Injustice, Indignation and the Construction of Intractable Conflict

Concessions for Concessions Sake: Injustice, Indignation and the Construction of Intractable Conﬂict in Israel-Palestine

Philippe Assouline† and Robert F. Trager††

February 17, 2017

In intractable conflicts, where issues appear indivisible, what factors lead populations to accept negotiated outcomes? We show that population preferences are determined in important respects by affective responses to the conflict process rather than by exogenous material factors. The framing of the conflict by political elites determines the legitimacy of a proposed settlement. In particular, when there is a perception of past injustice committed by a negotiating adversary, populations respond to cues that suggest that the scales of justice have been balanced. To examine these issues, we conduct a survey experiment on a representative sample of the Jewish Israeli population and a companion experiment on a representative sample of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. We find that holding the negotiated settlement outcome constant, approval of the settlement is strongly influenced by whether it is framed as a negotiating defeat for the Israeli or the Palestinian side if and only if respondents are primed to be indignant, and that these effects are strongly mediated by perceptions of the fairness of the settlement outcome. Moral indignation produces a desire for concessions for concession’s sake. Thus, the acceptance of a political settlement depends not only on its concrete details, but in large part on the political cues that frame judgments of fairness. Such conflicts over political framing violate fundamental assumptions of the rationalist literature on conflict processes.

We are grateful to Andrew Coe, Songying Fang, Susan Hyde, Andrew Kydd, Jason Lyall, Bruce Russett, Kenneth Schultz, Dustin Tingley, Alex Weisiger and seminar participants at USC and Yale for insightful comments.

† University of California, Los Angeles, [email protected]. †† University of California, Los Angeles, [email protected]. The persistence of some conflicts is mysterious. Long-running conflicts often seem to center on issues of control of material resources that can be divided. Israel and the Palestinian Authority contest control of territory and religious sites and closely related questions of Palestinian institutionalization and em- powerment. India and Pakistan have had difficulty agreeing on a division of control in Kashmir. Often, the issues negotiated do not significantly influence the balance of power. Over time, uncertainties about capabilities and levels of resolve would seem to be clarified. What then prevents adversaries from reaching compromises? Why are some issues fought over, sometimes for generations, where other potential conflicts over similar sorts of issues are quickly resolved?

In enduring conflicts, particularly when considerations of fairness and honor are involved, participants tend to be highly emotionally engaged. Understanding the determinants of the affective response to compromise, therefore, is likely key to understanding the development of political preferences over settlement outcomes. We find that these determinants go well beyond the facts of the agreement itself.

Following a substantial literature in psychology, we show that judgments of fairness are principal mediators of aﬀective response to a proposed dispute settlement. When there is a perception of an unfair or illegitimate past act committed by a negotiating adversary, populations will respond to cues that suggest that the scales of justice have been balanced. Indignation triggered by an adversary’s past actions thus transforms the psychology of negotiations. The perception of past injustice makes populations seek settlements that appear as impositions on the other side, even in the absence of any material or substantive incentives for doing so.

To examine these issues, we conducted a survey experiment on a representative sample of the Jewish-

Israeli population. Holding the negotiated settlement outcome constant, approval of the settlement is strongly inﬂuenced by whether it is framed as a negotiating defeat for the Israeli or the Palestinian side.

This eﬀect is conditional, however, on whether we induce indignation. We show through mediation analysis that these eﬀects are largely the result of moral rather than economic or security judgments. Thus, the

1 acceptance of a political settlement depends not only on its concrete details, but in large part on the political cues that frame judgments of fairness. The diplomatic framing and response of societal actors appears to play a principal role in the settlement of disputes.

When the political framing determines the attractiveness of a settlement, conventional representations of conflicts are inappropriate. To illustrate this point, we also present the results of a smaller companion experiment on a representative sample of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. We show that there is no reason to assume that actor preferences are characterized by risk aversion, or even that they are increasing in shares of the true objects of negotiations. A mutually preferred, negotiated solution may not exist. Conflict also cannot be modeled as a lottery over the extremes of a bargaining space because framings that influence preferences ex ante are not available ex post. Thus, representations of conflict processes will better fit political realities when these assumptions are relaxed.

When Is a Concession Palatable?

Where do the preferences of states originate? A substantial portion of international relations scholarship views interests as deriving from fear and the anarchic material environment of states (Mearsheimer 2001,

Waltz 1979). Another set of scholars are more agnostic about the sources of state interests, but treat them as exogenous to conﬂict processes. Scholars in the rationalist tradition are in this camp (Fearon 1995,

Schultz 2001, Kydd 2005). Constructivist scholars often take the opposite view, conceiving of preferences as evolving out of processes of interaction (Wendt 1999, Finnemore and Sikkink (2001)). These scholars address the question of preference origins most directly, and often see them as deriving from socially constructed identities.

As an empirical matter, these diﬀering views of preference origins are diﬃcult to disentangle. States may act for security reasons, material gain, or due to some understanding of what constitutes fairness, among other motivations. They may view the disputed territory as historically connected to their nations,

2 or believe that unjust actions by their adversaries merit punishment (Stein 2015). But what evidence could demonstrate whether a particular conﬂict is truly driven by a disagreement about what is fair or by a simple desire for more of disputed goods? Disagreements about fairness often result in material claims.

Claims for material goods must often be cloaked in demands for some form of justice. Even conflict participants themselves may not evaluate the true sources of their own motivations correctly. Actors may be convinced they are acting on strategic grounds even when their affective response to the situation is the more important explanation for behavior (Haidt 2001). Conversely, self-interest sometimes influences actors’ affective responses and understandings of fairness (Messick and Sentis 1979, Dawes and Thaler 1988,

195, Rabin 1998, 16). Thus, because individuals and states may act for many reasons, often have incentives to hide their true motivations for political purposes, and may not even understand the true drivers of their own actions, it is diﬃcult to isolate the true motivational processes that are at work. Observable shifts in conduct can rarely be assigned to shifts in preferences because strategic calculations and cognitive biases often provide plausible alterative accounts.

In this article, we show experimentally that preferences are indeed endogenous to the conﬂict process, and that they derive in important ways from non-material aspects of situations. Shifts in preferences occur as a result of factors that are not the result of strategic calculations. Instead, these shifts are best explained by individuals’ understandings of what constitutes justice for a group with which they identify. Perceived injustices that result in indignation produce a desire for concessions for concessions’ sake. Understandings of fairness are in turn mediated by aﬀective responses to the political framing of events.

The inﬂuence of emotions on international relations is a subject of growing interest. Scholars have argued that emotion can be wielded strategically as part of diplomatic signaling (Hall 2011, Hall and Ross

2015, Hall 2015, Wong 2015) and that, for example, signaling contrition and remorse for past actions might help build trust between nations (Lind 2011). Emotions play a role in the fundamental processes of international aﬀairs, such as establishing deterrence, building political inﬂuence, peacebuilding, and

3 securing adherence to international norms (Crawford 2000). Beyond the expediency of emotional appeals for political actors, however, other scholars have examined the role that emotions play in political decision making, including how emotions mold political perceptions and beliefs (Mercer 2010). Indeed, political analysts and neuro-scientists alike are increasingly identifying the substantial inﬂuences that pre-conscious processes and emotions exert on all elements of political cognition (Marcus 2000, Barrett 2006, Ross 2013).

In politics, as in all else, emotions are part of the processes through which people confront uncertainty and navigate change (Angie et al. 2011, Druckman & McDermott 2008). Accordingly, collective emotions appear to play a signiﬁcant role in shaping political attitudes and thus, also, in perpetuating conﬂicts

(Bar Tal 2013, Volkan 1988). Some scholars have, as a result, sought to measure the impact of emotions on political attitudes and whether collective emotions can be regulated to promote conﬂict resolution

(Halperin 2011, Cohen-Chen 2013).

Emotions operate as a means of appraisal whose influence may exceed that of deliberative processes, particularly when it comes to the adoption of ends, as opposed to the means of achieving them. The vast majority of information processing is done pre-consciously and non-cognitively, with the brain processing up to 11 million pieces of information unconsciously every second, versus 40 processed consciously (Brader and Marcus 2013). Pre-conscious judgments are often transmitted to consciousness via initially-unrefined emotions (Brader and Marcus 2013, Lerner et al. 2003). Initial emotions triggered in response to a stimulus then influence and bound later cognitive evaluation of that stimulus, for example by promoting attention to facts congruent with those emotions or in determining the depth of our cognitive processing (Renshon and Lerner 2010, Brader and Marcus 2013). Thus, much of the appraisals that we perform occur first outside of consciousness until the result is felt as an emotion (Spezio and Adolphs 2007, Stein 2008, Moll and de Oliveira-Souza 2007).

Moral and political judgments are subject to these unseen emotional inﬂuences (Horberg et al. 2009,

2011, Damasio 2008, Gordon and Arian 2001, Bargh 1997, Murphy and Zajonc, 1993). Manipulating

4 the emotions triggered by political communication has an impact on how the content of that message is then evaluated (Petty et al. 2001). Moreover, people tend to adjust their attitudes to fit their emotional responses (Petty et al. 2001, Haidt 2001, Haidt and Joseph 2004). By triggering specific emotions, then, one might be able to change the way populations respond to political information (Brader 2006, 18). For instance, even incidental anxious arousal (i.e., arousal that is induced via stimuli unrelated to the object of evaluation) has an appreciable effect on attitudes regarding immigration policy (Renshon, Lee and Tingley

2015).

