Election 2006: All-New Touch Screens and No One 2006

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Election 2006: All-New Touch Screens and No One 2006 ElectionElectionElection prepreviewprevievieww What’sWhat’sWhat’s Changed,Changed, 20062006WhatWhat Hasn’tHasn’t andand WhyWhy T TABLE OF CONTENTS a b Director’s Message . 3 l Executive Summary . 5 e o States to Watch. 7 Table of f Voting Systems: Widespread Changes, Problems . 12 c o Voting System Usage by State . 15 n Voter ID: Activity in the States and on the Hill . 19 t e contentsn Voter Verification Requirements by State . 22 Voter Registration Databases: A New Election Stumbling Block?. 23 t s Status of Statewide Voter Registration Databases. 28 Absentee Voting, Pre-election Voting and Provisional Voting Rules in the States. 30 State by State. 33 Methodology/Endnotes . 63 ELECTION PREVIEW 2006 1 Introduction/ Executive Summary his was the year that election reform was finally supposed The election process changed more in 2006 than in any year m Tto come together. since the disputed 2000 Presidential election. Consequently, e on the eve of a national election in which control of Congress s This was the year that the various deadlines embodied in the is in play — and two years from an open seat election for s Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) took effect: the White House — it is vitally important to understand What’s a computerized statewide voter lists, new voting technology, Changed, What Hasn’t and Why. g improved accessibility for voters with disabilities and a host Messageof other procedural and legal requirements mandated as part As always, we have enjoyed preparing this report. On behalf e of the new federal law. of us all, I hope you find it as valuable as we intend it to be. f If you have any questions or comments, do not hesitate to r This was the year when the election reform dialogue changed contact us at [email protected]. o as a result — from theoretical debates about what changes HAVA directed, to more practical discussions about exactly Doug Chapin m how to implement such changes. Director fromOctober 2006thet This was a year when officials at the state and local level h were asked to swallow profound changes in the way they manage the election process. e d This was a year when many of them suffered indigestion: i r Jurisdictions discovered that the voting machines they had Director• e selected after torturous public debate (and in some cases, c litigation) simply didn’t work. In other places, the machines As always, it takes a village to produce a report of this never had a chance to work properly because of human error ambition and scope. In that vein, I would like to thank the t blamed on faulty training of pollworkers and election officials; following key “villagers” in that effort: o r • Statewide voter databases that were supposed to settle the My electionline.org colleagues Dan Seligson (editor), question of who was qualified to vote were not finished or Sean Greene (research director), M. Mindy Moretti (senior could not be matched properly against other public records; writer), Alyson Freedman and Kat Zambon (researchers), and interns Meg Coady and Courtney McRae; • Disputes erupted over state efforts to manage the voter registration process as activists sued to overturn new state Sharon Lawrence, whose ability to ferret out obscure yet laws establishing rules for registration drives, describing valuable election information is never underappreciated at such rules as restrictions on their efforts to bring new this end of the pipeline; voters into the electorate; The University of Richmond — especially Professor Dan • Virtually no one was happy with electronic voting. Palazzolo, for his commitment to scholarship and Computer scientists continued to warn — and in some continued interest in our work and Tina Snellings for her cases proved — that tampering with new voting continued good cheer and patience with our continual technology was possible, while advocates for the disabled administrative needs; insisted that new developments in the area of verifying voters’ choices violated their right to a secret and The Board and staff of The Pew Charitable Trusts for their independent ballot; financial support and continued commitment to our work — and especially Michael Caudell-Feagan and Kent Mitchell • Voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPATs) became the ballot for their continued collegiality in our work together; of record in many states — leading many to worry publicly about the wisdom of such a requirement in the wake of a The tremendously talented (and to date infinitely patient) study showing that VVPATs comprised only about 90 design team at 202design, especially Mike Heffner and percent of the total vote; and Elizabeth Kaney; and • The battle over voter identification laws raged on, as four All the women and men who serve their communities as states enacted strict photo ID requirements (prompting election officials and whose information and insights are litigation) and other states expanded identification essential to electionline.org and its