurances that by law” may be seeking mainly to get a group disseminating beneficial policies is legally pro- of activists out of his or her office and to dis- tected. When several farmers in Hunan asked courage them from returning [Guo 2001: 434], whether they could publicize documents enterprising activists often waste little time ex- concerning excessive fees, officials at the pro- panding this discursive crack into a window of vincial Letters and Visits Office encouraged opportunity. They interpret official “instruc- them to do so, so that villagers knew what was tions,” as informal and off-hand as they usually forbidden and what was not. On one occasion, are, to be evidence that a meaningful gap exists the Office director also reassured them that between authorities at higher and lower levels. such actions were lawful and jotted some sup- What might have been little more than a brush- portive remarks on the cover of a provincial off, in other words, can easily justify upgra- regulation he gave to the lead complainant. ding a general license to publicize policies into Another Hengyang protest leader received si- an explicit go-ahead to challenge abusive local milar words of encouragement when he visited officials and mobilize opposition to unlawful the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing. More decisions in one’s own village. remarkably, when several farmers lodged a In sum, even though mediated contention complaint at the Fujian provincial government usually fails to generate the hoped-for relief, concerning a township’s illegal sale of farm- it can provide activists with crucial informa- land they had contracted, the staff member who tion about official misconduct, suggest poli- received them at the Letters and Visits Office tical openings (that may or may not exist), and Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 182 (by changing protest leaders’ expectations and phones to protect investigators who have come their store or resources) set the stage for direct to do research on rural contention. One protest rightful resistance. leader called two journalists sent by the ma- gazine Window on the South Wind (Nanfeng COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION Chuang) to warn them (three times) to change TECHNOLOGIES taxis after his followers discovered that county Some activists in rural China use remarkably officials had learned the license plate number low-tech (or no-tech) means to mobilize and of their vehicle; later, after the reporters stayed coordinate direct action. In Jize county, Hebei, in one location too long and were detained, for example, protest leaders set off firecrackers another activist phoned to offer to mobilize to assemble villagers in front of a general store hundreds of villagers to free them [Bernstein before leading them to demand a dialogue with 2003; Johnson 2004: 69]. township leaders, while in Hunan village look- Personal computers are another break- outs used gongs to summon community mem- through that has promoted the use of direct tac- bers to defend protest organizers who were tics. Computer printing, in particular, can aid about to be arrested. both in publicizing policies and reproducing But some newer technologies (which have letters of complaints. Activists in Anhui pro- only recently reached the countryside) have vince, for instance, painstakingly entered a be- played an even bigger role in facilitating direct neficial tax policy on a computer, character by rightful resistance. We have already seen how character, and then distributed printouts to stir audio equipment such as tape recorders, loud- up resistance to unlawful taxation. Shortly be- speakers, and mobile broadcasting stations can fore a number of “burden reduction representa- help publicize policies and rally supporters. In- tives” in Hengyang demanded a dialogue with somuch as direct action requires considerable a school head concerning tuition and fee in- coordination and planning, telephones have creases, they circulated printouts of their letter also become an important tool for protest lea- of complaint to parents of school children. ders. More and more activists these days use Most of these newer technologies are no mobile phones to arrange multi-village or even longer forbiddingly expensive. Mobile phones multi-township actions. In Hengyang, for ins- can be bought for 200 to 300 yuan (approxi- tance, one farmer set up a telephone tree that mately US $25-$40) and calls run about 60 fen connected hundreds of activists in nearly a (7 US cents) or less per minute. Shops that dozen townships. Many of his fellow organi- provide word-processing and computer prin- zers now have cell phones or land lines at ting can be found in virtually all county towns home; those who do not, rely on neighbors who and many townships. are willing to pass on messages about the time The technology that has transformed pro- and place of meetings, upcoming actions, the test the most is also one of the most widely number of protesters to turn out, and so on. In available: photocopying. In Hunan, it costs 30 Hunan, villagers have even used mobile fen (4 US cents) to reproduce a page the size Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... of this one and copy shops can be found in militancy reliably alienates the public [Rochon 183 most township seats. Photocopying not only 1988; Jasper 1997: 9, 13]. So long as rightful eases duplication of central, provincial and resisters refrain from demanding excessive do- city regulations, it also lends a patina of au- nations or harassing free-riders, tactical esca- thenticity and legitimacy to those documents lation usually generates