Researchers have started to map the varying eﬀects of discrete emotions on political cognition (Nabi

2002, Nabi 2010), and a growing literature employs this neuroscience research to explore how collective emotion regulation may serve as a means to help resolve intractable conflicts. In one study, subjects’ willingness to have direct contact with members of a rival group increased when anxiety with respect to the conflict was reduced by informing subjects that the other group’s behavior was malleable and liable to be improved with time (Halperin et al. 2014). Other research suggests that hope for the future induced in subjects via the manipulation of beliefs regarding the conflict leads to a higher willingness to make political concessions (Cohen-Chen et al. 2013).

Appeals to pre-conscious, emotional judgment – in order to influence political attitudes – have been achieved via survey experiment treatments that alter the framing and the emotional priming associated with presented political facts (Lecheler et al. 2013, DeSteno 2004). Scholars have also shown that emotions mediate the effect of decision frames and thereby influence decision making under risk, including with respect to political attitudes regarding compromise: enthusiasm, inter alia, correlates with risk-seeking behavior while anxiety correlates with risk aversion (Druckman and McDermott 2008). Negative emotions such as revulsion and anger may also increase risk-seeking behavior. Anger has, in addition, been shown to produce increased reliance on heuristics and reflexive processing (Griskevicius and Neufeld 2010). In lab experiments, subjects experiencing anger further showed a preference for punitive policies – immediate

5 retribution toward those responsible for a social problem – over more eﬀective reparative or preventative alternatives (Gault and Sabini 2000). Similarly, in another study, anger in respondents predicted support for war as a response for terrorism (Cheung-Blunden et al. 2008)

Disgust and distaste have, like anger to which they are related, been shown to exert a significant influence on later moral evaluation when they are induced. In particular, they amplify the perceived salience of negative facts, leading to harsher moral judgments (Ivan 2015, Eskine et al. 2011, Horberg et al. 2009, Schnall et al., 2008, Ugazio et al., 2012, Wheatley and Haidt 2005). Revulsion has thus been shown to negatively affect political attitudes regarding out-groups (Hodson and Costello 2007) and to strengthen dehumanizing biases and violent behavior toward out-group members (Buckells and Trapnell

2013, Matsumoto et al. 2015).

Emotions also mediate perceptions of fairness of material outcomes. For example, experiments have shown that induced positive emotions correlated with perceptions that price increases were fair while, in contrast, other experiments demonstrated that participants in an ultimatum game were more likely to make fair oﬀers and to reject unfair oﬀers when in a negative mood (Heussler et al. 2009, Forgas and Tan

2013). Feelings of disgust have been shown to signiﬁcantly increase sensitivity to unfairness and rejection of unfair outcomes (Moretti and Pellegrino 2010).

Perceptions of fairness in turn shape foreign policy attitudes by serving as an evaluation heuristic (Albin

2001, Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005). For example, survey respondents who reported prioritizing fairness as one of their moral foundations were more likely to support cooperative internationalist policies as well as internationalism involving the use of force (Kertzer et al. 2014, Kertzer and Rathbun 2015). Fairness perceptions have been found to inﬂuence international economic (Kapstein 2006, 2008) and legal (Franck

1995) relations. More equitable agreements are more durable (Druckman and Albin 2011) and procedurally fair processes make compromise easier to attain (Albin and Druckman 2012). In the Palestinian-Israeli context itself, a study of Israeli attitudes demonstrates that perceptions of Palestinian blameworthiness

6 correlate with preferences for punitive policies (Pickett et al. 2014).

Thus, although international political negotiations center on material matters, there is a long tradition of scholarship demonstrating that resistance to compromise and willingness to employ violence are strongly inﬂuenced by emotional factors. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that humans engage in a strong form of reciprocity that relates to an emotional reaction that goes beyond strategic calculation. Theoretically, under plausible assumptions about conditions prevalent during human evolution, the trait for cooperating with cooperators and punishing defectors becomes ubiquitous in populations

(Bowles and Gintis 1999, Gintis 2000, Sethi and Somanathan 2000 and 2001). Empirically, many experimental studies demonstrate behavior consistent with reciprocity, even at personal cost. Ulimatum game participants regularly reject low offers even though the rationalist equilibrium implies acceptance (Güth and Tietz 1990, Roth 1995, Camerer and Thaler 1995). It is noteworthy that rates of rejection of offers vary little across cultures because individuals understand local fairness expectations and adjust their offers accordingly (Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir 1991). Reciprocity at personal cost has also been demonstrated experimentally in other strategic contexts, including public goods games (Isaac, Walker and

Williams 1994, Fehr and G¨achter 2000). In fact, across a wide range of contexts, actors are willing to pay costs to punish those who have done them harm or who violate norms of justice (Giacalone and Greenberg

1997, Rabin 1993, Blount 1995, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999, Falk and Fischbacher 1999, Levine

1998). If negotiating adversaries are perceived as acting fairly, actors are more willing to compromise

(Tyler 1988, Casper, Tyler and Fisher 1988, Landls and Goodstein 1986, Lind and Tyler 1988). Dealing honestly and following ethical principles in conduct are central to evaluations of fairness (Tyler 1988).

History is full of cases of group violence carried out as revenge for unjust treatment. Ethnic violence is usually accompanied by a narrative of righting past wrongs committed by the attacked group. For instance,

U.S. cities experience riots connected to perceptions of systematic injustice towards racial or ethnic groups.

Following brutal treatment by Serb forces, Kosovo Albanian groups executed ethnic Serbs and suspected

7 collaborators in the years after the Kosovo War. German atrocities against Jews in the 1930s and 40s were rooted in part in revenge narratives, as was the mass rape of German women following the World

War. Revenge motivations may have contributed to the German decision to fight the Second World War following the humiliating settlement imposed after the first (Keynes 2013, Barnhart 2015, 2016a,b) and the need for vengeance is a contributing factor in many other cases of international conflict (Stein 2015).

Thus, individuals will feel indignant and seek to punish those whom they perceive to have intended to harm them without cause or commit injustice against them. We deﬁne indignation as a state involving anger, disgust and contempt that is evoked in observers by agents who “intentionally and without provo- cation or adequate reason, [cause] a victim to suﬀer harm” (Kahneman and Sunstein 2007, 10, Rozin et. al

1999). Thus, indignation differs from mere anger in that it also involves an element of moral disgust at the behavior and contempt for its authors and, therefore, is an emotion that promotes retributive or punitive action. Our view is consistent with the account in Gries (2005), according to which indignation is associated with a loss of dignity and a need to restore it. In the context of negotiating agreements, we expect indignation to imply that individuals will seek harsher terms and be less willing to compromise following perceived injustices. An implication is that the difficulty of finding compromises in long-running conflicts is not merely a function of exogenous preferences and strategic factors, but is determined endogenously by affective processes of the conflict.

The emotional dynamics of the response to perceived injustice go well beyond a desire to recover what was lost, however (Levy 1992). Actors often seek to punish and this seems to have a relationship regulating function in humans and other social animals. This response relates to an immediate emotional reaction, to further analysis or rationalization of the rightness of the action (Haidt 2001), and to means-ends analysis of the most eﬀective method. In fact, most violence committed across levels of social aggregation may be

“moral” in the sense of done to right an injustice in the eyes of the perpetrator of violence (Fiske and Rai

2014). In the Palestinian-Israeli context itself, Ginges et al. (2007), Ginges et al. (2011), and Ginges and

8 Atran (2009) show that moral motives, rather than eﬀectiveness, predict Israeli settler support for violence.

These considerations lead us to the expectation that the preferences of individuals following perceived injustice will be strongly influenced by the need to see that the offending party is punished and that this will be evaluated in large part through social cues rather than objective measures. We further expect that individuals will closely identify with political groups in long-running conflicts such as that between Israelis and Palestinians (Bar Tal 2013). These conflicts are more likely to be characterized by rigid us/them divides and group-strengthening behavior that heightens automatic emotional responses to events (Greenwald and

Pettigrew 2014). On an emotional level, group welfare becomes entangled with personal welfare, and perceived threats to the group (or the extant moral order) are emotionally received as threats to individual security (Bar Tal 2013, 82, Leege and Wald 2007, Volkan 2014, Halperin 2011). Thus, injustice and its appropriate response will be evaluated in group terms.

Empirically distinguishing between preferences that derive from material factors and those that derive from psychological and emotional dynamics is not simple, however. Emotions can cause actors to develop stronger attachments to the material goods in dispute. Thus, the simple desire for more may appear to be at the heart of disputes when in fact aﬀective processes have created the situation in which more is preferred to peaceful compromise.

We address these issues in several ways. First, we hold the material outcome constant while demonstrating that framings that influence perceptions of fairness have substantial effects on approval of a dispute settlement. We expect approval to be lower when framings that evoke indignation about the behavior of an adversary in the past interact with the framing of a settlement as a concession. We refer to this as the Scales of Justice Hypothesis. In evaluating it, we show that moral considerations are the principle mediators of this effect. Next, we test whether the changes in approval that result from changes in material conditions of a settlement are also strongly mediated by fairness evaluations. We refer to this as the

9 Fairness Mediation of Material Change Hypothesis.1

Scales of Justice Hypothesis: When a negotiating adversary is framed as acting unjustly, the framing of a settlement as a concession imposed on that side will increase the perception of fairness, and therefore also approval, of the settlement, holding the material outcome constant.

