Community Dynamics and Ecological Sensibility for Sustainable Mangrove Governance in , South , Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana Universitas Bakrie E-mail: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

To promote devolution and participation in natural resource governance, the government of Indonesia encourages the collective management of natural resources through self-governed local communes. It also promotes consensual decision-making over the use and allocation of natural resources at the village, district, and regency level. This approach, when coupled with the commercialization of Indonesia’s natural resources, is believed to encourage social inclusion, economic welfare, and ecological responsiveness.

The case of Sinjai’s mangroves suggests that the presence of social institutions can stimulate social sensibility, encourage attachment to the natural landscape, and instigate collective responsibility for protecting the local mangroves. Community initiatives for mangrove planting within the village of Tongke Tongke emerged due to wave intrusion, soil erosion, and material loss. The hope to create new land and own mangrove trees sustained the motivation for land restoration and led to the initiation of the Aku Cinta Indonesia (ACI) mangrove organization. The ACI organization, whose aim is to establish clearly defined property and user rights for safeguarding the cultivators’ hard work, provides community members with pride, identity, and platforms for mangrove conservation. Although the mangrove plots are privately owned by the 117 ACI members, they are also collectively managed and conserved by the multiple resource users across the landscape.

In Tongke Tongke, social institutions and local rules came into play and the people committed to protect the mangroves on behalf of the community. These social institutions took the form of kinship ties, collective identity, symbolic reciprocity, social responsibility, and ecological sensibility. The mangroves were not free access, but governed by formal and informal rules to maintain its benefits for the good of the community. The community, through the elders, determined the access and made decisions about management on behalf of them all. Community members acted in a way that benefited the overall good even when they were avowing individual rights. Individuals evolved behaviors that were commensurate with their responsibilities, leading to innovative power structures that were locally sensitive and environmentally appropriate.

Keywords: devolution, power relations, consensus, collective action, identity validation, reciprocity, social responsiveness, ecological sensibility JEL Classification: Q2 78 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

INTRODUCTION natural resource governance, the post-Suharto (1998–present) government of Indonesia (GOI) Indonesia’s population reached 210 million has adopted community-based natural resource in 2000; population growth rate is 1.8 percent governance, which focuses on decision- per annum. Approximately 41 million people making at the village, district, and regency (22% of the population) live in or near coastal levels as regards resource allocation. The areas (BPS 2000). Half of them are dependent regency government, along with the district on local coastal resources for their livelihood. management and local user communities, was Marine-related activities account for 20 percent given the right to manage Indonesia’s natural of total gross domestic product (GDP), and 19 resources (Satria 2002). percent of non-oil and gas GDP. Moreover, This paper discusses a later phase of the the coastal areas provide employment and GOI’s community-based natural resource income for about 16 million people, which governance program in the regency of Sinjai, is 24 percent of the national labor force Province. The program is the (Bappeda-Sulsel 1998). Resources such government-endorsed mangrove conservation as mangroves are overexploited for wood scheme within the village of Tongke Tongke, despite their importance for the sustainability of which was initiated by local villagers (YTMI marine and coastal fisheries. As well, there is a 2003). Many of Tongke Tongke’s programs potential for major expansions in aquaculture for promoting sustainable coastal resource production and rice farming. These expansions, governance were under the jurisdiction and if not carefully planned and controlled, will authority of various regency government destroy valuable natural resources including the departments as opposed to being centrally mangroves (Andrianto 2006; Barber 2002). administered through the adoption of an During the Suharto era (1967–1998), umbrella program (Prioharyono 2002). These natural resource governance was marked by programs contributed to the dynamics of a an exploitation orientation. Suharto’s regime multiple-user community and created new emphasized a philosophy of development space and opportunities for reinforcing the that was primarily based on centralized and mangrove conservation discourse. The purpose top-down decision-making. This form of of this paper is to examine the interaction decision-making was adopted to ensure between on-ground practice and government political stability and economic growth policies and programs for sustainable mangrove (Resosudarmo 2006). However, many governance, and to understand the complex of Suharto’s natural resource governance and dynamic power relations that influence initiatives were unsustainable, leading to collective action for resource sustainability further disempowerment and dispossession and conservation. It also examines the social of community members (Siswanto 2005). institutions and social relationships that need Moreover, Suharto’s initiatives were marked to be surmounted for social cohesion and local by power disparity and asymmetrical access mangrove conservation to emerge and endure. to strategic and structural power bases. This undermined local democracy, curtailed METHODOLOGY community participation, and led to uncontrolled exploitation of the country’s This inquiry employed the ethnographic natural resources (Siswanto 2005). To and qualitative research method. The unique promote social inclusion and sustainable nature of ethnography lies in its ability to Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 79

Figure 1. Map of the Indonesian archipelago

Figure 2. The island of Sulawesi and the village of Tongke Tongke 80 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

