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God and Evil: the Case for God in a World Filled with Pain
460 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI relevant materials in the Christian tradition that stress the importance of con- version and transformation for the pursuit of knowledge of God. In addition, I would like to see a fuller account of the relationship be- tween Christian philosophy and spirituality, especially since Moser thinks that “a Christ-shaped philosophy should be joined with Christ-formed phi- losophers” (169ff.). Undergirding a connection of this sort is a deeper im- mersion in (perhaps dependence on) a set of spiritual practices. This kind of emphasis resembles the early Christian integration of formation and the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods (for example, knowledge of God, discernment of divine truths, wisdom). Given the current expansion of topics in epistemology, I wonder whether Moser could relocate this project under the category of spiritual formation. The focus here would be on the practices, materials, and processes that are fundamental to the kind of Christian phi- losophy Moser has in mind. Notwithstanding these suggestions, Moser’s proposal rightly takes its place in the intersection of theology and philosophy. It creates space for at- tending more fully to epistemological issues that crop up within theology. REVIEWED BY FREDERICK D. AQUINO ABILENE CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY God and Evil: The Case for God in a World Filled with Pain. Edited by Chad Meister and James K. Dew, Jr. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity, 2013. 360 pages. $20.00. God and Evil serves as an excellent introduction to the problem of evil. Further, it goes beyond most works on the topic by addressing related issues including divine hiddenness, original sin, evolution, and hell. -
Die Oden Salomos 277
Die Oden Salomos 277 Die Oden Salomos Einleitungsfragen und Forschungsgeschichte von Michael Lattke (School of History, Philosophy, Religion, & Classics, The University of Queensland, Brisbane QLD 4072, Australia) Nach der bis heute unüberholten Einleitung von Harris/Mingana1 sind die Einleitungsfragen zu den Oden Salomos nicht mehr umfassend zur Dar- stellung gebracht worden. Da die Erforschung dieser rätselhaften Texte seit ihrer Entdeckung vor gut 200 Jahren zu einer eigenen kleinen Bibliothek geführt hat, möchte ich die knappe Behandlung der Einleitungsprobleme mit einem ebenso knappen Rückblick auf die Forschungsgeschichte verbinden und damit meine langjährigen Forschungen zusammenfassen. Einige Über- schneidungen lassen sich dabei nicht vermeiden. I. Bezeugung, Handschriften und Zitate der Oden Salomos In zwei Kanonsverzeichnissen2, der Stichometrie des Patriarchen Nice- phorus (Mitte 9. Jh. n.Chr.)3 und der Synopsis des Ps.-Athanasius (6./7. Jh. n.Chr.)4, werden die Psalmen und Oden Salomos offenbar wie eine einzige Schrift behandelt, in der die Oden auf die Psalmen folgten (PsSal+OdSal). Nicephorus war von 806 bis 815 Patriarch von Konstantinopel. Er starb im Jahre 828. Die um 850 verfasste Chronographie, in deren Anhang das stichometrische Verzeichnis steht, wurde ihm sehr wahrscheinlich fälschlich zugeschrieben. In dieser Stichometrie stehen zwischen den εαι γραφα κκλησιαζµεναι κα κεκανονισµωναι (»kirchlich anerkannten und kano- nisierten göttlichen Schriften«) des Alten und Neuen Testaments5 und den 1 R. Harris / A. Mingana, The Odes and Psalms of Solomon, 2 Bde., Manchester u.a. 1916/20 (II, 1–205). 2 Vgl. M. Lattke, Die Oden Salomos in ihrer Bedeutung für Neues Testament und Gnosis. III. Forschungsgeschichtliche Bibliographie 1799–1984 mit kritischen Anmerkungen. Mit einem Beitrag von M. -
Curriculum Vitae Michael Tooley
CURRICULUM VITAE MICHAEL TOOLEY Education University of Toronto, 1959-64. B.A., 1964. Princeton University, 1964-67. Ph.D., 1968. Personal Date of birth: 17 March 1941 Place of birth: Toronto, Canada Married to Sylvia Tooley, with daughters Sandra and Suzanne, and grandchildren Anthony, Joshua, Donald, Joseph, and Sofia. Citizenship: American and Canadian. Academic Honors and Awards President, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2010-2011. Vice President, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2009-2010. The Cecil H. and Ida Green Honors Chair Professor, Texas Christian University, Spring, 2010 The John Dewey Lecture, "A Philosophical Journey," American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, February, 2009. College Professor of Distinction, Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2006- Faculty Fellowship. University of Colorado at Boulder, 2006-2007. Boulder Faculty Assembly Excellence in Research Award, 1998-1999. JSPS Invitation Fellowship for Research in Japan. Awarded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1999. Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. President, Australasian Association of Philosophy, 1983-1984. Woodrow Wilson Dissertation Fellow, 1966-1967. Woodrow Wilson Fellow, 1964-1965. Most Recent Position Distinguished College Professor, Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado. 2006- University of Colorado, Philosophy Department: Professor, 1992–present, now retired. Previous Positions Bowling Green State University, Adjunct Professor, 2004-09. The Australian National University, Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences: Senior Research Fellow, 1988-92; Senior Fellow, 1992. University of Western Australia, Philosophy Department: Professor, 1983-88; Head of Department, 1985-88. University of Miami, Philosophy Department: Associate Professor, 1981-82; Professor, 1982-83. 2 Wichita State University, Philosophy Department: Visiting Associate Professor, 1980-81. -
Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, KNOWLEDGE of GOD
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 28 Issue 3 Article 9 7-1-2011 Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, KNOWLEDGE OF GOD Paul Copan Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Copan, Paul (2011) "Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, KNOWLEDGE OF GOD," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 28 : Iss. 3 , Article 9. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil201128333 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol28/iss3/9 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 344 Faith and Philosophy ontology of action has this fairly striking entailment: If causal determinism is true, then not only is there no free will, there is also no action or intentional behavior at all. How plausible is this result? (Given the force and creativity of recent compatibilist accounts of freedom and agency, I am inclined, even as a libertarian, to favor a view whereby what is at stake in the compatibility debate is something more modest than the complete range of our distinctively human capacities for practical rationality.) These brief questions about some of the central claims of Goetz’s book might be taken to imply only what we already knew; namely, that philosophers (like myself) with established posi- tions in this domain are unlikely to be moved its arguments. -
How Does Consciousness Merely Naturally Supervene on the Physical?
How Does Consciousness Merely Naturally Supervene on the Physical? * Kim, Tae-Ryang 55) Subject Class Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind Keywords Natural supervenience, Humean supervenience, laws of nature, dualism, physicalism Abstract The aim of this paper is to show that there seems to be no reason to believe that the mental merely naturally supervenes on the physical. By claiming that phenomenal consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, David Chalmers wants to be adualist. However, by claiming that the former merely naturally supervenes on the latter, he wants to rule out the mystery existing between the two without explaining the details. I claim that there are two options for adualist depending on whether he accepts Humean supervenience. If he accepts it, then there are two paths in front of him. I show that both paths are not acceptable in order. If mental properties are supervenient properties, then the mental logically supervenes on the physical, and if mental properties are subvening base properties, then the mental does not even naturally supervene on the physical. If adualist denies Humean supervenience, then he should show how phenomenal consciousness could merely naturally supervene on the physical without Humean supervenience. It seems that he should embrace mystery in this case. These considerations invoke the notion of Humean supervenience. I claim that 344 Humean supervenience is anatural view and defend it from acouple of objections to it. INTRODUCTION The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of philosophy. In general, the ideais that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamentally different kinds or categories of things or principles. -
Copyright © 2013 Brian John Arnold All Rights Reserved. the Southern
Copyright © 2013 Brian John Arnold All rights reserved. The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary has permission to reproduce and disseminate this document in any form by any means for purposes chosen by the Seminary, including, without limitation, preservation or instruction. JUSTIFICATION ONE HUNDRED YEARS AFTER PAUL A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy by Brian John Arnold December 2013 APPROVAL SHEET JUSTIFICATION ONE HUNDRED YEARS AFTER PAUL Brian John Arnold Read and Approved by: __________________________________________ Michael A. G. Haykin (Chair) __________________________________________ Jonathan T. Pennington __________________________________________ Brian J. Vickers Date______________________________ To Lauren, my heart’s captor TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . viii PREFACE . xi Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION . 13 Thesis . 14 Paul and the Second Century . 17 Capsizing the “Traditional” Paul . 23 Justification in the Fathers . 26 Methodology . 31 2. “BUT THROUGH FAITH”: CLEMENT OF ROME . 33 Background . 35 Authorship . 35 Date . 37 Summary . 39 Translation and Commentary . 41 Translation of 32.3–4 . 42 Objections and Responses . 47 Conclusion . 54 3. “FAITH AND LOVE”: IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH . 56 Background . 57 Manuscripts . 59 iv Chapter Page Antioch . 63 The Negative: What Justification is not . 65 Ignatius’s Opponents . 66 “We Love the Prophets” . 69 “Parting of the Ways”? . 70 Jewish Practices . 72 Ignatius, Paul, and Judaism . 75 The Positive: Justification in Ignatius . 78 Faith and Love . 78 The Gospel . 80 Justification . 83 Excursus: Prayer and Justification . 89 Ignatius and Paul? . 91 Martyrdom . 99 Conclusion . 102 4. “O SWEET EXCHANGE!”: THE EPISTLE TO DIOGNETUS . 104 Background . -
