CEU eTD Collection Central European University Central European Department ofPhilosophy MA THESIS Budapest 2010 David Bitter CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts T HE D ISSOCIATION OF Supervisor: Professor Howard Robinson Howard Supervisor: Professor Central European University European Central Department of of Philosophy Department Budapest, Hungary Submitted to Submitted David Bitter 2010 By C ONSCIOUSNESS CEU eTD Collection advantages, but each comes with a bundle of problems as well – there is no easy way out. experiences are under all circumstances unified (dissociation model). Each option has its (switching model); while thirdinvolves lettinggoof conception the consciousour our that continuous temporally are(generally) conscious experiences our conception that of our essential pains voluntary to and/or behavior (zombie model); secondthe letting involves go is phenomenality that conception our of go letting involves first the options: undesirable three is between a choice one facedwith ultimately, is that, of thesis the The general conclusion go leastof at “folk” of one our intuitions concerning the naturepain. of and/or consciousness let force usto to seem would phenomenon the of accounts all positive factor asrelevant, not explainable asan andartifact, away experimental conceptual-terminological issuesof pain do be seem Whilehidden doesn’t by phenomenon. to thephenomenon created observer the dilemma apparent the of out way easy no is there that is thesis this of tenet central The itis should Thus, explanations. one problematic. that only seekalternative expected idea of a divided consciousness seemsboth counter-intuitive and philosophically phenomenon constitutes a genuine empirical case of a dissociation of consciousness. Yet the the that arises possibility the “covert” reportof pain), of anda “overt” report analgesia contradictory on involves two pain (an Insofar thehidden observerreports phenomenon as – the“hiddenobserver”.of subjectthe can be eliciting by reporting” tapped “automatic hypnotist, the on painby the a “hidden part” onthepaininformation conscious registered awareness of outside certain special techniques, alleviatingwhile pain. the hypnotic Yet subjective analgesia alters experience of pain, using in effective highly is hypnosis that established experimentally and clinically both is It Abstract i CEU eTD Collection eeecs...... 65 ...... References 62 6. Summary and conclusions...... 5. The 55 breakdown of temporal ...... continuity 4. The dissociation of phenomenal 36 consciousness and access-consciousness ...... 26 ...... 3. On pain 2. The validity of the hidden 16 observer phenomenon...... 1 1. Introduction...... 4.2. Access-consciousness without phenomenal 42 consciousness...... 4.1. Phenomenal consciousness without access-consciousness...... 36 20 2.2. The “hidden observer”...... 16 2.1...... Hypnotic analgesia 1.4. The relevance of 11 the hidden observer phenomenon...... 1.3. Various 5 concepts of dissociation...... 3 1.2. Various concepts ...... of consciousness 1.1. 1 The “hidden observer”...... Table ofContents ii CEU eTD Collection devised theknown psychologistsfamiliarto hypnosis with hysteria.and For example, who Alfred Binet, first ever aphenomenonwas long theymerely research group; that before Stanford rediscovered IQ test, discoveredby not the (HOP)was phenomenon hidden observer speaking,Strictly the devoted a wholeinformation and the method by itwhich could be tappedwas dubbed the“hidden observer”. book ( of pain, concealed reports noovert the provided in experiences Sincethese subjects of affairs and the subjective reports of normal wakeful subjects who were not hypnotized. pain, leveland the of pattern matchedpain covertly both externalthe reported stimulus state conscious awareness. Surprisingly,in spite of the subjects’ firm allegations of notfeeling any outside by of subjects the andregistered both reported painwas allegedly about that reports “concealed information” on “covert” in succeeded eliciting they special techniques, their behaviorThe were relaxed,participants theirfacial expressions manifested no hintssuffering and of was totally very visuallittle and pain behavioral wereno questioning, there upon or signs of discomfort. consistent noor most reported subjects As expected, inice cold water. subjects immerse onearm the of with theirconscious, wouldfeel no– asignificantly or level reduced – pain),of which after they would verbal reports. awakeand their being despite in condition subjects, the (i.e., astate or which participants study in the analgesia Yet, hypnotic induce would they experiment, atypical In phenomenon. by means of certain1975; Knox, Morgan and Hilgard,1974)provided evidence for amind-boggling Hilgard, Hilgard, Macdonald,and Morgan 1978;Hilgard,Morgan and Johnson, Macdonald, Study of the 1970s,ErnestR. HilgardHypnosis hisduring and colleagues 1973; (Hilgard, In a famous series of atpsychological studies conducted theStanford Laboratory for the 1.1. The“hidden observer” 1. Introduction 1 On DoubleConsciousness ) to a CEU eTD Collection split off parts need not necessarily be mutually ignorant of each other. each of ignorant mutually be necessarily not need parts off split provided evidence thateven if ofconsciousness envisaged the isdissociation the possible, and(cf. later see,hidden (HO)experimentsWeinberger, 2000), have asweshall observer is an issue debate of considerable exactly by “secondary James meant Whatconsciousness” that Thus, heconcluded ignore each other, only that this 2 and/or temporal continuity of our conscious experiences. forcemost ustogiveultimately cherished theunity of concerning upsome intuitions our might HOP the another, or way one pain, of notions central our challenging beyond phenomenon, weseems are bound to tobe findnophenomenalike the HOP.Iam convincednot thatitdoes. Then again, asIwill argue, there idealtrouble.from follows really conclusion James’ whether alternativerather, is, question My Thus, this. of all of details the central at tenethand of – thishowever thesis weis that,might go about explaining the On the basis of such observations, James emphasized that action, surprisingly, writing the accusedJames ofhurting the hand(1890/1983,pp.205-6). hand could the prick manexhibiting of anesthetized without this awareness the any severely 1 whose hand anesthetic while wastotally in“automatic engaged writing” The PrinciplesofPsychology discussion such of phenomena alreadyin William 1890. Jamespublishedhis seminal work, Strictly speaking, James didn’t claim either that the split off parts of consciousness need necessarily mutually “Automatic” insofar as, cut off from cut offfrom but normal susceptiblebeingone, primary or the of to testify itsto existence in various oddways. (p.201; italics in original) anaesthetic parts is also there anaesthetic partsisalso during the times of anaesthesia, and coexisting with it, parts which coexistbutmutuallyignoreeachother. in certain persons purportedly , at least, , at may , in the same year, in which he recounted an incident of a man a of incident an recounted he in which year, same in the , be the case. bethe , the subject was not consciously aware of his own writing. , the totalpossible consciousness maybesplitinto in the form ofasecondary consciousness in theform 2 (p. 204; italics in original) italics 204; (p. sensibility tothe sensibility tapped 2 1 Yet nevermind Yet the – yet while James while yet – and made entirely CEU eTD Collection specialized cognitive systems (modules) are “broadcast” to a “global toa“global equipped are“broadcast” (modules) workspace” systems specialized cognitive various of outputs representational the when, arises or in, consists (A-)consciousness which theories to according /“global workspace” to related “globalbroadcast” the closely concept, functional a is essentially A-consciousness P-consciousness, to As opposed three conditions jointly are forsufficient A-consciousness, isindividually neither necessary. behavior, and (3) poised for the rational control of speech (verbal report). Arguably, while the of control rational the for poised (2) promiscuous”), “inferentially are (they reasoning refer to states the representational contents of whichin Block, term Also the line with are (1) poised to be used as premises in aswell contents/properties (cf. Harnad, 2001). believingthinkingsuch have states as andunderstanding P-conscious (might) feeling- complex that assume I pain. like emotion-sensations hybrid of properties phenomenal qualitative of properties emotions such as the the characterofhappiness,pleasurable or arethe examples Other paradigmatic chocolate. of orthe sweetness arose redness of the as such aresensations contents of P-conscious examples The paradigm Nagel, 1974). (seealso states be inthose to like” is “it something states conscious render that states or contents conscious of aspects phenomenal the or contents phenomenal the i.e., experiences, might be) something it is like to hold a belief orto grasp the meaning of something etc. 3 term the will use I line Block, In with phenomena. different various to and relates multiple concepts connotes insofar it as “mongrel” concept isa conceptof the that consciousness argued (1995/1997) Block consciousness. with start us Let dissociation. by and consciousness by mean we what specify first should we consciousness, of dissociation possible the discuss to going weare If 1. 2.Various concepts ofconsciousness I do not simply mean that thoughts are (might be) accompanied by, say, “inner speech”, but that there is (or phenomenal consciousness phenomenal access-consciousness (P-consciousness) to refer to our phenomenal 3 3 (A-consciousness) will be used to beused will (A-consciousness) CEU eTD Collection subject tobe conscious, shemust also be self-conscious meta-conscious.or Take for example for a that entail the Neitherclaim does (Levine, 2007). of subject the nature the position on adhering metaphysical aboveany in the that way noNote claim oneto to commits particular and exist’, thoughts but‘Ithink’ and ‘Ifeel’”p. (1890/1983, 221). experienceor – as or James eloquentlyit, “Theput universal factconscious is‘feelings not be mustfornecessarily whomita subjectis tobein, like something toundergo,state that or Arguably,Sono, itwouldn’t. Iwill ifassume that experience astate or is there P-conscious, a pain to be if there were nosubject be were if there a painto Consider pain,for example: would it make sense toclaim thereisthat somethingis it likefor be accessible. must states/properties in P-conscious is which a sense there Of course, (see P-consciousness without A-consciousness of example agenuine constitutes affairs of state stimulus on covertreports the provide to accurate their areanalgesic, really and capacity subjects to cognitively access this access to cognitively pain this (see notbeing actually bemight theiryetincapacity report overtly of sodueto P-conscious pain, in HOsituation the subjects one interpretation, just to According for candidate a divide. such intriguing aspect of the HOP is that, of HOP the aspect intriguing One everapart. come to two for the possible is itempirically whether is itquestionable andP-consciousness, A-consciousness between isdistinction aclearconceptual While there globally available, which does not entail that it is actually “consumed” by any output system. by virtue ofitsbeing berenderedA-conscious a will cognitive representation concept: reasoning)It is (cf. Baars,2002).notice important to thatA-consciousness is a dispositional reportingmemory,“consuming”planning, variousthe assessment, or systemsinputto (e.g., as become available contents therepresentational of by virtue which memory, with a working Section 4.2. ). Section 4.1 for whomfor prima facie 4 .). According to another interpretation, perhaps another interpretation, .). According to itexperiencewas like something to pain? the , it presents itself as a potential empirical CEU eTD Collection Yet, as I will discuss the issue in issue the asIwill discuss Yet, term. the of sense inthis alsodissociate might analgesia), hypnotic (like conditions certain multiple be itself2003). Interestingly, of comprised seemsto which, components under pain and Hyde, (Peretz agnosia auditory for generalized is true reverse the isspared, directions and distances yetpitch of perception is ruptured melodies of recognition auditory atonalia, inthecaseof while perception: pitch and general between perception pitch tonal dissociation identity in of blindobjects their 1986).Anotherinteresting field (Weiskrantz, example is the provide e.g., the to guesses concerning, enablingthus patients is above-chance spared, visual visual access colliculus) superior system to conscious preventing (the stimuli, another afflicted with iscortex) of damaged,thus thispatients syndrome neuropsychological striate (the system visual one while blindsight: of is that example A well-known spared. yetanother impaired, mightbe function one in domains which or tasks certain particular are selective impairments insofar as inmental functioning.impairments Such are there senseof inthe selective dissociations of often speak neuropsychologists cognitive There are many ways1.3. Various concepts ofdissociation in which the term dissociationassumedly, one might be both A-conscious and P-conscious,yet cease to be self-conscious. might So, A-consciousness. involve statesalso execution such some task/activity, of successful be understood.in isthe one engaged that experiences flow of is alsoacharacteristic since it Of course, For example, flow. of experience very the inhibit/terminate would this state/experience, her own focus on onewereto –if self-consciousness of hersense loses she activity, in a particular absorbed while oneflow isfully of that isit characteristic Yet anessential areP-conscious. experiences “flow” experiences(Csíkszentmihályi, Assumedly, 1990). undergoing such people and satisfactory account of HOP. the of account and satisfactory Section 3 Section ., this type of dissociation will hardly provide a full 5 CEU eTD Collection spared in condition this and(Ellis Young, 1988, analyzing andspoken word thesemantic system to leastdevoted analysispartially) are(at in modality. to visual thatboth the acoustic-phonologicalthe system dedicated suggests This words spoken of repeating capable both nevertheless from “word meaning deafness”. Such understandpersons, whileunable to are spoken words, suffering for persons integration. example Take itselfand manifesting unity each with part parts, distinct somewhat) least (at more or two into be split to seems A-consciousness which in disconnection of cases well documented are there Yet disintegration/non-integration. disconnectedinthesenseof nor neitherimpaired, HOs aspects, seem Thus, inimportant (viz., the “part” which provides the overt reports). (HYP)of subject the part” “hypnotized of the states/experiences the and states/experiences, own her to both meta-access have to seems and behavior organized and consistent behavior. Yetthe HO isin nowaylike suffering from persons schizophrenia: shemanifests organized initiatingand executing for of purposes the planning, accessing) these contents (jointly yetintegrating incapable be motivesof etc., various thoughts, perceptions, to insofaraccess-disunity as might sufferingpersons from haveschizophrenia individual access hand,seem tobegood likeschizophrenia examplesother syndromes of disconnection such On the evenaccessible. isnotindividually function for theimpaired in cases sense, those The neuropsychological involve syndromes above discussed in do not dissociations this consuming systems with content the systems consuming the to accessible is such noyet representation there individually accessible, areboth states mental distinct two (say, B)of Aand contents if distinct the sense, this In accessible. jointly Chalmers (2003), we and Bayne Following functions. intact various of might disconnectedness the and/or contents say that two consciousFurther notions of dissociation relate not to impairments,states but to the disunity A-consciousof are that A&B, then these states will be access- 6 in Schacter, 2000). Note that wordmeaning Note that 2000). Schacter, and of accessing semantic information semantic accessing of access-unified when they are they when dis unified. CEU eTD Collection Yet they a catkin, pickfornot draw integrating they incapable Yet they (andor out of do cannot) are control of the right hemisphere), theythe under is can nevertheless(which hand left their with draw word, or pick other any outof (say)aware being a small or seen toy having cat.not assert firmly while they further, and hemisphere), leftthe to localized are centers their speech intriguing is finding following:the can while patients verbally “kin”only word the report (for input input(which from will visual right visualfield) “kin”.Thereceives only the the receive from leftthe visual field) will only receive the visual input“cat”, while thelefthemisphere input brainreceives (which