provide detailed accounts of social interactions and interdependence between the researchers within small-scale settings and to reveal the and the subjects and phenomena being studied rules people use to construct, maintain, and (Law 2003). Lastly, the inquiry assumes that transform their everyday social reality. This through social interaction, reflection, and a research used ethnography because of its heightened learning capacity within ordinary ability to disclose the social and political settings, groups and individuals develop the constructions of the ecological landscape capacity and opportunity for increased social and the natural resources found within the responsiveness and natural resource protection case study site as well as to disclose the social (Marcuse 1988; Van Loon 2001; Lyotard 1979). practices that create, maintain, and transform Data were collected through power relations associated with natural resource participant observations, in-depth and governance (Fetterman 1989). Detailed biographical interviews (Pels 2003), and chronicles of the events and discourse that compilation of secondary data in relation to emerged, as well as the researcher’s reflections government policies, programs, and projects over these chronicles, were recorded, compared, in South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Adoption of the and analyzed to disclose the habits, attitudes, above methods stemmed from the need to and beliefs of the various research subjects acquire detailed accounts of the social and (Baba 1994). political phenomena associated with natural Qualitative inquiry was adopted to enrich resource governance in South Sulawesi knowledge of the field setting and provide (Wenger 1998). In conducting in-depth a “thick description of the specifics.” interviews, the researcher used unstructured but (Geertz 1973, 17) An important aspect thematically-focused interviews to understand of qualitative research is the researcher’s how social phenomena and their meaning ability to follow and understand research are constructed and perceived by the diverse subjects as they interact with others in the social actors (Turnbull 2001; Yin 1984). In communities in which they live. The lived addition to the above data collection methods, experience of research subjects is examined the researcher also wrote and compiled daily to gain a better understanding of reality accounts of observations and experience in construction, social action, and decision- diary format. making processes involving mangrove A pilot study in South Sulawesi was management and conservation. Qualitative conducted from August to October 2004 to inquiry aims to describe and understand acquire networks and connections within ordinary events in their natural settings, as the field site and obtain rudimentary data opposed to studying events in contrived and involving site topography and natural resource invented settings (Herda 1999). By using management programs held within the site. qualitative inquiry, the research holds a number Data were collected in South Sulawesi from of interpretive assumptions (Harmon 1986; Lee March to August 2005. The researcher returned 1998). The inquiry assumes the absence of a to Sinjai in 2008 and 2009, each for two single perspective and the presence of multiple months, to look at how recent perspectives and incomplete subjectively derived realities and insights may be incorporated in the that coexist (Law 2004), thus contributing to analysis. Government officials from South the negotiation of the discourse surrounding Sulawesi were interviewed in mangrove management and conservation. As (South Sulawesi’s capital) and in Sinjai City well, the research assumes complex interactions (Sinjai’s capital). Tongke Tongke villagers were Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 81 also interviewed. Interviews with community policies, programs, and projects (Cornwall leaders were conducted at home in the absence 1994). In addition, the research required of others, which was their preference; whereas comparing and contrasting the findings interviews with non-community leaders were and the subjects’ accounts of the initial conducted at home and/or outdoor in the objectives of the policies and programs. It presence of one to three other persons also needed to venture into the various who were relatives and neighbors of the critics’ perspectives of Indonesian policies, research informants. After regular visits and programs, and projects for the sustainable routine communication exchanges, research governance of natural resources. Textual informants began to open up and share their analysis was used to analyze the secondary perspectives on local participation for the data. Inquiry was conducted by comparing collective management of natural resources, and contrasting secondary and primary data. especially the mangroves. Primary data from This qualitative research utilized the N-Vivo in-depth interviews were transcribed at the field program for data storage and organization. The site. They were then triangulated through following analytical sequences were used interviews, participant observation, and a for analyzing and assessing every narrative closer scrutiny of the physical landscape. An and/or text contained within the primary data issue with ethnographic research is the length of (Fetterman 1989; Neuwman 2003). First, the time required for associating with the research texts obtained from the interviews and the subjects and collecting data. Time limitation researcher’s daily notes were coded (Bryman led the researcher to associate with and 2001; Crotty 1998). The coding process interview mostly those who contributed involved categorizing texts into key ideas to significantly to the program’s complexity explain what happened within the texts. The and dynamics; nevertheless, triangulation was categories were policy, expected outcomes, conducted to ensure the incorporation of various economic empowerment, social-ecological perspectives and decision-making in governing awareness, and natural resource protection. local natural resources. Another issue besetting Next, the researcher compared data and ethnographic research is that of fostering and contexts across the interviews to accentuate maintaining trust; in order to promote trust and explain the specific and unique (Bryman the researcher engaged the research subjects 2001; Crotty 1998). This was necessary for in communication and exchange on a daily analyzing the divergence and convergence basis and assured them of the confidentiality of in perspectives and social practices relating the raw data (Neuwman 2003). to the constructions underlying the mangrove Secondary data were obtained from organization; the outcome was coded government departments, donor agencies, according to the various social constructions nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and significance surrounding the organization government consultants, and academicians (Edwards 1998; Edwards 1999). The illustrative both directly through private meetings and method was then applied to determine the core indirectly through their publications. A number categories and their sub-dimensions, and to of reasons prevailed for the need to collect integrate ideas into hypotheses between core secondary data. At the outset there was categories (Bryman 2001; Crotty 1998). a need to understand the perspectives and One of the categories is the government’s interests of the officers involved in planning and perspective of resource users’ relationship implementing the natural resource governance with nature, which is defined in terms of 82 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

nature’s instrumental values (Eckersley 1992). The informants invited to participate Another category points to the researcher’s field in the research were those involved in the notes in which resource users’ relationships development and implementation of policies, with nature are defined in terms of the political, programs, and projects within the village of cultural, and symbolic elements that emanate Tongke Tongke. Community members and from nature’s social constructions (Eckersley officials targeted by government policies, 1992). From the above stemmed the hypothesis programs, and projects were also invited to on the discrepancy between policy objectives participate in the research. The implications and the proceeding of events surrounding the of government-induced initiatives can implementation of such policies. reverberate to community user groups who Subsequently, through several iterations were not targeted, thus user groups who were the researcher moved from vague ideas and not directly targeted but were indirectly concrete details in the data to complex and affected by the initiatives were also invited comprehensive analyses of the issues (Bryman to participate in the research. In general, the 2001; Crotty 1998). Examples of concrete selection of informants was based on the details are the social and political alliances extent of environmental issues that emerge of resource users, the power configurations within the locality, the extent of the research within the policy and village community, subjects’ involvements in coastal resource the rules underlying the social and political governance, the implications of policies, engagements among natural resource programs, and projects within the field site, users, and the customs, imagination and and the need to triangulate so as to ensure aspirations of project officers and community adequate representation of community user members. These concrete details were then groups. The categories of research informants used to generate a comprehensive analysis of who were invited to participate in South emerging issues associated with collective Sulawesi, along with their numbers and reasons natural resource governance (Bryman 2001; for each category, are depicted in Table 1. Crotty 1998). Moreover, these concrete During the first month substantial details were also used to acquire new insights information on life and local governance in the on facilitating social responsiveness, active village and the regency level was acquired. participation, and inclusive governance The information gathered encompassed the toward the sustainable governance of following: livelihoods of local community Indonesia’s natural resources. Lastly, while members, power structure within the contextualizing data within the complexity village and government bureaucracy, and dynamics of their environment, the contentions and contenders in coastal resource researcher attempted to discern thoughts and/ use and governance, and environmental issues or behavior patterns by comparing, contrasting, and corresponding interventions adopted by and sorting the various categories that emerged regency government officials and community from the data (Bryman 2001; Crotty members. Through this information the 1998). For example, when using the core researcher was able to determine the various category on community engagement and the user groups involved in coastal resource use analyses on collective action, the researcher and governance. As well, through successive analyzed and discussed the dynamic patterns observation and engagement with diverse of domination, reflection, and change. community user groups, the researcher Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 83

Table 1. Reasons for inviting the research informants in South Sulawesi Research Research Reason Reason Informant Informant NGO Aid government officials in Village officials The frontline personnel in representatives facilitating conflict resolution (3 informants) promoting and implementing (2 informants) among mangrove cultivators new initiatives in villages