Fairness Mediation of Material Change Hypothesis: Approval of settlements will be substantially determined by judgments of the fairness. Marginally better material outcomes elicit higher approval because they are judged more fair.

The Scales of Justice Hypothesis contrasts with the argument in Hassner (2009) that the indivisibility of Jerusalem’s Temple Mount is an inherent quality of that space, the fruit of “fundamental social facts”

– such as competing religious attachments – that leaders “cannot easily deﬁne and redeﬁne” (Hassner

2009, 10-11). Accordingly, Hassner argues that tensions over Jerusalem will “erupt as soon as one party perceives changes in the balance of power” over its holy spaces (Hassner 2009, 24), leaving little hope that a negotiated settlement over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem can ever be reached.2 Our hypothesis is more consistent with the argument in Goddard (2009, 18, 39), which views indivisibility as constructed through legitimating political rhetoric. Goddard thus asks whether Jerusalem’s indivisibility can be undone by the rhetoric of well-placed actors (Ibid., 207). For such rhetoric endorsing compromise to be perceived as

1Note that this is also consistent with the literature that shows that the fairness of a procedure is evaluated in terms of the fairness of the outcome (Lind, Kanfer and Earley 1990, Van den Bos et al. 1997, Van den Bos 1999). More favorable individual outcomes are judged to have been arrived through more fair processes. This constitutes a form of bias in individual evaluations of fairness (Messick and Sentis 1979, Dawes and Thaler 1988, 195, Rabin 1998, 16).

2Svensson (2007) also argues that territorial disputes anchored in religious claims lead to perceptions of indivisibility and are much less likely to be resolved via negotiation.

10 legitimate, Goddard theorizes that it must emanate from leaders centrally located in salient “social and cultural networks” (Ibid., 19). We ask how the induced perception of an adversary as acting unjustly, which is related to the elite framing of events (Berinsky 2009), inﬂuences population preferences over the forms of an acceptable settlement.3

Experimental Design

To analyze these issues, we conducted a large-scale experiment on a representative sample of Israeli Jews (N

= 1,960). The experiment, which was embedded in an opinion poll, presented respondents with hypothetical negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel whereby the sides agreed to a two state solution that would divide Jerusalem, including the Old City, and determine sovereignty over the Temple Mount or

Haram al-Sharif, a site holy to both Jews and Muslims. Our treatments randomized (1) whether Israel or the Palestinian Authority were described as forced to concede to divided sovereignty over the Temple Mount, although the divided-sovereignty outcome was constant in both treatments and (2) whether indignation was induced in respondents by reporting statements by Palestinian leaders praising violence against Israeli citizens. We also included a control condition (12% of respondents), which does not frame either side as having imposed a concession and does not include the indignation treatment, and a treatment with an objectively better outcome from the standpoint of Israeli negotiators (8% of respondents). In the latter condition, Israel keeps full sovereignty over the Temple Mount. After describing the negotiations and their outcomes, we asked whether participants in the survey approved, disapproved or felt indiﬀerent about the outcome, on a 5-point scale. In order to control for the inﬂuence of the treatments on perceptions that the sides would faithfully execute the deal, we informed respondents that monitors from Egypt, Jordan and

3Goddard argues that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, due to his lack of ties to Islamist groups, cannot legitimize any division of Jerusalem’s holy spaces by himself (Ibid., 26). We do not investigate the diﬀering impacts of diﬀerently positioned political and religious elites, but highlight this as a topic for future research.

11 Distribution of Treatments Among Respondents

the United States would guarantee and enforce the agreement.4

Outcome 1 – Control Group (12% of respondents)

- Shared sovereignty over Temple Mount; Jewish right of prayer - No concession framing, no indignation treatment

Outcome 1 – Fully Crossed

Palestinian Israeli

Concession Concession

20% of 20% of

respondents respondents

Indignation Indignation

Treatment

Concession No No

20% of 20% of

respondents respondents

Treatment Indignation Indignation

Outcome 2 – Better Objective Outcome (8% of respondents)

- Israeli sovereignty over Temple Mount; Jewish right of prayer - No concession framing, no indignation treatment

Figure 1. Distribution of Treatments Among Respondents.

We also asked a series of other questions following the vignettes. These were designed to measure the factors that mediate the eﬀects of the treatments and to more precisely establish the theoretical mechanisms at work. Here we focused in particular on whether the treatments inﬂuenced perceptions of fairness or perceptions of the side’s prospects in negotiations. Thus, we asked whether respondents viewed the settlement as fair, whether it should be considered for economic reasons, and whether it was the best deal available. We asked in addition whether respondents believed the deal would be faithfully executed due to the presence of international monitors. These mediators are discussed further below.

4Note that Egypt and Israel have been cooperating openly on anti-terrorism eﬀorts.

12 The experiment was ﬁelded in October and November 2015, a period of heightened violence, including stabbings and car ramming attacks, as well as other violence triggered by tensions over the Temple Mount, both within Israeli cities and in the West Bank. Thus, our survey examined Israeli attitudes regarding

Jerusalem as a live issue in the midst of a volatile, emotionally raw moment. We avoid the problem of non-attitudes and other pitfalls of posing hypothetical scenarios in survey research by asking respondents about matters that deeply concern them, sticking closely to plausible scenarios of which participants are well aware.

The experiment, conducted in Hebrew, began by emphasizing that the researchers were not associated with either of the parties. We then presented respondents with a scenario whereby during recent secret talks, the US, Israel and the Palestinian Authority discussed a division of Jerusalem as part of a permanent peace agreement between Israel and a new, sovereign State of Palestine. We described the division of

Jerusalem envisaged by the deal: Israel would get Jewish neighbourhoods and Palestine would get Arab neighbourhoods; the Old City would be divided in half, with the Christian and Muslim quarters going to Palestine, and the Jewish and Armenian Quarters going to Israel; Israel would retain control of the

Western Wall. The full text of the experiment appears in the appendix.

To investigate the eﬀects of indignation on willingness to make concessions for peace, we randomized whether we informed respondents of actual, recent statements by Palestinian leaders associating the national Palestinian cause with acts of violence against Israeli civilians. This approach is consistent with psychology studies that ask study participants to read news articles to prime emotional states (Johnson and Tversky 1983, DeSteno et al. 2000, Wegener and Petty 1994), and with studies of indignation or outrage in particular (Grobe, Douthitt, and Zepeda 1999, Sandman et al. 1993, Wiedemann, Clauberg, and Schutz 2003). In our experiment, two treatment groups (of 425 respondents each) read that

Critics of negotiations point out that the Palestinian leadership has used violence against civil-

ians as a political tool. Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas has said that terrorists in Israeli

13 jails “did what we, we, ordered them.” In the wake of recent terror attacks in Jerusalem, he

said that Palestinian leaders “welcome every drop of blood spilled in Jerusalem... blood on its

way to Allah. With the help of Allah, every martyr will be in heaven.” Fatah leader and former

Palestinian security chief, Jibril Rajoub has called recent stabbing attacks and murders, such

as that of the Henkin couple, “heroic.” Rajoub echoed other Palestinian leaders, such as former

General Intelligence director in the West Bank Tawﬁk Tirawi, in saying that stabbing attacks

should be turned “into a national strategy.”

Among those being presented with this information, half were told that Israel was forced by Palestinian negotiators to concede to divided sovereignty over the Temple Mount, while the other half were told that the Israeli government forced the Palestinian Authority to concede to the same. Thus, we varied only the framing of one provision of a larger agreement whose other provisions were also listed in the vignette. In all of these cases, the facts of agreement were held constant and were described in precisely the same way.

Those who did not receive the indignation prime also received the concession framing treatments. The concession and indignation treatments were thus fully crossed. The experiment was designed to detect a difference in the effects of the concession framing treatments when indignation was primed and when it was not. Distinguishing this difference in differences required that 80% of respondents be assigned to these four treatments shown in the central box of Figure 1.

To investigate the mechanisms involved, we also considered several potential confounders of our theory that evaluations of the fairness of the outcome were influenced by the treatments and in turn influenced popular approval. Framing the settlement as a defeat for one side may create the impression that the other side has received an objectively better deal. This is an alternative explanation of the impact of the treatments on approval if the effect of the treatment is therefore to cause respondents to believe that

14 material and economic aspects of the agreement are more favorable to one side.5 If this mechanism were the key driver of an effect of the concession framing, we would expect it to be equally strong following both indignation framings. The design of the experiment therefore addresses this issue directly. If the concession framing has a larger impact contingent upon the indignation prime, as we predict, this speaks strongly against this alternative explanation. To investigate this possibility further, in the questions following the survey vignette, participants were asked whether the agreement “should be considered for economic reasons, whether or not it is fair.” We also asked if participants believed that “it is NOT possible for Israel to negotiate a better deal.” If the treatments are affecting participant’s evaluations of material aspects of the deal, this will be reflected in the answers to these questions.

Another potential confounding factor is the impressions the treatments create about whether the deal will be lasting. A forced concession by a negotiating adversary may appear less likely to be carried out.

Alternatively, a forced concession by one’s own side may be believed to invite an adversary to demand more in spite of the current settlement. To account for these possibilities, we checked whether participants believed that the deal would be enforced or lead to further violence against Israel. Participants were asked whether the monitors from Egypt, Jordan and the United States would ensure that “the new Palestinian state is indeed peaceful and does not become a base of terrorism against Israel.” Alongside the question about the fairness of the agreement, these questions were treated as four potential mediators of treatment eﬀects.