of patients’ the hemisphere rightensurethe that to such away as inFor example, theword“catkin” isa typical on a screenin visually projected experiment, undera lackdue to havespecial conditions. beendemonstrated of integration experimental patients generally behaviorexhibitin ordinary life, everyday impairments numerous distinct epileptic seizures to one side of the brain, thus alleviating the epileptic symptoms. While such mosthemispheres forconfining thepurposes brainhavebeensectioned, often of of the in “split-brain” observed is socommonly what is exactly disconnectedness such Indeed, systems. consuming patients.set of a different to jointly accessible and individually CandDareboth systems, consuming In assumesuch patients, thatmight split into two (or more) distinctwhile yet internally unified parts; it is perfectlythe coherent to A-consciousness that notion the A about controversial cerebralespecially is nothing there Conceptually, and B are commissuresboth individuallysystems, each of which is internally unified and well-functioning. connecting or parts separate two into hassplit itself A-consciousness that itseems in cases, such Thus, and jointlythephonological properties andof spoken words semantic meaning their modality). (inthevisual two accessible persons suffering this from A-consciouscondition are individually both acoustic-the of deafness isnot merely ina disconnection cognitive functioning sub-personal atthe level; to one set of 7 CEU eTD Collection empirical of empirical case a “zombie”. still to deny the ifal.,1969). In hemisphereshort, rightA-conscious. Yet isso,andonewere seems this it P-consciousness, behavior initiatecognitive (Nagel, it whatseemslikevoluntary Sperry tasks,and et can 1971; then seemspatients it allbut:itcan can verbalinstructions, semantically grasp perform complex the split-brain of hemisphere right the rightYet “automaton”. is an hemisphere right the that alleging hemisphere verbal reportability), underlying capacities linguistic the hemisphere (whichpossesses would seemleft to the only assign P-consciousness and position assume a“Descartian” One might to qualify as an patients. in split-brain P-consciousness dissociated of issue the to inrelation take might one believe I positions possible the summarize which the visual stimuli projected to both hemispheres were easily visualizable/drawable. visualizable/drawable concept. Yet this line of reasoning is ruled out by literally hundreds of other studies in and “kin”, it would have had to first form a representationof “kin”– an apparently not easily 4 1.4. it(see to as essential regard we generally that consciousness of characteristic more) attempt to answer this question, it will be impossible not to have letto go of atleast one (or seems especiallyquestion The well? as streams parallel more) (or two into split relevant possibly and divide cognitive for the philosophysystems in cases like the split-brain syndrome, ofthen perhaps P-consciousnessmind, might mirror the for it seemsattention of philosophers. that For if A-consciousness whichevercan split into two separate, fully functional way caughtthe patients split-brain on empirical evidence the natural seemsthat than It more we Gazzaniga andBogen,1969). (Sperry, a into third representation “kin”) and (“cat” representations distinct two the One might argue that the left hand could not have possibly drawn a catkin because, in order to combine “cat” and 3 .). Since this issue is of great relevance regarding the HOP as well, I will now 4 8 Sections CEU eTD Collection principle-accessible P-conscious states in the case of A-dissociation, such P-states would be would P-states such A-dissociation, of case in the states P-conscious principle-accessible mightinsofaralsoIt bearguedthat asthesubsumptive posits thesis theexistencenever-in- of sense. “deep” a in quite dissociation thesis entails subsumtive the in leastat HOP, the caseof that, the in nevertheless, is term; “shallowness” arelative Of (p. 17). course, sense” shallow relatively a “in only is so this believe they yet in consciousness,” ‘disunity’ (2003)admitis“thereChalmers a inwhich that unity is sense a breakdown of a access and Bayne consciousness. of dissociation the entail doesn’t really position a such whether must be representationally consistent (Bayne, 2007). Second, it is at least highly controversial itcognition,will againstgo ourintuition P-unified that experiences within a singlemodality further apparentproblems with account. First,this in cases of competitivebehavior and/or two are there asIseeit, states, A-conscious indissociated casesof P-state total unified issue of of by virtue what such would states phenomenal should or besubsumed under one the Notwithstanding state. P-conscious by a single be subsumed necessarily will states mental such with associated P-states the states, mental P-conscious of set any for that, claiming model,mightswitching forstill BayneandChalmers’ (2003)notion one subsumption,of opt andthe zombie account the theory, automaton the with be unsatisfied to If were one impression generally,that, conscious our experiences are temporally continuous. again,itis highly counter-intuitive in sensethe of pitting itself subjectiveagainst our empirical impossibility of zombies without positing the dissociation of consciousness. Then hemispheres. two the between forth The and back attention its strength switches which system attention is one there of this viewversion, this to According is2008). (Bayne, time that same the at conscious are it them of neither seems to save P-conscious, and our A- be both can intuition hemispheres both though that, assume is to option Another concerning the 9 Section 4.1 Section ., Iwill argue CEU eTD Collection 1989, with which A both and Bareco-conscious without themselves being (Lockwood, unified versions of viewthis (“partial theories)unity” will A beyondposit, and B,athird C, P-state couldbe withoutinto split two self the this noticing Robinson,milder (see, 1989), e.g., immaterial e.g.,construe might, of selfwhoseconsciousness versionsan of a position such A and B, yet for whom thereposit that thereis is nothinga single to subjecthave will inconceivable is of two into experience(s)itsplitting subject isa single of idea the whom for like those who is independently to jointly P-conscious of bothexperience side, other On the aswell. subjects betwo will necessarily, there then, P-states, non-unified A&B. While strongif two will are positthat there P-states, havemight dissociated a single subject that notion the in or inconceivable incoherent essentially entails yetseesomething asubject of experience thatP-consciousness agree who Those each other. with P-unified not are they themselves P-states, other have subsumed might they while which, states P-conscious distinct has two person split-brain the that assume which of all left, positions three are there correct, If Iam very possibilitythe but of frequency, a genuine dissociation. relative the in not lies my interest for 1971), Nagel, 2008; Bayne, (cf. circumstances special certain in dissociates only which consciousness one have generally persons split-brain which to according views Ipresented have Neither ofP-consciousness. structure the not and contents accessible the in only that even non-split-brainpersons have two parallel streams of consciousness, viewhis implies adissociation 5 experienced it: essential not merelyinstantiated are “phenomenal to states/properties Yet,403). asIhave in noted the organism”1971, p. (Nagel, beascribedall, canperhaps to intoa mindat they though integrated not mental phenomena, conscious “isolated or P-states “free-floating” to more akin Ihave not included in my summary Puccetti’s (1981)positiondualon consciousness, forinsofar believesas he in Bayne, 2009;cf. BrookandRaymont, also 2009). by the subject” (Levine, subject” the p. 2007,514; italics added). Section 1.2 ., the subjective aspect of P-consciousness seems P-consciousness of aspect subjective the ., 10 5 in the subject, but are subject, the CEU eTD Collection credibility of retrospective reports concerning P-conscious experience is at leastis questionable, concerning at experience P-conscious reports credibility retrospective of retrospectivelyeven report to able be never will patients reversible: not is aboutcondition the brain, patients’ their experiences in the from damage structural/neural phenomenon sincearises Second, thesplit-brain in relation to their right they verbal concerning both HOs can andare undergoing. written reports the states produce hemisphere. Yet, is HOPthat of the then, advantage, A clear patients. from split-brain verbal attain reports to while the hemisphereisbarred access from it languageproduction,isimpossible areasunderlying the multiple factors that constrain the interpretation of split-brain data. First, since the right- consciousness comes from studiessplit-brain (Bayne, are 2007; Nagel,Yet there 1971). It is commonly held that the mostevidence convincing for apossible dissociation of 1.4. Therelevance ofthe hiddenobserver phenomenon considered cases of conscious dissociation as well. be will A-consciousness without P-consciousness of cases potential P-dissociation, take it to be an evident matter, as I will As for potential the A-consciousness not andcoming apartof though I do P-consciousness, argue that “phenomenal overflow” arguments either assumeversionwould ispossible, possibility the of Igenuine equally P-dissociation. entail if conclude a“one– view; which adhere to unified subject one to I were that consciousness” a singleviews selffrom to consciousness of streams multiple attribute views that between distinguish not I will of consciousness”, “dissociation term by the Thus, consciousness. dissociated of case agenuine mightconstitute HOP the that place, first in the possible, is it iswhether thesis this of question theprimary because of P-consciousness streams positionspositco-existing those we need thatsplit-brain have whichdeny to that patients two on more commented and dissociation of views various the mentioned briefly only have I 11 CEU eTD Collection 1895/2007, p.8;cf. in Spiegel, 1990), this noimplies way hypnoticthat states hysteria”should of “the construed (Breuerand Freud, basis of as be and determination disagree with such a claimhypnotic dissociations (if possible)– are “pathological”.arguing While perhaps it: be psychologists so then would pathology, with tend to that associated necessarily is humans in consciousness of dissociation the view that the adhereto If wereto one import. philosophical much have to seem not would argument an Such consciousness. of a dissociation involves it that believe to reason no is there condition, a pathological not is hypnosis since that, claim the to on cling unitythe mightfail of inconsciousness yet non-human animals” (Bayne,2008),nevertheless is it possible that course, and, in pathologies of consciousness; of of down other context the itsplit-brain is unified, remains syndrome possible unity the that breaks consciousness of in if the andadmit abovepoints consciousness the “even acceptthat Then might again, one arenothere underlyingneural associated changes with such conditions (Kihlstrom, 2005). that in no implies way this in nature, “functional” are hypnosis under phenomena dissociative note: conceived of P-dissociation Alsoas soinjustessential firstplace.take to the because it isclear explanation. not of Further, damage should be brain why the physical/structural issue in with the of HOP) place the is taking therereally whether a dissociation (i.e., 99). Yetthis seems2007, p.validity toconfound kindof theissueof descriptive reasoning observer paradigms in particular –might change the structure of hidden- consciousness”or – in general (Bayne,context hypnotic the of feature what is unclear “it for hypnosis, in of consciousness a dissociation for thecase weakens intact, areneurologically brains their that i.e., operation, no undergone have subjects hypnotic that fact the that believe Some on kindsthe of psychological split-brainprocesses patients mightbe undergoing. important data further of temporary nature hypnoticthe doprovide phenomena (reversible) even if 12 the existence of hypnotic states could or per se CEU eTD Collection have received extensive treatment in the philosophical literature, there is hardly any reference any hardly is there literature, philosophical in the treatment extensive received have conscious) dissociations. split-brainthan on internal patients possiblethe onof goings cognitiveexhibiting persons (A- In view ofitconsciousness, but provide seems of moreto kinds– and moreeven perhaps baffling –data this, it is interestingThus, not only does the HOP point towards the possibility thatof the dissociation of while split-brainHO). the of ignorant is HYP the “omniscient”, phenomena is HO the while isasymmetrical: meta-access of relation the that (Note well. HYPas of the mutually ignorant of each other, the HO situation,seems to have knowledge of the butinternal HO the within conflict in HYP direct the HOand asof the reports are the only not Finally, goings opposed on to split-brainparticular given time, both be in pain andcases, notbe in pain. whereany at could, one notion that the about inconceivable essentially be something seems to there the two hemispheres cases, split-brain on based of consistency issue the on makeconcessions to wereready one of the if even For patients. brain split-brain from far so evidence any than manner direct more way in a are content/properties representational and/or phenomenal of consistency intramodal of necessity experienced.(andintuitionbrings of feature This HOP the our out challenges) concerning the affairs, with theadvantage of the HO paradigm,HO then,is that subjects are exposed to theand same physical state of the HYP askedA further other. tothe is “kin”presented word while the hemisphere, toone “presented” to reportis “cat” word the of projection visual the e.g., stimuli: physical on different with theconfronted same thing typically are subjects the of brains the of hemispheres two the – studies, the split-brain In level of pain nature of hypnosis. the about debate substantive a than a terminological constitute rather would “pathology” functioning a normal constitute such aboutbreakdown of psychological –, disagreement 13 CEU eTD Collection concerning our notion of notion persisting concerning our of subjects time. through of itmight temporal the continuity but also consciousness, of have direconsequences flow of their P-consciousness, not only would such a position force us to abandon our notion subjects in the HO situation are victims of a “hyper-illusion” of arevictims in HOsituation subjects the subjects, from a metaphysical point of view,in argue Iwill As they are not. Yet, since thisincorrigibility view entails that that, even though the P-experiences of both and HOseem HYP the both the of P-experiences the even though that, see ( pains ownphenomenal our to conditions, all under we haveaccess, that “painful” ( “painful” pains arenecessarily conception that letgoofthe thus “partial and zombies” possibility of consistency claim of P-dissociation ( P-dissociation of claim ( automatisms merepsychological beas away explained of HOs cannot ( are credible pain)no (concerning phenomenology of the state being introspected” (p. 493). words, a hyper-illusionIn his is a“kind of illusionappearance. inwhich of an the introspectiveappearance an and phenomenologyappearance an doesbetween not reflect a mismatch the but world, external the and 6 pain beingand inpain not ( a single hardly that of in subject couldbeing aunifiedP-experience conceivable have both The HOP also raises important issuesBayne, 2007;Block, 1995/1997). about our concept of pain.in mention (exceptions– not discussionsworks of–the HOP to to philosophical are proper As noted above, it seems Block (2007)calls “hyper-illusion” ofwhich the kind involves illusion between mismatchappearance not a an Sections 3. ; see phenomenality claim phenomenality Sections (see and , then it seems that (v) one would either have to (a) posit the empirical the posit (a) to have either would one (v) that seems it then , Section 5 Section P-unity claim Section 3 2.2. 4.1 .), in effect implying that we should also let go of our intuition of and ., the only way breakto out of this apparent dilemmais toassume .). 4.2. ; see ; see consistency claim ), yet (iii) one were inclined to deny the empirical possibility empirical the deny to inclined were one (iii) yet ), validity claim Sections 3 Sections 3 14 . and . and ; see ). Yet if (i) the overt reports of HYPs 4.1. 