Project Aid the regency planning Community leaders The status quo in Tongke consultants, board in planning its annual from mangrove and Tongke—they are respected researchers and coastal zone management religious groups and aspired to by villagers academicians programs and projects (5 informants) (2 informants) Members of Approves the selection and The elderlies who The status quo – they are the house of funding of policies, programs, left the mangrove respected and aspired to by representatives and projects organization villagers (2 informants) (4 informants) District head The frontline personnel Bat poachers Contended with mangrove (1 informant) responsible for managing (2 informants) cultivators and plot owners issues and projects within the for poaching bats in forest villages Provincial Coordinates coastal zone Aquaculture Targeted by the mangrove planning board development policies across farmers who are and fishery policies and (2 informants) the regencies mangrove owners programs (5 informants) Provincial Collaborates with the Landowner, fish Middle class at the frontline forestry regency’s forestry department merchant, and to induce initiatives and department to promote the village’s capital lender change (2 informants) mangroves (1 informant) Regency Plans and approves the Mangrove Contentions among planning board selection and funding of cultivators cultivators led to insurgence, (1 informant) policies, programs, and (15 informants) changing power relations projects forwarded by various and participation in villages regency government sectors Regency Plans, implements, and funds Migrant laboring Targeted by the fishery marine and fishery and aquaculture fishermen and policies, programs, and fishery resource development projects and migrant farm projects for improved department fishery management projects laborers sustainability (2 informants) (5 informants) Regency forestry Plans, implements, and Nonmigrant in-land Decision-makers and department monitors policies, programs, fishermen owners of boats targeted by (2 informants) and projects related to forest (5 informants) projects management Regency spatial Collaborates with donor Housewives and Play key roles in household planning board agencies and government women fish traders decision-making and (1 informant) departments for developing (5 informants) targeted by development infrastructure and managing projects land use within villages 84 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

came to know of the depth and extent of their rights (Benda-Beckmann 2001). Savitri (2006) involvements in the use and governance of noted that in 2002, Regulation No. 34/2002 on local coastal resources. After having observed forest management was adopted by the national and engaged diverse community user groups government as a supplement to Forestry Act on a deeper level, the researcher began No. 41/1999 to address issues of indigenous interviewing them informally. Through rights and social justice. Furthermore, the these informal interviews the research implementation of Law No. 34/2002 stipulates informants indirectly disclosed those they that “all development activities undertaken would like the researcher to interview and by government agencies… must promote the those they considered “undeserving.” This spirit of good governance, meaning that local led the researcher to expand the research government should take the authority and focus to incorporate emerging discourse and responsibility for conducting development interview increasingly diverse user groups activities in a transparent and accountable based on the need for triangulation. manner” (Siswanto 2005, 144). With regard to natural resource governance, the adoption of these COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE laws reinforces the government’s commitment GOVERNANCE IN INDONESIA to collective management at the regency and community levels. Consequently, the regency Goal 1: Ensure Devolution through Village- government, acting as an autonomous entity, Level Mangrove Organization is given the authority to work with community members for the inclusive and sustainable During the late 1990s, indigenous uprising, governance of Indonesia’s natural resources resistance from provincial and regency (Munasinghe 1995). The international pressure government, and the demand for regional to acknowledge indigenous rights and devolve independence by separatist movements all natural resource governance to community user contributed to Suharto’s downfall in May 1998 groups led the government to adopt community- (Thorburn 2001). Suharto’s downfall carried based natural resource governance, where with it a new era of rapid and wide-ranging local user communities are given the rights to changes to Indonesia’s social and political decide and enforce natural resource allocation configurations. Consequently, natural resource at the village level, provided that it is in line governance during the post-Suharto era requires with regency initiatives and national directives the government to address issues of multiple- (Moeliono 2006). Interviews with provincial user community, indigenous uprisings, and and regency government officials suggested demand for regional independence through the perceived need to devolve Tongke Tongke’s devolution and social inclusion (Bebbington mangrove governance to local community user 2006). groups. A major achievement during the post- Based on their initiative, community Suharto era is the promulgation of Forestry members in Tongke Tongke cultivated and Act No. 41/1999, which recognizes the nurtured the village mangroves to protect contribution of indigenous groups and their against wave encroachment and material territories (Siswanto 2005). The 1999 Forestry loss in the early 1980s. Interest in mangrove Act is supplemented by Ministerial Decree cultivation stemmed from the need to create No. 5/1999, which stipulates the procedure for new land and protect the village against tidal resolving conflicts over land use and indigenous waves. With the passing of time, community Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 85 members’ attachment to the mangroves grew, formalized in meetings and village regulations. and the mangroves were perceived as a source As well, the unwritten rules for privatizing of identity, pride, social status, and material Tongke Tongke’s mangroves are perceived wealth. In the late 1980s the cultivators formed necessary to protect private interests, safeguard a mangrove organization called ACI (Aku Cinta the resource from external parties, and reassert Indonesia or I Love Indonesia) to acknowledge familial ties to the land and the coastal water. the efforts to protect the community’s According to ACI’s deputy head, Mr. ZNDN, mangroves. In 1995 Tongke Tongke received immigrants from the outer islands began the Kalpataru Environmental Award from settling in the village when community Indonesia’s president. Due to the mangrove’s members started cultivating the mangroves; ability to attract national projects, the regency hence, cultivators saw the need to privatize the and provincial governments converted the mangroves to protect individual property and mangroves into a park, endorsed the ACI, and maintain familial ties to the land and the coastal appointed one of the cultivators as ACI’s head water. Despite being privatized, the discourse in 1999. Today Tongke Tongke’s mangroves underlying the governance of Tongke Tongke’s cover 550 hectares and the ACI has a head, mangroves suggests the need for collective deputy head, and treasurer. The mangroves management and resource conservation. have a set of unwritten rules over its use, allocation and governance. These rules stipulate Issues that the extraction of plants and animals within Issues within ACI are historically rooted the mangrove forest requires consent from the within Tongke Tongke’s traditional power mangrove owners and the ACI head. According structure (Friedberg 1977). These perceived to ACI’s senior members, these unwritten issues take the form of credit taking, power rules also encompass those who are allowed grabbing, and social and political exclusion. The to enter the mangrove forest, the procedures ACI members come from diverse backgrounds taken before entering the forest, the marine and social status; among them are landowners, biota allowed for extraction and by whom, the boat owners, laboring fishermen, farm laborers, tree trunks permitted for cutting and by whom, and middle-aged inland fishermen who later and the sanctions accruing to trespassers and left the organization due to a perceived unfair violators. Mangrove owners allow villagers advantage of some member over others. Tongke to extract dead tree trunks and hermit crabs Tongke’s sea ponggawas are boat owners who for self-consumption and for sale in the local venture out to sea with the laboring fishermen market. However, outsiders are not permitted (sawi) to fish. Whereas the land ponggawas are to take anything or even enter the mangrove landowners and intermediaries who remain on forest without the owners’ consent: “we have to land to market the catch and provide funding, protect the trees and the land from foreigners logistics, and capital to the fishermen. In return who want to enter for research, recreation, and the fishermen are expected to store their catch business,” stated Mr. ABDRF. Sanctions for with the land ponggawas. In most cases the cutting live mangroves include having to plant land ponggawas loan money to fishermen to and nurture the same number of trees until they acquire boats and/or boat motors. The loan reach maturity. These rules were not formulated serves as a contract between the land ponggawas through joint decision-making nor were they 86 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

