From Problem Solving to Problematology

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From Problem Solving to Problematology Policy in Question: From Problem Solving to Problematology Nick Turnbull A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Social Science and Policy University of New South Wales Sydney February 2005 Abstract Since the postpositivist critique of the policy sciences, policy theory has come into question. More particularly, the ‘problem orientation’ upon which Lasswell defined the policy sciences has come into question because policy making does not conform to his problem solving logic. That logic is inadequate. I argue that we must reconsider the problem orientation at a philosophical level to reconstruct it upon a more appropriate foundation. This thesis does not depict how we should conduct policy making but deals with foundational concepts and issues. I draw on Michel Meyer's new philosophy of questioning, problematology, to consider policy theory in terms of questioning and to reconstruct the problem orientation on problematological grounds. The thesis is in two parts. Part I reviews and critiques past policy theory in terms of questioning, commencing from the problem solving basis of Dewey's philosophy and Lasswell’s ‘policy sciences’. I criticise this basis and outline how it made politics and argumentation residual aspects of reason. I discuss how the postpositivist critique problematised the policy sciences and how this permits us to pose policy theory itself as a question. Part II answers this question by reconstructing policy theory upon the problematological foundation of knowledge. Meyer’s logic of questioning incorporates problematicity in answering, allowing us to account for the politics of policy. I outline the dynamic nature of the logic of questioning and how it incorporates key concepts of interpretative epistemology; hermeneutics, dialectic, and rhetoric. I conclude by describing policy making as a synthesis of two questions: the policy question and the question of legitimacy. i Acknowledgements Thanks most of all to Denise who provided great support and encouragement: this would not have been possible without her. Thanks to Mum and Dad for reading all those stories to me as a child; to my Supervisors, Dr Susan Keen (School of Social Science and Policy), Dr Anthony Corones (School of the History and Philosophy of Science) and before them Professor Sheila Shaver (Social Policy Research Centre), who provided insightful comments on my work and gave me the freedom to pursue an original idea; to Malcolm who proofed my work, lent me a computer, and above all took the time to read Michel Meyer and discuss problematology with me; to Toby who spoke with me about my ideas on many occasions and also proofed two chapters; and to my supportive friends and family, Ross, Amanda, Ariadne, Shaun, Sonia, Caroline, Karen, Anne & Dave, and Diana. ii Table of Contents Page Number Abstract i Acknowledgements ii Table of Contents iii Part I Problem Solving 1 Introduction: Questioning Policy 2 1. John Dewey and Problem Solving 12 1. Dewey’s theory of inquiry 17 2. Answering as the dissolution of questions: positivism and pragmatism 27 3. Inquiry and practical reason 35 4. Recovering the value of questioning 40 5. Questioning and democracy 48 2. The Problem Orientation and the Policy Sciences 54 1. Harold Lasswell: theorising the policy sciences 58 2. Questioning the scientific model 67 3. The scientific solution to the problem of politics 76 4. Science and the problematicity of policy 82 3. The Politics of Policy Problems 93 1. Problems, policy problems, and problem setting 95 2. Politics and the policy process 109 3. Rethinking the problem orientation 124 4. Increasing Problematicity: Interpretative Epistemology and the ‘Argumentative Turn’ 133 1. The question of meaning 135 2. Theorising problematicity: the ‘argumentative turn’ 154 3. Theorising reason: logic versus rhetoric 161 4. Questioning, rhetoric, and interpretative theory 175 iii Part II Problematology 181 5. Questioning: The Philosophical Foundation of Reason 183 1. Questioning as foundation 185 2. Postmodernism and questioning 201 3. The problematological foundation and policy theory 219 6. Reconstructing the Problem Orientation 227 1. Commencing from questioning 228 2. Problematological answering 240 3. The autonomy of the answer 255 4. Problematological policy theory 263 7. The Problem Orientation and Interpretative Policy Inquiry 267 1. The tripartite conception of the problematological logos 268 2. Practice as questioning 299 8. The Question of Legitimacy 325 1. State and society: the problem of government 330 2. Legitimacy and discourse 352 3. Legitimacy and the policy process: the practice of power 360 4. Legitimacy, democracy, and policy studies 369 Conclusion 377 Notes 385 References 395 iv PART I PROBLEM