4.2. Section 2.1 ) and nevertheless (iv) cling on to the to on cling (iv) nevertheless ) and ), or else (b) let go of the conception 6 concerning the uninterrupted concerning the .) and (ii) the covert reports to be to controlled behavior accessibility claim continuous to the to ; CEU eTD Collection analgesia. hypnotic of application clinical the for especially well, as implications ethical significant For if the HO reallyissue of theoretical for the relevance philosophy of the psychology metaphysicsor mind. of feels pain itFinally, beshould that issue noted the of HOfeelsthe whether merely anypainisnot an while the HYP does not, then this would seem to have 15 CEU eTD Collection (Gettinger, 1974, surprisingly,not HOshavebeen then, to bereported covertly linesperceiving converging the it. Perhaps perceive)first and identify (i.e., one must indistinguish background picture, the 1977; Kihlstrom,and Barnhardt for Tataryn, in 1992): toselectively the order ablate longer than bottom the line. This raises sothe called “paradox of Judasthe eye” (Hilgard, horizontal lines. Yettheillusion andseeing still subjects persists, report the upperline as is allegedly possible to selectively ablate perception of the converging lines, yet not of the the cross. Further, take the example of the Ponzo illusion of seeabluish-green afterimage looking subject will a blank paper,the at paper, then, upon (see of paper is apparently607) mentionsJamesif (1890/1983,p. that a subject,for whom we ask a redcross on a sheet invisible, to fixatehallucinations his eyes fornegative that a established is well itwhile all, of First pain. the perceived all, after onhave, a particular do not point eliminate onPrima facie the sensory such credit to evidence? Ibelieve weshouldyet – this willneeddetection afair of amount arguing. ofdeafness 1977)and (Hilgard, hypnotic blindness(Zamansky & Bartis, 1985).Shall we give the presented moremuch modernexample, general. has For hypnotic for research evidence provided also stimuli. is phenomenon the introduction, in the noted as analgesia, hypnotic of case in the dramatic For example, While demonstrations of what are called what of While demonstrations 2.1. Hypnotic analgesia 2. Thevalidity of thehidden observer phenomenon , there would seem to be plenty of reason to believe that in the HOP, subjects in Hilgard, 1977). negative hallucinations negative 16 Figure 1 in psychology are most are in psychology .). Under hypnosis, it CEU eTD Collection the HO experiments. Some simulators might even claim not to have felt any pain during pain any felt have to not claim even might simulators Some experiments. HO the in hypnotist the fool easily can –, behave to them expects hypnotist the how with consistent by instructed experimenter tobehavehypnoticanother in during asession awaythey is think Indeed, so called “simulators”1981, – subjects who pleasepresentation in to subject order the hypnotist asa“good” 1986;Wagstaff,are (Spanos, not susceptible suggestionsitis to of hypnotist, the possible rather that they engage instrategic self- hypnosis, yet who the positively to respond to motivated areassumedly since subjects is are that then, argument, hypotheses unstated the thatthe might experimental procedure implicitly convey. The to refers expression The of experiment. 1959) the (Orne, characteristics” “demand with the complying merely they is were answer that Onepossible allalong? suffering they were fact, Yet why lie?would experimental Why subjects would befeeling theyclaim not to painif,in of affairs. actual representstate experiential HOandher the the reports “hidden” about nothing is there perhaps So hypnotist. the fool easily might one practice, of bit a with perhaps HYPs experience pain all along, and they along,they perhaps all only pain and HYPsexperience then, is assumeto that the subjects in these experiments are in reality perceiving everything – reaction, An skeptical something. understandable be that seeing/feeling yetnot something beseeing/feeling both might one that contradictory logically seems it it, about doubt No in Kallioand Revonsuo, 2003). The Ponzo Illusion Ponzo The 17 Figure 1. claim not to be suffering. After all, be suffering. to not CEU eTD Collection fake theirmore experiences persistently and more convincingly. isformerthe that andsimulators reals between distinguishes what then, apparently, either, “expected” of them. experiences undergothe they didn’t that hypnotic previous sessions after “admitted” Yet if one assumesit:deceivers. simulators areselected Think about for theiron verythe basis task havingof that reals didn’titis whoarereally the thereals impliesbecause that itis reasoning absurd the I claim that really undergo suchNot only is aboveline the of reasoning absurd, isthere but alsoempirical evidenceit. against experiences, 1980). seeSpanosand argument, Hewitt, that they would keep up with their “narrative” of the analgesic subject. (for a similar avoidunderstandablebe thatthey is itwant toseeminginconsistent, onlyexpected would to isit only since (iii) “faking”, abouttheir knows nobody them) (besides that can bequite sure they (ii) as insofar and analgesia, their faked have might they why for story” “cover no have reals (i) as insofar side, other the On honesty. for demands situational the with comply again) would (yet isinterviews”,itbe in that, simulators expected agents, “honesty the only to is onlyunderstandable ultimately,avoid that, would wantto they beingseen immoral as selected and instructed them simulate)to knows about their identity, andfurther, since, (iii)it who one the (viz., least experimenters one of the at fact that awareof the are well (ii) they demandthe of characteristics post-hypnoticthe honest toproduce interview reports, and since The skeptic might object in the following way: since (i) the simulators can clearly pick up on (Hilgard etal.,1978). do simulators hypnotist), the by not (and context different a in questioned and/or reports honest interviews taken admithaving feltpain all along, while“reals” uphold their claim havingof feltno pain after the hypnoticthe session. Thenagain, are when promptedsubjects togive 18 CEU eTD Collection way implies that there is no genuine pain-relief in such cases (Kihlstrom, 1998; Kihlstrom 1998; (Kihlstrom, cases such in pain-relief genuine no is there that implies way inno this of analgesia, hypnotic effects influence the can of do and subjects the expectations Thus, while situational and socialfactors, as well themotivations,as attitudes and motivation befor doing Here’s so? Hilgard what (1973,p. 404)had tosay about this: are“faking”situations merely with “demands”? andcouldthe What theircomplying 1994; Montgomery,Duhamel Shall and Redd, assume in 2000). we persons that such with pain,burns,(Hilgard andcancer andpainsassociated cancer Hilgard, treatment and applied, among others, issuccessfully hypnotic analgesia that fact the convinced, consider not still were If someone in obstetrics, dentistry, theirinthe reports such a way as to“avoid” “caught” on “cheating”. being treatment of postoperativeintrusions 1977).Arguably,(Hilgard, itis the hardly case that reals intentionally manipulate pain, chronictypically overact their role, providing lower overall ratingssimulators of while pain pain, andof no reports intrusions of occasional on report commonly and readily reals reports, honesty in Second, lietheir deceivinga detector. acquire skill of the deceivers)to for talented (even training intensive of months several ittakes and sociopaths, hardly are hypnotizables high- aswell. Yet lie detector fool a can agents andundercover sociopaths True, criterion. metthat reports 35%of simulators’ the only while forcriterion truthfulness, pre-set the foundZamansky, andBlock, 1994) when that, for honestasked reporting, 89%of reals met for (Kinnunen, detecting ateam of skin deception, conductance) researchers (electrodermal measure single a using First, claim. the against evidence empirical of pieces two here’s So by the dentist. No hypnotistinjected is aroundchemicals any either to without embarrass or to please.analgesia self-induced through chair dental in the gains pain now relieved but dentist complete reduction the painsufficiently hasnot is not around), obstetrician or to one original of the our own though subjects(even child for next whom her for the local again anesthetic hypnosis have she used by the to that requests hypnotic the helpof had analgesia with woman onechild whohaving attention call to necessary is only it side, social and phenomenal the both On 19 CEU eTD Collection HOP will now turn to attacking the credibility of the HO’s reports. It only natural,seems then,theskepticundermine that who would wishto validity the of the genuine experiences. of reflect pain reports generally subjects’ relief faking, conceding that majority haveof abandoned theorists role-playing long bynow their original positions on the that overwhelming is so analgesia hypnotic of favor in arguments and evidence The 2.2. The“hidden observer” beseems hypnosis. genuinely to to attributable McConkey,1990; Kallio and Revonsuo,2003). a way that, eventually, they may come to deceive themselves that they feel no pain(cf. Kihlstrom and enact the social role of a hypnotically anesthetized subjectby actively employing certain cognitive strategies in 8 guide himself through a hypnotic procedure to (Hilgard, 1977).be taught can one hypnotized: person very the be can hypnotist the that Yet note 1998). Lynn, and Kirsch guide thesubjectundergoing in changesthe experience in (Kihlstrom,1987; Kihlstrom Barnier, and 2005; emotion, thought orbehavior. “Suggestions” are verbal ornon-verbal communications that the hypnotist uses to offers suggestions to person(the subject)another for experiences involvinghypnotist) alterations(the insensation, perception, person one which in interaction social a in place taking procedure a as hypnosis characterize 7 ispoint thathypnoticanalgesia important The here. relevant not is achieved, is effect this then, how, of question the course, and1993) orcounterpain Bowers, imagery and Bowers (Hargadon, Woody, Of 1995). attention of (Miller stress-inoculation likediverting techniques Hilgard, 1994), (Hilgard and placeboeffects opiates (Goldstein 1975), endogenous andand Hilgard, 1991), Barabasz, this effectis notmediated by relaxation (Faymonville, Roediger et al., 2003; Miller, Barabasz Interestingly,least in at hypnosispersons highlysusceptibleto (Kallioand Revonsuo, 2003), and Sletten, 1977, Ulett Brown, in aspirin, andischemiccold-pressor diazepam,both placebo and counteracting pain (Stern, morphine,beplacebo acupuncture, more effective was hypnosis found to than acupuncture, and McConkey,1990).On contrary,the in comparing astudy various methods of pain relief, Instead of denying thephenomena, revisedversions of role-playing theories now posit that high-hypnotizables I have not yet defined hypnosis. Though there is no universally accepted definition, roughly, we might can relieve pain, and that at least one component of this effect in Kihlstrom,Mulvaney, and Tobias 2000). Tobis, 20 7 8 CEU eTD Collection that HOs are hypnosis (cf.that to susceptible andthemselves Kihlstrom 1990; Barnier, Spiegel, line whileit First, isThere possible above tothe reasoning. known arevarious objections of of affairs. state stimulus actual on the reports HO the claim the challenging that in effect context, in experimental the cues contained implicit the to for by reference be accounted might wereveridical, this reports HOs’ “more aware” agrees with this interpretation, hypnotic attemptsBayne toconvincingly role1201). enact the (p. of good (2007) subjects” arguing that thelevel of awareness, they “‘hidden’ thatthe concluded reports resultfrom Ss’ [subjects’] study underscores thesuggested with the were congruent that gave reports groups both pointexpected, as the researchers that would “hidden Since, aware”. be“less parts” their suggestion, viz.,that received opposite the was “more group other them, happeninginandaround that the things aware”of while groups: one received group the traditional suggestion they that havewould a“hidden part” into weredivided two study, subjects theabove for the interpretation.this In some support A much well-known and study anddebated by (1980) might HewittSpanos lendseem to “please” the hypnotist. to in order just pain on reported falsely have might HO the that follow to seem would it hypnotist, the please to motivation a strong have subjects that assuming still is skeptic since So, bet. the wouldseem likeasafer option second the analgesia, onhypnotic evidence “click to of orelse out” her state, analgesic couldn’t havefelt she lightany pain. In of the the point at which the HO was called forth. Yet, at this point, either the HYP would have really subjects had achieve did genuine painrelief, there was noroom need faking for or uptill perhaps the HO that selectively assume why then analgesia, in case the reports honest is provide generally not telling A if is instantly arises question that the thefollowing:it was thatsubjects conceded already truth? The role-theorist might argue that insofar as the 21 even if the CEU eTD Collection pressure moral of the study – at least according to Asch – is that people are prone to conformThe general pressure. group the conformedto participants toof the third social one The result:about thirds of the trials,in two- was that manipulation experimental The one. last the wasalways naïve subject the the built-in “participants”was Each naïvesubject about. hadtogive infront their aloud, answer of wholethe and group, gave consistent participant the of factwhich –a of experimenter the confederates wereall others subject; the yet evidently real one only wasactually there in eachgroup, wrong wasthat setup the in case, each evident answers. While was line. answer fourththe (target) inlength a with matchedjudge these to which of was werepresented withlines length,in andtheirtask differing of groups (comparison) three possibility mind brings lineto thefamous judgment Asch in study of which (1951), subjects and they really providedid the reports they in toconform did socialorder to This pressure. made subjects, notion the no very hiddenpart “lesssense Third,of perhaps the a aware”to instead of being omniscient, the divided part was even more anesthetized than the HYP. to a dissociation of consciousness, yet, compared to the classic HOP, in this condition, with the experimental demands. Perhaps the suggestion of a “less aware” hidden part did lead responded in way studythe they and inthe did Spanos Hewitt suggestionstheirallinfluence,itis exert clearwhy at not should subjects the one that assume Second, since the wording andinterpretation of suggestions play an important rolein the way are). experiences simultaneous involve agenuinedissociation ofconsciousnessveridicality issue isnot(for the – still might HOP the creation, experimental an merely were HO the if even that, possibility nor the by her system, “registered” cognitive information otherwise inaccessible access to 2005), this neither excludes possibility the HOmight,the inleast at that have principle, even when they clearly know this will deter them from answer. from correct them the this will deter they know clearly 22 because ofmerely complying CEU eTD Collection totally amnesic to the very suggestion until another prearranged cue (say, two short coughs in prearrangedcuetwo very another totally suggestion until (say, tothe amnesic become he session, thehypnotic of termination the after that, subject the to suggest also will Thehypnotist has terminated. hypnotic the after session cough) cue prearranged (say, a upona (say, subjectwindow) certain the perform act open undera that the subject hypnosis mightsuggestcombined cases, to the the with hypnotist such post-hypnotic amnesia. In suggestions post-hypnotic of example the memories). Take false imagined/constructed reals. example,For might simply be subjects confabulating based (i.e., producing reports on –butrealsestablishsimulators and this doesnot validity the credibility or of reports the of between differences detectable clearand perhaps are fine, say, there now might The skeptic sensitive to demand characteristics, simulators are simulators demand to characteristics, sensitive McConkey, andPerry, 1983, Laurence (Nogrady, zero to droppeddown simulators” of proportion whilethe rate, average whenthat, a low-demandinto put percentage situation, of the real HOs fellback tothe 50% among75% therealsandamong (Hilgard to al., simulators et 1978). Yetastudy found reals and simulators are put into high-demand situations, theincidence of HOs raises to about 10-15%constitute of population)the a produce HO (Hilgard &Hilgard, When both 1994). inis40% it thatnote only First, of highlyhypnotizable important to (who persons about turn and arecredible HO’s reports genuine. the that view the of favor in evidence and arguments additional provide us let further, analogy instead no(1980) study suchconformity.pushing this of Spanos and reported So, Hewitt acknowledged retrospectively they that had merely ingiven pressure, group to subjectsin the (Kihlstrom and Barnier,2005).Of while in course, participants Aschthe studies of affairs state stimulus actual the access to no had subject the entail that not does demands complyingpressure The with thein or HOP isclear:asubject’sgivingwith analogy to in Kihlstrom