and the fishermen, payable in installments Misuse of power within an unspecified time frame as long as Subsequent to receiving the Kalpataru the fishermen remain the ponggawas’ clients. award, Tongke Tongke began to receive funding Hence, decisions over the budget, equipment, and infrastructure development projects from and fishing locations are largely dependent on government and donor agencies. In 1996 ACI’s the ponggawas. In Tongke Tongke there are mangrove seed trade with the other provinces more inland fishermen who sell their catch in began to flourish, with government officials the local market than those working as laboring acting as the intermediary. Mr. ZNDN, the fishermen (sawi). The relationship between present ACI deputy head, recalled that 1996 ponggawa and sawi, which is characterized was the year of the boat incident. That year, the by power and hierarchy, benefits both parties Department of Marine and Fishery Resources and is common in coastal communities across within the regency and provincial level gave Indonesia. ACI a state-of-the art fishing boat. Although Credit taking the boat was recorded in ACI’s inventory list, Mr. ZNDN said it was solely used by Mr. TYB Fieldwork data indicate various stories and his relatives. Because of this issue Mr. surrounding the founding and advancement TYB was demoted from his position as ACI of ACI. The ACI deputy head claims it was head. The villagers’ ability to do this and Mr. he who initially united the different mangrove TYB’s willingness to give up his role reflect cultivators under the name ACI. Mr. TYB, a high level of responsibility, cohesion, and ACI’s former head who was deposed by social justice within the group. This was done other members due to perceived credit taking, in spite of limited response from the regency corruption, and domination of ACI, has a government departments. This incident shows similar assertion—that he was responsible for that Tongke Tongke has social institutions and founding the organization since he introduced social capital to ensure that collective efforts to ACI to government officials, NGOs, and donor protect the mangroves and the organization are agencies. ACI’s discontented members who left not undermined. the organization, Mr. TPD and Mr. BMBNG, among others, also take credit for initiating the Social exclusion mangrove cultivation scheme and the alliance In 2004 Sinjai’s Forestry Department with government officials. Moreover, according intervened in Tongke Tongke’s mangrove to these cultivators there is no need to maintain conservation through the department’s land and the present ACI, which they perceived to be forest rehabilitation (GNRHL) program. This corrupt, since the members of older generation program included initiatives on conserving are very well known and respected by others and reforesting Indonesia’s coast through the without having to resort to the ACI organization. cultivation of mangroves. Nonetheless, the land The various claims to ACI’s founding and forest rehabilitation program in Tongke notwithstanding, its deputy head, former head, Tongke boiled down to distributing funds among and former members all indicate the importance ACI members for planting new mangroves of forming an alliance to protect the fruit of and for demonstrating novel techniques for their labor. Hence, conservation values are safe selective cutting and mangrove cultivation to for safeguarding the collective needs of both the community members. ACI’s deputy leader, Mr. ruling family and the community members in ZNDN, was responsible for recruiting village Tongke Tongke. Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 87 laborers who will plant the mangroves and for Goal 2: Joint Decision-Making and paying them their wages. He noted that within Consensus across Government Levels the GNRHL program “it is the government Some government officials believe officials who decided on technical matters such consumer demand for coastal resources will as how much and which of the land should lead to their depletion and degradation. Hence, be rehabilitated and how this rehabilitation they see the need to protect local coastal should proceed.” Moreover, he remarked that resources through collective governance and “there is never a clear message concerning co-management. This, according to officials, the direction of the program, the structure of can be facilitated through consensus and the program, the funding for the program, and joint decision-making in policy and program the opportunities for participation in decision formulation (Ostrom 1990). Government and making.” He recalled that ACI members were community representatives conduct consensus reluctant to participate in the GNRHL program, building across the various levels of governance. hence, it was up to the ACI leaders to assist According to Mr. BDMN, the head of Sinjai’s the government in implementing the GNRHL Marine and Fishery Resource Department, program in Tongke Tongke. “government officials hold yearly meetings To a certain extent, the GNRHL program with community members to incorporate led to disputes and polarization among ACI local aspirations, promote participation, and members. Members claimed that government encourage sustainable development through officials simply endowed ACI’s elites with collective action.” These meetings are called money. It was then up to the elites in ACI to find MUSRENBANG or Musyawarah Rencana suitable villagers to (re)plant the mangroves Pembangunan. Fakih (1996) noted that in the and pay them. “Government officials simply name of national growth, development, and stated to Mr. ZNDN that the laborers be paid prosperity, the Suharto administration asserted a certain amount of money on a daily basis, its legitimacy by centrally administering the but it was really up to Mr. ZNDN to distribute governance of natural resources, leaving a much the money and organize the workers,” said Mr. reduced opportunity for indigenous groups TPD, a former ACI member. Contrary to being to reap benefits from local natural resources. passive and powerless, the community members Issues that beset natural resource governance weighed the implications of the government during Suharto’s administration include policies and programs in the face of complexity authoritarianism and one party dictatorship, and change. Moreover, when participating in intolerance of pluralism and dissent, widespread government programs, the villagers align to the political intimidation, corruption and nepotism, bits and pieces which pertain to their needs and displacement of responsibilities, and ecological interests while jettisoning others. Moreover, devastation (Moniaga 2000; Galdikas 2001). not all user groups can participate due to power The post-Suharto administration considers imbalance and information gap. Nonetheless, social inclusion and political stability through the dependency between government officials MUSRENBANG vital in achieving sustainable and community members is a two-way street, development goals (Rohdewohld 1995). and this can lead to villagers’ aligning with the Government officials have suggested the government’s discourse on protecting Tongke promotion of social inclusion by aligning and Tongke’s mangroves for future projects and aggregating diverse needs and interests (Kurian funding opportunities. 2000). Figure 2, which is based on inputs 88 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

from government officials at the provincial social reciprocity and social validation that are and regency levels during interviews, shows required for incorporating cultural sensitivity how interests are aggregated in policy and and environmental consciousness into people’s program planning. The diagram within Figure 3 thoughts and imaginations (Soja 1989; Light is also commonly found in government posters 1998). hanging in Sinjai’s government offices. With goodwill and benign intentions to facilitate Process and mechanistic issues social inclusion, the head of Sinjai’s Marine in representation and Fishery Resource Department indicated the Representation, whether by community need to encourage tudang sipulung or consensus leaders or government officials, may be fraught building. With regard to policymaking, he due to process and mechanistic reasons (Rourke said “the community members will follow 1986). Process issues include the narrow government rules and regulations when they are selection of representatives, the preference for drafted together with the community”. certain information over others, and the flow An official from Sinjai’s Forestry of information to and from the represented. Department, Mr. NWR, referred to “the need Mechanistic reasons include attendance and to develop a common vision and mission language barriers. In representation “what may with community members when promoting appear to be a consensus is in fact the more or less participation, social inclusion, political one-sidedly enforced outcome of the dominant stability, and continuity in government policies power relations under the often deceptively un- and programs.” Another executive from Sinjai’s problematical form of an agreement producing Forestry Department, Mr. SRJDN, remarked communicative interchange” (Meszaros 1989, that “every year through technical coaching 28). This can be a top-down directive from and consultation meetings we communicate our the regency or a one-party decision carried vision and mission, and state our limitations… out by village officials and elites. An example this is done to acquire commonalities of vision on concerns the promulgation of property and policies and programs and to gather aspirations commodity tax by Tongke Tongke’s village from the bottom.” Hence, according to officials. Village officials taxed community government officials, social inclusion, political members for owning properties such as boats, stability, and the sustainability of conservation bamboo huts, aquaculture ponds, and livestock. programs can be facilitated through aggregated During Tongke Tongke’s biannual budget interests and consensus building in policy and meeting, officials from the village planning program planning within MUSRENBANGs. board noted that community members avoided Further, government officials believed that paying the taxes stipulated by the village through MUSRENBANG wide-ranging government. They said this was due to a lack representation in consensus building could of effort to socialize the taxes. In a meeting, be facilitated. While the social and ecological village officials asserted the need to employ landscape is marked by multiple management debt collectors for socializing and ensuring tax regimes, the complexity of local contexts cannot payments. Some villagers noted that “suddenly be made subservient to a certain form of natural the village officials informed the villagers of resource governance (Steins 1999). Moreover, the need to pay taxes for their land, ponds, and egalitarianism and consensus building processes houses.” neither guarantee the lateral relationship one imagines nor do they warrant the emergence of Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 89 Figure 3. Consensus Building for Policy and Program Planning 90 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