Mctaggart's Paradox Defended
L. NATHAN OAKLANDER McTaggart’s Paradox Defended No argument has done as much to stimulate debate in the philosophy of time as McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time.1 On the one side are A-theorists who believe McTaggart’s positive thesis that time involves the A- series and temporal passage, but deny his negative thesis that the A-series and temporal passage are contradictory.2 On the other side are B-theorists who believe that McTaggart’s positive conception of time is mistaken, but that his negative thesis is true.3 At least part of the reason why McTaggart’s paradox has failed to convince defenders of passage is because they fail to appreciate his positive thesis and thereby misunderstand the rationale behind his negative thesis. The purpose of this paper is to prove that point. I shall proceed by first explicating what I take McTaggart’s positive and negative theses to be. I shall then show how and why one recent response to McTaggart’s paradox, which is representative of many, is unsuccessful because it misunderstands it. And finally, I will explain how a subsidiary benefit of my account of McTaggart’s paradox is that it can provide a clear criterion for distinguishing passage from non-passage views of time. 1 J.E.M. McTaggart, “Time,” in C. D. Broad (ed.), The Nature of Existence, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927; reprinted Grosse Pointe, Michigan: Scholarly Press, 1968): 9-31. All page references will be to the 1968 edition. J.E.M. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” Mind 18 (1908), pp. -
Economical Unification As a Method of Philosophical Analysis
The Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies University of Helsinki Finland Economical Unification as a Method of Philosophical Analysis Avril Styrman ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in lecture room 13, University main building, on 17 December 2016, at 10 noon. Helsinki 2016 i Thesis Supervisor Professor Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Tallinn University of Technology Pre-Examiners Professor Simo Knuuttila, University of Helsinki Professor Sami Pihlström, University of Helsinki Custos Professor Gabriel Sandu, University of Helsinki Opponent Professor Sami Pihlström, University of Helsinki ISBN 978-951-51-2696-2 (paperback) ISBN 978-951-51-2697-9 (PDF) Unigrafia Helsinki 2016 ii 1 Introduction The method of economical unification resembles a production line with three inseparable elements that are interconnected in two stages: Economy → Economically unified ontology → Applications In the first stage an economically unified ontology is explicated by applying the principle of economy. In the second stage concepts are defined and disambiguated and problems are resolved in terms of the ontology. The central argument that is defended in this doctoral dissertation is that the method is more progressive than plain conceptual analysis that proceeds in the absence of an economically unified ontology and in the absence of the principle of economy as an evaluation criterion of alternative ontologies. Its progressiveness results from having a stable economically unified ontology that is the same for all derivative topics, and which enables defining and disambiguating meanings of concepts, thereby facilitating their gen- uine understanding and resolving problems around them, more efficiently than in plain conceptual analysis. -
What the Argument from Evil Should, but Cannot, Be
Edinburgh Research Explorer What the argument from evil should, but cannot, be Citation for published version: Collin, J 2018, 'What the argument from evil should, but cannot, be', Religious Studies, pp. 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412518000598 Digital Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1017/S0034412518000598 Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Peer reviewed version Published In: Religious Studies General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 02. Oct. 2021 . What The Argument From Evil Should, But Cannot, Be Author information removed Affiliation information removed Michael Tooley has developed important and sophisticated evidential versions of the argument from evil that aim to circumvent sceptical theist responses. Evidential arguments from evil de- pend on the plausibility of inductive inferences from premises about our inability to see morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils to conclusions about there being no morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils. Tooley’s defence of this inductive step depends on the idea that the existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more likely, a priori, than the existence of unknown wrongmaking properties. -
Die Oden Salomos