Thus,and Barnier, 1985). while reals 23 way more way sensitive. are CEU eTD Collection exposed to. of theyhadbeen affairs of thestimulusveridical state reports they of giving are well-capable anything on HOuntilthe people confabulate isthere nothing torationalizeconfabulate observed about. Third, or in post-hypnotic amnesia, HYPhas the Yet behavior. (observed) confabulatesubjects provide upon attempting rational/coherent accounts of their to own amnesic issue, confabulation to the return to Second, memory into directly.) written gets and (i.e.,supposedly altogether information consciousness bypasses becoming (P-)conscious from be barred might information and/or experiences states, certain case of HOP, the thatin Hilgard hypothesized experiences, previouslythe is had barredaccessto P-conscious seems stopto here. For, first, as opposed to cases of post-hypnotic amnesia in which a subject analogy the Yet time. any given at (retrievable) accessible necessarily not is memory) which in post-hypnotic amnesia,itis clear that the subject information possesses in(stored her in HOPand both the that, fact the from arises analogy The barrier”. an “amnesic-like due to HYP the that to HOwasinaccessible the himself posited because Hilgard(1977) interesting, is especially possibility This confabulating? also intheHOparadigm Are subjects the answer(s). herregain accessnatureof hermemories, realizing previously given confabulated the to quickshort will two the subject memory). false course,after coughs, constructed Of something a produce (i.e., rationally account basedsounding an on unintentionally confabulate will typically,they suggestion); the (viz., of their action real cause the reporting hearing a cough. for whom Sure enough, suggestion had will windowupon the first the subjects effect open an everything. When recall easily to be able will subject the which after is given, succession) asked quick why they opened the window, they will be incapable of before after the amnesia is lifted. Yet in the HOP, subjects do not report their amnesia has been lifted – and once their amnesia is lifted, no access whatsoever to the doings of the HO; thus, HO; the of doings the to whatsoever access 24 CEU eTD Collection non-hypnotic state.)yet relaxed similarly a in feel would they pain of level the match to seem reports HOs’ the channels, expressive such from feedback of facilitative lack a to due pain experienced of level a lower in result expression) facial insofar as the verybeing in arelaxed state modulates lackthe very way in which sensory input from noxiousof stimuli is processed,the and/or expressionsubjectsa relaxed state (Hilgard, in 1977;Hilgard andHilgard, 1994).Yet this poses no problem insofar as of pain via channels9 that are normally under voluntary control (e.g., both the stimulus state of affairs level match the on of pain Well, reports HOs’ claimis of veridicality? of our basis What the he will at least have to assume the face validity of faceassume havethe HOP. hevalidity least the of to will at If the skeptic is to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon, then,it really seems like stimuli.the acquaintance of knowledge or prior and/or confabulation demand characteristics, role-enactment,seem be byappealingHence, not explainable HOP the to to away does pain (Hilgard, 1977). intensity of retrospective location, accounts the and quality duration, of provide accurate the Hardly so: for even if subjects were exposed levelthe priorpain of to exposure due (kindto the of) stimuli from outside laboratory? of the to differing patternsinferred have might subjects perhaps Yet of stimulation. stimulation,electrical or pain ischemic of induction HOs could with associated temperature) isn’tprobablepain? This infaceof studiesthe involved which reallyperhapsbuton tactilenotother cold subjects pain, were sensationsreporting on (e.g., stimuli exposure tothe prior beforethe hypnotic session(Zamansky Bartis, 1985).Yet and experiences. Yet this worry is cleared by studies in which subjects had no practice sessions or they (which pain of level the inferring merely were HOs the that arises possibility the analgesia, hypnotic beenhad theinsessions involving painful stimuli the preceding already to session exposed studies (Hilgard, 1973;Hilgardetal.,1975; Hilgardal., et 1978; Knox al.,subjects et 1974), in the original theHO stimuli? knowledge/acquaintance Since, basedpainful on prior of underare not hypnosis. Actually, HOs report a bit lower level of pain than average waking subjects do – their ratings match those of would have felthad theynot beenin an condition)basedanalgesic on their prior 9 Yet perhaps subjects might have provided their veridical veridical reports mighthave their provided subjects Yetperhaps and the subjectivethe of reports normal who subjects waking 25 CEU eTD Collection true: isinThe puzzlingfact asmentioned 40% around earlier, that, of following cases, the the are hypnotizable subjects withintheHOsituation): hypnotizable subjects highly as be relating understood to formulatestill the assumptionsto (naturally, following might we above,the then, Basedon of affairs. state actual matches the reported being reason if wehave let that us assume theHOP, of nature deeply puzzling the tobring out In order conclusions of the previous section in the following way: purported the summarize might we specifically, More etc. demands with experimental nor of HO,by the merely aresubjects fakingassuming that confabulating complying or or HYP, neither the of reports the explain away we cannot that argued I section, previous In the to doubt the credibility of a subject’s (or of a part of a subject’s) report, then what is what then report, subject’s) of a ofapart (or asubject’s of credibility the doubt to (iv) (iii) i) If the HYP reports that she is not in (i’)pain, then the HYP really i’ If the HO reports that she is in (ii’)pain, then the HO really i) If, within the hidden observer situation, a highly hypnotizable subject (ii) under (i) The HO reports she that is in pain. The HYP reports that she is notin pain. to doubt that the subject, ator least the HO, reason no have we then pain, in is she that reports covertly analgesia hypnotic reason to doubt that the subject, orat least the HYP, is no have we then in pain, not is she that reports overtly analgesia hypnotic If, hidden within observer situation,the ahighly hypnotizable subject under 3. On pain 26 is inpain. not is inpain. inpain. isn’t inpain. no CEU eTD Collection metaphysical position on the nature of the subject of phenomenal states/experiences. As for of of states/experiences. phenomenal subject nature the the on position metaphysical particular any to commitment any without be self-evident, to thesis first the assume I following theses: Yet the above claims would seem leadto toa contradiction if we were also tosubscribe to the following: the above, wecanconclude Based on the then, (vi) (v) (3) (5) (4) (2) (1) The HO is in pain. in pain. not is HYP The phenomenal properties. pain Phenomenality of functionally intact humanbrain cansupport only one P-conscious subject. Neurofunctional unity particular phenomenal particular phenomenal property experience or state P-conscious Consistency subsumed by a single unified phenomenal state or experience. state subsumed by unifieda single phenomenal or experiences at experiences or might be said to have multiple co-occurring (simultaneous) P-conscioussubject the states if consciousness; of field unified phenomenally single a have will Subjective unity: that experience that subject Subjectivity S for whom is there somethingitis like tobe inthatstate undergoor to : Necessarily, for any P-conscious state or experience or state for any P-conscious : Necessarily, : At any particular time particular any At : . Necessarily, at any particular time any particular at Necessarily, t , then those states or experiences will necessarily be necessarily will experiences or states those , then : Necessarily, at any particular time : It is a necessary condition of pain that it has 27 F. p to both possess of, yet not possess of, a of, possess not yet of, possess both to t , itis, for any impossible particular t , a P-conscious subject , aP-conscious t , anystructurally- p , there is a CEU eTD Collection experiences.itis hard very Indeed, imagine how one mightpossibly to his be about wrong subjective our about theses incorrigibility feeds which is that (viii) underlying intuition The either or both of the following two claims: deny have itseems skepticto would the that faking (etc.), in are subjects HOsituation the that possibility the out ruled already have we since Yet claim (ii’). (re-)attack to expected is skeptic HOP,the the casefor establishedthan the be much better seems to analgesia hypnotic for case the in general, Since, dilemma? apparent this resolve we shall How thesis. two parallel streams of consciousness – yetthis ispossibility by barred subjectivethe unity could accountfor theHOP wouldsubjects beby in that assuming such situations possessof we way only the that seem thus would it pain, of properties phenomenal the of possess not yet both possess of to orexperience state P-conscious single any for isit impossible thesis, consistency the to Since,according subject. P-conscious partsofasingle or aspects distinct asconstitutingmost, two beunderstood they distinctcan only P-consciousat subjects; constitute two HO cannot HYP andthe thesis, the neurofunctional according the Yet to thesis that the HO is phenomenal the either and thesis subjectivity the from a P-consciousfollows It following. is the problem the So subject, or at least a P-conscious part of a subject. be theses true. to Yet unless I indicate otherwise,theoretical possibility of letting go of any in of them shouldthe there be sufficient following reasons to do so. Iwilluphold intuitive enjoy the othertheses,the strong support, while theyseem to arguments, I will assume all of the above (viii) (vii) If the HO believes that she is in pain, then she is in pain. If the HO reports that she is in pain, then she believes that she is in pain. 28 CEU eTD Collection point: the issue is not whether things as represented match some particular state of affairs in of affairs state particular some match asrepresented things whether not is issue the point: the miss to seem perception of non-veridicality the and confabulation about arguments Thus, psychologically nature genuine of experiencesthe of such patients (cf. Melzack, 1993). professional nowadaysexist, whichnothe body pain would not doubtattribute do to parts inpain might perception be non-veridicalin such thoughtof as thesense patients they that theConsider example: pain another “phantom While by with limbs”.experienced patients perhaps falsedue to feedbackfrom arriving visualanother system 2009). (Maddula, an outcome ofmisinterpreting visualimages due toa defective visual monitoring system, or visual experiences it– e.g., hasbeen that such“confabulativesuggested behavior” might be Actually, itis very likely that patients claim to see exactly because they have phenomenal havingYet in having afalse isnot this to equivalentnoall.perception sense perception at evidence regarding false patients’ beliefs theabout one’s about Yet I fail to see how confabulation in visual agnosia might provide support for false beliefs states. subjective very one’s about false beliefs visual environment, this syndrome is not infrequently visual not thisenvironment, as is syndrome a taken their about confabulate persistently patients these factthat Due tothe etc.). tests, performance frequently suffer due accidents bumpingto into walls andother objects, they fail visual on they aredamaged, lobes contrary the (their occipital to evidence obvious vision theirdespite Anton’s syndrome (visual aconditionagnosia), in which patients firmly deny having lost is mind to comes that example A neurological be possible. might belief afalse such how of skeptical such about a possibility,itwould be convincingtoseeatleastan empirical analogue havepossible to afalse for one’s about belief those(like ownpain-states, me) whoare own current pain. While some (e.g., Dennett, 1978) have argued that it is at least logically internal phenomenal states. Surely,persistentconfabulation provides strong states. phenomenal 29 external visual stimulus state of affairs. of state stimulus visual par excellence par example of CEU eTD Collection automatic in the sense of being reflexes: arenot “automatic reports” wellthat point illustrates the (1890) from Binet Apassageetc.). modalities by and alternative invarious providing ways(e.g., verbal pressing buttons, reports forthrough, subjects arewellcapable of reports on providingtheir covert in pain various to the notion of asingle unified consciousness. Yet the automaton theory does notseem goto and above mere psychophysiological/behavioral reflexes, then the HO poses no serious threat mightitmerely Surely,bean “automaton”. amount reports argued,if covert to nothing over sophisticated) proposal would be assumeto that the HO has no beliefs at all because it ( beto atleastfurther two arguments the comeskeptic might forward with.less The(and first experiencing pain. Besides arguments related to faking (which we have ruled out), there seem isshe that all, after believes, HO really claim the whether by attack (vii) questioning then, isundermining reports, reliability the to to moreHOs’ of Perhaps route promising a of affairs.) state actual stimulus on featureshe HOis the the of precise can that reports acentral Anton’s provide syndrome, from patients to suffering that,asopposed important way as recall well: markthe in another fall seem off to arguments veridicality (Actually, shewasn’t. fact, of matter (psychological) a as when, in pain was she that believe might one whether but world, external the hadthat been thoughtof. 26) (p. number the of experimentalist the inform to wished thus it if as stiffen, will of thefingertimes, having after the yielded impressed times three to movement number a certain subject the of finger the raising by initiative the assumes himself experimentalist the If instrument. this upon times distinct three press he will hand his in adynamometer has subject the If member. other any of movement the orto writs the apply to will same the times; three his finger will raise subject the hand, insensible the of fingers the shaken times several have we experiment the holds apeninhe hishand will thefigure write 3.If he hasnoif and pen, before If numberhand.to think of 3. he anaesthetic weaskthe subject the Thus, […] themannerin which ideais the expressed depends uponthe attitude given to 30 sic ) is ) CEU eTD Collection claim (vii) by a reductio argumentin the following way: undermine she could pain, occurring own one’s about belief have afalse to is impossible it agree that if claim.she wereto to Then, want skeptic would the isjustwhat this Of course, The argumentfrom suffering would golike thus this: subject formulated this after a hypnotic session: intensive pain, she concurrentlycharacteristic reports not to be argumentfrom suffering. The starting pointof argumentwouldthis be animportant suffering of the call or might we what “bothered”the of form in the come might objection powerful) HO’s more (way Another by the reportpain. As a which I have not yet discussed: while the HO reports (Hilgard, 1977,p.209) is,looks judgeit. at what The hidden partdoesn’t dealwith anddoesn’t pain. It Therefore, (x) (ix) (vi*) (vii) If the HO reports that she is in pain, then she believes that she is that in she is believes she that then in If HO the pain, reports pain. (vii) (xi) (vi*) If the HO believes that she is(viii) in pain, then she is in pain. Therefore, pain. Suffering is an essential feature of pain; i.e., if there is no suffering, there is no The HO is suffering. not The HO does not believe that she is in pain. [mod. toll., (viii), (vi*)] It isnot the case that It isnot the case that the HO is in pain. is HO the the HO is in pain. is HO the 31 CEU eTD Collection 1977; andHilgard 1994; Loeser Hilgard, Melzack, and Melzack, 1993;Melzack 1999; and components 2007;Hilgard, least (Aydede, 2010;Grahek, two of at experience comprised As it empiricalhappens, isstrong there evidence isaphenomenologically complex pain that pain proper. for a sensation/feelingbeliefs, which, the only possible though option leftshe fakingsuffering on thethat HO’s ishavewould ruled (xii)? andfalse report credible we out Since associates seem to be that the HOwith is using pain,the if pain assumed on termone (ii’*) HO’s report the for discrediting what could bethereason Yet “pain” she does not construe of as leastassumehave wouldskeptic atto following: the On the other hand, in order to secure the claim that the HO is not suffering (claim (ix)), the to claim upon attacking (ii’): attacking upon claim to wished skeptic the what just is (which claim following the entails argument above the hand, Yet the issue of credibility would now arise in a different form for the