Tongke Tongke’s community leaders and Implications for power sharing ACI members, including some sea ponggawas Power is defined as “the capacity to (Mr. MSTMN, Mr. BMBNG, and Mr. MSTF), introduce change in the face of resistance” observed that community participation in (Etzioni 1968, 670). Power can be classified policy and program planning for sustainable as utilitarian, coercive, and persuasive power coastal resource management was very (Etzioni 1968). Utilitarian assets include much limited. These meetings discussed the economic possessions, technical-administrative mangrove forest rehabilitation program, the capabilities, and manpower (Etzioni 1968). sustainable aquaculture farming program, and Coercive assets are the weapons, installations the fishery monitoring program in the Bay and manpower which the military, the police, of Bone where Tongke Tongke is located. the court, and the government use (Etzioni Moreover, these community leaders felt 1968). Persuasive power is exercised “through that they were not represented in policy and the manipulations of symbols, such as appeals program planning despite their membership in to the values and sentiments of the citizens” ACI and their elite status. They said “those who (Etzioni 1968, 331). It is exercised “in order know about the programs and are involved in to mobilize support and penalize those who planning and implementations are only those deviate by excommunicating them” (Etzioni who interact with government officials, namely, 1968, 331). Consequently, persuasive power the village officials and deputy head of ACI”. rests in the interpersonal ties that bind the In addition, these community leaders noted that members of a unit to each other (Etzioni 1968). policy and program planning was marked by With regard to natural resource governance, a top-down and one-way flow of information the narratives from Tongke Tongke suggest from representatives to the represented. These that these various sources of power influenced could deny community members the voice, groups and individuals in multidimensional the identity, and the agency (Dyrberg 1997). ways (Nuijten 2005). On the other hand, the deputy head of Tongke As indicated by Etzioni (1968, 336), the Tongke’s ACI mangrove organization said that narratives from Tongke Tongke’s mangrove “it is too formal for the community if they hold governance suggest that “while persuasive a meeting and say that it is a meeting. Often power may support normative control, it tends times the community does not want to come to neutralize normative control in the absence if they are invited to a meeting.” He added of monitoring and enforcement.” This “occurs that meetings with government officials were macroscopically when a sub-collectivity is usually conducted in processions filled with mobilized against societal leadership” (Etzioni protocols, esoteric language, and reverence 1968, 336). In Tongke Tongke, this was seen for the hierarchy within the bureaucracy. in a conflict between two elites. One of the Community members preferred to refrain from parties, which was composed of former ACI these meetings because they felt dislocated from members, mobilized the persuasive power themselves and their everyday surroundings of the community members within the unit when attending them. Villagers avoided (Etzioni 1968, 336). Contentions between associating with the culture and circumstances leaders with normative and persuasive power surrounding these meetings. Moreover, villagers surfaced when those who sought to mobilize in Tongke Tongke spoke a local dialect (Bugis an un-mobilized group were confronted by Pesisiran), whereas meetings with government “apathy institutionalized in social bonds” officials usedBahasa Indonesia. Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 91

(Etzioni 1968, 337). This occurred when the Goal 3: Protect Natural Resources through disgruntled ACI members mobilized others to Commercialization and Conservation depose its former head, Mr. TYB, and recurred Policies when the discontented ACI members who left After 1997 the regency government the organization mobilized others to dispute has protected Tongke Tongke’s mangroves the current vice head’s unfair domination of through legal measures. An example is the organization and its associated benefits. It is the implementation of regulations on the possible that the various forms of power “tend use, allocation, and governance of Tongke to slant compliance in its own direction which Tongke’s mangroves. In 1997 Sinjai’s Forestry is partially incompatible with that of the others” Department enacted Regulation No. 23/1997 (Etzioni 1968, 353) and, hence, tended to (1997), which stipulates that logging and neutralize each other. The multidimensionality destruction of the forest cover area will be met and the various forms of power also exacerbate with a fine of IDR (Indonesian Rupiah) 500 plurality in decision-making. In the case of million (USD 50,330.24) or a maximum of Tongke Tongke’s mangroves, “the controlling 10 years imprisonment. However, this law is over layers of several societal units is shown contradictory to Local Regulation No. 09/1999 to mix various kinds of power without giving (1999), which says that selective cutting of the clear priority to one kind” (Etzioni 1968, 355). mangroves is permitted 50 meters (m) inland Nonetheless, as suggested by Etzioni (1968) and from the coast (i.e., from the reach of the highest portrayed in Tongke Tongke, some of the power tide), provided that users obtain a permit from may have been lost due to the neutralization the head of the region or the extension officer effect. This contributed to the contingent from Sinjai’s Forestry Department. A breach emergence and dissipation of multiple would result in three month’s detention and/or management regimes in Tongke Tongke’s a fee of IDR 50,000.00 (USD 5.03) (Kehutanan mangrove governance and, to a certain extent, 2002). The contradiction in these laws has created a space for the distribution and sharing caused the villagers to perceive them as trivial of power among wider community user groups. and non-binding. In Tongke Tongke, the use of power by ACI members and villagers considered community members, along with the need to the enactment of these conservation statutes involve higher level authority, was associated as authoritarian and top-down. Nonetheless, with timing, perceived urgency, and pace of they welcome the laws. The ACI members change. Etzioni (1968, 364) noted that “the less simultaneously detest and respect the statutes overdue and the more rapid the transformation promulgated by government officials. On one of a societal structure, the less need there is hand, the ACI members viewed the government for order enforcing organization and the more officials as encroaching on their mangroves and slow a transformation, the greater the need for taking the credit for the members’ cultivation such organization whereby power and force are initiatives. On the other hand, the government involved.” Despite the present lack of initiatives regarded its action as validating the members’ from ACI leaders, narratives from Tongke identity and labor while protecting their material Tongke suggest that power ‘negotiations’ and symbolic interests and providing them with among the various members contributed to a a place to differentiate themselves from others. dynamic and ongoing protection of Tongke According to the head of Sinjai’s Regency Tongke’s mangroves. Planning Board, Mr. SYMSQMR, awareness 92 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