SOLVING Introduction: Questioning Policy Policy theory has become a problem. The postpositivist critique has undermined the scientific conception of policymaking and exposed the idea of a problem solving policy science as a ‘myth’ (Rein and White 1977). In reality, political actors disagree over the nature and meaning of policy problems, holding many different interpretations of them and arguing with each other about them throughout the policy process. Apodictic policy solutions are rarely found, even in the most mundane of cases. The policy process is characterised by complexity and uncertainty, and sometimes goes on indefinitely without ultimate resolution. In fact, the implementation of solutions tends to change the very nature of problems, leading to difficulties in evaluation. Politics is everywhere in policymaking – it even seems to commence after policy decisions have been made rather than being completed before the policy process commences (Hajer 2003a: 89). The idea that the policy process is an ordered separation of politics and administration has collapsed. Sometimes solutions are found but not implemented, at other times they are implemented, evaluated and found to have failed but are not reconstituted. On other occasions policymakers do nothing about a problem at all, or insist that there is no problem, despite other views to the contrary – is this a solution? The very notion of what constitutes a solution becomes problematic under these circumstances. What, 2 precisely, is the relationship between policy problems and policy solutions? Despite the confusion, policy still deals with problems. And, in general, policymaking goes on without collapsing into irrationality. We are able to coordinate responses to our problems, or least we can do enough to go on with debate, making changes incrementally as we go. Sometimes policymakers have even restructured major policy areas, for example, remodelling welfare states and establishing international environmental agreements. Whatever our views of these changes, the ‘problem orientation’ inherited from the work of Lasswell and Dewey still seems to accurately characterise what policy is about, even if we recognise the positivist or pragmatist versions of problem solving as idealistic descriptions. Many advances have already been made in policy theory. The interpretative or postpositivist theorists have retained aspects of Dewey’s and Lasswell’s ideas but have also drawn upon European philosophy and social theory in the form of hermeneutics, phenomenology, critical theory and poststructuralism (see Fischer 2003a; and, for a concise summary, Yanow 2003: 229-34). Taking this work as a starting point, we can now seek a framework within which to develop new theory that incorporates the contingency of politics and the complexity of policymaking activity with the problem orientation of policy theory. 3 Accompanying this theoretical shift away from the problem solving model is its empirical counterpart, found particularly in new institutional arrangements. The search for problems and solutions is no longer carried out exclusively by the state but is conducted in concert with non-state actors in complex, changing networks (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003b). Hajer and Wagenaar (2003b) point out that the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ is not just theoretical but describes well the changing contemporary practice of politics. With major changes to the welfare state, and the activity of new social movements that conduct politics outside the state (on ‘subpolitics’, see Beck 1996), the institutional structure by which we understand policymaking has been problematised. We can no longer substitute institutional structures for our theoretical organising concepts, nor rely on the inertia of established power to make our definitions of policy for us, because the power to set problems does not lie exclusively with the state. Rather, we have to look to new interpretative theories in order to explain reality. And, I would also suggest, this refocuses our attention on policy problems themselves as the object of our inquiry, and on problem setting, deliberation and political mobilisation in particular. Much work has already been completed in this respect, in policy studies and in political and social theory generally. The trend was summed up at a historical level by Lyotard, who said we are living in a ‘postmodern condition’ in which everything is uncertain and the organising conceptual narratives of modernity no longer adequately describe the world. The postmodern 4 condition is a period in which everything is problematic; problematicity has come to the fore across society as well as in scholarly thought. The trends in policy studies thus reflect trends elsewhere. In short,
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