5When compromises are framed as being oﬀered by an opponent in a negotiation, those compromises are sometimes

“reactively devalued”; publics caught in conﬂicts approve of concessions more when these concessions are proposed by their own side (Maoz et al. 2002). Past literature has viewed this phenomenon as resulting from a signal about the quality of the agreement rather than an emotional reaction to a social context.

15 Results

The Scales of Justice Hypothesis receives strong support, both in the eﬀect of the treatments on the approval of the settlement, and in the mediation analysis. Approval of a settlement is dependent upon the interaction of the indignation and concession treatments, as Figure 2 shows. Under the indignation treatment, when shared sovereignty over the Temple Mount is described as having been forced upon

Palestinian negotiators rather forced upon Israeli negotiators, approval of the settlement is 9 percentage points higher. This difference is significant at the .01 confidence level using a two-tailed test. In the absence of an indignation prime, approval is actually higher when Israeli negotiators are described as having made a concession, although this difference is not significant. The difference in these differences, demonstrating that the effect of the concession framing is contingent upon indignation, is also significant at the .01 confidence level. These effects are confirmed by regression analysis with demographic controls, available in the Online Appendix.

16 40

Percent Approval Percent 25

20 Israeli Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Concession Concession Concession Concession

No Indignation Indignation Treatment Treatment

Figure 2. Effect of Forcing a Concession.

Changes in the objective provisions of the settlement also inﬂuenced approval. When Israel retains sovereignty over the Temple Mount, settlement approval increases by 10 percentage points over the control condition. This tells us that Israelis are sensitive to this aspect of negotiations, but not why they are so.

To deepen the analysis, we investigated four mechanisms through which the framing and provisions of a settlement might drive public support. Recall that the ﬁrst proposed mechanism concerns what respondents perceive to be fair. We used the responses to construct a scale with ﬁve levels: totally unfair

(0), somewhat unfair (25), neither fair nor unfair (50), somewhat fair (75), or totally fair (100). The next two mechanisms concern the economics and bargaining logic of making a deal. We asked participants both whether the deal should be considered for economic reasons, whether or not it is fair, and whether the deal is the best attainable. The ﬁnal mechanism investigates whether participants trust the agreement would

17 be successfully enforced. We used the answers to these last three questions to construct scales with ﬁve levels: strongly disagree (0), somewhat disagree (25), neither agree nor disagree (50), somewhat agree (75), or strongly agree (100).

As Figure 3 illustrates, under the indignation prime, the concession framing treatment influences all of the mediators. The largest effect is on the perception that the deal is fair. This effect is significant at the .01 level, and all of the other effects are significant at the .05 level. Thus, our expectations about the factors that would mediate the effect on approval are borne out.

Figure 3. Effect of Forcing a Concession on Mediators, Indignation Framing.

How did the mediators aﬀect support for the proposed political deal? To ﬁnd out, we performed a linear regression of approval for the deal on the four mediators. The regression model included demographic controls, including for gender, age bracket, level of education, family situation and income. We also controlled for one attitudinal variable, right-wing political views. Finally, we included indicators for the

18 treatments. Thus, the regression was designed to isolate how beliefs about fairness, economic motivators, trust, quality of the deal and resolvability of the conﬂict itself aﬀect approval of the proposed deal, as outlined. Table 1: Effect of Mediators on Israeli Support for Proposed Settlement

Coefficient Std Error P value

Mediators Deal is fair 0.57 0.03 0.000 Deal is best that can be achieved 0.13 0.02 0.000 Deal should be considered for economic reasons 0.18 0.02 0.000 Deal will be enforced 0.17 0.02 0.000 Controls Treatment (not shown) Political orientation -2.06 0.53 0.000 Income -0.15 0.35 0.669 Education level -0.03 0.07 0.624 Family situation 0.83 0.68 0.222 Age group 0.95 0.38 0.012 Gender 0.31 0.99 0.754

Note: P values are based on a two-tailed test

Table 1. Effect of the Mediators on Settlement Approval.

As Table 1 shows, all four mediators substantially affected support for the proposed deal (with all related coefficients being highly significant). Perceptions of fairness outweighed other considerations, however.

The other mediators, which can be described as material and instrumental considerations (i.e. economic benefits, reliability and quality of the deal) had important but far less significant influences on approval levels of the proposed settlement. The political orientation of respondents also had a dramatic effect on settlement support, as expected.

We use the results from Figure 3 and Table 1 to evaluate the relative importance of the four mediators.

We find that the fairness mediator accounts for about 54% of the total effect of the framing treatment on approval when subjects receive the indignation prime. This result is obtained by first noting that the

19 fraction of Jewish Israeli respondents who consider the deal fair increases 7 points when joint sovereignty

over the Temple Mount is framed as having been forced on the Palestinian side over when it is framed as

forced on the Israeli side. Second, note from Table 1 that a change from considering the deal totally unfair

to considering the deal totally fair is associated with a 57% increase in the likelihood of supporting the

deal. Thus, multiplying .57 ∗ .7 and dividing by the total treatment eﬀect of 9 points yields the fraction

of the treatment eﬀect that is accounted for by the fairness mediator (54%). The two economic mediators

combined account for a little under a quarter of the total eﬀect, and conﬁdence that the deal would be

enforced accounted for another 10%. This analysis is presented in the left-hand column of Table 2.6

Percent of Total Effect Framing Outcome Mediator Treatment Treatment

Fairness 54% 69%

Economic Considerations 14 17

Best Bargaining Outcome 9 5

Enforcement 10 8

Other Mechanisms 14 1

Table 2. Mediator Effects as Percent of Total Effect.

We performed a similar mediation analysis on changes in the actual negotiated outcome from shared

sovereignty to full Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount. As the right hand column of Figure 4 demon-

strates, we ﬁnd strong support for the Fairness Mediation of Material Change Hypothesis. In particular, fairness considerations drive an even greater proportion of the result, over two thirds. This provides ad-

6Note that because we employ linear models, this form of mediation analysis is mathematically equivalent to that recom-

mended in Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010).

20 ditional evidence that even when tangible issues of control are directly at stake in negotiations, a moral calculus, and cues about what constitutes a fair outcome given past history, may drive conﬂict dynamics.

Discussion

The results demonstrate that the framing of a settlement as a compromise forced on one side or the other can have a substantial impact on whether the compromise is palatable. This eﬀect occurs when there is a perception of past injustice committed by a negotiating adversary. We have also provided evidence that this eﬀect is primarily the result of moral considerations rather than inferences made about the attainability, quality or sustainability of the negotiated outcome.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that such effects have prolonged influence in real world conflicts. Outrage at a negotiating adversary’s support for terrorism may trigger the need to force a concession, thereby limiting the set of acceptable negotiated outcomes. Coll (2009) argues that, on the question of control in Kashmir, an agreed settlement between India and Pakistan was abandoned because leaders believed it would be unpopular following perceived Pakistani government complicity in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Similarly, in late 2014, near complete peace talks between the Colombian government and F.A.R.C. rebels – that could have resolved a decades long conflict – were suspended by Colombia after Marxist rebels kidnapped a Colombian general. Among the principle reasons for the suspension appears to have been widespread public outrage. Kydd and Walter (2002) argue that such effects are a rationalist calculation about the ability and willingness of an adversary to exercise control over extremist elements, but this misses the popular and emotional aspects of peace-process dynamics. To the extent that negotiating partners are seen as in control of actions that are perceived to be unjust, emotional reactions require settlements in which the scales of justice are balanced.

One implication is that in conﬂicts that are framed by narratives of indignation, the appearance of negotiating defeat can serve the cause of peace. Political leaders must weigh a tradeoﬀ, however. The

21 appearance of negotiating defeat makes a settlement more palatable to an adversary, but it may also demonstrate weakness or a willingness to compromise and thereby embolden the adversary in the future.

In fact, the appearance of weakness will be blamed for the spoiler attacks attacks that often accompany attempts at settlements (Kydd and Walter 2002), create a post-settlement narrative against making further concessions. Thus, although we do not directly examine these eﬀects here, we believe peacemakers will often need to balance the short-term beneﬁts of the appearance of negotiating defeat against potential longer-term costs, particularly when a full settlement of the ongoing dispute has not been reached.

Since publics take cues about fairness in political contexts from elites (Gottfried and Trager 2016), the elite framing of the behavior of adversaries as illegitimate will have a substantial impact on what is politically possible. Constructing the behavior of an adversary as unjust may be an important tool of popular mobilization for elites in conﬂictual situations. But once undertaken, the range of possible settlements may also be restricted to those that appear as imposition. Of course, restricting the bargaining space through rhetoric that inﬂuences popular reactions to a settlement may also be employed as a negotiating strategy

(Fearon 1994).

How long indignation framings have these effects is an important topic for future research. Political outcomes are evaluated by publics caught in conflict through the lens of their collective memory, which, particularly in apparently intractable conflicts, is often comprised of narratives that highlight adversaries’ immoral character (Bar Tal 2013, 141-149). Thus, a public that has long experienced indignation with respect to a certain adversary is likely to interpret new events in light of that collective memory and to experience indignation again. New, perceived injustices embed themselves in a long narrative of related perceived injustices, and trigger and reinforce emotional pathways (Bar Tal 2013, 221-222). In the case of our experiment, respondents’ indignation was triggered by Palestinian leaders’ recent statements but drew on a longstanding perceptions among the Israeli public. The experiment also demonstrates, however, that these narratives are latent until triggered by specific framings in the moment. Therefore, although these

22 issues merit further study, the evidence suggests that elite cues at critical junctures in peace processes can

facilitate public acceptances of changes to the status quo, even in long-running conﬂicts.