of protecting local coastal resources can and the community to encourage both mangrove arise through their commodification and conservation and economic development.” commercialization. Commercialization of Selective mangrove cutting is permitted 500 local coastal resources can take many forms, m from the coast, whereas the composition is including promoting ecotourism, processing 60 percent mangroves and 40 percent ponds. and marketing local fish products, and selling The ponds are expected to produce milkfish, locally made handicrafts. Some officials which is sold locally; the mangroves can also believed that stimulating ecological awareness be used for economic purposes. In Sinjai, wood to protect local coastal resources is grounded on and twigs from the mangroves are sold locally the need to commodify and commercialize local for use as firewood, whereas the seeds have a coastal resources for improving social welfare. value and a price. The leaves are also sold in The head of Sinjai’s Regency Planning Board the village for use as feeds for goats and other observed that the mangroves’ ability to attract livestock. funding from the international community The Samataring District head acknowledged stimulates awareness and motivation for their that commercializing local coastal resources protection. In a similar vein, the Samataring can discourage ecological awareness and District head, Mr. ADNR, said “if we try to exacerbate natural resource overutilization. promote our mangrove to countries outside Moreover, when coupled with a preoccupation Indonesia, foreigners would automatically for private profit, the presence of investors, come here… we can try to make something commercial values and potential market demand out of our mangroves, such as an ecotourism for local coastal resources can discourage site, so the mangroves can provide the villagers environmental sensibility and encourage with income.” An official from the regency’s resource overutilization. This contradictory Forestry Department, Mr. SN, pointed to the opinion suggests that some officials are aware need to transform Tongke Tongke’s mangroves of the need to venture beyond utilitarianism in into a bank from which villagers can obtain facilitating ecological awareness, devolution of financial security. In promoting ecological responsibility, and social cohesion. However, awareness, the perceived need for attaching the officials seemed to have trouble stepping commercialized value is evident through out of the bureaucracy-induced rationality and policies and programs that combine sustainable the perceived need for funding. The presence development initiatives and natural resource of funding does not necessarily deter the commercialization efforts (Batterbury et al. emergence of social and ecological sensibilities. 2003; Beck 1999; Beck 2000). Contrary to being passive and powerless, With benign intentions, government both community members and government officials strove to integrate development, officials had been weighing the implications of sustainability, and ecological education government policies and programs in the face through initiatives such as the construction of of complexity and change. mangrove-enclosed aquaculture ponds, the ban on destructive fishing, and the protection and Capture by commercial imperatives utilization of Sinjai’s reefs as breeding grounds. It was when symbolic and authoritative Mr. BDMN, head of Sinjai’s Marine and resources began flowing from the mangroves Fishery Department, described the mangrove and its social constructions that the majority of enclosed aquaculture pond as “a project the resource users became keen on protecting involving the fishery and forestry department Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 93 them. However, when ACI’s former head ACI, was misusing his power, subverting the utilized the mangroves to accumulate private other ACI members, and undermining efforts to gains and dominate the organization, the protect the mangroves. This suggests that social ACI members perceived the mangroves as constructions underlying property and user a probable instrument of domination and rights in Tongke Tongke influenced social and marginalization. This illustrates that multiple ecological responsiveness for natural resource social constructions and multiple attachments protection. to the mangroves underlie Tongke Tongke’s In The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin conservation efforts. The attachments go beyond (1968) assumed there are only two choices in utilitarianism and resource commodification. natural resource management, either through Space can be created for multiple attachments privatization or state intervention in which to flourish; nonetheless, this space can also public ownership prevails. The failure to be deterred, undermined, and curtailed due to promote socially viable and ecologically power imbalance and complexity within the sustainable decision-making leads to the social and ecological landscapes. argument for public ownership by the state. Nonetheless, privatization of Tongke Tongke’s PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE mangroves can coexist with social capability GOVERNANCE and public obligation for their protection and conservation. Noting Hardin’s narrow The collective governance of natural categorization of natural resource management, resources is associated with the need for Ostrom (2007) remarked that multiple collective ownership and co-management; it management regimes are present and that Hardin assumes that private interests are contradictory undermined the presence of social institutions to collective needs (Ostrom 1990). Ostrom’s created through mutual engagements. On the common pool resource (CPR) theory suggests other hand, what Ostrom (1990, 1993, 1994, that collective governance can be facilitated 1995, 2001, 2005) fails to recognize is that the through common ownership, consensus, and anticipation of personal rewards emanating joint decision-making (Ostrom 1990). The from the privatization of local resources can narratives from Tongke Tongke suggest that increase the resource users’ motivation for private ownership of the mangroves and the need their protection. In Tongke Tongke mangrove to protect them are not contradictory. Private owners were highly motivated to protect and ownership of the mangroves is more associated conserve the mangroves due to the symbolic with public obligations as opposed to private rewards (e.g., status, identity, political space) rights. One story is that mangrove ownership they received from the private ownership and by local user groups led to its protection. The the collective management of the plots. Tongke perceived need to protect the mangroves and Tongke’s experience also suggest that the its social constructions is so great that villagers mangroves’ private ownership and collective refused bad judgments, which can undermine management led to their association with non- the collective management of the mangroves. market resources such as those of family time, For example, when Sinjai’s Marine and Fishery social life ,and ecosystems as opposed to their Resource Department collaborated with Mr. association with market commodities. TYB to advocate the construction of aquaculture ponds within the mangroves, the villagers objected, saying Mr. TYB, the former head of 94 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