skeptic. For, on the one (ii’*) (vii*) Therefore, (iv) (iv*) Therefore, xi If the HO reports that she is not suffering, then the HO (xii)is not suffering. The HO reports she that is in pain. in pain. [neg.intr., (ii’), (vi), (vi*)] It isnotthecase that It isnot the case that that she is in pain. [neg.intr., (vii), (iv), (iv*)] that It isnotthecase the HO reports that she is in pain. [mod. toll., (vii), (xi)] if the HO reports that she is in pain, then the HO really is if the HO reports that she is in pain, then she believes 32 CEU eTD Collection stimuli would be accompanied by suffering, then by stimuli conceptis of beaccompaniedperhapsitwould suffering, then needspain our that those whom for affairs aspersons state onthestimulus reports as accurate just of providing bemeanwhile capable (c) any“hurt”, experience not (b) yet asapain-experience, experience identify an a person if it isbutshould (a) that inhowever rarecases, possible that, believe have nobearing onthe itisconceptual groundingwhat of forbe someone in to pain, others mentioned cases the While some of arguethat components pain. between two the dissociation a such of implication philosophical the concerning is disagreement there As expected, Price, Carrierand Bushnell, 1997). al.,1999; Rainville, Duncan, significantly inhypnoticet (Rainville analgesia diminished to die prematurely (cf. Grahek, 2007). totally incapable of feeling pain, they frequently suffersevere physical injuries, and it is not uncommon forthem yet in which there10 is a complete shutdown of the pain system. Since persons inflicted with this disorder are there affective-motivational componentis truly missing,he does not discuss hypnosis – as it seems, (2007) arguesthatisin pain be) onlygenuine (mightasymbolia whichthe empirical case the pain. of quality and intensity location, the discriminating and detecting of capable are well they yet stimulation), the laugh during and chat smile, often (they stimuli noxious severely to even reaction affective negative any show to fail patients condition, neurological most Inthis asymbolia. being notable amongpain conditions, these the perhaps in certain dissociate to arereported components these Interestingly, cortex. cingulate nature by is supported of anterior the (primarily) pain, aversive the and (avoidance-related) to relates component affective-motivational called so brain. in The the cortex somatosensory location,intensity duration, and quality of pain,and by is supported (primarily) the the discriminate and identify to capacity our to relates component sensory-discriminatory The calledBushnellHofbauer, andDuncan,1999). so Casey, Carrier, Rainville, 1968; This syndrome is not to be confusedwith congenital analgesia, acondition inwhich tactile sensing is intact, is soundpsychological/neuroscientific suffering thatthe evidence of componentpain is 33 10 Though Grahek Though CEU eTD Collection that they experiencingthat notthey pain are i.e., – suffering not are they that is mean (naturally) they what pain, no feeling report overtly HYP) actually,the (or, subjects when argue, might she Hence, of pain. concept the very well hypnotized subjectsmade understandmightclaimunder thethat assumption haveprogress to not the skeptic would start with the following: to a contradiction, and without assumingactually Gordianthe for shemightcut knot, reconstruct leading original the argumentwithout that the HO has false beliefs or is dishonest.pain pain, isactually referring to she Thus, to pain to The skeptic’s job is not finished yet. For if subjects within the HO situation generally referred of pain (let us call this pain this call us (let pain of component with sensory-discriminatory associated the qualities HOexperiences the deny that concept) skepticneednot orcomponentof the feature of pain.(our an Of course, essential sake letof argument, usassume themore conservativewhich view according to is suffering reevaluatingAydede, 1978). (cf. 2010; Since Dennett, myissue is forwith the skeptic,the inpain sensory v’ The HO is in (vi’) pain (iv) (ii’’) If the HO reports If she the that HO is reports in then she is pain, in pain (ii’’) (iii) The The HYP reports that she is not in pain. (iii) i’ If the HYP reports that she is not in pain,(i’’) then the HYP is not in pain Therefore, sensory whenever they reported on “pain”, then it would follow from (v) that the HYP is HYP the that (v) from follow would it then “pain”, on reported they whenever The HO reports she that is in pain. . Clearly, this would not help. Clearly, would not this much in dilemma.resolving our Yettheskeptic sensory ). What she might posit, though, is that when the HO reports sensory affective . sensory : . This way, it would seem that the skeptic might 34 sensory . affective . CEU eTD Collection experiences of pain. of experiences it was assumed that both the HYP and the HO are reporting on their P-conscious states or the HO feeling pain would seem to linger under around HOfeeling wouldthe seem to pain yet feeling pain not HYP the between contradiction apparent the theses, assumed under the problem.is our fornecessary For, aspain conditionto apain’squalifying orthogonal proper The moral of the above is that the issue of whether the “suffering” component of pain is a reported level reported of pain pain In 2003). otherthe study,both reduce high-hypnotizables could to be (somewhat) capable of reducing the level of of becapable pain to (somewhat)reducing the level of improbable inlightof empirical two studies. In low-hypnotizablesone of werefound these, misunderstood or misinterpreted questions the or pain misunderstood concerning pain be feelingany to not when claim they experimenter the subjects aredeceiving that assuming In light of our theses, (v’’) and (vi’) are not compatible. Surely, we should not fall back on headache for the skeptic comes in the form in skeptic statement: forthe form comes headache the of following the pain the skeptic. For subjects within the HO paradigm commonly report on both both pain commonly on within subjects report HOparadigm For skeptic.the the Yet whileit is true that claims (v’) and (vi’) are compatible, this strategy will hardly work for affect affective sensory (v’’) The The HYP is neither in pain (v’’) (v’) The The HYP is not in pain (v’) Therefore, without . So a last resort of the skeptic might be to assume that perhaps the HYP – and, as it happens, the HYP explicitly ithappens,reports HYPexplicitly –and,as the achangein pain sensory (Crawford, Knebel andVandemia,1998, (Crawford, sensory affective (Rainville al.,et 1999). sensory . 35 , nor in pain any affective affective understanding of pain as long as not feeling any pain any feeling . . without sensory. and in enhance the level of level the enhance Kallio and Revonsuo, and Kallio a reduction in areduction the Yet this is highly sensory sensory . So the So . and CEU eTD Collection used by Sperling (1960) in originalhis paper. 11 the study, subjects had to report on only one row of symbols following a tone that was memory immediate from can be of retained averagethat symbols the number that established many symbols asthey condition).Using thismethod, Sperlingcould (“whole report” of the study, after a very brief (50 msec) exposure to the stimuli, the subjects had to recall (see each of4symbols 3 rows of configuration ina typical e.g., as (1960) on“iconic memory”. Inthis study, Sperlingflashed an and array letters of numbers, empirical study in cited of thissupport viewis by a classic experimentconducted Sperling The 1995/1997). consciousparadigmatic Chalmers, 2003;Block, (cf. Bayne also and beA-possibly wecannot which of experiences have P-conscious we happen that can information amountus atisthe of it cognitively to that accessible any particular time, given an informationalwhich,according bottleneck2007, 2008), thatseverelyconstrains dueto to The main strategy I wish to focus on is based on “phenomenal overflow” arguments (Block, claim: following dispose with the HOPifwewereto ofthe nature paradox seemingly resolve the might in Iwillfocusis strategy, ontheopposite pain(ii’). chapter, In this we whether and examine we might dispose with the claim that if the HO reports that she is in pain, then the HO really In thelast section, of“pain”, weexamined alternative by whether, interpretations providing 4.1. Phenomenal consciousness without access-consciousness Psychologists nowadays preferthe terms “short-term memory” or“working memory”, but this is the term 4. Thedissociation of phenomenal consciousness and i) If the HYP reports that she is not in pain, (i’)then the HYP really isn’t in pain. 11 under such conditions is around 4 symbols (4.3 to be exact). In be under In secondthe exact). to 4symbols isaround part of suchconditions (4.3 access-consciousness 36 Figure 2 .). In the first phase first the In .). CEU eTD Collection without A-consciousness, at least insofar as the following is a possible interpretation of it: of P-consciousness candidate least agenuine is HOPat the that argued Block (1995/1997) reformulate claim (i’) in the following way? could we Inotherwords, excess? and phenomenal itinlimited access for of terms account might we thus, that, and situation, Sperling the of analogue is an HOP the that possible it Is memory”. “iconic on experiments halfasecond presented trials. immediate-recall in observed the (9.1) number the twice more than condition was report in memory. averagenumber the immediate ofsymbols Indeed, availableforreport partial the their on based on report can they than subjects the to available information more is there that individual row) was beto higher than in the whole report condition, then that would establish on performance which tone they were going to hear tone, they had toreportthe symbols in Now, middlethe since row. did subjects not know after the array of symbols medium-pitch heard a ifthey andwas row; bottom in symbols the the report they had to tone, flashed, if their average low row;ifreport hearda inhigh they symbols heardthe subjects had tothe tone, top a they (i’’’) If If she the that HYP is reports not in then the pain, HYP in not (i’’’) A-conscious all the rows (to be calculated by adding up the average performance on each after A typical array of symbols inSperling’s (1960) of pain. of the visual stimuli was flashed (“partial report” condition): if condition): report” (“partial flashed was stimuli visual the X B 7 L 4 I Figure2. 37 W V 5 F 7 3 CEU eTD Collection by subject.”) the experienced are but subject, in the instantiated merely not are states/properties “Phenomenal said tobein Levine’s inp. 514)already pain. (Recall cited point(2007, this: to relation even access were not if pain Yet qualify asaccessible. to be in order actually need accessed not content broadcast” “globally concept, isadispositional A-consciousness –since pain the access HYPdoesn’t the that not is problem the course, Of pain. the access cannot simply HYP the HOP, in the Yet both individuallybe accessible,A&Bnot jointly are accessible 2003). (Bayne Chalmers, and inthe access-disunity discussed single row can easily be can reported easily single row in symbols the fact that any from the derives memory” (accessibility) “immediate capacity of Second, in Sperlingthe experiments, the very evidence of availability “overflowing” the all. be feeling to not claim firmly they contrary, –onthe localizeetc. or characterize report some overtly is it subjects After all, in analogue casethat of the not the of HOP? this case the the “generic couldwhat be Yet feature phenomenology” as“generic phenomenology”). this referslatter (2007) to (Block in relation to pain which they cannot specify or they can report on, or at least report having had havingleast orat report on, they can report seeingsubjects assert that of feature Sperling-typeexperiments the is anessential I, for one, am deeply unconvinced that such a strategy can account for the HOP. First of all,it subjects within the same body. (He doesn’t consider any further possibilities.) 12 According to Block, a second possible interpretation of the phenomenon is that there are two different failure to use the information to escape thepain.informationfailure touse the to have pain,it,that report not does by andby tofailure asshown access the the to herself, or himself person, the but in somewhere, pain there is P-conscious There problem. of dissociation sort has some who person, the system, is one There ible for the HYP, than it is hard to see in what way the HYP might be Section 1.3 Section if cued. Thisof pattern availability fits thedescription of .: while representational contents A and B might 38 some 12 P-conscious experience of stimuli the of experience P-conscious (p.406) any more pain at pain than CEU eTD Collection will be no cognitive system to which A&B will be jointly accessible, there will nevertheless will there accessible, jointly be will A&B which to system cognitive no be will B in another cognitive system is associated with phenomenal state Q, then even though therecontent P,meanwhile state representational with phenomenal is associated systems cognitive argued for the latterThough (2008)hasmeanwhile theidea,Bayne abandoned Chalmers and Bayne (2003) possibility, A-dissociation. of face inthe unity its retain might it whether or in A-unity, breakdowns claiming an Of is question important course, mirror/accompany whether might P-consciousness the that if representationalthe system. content capacity the unrelated tothe seems from isof pain whichgaining accessto barred HYP the A in one of the be explainable awayinformational byappealing to bottlenecks; whateveris it byvirtue of seem notto HOPdoes the that underscores meta-access about This point HO. of the existence very the to even oblivious is totally latter the HYP, the in on going things about omniscient involve a relationseems to HOP the each other, ignorant of mutually are hemisphere right the and hemisphere of asymmetrical access between the HYP and the HO: while the HO is Then again, as mentioned in mentioned as again, Then is A-conscious of pain, the other of which isn’t. itcontrary.seems like So wearedealingwith parallel two cognitive systems –one of which HYP claims notto be feeling any pain, atthe same time, the HO is ardently reportingjust the the HOP might go through. Yet this seems hardly plausible in light of the fact that while the of interpretation a “single-system” believe that to seems he nevertheless in italics original), P-conscious state in me that I don’t have access to, then that state isstate not have to,then in that I don’t access methat state P-conscious is “if claim himself thatthere forcetothe concedes Though Block thereisa (1995/1997) that Section 1.4. , contrary to the split-brain case in which the left 39 mine atall” (p.406; CEU eTD Collection of phenomenal overflow in a single system. Now add to this picture the obscure implication obscure the picture this to add Now system. in asingle overflow phenomenal of implications I seeas far,the this iswhat So properties/content. inconsistent intramodally with of pain) state inaccessible an and ofno-pain state (anaccessible states P-conscious occurring allegedly co- two Yetif thenbackto ouroriginal is problem: we are conscious so, state. this P- a non-painful as describe whatwewould is exactly this And,what-it-is-likeness arguably, pain. in being of whatsoever experiences A-conscious no has she that fact the of A-conscious be must there that well assume might we contrary, the a “zombie” –on not is HYP the arguably, possibility of zombies who nevertheless have inaccessible P-conscious experiences). Now, cannot allow for this unless she were to posit the obscure – if not outrightincoherent – phenomenal proponent (of the of overflow the course, tobe“zombie” states conscious states A- for those allowing without states A-conscious of theoccurrence weassume when models might not at all be A-conscious. Yet a serious problem arises for phenomenal overflow cases insuch aspersons insofar states vegetative in certain or infancy inearly case the just be possiblebebeing for also without asubjecttoP-conscious might A-conscious.Perhaps this dissociation only in a “shallow” sense. For the sake of argument, let us grant that it might be involve cases such overflow, phenomenal involve ofA-dissociation insofar ascases that in mentioned I As inconsistent P-states of the HYP and the HO. will be which a state intramodallyP-conscious apparently will subsumptively unify the which is isn’t,P-conscious of onesuch pain and which a viewimplies ineffect there that problem with this view is that insofar as the HOP involves two cognitive systems, one of claim is simply that 13 P andQ same tobeinboth at the for thesubject is like time. itbe something Note that this view does not entail representationalism as generally understood inthe philosophy of mind. The something it is like for her to be in, say, a meta-(A)-conscious state in which she is fully is she inwhich state meta-(A)-conscious a say, in, be to her for like is it if there is a