We now turn to the question of what implication these ﬁndings have for rationalist explanations for

war, and in particular for the question of whether negotiated solutions exist that both sides would prefer

to war. The answer depends on whether the sides in a conﬂict occupy a single social space or whether

instead leaders on each side can make statements and frame the conﬂict for their own publics without

opposing publics becoming aware. In certain circumstances, particularly in the distant past, this may have

been possible. The Treaty of Kadesh from 1259 BCE, for instance, is represented slightly diﬀerently in

Hieroglyphics on the walls of Karnak in Egypt and in the Akkadian language on the giant clay tablets

found at the Hittite capital of Hatusha. Both leaders appear to have been attempting to give favorable

signals to their own audiences. Even then, however, the Hittite king knew enough of Egyptian aﬀairs

following the Battle of Kadesh to write to the Pharaoh Ramses II to chastise him for claiming a decisive

victory when the result had been closer to a draw.7

In modern times, the cultural spaces occupied by opposing publics are more uniﬁed. For instance,

Palestinian oﬃcials’ statements in support of violence have often been used by Israeli opponents of peace talks to argue that Palestinian leaders cannot be trusted, and have thus had an impact on Israeli perceptions of the peace process. One such politically salient moment came less than a week after signing the Cairo

Accord of 1994. While speaking in a mosque in South Africa, Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman and later President of the Palestinian National Authority Yasser Arafat called on Muslims to join a “Jihad” to liberate Jerusalem and compared the accords he had just signed to Mohammed’s temporary, tactical pact with the Quraysh Jewish tribe.8 This speech was later replayed on Israeli radio and led to much public

7Kitchen (1999, v. II, 13).

8The full speech is available at http://www.textﬁles.com/politics/arafat.txt.

23 criticism of Israel’s government for engaging in talks with President Arafat at all.9 He, in turn, argued that he had referred to a peaceful jihad, but Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s Prime Minister, dismissed this explanation, said President Arafat had caused a “crisis of trust” between Israel and the Palestinian leadership that threatened the new peace process, and demanded that Arafat publicly aﬃrm his commitment to peace.10

Similar episodes have recurred, and the present Israeli government has made Palestinian “incitement” of violence a central focus of its characterization of the Palestinian leadership. It appears that partly for this reason, in recent polls, a strong majority of Israelis indicate that, despite wanting peace talks to resume, they do not trust Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas.11

Thus, it is important in the modern world to consider the bargaining dynamics when leaders speak to all when they speak to their own. To facilitate these considerations, we present results from a companion experiment conducted in Arabic on a representative sample of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

Due to the controversial nature of the topic, a large number of households either declined to be interviewed at all or refused to listen to the survey vignette. This left us with a sample of 384 households that answered the survey and passed checks demonstrating that they had followed the survey vignette. This population of respondents does not diﬀer substantially on demographic measures from the total Palestinian population or from the total population that we attempted to interview, but we nevertheless consider the results obtained as illustrative of what such experiments might discover rather representative of the true preferences in the population. Further information about this experiment can be found in online Appendix A.

The West Bank and Gaza experiment used the same vignettes and treatments, but we did not specif- ically prime for indignation in the Palestinian context. Both experiments also included a treatment, not discussed above, which informed participants that the settlement had been supported by Palestinian reli-

9New York Times, May 20, 1994, “Rabin Says Arafat’s ‘Jihad’ Remark Set Back Peace Eﬀort.”

10New York Times, May 20, 1994, “Israel Demands Arafat Reaﬃrm Peace Accord.”

11See the The Peace Index poll from January 2016, available here: http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=301.

24 gious authorities. The results of this treatment in both populations form part of the discussion below.

50% 60%

48% 50%

46% 40%

44% 30%

42% 20%

40% 10% Israeli Israeli Palestinian Palestinian Concession; Concession; Concession; Concession; No Endorsement Endorsement No Endorsement Endorsement

Israeli Approval Palestinian Approval

Figure 5. Implied Leader Preferences.

To see how the political framing of a settlement in a uniﬁed cultural space relates to rationalist explanations for conﬂict, consider Figure 5. Here, we represent leader incentives to compromise as corresponding to popular approval of a settlement (Tomz 2007, Trager and Vavreck 2011, Kertzer and Brutger 2015,

Gottfried and Trager 2016). If the Israeli population is primed by elites with the indignation treatment, what leader incentives are implied? The solid line in the Figure represents Israeli approval of a settlement under diﬀerent treatment conditions with outcomes ordered such that approval is increasing. First, notice that as it is drawn, the mapping from outcomes to approval is not characterized by global risk aversion.

This violates the traditional assumption guarantying the existence of a negotiated solution that both sides prefer to war (Fearon 1995). In fact, when conﬂicts center on political framing and categorical outcomes, the concept of risk aversion is incoherent because negotiations are not over amounts of a commodity, which means there is no natural understanding of a “distance” between outcomes - as there may be in the case of territorial outcomes (O’Neill 2001a). We also have no reason to expect, however, that this assumption

25 would hold in an approximated or altered fashion.12 To see why, consider two goods that two players could posses or not posses and suppose utilities are additive and separable. Assuming adjacent points are equidistant, it is then impossible for both monotonicity and concavity to hold. To see why, suppose the ﬁrst player cares more about good A than good B, so u1(1, 0) > u1(0, 1). For Player 1’s utility to be increasing over the whole issue space, the ordering of outcomes must then be (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1). In intuitive terms, this violates concavity because the point u1(0, 1) lies below the line between the points on either side. Thus, when there are a series of categorical factors that frame the desirability of a settlement, such as which side is perceived to have forced a concession and which political elites endorse it, there is no reason to expect, a priori, that a settlement exists that both sides prefer to conﬂict.

The dashed line in Figure 5 represents Palestinian approval at the same settlement outcomes. Notice that Palestinian approval is non-monotonic, again violating the assumptions of traditional models. This form of violation of the traditional assumptions guaranteeing a mutually preferred negotiated solution will also be the norm, not the exception, in contests over framing and categorical outcomes. Loosely speaking, monotonicity will be violated (in every ordering of categorical outcomes) whenever one side cares much more about one aspect of an outcome than the other side does. This implies that the sides’ preference orderings over outcomes are not mirror images.

Following Fearon (1995), most formal international relations scholarship models conﬂict as a costly lottery over extreme points in a bargaining space. The side that wins, in other words, can choose its most preferred bargaining outcome.13 This assumption appears reasonable when material goods are at issue, but it too may not make sense when the framing of potential settlements is a primary object of negotiations.

12To consider these matters more formally, we need to deﬁne the the set of outcomes as a metric space. If the points are represented on a line according to the Figure 5 ordering with unit distances between adjacent points, the mapping is not globally concave, as the Figure illustrates.

13See, for example, Kydd (2005), Schultz (2001), Trager (2015, forthcoming).

26 The principal reason is that the same set of settlement options that is available to the parties before the

conﬂict is not available, or may not be relevant, after the conﬂict is fought. Beforehand, a settlement

may be acceptable to both sides if it is endorsed by certain political or cultural elites; afterward, those

endorsements have a diﬀerent meaning. As Figure 5 illustrates, the settlement that maximizes Israeli

approval involves the endorsement of Palestinian religious ﬁgures, but this does not correspond to the

low-point of Palestinian approval. If the Palestinian side loses a conﬂict, it would not make sense to view

Palestinian leadership preferences over the outcome as comparable to a peaceful settlement endorsed by

Palestinian religious authorities, discounted by some ﬁxed cost of conﬂict. Rather, defeat involves its own

set of elite framings and material conditions inﬂuencing elite preferences.

Thus, the traditional rationalist assumptions should only be expected to hold when the sides are

disputing amounts of goods that both sides want. When preferences are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by political

framings, there is no reason to expect opposite preferences over this expanded set of outcomes, much

less global risk aversion. In fact, these common rationalist assumptions are unlikely to hold, even in an

approximate form, when a series of discrete material questions are negotiated, and for some of the same

reasons given above. Conceiving of a conﬂict as a lottery over outcomes in the bargaining space may also

misrepresent what political actors care about - and what drives the conﬂict - ex ante.

The implication of these observations is not that rationalist theory has no role to play when non- material framings of settlements are an important aspect of negotiations between political elites. On the contrary, elites may be clear-eyed about what framings would be acceptable, and thus elite bargaining may be well described by rationalist theories. But it may be that in models of conﬂict processes, relaxing the three common assumptions described here - monotonicity, global risk aversion, and conﬂict as a lottery over bargaining extremes - will yield theory that more closely tracks political processes.

27 Conclusion

Constructivists tend to emphasize aspects of identity that are malleable as a result of social processes that occur over long time scales. Socialization of one sort is thought to lead to an identity that implies one set of policy preferences, while socialization of another sort produces leaders of an entirely different stripe. The results presented here demonstrate that the construction of the political context of peace settlements also happens on abbreviated time-scales. In moments when a negotiated solution to a conflict appears possible, what elites say about the past actions of opposing leaders has a significant effect on what settlements the public will accept. These findings also show the importance of the construction of the adversary rather than the self. Not just one’s own identity, but one’s image of one’s adversary, determines foreign policy preferences.