CONCLUSION to be given a sense of importance and dignity, which appeals to their identity and imagination Collective action to protect natural (Weick 1995). Only then can individuals be resources cannot be maintained solely through actively involved in supporting the cause to collaboration and consensus since contentions protect Indonesia’s natural resources. and antagonistic relations are present within The narratives from Tongke Tongke suggest the social and ecological landscapes. Tongke that an individual’s sense of importance, Tongke’s experience suggests that collective recognition, and obligation to act for the action is contextualized within the dynamics common good will motivate him/her to perform and complexity of local settings. In democratic extraordinary actions beyond his/her everyday societies, collective action for natural resource practice, including that of protecting local protection cannot be dictated or enforced by natural resources (Lacan 1999; Etzioni 2004). external agents (Habermas 1987). The concept However, participation and inclusion cannot of collective action has to make room for take place in the absence of complex reciprocity differences in the resources required to change among various groups and individuals (Giddens an individual (Friedman 1992; Plumwood 1981). The principle of reciprocity underscores 2002). Resource users change through their the mutual need for power, recognition, and personal experience of engaging with one validation in order for social responsiveness and another and through a reflection of themselves ecological sensibility to emerge (Harvey 1996). and the social and ecological landscapes Tongke Tongke’s experience further suggests (Thompson 1994). Changing an individual is that complex patterns of reciprocity among different for different people, meaning that the groups and individuals shape the discourse length of time and amount of resources required surrounding the mangroves and influence the to change a person vary from one individual to barriers and enablers for participation in natural another. resource protection. Collective action for natural resource Undermining reciprocity can result in protection is shaped by individuals acting on power imbalance, resistance, and decreased the social and ecological landscape. It is the social capability (Holub 1992; Kiros 1985). transformations within groups and individuals The narratives from Tongke Tongke suggest that hold the greatest promise for the collective that when power imbalance surfaces, when and sustainable governance of natural reciprocity is undermined, and when private resources. Nevertheless, any willed action interests override local social institutions, by an individual will inevitably be context suspicions and mistrust arise, fueling the dependent. Therefore, when speaking of the potential for overutilization of the natural initiation and maintenance of collective action, resources (Lesser 2001). On the other hand, the there is the obligation to take up a position narratives on Tongke Tongke’s mangroves tell on the matter of agency (i.e., human actions) that power struggles and resistance can lead to and social structural forces (Soja 1989). The the emergence of social space and competing need to involve others and promote collective discourse for the sustainable governance of natural resource governance looms large in natural resources. The emergence of space and the face of Indonesia’s mass environmental competing discourse in Tongke Tongke requires degradation and structural inequality. To the formation of alliances (Etzioni 2004). These promote participation and collaboration for alliances not only provide identity and voice for natural resource protection, resource users need the various resource users, they also motivate Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 95 groups and individuals to mobilize and participate in the contingent restructuring of the Ashforth, B. 1998. Becoming: How Does the Process of Identification Unfold. In Identity landscapes (Etzioni 2004). On the other hand, in Organizations: Building Theory through resistance and mobilizations are also contingent Conversations edited by D. Whetten. London: on the alignment of competing timelines and Sage Publications. the complexity of events within the landscapes. Baba, H. 1994. “The Commitment to Theory.” In The They tend to be fragmented and diffused. Location of Culture, 19–39. London: Routledge. Complex patterns of reciprocity among user groups promoted attachment to the mangroves Bappeda-Sulsel. 1998. Rencana Strategis Pengelolaan Pesisir Dan Laut, 115. and the natural landscape. This attachment also emerged from a history of living within Barber, C. 2002. The State of the Forest: Indonesia. landscapes. A person’s tie and commitment to Washington, D.C.: Forest Watch Indonesia & Global Forest Watch. nature cannot be dictated solely by institutions, policies, and monetary incentives (Fararo Batterbury, S., Anthony Bebbington, David Lewis, and 1992). It is very personal and is precipitated Elizabeth Olson. 2003. “Of Texts and Practices: Organizational Cultures and the Practice of by the person’s identity, imagination, and sense Empowerment in World Bank Funded Programs.” making (Elliot 1999). Moreover, it is dynamic In Order & Disjuncture: The Organization of Aid and multidimensional as opposed to being & Development. London: SOAS. static and mono-dimensional (Leuwis 1993). Bebbington, A. 2006. “Local Capacity, Village This is because an individual’s construction Governance and the Political Economy of Rural of natural resources and their governance is Development in Indonesia.” World Development fluid and dependent on the complexity of local 34 (11): 1958–1976. circumstances (Leuwis 1993). Tongke Tongke’s Beck, U. 1999. “Individualization and ‘Precarious experience on its mangroves shows that when Freedom’: Perspectives and Controversies of a ties to the social and natural environment are Subject Oriented Sociology.” In Contemporary rewarded with recognition, validation, and Social Theory, edited by A. Elliott, 156– 169. Malden, Massachussetts: Blackwell differentiation, groups and individuals will feel Publisher. obliged to retain these ties while protecting the social and ecological landscapes. Moreover, the ———. 2000. What is Globalization ? London, United Kingdom: Polity Press. ties to the mangroves stimulated the emergence of a reflective capacity to collectively protect Benda-Beckmann, F., ed. 2001. Sumber Daya Alam dan the mangroves. Jaminan Sosial. Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Pustaka Pelajar.

REFERENCES Bookchin, M. 1994. Which Way for the Ecology Movement ? Edinburgh, Scotland: AK Press. ———. 2002. Keputusan Daerah No. 203/2002 tentang Konservasi Hutan Bakau dan Satwa di Bourdieu, P. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Kabupaten Sinjai. Dinas Kehutanan, 1–3. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Agrawal, A. 2008. Environmentality: Technologies of BPS. 2000. “Statistik Indonesia 1970–2000.” Accessed Government and the Making of Environmental on February 16, 2004. http://www.bps.go.id/ Subjects. London: Oxford University Press. sector/population.

Andrianto, A. 2006. “District Governments and Poverty Bryman, A. 2001. Social Research Methods. New York: Alleviation in Forest Areas in Indonesia.” Oxford University Press. Governance Brief. Indonesia: Centre for International Forestry Research. 96 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

Cornwall, A. 1994. “Acknowledging Process: Friedberg, M. C. E. 1977. Actors and Systems: The Methodological Challenges for Agricultural Politics of Collective Action. Chicago: The Research & Extension.” In Beyond Farmers University of Chicago Press. First: Rural People’s Knowledge, Agricultural Research & Extension Practice, edited by I. Friedmann, J. 1992. Empowerment: The Politics Scoones. London, United Kingdom: Intermediate of Alternative Development. Oxford, UK: Technology Publications. pp. 98–116. Blackwell.

Crotty, M. 1998. The Foundations of Social Research: Galdikas, B. 2001. “Revenge of the Little People.” Meaning and Perspective in the Research Accessed November 5, 2003. http://www.abc. Process. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin net.au/4corners/content/2002/timber_mafia/ Pty. Ltd. viewpoints/viewpoints_galdikas1.htm

Dyrberg, T.B. 1997. The Circular Structure of Power: Geertz, C. 1973. “Thick Description: Towards an Politics, Identity, Community. New York, New Intrepretive Theory of Culture.” In Interpretation York: Verso Publishing. of Cultures. New York: Basic Books Inc.

Eckersley, R. 1992. Environmentalism and Political Giddens, A. 1981. A Contemporary Critique of Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach. Historical Materialism. London: MacMillan London: UCL Press. Press, Ltd.

Edwards, Victoria M., and Nathalie A. Steins. 1998. Habermas, J. 1987. Lifeworld and System: A Critique “Developing an Analytical Framework for of Functionalist Reason. Boston, Massachusetts: Multiple-Use Commons.” Journal of Theoretical Beacon Press. Politics 10 (3): 347–383. Hardin, G. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Edwards, V. 1999. “Platforms for Collective Action Science 162: 1243–1248. in Multiple Use Common Pool Resources.” Agriculture and Human Values XVI: 241–255. Harmon, M. 1986. Organization Theory for Public Administration. Boston, Massachusetts: Little Steins, Nathalie A., and Victoria M. Edwards. 1999. Brown & Company. “Platforms for Collective Action in Multiple- use Common-pool Resources.” Agriculture and Harvey, D. 1996. Justice, Nature and the Geography of Human Values 16 (3): 241-255. Difference. Blackwell Publishers.