more community and impedes crackdowns by officials who pre- approval than disapproval. Particularly in lo- viously would have claimed they were bogus. cations where villagers have become exaspe- In Hengyang, when a deputy township head rated with the Center’s failure to rectify and the chair of the township People’s long-standing wrongs, unconventional tactics Congress attempted to shut down a group of do not undermine the legitimacy of protest and activists who were reading copied regulations drive away supporters, but more often lead to over a loudspeaker and alleged that they were comments such as: publicizing phony “black documents,” several activists challenged them to produce the real When officials push people to rebel, people have to resist. or “red” versions. Rebuffed, the officials had nothing more to say. The protest leaders then Direct tactics can help a group of activists immediately announced to the surrounding expand their base by creating solidarity, for- crowd that these officials were “active ging a collective identity, and strengthening counter-revolutionaries” because they had trust. It is often the case that the more assertive “defiled” central policies. and enterprising protest leaders are, the more All these technologies enable adept rightful their stature rises – though popular acclaim resisters to reach out to (and fire up) a mass does not always translate into active participa- constituency in a way that was less critical tion in the next round of contention. As we when they were simply lodging mass will see in Chapter 5, interested onlookers so- complaints and depended largely on elite allies metimes join protests or become leaders them- rather than disgruntled, agitated villagers. Ad- selves; more frequently, they offer financial vances in duplication and communication support or applaud the actions of activists (with faxes, e-mail, text-messaging, and the in- whom they have come to respect or even ad- ternet not far behind) [Tarrow 1998: 132; on mire. In this way, although direct tactics esta- Falun Gong, see Thornton 2002] also help or- blish a “radical flank,” they do not redound ganizers mount popular action and gauge how chiefly to the benefit of those who employ mo- disruptive they can be without crossing into derate, mediated tactics. Instead, they often set “forbidden zones.” in motion a sequence of events where wary but hopeful spectators (and some new participants) POPULAR SUPPORT are delighted to see imperious, corrupt, and In rural China today, there is not much evi- abusive officials get their comeuppance and dence of a “strategic dilemma” where disrup- even privately egg rightful resisters to ratchet tion is necessary to draw attention but the level of confrontation up a notch. Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 184 The following episode illustrates how the importance, participating in direct rightful resis- back-and-forth between protest leaders and their tance, or offering financial or moral support to followers can lead to tactical escalation. In Shan- those who do so, is not as risky as it might seem. dong, an elected village director lodged nume- Since their ham-fisted involvement in suppres- rous complaints and even filed a lawsuit against sing the 1989 protest movement, China’s secu- an accountant who was the front-man for a cor- rity forces have become much more concerned rupt village Party secretary. But the director with the misuse of force. The police increa- could not secure access to the accounts that singly seek “to minimize popular anger through confirmed the financial shenanigans of the two more moderate policing of protests” [Tanner men. (To shield their underlings and themselves 2004: 148] and rely on containment and mana- township officials had spirited away the account gement rather than deterrence and quick sup- books to their office and locked them up.) In pression. This shift has meant that many 2002, with a new election approaching, the di- low-key protests are permitted to continue (and rector realized that he might lose, largely be- crowds allowed to disperse), with little danger to cause he had been so ineffective in bringing the most participants [id.]. Moreover, from impe- Party secretary and the accountant to justice. His rial days to the present, protest leaders have al- supporters were concerned and urged him to use ways paid the highest price when collective bolder, direct tactics. The director demanded a action backfired, while followers have been pro- meeting with the township head, during which tected by their numbers, their relative anony- he threatened, if he was again prevented from mity, and the authorities’ fear of alienating a seeing the accounts, to mobilize his following to broad swath of the population. In fact, a occupy the township office building. The common outcome has been arrest and imprison- township head relented but only granted permis- ment of ringleaders followed by concessions on sion to review the books for a single day. The the subject of the protesters’ demands [Bianco director agreed but decided to spring a surprise. 2001; O’Brien 2002: 150; Bernstein and Lü At the end of the appointed time, nearly 60 of his 2003].17 In some senses, taking part in a de- supporters suddenly appeared, seized the ac- monstration is even less dangerous than partici- counts, and ran off with them. This incident led patingintypicalmediatedtactics,suchas the township leadership and the village Party openly identifying oneself by signing or thumb secretary to cancel the upcoming election, the- printing a collective letter of complaint. While reby allowing the village director to retain his direct tactics require considerable planning and position. It also helped the director win back coordination, and place protest leaders in no many of his former backers who had been small jeopardy, they also often ease the job of disappointed with his lack of resolve. amassing and retaining popular support. Popular support for direct tactics arises for a number of reasons. Above all, it derives from widespread frustration with the ineffectiveness 17. On the high risks leaders of collective appeals typi- of mediated contention. Of nearly equal cally face, see Y. Cai [2004: 447-448]. Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... Who Innovates? were unwilling to relive the discrimination and 185 In many countries, new tactics are associated exploitation they had experienced. Others had with new activists [Jasper 1997: 231, 241; served in the army and found themselves della Porta and Diani 1999: 189] – with suc- locked out of the village leadership when they cessive “micro-cohorts” [Whittier 1995: 56] returned home (on veterans and rural protest, who enter a movement often after working in see K.J. O’Brien and L. Li [1995: 758], T.P. Bernstein and X. Lü [2003: 148-149], another movement [Meyer and Whittier 1994; J. Yu [2003: 1]).19 After years of fruitless me- Voss and Sherman 2000: 328]. Although in diated contention, most felt they had no alter- rural China we see some of this, particularly native to escalation, unless they were willing among new recruits who took part in mass to discard their ambitions, their self-respect, campaigns during the waning days of the and their hopes for a better life. Maoist era, our limited evidence suggests that Personal, psychological factors also help tactical escalation is mainly the handiwork of explain why some veteran complainants have seasoned complainants who have learned new adopted direct tactics. Most of the innovators tricks as their abilities, resources and commit- we have encountered are unusually assertive ment have grown. In Hengyang, for instance, and self-confident characters, who, for all 32 protest leaders on whom we have infor- example, enjoyed telling anyone who would mation had been involved in collective action listen how much pride they took in fighting for at least eight years, and all of them em- wrongdoing.20 Along these lines, one activist ployed mediated tactics before moving on to in Hengyang said: direct action.18 Of course, long-time complainants do not always graduate to direct rightful resistance. 18. On protest in Hengyang in the late 1980s and early Those who do, in Hengyang, have typically 1990s, see T.P. Bernstein and X. Lü [2003: 187-189] and been middle-aged or slightly older men who J. Yu [2003]. say they feel boxed in, in that they have few 19. Our 1999-2001 survey of 1,600 villagers in 4 coun- other options to improve their economic, so- ties (2 in Jiangxi, 1 in Jiangsu, and 1 in Fujian) [Li 2004: cial or political position. A number of Heng- 244] showed that both men and army veterans were yang protest leaders who were under 35 years considerably overrepresented among rightful resisters. of age simply left the countryside and became This survey did not distinguish between mediated and direct forms of rightful resistance. migrant workers after a multi-village, collective complaint in 1996 failed to produce any 20. E.J. Wood [2003: 234-237] highlights the “pleasures relief. Older complainants however, could not in agency” experienced by many participants in collec- easily do the same, not least because they often tive action. Her study of insurgency in El Salvador showed that feelings of increased autonomy, self-esteem had elderly parents and teenage children to and pride came about “in the course of making history, look after. Some of these men had also been and not just any history but a history they perceived as migrant workers themselves for a time, but more just.” (P. 235) Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 186 I have been combative since I was young their neighbors to the end and have repeatedly and have no tolerance for injustice and evil. solicited contributions from the public to lodge Another protest leader from Hengyang was complaints. As time goes by, they often feel proud to announce: growing pressure to find a way, any way, to deliver at least a portion of what they have I have been rebelling against abusive cadres promised. They wish to show that they have since Mao Zedong was still ruling China.21 the mettle to stand up to the authorities for as long as it takes and to demonstrate that their Indeed, several rural organizers even acts of defiance will ultimately have a payoff. compared themselves to vaunted Party martyrs Lastly, architects of direct rightful resis- and vowed that they would rather die than tance seem to possess an abiding faith in the knuckle under to unjust and corrupt local of- Center’s desire (if not capacity) to halt policy ficials. One activist from Lianyuan county, violations. They appreciate better than most Hunan, went so far as to allude to the famous that officials up to the province level are un- Qin dynasty rebels Chen Sheng and Wu Guang likely to redress popular grievances, yet they by claiming: continue to say that some leaders at the Center truly wish to end misimplementation of bene- Kings and generals are not born to be kings and generals. ficial measures [Guo 2001: 435-437; Li 2004]. In the words of a protest leader from Fujian: These diehards not only refuse to retreat, they also have no use for tactics that have re- Central leaders share a common interest peatedly shown themselves to be inadequate. with people like me, at least to the extent that they agree that