On this account, framings of a dispute that engender indignation are constituent elements of issue indivisibility. Like the staking of a bargaining reputation or a public statement that engenders audience costs, these narratives of the past can be used for bargaining leverage. They influence the sorts of settlements that are acceptable. Beyond their influence on the material facts of the settlement, however, they influence the political forms that it can take. Indignation creates an emotional need to balance the international political scales of justice, and this need promotes behavior that may be contrary to direct material self-interest. As a result, those who want peace should resist the demonization of an adversary.

Those who want a better objective outcome for their side should understand that in contests where the emotions and narratives of indignation have been engaged, the political framing of a settlement can be traded for material concessions. Peace may require the appearance of negotiating defeat.

The fact that political and societal actors create these narratives and choose how and when to engage them for political purposes provides hope that political agency may overcome apparent indivisibilities. In these processes, the emotional states of the moment create a reciptivity to settlements or a lack thereof,

28 even in populations that are already embedded in conﬂict narratives. As revolutions are said to appear impossible beforehand and inevitable afterwards, solving long-running conﬂicts may appear impossible until actors alter taken-for-granted social facts for the long-run through the emotional appeals of the moment.

29 References

Albin, Cecilia. 2001. Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Albin, Cecilia and Daniel Druckman. 2012. “Equality matters: Negotiating an end to civil wars.” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution p. 0022002711431798.

Angie, Amanda D, Shane Connelly, Ethan P Waples and Vykinta Kligyte. 2011. “The inﬂuence of discrete emotions on judgement and decision-making: A meta-analytic review.” Cognition & Emotion 25(8):1393– 1422.

Armﬁeld, Jason Mathew and Harry Francis Akers. 2010. “Risk perception and water ﬂuoridation support and opposition in Australia.” Journal of public health dentistry 70(1):58–66.

Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2013. Intractable conﬂicts: Socio-psychological foundations and dynamics. Cambridge University Press.

Barnhart, Joslyn N. 2015. “Status Competition and Territorial Aggresssion: Evidence from the Scramble for Africa.” Security Studies Forthcoming.

Barnhart, Joslyn N. 2016a. “The Consequences of Defeat: Military Failure and State Aggression.” Working Paper .

Barnhart, Joslyn N. 2016b. “Status Threat, Recovery and Third-Party Aggression.” Working Paper .

Barrett, Lisa Feldman. 2006. “Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience of emotion.” Personality and social psychology review 10(1):20–46.

Berinsky, Adam J. 2009. In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Brader, Ted. 2006. Campaigning for hearts and minds: How emotional appeals in political ads work. University of Chicago Press.

Brader, Ted and George E Marcus. 2013. “Emotion and Political Psychology.” The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology 2:165–204.

30 Brader, Ted and Nicholas A Valentino. 2007. “Identities, interests, and emotions: Symbolic versus Material wellsprings of fear, anger, and enthusiasm.” The aﬀect eﬀect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior pp. 180–201.

Buckels, Erin E and Paul D Trapnell. 2013. “Disgust facilitates outgroup dehumanization.” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations p. 1368430212471738.

Casper, Jonathan D, Tom Tyler and Bonnie Fisher. 1988. “Procedural justice in felony cases.” Law and Society Review pp. 483–507.

Cassino, Dan and Milton Lodge. 2007. “The primacy of affect in political evaluations.” The affect effect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior pp. 101–123.

Chen, Mark and John A Bargh. 1997. “Nonconscious behavioral conﬁrmation processes: The self-fulﬁlling consequences of automatic stereotype activation.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33(5):541– 560.

Cheung-Blunden, Violet and Bill Blunden. 2008. “The emotional construal of war: Anger, fear, and other negative emotions.” Peace and Conﬂict 14(2):123–150.

Cohen-Chen, Smadar, Eran Halperin, Richard J Crisp and James J Gross. 2013. “Hope in the Middle East malleability beliefs, hope, and the willingness to compromise for peace.” Social Psychological and Personality Science p. 1948550613484499.

Crawford, Neta C. 2000. “The passion of world politics: Propositions on emotion and emotional relationships.” International Security 24(4):116–156.

Dafoe, Allan, Jonathan Renshon and Paul Huth. 2014. “Reputation and status as motives for war.” Available at SSRN 2332048 .

Damasio, Antonio. 2008. Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. Random House.

Dawes, Robyn M and Richard H Thaler. 1988. “Anomalies: cooperation.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives pp. 187–197.

31 DeSteno, David, Richard E Petty, Derek D Rucker, Duane T Wegener and Julia Braverman. 2004. “Discrete emotions and persuasion: the role of emotion-induced expectancies.” Journal of personality and social psychology 86(1):43.

DeSteno, David, Richard E Petty, Duane T Wegener and Derek D Rucker. 2000. “Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: the role of emotion speciﬁcity.” Journal of personality and social psychology 78(3):397.

Druckman, Daniel and Cecilia Albin. 2011. “Distributive Justice and the Durability of Negotiated Agree- ments.” Review of International Studies 37(3):1137–1168.

Druckman, James N and Rose McDermott. 2008. “Emotion and the framing of risky choice.” Political Behavior 30(3):297–321.

Eskine, Kendall J, Natalie A Kacinik and Jesse J Prinz. 2011. “A bad taste in the mouth gustatory disgust inﬂuences moral judgment.” Psychological Science 22(3):295–299.

Fearon, James D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” American Political Science Review 88(3):577–92.

Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49(3):379–414.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. “Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics.” Annual review of political science 4(1):391–416.

Fiske, Alan Page and Tage Shakti Rai. 2014. Virtuous Violence: Hurting and Killing to Create, Sustain, End, and Honor Social Relationships. Cambridge University Press.

Forgas, Joseph P and Hui Bing Tan. 2013. “Mood effects on selfishness versus fairness: affective influences on social decisions in the ultimatum game.” Social cognition 31(4):504–517.

Franck, Thomas M. 1995. Fairness in International Law and Institutions. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Gault, Barbara A and John Sabini. 2000. “The roles of empathy, anger, and gender in predicting attitudes toward punitive, reparative, and preventative public policies.” Cognition & Emotion 14(4):495–520.

32 Gayer, Corinna Carmen, Shiri Landman, Eran Halperin and Daniel Bar-Tal. 2009. “Overcoming psychological barriers to peaceful conﬂict resolution: The role of arguments about losses.” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution .

Ginges, Jeremy and Scott Atran. 2009. “What motivates participation in violent political action.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1167(1):115–123.

Ginges, Jeremy, Scott Atran, Douglas Medin and Khalil Shikaki. 2007. “Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conﬂict.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(18):7357–7360.

Ginges, Jeremy, Scott Atran, Sonya Sachdeva and Douglas Medin. 2011. “Psychology out of the laboratory: the challenge of violent extremism.” American Psychologist 66(6):507.

Goddard, Stacie E. 2009. “When right makes might: how Prussia overturned the European balance of power.” International Security 33(3):110–142.

Gordon, Carol and Asher Arian. 2001. “Threat and decision making.” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 45(2):196–215.

Gottfried, Matthew S. and Robert F. Trager. 2016. “A Preference for War: How Fairness and Rhetoric Inﬂuence Leadership Incentives in Crises.” International Studies Quarterly .

Greenwald, Anthony G and Thomas F Pettigrew. 2014. “With malice toward none and charity for some: Ingroup favoritism enables discrimination.” American Psychologist 69(7):669.

Griskevicius, Vladas, Michelle N Shiota and Samantha L Neufeld. 2010. “Inﬂuence of diﬀerent positive emotions on persuasion processing: a functional evolutionary approach.” Emotion 10(2):190.

Grobe, Deana, Robin Douthitt and Lydia Zepeda. 1999. “A model of consumers’ risk perceptions toward recombinant bovine growth hormone (rbGH): The impact of risk characteristics.” Risk Analysis 19(4):661–673.

Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. “The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.” Psychological review 108(4):814.

Haidt, Jonathan and Craig Joseph. 2004. “Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues.” Daedalus 133(4):55–66.

33 Hall, Todd H. 2011. “We will not swallow this bitter fruit: Theorizing a diplomacy of anger.” Security Studies 20(4):521–555.

Hall, Todd H. 2015. Emotional Diplomacy: Oﬃcial Emotion on the International Stage. Cornell University Press.

Hall, Todd H and Andrew AG Ross. 2015. “Aﬀective Politics after 9/11.” International Organization 69(04):847–879.

Halperin, Eran. 2011. “Emotional barriers to peace: Emotions and public opinion of Jewish Israelis about the peace process in the Middle East.” Peace and Conﬂict 17(1):22–45.

Halperin, Eran, Smadar Cohen-Chen and Amit Goldenberg. 2014. “Indirect emotion regulation in intractable conﬂicts: A new approach to conﬂict resolution.” European Review of Social Psychology 25(1):1– 31.

Hassner, Ron. 2009. War on Sacred Grounds. New York, NY: Cornell University Press.

Heussler, Tobias, Frank Huber, Frederik Meyer, Kai Vollhardt and Dieter Ahlert. 2009. “Moderating eﬀects of emotion on the perceived fairness of price increases.” Advances in consumer research 36:332–338.

Hodson, Gordon and Kimberly Costello. 2007. “Interpersonal disgust, ideological orientations, and dehumanization as predictors of intergroup attitudes.” Psychological Science 18(8):691–698.

Horberg, EJ, Christopher Oveis, Dacher Keltner and Adam B Cohen. 2009. “Disgust and the moralization of purity.” Journal of personality and social psychology 97(6):963.