Zurich Open Repository and Archive University of Zurich Main Library Strickhofstrasse 39 CH-8057 Zurich www.zora.uzh.ch Year: 1979 Die Oden Salomos in ihrer Bedeutung für Neues Testament und Gnosis Band I: Ausführliche Handschriftenbeschreibung, Edition mit deutscher Parallel-Übersetzung, Hermeneutischer Anhang zur gnostischen Interpretation der Oden Salomos in der Pistis Sophia Lattke, Michael Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-138514 Monograph Published Version Originally published at: Lattke, Michael (1979). Die Oden Salomos in ihrer Bedeutung für Neues Testament und Gnosis Band I: Ausführliche Handschriftenbeschreibung, Edition mit deutscher Parallel-Übersetzung, Hermeneutischer Anhang zur gnostischen Interpretation der Oden Salomos in der Pistis Sophia. Fribourg, Switzerland / Göttingen, Germany: Éditions Universitaires / Vandenhoeck Ruprecht. LATTKE · DIE ODEN SALOMOS ORBIS BIBLICUS ET ORIENTALIS Im Auftrag des Biblischen Institutes der Universität Freiburg Schweiz und des Seminars für Biblische Zeitgeschichte der Universität Münster herausgegeben von Othmar Keel, unter Mitarbeit von Bernard Tremel und Erich Zenger Zum Autor: Michael Lattke, geb. 1942 in Stettin. Nach dem Abitur (1961) Studium der Mathematik (1961-1963), Philosophie und Theologie (1964-1969) in Bonn und Tübingen. Diplom der katholischen Theologie in Tübin• gen (1968). Seit 1966 verheiratet mit Gisela Bewerunge, 2 Kinder. 1970-1971 Referent für theologische Erwachsenenbildung im Bistum Speyer, 1971-1973 wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Institut für neu testamentliche Textforschung der Universität Münster i. W. Promo vierte 1973-1974 in Freiburg i. Br. mit der Arbeit «Einheit im Wort. Die spezifische Bedeutung von &y&n"f), &y(f..n'a.v und cpif..dv im Johan nesevangelium». -
Morality and the Personhood of God: a Moral Argument for the Existence of a Personal God
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY JOHN W. RAWLINGS SCHOOL OF DIVINITY MORALITY AND THE PERSONHOOD OF GOD: A MORAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSONAL GOD A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE JOHN W. RAWLINGS SCHOOL OF DIVIITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THEOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS BY STEPHEN S. JORDAN GOODE, VIRGINIA MARCH 26, 2021 Copyright © 2021 Stephen S. Jordan All Rights Reserved APPROVAL SHEET MORALITY AND THE PERSONHOOD OF GOD: A MORAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSONAL GOD Stephen S. Jordan Read and approved by: Chairperson: ____________________________________________ David Baggett, Ph.D. Reader: ____________________________________________ Marybeth Baggett, Ph.D. Reader: ____________________________________________ Ronnie Campbell, Ph.D. Date: March 26, 2021________________________________ DEDICATION To my beautiful bride, McKenzie, and our children. Without your love, prayers, and encouragement, this project would not have happened. Thank you for all of the ways that you have supported me throughout the PhD journey. Disney World, here we come! iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Not many worthwhile things are accomplished in life apart from the help of others, and a project such as a dissertation is certainly no exception. For this reason, I have several people that I would like to thank below. First, thank you to my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ. Without Your transforming love, I would be lost and without hope. Second, I would like to thank my wife, McKenzie, for her encouragement to pursue a PhD, and for her unwavering support of my doctoral studies over the past six years. I have said it before, and I will say it again, apart from the grace that made my salvation possible, you are the most vivid representation of grace I have experienced this side of heaven. -
No Soft Doctrine: Royce on the Problem of Evil
Acta Cogitata Volume 4 Article 3 No Soft oD ctrine: Royce on the Problem of Evil Brandon Wright Grand Valley State University Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.emich.edu/ac Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Wright, Brandon () "No Soft octrD ine: Royce on the Problem of Evil," Acta Cogitata: Vol. 4 , Article 3. Available at: http://commons.emich.edu/ac/vol4/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@EMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Acta Cogitata by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@EMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Brandon Wright No Soft Doctrine No Soft Doctrine: Royce on the Problem of Evil Brandon Wright, Grand Valley State University Abstract Because of the ubiquity of evil, religious systems, which aim to influence the way we live our lives, must answer three questions: what is evil, why does evil exist, and how can we eliminate, or at least manage, evil? Call this the broad problem of evil, as opposed to the traditional narrow problem of evil. I reconstruct the answer to the broad problem of evil found in Josiah Royce’s later writings in the second section of this paper. Then, I explain why traditional theodicies are deficient answers to the narrow problem of evil. I argue that Royce’s answer to the broad problem of evil merits a response from philosophers in the Abrahamic traditions because, while it is theistic—and even teleological—in nature, it does not presuppose the Abrahamic conception of God, nor does it suffer from the deficiencies of traditional theodicies.