mental representation that is P-conscious, then so and so. Section 1.3 Section ., as opposed to Bayne and Chalmers, I am not so convinced 40 13 Yetaclear CEU eTD Collection implying adissociation in P-consciousness in a“deep”quite sense. pain’sthat being even potentially available for access,then believeinI onewould effect be On hand,if other the posit one were to possibility the persisting of phenomenal pain without shallow sense.” “inarelatively of consciousness implies this adissociation only then I agree: moment, given any at state a phenomenal in contained information the all access possibly we fact unity So if“breakdown”cannot that seeming of the simply to the access refers haveaccessto. principle) possibly (in wecannot which P-conscious states/experiences our of features/aspects particular be certain nevertheless theremight feature/aspect), that to attention our way implies that, at any given time, however much we might be ready forit (e.g., by focusing at information available amountthe certain of onlya cognitive processing, on due toconstraints t isthat establish memory” “iconic on studies What experiments. Sperling-type of implications the of interpretation Chalmers’ and Bayne and Block’s both in fallacy main the as see I what out me point Let top. on inconsistency intramodal with dissociations pain/no-pain.of view of the HYP: one of P-conscious pain, and another of a unified P-conscious hybrid of then, are you get, Shallow What state. in-principle-inaccessiblebe an P-consciousunifying state and the painful non-painful the or non-shallow also will there A-dissociation, of case in the that, thesis subsumtive Chalmers’ and Bayne of – adhere to this view, and you will have two 1 could bebe to said alsoA-conscious (i.e., potentially available for further processing) at t 1 can actually be accessed (i.e., further processed or “consumed”)time or further at processed can be accessed(i.e., actually even if two all the information contained in a P-conscious state at time at state P-conscious in a contained information the all in-principle-inaccessible P-conscious states from the point the from states P-conscious in-principle-inaccessible 41 t 2 . Yet this in no in this Yet . t 1 , CEU eTD Collection words (1995/1997, p. 385): words blindfield having without anyvisual proper experiences of projectedthe stimuli. InBlock’s her to byvisual activated projections of representations the be A-conscious wouldpatient Block Yet conceptualized of he a inwhat dubbed“super-blindsight”, phenomenon which a of behavior. or rational the verbal control of forreport reasoning, the purposes representation this incapable of using be nevertheless would thepatient water, of of features glass the positively biaspositively her forced-choice might which representation amental activating system, thus by her collicular were detected ifeven In glass words, of aglass water notreachfor other inherblindfield. the still of water for thispatientifconvincingis were thirsty, claim even ablindsight shewould that support blindsightconcept, patients areA-conscious not of withinthings theirblindfield.A atleast P-consciousness, Blockthat, (1995/1997)emphasizedunder histhe of construal and A-consciousness between distinction conceptual the on paper original his In specifically, Iam interested in whether wemight make progress by assuming the following: More resolvingcontradiction between theHYP’sandHO’sreports. the apparent overflow, viz. the possibility of A-consciousness without P-consciousness might help us in of opposite phenomenal pursue whetherassumingthe again,focus HOonce the and on the reorient to wish I section, this In theses. unity and/or consistency our of go letting from refrain to were intention if one’s ice much cut not would arguments overflow phenomenal in theexperiencereinterpreting thespiritof In the that of HYP the section, previous Iargued 4.2. Access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness (ii’’’) If the HO reports that she is in pain, then the HO is A-conscious (but not (but isA-conscious HO the then isinpain, she that reports HO If the (ii’’’) P-conscious) of pain. guesses concerning a very a limited setof concerning very some very basic 42 CEU eTD Collection Then again, insofarThis would seem fitto the picture: thereas is nofeeling of pain,just “pure” knowledgethe about it. HYP was aware of this knowledge all along, this case is not a Consider the following retrospective report of a subject: report followingConsider the retrospective of kind,withthis thoughts/ideas of intoher“popping” pain mindany feeling without of pain? Is itpossible HOmight thatthe be a“very limited partial zombie” (Block, 1995/1997,p.385) case of “super-blindsight”: phenomenon, in observed (analgesia),anesthesia qualify would seem to as a paradigmatic is infollowing Construedof which generally this perceptual state way, associated. the the or withis presented, object modality the which sensory through of any the P-experience having same at the time without state aperceptual or object an of a representation access to gain any might one in tocase which viz.,as applying insense, of amoreconstrued general if were term the “super-blindsight” mightbein cases of any there whether interested more appear toexist”402). Block might (p. well beconcerningblindsight right but patients, Iam issuper-blindsight 386), ultimatelya striking fact”(p. concluding that such cases “do not of nonexistence (apparent) “the that exclaimed he P-consciousness, without A-consciousness Though Block left the question open as to whether there might be any actual cases of there but didn't say it. (Hilgard et al., 1975, p. 286; italics in original) doesn't Part of me knows the pain is there, but I'm not sure I (James, 1890/1983,p.202; italics in original) bent three or six times by the operator, or if he stroked it three, six, etc., times.” Similarly the subject the Similarly placed inthehand occasioned Things placed in the hand were not felt, but felt, not were hand in the placed Things There is something itis like to experience the latter, but not the former, he says.” likeknow visually to an about X in blindhis field and an X inhis field. sighted what it it.himselfis contrasts any of super-blindsighter experience The perceptual the way some peoplesolutionspop intoproblems thoughts,orin our that beenworrying we’veabout to just know Visual information from his blind field simply into hispops in thoughts way the the time or which way is north without having feel it, but I'm not sure if the hypnotized part may have known it was thought of the number 3, 6, etc., if the hand or finger was ideas of of a keyorknife, handthe butfelt nothing. 43 thought feel of […]. A key, a knife, it. The hypnotized part CEU eTD Collection be the converging seems to of HO the interpretation zombie the of a gut-rejection road. Interestingly, that down resolve ourreal problem; if we are going toposit zombiehood, we will havego all to the way pointexamples ofsuper-blindsight, positing HOs be“very to limited partial not zombies” will of empirical good constitute well might practicallyanalgesia hypnotic of cases certain while Hence, HYP is not. all parties the yet of which is P-conscious, HO which the of or experience state mental isasingle there interestednature of the HOP will remain under any interpretationreal our that clear now of what the HO reports on insofarin as theunder anyinterpretation of pain insofar as we assume the HO tobe P-conscious of itpain,is HOP. in While Yet while of how one might possibly both would have simply shifted from how one might both insofar as we were to assume that the HO any of whatitpain, experiences considerssensory painwithout as about acquireis knowledge P-conscious of such “knowledge”, to For evenifthe HOwere linger seem to our on. of nature HOP would apparently paradoxical problem (like cross-modal thoughts or sensory of dilemmaexperiences) pain, concerningthe our So theproblem is following:isinsofar the astheHYP totally “stand-ins” of oblivious any activities), and the pain in particular. In the words of an experimental participant: thethat HYPis both totally aboutignorant HOin the general its(including reporting is many HO cases of characteristic truly baffling the But involved. is nocontradiction there “super-blindsight” we have been –butdiscussing if subjectknew the herabout knowing, then paradigmatic example of the HOP. Sure enough, itis an exciting example of just the kind of writing) I didn’t knowingly know Iwas writing. (Hilgard, 1977, p. 210) and(instrange, because Ididn’tfeel thepain It’s knowingly automatic reported, Section 3 Section . we only concluded that the dilemmatic nature of the HOP will remain will HOP of the nature dilemmatic the that concluded . weonly issue has little to do with the feeling of pain per se: the dilemmatic the se: per pain of feeling the with do to little has issue think that she is in pain yet not think that she is in pain. in is she that think not yet in pain is she that 44 feel pain yetfeelnot paintothe problem CEU eTD Collection 188). Thougharguments for this position are hardtofindin (something work Hilgard’s the ‘intellectual’ level claimingfor thatthe something awareness” (p.185), “a HO ismerely at metaphor happening but not availablein not“thewas hithertoof up till observing retrospectivethe accounts, point the part to the consciousness that, believed he nevertheless of this, well aware HOP–was of the modern re-discoverer the of the hypnotized While (1977)– Hilgard having been P-conscious. as experiences HO retrospectively their of person” (p. “excruciating”.Weadd tothis might thefurther pointimportant subjectsthat recounteven reasona second in general), non-psychologists most suspect I and Bayne; to(and Block to According believe thatwith. the HO associated is itgenerally states/processes physical the from dissociate well very itmight then is P-consciousis contingent, if P-consciousness that arguments zombie from follow to seem only would it isseem argue futilephilosophically against based to zombiehood on somatic markers–after all, that shepressure would seem hardly likeindicators sufficientof itP-conscious pain.Second, would often describes the pain as self-reports of self-reports of 1969, pain (Hilgard, of pain do not covary with the intensity neithernor philosophically empirically,of very markers psychophysiological First, promising. stimulation in the same lawful way asmesuch seems pain. to a reasoning Yet as underP-conscious of level andpattern activation shown by heart and same markersof the pressure)manifest rate blood pain psychophysiological (e.g., certain analgesia, in hypnotic that, observation common the on based is first The Block (1995/1997)proposed reasonsmighttwo whywebelieve that the HOis P-conscious. Perner (2007) seem to imply that the HO might not even qualify as (fully)A-conscious. mostleastlike probably) P-conscious,psychologists Bowers(e.g.,1994)orDienes and is be at (or HO must thatthe Bayneargue (2007) or (1995/1997) likeBlock philosophers in Kihlstrom al.,et 2000); thus, andrate heart blood 45 CEU eTD Collection dreaming, or interrupting this sleep-state very without their awareness their Sincedreaming. dreamers areWhat Ihave in mind is between implicitthe relation HOPand“lucidthe dreaming”. Lucid people who HOP which claim– to bestthe ofmy knowledge –has not yetbeen in discussed literature. the the of to interpretation” Mary “Swamp the of beimplication important and perfectly interesting an is There aware during their dreams that they are any “miracles”. As an experimental participant formulated this in relation to HOP: in the to this relation formulated participant anexperimental As any “miracles”. assuming without – possible be empirically well very might cases such isthat is correct) view HOPsuggests Hilgard’s (if the such a and what about scenario; inconceivable conceptually say, a rose for the first time (Dennett, 2007, for timesay, first (Dennett, the a rose into sheafter seeing, gone state would have the identical becomes to state herway brain that Swamp is by Mary bolt struck lightning of a thatmiraculouslyher braininsuch rearranges a tones refer to sounds allegedly not heard by the HYP. bythe heard not allegedly sounds to refer tones 14 knowledge of room just like Jackson’s famous (1982) Mary before(who, leaving this room, has no case imaginary neuroscientistof Swamp Mary,an of vision imprisonedin ablack and white dissociation of P-consciousness (including cases of phenomenal overflow). Second, recall the associatedyouif with toassume like),pain, than theempirical possibility of a genuine possiblyour (orthe bodily/cognitivereporting unconsciously pain on states/processes light of the HOP, it would First of stillall, onemight argue that if letting go of at least one of our theses bewere unavoidable in less counterintuitiveseem. first at might it as to position assume the empirical viabilityBayne (2007) has on), I believealso commented is itatall not skepticalas or absurd a of This subject also participated in a session in which hypnotic deafness was suggested, thus, the “registered” the thus, suggested, was deafness hypnotic which in session a in participated also subject This part of your brain. Maybe the tones register in your memory and skip going through the conscious whatit islike 14 (Hilgard,p. 210) 1977, to see colors), with the only difference that, before her release, 46 in Alter, 2008).Arguably, isnothingthere CEU eTD Collection reasoning, one might argue about way: argue HOin mightfollowing the one the reasoning, such of spiritIn the behavior. manifest goal-directed clearly subjects that observation A common argumentin favor of ascribing tolucid P-consciousness dreamers isbased on the as well? sake) that forin dreaming general, lucid position (or our on dreaming re-evaluate shouldn’t weperhaps then P-conscious, not is HO the contrary, the to memories of claims despite that, believe to reason have if wemight direction: other the from issue approach the Or to P-conscious? is HO the that HOP, the of in case the data empirical of such kinds just between fitsuch a lucidthat really have dreamers luciddreams, P-conscious then why in the face ofjust deny, fitbetween thebehavioral, andsubjective psychophysiological data,one werewilling grant to only retrospectively uponawakening).(viz., So the is question thefollowing:if, based on a becoming only experimenters, the P-conscioustheir of dreams signalingunconsciously to were subjects inthementioned studies that would posit few andestablished, professionals isbeHere’s to nowwidely well- issue.Evidence onluciddreaming the considered sleep sleep-phase (the associated with dreaming) (cf. LaBerge, 1990). reported andthe observed signals, all cases of which during occurred unambiguous REM dreams duringnight. their that Asit sleep out,therewasturned a correspondence between the lucid had they – times many how and when yes, if – and whether of accounts retrospective measures andsubjects’ polysomnographic matchedwith both signalswerethen dreams. Such afist-clench)perform aneye-movementlucidsomeor prearranged their signal during (e.g., to dreamers lucid well-trained asked researchers studies, of series famous In a dream-states. for the existence of such finding reports) took (beyond subjective to the of task evidence researchers skepticism, great metwith were lucid originally dreaming of subjective reports 47 CEU eTD Collection physical. insofaras it does not posit (and neitherdoes itdeny) thatP-consciousness is causally inert with respect to the our psychological functioning. This position is neutral concerning the issue of metaphyisical epiphenomenalism 15 behavior followinon (xvii),it wascontingent thatgoal-directed noway would here. sense psycho-functional in the be understood is to term the if especially epiphenomenalism, on question the beg The above claims, if true, would clearly entail (xiii). The problem is that both claims seem to following: brain is (mostpatients probably) P-conscious, oneargue for might (xiii)by claiming the split- of right-hemisphere the that view the of favor in argument (1997) Shallice’s on Based why following the claim sufficeshould not for our purposes: mightask he specifically, More first inassumption. to the “folk”intuition relation merethan more want clearly will skeptic the appeal, intuitive has some admittedly While the argument Psycho-functional epiphenomenalism is apositionaccording to whichP-consciousness has no role to play in (xv) The The HO must be P-conscious. (xv) Therefore, The HO manifests goal-directed behavior(xiv) (xiii) It is a necessary condition of goal-directed behavior that a subject be xi) P-consciousness is not (xvii) epiphenomenal. If goal-directed behavior were possible in the absence of P-consciousness, (xvi) (xiii’) It is a necessary condition of goal-directed behavior that a subject be P-conscious. then P-consciousness would be epiphenomenal. be would P-consciousness then A-conscious. 