what I’m struggling For protest leaders with such hard-charging against also undermines Party rule. personalities, disenchantment with mediated contention only feeds their indignation, brinks- Similarly, although an activist from Shan- manship, and dreams of grandeur while boos- dong repeatedly dodged questions about whe- ting their commitment to find a way to do ther he genuinely trusted the Center, he insisted whatever it takes to prevail. that so long as China’s President wished to stay That many rightful resisters possess strong in power, he would need people like him to personalities and no lack of self-esteem also help control wayward local officials. For such means that they are likely to find it humiliating individuals, declining trust in the Center’s to let their supporters down. Tactical innovators in rural China are typically highly attuned 21. On the persistence and reputation for courage of pro- to questions of dignity and “face” and believe test leaders, see T.P. Bernstein [2003]. (often correctly) that they will be mocked as 22. For rumors that he had been bribed by a county go- cowards if they back down after a few setbacks vernment leading an activist to begin a campaign of pu- 22 [Yu 2001: 568]. This is especially true when blicizing fee-reduction policies, see I. Johnson [2004: protest leaders have openly vowed to defend 57-58]. Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... capacity does not cause a lapse into passivity; since direct contention is usually aimed at lower 187 instead, it strengthens their resolve and encou- level officials than mediated contention. Local rages them to step up their efforts to assist a adversaries are confronted not bypassed. Protes- besieged and weakened Center. ters give up on high-level patrons and take matters into their own hands. On the other hand, Some Implications rightful resisters sometimes turn on their inef- Rightful resistance has evolved in rural China. fectual (or two-faced) advocates at higher levels Some long-time activists, seeing few alterna- and attack them. Consider this example from tives and too proud to accept defeat, have Hengyang: after a protest organizer’s wife was turned to more confrontational forms of beaten by township cadres and several hired contention. Instead of counting on higher-level toughs, another activist led a delegation of villa- patrons to address their claims, these rightful gers to the county to insist that the perpetrators resisters and their followers have increasingly be punished. At this point, the protesters were come to demand justice on the spot. In an at- employing mediated tactics because they treated tempt to halt policy violations, they have trans- the county as a potential ally against their formed tiny openings into opportunities to township foes. But when the county head sum- deploy new, more disruptive tactics, such as marily rejected their demands, the activists de- publicizing policies, demanding dialogues, and cided that the county was in truth a backstage face-to-face defiance. In the course of doing supporter of their antagonists. Instead of procee- so, they have exploited the spread of commu- ding up a level to the city government (which nications and information technologies, inclu- they still considered an ally), they decided they ding mobile phones, photocopying, and would challenge the county itself by setting up a computerized printing. Direct tactics, to this human blockade on a county highway. As their point, have generally not overstepped the perception of the county’s stance changed, their Center’s sufferance (so long as protest leaders tactics had morphed from mediated contention and their followers stop short of violence and (aimed at the county, by appealing to it for help) clearly illegal acts), and they almost always to direct action (against the county, by blocking meet with popular acclaim, as rightful resisters the county road). So far, direct contention has persist, win occasional victories, and keep mostly targeted township and village cadres; trumpeting their willingness to sacrifice all for this episode shows it can move up the hierarchy, the interests of the Party and the people. with potentially explosive consequences. These developments have several broader The “addressees” [Szabo 1996] of conten- implications for research on contentious poli- tion have changed in another important way. tics. Tactical escalation, it should be noted, has In rural China, the audience for collective ac- brought about what D. McAdam, S. Tarrow and tion is broadening well beyond fair-weather C. Tilly [2001: 144-158] call “object shift,” in friends in officialdom. Rightful resisters now two different senses. On the one hand, the focus regularly turn to another third party – the pu- of rightful resistance has shifted downwards, blic. The strategic dilemma that researchers Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang

... 188 have observed in the West [Rochon 1988; Seen in this light, whether opportunities have Jasper 1997: 9, 13; della Porta and Diani 1999: expanded or contracted depends on the tactics 182-183] can easily be overstated in the Chi- under consideration. Tactical escalation in nese countryside, where radicalism typically rural China thus hinges less on whether the attracts support rather than chases it away. system is open or closed [Kitschelt 1986: 66] Many of our interviewees in fact believe that than on which doors are opening and closing. protest organizers should have acted earlier The key question, as we saw in Chapter 2, is and even more dramatically. This is a good “opportunity for what?” [Meyer and Minkoff reminder that tactical escalation is often as 2004: 1461-1463, 1484] It has not been an im- much about building a protest subculture as proving political opportunity structure24 but a winning battles [Jasper 1997: 237] and that we shifting one that has undermined mediated need to peer deep inside protest groups to un- rightful resistance and promoted direct derstand how internal solidarity is built and rightful resistance. collective identities form [della Porta and At the same time, tactical innovation re- Diani 1999: 181-182]. This implies more at- quires that skillful activists seize available op- tention to recruitment and leader-group dyna- portunities [McAdam 1983: 737; Jasper mics, and further consideration of the ways in 1997].25 Protest leaders may understand or mis- which tactical choices can “widen the circle of understand their situation, and then devise those psychologically prepared for mobiliza- brilliant or foolish moves.26 In the Chinese tion” [Rochon 1998: 162], play a role in knit- ting a group together, and “reinforce affective ties among protesters.” [Jasper 1997: 237] 23. On expanding opportunities and tactical innovation, see D. McAdam [1983: 737], M. Szabo [1996] and The evolution of rightful resistance also D.C. Minkoff [1999]. suggests how political opportunities can fi- gure in tactical escalation. Yes, some sympa- 24. For definitions of “political opportunity structure” thetic officials have provided rightful resisters that underscore political openings, rifts among elites, information about beneficial policies and as- elite allies, and the state’s capacity for repression, see D. McAdam et al. [2001: 27] and S. Tarrow [1998: 71]. surances that it is safe and advisable to go beyond lodging complaints.23 But often more 25. On political opportunity structures as “a system of significant than new openings has been the permissive incentives rather than of firm constraints,” see inability of protesters to locate allies who will T.R. Rochon [1998: 203]. stick with them to the end. Activists have 26. Tactics are also chosen partly for psychological, learned that they must rely on themselves and cultural, and biographical reasons. They express moral their constituency more, both for protection visions and identities. Activists may find some certain and to prevail. Their advocates at higher le- tactics enjoyable and others dull. Protest leaders may have their self-image tied up in being at the cutting edge. vels have often shown themselves to be vir- For these and other reasons, tactical choices can diverge tual allies at best, and this has altered the costs from what an opportunity structure would predict. See and benefits of different forms of contention. J.M. Jasper [1997: 244-245, 301, 320]. Tactical Escalation in Rural China

... countryside, a growing realization that most of adjusted their tactics accordingly. Crises, tur- 189 their anticipated allies are missing in action bulence and shocks (brought on mainly by de- has demoralized less committed activists and feats), and the response of activists to them has encouraged more assertive protesters to search precipitated tactical escalation [Beckwith for new, more effective tactics. After repeated 2000; Voss and Sherman 2000: 341]. Through failures, some rightful resisters have developed a long and bumpy process of experimentation, a new (perhaps more realistic) appreciation of protesters in different locations have groped the openings and threats they face, and have their way from mediated to direct contention.

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... 192 Résumé Abstract Kevin J. O’Brien et Li Lianjiang, « Escalade tactique » Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, Tactical Escalation dans la Chine rurale in Rural China L’archétype de la résistance légitime, c’est le dépôt d’une Petitioning is the archetypal form of rightful resistance. requête collective auprès de l’administration. Mais que But what if a petition falls on deaf ears? Some long-time se passe-t-il si la requête est ignorée ? Certains protesta- protesters, seeing few alternatives and too proud to ac- taires de longue date, face au peu d’alternatives qui s’of- cept defeat, have turned to three more direct forms of frent à eux, et trop fiers pour renoncer, adoptent des confrontation: publicizing policies, demanding dialo- formes plus directes d’opposition : porter à la connais- gues, and face-to-face confrontations with local officials. sance de tous les termes des mesures politiques, exiger Direct action signals a break with more mediated forms des débats, affronter face à face les responsables locaux. of resistance, since protest leaders, rather than reporting Ces actions directes représentent une rupture par rapport a policy violation, try to stop it by appealing to the aux formes de résistance légitimes qui passent par la mé- community as much as to higher authorities. This “tac- diation, dans la mesure où ceux qui mènent les protesta- tical escalation” is a consequence of shifting opportuni- tions, loin de se contenter de rapporter les violations ties and a reminder that any assessment of whether commises, essayent d’y mettre un terme en en appelant opportunities have expanded or contracted depends on aux communautés locales autant qu’aux autorités supé- the tactics adopted. rieures. Cette « escalade tactique » résulte d’une trans- Keywords formation des opportunités et nous rappelle que le fait de rural community, direct confrontations, resistence tactics, considérer que les opportunités sont plus ou moins nom- protesters breuses dépend en réalité des tactiques adoptées. Mots clés communauté rurale, confrontations directes, tactiques de résistance, protestataires