Elliot, A., Ed. (1999). Contemporary Social Theory. Herda, E. 1999. Research Conversations and Narrative. Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers London: Praeger. Inc. Holub, R. 1992. Antonio Gramsci. Beyond Marxism Etzioni, A., ed. 1968. The Active Society: A Theory and Postmodernism. London: Routledge. of Societal and Political Processes. London: Collier-McMillan Ltd. Honneth, A. 1999. “Patterns of Intersubjective Recognition: Love, Rights and Solidarity.” In Etzioni, A. 2004. The Common Good. Malden, Contemporary Social Theory, edited by A. Elliot. Massachussetts: Polity Press. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. I: 184–196. Fakih, M., ed. 1996. Pengakuan Atas Sumberdaya Alam. Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Pustaka Pelajar. Horkheimer, M. 2002. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. Fararo, J. C. T., ed. 1992. Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique. Key Issues in Sociological Kiros, T. 1985. Towards the Construction of a Theory. New York: Sage Publications. Theory of Political Action: Antonio Gramsci Consciousness, Participation and Hegemony. Fetterman, D. 1989. Ethnography: Step by Step. New York: University Press of America. London: Sage Publications. Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 97

Kurian, M. 2000. “Principles for CPR Theory.” The Islands: Political and Legal Constraints and Common Property Resource Digest 53 (June). Opportunities. IGES International Workshop.

Lacan, J. 1999. “The Mirror Stage as Formative of Munasinghe, S., ed. 1995. Property Rights & the the Function I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Environment: Social & Ecological Issues. Experience.” In Contemporary Social Theory, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. edited by A. Elliott. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc. I: 61–67. Neuwman, L. 2003. Social Research Methods: Qualitative & Quantitative Methods. Boston, Law, J. 2003. “Making a Mess with Method.” In The Massachusetts: Pearson Education Inc. Sage Handbook of Social Science Methodology edited by William Outhwaite and Stephen P. Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Turner, 595–606. London: Sage. Evolution of Institutions for Collective Actions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Law, J. 2004. After Method. Mess in Social Science Research. London: Routledge Publishing. Ostrom, E. 1993. “Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma.” In Rethinking Institutional Lee, T. 1998. Using Qualitative Methods in Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives Organizational Research. Thousand Oaks, and Choices, edited by D. F. H. P. Vincent California: Sage Publications. Ostrom. San Francisco, California: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press. pp. 101–127. Lesser, E., ed. 2001. Knowledge and Social Capital: Foundations and Applications. Boston, Ostrom, E. 1994. Neither Market Nor State: Governance Massachusetts: Butterworth Heinemann. of Common Pool Resources in the Twenty First Century. Washington, D.C.: International Food Leuwis, C. 1993. “Towards a Sociological Policy Research Institute. Conceptualization of Communication in Extension Science.” Sociologica Ruralis Ostrom, E. 1995. “Constituting Social Capital and XXXIII: 281–305. Collective Action.” In Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Light, A., ed. 1998. Social Ecology after Bookchin. Cooperation in Two Domains, edited by R. K. E. Democracy and Ecology. A Guilford Series. Ostrom. London: Sage Publications. I: 125–161. London: The Guilford Press. Ostrom, E. 2000. “Collective Action and the Evolution Lyotard, J. F. 1979. The Postmodern Condition: A of Social Norms.” Journal of Economic Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester Perspectives 14(3): 137–158. University Press. Ostrom, E., ed. 2001. Institutions, Ecosystems and Marcuse, H. 1988. Critical Theory and The Promise Sustainability. Ecological Economics Series. of Utopia. Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey New York: Lewis Publishers. Publishers, Inc. Ostrom, E., ed. 2007. Understanding Knowledge as a Meszaros, I. 1989. The Power of Ideology. London: Commons. From Theory to Practice. Cambridge: Harvester Wheatsheaf. MIT Press.

Moeliono, M. 2006. “Conservation Policy and the Ostrom, E. 2005. The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Commons.” The Common Property Resource Political Economy of Development Aid. New Digest 76: 1 – 4. York: Oxford University Press.

Mohan, G. S. and __. Kristian. 2000. “Participatory Pels, D. 2003. Unhastening Science: Autonomy and Development & Empowerment: The Dangers Reflexivity in the Social Theory of Knowledge. of Localism.” Third World Quarterly 21(2): Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 247–268. Plumwood, V. 2002. Environmental Culture: The Moniaga, S. 2000. Advocating for Community-Based Ecological Crisis of Reason. London: Routledge Forest Management in Indonesia’s Outer Publications. 98 Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana

Prioharyono, E. 2002. “Management of Mangrove Turnbull, D. 2005. Masons, Tricksters and Forests: Conversion and Reforestation of Cartographers: Comparative Studies in Mangrove on the Coast of Paojepe, Bonepute the Sociology of Scientific and Indigenous and Tongke Tongke, South Sulawesi.” Jakarta: Knowledge. London: Routledge. University of Indonesia. Van Loon, B. 2001. Introducing Critical Theory. Resosudarmo, B., ed. 2006. The Politics and Economics Melbourne, Victoria: McPherson’s Printing of Indonesia’s Natural Resources. Singapore: Group. RFF Press. Weick, K. 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations. Rohdewohld, R. 1995. Public Administration in London: Sage Publications. Indonesia. Melbourne: Montech Pty Ltd. Wenger, E. 1998. Communities of Practice: Learning, Rourke, F. E., ed. 1986. Bureaucratic Power in Meaning and Identity. Cambridge, United National Policy Making. Boston: Little Brown Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. and Company. Woodley, S., ed. 1993. Ecological Integrity and the Sabatier, P., ed. 1981. Effective Policy Implementation. Management of Ecosystems. Ottawa, Canada: St. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books. Lucie Press.

Satria, A. 2002. Pengantar Sosiologi Masyarakat Yin, R. K. 1984. Case Study Research: Design and Pesisir. Jakarta: Cidesindo. Methods. London: Sage Publications.

Savitri, M. 2006. “Change without Reform?” YTMI. 2003. Tongke Tongke dalam Perspektif Community Forestry in Decentralizing Pembangunan Partisipatif. Makassar, YTMI, Indonesia. IASCP. Bali. UNDP, UNICEF, Sinjai. 107 pp.

Siswanto, W. 2005. “Decentralization of the Forestry Zey, M., ed. 1992. Decision Making: Alternatives Sector: Indonesia’s Experience.” In The Politics to Rational Choice Models. London: Sage of Decentralization: Forests, People and Power, Publications. edited by C. J. Pierce-Colfer. London: Earthscan.

Soja, E. W. 1989. Postmodern Geographies. The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London: Verso Publication.

Steins, N. A. 1999. “All Hands on Deck: An Interactive Perspective on Complex Common-Pool Resource Management Based on Case Studies in the Coastal Waters of the Isle of Wight, Connemara and the Dutch Wadden Sea.” Rural Sociology. Den Haag: Wageningen University. 212 pp.

Thompson, J., ed. 1994. Beyond Farmer First Rural People’s Knowledge, Agricultural Research and Extension Practice. Intermediate Technology Publications.

Thorburn, C. 2001. Regime Change. Prospects for Community Based Resource Management in Post New Order Indonesia. IASCP Inaugural Pacific Regional Meeting, Brisbane, Australia.