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EAC 8-11-11 Design..Roundtable United States Election Assistance Commission Roundtable Discussion Design Counts in Elections 1225 New York Avenue, NW Suite 150 Washington, DC 20005 Thursday, August 11, 2011 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1 The following is the verbatim transcript of the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Roundtable Discussion “Design Counts in Elections” held on Thursday, August 11, 2011. The roundtable convened at 9:01 a.m., EDT and adjourned at 4:49 p.m., EDT. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION MS. LAYSON: Good morning and welcome to the EAC’s Design Counts in Elections roundtable discussion. My name is Jeannie Layson and I’m the Communications Director at the EAC. This roundtable is one in a series aimed at preparing for the 2012 federal election cycle. And for those of you who are counting, general election day is exactly 453 days from today. Election officials share the goal of providing a positive experience that will give voters confidence that their votes were cast and counted as they intended. Implementing best practices in ballot and polling place design contributes to a voter’s positive experience and ensures that the process is accessible and convenient to the widest possible audience. Today, we will strive to take the guesswork out of designing ballots and polling place signs by using simple design principles and considering best practices. Small changes can come with few costs, yet yield huge benefits for the American electorate. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 requires EAC to conduct a public study about ballot designs used in elections for federal office. And the study must consider the following: What will be number one; the most convenient, accessible and easy to use for voters, individuals with disabilities including the blind and visually impaired, and voters with limited proficiency in the English 2 language. Number two, yield the most accurate, secure and expeditious system for voting and tabulating voting election results. Number three, be non-discriminatory and afford each registered and eligible voter an equal opportunity to vote and have that vote counted. And last, number four, be efficient and cost effective for use. In 2007 EAC released its “Effective Designs for the Administrative of Federal Elections” report and the report’s resources include voter information materials, ballot design practices for several voting systems, sample images and design specifications. It includes input from election officials, voters, poll workers and other experts. The report addresses the design planning process, insights into designing ballots and much more. EAC also developed an image library containing thousands of camera ready images. These images can be customized for local jurisdictions and then sent to the printer for production, a service that saves election officials time and money. EAC has already provided CDs of the report to thousands of elections officials across the country, and election officials can give EAC a call toll free at 866-747-1471 or go to eac.gov to request the image library. Thank you to Commissioners Bresso and -- Gineen Bresso and Donetta Davidson and Executive Director Tom Wilkey for their leadership and support for this series of discussions. And thank you to Emily Jones, who managed all of the logistics for today’s roundtable, and also, to Karen Lynn-Dyson and Matt Weil, who are EAC’s subject matter experts on election design. 3 This roundtable will be a two-way conversation. Tweet comments or questions using the hash tag BReady2012. That’s the letter “B” Ready 2012, or submit a question via the web cast. Go to eac.gov for instructions. And for those in attendance, the Twitter file is located on the big screen to your right. And now, I turn it over to our moderator, Merle King, who is the Executive Director for The Center of Election Systems at Kennesaw State University in Georgia. Merle, please begin. DR. KING: Well, thank you, Jeannie. Welcome, those in attendance and those that are following this roundtable on the webcast, today. What I’d like to do is to, really, compliment the EAC for recognizing the importance of looking at the human factor-related issues in elections. Often, those of us that work in elections focus on the technology, which is important, but after each election there always seems to be a collection of human factor issues that are often very hard to diagnose and to fully understand how they occurred, why they occurred, and then, how to mitigate them going forward. In the management of IT, often, we say that the best kind of problems and mistakes to have are those that catch fire and smoke, because they remove the ambiguity about what caused them. But, when we deal with human factor issues in elections, often, it takes months and years of analysis to figure, how did we get to this error, how did it manifest itself, and then, more importantly, what can we do to mitigate it and keep it from occurring in the future. And, that’s in large part what today’s roundtable is about. It’s about looking at things that can be done now, things that 4 can be done in the near future, and in the long run, that will remove many of the human factor errors that occur in elections. So, it’s a great concept, and I compliment the EAC for recognizing the importance of this topic. What I’d like to do is to begin by asking the members of this roundtable to introduce themselves. And, I’m going to start with Ron, in just a moment, and we’ll kind of wheel around the table. And then, I’d like to talk about a little bit of ground rules, if you will, about how we kind of manage this discussion over the day. And then, we’ll move right into the first topic and the first presentation. So, with that, Ron, if you would begin by giving us a brief introduction, who you are, your role in elections, and your experience. MR. GARDNER: Thank you Merle, it’s a pleasure to be here, and, I must say, an honor to be here, with so many distinguished people that are experts in this field. My name is Ron Gardner and I am attorney. I am the Director of Field Services for the National Federation of the Blind. I’m also a public member of the United States Access Board, which is really my entrée into the Election Assistance Commission and this topic matter. I, also, for a few years, was the Director of the Professional Development and Research Institute on Blindness at Louisiana Tech University. I happen to be blind. I also happen to be hearing impaired. I am not a technical expert. I’m a consumer, and I am passionate, and I’m pleased to be here. DR. KING: 5 Great, thank you Ron. Elizabeth? MS. DEITER: I’m Elizabeth Ensley Deiter and I also go by Libby. I’m the Shawnee County Election Commissioner, which is the county for Topeka, Kansas. And my county is a medium-sized county, about 105,000 registered voters. I’m also the president-elect of the International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials and Treasurers, IACREOT. And this year, I am honored to be their representative to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. And I am very honored to be here, so thank you. DR. KING: Thank you, Elizabeth. Drew? MR. DAVIES: I am Drew Davies. I own Oxide Design Co, a communications and information design firm. I’m here because I also serve as the design director of AIGA’s Design for Democracy Program. We are the authors of the EAC’s “Effective Designs” document that we will be discussing here, today. And certainly, as has been said before, it’s an honor to be here. DR. KING: Thank you Drew. MS. QUESENBERY: I’m Whitney Quesenbery. In my commercial professional life, I’m a user experience researcher. In my election’s life, I run a volunteer group called Usability and Civic Life, which mobilizes user experience professionals to help with election problems. I, also, serve as the chair -- subcommittee chair for human factors and 6 privacy on the TGDC as we drafted both the current VVSG 2005 and the version that’s working its way through the process, now. I served briefly on the Design for Democracy Board. And I’m always awed that anybody will listen to what I have to say about elections, because there’s so much to know about it. DR. KING: Thank you, Whitney. Amy? MS. BUNK: My name is Amy Bunk. I’m the co-chair of the Plain Language Action and Information Network. We’re an inner agency -- federal inner agency group dedicated to promoting clear language across the Federal Government. I am also -- in my real job, I’m the Director of Legal Affairs and Policy at the Office of the Federal Register. We’re part of the National Archives, so anything I say here, today, is that of my own, my own voice and not that of my federal agency. I‘m here to discuss plain language, and I am a voter, so, I guess I’m a constituent. Thank you. DR. KING: Thank you. Larry? MR. HERRERA: Hello, my name is Larry Herrera and I’m the appointed City Clerk for the City of Long Beach. My role in the City of Long Beach is to conduct municipal elections, as well as support the legislative affairs of the city council. My experience in elections began in 1988 and I’ve learned a lot during that period of time. And I look forward to the ideas and the dialogue that we will have today with the rest of the panel.
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