mission. requirements to include proof of citizenship at the time of registration. ELECTION PREVIEW 2006 3 voting machines freezing up, having alignment problems, E EXECUTIVE SUMMARY x unexpectedly shutting down or other issues. e This was supposed to be the year — and the election — when Machines challenges grow c the voting process nationwide was more secure, more Concern over DRE security and reliability has peaked in many u technologically advanced and more trusted by the citizens parts of the country. Lawsuits seeking to prohibit the use of t and candidates participating. electronic voting machines have been filed in Colorado, i ExecutiveArizona, California, Pennsylvania and Georgia. v Yet as the mid-term elections approach, machine failures, e database delays and foul-ups, inconsistent procedures, new In Maryland, a disastrous September primary saw nearly an rules and new equipment have some predicting chaos at the entire county unable to open polls on time after an election S polls at worst and widespread polling place snafus at best. worker forgot to include activator cards to start up touch- u screen machines. Other problems, including frozen screens m The changes to the American electoral system have been and missing ballots plagued the election in places where the SUwidespread. New machinesmmary for voters with disabilities have machines were able to function. Problems were so severe that m been implemented in polling places nationwide, while Maryland’s governor suggested all voters cast paper absentee a statewide voter registration databases are up and running in ballots rather than use electronic voting machines — one year r most states. after he vetoed legislation that allowed no-excuse absentee voting (the legislature over-rode the veto). y But critical differences still exist across state borders and new controversies emerged in 2006. Strict new voter ID rules have The academic community has continued to challenge the been the cause of continual legal challenges in some states, security of voting machines as well. while lawsuits in other states have challenged the use of electronic voting systems. Limits on voter registration drives A Princeton University computer science professor released a enacted in two key battleground states have been struck down report that described how a Diebold TS machine — the same by federal judges. While the use of paper backups to kind used in Maryland — could be compromised by loading a electronic voting has become more widespread, the rules for malicious program that can be spread from machine to their use in recounting or auditing totals after an election vary. machine. Johns Hopkins University professor Avi Rubin, also a poll worker, said tamper-resistance seals on the machines The Nov. 7 election promises to bring more of what voters could be easily removed and replaced, unnoticed by election have come to expect since the 2000 election — a divided officials. A company spokesman said the accusations of body politic, an election system in flux and the possibility — security flaws were “exaggerated” and that the kind of if not certainty — of problems at polls nationwide. tampering that was successful in the lab at Princeton could not be replicated in a polling place because of newer CHARTING THE CHANGES software and security procedures. 1. Voting technology Supply problems The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) required that every polling place in America have at least one voting A number of states have had other sorts of problems with system available for people with disabilities in time for the machines — getting them to the polls on time in the first first federal election of 2006. With primary season now place. West Virginia, Indiana, Arkansas and Tennessee complete, jurisdictions around the country tested new voting reported difficulty receiving the election equipment they technology for the first time, with mixed results. The electronic purchased from vendor ES&S. In some cases, the company voting systems most commonly employed to meet the federal has been compelled to refund money to localities for failing mandate — termed direct-recording electronic or DRE to meet contractual obligations for machine delivery, ballot systems — were troubled by both machine and human errors programming and maintenance. in many of their early roll-outs. Paper trail/vote-by-phone use increases Even though turnout was generally low in the primaries, new The most common solution to the challenges posed by using procedures and new equipment troubled poll workers from electronic machines has been the addition of voter-verified coast to coast. While there were some success stories — paper audit trails (VVPATs), slips of paper that voters can see Florida no longer makes headlines during elections — showing their vote choices before casting an electronic ballot. problems were reported in dozens of other states such as The paper is then saved and can be used to conduct an poll workers having trouble booting up or shutting down independent audit of electronic vote totals.
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