Horberg, Elizabeth J, Christopher Oveis and Dacher Keltner. 2011. “Emotions as moral ampliﬁers: An appraisal tendency approach to the inﬂuences of distinct emotions upon moral judgment.” Emotion Review 3(3):237–244.

Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele and Dustin Tingley. 2010. “A general approach to causal mediation analysis.” Psychological methods 15(4):309.

Ivan, Cristina-Elena. 2015. “On Disgust and Moral Judgments: A Review.” Journal of European Psychology Students 6(1).

34 Jervis, Robert. 1992. “Political implications of loss aversion.” Political psychology pp. 187–204.

Johnson, Eric J and Amos Tversky. 1983. “Aﬀect, generalization, and the perception of risk.” Journal of personality and social psychology 45(1):20.

Kapstein, Ethan B. 2006. Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Toward a Level Playing Field. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kapstein, Ethan B. 2008. “Fairness Considerations: Lessons from International Trade Negotiations.” 123(2):229–245.

Kertzer, Joshua D and Brian C Rathbun. 2015. “Fair is Fair: Social Preferences and Reciprocity in International Politics.”.

Kertzer, Joshua D, Kathleen E Powers, Brian C Rathbun and Ravi Iyer. 2014. “Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes.” The Journal of Politics 76(03):825–840.

Kertzer, Joshua D and Ryan Brutger. 2015. “Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory.” American Journal of Political Science .

Keynes, John Maynard. 2013. The economic consequences of the peace. Courier Corporation.

Kitchen, Kenneth Anderson. 1999. Ramesside inscriptions. Blackwell.

Kydd, Andrew. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kydd, Andrew and Barbara F Walter. 2002. “Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence.” International Organization 56(02):263–296.

Landls, Jean M and Lynne Goodstein. 1986. “When is justice fair? An integrated approach to the outcome versus procedure debate.” Law & Social Inquiry 11(4):675–704.

Landy, Justin F and Geoﬀrey P Goodwin. 2015. “Does incidental disgust amplify moral judgment? A meta-analytic review of experimental evidence.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 10(4):518–536.

Lecheler, Sophie, Andreas RT Schuck and Claes H de Vreese. 2013. “Dealing with feelings: Positive and negative discrete emotions as mediators of news framing eﬀects.”.

35 Leege, David C and Kenneth D Wald. 2007. “Meaning, cultural symbols, and campaign strategies.” The Aﬀect Eﬀect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior pp. 291–315.

Lerner, Jennifer S, Roxana M Gonzalez, Deborah A Small and Baruch Fischhoff. 2003. “Effects of fear and anger on perceived risks of terrorism a national field experiment.” Psychological science 14(2):144–150.

Levy, Jack S. 1992. “Prospect theory and international relations: Theoretical applications and analytical problems.” Political Psychology pp. 283–310.

Lind, E Allan, Ruth Kanfer and P Christopher Earley. 1990. “Voice, control, and procedural justice: Instrumental and noninstrumental concerns in fairness judgments.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59(5):952.

Lind, E Allan and Tom R Tyler. 1988. The social psychology of procedural justice. Springer Science & Business Media.

Maoz, Ifat, Andrew Ward, Michael Katz and Lee Ross. 2002. “Reactive devaluation of an Israeli vs.Palestinian peace proposal.” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 46(4):515–546.

Maoz, Ifat and Clark McCauley. 2009. “Threat perceptions and feelings as predictors of Jewish-Israeli support for compromise with Palestinians.” Journal of peace research 46(4):525–539.

Maoz, Ifat, Ilan Yaniv and Naama Ivri. 2007. “Decision framing and support for concessions in the Israeli– Palestinian conﬂict.” Journal of Peace Research 44(1):81–91.

Marcus, George E. 2000. “Emotions in politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 3(1):221–250.

Matsumoto, David, Mark G Frank and Hyisung C Hwang. 2015. “The Role of Intergroup Emotions in Political Violence.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 24(5):369–373.

McDermott, Rose. 2001. Risk-taking in international politics: Prospect theory in American foreign policy. University of Michigan Press.

McDermott, Rose. 2004. “Prospect theory in political science: Gains and losses from the ﬁrst decade.” Political Psychology 25(2):289–312.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: University of Chicago Press.

36 Mercer, Jonathan. 2010. “Emotional beliefs.” International organization 64(01):1–31.

Messick, David M and Keith P Sentis. 1979. “Fairness and preference.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 15(4):418–434.

Moll, Jorge and Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza. 2007. “Moral judgments, emotions and the utilitarian brain.” Trends in cognitive sciences 11(8):319–321.

Moretti, Laura and Giuseppe Di Pellegrino. 2010. “Disgust selectively modulates reciprocal fairness in economic interactions.” Emotion 10(2):169.

Murphy, Sheila T and Robert B Zajonc. 1993. “Aﬀect, cognition, and awareness: aﬀective priming with optimal and suboptimal stimulus exposures.” Journal of personality and social psychology 64(5):723.

Nabi, Robin L. 2010. “The case for emphasizing discrete emotions in communication research.” Commu- nication Monographs 77(2):153–159.

Nabi, Robin L, James P Dillard and M Pfau. 2002. “Discrete emotions and persuasion.” The persuasion handbook: Developments in theory and practice pp. 289–308.

O’Neill, Barry. 2001a. “Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory.” International Studies Quarterly 45:617–640.

ONeill, Barry. 2001b. “Risk aversion in international relations theory.” International Studies Quarterly 45(4):617–640.

Petty, Richard E, David DeSteno and Derek D Rucker. 2001. “The role of aﬀect in attitude change.” Handbook of aﬀect and social cognition pp. 212–233.

Pickett, Justin T, Thomas Baker, Christi Metcalfe, Marc Gertz and Rose Bellandi. 2014. “Contact and Compromise Explaining Support for Conciliatory Measures in the Context of Violent Intergroup Con- ﬂict.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency p. 0022427814528182.

Rabin, Matthew. 1998. “Psychology and Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 36(1):11–46.

Renshon, Jonathan and Jennifer S Lerner. 2010. The role of emotions in foreign policy decision making. Technical report Working Paper, Harvard University.

37 Renshon, Jonathan, Jooa Julia Lee and Dustin Tingley. 2015. “Physiological arousal and political beliefs.” Political Psychology 36(5):569–585.

Ross, Andrew AG. 2013. Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conﬂict. University of Chicago Press.

Sandman, Peter M, Paul M Miller, Branden B Johnson and Neil D Weinstein. 1993. “Agency communication, community outrage, and perception of risk: three simulation experiments.” Risk Analysis 13(6):585–598.

Schnall, Simone, Jonathan Haidt, Gerald L Clore and Alexander H Jordan. 2008. “Disgust as embodied moral judgment.” Personality and social psychology bulletin .

Schuetz, Holger and Peter M Wiedemann. 2008. “Framing eﬀects on risk perception of nanotechnology.” Public Understanding of Science .

Schultz, Kenneth. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sethi, Rajiv and Eswaran Somanathan. 2001. “Preference evolution and reciprocity.” Journal of economic theory 97(2):273–297.

Sheafer, Tamir and Shira Dvir-Gvirsman. 2010. “The spoiler eﬀect: Framing attitudes and expectations toward peace.” Journal of Peace Research 47(2):205–215.

Spezio, Michael L and Ralph Adolphs. 2007. “Emotional processing and political judgment: Toward integrating political psychology and decision neuroscience.” The aﬀect eﬀect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior pp. 71–95.

Stein, Janice Gross. 2008. “Foreign policy decision making: rational, psychological, and neurological models.” Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases pp. 101–116.

Stein, Rachel. 2015. “War and Revenge: Explaining Conﬂict Initiation by Democracies.” American Political Science Review 109(3):556–573.

Svensson, Isak. 2007. “Fighting with Faith Religion and Conﬂict Resolution in Civil Wars.” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 51(6):930–949.

38 Tomz, Michael. 2007. “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach.” International Organization 61(4):821–40.

Trager, Robert F. 2015. “Diplomatic Signaling among Multiple States.” The Journal of Politics 77(3):635– 647.

Trager, Robert F. forthcoming. Diplomacy: Communication and Origins of International Order. Cam- bridge University Press.

Trager, Robert F. and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. “The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party.” American Journal Political Science 55(3):526–545.

Tyler, Tom R. 1988. “What is procedural justice-criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal procedures.” Law & Soc’y Rev. 22:103.

Ugazio, Giuseppe, Claus Lamm and Tania Singer. 2012. “The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario.” Emotion 12(3):579.

Van den Bos, Kees. 1999. “What are we talking about when we talk about no-voice procedures? On the psychology of the fair outcome eﬀect.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 35(6):560–577.

Van den Bos, Kees, E Allan Lind, Ri¨elVermunt and Henk A. M. Wilke. 1997. “How do I judge my outcome when I do not know the outcome of others? The psychology of the fair process eﬀect.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72(5):1034–1046.

Volkan, Vamik D. 1988. The need to have enemies and allies: From clinical practice to international relationships. Jason Aronson.

Volkan, Vamik D. 2014. Psychoanalysis, International Relations, and Diplomacy: A Sourcebook on Large- Group Psychology. Karnac Books.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Wegener, Duane T and Richard E Petty. 1994. “Mood management across aﬀective states: the hedonic contingency hypothesis.” Journal of personality and social psychology 66(6):1034.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

39 Wheatley, Thalia and Jonathan Haidt. 2005. “Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe.” Psychological science 16(10):780–784.