15 For, as I will soon discuss the issue, even if one adhered to adhered ifone issue, even the as Iwill discuss soon For, 48 CEU eTD Collection theory entails (at the minimum) the following claim: following the minimum) the (at entails theory involving the central control and monitoring of various subsystems, the dissociated control or maintained voluntarily. Of course, insofar as voluntary (intentional) action is understood as action;mightwell purposes behavior goal-directed its without beingserve important initiated of “dissociated control”, then, there is nothing contradictory in the notion of an unintentional subsystems.According and of tothis the theory oversee functioning coordinate, various the initiate/inhibit, is to conditions) normal which (under of task the system executive central from the and dissociate activated automatically become hypnosis), (e.g., circumstances special certain under might, control behavioral of subsystems cognitive non-conscious and (1994;Bowers Davidson,Bowers 1991;Millerargues certain that 1993) andBowers, not even A-consciousness (xiii’))(xvii) argue (contra (xviii),independently that might whether one adheredto or one of is a is that, necessary topic our to is orthogonal epiphenomenalism of issue the why reason second The condition now. of goal-directed Of (xviii)is zombistletcourse, whatthe exactly issue deny,but would for usputthis aside behavior. For example, claim: empirical following the to and (xiii’) about of goal-directed actions, one might easily admit to(xiii) if she were to admitboth to P-conscious. For,e.g.,even if P-consciousness hadnocausal toplayrole in the bringing epiphenomenalism that noted be it should Of course, sake). for that A-consciousness, (or P-consciousness (xiii’’) It is a necessary condition of voluntary (intentional) behavior that a subject be a subject that behavior (intentional) voluntary of isnecessary condition It a (xiii’’) is also P-conscious. state/experience Any A-conscious (xviii) A-conscious. per se is not really related to our issue concerning whether the HO is HO the whether concerning issue our to related really not is 49 CEU eTD Collection argues that yes, shedoes: that argues functioning, question the is whether the HO engages in any such cognition. Bayne(2007) inin high-level executive hypnosis general, can, engage Yet evenifsubjects under 2002; cf. Dienes also and Perner,2007). FanandPosner, (Raz,Shapiro, interference iseliminated Stroop processing, amazingly, the high-hypnotizablescircumstances, suggestions hinder lexical when aregiven to the normal under is non-eliminable very and robust while effect interference Yet this red color). errors when the word presented itself denotes usually more answerautomatictime lexical moretake processing, subjects to and commit a color name (e.g., the word “blue”name areaskedto which subjects of color the ink appears,due the a inword which to written in in test, example,in Stroop For classic the activated). once unstoppable “mandatory” (i.e., as of thought recently until were which processes automatic inhibit voluntarily even executive functioning. Actually, is there evidence now thathighly hypnotizable subjects can evidencealso strong contrary,subjects tothe viz.that high-level hypnosis under exhibit is there Yet cf.and Rhue,1991). inhypnosis, Lynn processes automatic general on overview hypnotic Admittedly, phenomena. evidence is infavor of some there agood view(for this in observable controlled effort or attention, of allocation directed initiative, executive no iswhich according theory to there denies, control dissociated just whatthe this is Of course, following: adhered (xviii),to in order to secure (xv) based on(xiii’’), one would also have toassume the Now, if goal-directed behavior canbe automatic (non-A-conscious), then, clearly, even if one to invoke zombie98) systems. (p. inclined most are we in which syndromes those in seen those than flexibility and involve[…] hiddenbehaviours observer more cognitive appearto sophistication xv) The HO manifests voluntary (xiv’)(intentional) behavior. 50 CEU eTD Collection reports of atleastpain pain (or insofar as Bayneis correct that let us grant argument, sakeof the For P-consciousness. It is clear from the context of theagainst (xiii’’) in followingthe way: above for theissue indirectly, independentgrounds). Instead,Bayne arguing argue tackles on passage challengeskeptic/zombist will admittedly,is hard tend to (of course, notoriously to (xviii) that whatBayne hismself provide independentfordoesn’t any argument(xviii) very –the claim the Bayne has in mind is follow: clearly would following behavior (xiv’) Now, if one subscribed (as Bayne clearly does) to the viewsense, arises thatonly at the A-conscious level.the HO manifests voluntary leastin zombiehood, at view, the philosophically/psychologicallyof question the relevant processes activated during the Strooptaskas involving“zombiehood”, either. inmy So, lexical automatic referwe don’t After tothe all,place. in first the “zombie systems” involving as convinced Iam such automaticprocesses construe of not broadcast), weshould involve A-consciousness might (information feed into the subsystems without being globally iswhich insofar noclearsign there Yet functioning. assuch executive cases neednot of in –i.e., isinflexible in behaviorcases of subjects goal-directed the and unsophisticated in cases which involving those as “zombie systems” of though, thatBayne conceives Note, bodily states – viz., as representations of the subject’s conscious states. (p. 97) states, thensuggested –hidden observer behavioursof arereports bodily and perceptual have I –as if implausible: we facie prima is model oughtzombie the by given answer The to treat them as we treat other reports of perceptual and (xiii’’’) Itis a necessary condition of voluntary (intentional) behavior that a subject be P-conscious. and to the view that A-consciousness entails P-consciousness (xviii), then the then (xviii), P-consciousness entails A-consciousness that view the to sensory ) are reports of perceptual and bodily states. Yet how does 51 CEU eTD Collection implicit perception does not involveimplicitperception does A-consciousness. then onimplicitevidence likeperception would seem for claim nosupport (xx) insofar as “unconscious”is as applying all understood to cases in is a which subject P-unconscious, if side, other Onthe P-conscious. being also without content of perceptual A-conscious bear argumentwould not to on originalour seem viz.,might issue, whethertheHObe following: “unconscious” If is as merely understood “implicit”,a synonymfor then above the reasoning, verbal in wereavailablethis toperception perceptual relate for contextwould the contents which report, and the rational in perception explicit or press). Conscious in (Kihlstrom, event” that of conscious perception control of independentin of,in or the absencestimulus of, environment action currentthe of an object behavior. or thought, experience, subject’s But the on effect “the as define then might we which perception”, the problem“implicit on evidence mounting the to is reference make might theone (xx), for support As argument for unconscious emotions): Bayne, one might perhaps arguein followingthe way from (adapted Kihlstrom et al.’s (2000) insofarActually, asreports of pains mightbe understoodasreports of contrabodily states, P-consciousness are simply notapplicable to cases like the HOP. assumptions/intuitions concerning relation the between reportingsophisticated and common perhaps our so phenomenon; uncommon and is peculiar a rather HOP After the all, we how that’s because just states (P-)conscious thesubject’s of as representations suchreports treat we should that this from follow it (xxi)Pain Therefore, Perception can be unconscious. (xx) Pain (xix) (sensory) (sensory) can be can unconscious. is of states. bodily perception the 52 usually go about interpreting goabout such reports? CEU eTD Collection the hypnotic session. hypnotic the function of HO’sgainingaccessthe to them for purposes “automatic the of reporting” during inmemory reinforced a more andbetter as of deeply representations processed were pain fact that simple by the ismediated experiences HO’s the of reportability retrospective the that toward the view that HOs might, after all,be P-conscious. Then again,one might still assume seem be tiltseem might capable of.unconscious balance the to donot to This cognition capable of pulling off a feat which subjects engaged in various purportedly other high-level is HO be, might the admittedly, processes certain P-unconscious sophisticated however So, reporting activities of the HO. the and asphenomenal pain) retrospectively interpreted/remembered states bodily/cognitive the (or pain-experiences both prior of memory traces to the least at full access HO casegain (meta-)access totheir beingin engaged high-levelany cognitive processing,in subjects the have never any subjects in cases, mentioned while, the For HOP. the such cases and such high-level unconscious cognition is possible, there remains a crucial difference betweensimply not A-conscious of their beingin engaged meta-cognition?).even Yet that granted were subjects (perhaps along all P-conscious really weren’t subjects be that sure wecan how ask might one course, Of self-monitoring. others) involves (among meta-cognition because flexible planning control and of behavior takes place; (if latter the ispossible) striking ismemory strikingvery“workspace”becausepossible) working the where constitutes The 2005) and 2005). andKihlstrom, unconscious former(Glaser meta-cognition (if striking examples such processesof arethoseof unconscious memory working (Hassin, it. Perhapsthemost without actually occur might P-consciousness involving paradigmatically many as formerly directionof tothe cognitive processes evidencethought that points of body a growing that claiming now are neuroscientists and psychologists again, Then 53 CEU eTD Collection under similar circumstances. under similar P-consciousness if one had no second thoughts on ascribing P-consciousness to the HYP should beher on states denied “online” bodily/cognitive/perceptual sophisticated reports at first seem. On the other hand, admittedly,it is hard to see why a HO that can provide rather might obscureasit that not painis on unconscious reporting ideaof unconscious perhaps the cognition and the voluntary control of flexible behavior might occur (P-) unconscious pain I don’t think we can call any shots here. Surely, as counter-intuitive as the notion of an (sensory) might be, if one is willing to grant that even working memory, meta- memory, working even that grant to is willing if one be, might 54 un consciously, then CEU eTD Collection point, though, let though, memakepoint, first acouple on issue. comments of demand-compliance the dissociation a genuine from arising experiences simultaneous as of pain of experiences consciousnessoscillating their (Spanosconstrue mightthemselvesallowof to withinenactment come subjects HOsituation that the and Hewitt, 1980). of role- modern theories On contrary, the (etc.). tobefaking subjects backfall on assuming Before I elaboratesuggestions as implicit requests to focuson on the noxiousthis stimulation. Of course, one needlatter not characteristics,subjects posit might that misunderstood have misinterpretedor such p. 186).YetHilgard,proponents 1977, of SM, building the on notionthe of demand referred to shiftongoingshould she that subject the to hersuggested explicitly never hypnotist the informationattention; course, Of stimulation. noxious the from away and to attention her switches or shifts hypnotist, the of onsuggestion processing the contrary,one of (partwhich in the or the the)Bayne “switchingfor this (2007) calls (SM), the is model” basicthe idea original is there that only subject subject HOmight presentexperiments, be unawareat any time the(cf. duringhypnotist the HO onlyexperiment who, upon the reports, thusintroducing time-indexicals our original to claims in followingthe way: strategy involves challenging nature the truly simultaneous of HYP’sthe and HO’sthe makingforleft senseof apparentlycontradictory the reports of HYPand the HO.This the apart, yet who are still not willing to let go of coming any of our P-consciousness theses, and there A-consciousness of seems possibility to be empirical onein the optionbelieve not who do yet fullybe credible, HO to the HYPand the both of reports the who take those For i’ The HO reports that she is (iv’)in pain at time ii) The HYP reports that she is not(iii’) in pain at time 5. The breakdown oftemporal continuity 55 t 2 , t 4 , …, t , t 1 , t 3 , …, t j . i . CEU eTD Collection problem is that subjects don’t appear to experience any switching of experience switching appear to of their conscious any isproblem don’t subjects that simultaneously. construe of alternating the ashavingoccurred course, prior experiences Of (post-hypnotically) retrospectively might subjects that assumption the in controversial experiences Though assimultaneous. a bitbafflingin itself, isnothingthere very alternating their of construe themselves might subjects that issue the to return now us Let experiences. the issue is whether we might accountfor the HOP by assuming that subjects have oscillating muchquestion ofswitching dowith hasnot veridicality.to characteristics Rather, demand or spontaneously shifting their attention to and away from the painful stimuli. So, as I see by spontaneousregistry isthe of hypnotic effectuated analgesia pain during subjects’ it, the situational cuessuggestions,misinterpreted anddemands, and nevertheless etc., that propose necessarily sure this againsttheSM.YetI’m not is of registration militates pain spontaneous the so. After Interestingly, Bayne (2007),while himselfa proponentof SM,believesthe thatevidenceall, on the proponent registeringspontaneous painfulthe of stimuli. of the SM subjects doengagein cognitive system) (or andfurther, really their that issue grant might well nevertheless parallel had fantasy-experienceslet two simultaneously. Yet usnotthis pursue rest his caseleave open possibility akin the lucidthat, to dreaming, might perhapssubjects have concerning evident thiscontextual would etc.), still “registered”(dueto cues pain havingbeen actually withoutany on information veridical reports HOs mightprovide retrospective that believed wouldinformation arguethat I again, spontaneously. Then “register” really do ifdo subjects suggestions willnot misinterpreted and/or demandappealingto characteristics pain even if the HO is suggested only is suggested HO the if even pain arecapable Recall subjects intensity of location,the on duration,reporting that and quality of after 56 the physical stimulation is terminated. So terminated. is stimulation physical the even if one CEU eTD Collection At time At HOPthen. paradigmatic the of switching account of the throbbing was analgesic; in not was needed HO experience all for the that case, this to thegradual decrease that the amnesia insofar HYPwas example asthe aparadigmatic HOP of above the the caseis not Of course, of the HYP be lifted. had inmind if considerwe the following case,also by recounted Hilgard: he probably what of a hunch wecan get Ithink on idea, the While elaborate didn’t Hilgard simultaneous vs. the switching interpretation of the HOP, the on passage ina noted he As explanation. possible a to closest came who – SM the itwas Hilgard perhaps experiences. –afierce Ironically, critic (1977) of parallel continuous constitute experiences discontinuous their alternating, that have“hyper-illusion” to the I know of) has so far come forward with an account of how it mightnobody beleast possible (at SM the of for personsproponent no happens, it As continuous. are experiences their that claim HO the and HYP the both generally, – either session, hypnotic the during experiences t 2 , she shifts her attention to the painful stimuli and feels “excruciating” pain. Yet at Yet pain. “excruciating” feels and stimuli painful the to attention her shifts she , throbbing.’” 238-9) (pp. in decreasethe step been another ‘That’s there’s funny, subject repeated: liftedhypnotistchangemistake. was from The hisarm a shoulder,the and the throbbinghad decreasedcontinuously theand that previous reportof a sudden hypnotist placed hishand on shoulderthe again,reported thatthe subject the and was unaware going part of overtly on,The the throbbing. the responding inquiry was While hiddenobserver histhe arm. throbbingdecrease’ in of the been a ‘step had there that he reported experience, covert the amnesic for subject in had With and the removed analgesia. hand concealed painhe experienced the hypnotist’sthe hand on hisfor shoulder hidden the hereport, described the enough, butthat was there somein throbbing arm,graduallythe With decreasing. itwas comfortable that hereplied was comfortable, arm the whether asked When releasethe hypnotic in of of analgesia arepetition ischemic session. an pain This subject remaining hypnotized had justhad thetourniquet removed following 237; italics added) (p. experiences.” a pairongoing represent of thetwo reports that subject convinces the interpretations. Thisis because true the both to applies dissociated as behaviors two the of classification the 57 amnesic component t 1 , the subject (HYP) feels no pain. Mutatis mutandis common to both , here’s my t 3 , CEU eTD Collection both continuously P-conscious! as well, she will in fact report that, during the time spanpoint uptill ofconsciousness that stream an uninterrupted of perception aware of HYP’s the of which, according toour other formula, was perceived by the HYP as t having during span time the pain had P-conscious she apersisting memory traces, will report our formula, the subjective time for HO at this time instance will be instancefor will HOatthis time time formula, subjective the our of to leadingof HYPup the any at time to have access HOwill the what simultaneously, present be HYP the theHOand at notime can SM, the to since according Ofcourse, HYP’s states. time Wemight say, then, that at any time consciousness consciousness flowing(in from this case, also in pain at (in (in “HO it mode”) that is only believed at believed she all, after – HYP the of time-construal the instance ago (at ago instance again “HOmode”,is theto subject ofthefact shein oblivious that wasn’t pain justan mis having happened since stream of consciousness since consciousness of stream Now, since the subject is sure (quite righty) at righty) is (quite sure since subject the Now, stimuli,butshe isby also struck total amnesia all regarding happened that at(during) HYP,not backswitching the upon her sheshift to only attention away from does painful the 2-50 conception of a continuous experience of analgesia. Then, at Then, analgesia. of experience continuous a of conception . Of course, at course, . Of t j , the HO will think that the time is time the that think will HO the , t 3 (in “HYP mode”) that it is only is it that mode”) “HYP (in t 2 t , the HO will also come be construed of as having a continuous stream stream of acontinuous of beas having come construed HOwill also , the 3 t ). A possible explanation for this amnesia is that she accepts and builds on builds and accepts she is that amnesia this for explanation A possible ). 100 the HO alsohas full access to the memory traces of the HYP up till t t j-1 1 , the HYP mistakenly construes of . Let us assume, then,that the HO is quizzed at t t 1 3 , yet since the HYP hasn’t the faintest memory of anything of memory faintest the hasn’t HYP the since yet , . Since, in “HO mode”, the subject remembers that she that remembers was in subject “HOmode”, the . Since, t i , the HYP will think that the time is time the that think will HYP the , t 2 through t (j/2)+1 58 t 2 t , it seems logical that she should believe at believe should she that logical seems it , . Now, recall that the HO has access to the 3 is that there were no temporal “gaps” in her “gaps” notemporal were there that the same subject. So since the subject Sosince the subject. thesame t 3 ). t 2 - t 50 , the HYP and the HO were t t 3 t t 4 as 50 t j , upon switching once switching upon , are the memory traces the memory are 51 . Since the HO is well , and based upon her t t (i+1)/2 2 t , resulting ina 100 . According to , while atany t 99 t t 2 4 , . CEU eTD Collection responsibility. moral of notion very the threatening effect in nonsensical, apparently are on judgments base ourethical we hypotheticals counterfactual then subjects, the are nopersisting if there –e.g., lightheartedly be taken to issue no is this Naturally, well. as illusory be might conceptionviz.more our of that persisting possibility, disturbing of experience subjects even perhaps a raises continuity illusory of possibility the Yet time. through evolve they that implication of the model – after all, it seems a most fundamental unwanted an featurebe quite of would consciousthis states Admittedly, altogether? illusion an is continuity that consciousness. Yet perhaps it is not only the case that continuity breaks down in the HOP, but of stream own one’s of continuity temporal the concerning hyper-illusion of victim a the be easily might one that implies model the saw, we as that, is problem (related) A second retrospectively, according to the SM, we are forever doomed to oblivion in the HO scenario. thechanges of aware wearewell cases whilein these Yet etc. substance, psychoactive includemight into dozinglight off sleep, entering astate of intoxicated becomingtrance, bya alterations inexperience. Such same any examples (meta-conscious) aware of being time plenty examplesof of a person’s entering intoan altered state of consciousness without at the Of are there having course, occurred. or occurring whatsoeversuch experiential of oscillation recollection or any knowledge awareness, without experiences switches inherconscious radical mighthavemodel, constant one the according to isthat, problem clearly A first believe thereis any empirical supportingevidence it. theses. Unfortunately, model the also hasits drawbacks, serious ultimately, and, Idon’t cherished our of any of abandonment the necessitating without experiences, simultaneous tentative explanation of why/how itmight seem to subjects that they have (had) two As bizarre model asthe proposed seem,might haveit does thevirtue of leastproviding ata 59 CEU eTD Collection neural indicators might merely be reflections of subjects’ noticing/signaling the switches? the noticing/signaling subjects’ of reflections be merely might indicators neural all,irrelevantat isand therobust not rivalry in caseof binocular meta-cognition issuethe of indicators of switches(Tononi,perhapsthe and Srinivasan, Orthe Edelman, Russell 1998). well aware of the switches are subjects rivalry, binocular of in case the Of course, percepts. two between forth and back taking place switching – aconstant experiences subject stimuli,but the two the image of fused of a or stimuli, the point is that thereindependently eachto eye. In such cases,instead ofare having a single percept of only one of thealso robust neural blue redimage agrated stimuliincongruentimage) (e.g., two andviews agrated projected subject a when occurs that a phenomenon rivalry, binocular of case the example for Take lacking. conscious experiences and of states/processes the brain)the is– evidence which totally betweenour correlation is,a minimum, psychophysical at there that do, asI assumes, as one attentional(neuro)psychophysiologial forleastinsofarevidence the purported switching (at leastexpect would switching, one measures providebehavioral evidenceagainst at decisive nor experience/reports, subjective neither that if conceded even one Yet Bayne, 2007). (cf. underlying consciousthe states behaviorneed notthemselvesbesimultaneous simultaneous simultaneously,covert reportingoccur do undermine not would still this the SMinsofar as and overt that evidence behavioral were there if even that viz., well, as point opposite an for noconstitute decisive one might experiences. argue evidencecourse, simultaneous against Of inin would behavioral this sense sosuccessive differing modalities, reporting output measurement study involved validity First, the generalizability of the and/or these of results. haveYet onemight the concerning 1980).reservations milliseconds 500 (SpanosandHewitt, least byat from other each separated were subject of reports the “covert” and “overt” cases, single the issueaddressed found in study ofswitching that that, of the directly 15 out 16 True, enjoy support. any empirical seem to not theSMdoes asnoted, news isthat, The good 60 CEU eTD Collection potentially having abandon to notionthe of a temporally consciousness.continuous is it not clear dissociation, whatof the philosophical experiences import of holding genuine on to the notion of unity psychologically is into the face of admits model the as insofar all, questionablea model whether is the model consciousness. preferable to Afterdissociated of leastis it at model, of the implications potential tothe concede to ifonewere even drawbacks.Yet its conceptual/theoretical model has also the notwithstanding, asdiscussed, account at both the experiential and at the objectively detectable level. The empirical issues flickering from wecan think significantly proposed of differ perceptual/attentional the of examples closest it, the and beevidenceno supporting seemto there that fact of the in light SM the of plausibility empirical the of skeptical one,am for deeply So I, low-hypnotizables casethe (DePascalis, of 2007). in intensity than latency, greater and faster frequency, ahigher with occur actually switches such persons, hypnotizable inhighly caseof the that, evidence firm is contrary, there the awarenessthe ifswitchingsuch of youlike (Cosmelli –altogether and 2007).On Thompson, is voluntarily,might inhibit there noevidence that of one occurrence –or the such switching SM. Forwhile, true, rate the of switchingspontaneous in binocular rivalry becan biased the against militate to seems which rivalry binocular of feature important is another There not have “step-wise” experiences. Soswitches must be quite frequent and rapid.) do observer termination the suggestions areafter subjects of most and given stimulation the stimuli hidden even of patterned when can descriptions retrospective subjects precise provide been so farnot as its mentioned,detected occurring is dueto sporadically only anon-starter: some find to expect would then we states, incongruent between two flicker really can experiences butmatter, This is a complicated point general ifthe remains:P-conscious subjects’ differences between those states. (Note that simply assuming that such flickering has flickering such that assuming simply that (Note states. those between differences 61 CEU eTD Collection concerning the veridicality of pain-reports ( pain-reports of theconcerning veridicality reinterpreting claims nature HOPby of the and/or attacking apparently the contradictory dissolve might we whether examined I phenomenon, the away explaining at attempt second I concluded that theevidence and thearguments in favor of HOPare the overwhelming. Asa questions, tothese issues related important most the of exposition detailed followinga rather available on hypnotic analgesia ( by considering consciousness until whetherwe have notconsidered all other possible explanations. Thus, Istarted out we might of in unity the assume abreakdown not we should that was stance my methodological discredit or of Adhering was indirect. consciousness the principle to innocence”, of “presumption the of otherwise explain acase of mightconstitute HOP the a dissociation inquiry My methodwhether of concerning away the empirical shall hardly find an of phenomenon the account devoid implications. of unwanted data we are exposed, phenomenon the of details the once conflict, conceptual and/or theoretical avoid to mightattempt we however show that, was to goal main the Rather, conclusion. firm notoriously challenging this answer to know the may beto it as as desirable Yet consciousness. dissociated case of question, the primary objectiveThe agenuineprimary question constitute whether thesis this underlying HOPmight the was of this thesis was not to arrivewithin the fields of psychology and the cognitiveat sciences. a about unity the of experience,conscious aswellwith modelsall of current consciousness intuitions “folk” our with be inconflict to seems it for controversial, highly is phenomenon mind. again,the human of Then power the evidenceand complexity of amazing the hypnosis research has The uncovered. isphenomenon itfor intriguing, provides further that phenomena controversial most and intriguing most the of is one HOP the Arguably, 6. Summary and conclusions Section 2.1 .) and/or the“hidden ( and/or observer” .) Section 3 62 .); here, I arrived at the conclusion that, conclusion the at arrived here,I .); Section 2.2 .), but CEU eTD Collection adhere the switchingmodel. to has the model the virtue Though for of apparent accounting and HOP, the of claim simultaneity the abandoning for ourselves ready should we whether phenomenal character of pain is worthwhile examining. Thus, in Thus, examining. worthwhile is pain of character phenomenal violatingmostwithout central intuitions unity our aboutthe orthe consciousness of any isThere that nodoubt model which claims toprovide asatisfactory of HOP the account relatively sophisticated discussion on “unconscious”our pains. model hasoneseriousit “zombily” though problem, ina wemight– that assumes engage evidence and modelstheoretical provided bypsychology and the cognitive sciences. The intuitions with most unity concerningandwith consciousness, of our of the empirical the P-consciousness. Admittedly, a of great advantage zombiethe isit model is in that both line against it without reasonsgood to resist zombie the it model,is notoriously hard provide to concise arguments beggingbe Though thereseemto be alltheway. taken have to thatroadwouldassume zombiehood, the questionwere to if one theHOP, of in thecase that though, beconceded, hadsoon to It blindsight”. “super- of analogue an be might HOP the perhaps onthat proposing tone, the optimistic an with out function(s) mightseem, zombies” “phenomenal as thenotion of As counter-intuitive and/or necessary presence of the consistency thesis (see thesis consistency the problems solutionsthan by violatingpotentially suchbasic assumptions as expressedthat by do such models implicitly entail a dissociation of P-consciousness, but they create more overflowmost seemed arguments promisingafirst at glance,it not was that, only concluded positive account of While HOP. the frameworks laid the theoretical by down phenomenal in noescape, was there Seeing that controversies surrounding the issue of pain are orthogonal to the dilemma posed by the HOP. as central theymightatas first have variousthe seemed, philosophical and questions Section 3 Section 4.1 .). 63 ., I faced head on the challenge of I a providingfaced., headon of challenge the Section 5 Section 4.2 ., Iinquired . started CEU eTD Collection neither will. Either way, Ihope the stakes are now clear. than If perhaps we cannow”(ibid.). nearfuturefuturethe will didn’t,farthe perhaps – or more wisely this doubtlessquestion will answer “The of near future the believed science that “On wholethe is itabstain best to from (1890/1983,p.210).Ironically,conclusion” he also decide,William his that, himselfbeingexposition unable own James noted topic, to this of framework for HOP:more finding afterthe to struggle thanacentury adequate an ago, with I myself am as ambivalent as ever as to which model to opt for. Of course, I am notconsciousness. the first of dissociation the of possibility empirical the and to concede breath, a deep take we haveto more choices– no believe berejected, wehave then areto I model model switching and the this model might be leastthe from desirable a metaphysical of view. point If zombie the of self, the persistence the and continuity temporal concerning implications radical potentially of phenomenalityswitching is model most the appealing inthe justice it sense that does conceptions to our both and to revision concepts of executiveof our pain,voluntary behavior, functioning the like.The and our conceptions– astrict evident the beyond ithas complications noadded that in sense attractive the most of thezombie model, switching the model and the model.dissociation Thezombie is model the unity of the we badchoices: is three faced with are ultimately that then, consciousness. conclusion, My tentative continuity of consciousnessYet and the persistence of subjects through time. due to its pricethe consciousness, abandoning soatintuitions of it central only asthe does such unity model of the whilethis Thus, theoretical respects consequences. and/or conceptual dire have to seems it which to in addition unfounded, empirically seems it amnesia, hypnotic of phenomena general the under HOP the of case the subsuming of elegance the as how onemighthave co-existing a“hyper-illusion” of two as streams of well consciousness, 64 CEU eTD Collection Bowers, K.S. (1994). Dissociated control,imagination, andthe phenomenology of Block, N.(2008).Consciousnessaccess. andcognitive and psychology between mesh the and accessibility, Consciousness, (2007). N. Block, a function On Block, N.(1995/1997). a confusion InN.consciousness. about of O. Block, Binet, A.(1890). Bayne, T. and Chalmers, D. (2003) What is andBayne, unity Chalmers, D.(2003)What the = consciousness?.of T. URL Unity consciousness. of (2009). Bayne, T. Bayne, T. (2008). Bayne, T. The unity andthesplit-brainconsciousness of syndrome. (2007).Bayne, T. Hypnosis and the unity consciousness. In of G. A. Jamieson (ed.), Baars, B. (2002). The conscious access hypothesis: evidence. The consciousrecent Baars, Origins access and B.(2002). (ed.), “Pain”.N. Zalta Aydede,E. M. (2010). In Alter, T. (2008). Phenomenal knowledge without experience. In E. Wright (ed.), Asch, S. E. (1951). 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