Wiedemann, Peter M, Martin Clauberg and Holger Schiitz. 2003. “Understanding ampliﬁcation of complex risk issues: the risk story model applied to the EMF case.” The social ampliﬁcation of risk p. 286.

Wong, Seanon S. 2015. “Emotions and the communication of intentions in face-to-face diplomacy.” Euro- pean Journal of International Relations p. 1354066115581059.

Zartman, William and Guy Faure. 2005. Escalation and Negotiation in International Conﬂicts. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Zellman, Ariel. 2015. “Framing consensus Evaluating the narrative speciﬁcity of territorial indivisibility.” Journal of Peace Research 52(4):492–507.

40 Appendix A: Survey Experiment Text in English

Version 2: Indignation treatment + Palestinian concession.

“The following questions relate to recent negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. You will be asked whether you approve or disapprove of a hypothetical agreement between the two sides. The organization conducting this survey is not associated with either of the parties.

During recent secret talks, the US, Israel and the Palestinian Authority discussed a division of Jerusalem as part of a permanent peace agreement between Israel and a new, sovereign State of Palestine.

Critics of negotiations point out that the Palestinian leadership has used violence against civilians as a political tool. Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas has said that terrorists in Israeli jails "did what we, we, ordered them." In the wake of recent terror attacks in Jerusalem, he said that Palestinian leaders "welcome every drop of blood spilled in Jerusalem… blood on its way to Allah. With the help of Allah, every martyr will be in heaven." Fatah leader and former Palestinian security chief, Jibril Rajoub has called recent stabbing attacks and murders such as that of the Henkin couple “heroic.” Rajoub echoed other Palestinian leaders, such as former General Intelligence director in the West Bank Tawfik Tirawi, in saying that stabbing attacks should be turned "into a national strategy."

Supporters of the negotiations argue that a deal is the best hope for Israeli security over the long-run.

In the most recent negotiations, the Israeli government forced the Palestinian Authority to concede that there will be divided sovereignty over the Temple Mount between Israel and the Palestinians. There will be a new right of prayer on the Temple Mount for Jews.

Other aspects of the latest proposal include that Israel will get Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and Palestine will get Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem. The Old City will be divided in half, with the Christian and Muslim quarters going to Palestine, and the Jewish and Armenian Quarters going to Israel. Israel will retain control of the Western Wall and there will be a right of prayer on the Temple Mount for Jews.

The agreement would be guaranteed and enforced by monitors from Egypt, Jordan and the United States.

41 Questions:

1. If the government of Israel accepted this agreement, would you a) strongly approve b) approve c) neither approve nor disapprove d) disapprove e) strongly disapprove

2. In your view, this agreement is a) Totally fair b) Mostly fair c) Somewhat fair d) Neither fair nor unfair e) Somewhat unfair f) Mostly unfair g) Totally unfair

3. Do you agree that such an agreement should be considered for economic reasons, whether or not it is fair? a) strongly agree b) somewhat agree c) neither agree nor disagree d) somewhat disagree e) strongly disagree

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

4. The monitors from Egypt, Jordan and the United States can be trusted to ensure that the new Palestinian state is indeed peaceful and does not become a base of terrorism against Israel a) strongly agree b) somewhat agree c) neither agree nor disagree d) somewhat disagree e) strongly disagree

5. It is NOT possible for Israel to negotiate a better deal with the PLO than the one described above a) strongly agree b) somewhat agree c) neither agree nor disagree d) somewhat disagree e) strongly disagree

42 Appendix B: Survey Experiment Text in Hebrew

Version 2: Indignation treatment + Palestinian concession.

השאלות הבאות נוגעות לשיחות משא ומתן שהיו לאחרונה בין ישראל לבין הרשות הפלסטינית. בשאלות הבאות אתה תישאל האם אתה מסכים או לא מסכים ל"הסכם תיאורטי" בין הצדדים. למען הסר ספק, הארגון שעומד מאחורי הסקר אינו גוף פוליטי ואינו מזוהה עם אף אחד מהצדדים.

במהלך שיחות חשאיות לאחרונה, ארה"ב, ישראל והרשות הפלסטינית דנו בחלוקה של ירושלים כחלק מהסכם שלום קבוע בין ישראל ובין מדינה פלסטינית ריבונית חדשה.

מבקרים של שיחות המשא ומתן מצביעים על כך שהמנהיגות הפלסטינית השתמשה באלימות נגד אזרחים ככלי פוליטי. הנשיא הפלסטיני מחמוד עבאס (אבו מאזן) אמר שטרוריסטים בכלא הישראלי "ביצעו כפי שאנחנו פקדנו עליהם,... לקיים את חובת ההתנגדות". לאור פיגועי הטרור האחרונים בירושלים, הוא אמר שמנהיגים פלסטינים "מברכים כל טיפת דם שנשפך בירושלים... דם בדרכו לאללה. בעזרתו של אללה, כל קדוש מעונה יהיה בגן עדן". בכיר פת"ח וראש הביטחון המסכל בגדה לשעבר, ג'יבריל רג'וב, כינה את פיגעי הדקירה האחרונים ומעשי רצח כמו זה של הזוג הנקין, כ"גבורה". רג'וב חזר על דברי מנהיגים פלסטינים אחרים, כמו ראש מנגנון המודיעין הכללי הפלסטיני לשעבר, תאופיק טיראווי, באמירתו שפיגועי דקירה צריכים להפוך ל"אסטרטגיה לאומית".

תומכים במשא ומתן טוענים שעסקה היא התקווה הטובה ביותר לביטחון ישראל בטווח הארוך.

בשיחות האחרונות, ממשלת ישראל אילצה את הרשות הפלסטינית להסכים לחלוקת הריבונות בהר הבית בין ישראל ובין הפלסטינים. תהיה זכות תפילה חדשה ליהודים על הר הבית.

היבטים נוספים של ההצעה האחרונה כללו שכונות יהודיות בירושלים תחת ריבונות יהודית, ושכונות ערביות בירושלים תחת ריבונות פלסטינית. העיר העתיקה תהיה חצויה, כאשר הרובע הנוצרי והמוסלמי תחת ריבונות פלסטינית והרובע היהודי והארמני תחת ריבונות ישראלית. הכותל המערבי יישאר בשליטת ישראל ותהיה זכות תפילה חדשה ליהודים על הר הבית.

ההסכם יפוקח וייאכף בידי פקחים ממצריים, ירדן וארה"ב.

43 Questions:

1. בהנחה שממשלת ישראל תקבל את ההסכם הזה, האם אתה: a. תומך במידה רבה מאוד b. תומך במידה רבה c. לא תומך ולא מתנגד d. מתנגד במידה רבה e. מתנגד במידה רבה מאוד 2. בראייתך, האם ההסכם: a. הוגן במידה רבה מאוד b. הוגן במידה רבה c. לא הוגן ולא בלתי הוגן d. בלתי הוגן במידה רבה e. בלתי הוגן במידה רבה מאוד 3. באיזו מידה אתה מסכים לכך שיש לשקול את ההסכם מסיבות כלכליות, בין אם הוא הוגן או לא? a. מסכים במידה רבה מאוד b. מסכים במידה רבה c. לא מסכים ולא מתנגד d. מתנגד במידה רבה e. מתנגד במידה רבה מאוד

אנא דרג באיזו מידה אתה מסכים או מתנגד להצהרות הבאות:

4. אפשר לסמוך על כך שהמשגיחים ממצרים, ירדן וארה"ב יבטיחו שהמדינה הפלסטינית אכן שוחרת שלום ולא הופכת לבסיס לטרור נגד ישראל. a. מסכים במידה רבה מאוד b. מסכים במידה רבה c. לא מסכים ולא מתנגד d. מתנגד במידה רבה e. מתנגד במידה רבה מאוד 5. לא ניתן להגיע להסכם טוב יותר מול הרשות הפלסטינית מזה שתואר קודם לכן. a. מסכים במידה רבה מאוד b. מסכים במידה רבה c. לא מסכים ולא מתנגד d. מתנגד במידה רבה e. מתנגד במידה רבה מאוד

44 Appendix C: Survey Demographics

SAMPLE NAT’L CENSUS

Age Freq. Percent of adult population* 18 to 24 460 18 10 25 to 34 616 24 21 35 to 44 504 20 19 45 to 54 422 17 15 55+ 555 22 34 Gender Male 1249 49 49 Female 1308 51 51 Religiosity Secular 1339 53 43 Traditional 696 27 23 Religious 374 15 24 Ultra Orthodox 148 6 9 Education Level Elementary or less 1 4 1 14 High School, no matric. 208 8 17 High School with matric. 510 20 20 Secondary, no acad. degree. 632 25 17 Bachelor's degree 835 33 32 Graduate degree 345 13 Income Far below avg. 362 14 Below avg. 487 19 Average 743 29 Above avg. 558 21 Not Available Far above avg. 134 5 Refused to answer 273 11

Sample vs. National Census data: Our survey was conducted on an Internet-based panel of Israeli Jews, representatively sampled on the basis of gender, age, religiosity and location of residence.

* The displayed National Census percentage of population that is in the 18 to 24 segment is based on census data regarding 20 to 24 year olds, and thus is in reality likely closer to the sample value of 18. The fact that the sample was Internet based also partially explains why the oldest age segment is underrepresented in our sample and why the youngest segment, ages 18 to 24, is slightly overrepresented.

2014 data, regarding age and gender breakdown, from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/shnatone_new.htm; 2013 data, regarding religiosity and education levels, from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/shnatone_new.htm#7